As I have commented many times, the UOR system itself has, with a small number of exceptions, been a great success, providing all manner of vehicles and equipment across all three services for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. Equally, we all know that the UOR system creates problems for the long term, generally they are not integrated into the fully complete logistics and maintenance system and because they are obtained for a very narrow range of application they might find themselves completely unsuitable for an operation elsewhere.
Post Afghanistan, depending on what that might end up becoming, as the Army transitions to Future Force 2020 or what comes out of the 2015 SDSR, many of these UOR vehicles and items of equipment are going to find themselves subject of a decision.
That decision is quite simply to retain or dispose.
Take CVR(T) 2.0 as an example.
CVR(T) is due to be replaced with FRES SV but with the in service date for FRES SV slipping ever more distant into the future and obviously, not available in Afghanistan, a UOR created the Mark 2 version.
A total of 50 vehicles were ordered for £30m, final deliveries this year, compare this with the development costs of £500m for the development contract alone for FRES SV Scout and a couple of other variants. CVR(T) 2 involved re hulling and adding in a range of additional system and improvements whilst taking many major sub systems from older vehicles. CVR(T) 2.0 is now available in the Scimitar reconnaissance vehicle, Spartan troop carrier, Samson repair and recovery, Sultan command post and Samaritan ambulance variants, all of which have been delivered as part of the UOR.
From BAE
All models are based on the Spartan design which allows blast attenuating seats to be fitted for all crew members and an alternative escape route. The new hulls are fabricated from modern aluminium alloy which will reduce maintenance costs. Other improvements include redesigned and repositioned driver foot controls to reduce lower limb mine blast injuries, improved appliqué armour to improve blast and ballistic protection, upgraded torsion bar suspension to improve vehicle mobility, revamped fuel system and tanks, a heavier-duty winch on the Samson variant and a new power distribution system.
Since the introduction of the CVR(T) Mk2 to Afghanistan, two Scimitars have been hit by IEDs. In the first incident the crew all survived. In the second, tragically, the commander and gunner were killed following a rollover. The driver survived.
We have discussed the viability of the CVR(T) platform for modern operations many times and whether it is wholly suitable for the future, despite sunk costs being sunk costs and UOR sunk costs even ‘sunker’ the commercial attraction of 50 vehicles for £30m is hard to ignore.
Spend some more and commonality with the new Warrior turret might be possible, upgrade the engine and transmission, switch to band tracks and all of a sudden you have a much improved vehicle.
I am not actually suggesting that this is a good idea and this is probably not the thread to repeat those old arguments but this is just to illustrate how a make do and mend approach might seem attractive in light of increased pressure of the budget.
Paul g, you beat me to it with the KSG! It was featured in Guns & Ammo, August 2011 issue. Have you seen the Kel-Tec RFB Bullpup rifle in 7.62?
http://www.keltecweapons.com/our-guns/rifles/rfb/
“One doesnt need to know much to form the opinion that something is deeply deeply wrong there.”
You have no idea what is wrong though. You have no constructive criticism on the matter.
So lay off the sanctimonious comments about people being idiots or not having learned anything or entire systems being broken.
The whole FRES saga is a very complicated one that goes FAR beyond the military and those within it.
@ observer i have mentioned the RFB on here in the past, about a year ago (once or eleven times)!!! Interesting on one of the you tube videos a US marine says it’s one of the best weapons he’s used (dunno if got to use it on ops)
Forgot to say great minds think alike!!!!
@ ace i meant not observer
“upgrade the engine and transmission, switch to band tracks and all of a sudden you have a much improved vehicle.”
This bit made me laugh, swap out the engine, transmission and installa functioning useful turret and you immediately end up with a programme as complicated and potentially (especially in terms of development costs) as expensive as FRES-SV.
I dont dispute that UK armoured vehicles policyhas been ****ed up for the last 20 (30? 40? 50?)years but FRES-SV/Warrior/Foxhound finally offer an opportunity to bring some sense to it. Cancelling FRES-SV and replacing it with something just because at first glance that something might look cheaper will just perpetuate the cycle. It would be especially depressing as both the FRES-SV programme and Warrior upgrade build in lessons from Afgfhanistan, including having capacity for substantial upgrades. The skill with the UOR programme is to recognise the things they offered and build those into future programmes.
Just to throw another example in because I know it better than others – Mastiff. A great vehicle and has done a hell of a lot in ‘ghan and raises good questions about whether it cannot only ever stay a UOR item, or come into the core budget.
When I last looked at it (few years now), the biggest problem for the Mastiffs was the training and spares issues. They were being rushed in so quickly, it was hard for the support organisations to keep up. The other problem is that there are limits to off the shelf systems.
A 100 Mastiffs went through about 120 axles in 8 months in ‘ghan! Part of the problem was all the extra armour, but the rest went back to the fundamental design of the system. So what is the answer when the troops go back home? Stick with Mastiff, mod it some more or get new kit? From a purely admin and costs view (Treasury is going to murder the MOD with the UOR invoice for bringing stuff back in!) it can be argued that getting a new system simply saves hassle and works out cheaper for MOD (not UK as a whole!).
Treasury are the gorilla in the room, if they charge MOD for bringing UOR kit into core, the mend and make do attitude won’t happen. If MOD have the money to bring the kit in, stick with what they know and buy a few more that can be rolled out across the users, then it may happen.
@ DJ re axles
Do you have a break down of what broke? Was it front, rear, or middle? Was it half-shafts or diffs?
Was there a pattern or just a series of “random” failures (because of “road” conditions, driver, etc. etc.) ?
Desk Jockey,
Excellent post. Mastiff and Ridgeback are perfect examples of the problem, their rush into service means that they have been through multiple different generations in just a few years to correct various deficiencies, maintenance is a nightmare because the vehicles development was so limited (many subcoponents are civilian and not designed for the rigour of military operations) and the whole vehicle lacks mobility and wider utility (lack of variants and adaptability etc). The key therefore is to take the reason why they were procured, mine protection, and build that capability/quality into future programmes such as the Warrior upgrade and FRES.
Desk Jockey
I for one would be very interested in anything you had to say regarding the logistical hamstrings of the MRAP fleet, assuming you have some special knowledge to share.
X – Sorry, I don’t know the answers to those. I was aware of it because of the wider issues of supporting the team in getting more spares, mainly from the US.
Bob – Fully agree. The lessons need to be incorporated. But that does not answer the question of what is the best way forward at the time when there is not a lot of money? Will dumb policies, particularly those around financial accounting, mean more FRES like procurement messes happen rather than going just sticking to something ‘that mostly does the job’? It is not an easy one and a lot of these decisions will need to be made in the next few years.
The UOR is a very unique UK success story, but as TD says, it should not blind us to the wider problems.
DominicJ – My knowledge of MRAP is limited because I did not work directly on those projects. My involvement stemmed from the US side of things, because of course that is where they were bought from.
As a general rule, buying American is a royal pain in the arse, but there are pockets of where this is not the case and Mastiff/Ridgeback is one of them. The Yanks were happy to sell and great at pulling out the stops to make things happen. The problems came further down the line when the vehicles were being shaken to pieces in operational theatre. The USMC were having the same problems. What it meant, was that both the UK and US customers overloaded the supply chain with requests for spare parts. In a coherent and well planned programme, this could have been dealt with, but in a UOR context, everything just happens a lot faster.
The big thing to remember about UOR is that it is designed to accept risk. MOD goes to Treasury and says, “We badly need X and we need ££/$$ to go and buy it. No guarantee it will work and if buying American, we will not have operational sovereignty (usually).” Treasury says, “Fine, here you go, for use in theatre only.” It cuts so much red tape, but it also cuts out technical and financial scrutiny to the bare minimum. Very few other countries defence procurement organisations will even think that way which is why I had great fun explaining to the French! Several times!
Reaper is an example that contrasts significantly with MRAP. Another great product, but the ability to do anything with it outside of the rules set by the US is very constrained. When I worked on that one, my feeling was just Reaper was a one trick pony that could never be brought back despite how hugely capable it was for the UK. Maybe things have changed since then, I don’t know.
Desk Jockey,
Dont get me started on MoD accounting practices, all I will say is that they managed to make a Harrier look more expensive to operate than a Tornado GR.4.
My humble opinion is that FRES-SV in its current form is a very sensible prograsmme with a good balance between risk, capability and cost- it would be a terrible shame to see it die. That said, I thought Boxer did the same thing and that got killed to.
DJ
Oh well, it was just the specific axle count that got me all excited
My favourite article on here remains the RAF Squadron Manning bit by Wibble, its a shame there isnt one for everything.
Bob – “upgrade the engine and transmission, switch to band tracks and all of a sudden you have a much improved vehicle.” “This bit made me laugh, swap out the engine, transmission and installa functioning useful turret and you immediately end up with a programme as complicated and potentially (especially in terms of development costs) as expensive as FRES-SV.”
This is what was done with the FV430 Bulldog, new engine and transmission, armour etc, 50 vehicles for £85milllion. I believe the engine and transmission was a modified version from the Bradley. Also, the FV432 can take the turret from the Ferret, not exactly state of the art, but not FRES money either.
A shock to paul g who has asked for a Denel munitions factory several times:
” product portfolio includes large-caliber ammunition
(76mm to 155mm), artillery projectiles, propellants
charges and pyrotechnic carriers, mortar bombs, 40mm
grenades and various sub-systems.
The key highlights and achievements include:
• The integration of Rheinmetall’s business approach
into RDM [Denel Munition] to achieve a turnaround from a loss of
R80m in 2008 to a profit of R81m in 2009, within 15
months of taking management control of the entity”
- from their 2010 annual report
- no wonder PzH2000 works best with Denel munitions (e.g. for range)
That “50 vehicles for £85 milllion” was a great job and Bulldogs got much praise in Iraq
- just that someone got over-excited and at least 500 were converted
How thorough was the remanufacturing, btw, i.e. is it a reasonable expectation that they will pnly bow out after 70 years’ service life?
@ Desk Jockey
Thanks anyway. What you have to consider is that if Mastiff was say a civilian vehicle that weight would be spread across 4 axles in a cab-over engine design. Basically 3 axles are doing the work of 4. So there is bound to be some problem with axles. There is no obvious solution. To go with a cab before the front axle a la MAN and Tatra (with lots of amour plating to the read of the cab) would mean there would be a gap between and passenger cabin…….
Back in the midst of time I wrote a short piece on Mastiff spares and the perils of buying off the shelf
Had to do a spot of searching but have a read of this
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/05/the-dangers-of-off-someone-elses-shelf/
AR,
To be specific Bulldog MkIII uses the Cummins 6-BTA-250 diesel running through an Allison TX-200-4A.
However some things need to be remembered about the Bulldog upgrade. FV432 was very easy to upgrade, it is a large steel box (very easy to mess with) that was designed for components that were considerably larger than those being inserted (and it is said that the original design was relatively spacious)with no surveillance sensors, BMS, or associated data networks etc. And the outcome was not that great as they were not deemed as suitable for Afghanistan.
As for the turret from Ferret I can only assume that you mean Fox and are reffering to the handfull of vehicles equipped with it that were assigned to the Berlin brigade. Unfortunately that turret was and is a joke. The gun is completely unstabilised and manually operated (developed by RARDE it is actually more like a mini tank main gun than a chain gun) whilst to my knowledge no Fox turret has ever been fitted with a credible night vision system.
TD,
Your Mastiff spares article was fascinating, thank you.
X,
There is one advantage to having the engine bay in front of the cab, it puts the front axle (which is where an IED is most likely to detonate)well ahead of the crew compartment. Of course there are also notable disadvantages. The thing is that Mastiff/Ridgeback is basically just a very heavily armoured heavy duty truck (Spartan Chassis chassis, Marmon-Herrington axles, Allison 3500 SP transmission) rather than a dedicated armoured fighting vehicle (a tough truck I will admit) so it comes with all the deficiencies associated with that. Interestingly (for a proper armoured fighting vehicle) the US Army appears to be getting on well enough with its double-V-hull (DVH) strykers to have ordered two brigades worth and the DVH will be included in the Canadian LAV upgrade suggesting it works well. In an ideal a world a Piranha V modified with a DVH might make the perfect resuscitated FRES-UV.
Bob, cheers for specs on the engine and transmission.
I think your assumption on the upgrade being ‘very easy’ over-simplifies the process, I’ sure it had its own design and installation problems that were overcome by skilled engineers.
For Ferret, yes read Fox, schoolboy error. They were isued to the Berlin brigade, but that was prior to introduction of the Warrior, hence the small numbers. The Bulldog use in Afghanistan was negated due to the IED threat, but then that was the same for a lot of vehicles hence the need for MRAPS.
I wouldn’t describe the set up as a joke either, the APC ‘box’ fitted with a turret was used to great effect in Vietnam by the Australians on their M113′s firstly with the Saladin turret and then afterwards with the Scorpian turret. Yes the turret is unstabilised, yes it is manually operated, but then it is old technology, as is the RARDEN and to the night vision system. The chain gun has its advantages, but it was developed after the RARDEN. As an aside, the Israelis upgraded the powered turrets on their M60′s from hydraulic to electrical due to the fire risk, and later they upgraded the fire control system.
My point about the FV430 was that old technology can be upgraded without approaching FRES style costs, which you had stated, and just because some systems aren’t upgraded doesn’t mean they can’t.
While I can appreciate that a vehicle as light as CVR(T) is not sufficient for the current role, it always amazes me that we have ended up with a “Scout” that is pretty much in the same weight class as Warrior. In fact really, it just seems like another IFV. I think the design is great to be honest, it has been designed with growth in mind and appears to be very capable.
However, I do not see the point in upgrading the Warrior AND introducing the FRES Scout. I personally feel it would be a better idea to upgrade a large proportion of the Warrior fleet and hold out until better technology is available that makes the whole weight vs protection vs deployability equation easier to handle. Then when such a time comes, we could look at replacing many vehicles including Warrior with something more like FRES Scout, but hopefully, lighter and for the love of god, please, much more “British to the bootstraps” than the current system.
Looking at FRES as a whole, sight has been completely lost of what it set out to replace. I think the whole programme needs a rehash and to be fair, apart from the Scout, I think the programme has been silently killed.
The original plan was to replace mainly Saxon, CVR(T) and F432. But then there are other vehicles that I feel need to be brought in the equation. Viking, Warthog, Pinz, Land Rover etc.
I feel that a the Foxhound, if proven succesful and all goes smoothly should grow into a massive order to replace a lot of Army equipment. There is of course the LPPV requirement for which it currently fulfills but a 6×6 development alongside more ambitious 4×4 production is what is needed. Saxon, Pinz, Mastiff, Ridgeback, Wolfhound, Husky and all the other shit I can’t even think to remember (because there’s so much of it in such small minature fleets), could all be replaced by a “Foxhound Family”. Not only this; there is the OUVS which nobody ever seems to speak about, Foxhound, again, a good solution.
And what for the now “reprioritised”,or in english language, cancelled, FRES Utility vehicle? We are effectively looking for an APC surely to replace F432. In many ways, I think this is in much more urgent need of replacement.
CVR(T) may no longer be considered a suitable scout in our own army (I do feel it still has potential as a weapons carrier and escort for light role forces), but the recent development and any future investment could produce a successful export vehicle.
As a small, light, versatile and easily maintainable little tank, it must tick a few boxes for many armies; and a basicly spec’d model aught to be within most budgets.
For our own use, I can’t imagine that new band tracks would be too expensive to integrate if we did intend to keep it in use; or even a switch from the 30mm, if we didn’t try to be too flash.
“it always amazes me that we have ended up with a “Scout” that is pretty much in the same weight class as Warrior.”
In many countries, US included, this is not weird at all. They have the Bradley for scouting.
Italy all but uses Centauro, a tank-killing 8×8 with 120 mm gun.
Russia uses, i believe, BMPs variants.
The move to a more “fighty” Scout, complimented by light, agile wheeled vehicles as currently planned entirely makes sense.
“But then there are other vehicles that I feel need to be brought in the equation. Viking, Warthog, Pinz, Land Rover etc.”
I doubt Viking is going out of service anytime soon. It’ll stay with the Commandos for a long time.
Pinzgauer and Land Rovers are not a matter for FRES, but are due for replacement under OUVS, now Medium Protected Vehicle, Multirole.
It is within this frame that FOxhound will eventually fit.
If the cost comes down, though. The thing is expensive.
Also, Zephyr and SPV400, the defeated contenders for LPPV, both offer the 6×6 variant.
Foxhound, at least for now, does not.
I still don’t understand how the Spanish managed to buy 212 ASCOD’s for EUR 700 million which presumable includes the R&D cost and we are spending GBP 500 million on FRES SV and we don’t get a single vehicle. I am all for buying of the shelf on this program. I realise the British Army has some specific requirments but I just can’t get my head around this type of spending. Does anyone have an explination for it?
Another factro I do not understand is that if we are going to go of the Shelf which we seem to be then whats the point in the FRES concept i.e. 3000 similar vehicles. The idea behind this wass to save on development cost. However if we don’t have development cost surely its better to pick the right vehicle for the job. At 35 + tonnes for FRES SV surely we will have major mobility problems in the future if all Army vehicles are the same. I realise we need heavy vehicles that can withstand IED’s however we can’t make every vehicle the same.
I must admit the £500 million price tag for the Developement phase of the FRES SV programme does bear closer scrutiny. Maybe somebody who has an MP on the Defence Select Committee should write to them and get them to ask the right questions next time the MoD is in front of them.
Lord Jim – Yes you are correct from reading it all I can see is that its for modifications to the vehicle to allow it to be heavier to fufill more of the FRES role’s required. However if as is likley FRES will stop at the SV varinat this seems uneccessary. Other than fitting the vital Tea making facilities what is it that the British Army needs to do that can take an tried off the shelf design and spend more on modifications than the cost of the original design work?
BB,
I’d like to see something like a droppable Spartan (its chassis/trackbase footprint and weight seem feasible, I don’t know about internal stressors from an LVAD landing) with 120mm mortar aboard seems like a fine thing to tack on to whatever the UK’s future airborne capability looks like (16 AAB or a smaller structure.)
Chris Morris,
With you on Foxhound if a broader set of good operational data comes in. Even — much — more so on Warrior (though I’d slash fleet numbers) wrt FRES. Someone upthread mentioned, despite price tag, that FRES SV in its ASCOD variant seemed a well-run program. This may well be so, and we should pause before discouraging any progress in the cluster**** that is early-stage procurement management at MoD (although if this is early stage on FRES I’m Mary Whitehouse’s supporting hosierie.) But it just seems the wrong approach for the job. The Warrior fleet — one of the few cases where Britain has a backlog of vehicles and spares to help keep up a downsizing heavy-armour force — is in hand already, quite durable, and with upgrade due for however many survive the next couple of years of Geddes 2.0 for Land Warfare. But as a scout it seems to fall inbetween categories. Like James I think the best solution to a broad-spectrum medium-weight force (brigade sized) is to buy a medium-weight component, an 8×8 vehicle family, for the job, rather than the logistical nightmare of Multi-Role Brigades with every maneuver vehicle under the sun in the command. For a heavy-end legacy brigade, I suggested in the MRB thread (following, unknown to me, an earlier thought by OGH) repurposing some of the Chally 2 fleet by swapping the turret for a CTA 40mm turret plus recce electronics, to ride-along in “mixed” heavy calvary formations (120mm MBTs and 40mm/sensors scouts) that would share parts and upkeep and provide similar survivability. (The French have mulled this as an AMX 10RC replacement with the mothballed part of their Leclerc fleet, and the Russian T-95 Unified Platform program echoed it before it was axed.) On another front, but probably with more expense for modifying the passenger compartment, you could mod Warriors for the job given the (relatively) large in-service fleet. None of that comes up with a good evidence-based reason for FRES SV as-is.
James,
You were at Ft. Lewis for the demos in ’02? You might have run across my American uncle (who I mentioned on occasion when I was ’round here more often.) He was still late in his civilian DoD days then before retirement (a Sixties-Seventies vintage tanker when in uniform), worked on MILES for years but by then back on optics and targeting for armoured gunnery, including the MGS’s tweaks of the American L7 mod. (M-hundred and something but couldn’t remember what now if I tried.)
I’m very much in agreement with you about a vehicle-family 8×8 brigade as the middle weight in the post-Stan army and wanted to pick your brain more about both Stryker and alternative platforms. As an organisational principle the MTOE for Stryker brigades (now they’ve finally given some deeper attention to at least semi-organic support) is first class (also reasonably impressed with the Italians’ derivative plans, by way of their wheeled-mech cavalry, for the Freccia-based brigades. I know less about where the French are going with their wheeled units.) But besides “it’s pretty well de-risked now for the design type and the Americans have unit costs managed down well over a proven term” — which are important qualities! — so far it’s a single-customer system with some potential hull and height issues and I wanted to hear more about how well you think it competes with alternatives. If I was Anthony Newley (and ruled the world like his song says) I’d stick Stryker in a competition with Patria AMV and RG41. The first of those as an also-fairly-proven system with that large licensed Polish production line up and running for possible cost management on workshare, the second (RG41) to flesh out whether it’s up to the BAE brochure in terms of results at (purportedly) low cost.
On that matter, wrt wf’s comment,
It is an issue of cost, although the 8x8s can provide a variety of things (105mm assault gun, mortar carriers, recce versions with reasonable electronics, properly fitted ambulance and engineering variants, etc., all stuff we know but there are always other readers, not to mention the pols) the MRAPs don’t. And it seems as though constructing that kind of force inbetween the “hard as nails David” (instead of Goliath, and copyright by Jed) of heavy and lightweight initial-entry on one side of the scale and long-commitment MRAPed units on the other (not that tracked and wheeled armour don’t have resistant qualities, just used it as shorthand for the UOR vehicles) is a higher priority now than FRES as originally conceived.
In general,
Like OGH it seems as though UOR, especially on the heavy MRAP side, has actually worked fairly well, much better than the Ministry average. I’d like to see the greater number of those vehicles in fleet management to supply smaller, future “enduring commitment” forces (size and purpose are a subject for another thread, but nothing like this whole-army-roulement-forever-amen MRB bollocks) because they were bought for the role and provide (we could all die of shock) a sizeable, diverse, and deep in numbers fleet for the job. I give the upper-class t**t at Number 11 (“Core budget? What core budget?”)until February 2014 to start selling them for scrap.
Chris,
Sorry — there’s a sentence out of place in my comment on your comment. The bit about falling inbetween categories, bodged inbetween talking about Warrior, is ref: FRES SV. Late-night typing (well, late one ocean and one continent away) isn’t my friend.
Hi Martin,
Not sure if the programme cost is in it ” Spanish managed to buy 212 ASCOD’s for EUR 700 million which presumable includes the R&D cost” but whatever it was, Austria took a half share of it.
Hi Bob,
That sounds like a good idea, latching onto a very long production run for most components:
“In an ideal a world a Piranha V modified with a DVH might make the perfect resuscitated FRES-UV”
I hear that the AMV produced in S. Africa is also extra hardened against IEVs and mines; do you know the specifics? That production run is also into its 3rd thousand (ie. past the 2.000 mark).
Hi BB,
RE “As a small, light, versatile and easily maintainable little tank, it must tick a few boxes for many armies; and a basicly spec’d model aught to be within most budgets.”
- the development shop in Jordan bought the Belgian CVRTs; interesting to see how they will be kitted out (none sold yet, as far as I can see from trade press)
RE “For our own use, I can’t imagine that new band tracks would be too expensive to integrate”
- BAE is offering this upgrade (not taken up?)
TD
It wasnt so much “spares availabilty” problems that I was interested in, but more the “day to day” side of things.
Itas been mentioned by a few people that MRAPs are a pain in the arse because they require so much maintanance, whereas Jackals ace because it doesnt.
There very little on such things out there, or certainly, very little thats easily accessable to the none military folk.
All we can see is the horrifying number of dead and mained who were riding jackals at the time.
But it might shed a lot of light on why the army resisted MRAPs for so long, it might not of course, I maintain they’re murdering bastards who didnt want to defund FRES, but it would be nice to know one way or the other.
I suspect Dom, it was a complex mix of factors, the single smoking gun is rarely in evidence
TD – That was a great post on Mastiff. Pity that story was never really shouted about by the mainstream press. You hit the nail on the head with that one.
Dom – Having spoke to a CO who was attending the funeral the next day of one of his soliders blown up in a jackal, his attitude was pretty much that it was to be expected and hard to actually resolve. The two reasons he said for the jackal being used was a)they were used by special forces, looked cool and so the soldiers wanted to use them and b) Afghanistan is such a hostile place for vehicles that you just have to sacrifice armour to go places.
Considering the army guys loved those quad bikes which have no armour at all, you can kind of see how this fits into the “get on with it” attitude. The Taliban know that mobility is an issue and so they exploit it through IEDs and amushes at choke points. You either choose to drive around the problem or fly over it, both of which bring up other risks.
Bob and ACC mention Piranha V as a possible UV. There are also the candidate vehicles for the Marine’s personnel carrier programme that could take on the roll.
I wonder whether we can or should just look at the unit and associated costs of the US Army and Marine Corps carriers, and just go ahead and buy one. I’m absolutely convinced that vehicle competitions of the kind we’ve already run can be tailored to present any of the likely candidates as the best performer; so why not just go about things with the just-do-it kind of attitude that we have with UORs. It seems we would get a perfectly sound multi-function vehicle at the end of the day, we just seem intent on over complicating things.
I can not believe that people still think £500 million is a lot for the FRES-SV development phase- it just is not- in terms of armoured vehicle development, compare to how much the US is expecting to pay for the GCV programme, hell they paid GDLS $58.3 million just to design and prototype the double v-hull stryker modification. In previous threads I have listed multiple AFV development contracts to prove that the FRES-SV is not expensive. ACC is correct, the 212 number does not ionclude development costs (which are virtually impossible to deduce for that programme as a large amount of the work was funded by SDP).
I am equally perplexed by the fascination with FV432/Scimitar; it is time to face reality- these vehicles are ancient and come with inherent capability flaws that no amount of re-engineering is going to solve. The best solution now (and has been since the 90s) is to acquire a new platform with plenty of growth potential that builds in the lessons from Afghanistan, ie FRES-SV and Warrior upgrade. The notion that continuing to roll around in 1950s/60s cut and shut jobs is sensible, when for the largest part they have proven inadequate on recent operations, is just silly.
ACC,
Agreed, the Patria AMV and DVH Piranha derivatives are both interesting, I dont know the extent of the Hoefysters mine protection- best way to find out would be to blow them both up and see what happens.
Gabriele,
As always thank you for the excellent comment, I continue to be an avid reader of your outstanding blog.
Bob, we have rehearsed these before. I think the real issue with the costs of the FRES-SV development phase is because we are not actually starting from the ground up and designing something genuinely innovative or world beating, more an incremental set of improvements to an existing design. It is therefore a reaction to the toxic legacy and a reflection on the fact that we seem to have painted ourselves into a corner from an industrial, doctrinal and design perspective.
£500m might not seem a lot to you, it might not even be much in the context of other more ambitious developments but not even you can blithely swat away the very real fact that £500m IS a lot of money.
As for upgrading vehicles, the world is full of integrators (or engineers) that can take a basic design and improve it, after all, it is exactly what we are doing with FRES is it not?
It might make you laugh but it is perfectly reasonable and sensible to upgrade old designs, my examples of a new engine, transmission and band tracks for CVR(T) would not be some huge development because all the sub systems are MOTS/COTS. After all, we have already proven that new hulls can be fabricated for not a lot of cash. A new turret, likewise, CMI for example, have a number of models that could be used I suspect, KADB have also worked on this.
It is not some far flung hyper expensive fantasy as you seem to portray.
However
I am not advocating we stick with a 40 year old design, nor am I advocating we cancel FRES but what I stating is that when you compare the costs of upgrading CVR(T) to the costs of FRES SV Scout the figures make the latter very hard to justify in light of a reducing defence vote.
The arguments for FRES therefore, have to be much stronger than they are because there is a long list of other things that we could spend the money on.
1) £500 million over 4 years for 7 prototypes including 4 seperate variants and a common base platform for future variants is peanuts, compare it to other programmes, I have done it before and nobody here could actually dispute it with evidence- simply calling something expensive does not make it so.
2) Those engineers have to have something to work with, the elderly CVRT/FV432 platforms do not offer enough
3) We have not painted ourselves into a corner, quite the opposite, the IP arrangements and growth potential of the platform mean it will be highly flexible
4) It will be “world beating” and “innovative” just because it is not a hover tank powered by a plasma drive it does not mean it is neither of those things
5) You have not provided any costs for a credible upgrade of CVRT, you have just assumed them to be low because you say they will be to suit your argument.
Bob
But these vehicles already exist!
Theres already a medical ASCOD, and a fire support one, and a command and control one.
They’re taking a pre existing command and control vehicle and bolting on a bit of uk specific kit.
DominicJ
Wrong. Those vehicles do not exist. They are taking a pre-existing chassis design, modifying it, fitting with a new drivechain to create a common base platform and then building bespoke UK variants on top.
If you want to have a debate about procuring directly off the shelf (only changes to meet language requirements, local highway/health and safety laws and pre-existing-also-off-the-shelf comms) versus highly evolved bespoke variants then that is fine, but do not tell lies as you did in your previous post.
FRES-SV will offer a vehicle that can be upgraded to an engine output of 1,000hp and an electrical output of 1,000amps on a chassis with a stretch GVW of 42 tonnes as needed as part of an existing development roadmap, find a me a way of making CVRT do that.
FRES-SV in its current form strikes a balance between extracting the best that industry currently has to offer without risking piles of money (again, see GCV or for that matter the now dead EFV) on developing something completely new and spectacular from the ground up.
I am perfectly willing to listen to criticism of the ASCOD-SV, but so far nobody here has provided any that has actually been supported with evidence and context- there has just been lots of screaming about it being “expensive” or “old” without explanation.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ASCOD
“The ASCOD family includes the LT 105, a light tank equipped with a 105 mm gun, a SAM launcher, an anti-tank missile launcher, mortar carrier, R&R vehicle, Command & Control vehicle, ambulance, artillery observer, and the AIFV model.”
“ASCOD Pizarro is built by Santa Bárbara Sistemas. It has multiple variants.[2]
VCI/C – Infantry / Cavalry Vehicle; This is the basic ASCOD Pizarro.
VCPC – Command Vehicle
VCOAV – (Vehículo de Observación Avanzada) Advanced Reconnaissance Vehicle
VCREC – Recovery Vehicle
VCZ – Engineering Vehicle
LT-105 Light Tank – A light tank, designed for the export market, with a 105 mm gun. There are three turrets available, each made by a different manufacturer. These manufacturers are Oto Melara, General Dynamics, and Denel Land Systems (formally known as LIW).[11] The vehicles for the Royal Thai Marine Corps will use the turret from Denel.
Donar – Medium 155mm SPA based on the KMW PzH 2000″
All currently in service with Spain.
Dom versus Bob. This should be good.
If we were spending all that money on the SV and ending up with a British made, sellable product, then that would be great. But we seem to be taking an existing vehicle, keeping the metal box (that to me seems to be the simplest part to develop) and then trying to change everything that can either go into it or bolt onto it; and we go into this with no guarentees over workshare.
We neither have the cost benefit of buying a truly off-the-shelf product, or the employment and export benefit of having a British product. The worst of both worlds.
I recently wrote in the ‘Destination of the Defence Pound’ thread of our purchase of 14 Chinooks; and how the UAE and Australia since bought a similar number of off-the-shelf Chinooks – US Army spec, and added to the US Army’s order to benefit from their bulk price deal with Boeing. Meanwhile, we buy the basic airframe and throw in UK specific kit to make a unique but more expensive product in order to protect a small number of jobs of debatable worth to the UK economy – as they are related only to making an MoD purchase more expensive while offering nothing for external sales.
We currently do not seem to buy off-the-shelf insofar as any sane person would interpret the phrase ‘off-the-shelf’; and we neither seem to be paying for genuinly British development and manufacture.
If we are to spend a fortune on making ASCOD unrecognizable from the original vehicle, then why did we start with ASCOD in the first place? If we actually wanted an ASCOD SV, then we should have taken our half billion quid and just bought some.
BB,
If you want to end up with a British made, sellable product you have to add a zero to £500 million figure, then times it by 3 or more (again, please see GCV and EFV). As I said, ASCOD-SV strikes a ba;ance between OTS and bespoke that reduces risk and cost, people here just need to realise that £500 million is not a large sum of money.
DominicJ,
Yes, ASCOD exists in multiple variants, ASCOD-SV does not though so your post is irrelevent.
Bob
“Yes, ASCOD exists in multiple variants, ASCOD-SV does not though so your post is irrelevent.”
It would seem the mob disagrees…
I’m afraid the onus is on you to demonstrate why ASCOD SV will be £500mn+ better than ASCOD.
No, the onus is on you as I have already made such a demonstration multiple times before in multiple threads. In summary,
More powerful engine
More capable transmission
New suspension
New turret
Growth potential to 1,000hp, 1,000 amps, 42tonne GVW and 2.1m turret ring
New thermal sights with under-armour laser designation
Enhanced IED protection (said to be Mastiff equivilant)
Custom GVA vehicle data network
£500 million buys 7 prototypes covering 4 variants and detail design for the remain variants- compare with other AFV programmes (notably GCV and EFV)
I also tend not to listen to mobs as they usually consist of ignorant sheeple huddling together to comfort themselves about their own intellectual inadequacies.
Bob, be robust, be direct, but don’t be a twat because quite frankly, am not interested in your assertions of intellectual superiority or single minded pursuit of not being in the herd and this place is becoming a forum for single service ranting, which makes it no different to other places on the net.
Am getting sick of it to be honest so play nice or fuck off
Lets start from first principles and something we can maybe find some common ground and engage in a reasonable discussion like reasonable people
The subject of £500m being, or not being ‘a lot of money’
Forget whether it is a lot of money compared to other vehicle development, we will get to that later.
Concentrate on the number in the context of the number itself and how it compares, for example, to the investment budget for the Army or MoD as a whole, or perhaps the running costs of I dunno, a Bay class. I know they are not entirely related but that too is irrelevant.
In light of static or declining defence equipment budgets do you, or do you not think £500m is a lot of money
It is a simple question
Yes or no
I think it is a Yes, for the record