As I have commented many times, the UOR system itself has, with a small number of exceptions, been a great success, providing all manner of vehicles and equipment across all three services for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. Equally, we all know that the UOR system creates problems for the long term, generally they are not integrated into the fully complete logistics and maintenance system and because they are obtained for a very narrow range of application they might find themselves completely unsuitable for an operation elsewhere.
Post Afghanistan, depending on what that might end up becoming, as the Army transitions to Future Force 2020 or what comes out of the 2015 SDSR, many of these UOR vehicles and items of equipment are going to find themselves subject of a decision.
That decision is quite simply to retain or dispose.
Take CVR(T) 2.0 as an example.
CVR(T) is due to be replaced with FRES SV but with the in service date for FRES SV slipping ever more distant into the future and obviously, not available in Afghanistan, a UOR created the Mark 2 version.
A total of 50 vehicles were ordered for £30m, final deliveries this year, compare this with the development costs of £500m for the development contract alone for FRES SV Scout and a couple of other variants. CVR(T) 2 involved re hulling and adding in a range of additional system and improvements whilst taking many major sub systems from older vehicles. CVR(T) 2.0 is now available in the Scimitar reconnaissance vehicle, Spartan troop carrier, Samson repair and recovery, Sultan command post and Samaritan ambulance variants, all of which have been delivered as part of the UOR.
From BAE
All models are based on the Spartan design which allows blast attenuating seats to be fitted for all crew members and an alternative escape route. The new hulls are fabricated from modern aluminium alloy which will reduce maintenance costs. Other improvements include redesigned and repositioned driver foot controls to reduce lower limb mine blast injuries, improved appliqué armour to improve blast and ballistic protection, upgraded torsion bar suspension to improve vehicle mobility, revamped fuel system and tanks, a heavier-duty winch on the Samson variant and a new power distribution system.
Since the introduction of the CVR(T) Mk2 to Afghanistan, two Scimitars have been hit by IEDs. In the first incident the crew all survived. In the second, tragically, the commander and gunner were killed following a rollover. The driver survived.
We have discussed the viability of the CVR(T) platform for modern operations many times and whether it is wholly suitable for the future, despite sunk costs being sunk costs and UOR sunk costs even ‘sunker’ the commercial attraction of 50 vehicles for £30m is hard to ignore.
Spend some more and commonality with the new Warrior turret might be possible, upgrade the engine and transmission, switch to band tracks and all of a sudden you have a much improved vehicle.
I am not actually suggesting that this is a good idea and this is probably not the thread to repeat those old arguments but this is just to illustrate how a make do and mend approach might seem attractive in light of increased pressure of the budget.
Could many of our procurement problems simply be caused by a lack of urgency? Paying someone handsomely to form a chain of committees to look at vehicles and their systems and to produce reports on vehicles and their systems, then watching them do just that forever and a day without delivering a finished vehicle; rather than just demanding a solution to a problem asap.
There must surely be lessons to be learnt from looking at the differences between UORs and the regular procurement processes, and streamlining efficiencies to be made. Let’s give a company a few hundred million a year to look at the issue, and hope they get back to us before 2020.
I would certainly look at the possibility of wolfhound becoming a gun tractor, plenty of space for gun crew and flatbed for ammo carrying. Yes al the pictures of it in the stan show up to the eyeballs in armour, but would it need that in a non coin artillery role?
Plus if it did find itself in a coin situation ie using known routes then just fly/bus/ship in the additional armour
I just can’t understand the Army’s issue with getting new vehicles into service. It seems every time they issue a UOR they get 100+ vehicles or so for around the 100 million mark. Yet they have spent billions on FRES and not gotten a single vehicle. They go off the Shelf with FRES SV and they have to pay 500 million for the prototype. Can any one offer any explination as to why this is the case?
The core of MoD procurement is the CADMID cycle or Capability, Assessment, Developement, Manufacture, In service, Disposal. Add to this two key milestones, “Initial Gate” once the Capability requirement has been identified and “Main Gate” after the Assessment phase. It is these two milestones that define a programme and how it is to advance and what funding is available. The problem the MoD has is that a fair amount of funding is required to pass “Main Gate” and so many programmes, not just the Army’s are held at the Assessment stage for extended periods of time. This still cost money but the programme is not cancelled so is still on the books. This is also the point at which the powers that be bring out their wish lists and as the programme is not moving forwards they are able to chop and change the design etc whist roughly sticking to the Capability gap requirements.
In theory once a programme passes “Main Gate” it is full steam ahead with a path laid out for developement and manufacture and funding allocated. In reality this rarely happens if ever as there is never enough funds for all programmes at the best of times so the developement phase is also dragged out as funding changes require design changes and revised programme and planned delivery timetables.
IF a programme actually gets into the manufacturing phase things can still go wrong, though at this stage it is mainly an issue of funding and usually results in either a reduction in the number of items procurred or the delivery rate is slowed. If however the developement phase was not carried out effectively then this can have a knock on effect in manufacturing as modification etc have to be made on the production line.
Next we have the In service phase and this is where the powers that be often try to save money. This is done ususally by cutting the support budget for a platform. In theory during the Assessment and Developement phases a comprehensive support plan is developed listing the maintenance and spares requirements to keep new platform in service and available in the agreed numbers etc. However again to save money this often doesn’t happen with Typhoon being a classic example where spares were taken from the airplance production lines to keep those already delivered flying. This of course has the knock effect of slowing the porduction line down for obvious reasons.
Even when a plan is in place it is supbject to morotoriums where funding can be cut from the support budget with little or no warning as funds are needed elsewhere, usually due to overspending in the Assessment or Developement phases of other programmes.
SO the CADMID cycle is what is suppoed to be followed but funding and time constaints can cause hybrid cycles, often involving the merging of developement and manufacture, like in the Adour Mk106 programme to re-engine the Jaguar. This meant that swhen problems arrose with engines already deliverd there was no funding to effectively solve a problem as so a “Band Aid” fix was applied, but this led to the Jaguar GR3 never being officially cleared for operational use and hence why it was offered up for early retirement.
The CADMID cycle should work and it is far better than what preceeded it, but it relies on intelligent and firm decision being taken at all stages and for all the higher ups involved to be on the same page. If requirements or budgets change people must have the balls to cancel prgrammes rather than keep them in limbo. Managers need to be in charge for more than a three year posting.
UORs work but as thir title suggests they shoud be the exception to the rule, and not a permentent part of teh procuremetn cycle. This has been the reality of the MoDs procurement for decades, having to issue UORs to get its kit up to warfighting stadards or filling holes that should have been filled.
I sincerely hope the current revives finally begin gto sort this out but it also need secure funding levels over the long term to really work.
martin
process, procedure, career postings for brigadiers.
The goal is not to procure functional kit, its to follow the rules.
@TD: add a remote controlled turret to CVR(T) 2.0 along with the improvements you specified, and you have a light forces AFV that will do very well.
FRES(SV) is clearly aimed at the heavy end. God knows how we are spending 0.5B on developing an “off the shelf” vehicle
RE “and you have a light forces AFV that will do very well”
- yes, but would it not be rather a fire-support vehicle as opposed to recce? Even in that case there would be a place for them in the current organisation (close recce, but what assets would be there to do also what it “says on the tin”?)
- that’s on the thinking that if you have dedicated fire support, it should be organic to bn level (like 81mm mortars to coy; 120mm – which we don’t have – to bn, etc)
ACC
A light company/battalion today has organic mortars and organic HMGs and organic ATGM carried on organic land rovers.
Why cant it have an organic Scimitar troop?
“process, procedure, career postings for brigadiers.
The goal is not to procure functional kit, its to follow the rules.”
Your politics constantly colours your posts. It’s more obvious now than ever. You’re so used to criticising it’s all you can do. You do NOT know that is the case, I’d be willing to bet you have no evidence WHATSOEVER and you just like the sound of your own moaning voice, criticising everything and anything that you don’t like seeing happen and spinning it all into tall tales of incompetence and tribalism and broken systems.
Change the record Dom.
I’m certainly warm to the “make do and mend” philosophy, and have spent 12 very painful years on both government and industry sides of the procurement fence, our current system seems designed to result in a lethal combination of soaring ambition (requirements creep, etc), and boggy process.
Given a choice, I’d buy Stryker, Jackal and quad bikes, which would sort out 99% of the mobility requirements for the infantry and recce (and their supporting arms. The Stryker MGS could even be a useful light tank. Easy decision, affordable, available once the ink on the contract is dry. Then turn the attention to a new 4 tonner with equal mobility.
no edit function. “mobility and capability requirements” in post above.
@ James – do you have experience with the Stryker? I have read a lot of criticism of the vehicle but it appears to be from arm chair generals like myself. Would it be a suitable vehicle for the UK?
@ Gareth Jones,
nothing in life is perfect, I wouldn’t claim that for Stryker. I spent a couple of weeks in Fort Lewis with the Stryker Brigade in 2002, so before its’ first deployment, as part of the UK’s FRES SV investigation. My report (I was one of 5 Brits on the visit) was nearly all positive.
Everything in life is a trade off, between time, cost, and capability. I believed then and I believe today 10 years later that Stryker is the best blend between those three for FRES SV, and also mechanised infantry. What many do not realise is that the Stryker Brigade has a doctrine and ethos that is very very similar to the UK Army, not like the mainstream US Army. USMC – with whom we often compare ourselves as a Joint force – is also similar, and they keep looking at Stryker themselves although I don’t think they have bought any yet.
Stryker is – IMO – 99% of what we need for rapid intervention Brigades. 99%, available today, affordable. I was also attracted by the empty space in the hull of the basic variant. Put an elevating mast and ISTAR suite in there. Put 4 stretchers in there. Put a C3 suite in there. Put a pair of mortars in there. It’s like a single bedroom of space, empty. Massive possibilities. I was also attracted by the power availability. Paul G is better placed to comment on what the REME need, but he could run his GPTIRF in there with power to spare. Also a great combination of operational and tactical mobility.
Is Stryker the answer to everything? Of course not. But I’d rather have that than some fantasy vehicle delivered in 10 years.
CVR(t) 2.0 would, I’m afraid, simply be an exercise in papering over the cracks. I understand that cost will always be the driving factor but we NEED a new family of recce vehicles. They have had far too many bolted on additions over the years to be a viable platform for the future, and I think most people would be shocked if they ever had to spend any time in a Scimitar turret, where some stoppage drills on the wind-up gun include spanking it with a nylon hammer! Furthermore, the turret is still turned by hand for goodness sake! If we were talking about putting the 40mm CTA gun on, then I think the cost will mean that we may as well just get Fres, and I think Fres will be a good solution, if a little large for the super sneaky stuff.
Ref: ‘add a remote controlled turret to CVR(T) 2.0 along with the improvements you specified, and you have a light forces AFV that will do very well.’
Spartan and Scimitar already have weapons systems that can be fired internally, albeit turned by hand rather than a gucci RWS.
@Ed Zeppelin: my thoughts re the recce requirement is that we need a heavy variant (FRES(SV)) for our armoured formations and something lighter for 16AAB/3CDO/other lightish brigade. The two requirements cannot be merged
I’m not convinced that we do, but there is no reason why we couldn’t keep CVRt 2.0 for any spearhead/rapid deployment forces. However, I am yet to hear a decent argument, with examples, for the benefits of an air portable light tank, principally as we don’t have the strategic lift to make it possible to achieve.
Phil
“You do NOT know that is the case”
Really?
Do I not?
Procedures followed, lessons learned, yes Phil, the army is entirely different from every other large organisation despite using the same bullshit bingo cards.
Ed
Personaly, when I say CVRT 2.0, I dont so much mean, new build CVRts, I mean a properly new vehicle.
It shouldnt be too expensive to design a modern CVR(T), designed and built with all the kit added since the 60′s in mind
Maybe thats just my ignorance showing though.
It’s your ignorance Dom.
And your political REMF credentials are showing.
Hi DJ,
A misunderstanding “Why cant it have an organic Scimitar troop?”
- I am all for it, was just pontificating where it would fit, without changing the organisation
- I really like the French unmanned turret for the 40 CTA (not sure if they use it themselves on anything); I was just starting from its limitations in a recce tasking (as fire support is no substitute for recce, and close recce is deemed an essential function, even at the bn level)
Ed
The only real air portable bonus I see is them islands down their, anything looks iffy, we can have a few troops down there quickly.
Personaly, I think it’d be easier just to base a few tanks there.
To me, the advantage comes not so much in air portability, but just portability.
The big tank landers can land one tank on a beach, and thats handy, but they could land 5 light tanks, and thats really handy.
A single MBT troop or 5 Tankette Troops?
Well, that depends on the war of course, but I think its better choice than 1 heavy tanktroop or 2 medium tank troops.
@James: the issue with Stryker has three main threads. Firstly, the “wheels vs tracks” issue, where a vehicle with slat armour, and now a double V hull, is probably already past 25 tonnes, is not going to be very mobile off road. It’s noticeable that the vehicle seems to be largely restricted to route escort in Afghanistan, as opposed to to it’s more free wheeling role in Iraq. Apparently the double V hull required to make the Stryker IED-survivable has also made it a great deal less spacious inside
Secondly, I’m all in favour of having nice systems and better ways of working, but these aren’t tied to specific systems.
Thirdly, given that Stryker is now in the same weight class as Mastiff and Ridgeback is likely to kill any procurement instantly for the time being. They aren’t that similar, but the politicians will say they are
“Procedures followed, lessons learned, yes Phil, the army is entirely different from every other large organisation despite using the same bullshit bingo cards.”
Dom I agree that on a systems level the army is often no different. But it is also very different. If a consultancy was bought in to try and increase efficiency or whatever in the Army toward some goal then those consultants would need to study the processess, study the systems, study the culture, study the thinking, study the resources, study the structure and study the inputs and outputs. Why do they study? Because each organisation whilst it will have isomorphic characteristics, will still be sufficiently different to warrant a bespoke solution and not a general solution.
I say to you, that you don’t have ANYWHERE near the knowledge to judge a system broken or its processes useless. Not one person on here does. That shouldn’t stifle debate, but AGAIN I say it should stop such arrogant, hand waving disdain for a system you have proven time and time again to have an almost childlike understanding of.
If you’re going to fling shit Dom expect shit to be flung back. Obviously you’re very used to putting the question and launching attacks but if I think you’re just spouting off pathetic sound bites then I will challenge you on it.
In short, you’re gobbing off without a particle of real evidence to your name.
Hi James,
I haven’t kept up but when I last looked, Alligator and AMV were more in the running than Stryker
RE “USMC – with whom we often compare ourselves as a Joint force – is also similar, and they keep looking at Stryker themselves although I don’t think they have bought any yet”
This wasnt a specific post about CVR(T) Mk2 per se but using that as an example of how the UOR’s or prospect of maybe upgrading them, bringing them into the main equipment plan etc might put a great deal of pressure on other programmes.
£60m for 50 vehicles on a balance sheet is tough to compare against £500m for no vehicles whatever the practical realities
Just saying, the arguments for new kit are going to have to be very convincing
Dom, CVRt 2 already exists. A ‘new’ CVRt family also exists. Its called FRES. Are you saying that we should have a lighter version of Fres? If so, I think that argument has been exhausted.
TD, ref cost of UORs vs Fres; I can only assume that it is so cheap because no new tooling/technology was required to make them. All the sighting/gunnery/drive mechanisms were in service. It is like how you could always make a few different lego vehicles from the pictures on the back of the box, albeit without the instructions.
Regardless of FRES being based on the ASCOD, what percentage commonality will the final vehicles have? I would have thought fairly low once all the 40mm/Comms/Sighting kit is whacked in, but I would be interested if anyone knows.
Even if the 50 odd CVRT 2 vehicles are shit canned after Herrick it wouldn’t be the end of the world. They could end up as the OPFOR fleet in BATUS, or something along those lines.
@ james, BV, fridge, microwave,etc etc!!!
The GPTIRF wouldn’t fit though the box body was so heavy it had to go on a 8 tonne TM, no room inside and it had to have it’s own 40KVA genny as 16/24KVA was enough, still the inflatable penthouse was bob on!!
“Just saying, the arguments for new kit are going to have to be very convincing”
Slight correction. Arguments for CREATING new kit are going to have to be very convincing
I for one, have no problems of buying stuff from other people if it’s good and reliable. Saves development cost, saves development risk, trial before you buy, maybe some tech transfer, more money for more off the shelf mature stuff etc.
Sure, you won’t end up being cutting edge F-22 users, but you’ll end up with mostly tried and reliable equipment, which can be worth it’s weight in gold.
edit 16/24 wasn’t enough, sheesh!
@ observer, if i was a) still inside the wire and b)allowed to have a say in equipment purchase I’d be straight over to ST kinetics, already proven with warthog, they have a good product range (40mm UGL ammo being one of many) Then i’d pop of to south africa to have a chat with denel, again for the same reasons. It’s time to break this cycle of only looking at US/UK firms
oh and metalstrom in oz as well, mainly for the 5 round underslung shotgun, in these days of weightsaving a couple of these per section would save having to lug around another weapon, some might argue not much of a weight save but the buggerance of another weapon slung about you would be solved.
website says it weighs 1.8lb!!!
http://www.metalstorm.com/content/view/83/167/
er.. metalstorm is an STK partner.
The bad point on those launchers are that they can’t be reloaded in the field, you have to finish the whole tube, throw it away and fit a new one. Think Garand clip in WWII. Best use for Metalstorm tech is probably as an area defence mine. Which claymores can do as well…
Oh well, back to the drawing board.
You seen the STK SAW yet?
Phil
“I say to you, that you don’t have ANYWHERE near the knowledge to judge a system broken or its processes useless. Not one person on here does.”
Since the results from the system are shit, there are two possibilities, the process isnt followed, or the process is shit.
Since the default position is, “policies followed” arse covering, then it seems the system is broken.
Why not fix it?
Because that would require someone to take a risk, and we dont do that.
But yes phil, no one can criticise unless they’re a 25 star general, any children who say the emperor has no clothes on must be shouted down.
Dom, in your case, it’s more like the kid (you) walked up to the Emperor and tried to unbutton his pants.
“But yes phil, no one can criticise unless they’re a 25 star general, any children who say the emperor has no clothes on must be shouted down.”
He gets shouted down when he starts to shout bollocks.
Perhaps you’re hard of understanding.
It is not the fact you know nothing about the system that winds me up, it is the fact you gob off and fling shit about something you haven’t got the foggiest damn clue about and act like you have some sort of superior answer. Exactly the behaviour of a politician who has the luxury of flinging shit from the benches and isn’t in the position to make any decisions and do something about it.
What’s wrong with Viking 2 or warthog in a variety of roles. Not a main battle tank force but we have warrior and challenger for that.
Phil
“act like you have some sort of superior answer”
Where have I suggested an answer to our procurement disasters?
I’ve merely pointed out that they are complete and total cluster****s.
I’ve made a few small suggestions, perhaps you’d like to point out the flaws rather than hurl abuse?
But then of course, you dont have any ideas, and never have, you’re rather boring.
“But then of course, you dont have any ideas, and never have, you’re rather boring.”
Oh I’m in the Council Chamber and have just received a wounding from your rapier like wit. Bore off.
“Where have I suggested an answer to our procurement disasters?”
You haven’t. That’s my point. You don’t know enough to. Nor do you know enough to know what is wrong with the system. But that doesn’t stop the constant high handed criticism and disdainful language and the distinct impression that you think the whole organisation is run by idiots because they don’t subscribe to Doms world view.
It’s such a simple point, you make yourself look a fool by gobbing off about stuff you don’t understand. One can criticise within the confines of ones knowledge, and one can criticise vociferously without coming across like a know it all when they plainly don’t.
I am not being insulting, I have made no judgements about your character other than the fact you are clearly used to criticising from your role as an unelected politician and this comes over in your sound-bite posts which are big on dramatic statements and short on substance.
Which again is fine, but you can’t help yourself from throwing mud and being high and mighty at the people who work in a system you have no idea about.
Dom, I do have my arguments with Phil, mostly on static and fluid methods of warfare, but we’re arguing from knowledge, I can see where he’s coming from, more or less, and he can see my point too, somewhat, but in all honesty, neither of us can see where you draw your conclusions from, other than thin air, which would then mean bias.
If you want people to take you seriously, argue from knowledge, not idealogy. Do your own research, not just use soundbites.
You managed to assemble the “Forward Support Company” orbat you were looking for yet? It’s a good way to start learning about the military instead of just whining.
@ James – thank you for your answer. A lot of the criticism was about the original requirement calling for the vehicle to be transported by C-130, which it can’t now due to growth. However, as we don’t have a large air transport fleet and are retiring the C-130 anyway, so it comes down to the old wheels vs tracks debate and TD’s question, is it better to mend and make do rather than buy new, even if it is off the shelf.
If you want an answer to that question, think you might have better luck looking at it the other way round, from the budget end.
If you have $ for newer equipment to replace worn out stock, go for it. If not, tighten the belt a little and save for a rainy (rainer?) day.
@ Observer – STK SAW? Do you mean the Ultimax 100? Nice weapon but I can’t see us buying it. Pity as allegedly its not much heavier than an assault rifle and would be good for the suppressive fire we were discussing on another thread.
It’s accuracy is also assault rifle level, which is why a lot of us like it so much.
I met quite a few cases of SAW gunners getting so bored at target practice, they started doing really strange stuff like trying to saw down the wooden stakes holding up targets, cutting pieces off the targets and skeet shooting wooden chunks that fly off targets.
It’s terrible at firing blanks though, blanks simply don’t have the power to counter the anti-recoil system.
There is a line of thinking in the Singaporean Army, that because you’re going to be outnumbered anyhow, grab any edge you can over your enemy. So if your enemy uses an AR, grab a LMG. He uses a 7.62 on a humvee, use a 0.5cal. He uses 81mm motars, use a 120mm. Overmatch game.
This drives into STK thinking, which is why they try to get utility of their weapons down one class step.
So our LMGs are used like big ARs, our light strike/humvees use anti-recoil 0.5cal/sabot instead of 7.62 and forward support is super light 120mm motar. Fails a bit at higher levels, there is only so much tweaking you can do the higher up you go. Too bad. Pity.
@ Observer. Interesting info. Ddo you know how much more a ULTIMAX 100 costs over say the SAR-21?
I recall reading an article about the Russians and machine guns which ties in with this thread. The snipers were given new fancy sights but instead of ditching the old ones they put them on their LMG’s and MMG’s; greatly improved accuracy, to the point that their Light Machine gunners could act as DM.
Not to get in the middle of Phil, Domj and Observer’s verbal melee, but I thought my experience might throw some light on what is being discussed – I have worked for a consultancy firm where I project managed a contract providing specialist advice to Defence Estates, this was roughly ten years ago. When I first started managing the project, I worked closely with the client representatives – a civil servant (who name escapes me) and (his rank of the time) Colonel Paul Chambers of the Royal Engineers. I have to say Paul impressed me (and everyone else who knew him at the consultancy) no end, he knew his stuff, was decisive, worked well with the civil servant and everyone acknowledged that his presence made a difference and got things done that previous incumbents in his job had failed to tackle. Regrettably Paul was redeployed at the end of his posting and was replaced, and the person who replaced him did not impress me to the same extent- for most part as he was simply rather risk adverse and while I am sure it was not the case, it felt like he was simply working out his posting so he could retire. Therefore I can see that certain individuals might well be as DomJ’s describes though even with my anecdotal evidence I fail to see how you can extrapolate from one example to the entire service is beyond me.
Tubby, thank you for your insight, and the observation that any organization always has a variety of people working in it, some good, some bad, most just average.
Sounds like Colonel Chambers was one of the good ones, all organizations need more people like him. Pity they’re so rare.
Sorry GJ, they seem to be rather closed mouthed on the costs.
Found a quotation estimate. The Ultimax Mk V for the US IAR competition cost US $4,000 by General Dynamics.
@ observer, my fall back choice!!
Hmm, FRES…. what happened to the rule of ‘never buy a Mark 1 of anything? Given the problems that this encompasses, should we not be looking at CVR(T) 3 for post Afghanistan conflicts, incorporating all the lessons learned? Having recently read the Wikipedia entry for the Vickers Mk VI Light Tank, one sentance struck me given its simplicity…
“Many of those produced were actually variants designed to solve problems found with the original design”
….why the rush to buy an expensive Mk 1 rather than a cheaper improvement of an existing design?
Phil
The FRES project started in 1999.
After 13 years and god knows how many billions, we have, nothing.
A year from now, we *might* have seven vehicles for testing.
One doesnt need to know much to form the opinion that something is deeply deeply wrong there.
Observer
“If you want people to take you seriously, argue from knowledge, not idealogy. Do your own research, not just use soundbites.”
See above.
Tubby
Because I havent just seen once incident….
Since you brought up defence estates….
Air Cadets (I think).
They had a budget for repairs to their buildings.
Every year, first day of the financial year, they cut a cheque for their entire annual repair budget, and sent it to a local builder. The building was falling down, yet he easily took three months to effect basic repairs.
No one had a clue why they were in this arrangement, whether there was a legal agreement (and if so what its terms were) and whether they were allowed to stop.
No idea if its been resolved or not.
I can just go on and on and on.
Thats not to say the army is only at fault, or the armed forces, or even the government, but being in company isnt really relevent to being incompetant.