A straight reprint from the conclusions and recommendations page
Introduction
1. At the outset of our Report, we wish to pay tribute to the UK Armed Forces and civilian personnel who contributed to operations in Libya. They continue to impress us with the courage, dedication and professionalism with which they undertook this operation which we are convinced saved thousands of civilian lives. We also wish to acknowledge the contribution of the families of Armed Forces personnel. (Paragraph 1)
2. We support the principle that Parliament should whenever possible be consulted and authorise the use of military force prior to its deployment. However, given the Prime Minister’s statement on 18 March 2011 and the debate in the House of Commons on 21 March and that urgent action was required to safeguard civilians in Libya, we are content that Parliament was consulted as soon as practicable. (Paragraph 4)
United Nations
3. Witnesses told us that there were unique circumstances in Libya and, given the gravity of the situation and the potential consequences of inaction, we agree that the international community was justified in its response. (Paragraph 16)
4. We note the contrary opinions we have received regarding the legality of the operation in Libya. It is not for us to comment on the legality of the operation. We agree that the legality of the operation is a separate issue to the issue of the legality of how the operation was undertaken. In response to our Report, the Ministry of Defence should commit to review the conduct of the operation and its compliance with international law. We commend the Government for publishing a summary of the Attorney General’s legal advice and respect the decision not to publish the advice in full but are disappointed that the Prime Minister felt unable to share the advice with us on a private and confidential basis as this would have enabled us to scrutinise the operation in Libya more effectively. We recommend, however, that when a summary of legal advice has been published and developments occur that lead to updated legal advice being sought from the Attorney General, an updated summary of the advice should be published as soon as possible. (Paragraph 24)
5. We welcome the Minister for the Armed Forces’ statement that the Government would expect National Transitional Council forces to be treated in exactly the same way as pro-Gaddafi forces with respect to potential war crimes, as it is essential that both sides in the conflict are treated the same not just in the interests of justice but also for the credibility and future of the International Criminal Court and support of the international community for future operations. (Paragraph 28)
6. While we are aware that there are circumstances where no international authorisation is required for the deployment of UK Armed Forces, we expect the Government to ensure that UK military and civilian personnel comply with international law at all times. (Paragraph 29)
7. We note the concerns expressed that, although not authorised under the UN Security Council Resolutions, regime change was a goal of the mission of Libya. Although it is difficult to see how the mission could have been successfully completed without Colonel Gaddafi losing power, we are concerned that this, rather than the protection of civilians as set out in the Resolution, came to be seen by some countries as an integral part of the mission. The apparent conflict between the military and political objectives meant that the Government failed to ensure that its communication strategy was effective in setting out the aims of the operation. In future, the Government’s communication strategy needs to be more effective so that the public are confident of the aims and goals of such operations. (Paragraph 34)
8. We accept that the coalition forces did their best to prevent and minimise civilian casualties and we commend them for this approach. This lesson, taken from Iraq and Afghanistan, will, we hope make the building of the subsequent peace in Libya significantly easier. Nonetheless, it is at least possible that some civilian casualties were caused by coalition actions. In the absence of observers on the ground it is impossible to say whether, despite the best efforts of coalition forces, any civilian casualties were caused by coalition action and if so how many. (Paragraph 38)
9. We note that under Resolution 1973, the coalition was obliged to protect civilians from casualties caused by National Transitional Council forces as well as pro-Gaddafi forces. In response to our Report the Government should set out how this obligation was carried out. Although we acknowledge that it is difficult to estimate numbers, this should include an assessment of the number of civilian casualties caused by coalition forces, pro-Gaddafi forces and NTC forces. (Paragraph 41)
10. We are concerned by reports that large numbers of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, previously in the armament of pro-Gaddafi forces, are missing in Libya. We accept that the Government, the UN and NATO have acknowledged that this is a major concern for security in the region and the wider world. We expect the international community to support and maintain pressure on the new Libyan regime to ensure that these weapons are held securely and safely. We agree this should be part of a UN-led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, as part of the broad post-conflict settlement. We expect an update on progress on this in the Government’s response to our Report. (Paragraph 45)
11. We acknowledge that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons confirmed, following an on-site inspection, that the remains of the chemical weapons stocks declared by the Gaddafi regime were intact and secure, pending completion of destruction. We note with particular concern the discovery of a previously undeclared stock of chemical weapons. We also note that the Government stated that it would monitor the situation closely with international partners. In its response to our Report the Government should state what further measures it has taken to address this issue and the progress made in the destruction plan. (Paragraph 48)
12. The international community must help and support Libyan women in the future to ensure that there are opportunities for them to have a wider role in the building of the new Libya. (Paragraph 50)
13. We note that the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review stated that the UK would be more selective in its deployment of UK Armed Forces and would do so where there was a “clear strategic aim…and a viable exit strategy”. Whilst accepting that operations should have a clear strategic aim, we recommend that the Government should develop this concept by undertaking a more detailed, comprehensive and strategic assessment before deciding to intervene. We also note the Minister for the Armed Forces’ comments that the operation could have ended in a variety of ways and that there is a limit to the number of engagements that can be undertaken where the exit strategy is known with complete clarity at the outset. Whilst recognising that the changing circumstances of operations may require exit strategies to be reviewed and updated, we are concerned that the Minister’s comments invalidate the SDSR’s assertion that UK Armed Forces will be deployed only where “we have a viable exit strategy”. (Paragraph 55)
14. While we do not regard a UN Security Council Resolution as a prerequisite for military action by UK Armed Forces in all cases, we commend the Government for obtaining UN Security Council approval for operations in Libya. However we are concerned that the abstentions of five Council members, particularly the veto-wielding countries of Russia and China, may make obtaining United Nations support more difficult for similar situations in the future. (Paragraph 60)
15. We note that some commentators have suggested that the action in Libya may have made it impossible (as evidenced by the Russian and Chinese concerns over Syria) for the international community to take decisive action over other countries. The implication contained in that suggestion, that we should therefore not have supported the action in Libya, is one we reject. It is impossible for us to tell what the consequences would have been of allowing the killing of civilians in Benghazi, but we consider that the determination of the Arab League and of most countries of the United Nations that a massacre would be unacceptable was an example of the international community acting as it should. It was acting in a coordinated way to reflect the adoption by the United Nations in 2005 of the “Responsibility to Protect” enshrined in Resolution 1674. (Paragraph 61)
NATO
16. We commend NATO and UK Forces for the speed of the operational deployment in Libya. We are however concerned about the tensions regarding command of the operation during its early stages. There was confusion over the command and control of the operation in the early stages of the operation until NATO took command. We are particularly concerned at the apparent decision of the French Government to commence air operations without consulting allies. We call upon NATO and the Government to look very carefully at how command and control decisions were made in the early stages of the operation and to identify the lessons for any future operations which necessarily begin in an ad hoc manner. (Paragraph 74)
17. We welcome the significant involvement of non-NATO countries, particularly those from the Arab League and Sweden, to operations in Libya. However, we are concerned to establish how the contributions of non-NATO countries fitted into the NATO command and control structures and call on the Government to clarify the command and control structures that were implemented and how they were coordinated. We also call on the Government to clarify how it ensured that any bilateral alliances between non-NATO countries and the National Transitional Council were monitored to ensure that they did not impact unfavourably on the NATO mission or were contrary to the measures in the UN Resolutions. An assessment of the integration of non-NATO countries should be a key part of the lessons learned exercises undertaken by NATO and the UK. (Paragraph 81)
18. For the time being, there will still be a heavy reliance on US command and control functions for future operations. It should be a priority for NATO to examine this. However, whilst accepting the current economic climate and its implications for defence capabilities, we are concerned that future operations will not be possible if the US is not willing or able to provide capabilities such as unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence and refuelling aircraft. It should be a priority for NATO to examine this over-reliance on US capabilities and assets. This challenge will be heightened by the US stated intention to shift its military, geographic and strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific region. (Paragraph 90)
19. We have no evidence of any shortfalls in military assets held by NATO nations needed for operations in Libya. Nonetheless we seek assurances that the UK is pressing NATO to consider the issue of over-reliance on any single nation, and is itself considering the balance of its future forces and how it can best add to the overall mix of NATO capabilities and command and control capacity. (Paragraph 91)
UK contribution to the operation
20. The National Security Council appears to have worked well in respect of the situation in Libya, particularly in coordinating the response of Government Departments. This was important as the mission in Libya had many component parts, not just the military operation. (Paragraph 95)
21. We commend all air units on their role in the operation, both in a combat role and in the Non-combatant Evacuation Operations for UK and other civilians by Hercules prior to the commencement of combat operations. We note the Chief of the Air Staff’s view that both Tornado and Typhoon had operated well. We particularly note that in its first operational role Typhoon performed very reliably. We also note that the Joint Helicopter Command was able to deploy successfully Apache helicopters to the Mediterranean Sea as well as maintain numbers in Afghanistan. (Paragraph 106)
22. ISTAR capabilities are vital to the ability of UK Armed Forces to undertake operations such as those in Libya. We note that it was necessary as part of the mission to extend the service life of the Nimrod R1 signals intelligence aircraft. We expect the MoD to give a higher priority to the development of such capabilities in advance of the next SDSR. In response to this report we also expect the MoD to clarify the position on the future of Sentinel and whether consideration is being given to its retention and what impact retention would have on other budget areas. (Paragraph 110)
23. We commend the actions of the Royal Navy in the operation particularly in respect of the evacuation of civilians from Benghazi, the enforcement of the arms embargo and the early deployment of the first Response Force Task Group. However we note that important tasks, such as the Fleet Ready Escort and counter drugs operations, were not able to be carried out due to meeting the Libya commitment. Given the continued high levels of standing maritime commitments it is likely that this type of risk taking will occur more frequently as the outcomes of the SDSR are implemented. This will be a significant challenge for the Royal Navy and the MoD who should outline their plans to meet this challenge in response to our Report. (Paragraph 114)
24. In our SDSR report we noted the decommissioning of the Harrier Force. Whilst none of our witnesses told us that the Libya operation could not have succeeded without a fixed wing aircraft carrier, we note that three ships capable of carrying aircraft were deployed in theatre as well as the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean. We also note that the First Sea Lord told us that if a carrier with Harrier Force capability had been available it would probably have been used. In response to our Report the Government should indicate if the operation could have been carried out more effectively and efficiently with an aircraft carrier. We repeat our support for proceeding with both Queen Elizabeth class carriers to ensure one is always available for operations. (Paragraph 116)
25. We note the high reliability and accuracy of the principal air munitions employed, but we also note reports regarding shortages of munitions, such as the new variant Brimstone missile, during the operation. UK Armed Forces require large enough stocks of ‘Warlike Materiel’ which can be quickly replenished when used. This requires larger stocks of those items which are more difficult to procure or slower to produce. In response to this report the Government should outline the contingency measures that are in place and whether it has any plans to review them. We accept that that it was necessary for UK Armed Forces to use costly precision guided weapons on some missions in order to minimise or avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage. In response to our Report, we request a detailed explanation on how decisions on which munitions to deploy are made, and at what command level, and whether cost is one of the factors considered. (Paragraph 125)
26. Although the UK was able to satisfy both operations in Libya and the Military Standing Tasks and other operational commitments, Operation ELLAMY was conducted prior to the implementation of many of the Strategic Defence and Security Review decisions on capability reductions. We believe the Government will face significantly greater challenges should an operation of similar size be necessary in the future and it will need to be prepared for some difficult decisions on prioritisation. We consider that Operation ELLAMY raises important questions as to the extent of the United Kingdom’s national contingent capability. We urge the Government to review the United Kingdom’s capacity to respond to concurrent threats. This work should be conducted as a matter of urgency before the next Strategic Defence and Security Review. (Paragraph 127)
27. We welcome the successful interoperability of Anglo-French Forces during the operation, particularly in respect of maritime-based attack helicopter operations. We note the Minister’s comments that there were some problems in the early stages of the operation and request an account of what these were and how resolved. We will continue our scrutiny of the Anglo-French Defence Treaties. (Paragraph 129)
28. We note that in December 2011 the Government stated the estimate for the whole operation was £212 million, made up of £145 million of operating costs, plus a further £67 million on the cost of replenishing munitions used in Libya. We also note that the Secretary of State for Defence announced that fully audited figures would be produced as part of the annual accounts. We expect the details included in the accounts to be as complete as possible and should include a detailed explanation of the component parts of the additional costs, including those of replenishing munitions. In response to our Report the MoD should indicate the timetable for them being reimbursed the additional costs by HM Treasury. In light of the fact that other commentators have estimated the cost of operations to be much higher than the MoD estimate, we expect the MoD and HM Treasury to provide us with a detailed and transparent explanation of the methodology used when calculating its figures. We remain concerned that the MoD does not understand the full costs of operations in Libya. (Paragraph 135)
Implications for future operations
29. Some aspects of NATO’s involvement in operations in Libya were particularly positive, especially the involvement at an early stage of non-NATO nations. However, we also note concerns expressed to us that the US “handed off” the operation to European allies and that NATO is a divided Alliance. We consider that the US decision not to lead the engagement in Libya was positively beneficial, in that it forced European members of NATO to face their own responsibilities, and shone a light on the gaps in European capabilities—gaps which we consider it essential to be plugged. Experiences from operations in Libya have revealed challenges for the political and military future of NATO, including the requirement to develop new ways of working especially if the US does not participate in operations and there is further involvement of non-NATO countries. These challenges must be considered as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 143)
30. We commend the Government for commissioning a lessons learned exercise undertaken by the National Security Adviser. We request a list of all those consulted as part of this exercise. We note that the review stated that “overall the central co-ordination mechanisms worked well”. However we also note that the review highlighted a number of lessons for handling future conflicts. In response to our Report, the Government should set out the steps to be taken and timescales involved to resolve these concerns. We look forward to hearing how the Government proposes to “ensure that it obtains key command positions in those parts of a reformed NATO Command Structure that are most likely to be relevant to the conduct of future operations”, including clarification of which key command positions. (Paragraph 147)
31. We note that the National Security Adviser’s review stated that individual departments would conduct their own lessons learned exercises. The MoD should clarify the remit, format and schedule of the reviews it has carried out or will be undertaking and we expect to see the reports. We request a briefing from the MoD’s Defence Operational Capability on the lessons learned from the Libya operation. (Paragraph 148)
32. We commend the Minister for the Armed Forces’ commitment to include the costs of the operation in the lessons learned process. This should include an assessment of cost effectiveness and value for money of the assets deployed. We note his comment that cost comparisons with allies on different types of operations are only valid if comparing like with like (including the difficulty of the operation), but recommend that where possible these comparisons should be undertaken. (Paragraph 150)
33. We note the concerns of witnesses regarding the operation, but believe that the mission in Libya should be regarded as a success. NATO and other nations acting under the authority of the United Nations have ensured the safety of Libyan civilians who would otherwise have been at risk of being killed by pro-Gaddafi forces. (Paragraph 155)
34. UK Armed Forces have contributed significantly to the successful conclusion of the operation. UK Service personnel have yet again performed their duties in a professional and dedicated manner. The capabilities deployed by NATO and the UK performed well, minimising civilian deaths and collateral damage. However the mission has also highlighted challenges and issues that need to be addressed and taken forward by the United Nations, NATO and the UK Government. The mission in Libya was successful in discharging the UN mandate. The real test is whether the success of this mission was a one-off or whether the lessons it has highlighted mean that future such missions can be successfully undertaken, whilst maintaining the UK’s capability to protect its interests elsewhere. (Paragraph 156)
Down load the reports by clicking the links
Operations in Libya - Vol I
Operations in Libya - Vol II
My god, have just read some of the written evidence
If this is the state of knowledge by people who should know better than I really do despair and it is obvious that the real problem lies not with the politicians but with senior members of HM Forces, who it would seem, are finally being exposed by a lack of cash for the low grade thinkers that we seem to be churning out.
Fuck the country
Fuck service personnel
Fuck trying to actually work with what we have
In fact, fuck everyone
Lets have more toys, a self indulgent whine and the golden opportunity, never to be missed it would seem, to have a go at each other
It really is quite sad
Erm, has someone nicked TDs name?
Only read the summary and recommendations, and the overly legalistic tone aside, the recommendations regarding both the revisiting of some of the SDSR points as well as some NATO-level issues would make a good list for frequent follow-up and discussion
@TD
You have my sympathy. The evidence (most of which seems incontrovertible) certainly doesn’t support anyone promoting an anti-carrier agenda.
“In response to our Report the Government should indicate if the operation could have been carried out more effectively and efficiently with an aircraft carrier. We repeat our support for proceeding with both Queen Elizabeth class carriers to ensure one is always available for operations.”
Anyone still believe the intention isn’t come to a ‘decision’ in SDSR2015 to fit cats-n-traps to both carriers………………..?
No sympathy needed DS, did you write some of that utter fucking drivel then
Jedi, the defence select committee are about as much use as a wet fart and they can support all they want, as they have done in the past and you know what results they get
Its round with a lot of space in the middle
I admit I’ve only dipped into the document, but the analysis I read there appeared reasonable. Exactly which bits of it do you take issue with?
the written submissions from the PTT etc
@TD
There was no input from me. I know the PTT is often OTT in its claims but isn’t it intriguing that so many senior service and civilian figures, with all that knowledge, experience and expertise between them, have arrived at roughly the same conclusions? As I said before, their evidence provides small comfort for anti-carrier lobbyists. So, despite your rather strongly-worded protestation, methinks you still have my sympathy.
I’m sorry if I’ve stepped into some sort of dispute here. I did read the submissions and what I read appeared reasonable. Things like – it’s a good idea to keep enough munitione – especially of ones with long lead times or other potential obstacles to procurement. Four Astutes with 24 TLAM would have provided a very responsive way to take out precision, high value, hardened targets a long way from the coast. Harriers (claimed to have been incapable of using precision weapons) could have carried AGM-65G2, PIV and CRV etc. etc. I understand those providing the submissions had agendas but I guess I’m looking for specific factual errors or omissions in their submissions here.
Having been directly involved in the training of many middle ranking and some current senior officers (some of my former students are now 3*s) I have to concur with TD. The intellectual level of a significant number is actually quite abysmal and it shows when forced to argue their case in Select Committee meetings. My feeling is that a large proportion of the high flying middle rank officers quit the forces in the 1990s after the original Options for Change (1991-94) and Strategic Defence Review (1998). As the cuts have bitten and the operational tempo post 9/11 has been maintained so many more of the best and brightest have had enough. These are the people who should be at the top, not the current third XI team that seems institutionally incapable of exercising proper leadership. The Libya operation bears this out in many ways.
Consequently we have had a series of very poor decisions and policies from all three Services that have now created a perfect storm at a time of financial stringency. For example take:
* Armoured vehicle procurement
* FRES
* Nimrod MR4A
* The original unaffordable carrier decision
* Failure to counter IEDs with proper MRAP vehicles
* Operations in Basra
* Failed counter-insurgency doctrine in Iraq and Afghanistan
* The Harrier decision
* The emerging flying training disaster
* The farce over F-35B, F-35C and the concealed costs of carrier modification
* The Astute submarine programme
* The failure to develop viable UAV platforms
* The Team Complex Weapon shenanigans and attempt to get a gallon out of a pint pot
* The delays and under-arming of the Type 45 and Type 26 warships
* The failed transport helicopter procurement strategy
* The indecision over the Trident replacement
* The failure to to deploy viable deterrent forces in the Falklands
* Over-extension of forces in Libya
* And now an apparent determination to somehow get involved in wars against Iran and Syria
I sometimes wonder what they put in the water at Main Building.
And I could go on. There are far too many indefensible policy and procurement decisions being made, often for very short term reasons such as immediate cost savings, that have seriously undermined the UK’s military capability and its defence industrial base. Not only do our politicised generation of senior officers (all 480 of them, 1*s and above) go along with what is demanded by the Treasury and politicians – when was the last military resignation on a point of principle? – but all too often they are the instigators of thoroughly bad policy. Just read today’s report or the PAC reports on carriers and armoured vehicles.
And before the normal whingers start complaining about ‘what do you know?’, well until very recently I have worked for almost 35 years alongside many of the current upper military echelon and I have been simply amazed recently at some of the promotions. It seems a stiff bearing, loud voice and lots of self confidence will still take people right to the top. No wonder our American counterparts are increasingly dismissive of us.
This feels more and more like the Interwar period with its inept and inadequate military and political leadership conducting defence and foreign policy. At some point we are going to get our arses kicked big time, just like 1940. And we will deserve it.
I found the First Sea Lords comments enlightening;
“Using Libya as an example of the need, or not, for aircraft carriers can lead you to
some false assumptions. If we had had a carrier with Harrier capability, as we used to,
I suspect we would have used it as another option, and it might have been reactively
tasked in some circumstances. But, let us be absolutely clear, it could not have
provided the effect of Tornado with Brimstone and Storm Shadow”
Fatman
As I have said elsewhere; there is lot of evidence of a stultifying conformity to doctrine, and stiff upper lip type culture; leading to as you say a 1940′s level of ineptitude in our armed forces.
If we ever go up against someone who knows what there doing or who knows the ground and their own limitations we are going to get a kicking.
Basra was a warning, next time it will be Singapore all over again. complete with Prince of Wales and Repulse.
Impressive list, Fatman
- personally I would leave Astute out [ok, skills gap was allowed to emerge, America had to help us out and now the price of a whole (extra) boat has been squandered on adjustments of the trip-feed... but all of it down to politicians (no?)]
I can see the argument re Storm Shadow (although RN TLAMs largely duplicate that capability). The Harrier vs Tornado argument is more moot as Harrier could carry at least two AGM-65 and Paveway IV the combination of which would largely emulate Brimstone when used in SALH mode. Brimstone has a smaller warhead for somewhat less collateral damage, but how often would that actually have been a consideration?
@Fatman. What were the team complex weapons shenanigans?
@ ChrisW
Stanhope seemed to be adamant that there was no comparison (Tornado > Harrier) and that had the decision gone the other way then the Harrier force – having to prioritise Afghanistan – would not even have been available for Ellamy.
Chris W
TCW – every time a deal has been reached the money available is reduced and the negotiations start all over again. And again. This has build all kinds of delays into the multiple programmes, put up costs and then of course leads to more negotiations ad infinitum. The future should be interesting… but at least CAMM has now been ordered.
ACC
Astute. Yes, part of the problem was the moratorium on SSN building in the 1990s and the skills gap at Barrow, but you should also ask why the RN believes that building 7 very large boats makes more strategic sense than 10-12 smaller ones for the same money. The intellectual failure is one of abandoning evolutionary change for revolutionary. Of course, Astute is undoubtedly better than building say a Trafalgar batch 3, but as every engineer knows radical changes should be avoided. The result is a major shrinkage in the fleet and the acquisition of a boat whose size effectively limits its coastal deployment (ask the citizens of the Isle of Skye). The RN is obsessed with building large SSNs, even though there is as yet no solution to the disposal of the old nuclear boats.
Their utility in the sorts of conflict we now face can be seen as essentially that of cruise missile launcher. If that is the primary purpose it would have been a lot cheaper to have built half a dozen destroyer-sized vessels carrying a lot more TLAMs. But that involves thinking outside the box and there are very strong vested interests that will argue that the SSN is the only possible solution. Bear in mind it is the Services that define the requirements, not civil servants or politicians. And this is where the problem sets in – the Services each have their sacred cows (such as the carrier acquisition programme) and will sacrifice anything else to get them. This is how we end up with distorted forces structures and inadequate equipment levels. If you have poor senior officers you will get poor decisions about what is needed. You could reasonably argue that Astute is not the answer we need, no matter how good it may be as an SSN.
A good question ” you should also ask why the RN believes that building 7 very large boats makes more strategic sense than 10-12 smaller ones for the same money. The intellectual failure is one of abandoning evolutionary change for revolutionary”
- I can imagine that the obsession with being a global force, capable of operating anywhere,may have been the driver (while forgetting that we have sturdy allies in far away places – for replenishment and joint naval operations)
- on another blog site I argued that the ambition should be reigned in, to cover as far as the FI in the West and to Diego Cargia in the East; without insisting on independent operations further out… the budgets could suddenly go much further and RAS capacity look much less streched
@ Fatman – “but you should also ask why the RN believes that building 7 very large boats makes more strategic sense than 10-12 smaller ones for the same money.”
Perhaps this reflects the need to preserve an ability to design, as well as build, nuclear submarines, i.e. to create derivations of the Trafalger class will inevitably cause skills to atrophy to the point where new design is impossible.
We might argue that at seven boats (+4), nuclear submarines should not be deemed a strategic industry, as we cannot afford to build a useful fleet, but that is a separate argument.
“on another blog site I argued that the ambition should be reigned in, to cover as far as the FI in the West and to Diego Cargia in the East; without insisting on independent operations further out…”
But the main operation area already is the one you propose, even if a frigate every now and then might go as far as Singapore or even visit Japan (ridiculously rare).
You are not really proposing cutting anything.
7 boats was our political masters degreed not what the original plan which was a one for one swap for the S & T Boats.
What amazes me about Astute considering her size is no VLS tubes to bring into line with USN.
As for 12 smaller boats there is some talk about the web of Australia looking at Virginias to replace the Collins. The SSK being too short legged to cope with the Indian Ocean transits.
HDW Type 216 and BMT Vidar®-36 do look interesting.
http://www.bmtdsl.co.uk/?/308/899/
I also like stuff like this too……
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/c/c5/BrahMos_missie_on_Lada_class_non-nuclear_submarine_maqette.jpg/1280px-BrahMos_missie_on_Lada_class_non-nuclear_submarine_maqette.jpg
Ermm, the topic was “why such big boats…that you only get 7, instead of 10-12″
- the number is now so small that the navy (as regards SSNs) is always operating on the edge and nothing can go wrong (we are not mentioning the out of date charts here; that was a good way to save)
- the other thing that would be seriously stretched (on operations) is RAS
…so, Gaby, you are right: I was not suggesting of cutting anything
Was that ermmm directed at me perchance?
@x
Yes, but the point is that even a cursory examination of the likely costs + inflation should have made clear to the RN that replacing the S&T boats one-for-one with a new design that was both significantly larger and more sophisticated was never, ever going to be affordable. The situation is that of of a company that needs 12 saloons for its sales reps, but because it wants to keep up with its more successful rival (the USN) decides to settle on 7 Rolls Royces instead of 12 BMWs, and is then surprised it cannot cover all the areas it desires. The Services are letting their ambitions override fiscal prudence. Logically the RN will only be able to afford 3 or 4 replacements for Astute and perhaps a single replacement for those in due course, unless some fundamental rethinking takes place.
The answer may of course be to abandon nuclear power in favour of more affordable AIP and accept the limitations. But I have yet to see any sign that this kind of realistic thought process is being implemented. The Astute class in submarine building terms is probably a dead end I am afraid and it will probably be the last SSN, unless of course the UK economy starts growing at 4% p.a. And I totally agree about the lack of VLS tubes. Why build something so large and expensive and then fail to equip it properly? Presumably this was a cost-saving measure – which means that we could not really afford what we needed in the first place if you think about it.
X, no (but , for clarity, I should have started with “Gaby” rather than finished with it)
@ Fatman
Yes and no. As with most things it is more a case of choosing to afford. Astute 8 & 9 would have cost less than Astute 7. Barrow is good at SSNs; I would rather have more submarines than spend money on T26. What annoys is that 7 is just a stupid number; one wonders about refit cycles etc.
As for VLS I do hope it was a cost cutting measure and not a failure of imagination. Sadly I think it is probably both.
@Chris B.
Point taken, but arguing whether a weapon system, taken in isolation, can substitute for another one is a different thing from asking whether it would have been available for the substitution. The combination of sea-based Harrier and TLAM clearly has a large degree of overlap with the GR4s capabilites. It obviously couldn’t substitute for Typhoon in the air superiority role, but then something would have gone very wrong if the Libyan AF was still able to get any fighters airborne on D+1.
@Fatman
I understand where you are coming from on TCW. CAMM does look to be a great concept and a huge capabilty upgrade on both Rapier and VLSW. I do wonder what the LMM brings to the table that a guided 70mm rocket can’t, particularly when you can carry 19 of the latter in place of perhaps five of the former.
You point out two issues with the submarine. 1. Could a detroyer sized ship which could have been built in greater numbers much more cheaply have substituted in a TLAM delivery role and 2. would 12 of something a bit cheaper have been better value/more capable than 7 of something huge and gold-plated. We could have whole threads on either question that would doubtless just run and run.
The advantage of having TLAMs on an SSN/SSGN over a sirface is that an opponent will not know where that platform is even if he has half decent ocean and air surveillance in place. You can’t quantify that as a purely psychological benefit. Assuming you’re in a peer to peer conflict the submarine also confers much enhanced survivability. You’re obviously going to be able to fit a lot more TLAMs on a surface ship (barring and SSBN conversion) and the ship is going to have a lot more versatility in what it can do across the spectrum of conflict.
The excellent vs very good argument is more difficult. The USN as another poster pointed out retreated from the excellent to the very good. How likely are we to come up against an opponent where having anything less than the best possible SSN will make a difference? In that, highly unlikely scenario it would make all the difference and in any other, quantity, and perhaps smaller size would win out.
Now that we are all (?) agreed that the boats were built unnecessarily big/ expensive
…comes the next ermm (by Nick Clegg):
“Any chance you could extend those boats a bit, behind the fin, to take just a couple of missiles, and we could save the Vanguard replacement monies”
@ArmChairCivvy: depends how large and flexible the common missle compartment is
@ Fatman
No sure I get your point about the size of Astute, the intention to deploy tomahawk would suggest that Astute was not intended to go close to shore.
Re the concept..t it could be a sacred cow but it could also be part of portfolio management of procurement for the SSNB which needs the Astute program to trail blaze
Given what’s already committed to SSBN I suspect that Astute was a constrained concept but I don’t think it’s that difficult to get off the shelf diesel small subs or licensed production
–
Not sure which country now own s German sub production – expect UAE now or soon – so we could just ask them for a deal and get some late trades as per the gone missing Greek deal
Also think the BMT snorkel sub interesting
Re your type 3 seniors do you think the new era of budget responsibility for service chiefs will find them out and scare then off?
@RW
Astute also has a SF role and as the only available submarine will be used for all kinds of roles such as coastal recce for which a vessel this size is perhaps not best suited. I suppose this is really an argument for at least two sizes of boat. If Astute is essentially a TLAM platform a surface ship would almost certainly be adequate against the sort of targets likely to be envisaged (Libya, Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, etc) since they will not have blue water capabilities.
This really comes down to our concept of future strategy. If we still see ourselves going head to head against a major power like the old USSR clearly we want the best (and a defence budget to match). If, as I suspect, the UK’s future lies in token support of the US in major intervention operations and undertaking only minor ones ourselves then we are unlikely to encounter serious opposition. Even against Argentina a ship-based TLAM platform would be adequate. So are we still in the serious war fighting business as the top brass would prefer, or are we now (post-SDSR) so reduced that we can accept less capable forces because we aren’t going to take on China, India, etc? And where does this leave the carrier procurement? Because if we have downgraded our enemies then surely we can get by with F-18 instead of F-35. I don’t feel that SDSR has really defined the nature of the clout we feel we require or who our enemies are, but if we try to pretend that we are capable of taking on the big boys, when in fact we are not, then someone will call the bluff one day.
IXION: “Basra was a warning, next time it will be Singapore all over again. complete with Prince of Wales and Repulse.”
Since so many experts are using this blog can I ask what the best book on the Fall of Singapore is? with regard to military tactics etc.
I have read about it before, but not in the detail I was looking for.
Seems crazy how 30,000 Japs could defeat 100,000+ Empire troops even if they were vasty better equiped thats a huge number difference. The planes and Tanks shouldn’t have had as big an impact as they did given the jungle terran earlier in the campaign?
diesel electrics are useless for anything but coastal defence
they lack the ordnance for land attack or the range for aggressive naval warfare.
They might win in wargames, but once that snorkel pops up.
Everyone who can build them, does.
no
no idea as to tactics or specifics, i’d put it down to crap occupation troops against elite killing machines
Observer will be able to give you a very good reason why we got our arses kicked since the reason is the single biggest problem by far for the SDF still today.
Having now had chance to have a good read through it. The written evidence section seems at odds with the first. The first seems to have some good Q&A sessions in parts a little dry, but that’s the nature of these things. The second part of the report seemed to be baffling, why a group of seemingly so educated and with so many letters after their names would come up with such rubbish to put in a report.
It’s so full of holes that I find it odd they were given such a large part of the report to sound off their ‘evidence’. In nearly all of the comparisons and tables it wasn’t so much as apples and oranges comparisons as apples and space shuttles.
Looking forward to dipping into this, at first glance the telling line for me was para 23 of the summary and the RN’s inability to meet its other commitments due to Libya, and how Government is looking forward to the MOD’s solution to this. Proof that the RN is now below the critical mass necessary to meet its commitments worldwide. Solution – either build more bloody ships or reduce the commitment.
Astute is a class 1 procurement cluster#### which is pressing ahead for the sole purpose of supporting our nuclear shipbuilding industry so we can build the Successor SSBN.
The written evidence.
All the Committee has done is seek pluralistic views. It stands to reason that the most noisy and opinionated have contributed. It is sound reasoning to argue that everyone’s opinion is useful, if not necessarily particularly relevant. By sounding out some of these strange groups and people, they helped build their understanding of the issues. I haven’t read the whole report but I wonder how much weight was given to each of these submissions. Some of them are amateur in the extreme, some of them are opinion pieces but all of them as a whole represent a valuable picture and source of information.
I even spotted the Pheonix Think Tank in there.
So anyway, it’s gathered evidence. Evidently from some exercised individuals or groups amongst others but all of that information is useful and should be sought out. If the Committee didn’t look at a variety of viewpoints, stances and opinions then it wouldn’t have been worth the paper the report was written on.
@ Phil, I agree with what you say, I just don’t think ‘the broad church’ view was balanced enough. It was all much of a muchness, but like you say I suppose it’s to be expected.
Some of the written “evidence” was down right shoddy. My complaint about such things is that there appears to be no opportunity for a response to things like this. If there were, I suspect some of the written evidence would be slaughtered under close scrutiny.
I don’t know how the Committee gathered its evidence. It seems people just submitted it. The Pheonix Think Tank screed is particularly headache inducing. I imagine much more weight was given to more official evidence but the other evidence certainly gives context and flavour to the debate. And also, we’re a democracy. People whose cheese has slipped off their cracker, or so we think, get to shout too. Maybe next time someone from here could put a submission in on the next report. It’s no use arguing about the skewed nature of the debate when we haven’t voiced our opinions.
Part of the problem is the Defence Committee, like other Select Committees, does not have the support or resources that a comparable Congressional Committee possesses. This is why their questions are sometimes poorly framed and basic knowledge is lacking. The US House Armed Service Committee, for example, has a whole team of researchers who can provide briefs to members and suggest questions. This enables them to hold witnesses to account in a much more professional way. But somehow I think that UK governments of any persuasion will instinctively shy away from loosing this particular genie. The results could be very embarrassing for MOD. Let’s face it, most of us who read these reports have seen occasions when minsters, civil servants and senior military officers have at best been highly evasive with the truth and at worst have downright lied to the Defence Committee – and it has not been picked up. The UK’s defence failings partly come about because MPs cannot hold them to account while mistakes are in progress. Instead we have autopsies after projects have failed or operations have been ineptly completed.
Chris B.
I suspect it was shredded but divergent viewpoints are all valid, if not all relevant. I doubt very much it’s the first time for example a thick, heavy envelope has thudded onto their floor with the return address, ‘Pheonix Think Tank’. I am sure they have a list of usual suspects who like the old man thundering about Council Tax in the local papers letter section, never shut up.
Commons Defence Committee Releases MoD Briefing on Typhoon in Libya Operations
http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/132546/mod-report-on-typhoon-operations-in-libya.html
I don’t begrudge people their opinions, but when people start posting numbers or making statements purported to be facts then we start entering very different territory, which is no longer opinion and has now become an argument about fixed and known variables.
If people manipulate that data then that is not just offering a divergent opinion, it is twisting the truth or outright lying to achieve a position or implant a particular viewpoint in the heads of important individuals.
Dissapointed to see the Pheonix Think tank influencing this, even as a maritime supporter believe that they are biased and choose to ignore the bigger picture.
And advertising a truly informative
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
_________________________________________________
Tuesday, February 14, 2012
9:30 AM
To receive testimony on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future
Years Defense Program.
- the Executive arm truly have to make their case
- a pity that forward-looking part of the Committee work is so much less pronounced here than being after-the-fact watch dog
Apologies not actually read the report but I do note that Libya has been cited as one of the reasons why we have exercised an option for an eighth C-17 http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/ModToBuyExtraC17Aircraft.htm (and it also proves that the RAF are not all about fast pointy things)