The previous post from Sir Humphrey drew some great comments and a vigorous debate but I think there was more common ground than not.
Plan A, politics
Plan B, deterrence
Plan C, defence
Plan D, recapture
We are going to have to be monumentally incompetent to get to a point where Plan C is needed and Plan D, most unlikely but extreme low probability/high impact events do happen, just as BP or the shareholders of RBS.
I think we all pretty much agree that before we even get to discussions about defending the islands we must first look at intent and ability on behalf of the government and military of Argentina. In this there is a significant disparity between rhetoric and reality but the Falkland Islands remain an extremely powerful and emotive issue in Argentina. Sometimes I think we might be in danger of underestimating the depth of this emotion. The ‘Malvinas’ issue can always be relied upon to draw the gaze of a restive Argentine population, it’s an easy way to distract public opinion so in light of the recent and growing controversy around the train accident we might reasonably expect that dial to be turned to 11.
The usual suspects will continue to wade in and let’s not be expecting much solidarity from Spain either as the issue of Gibraltar remains a sore point. So, politically, there seems a rising tide of opinion, activity and pressure from multiple sources to which we must decide how to react.
In the previous discussion there were some great points but I thought one of the most interesting ones was the difference in cost between a small increment in defence capabilities to plug one or two potential vulnerabilities and mounting a recapture operation should those potential vulnerabilities be exploited by an intelligent and cunning enemy, or another way of saying this, what happens if we have miscalculated.
We should not underestimate the military capability on and around the Falkland Islands or over-estimate what Argentina can bring to bear.
However, it’s the weekend and it’s either this or a post on ISO containers so as a bit of fun I thought it would be good to discuss how the defence capabilities on the Falkland Islands could be enhanced.
Rules of the Road
Why Bother
Let’s assume, for the purposes of this weekend post, the grown-ups at the MoD have decided that in the face of a perceived increase in intent and the potential for an improving Argentine capability in a number of areas ‘something discrete’ has to be done.
Funding
As we all know, whenever defence capabilities are discussed, costs are both high and almost impossible to track down so there are no hard and fast rules, however, the basic principle is that if we want to increase capabilities over the medium terms there is not a huge pot of cash from which to dip in, so be modest.
If you want to trade existing capabilities off against new ones then fair enough, robbing Peter to pay Paul is within the rules. Depending on how it is counted, the current bill is in the order of three to four hundred million pounds per year.
Using non MoD funding for dual use capabilities could be an interesting avenue to explore.
Visibility
There is a balancing act between improving military capabilities and inflaming the political situation but it should also be noted that playground rules are sometime the most effective. Big statements can be effective but might not always be the best long term solution.
Mix and Match
The idea is to create a balanced force with the appropriate communications, mobility, ISTAR, logistics and combat elements, building on what is already there in some cases or from scratch.
Other ideas are permissible, moving the balance between regular and reserve, sponsored reserves or other engagement models for example.
Although any suggestion has to be balanced and sustainable you might decide to invest a greater proportion in sensor networks than machine guns, explain the rationale.
Every single nut and bolt has to be shipped or flown into the islands, too much variety adds costs.
Finally, people are always the most expensive, using capital spending to replace personnel is always worth investigating.
Dual Use
Any ideas for capabilities that have a wider utility for the Falkland islanders will get top billing.
The islands existing GSM/WIMAX network for example, could be extended and used for a network of remote sensors at vulnerable areas.
Don’t forget, the Islands have a vehicle ferry/landing craft and Islander aircraft operated by FIGAS
Should you think a hovercraft could provide both something of civilian and military use (Jed) then that would be a fair use of limited funds.
So, in your own time…
PS
Don’t forget, this is only a bit of fun!
interesting. a few months ago, i was laughed off this board and told i was being a right wing reactionary when i expressed alarm about the vulnerability of the FI. now it appears that many are actually looking at the issue and seeing where i am coming from.
vindicated?
yes i am.
I’ll nip to one side of the blue touchpaper immediately above and dig in, in a mixture of suggestions and questions for those who would know (those in or out of uniform, and in or out of defence contracting work):
- Dual use is clearly an important piece of the puzzle, both for the sake of the islands’ (and Islanders’) own infrastructure with the possible ramp-up to exploratory drilling, and so we can push some of the everyday expenses down a different budget stovepipe. You’ve already thrown out a solid suggestion, boss — piggybacking GSM/WIMAX for daily-chatter tripwire sensors. ELINT is a critical element in all of this. The other is HUMINT, and with potential drilling expansion in store now is probably a good time to push development funds towards an indigenous coast guard with a volunteer sort of militia-pressing among the islanders. One part RNLI-type humanitarian ops, one part Fisheries Protection, both of which taken together represent a chance to engage a body of locals — who will thereby be tied to everyone else in the Islands with that population — in getting a full, on-record knowledge of comings and goings in the EEZ. Much cheaper to supply and run (donations of ageing Halmatics from back home? Will they stand the wave strength in those waters? And get the folks in Glasgow to knock out another Jura in fetching FI colours to replace the fisheries role of HMS Clyde. Sell her (Clyde) to Jamaica as a flagship to cover some of the costs or bring her home as a bigger, better River to troll for suspicious Icelanders. Yes, I know they’re all suspicious.) The FI’s future lies in the surrounding EEZ and that’s the Argies route of approach. Enable them sticking their beaks out in it as much as possible through non-MoD funding lines. Workship crews should undergo training so that they can work under Naval Discipline Act in an emergency and move FIDF around. The more mobile that lot are (especially the ability to port them over onto West Falkland, setting up visual OPs and sniping positions so the regulars can concentrate on East Falkland) the better. Also worth considering a civil helicopter SAR service branched off the prospective home one, not just for SAR but disaster relief in storms, civil medevac, and emergency transport of the forces.
- Streamline permanent presence in the area of operations to the “distance” services, RAF and Naval Service. Army takes on a reinforcement role. That would be salutary on three counts. One is just that, streamlining, and a suspicion that this alone will help manage some transit, accomodation, stores, etc., costs. The second is that it’s a great excuse for an annual (or even twice-yearly) opex by Spearhead to reinforce (airlanding or parachuting in) at one go. It’s a maximal test of everything from refueling and airframes to loadmasters’ logistics and squaddies endurance for sitting on their arse in a cold airframe. Probably, what, 18 hours even in a C-17 accounting for headwinds and refueling? After that, “somewhere in Africa,” Finnmark, or Oman would all be a trice. Also, since this is sovereign UK soil, its residents British citizens (even as a lefty I don’t really object to the historical nature of “subjects”), you could gear up company or battalion battlegroups of TA every year or two to head down for exercises. Not too different from keeping notional attackers out of the north Scottish coast or the Province, and a chance to practice actual, y’know, territorial defence. Great photo op for the TA and their lobby for regenerating lost capabilities (“Our Brave Volunteers in the hallowed Falklands!”) and has the effect of reducing the windows of minimal garrison size and readiness. In order to conduct those exercises, you have to mobilise and task logistical resources back home, which could be diverted to the actual reinforcement plan either coming or going.
- Big fan of James’ and x’s RAF Regiment suggestion. (Well, big fans of theirs anyway, perhaps my two favourite Tories ever other than an old friend from uni.) The garrison grows a company, one dedicated to somewhat mobile defence of MPA, and one that will be seen in purely defensive terms. Absolute no brainer.
to the RM. If we can get the corps back onto ‘phibs as EMFs and back onto ships as Fleet Protection, rather than tramping around the Stan like line infantry, they should be able to do quite a bit of “special forces support” as they are. (I respect the skills nad operational role of SF, but dislike this language that makes commando units sound like their batmen.) So, take the company-sized RM element from SFSG and beef it up a bit. Commando 21 coys are undermanned as it is unless you throw all four in at once — take a rifle coy and add “maneouvre support” weapons elements (special eye to snipers and mortars for fixing opponents), probably an extra clerk and signalman or two, up to about 140-150 bods. Commanded by a major so he can talk on level terms to most of the MPA mafia and RN staffers. In other words something much more substantial than LP 8901 was in ’82. And Vikings galore, shuffled back from Afghanistan and cost-accounted somewhere in the wilds of fleet management. There’s your islands QRF/SF-hunting force while the Fighting Ray-Bans maintain the MPA standoff zone.
- RIC enhancement is right idea, wrong service. Unless we’re ready for the cost and resource-devouring of a full battlegroup in the islands (could it be done with Warthogs? I realise they’re twice the weight of Vikings but what about detaching front cabs for scouting? Also how do they distribute gvw over the tracks? Restricted to the roadways — in which case, could we design deployment plans to “screen out” the firing distance of James’ SF teams with ATGWs by putting remaining minefields between Bluefor and Redfor?) If not, and I’m not especially though there are ways to do it, then better to fit the terrain, climate, and general dampness of the islands’ frontiers (also known as beaches
- I suspect there are some real opportunities to “capability plus” either the intelligence gathering (Mk.1 Eyeball) or combat support of the minesweeping command. But though my own dear granddad was a sapper I don’t have too many original ideas on that score. Would love to hear them, though, including repurposing mines or mine-clearance equipment as defensive barriers at key points.
As for the rest, it really boils down to the fact that these Really Are Islands You Know and creating a bit of strategic distance for the Argentines to face would be a Good Idea. And that creation of strategic distance lies alternately with the RAF and the RN. So:
- As part of a push to bloody well make the RAF eat its teaspoon of cod liver and like it by purchasing 160 Typhoons and keeping them in service, there’s a chance to expand Falklands air defence. In another thread I suggest that most other air forces would be ludicrously happy with a ratio of 6×12 active squadrons (72) for QRA, 2×12 (24) for OCU/OEU, and 48 spares. This leaves 16 aircraft left over. Considering that 1) this is sovereign UK soil over which a bloody war was fought only a generation ago and 2) it’s Britain’s strategic gateway to an entire region of the world (South Atlantic/Antarctic) at the south end of a global region (Atlantic pole-to-pole plus Mediterranean) where the UK would be well advised to concentrate its power projection (plus East Africa & Oman) it is worth making a meaningful QRA contribution down south, since 1435 Flight is really the most in-danger QRA force on the payroll.
- So, double the RAF fast jet presence. Two flights of four, with the ability to send in a third flight on short notice. (So that’s 4×4 flights of aircraft, shifting one set every so often and resting one as spares that could regenerate with emergency pilots — instructors, extras from other squadrons, in desperation the newly passed-out of training — for a full sixteen if need be.) Eight Typhoons in the islands all FGR-cleared. In honour of the service they represent I’d nickname the second flight “Bravado,” “Tiny Roadsters,” “Low Altitude,” and “Handlebar Moustaches.” Move the air patrol from four to eight — a doubling, yes, but with those low numbers not a grotesque increase. Massively increases AR’s air-superiority issues, however. Greatly increases the odds their will be aircraft up and ready when you try to neutralise MPA, and that you can take the risk of scrambling jets near the runway (thanks to RAF Regt. cover) even under fire to get them up. Odds of swift and relatively bloodless neutralisation way down. This also provides proper air cover for
- The Flaklands Guard Ship. Again, since this is Britain’s one truly militarised frontier (except the slow-burn insanity of the Cyprus SBAs) there is much more casue for a warship here than WINDIES or even Armilla (where the most directly and persistently effective RN contingent is the MCM flotilla.) So the Falklands posting goes to a Type 23, which already has Merlin and Harpoon integrated unlike their big sisters the Darings. Also, one with Sonar 2087 installed (even if this means, according to one of our other posters, risking new gyms on shipboard across the fleet, the real point of T23s vice patrol vessels is that they’re world-league GP frigates plus their actually world-beating ASW set.) You have a solid GP warship, able to play chicken with the ARA, and specifically equipped to help keep tabs on SSK movements. (I’ve also wondered about the ARA using them to ‘spoof’ the regional SSN with cat-and-mouse engagement, assuming restrictive Bluefor ROE until there’s substantial shooting on the islands, in order to screen landing forces.)
- APT(S), which is of course a separate mission, should be given over at all times, anyway and as a matter of course, to an SSN. Destroyers look pretty in the tabloids, but if you want actual power projection into the region (not just the South Atlantic but the west coast of Africa and, if need be, the northern littoral of S. America up Venezuela way) then you send an SSN with a decent quiver of Tomahawks. Serves a lot more purposes than just Falklands deterrence and you don’t leave B.A. guessing — they just know already that this must be risked or overcome.
Look forward to everyone else playing Fantasy Garrisons (TM).
“Flaklands,” hmm … sometimes a Freudian slip is not just a cigar.
why hasn’t anyone stated the obvious? the UK (and the US) needs to get out Afghanistan so that real deal commitments can be met!
once that is done you have the forces necessary to EASILY defend these islands. but that must be done first or all you’re really talking about is at best a holding action and at worst an effort to reclaim the islands.
time for us all to get our heads together and end that nonsense. once that is done you have an extremely strong cadre of combat trained Marines and soldiers on which to build your defense however you see fit.
Solomon,
Myself I take that as read (getting out of Afghanistan.) Others may not (although a pretty strong party here do) and we’ve had some good debates on that round here. But in slightly less strenuous terms that’s exactly right. Elective land wars in Asia (and, while a punitive expedition after 9/11 was right and necessary, the long-game COIN approach over the following decade was absolutely elective) are just not a good idea.
A side note on Type 23 as guardship: CAMM* will come into service, it seems, close to an on-time delivery. The increased range of engagement, ability to update from varied radar inputs, and potentially greater numbers loaded aboard should, together with ‘Phoons above, allow T23 to overcome its Achilles heel (deadly vulnerable to saturation attacks) and do a creditable job on self defence if 2-3 Argentine jets tried to USS Stark her at the start of an engagement.
* I refuse to use the new type designation. Because it’s just sad. Like, “the guy in Marketing who can never pull even on ladies’ night down the local came up with this” sad.
Sol, I have no doubt that once all (allied) troops have been withdrawn from A’Stan, they will be mothballed due to the accompanying ‘peace dividend’ round (“Hey we’re out, let’s save some money” / “It’s the economy, stupid”-lot) so any ‘liberated’ assets will be unavailble for Real World missions – no matter how badly they are needed for said missions…
An Argie invasion force might be preceded by commando raids using Hercs or civilian aircraft (and perhaps a few civilian ships to maintain the element of surprise) to conduct strikes against certain strategic C3 sites. Also, fishing trawlers can be easily configured to lay mines, and just the rumor of sea mines will hamper any RN task force’s freedom of movement.
Playing Red Team here, a lot has changed since the 1980′s. Commercial Sat recce is available for Argentina, as is considerable GEO/HUMINT from the Falklands itself. Argentina knows about the elaborate defensive sites and it will avoid having to charge those with its equivalent Light Brigades. Still, eventually any impenetrable fortress has a weak spot, and we can safely assume that most of the UK’s main island installations have been under close observation for some time.
But bottom line we have to keep in mind what Argentina’s objective would be; the islands themselves or the surrounding offshore oil/gas fields. Capturing the latter may not even require an island invasion force.
Last I checked, the Args only have one Type 209, and two Santa Cruzs in terms of SSKs. Not much of a threat as the Santa Cruzs are barely operable, and only the 209 is capable of ops. Also, this argument over whether the Args can take the Falklands is moot until the Args develop a serious amphibious capability which they do not have.
@solomon
No you have not been vindicated, see the other Falklands thread for the ongoing… debate.
What you, wf and James have postulated are extreme end scenarios requiring mass incompetence, extreme luck and enough coincidences to make you Las Vegas’s worst enemy if it happened there. Read the main article to see that this section is here only just because a one in a million “what if” scenario may happen.
TD, I’d put the budget not as the MoD’s 200-300M one but the FLDF’s budget which I estimate is around 500m pounds annual. In a case like this, if you need X piece of equipment in a week or less etc, you’re already screwed, you simply won’t have the budget for it. For low budget areas, what you need to do is a slow ramp up of capabilities, for example, 200 rifles per year over 10 years (~200k per year) to build up to a stock of 2000 rifles, not a single 10m pound buy.
Possible areas of improvement? Maybe a UAV section folded in with SAR. A pair of thermo-birds would help a lot in search and rescue and can double duty in times of war and to frustrate Jame’s SF marauders. In fact, since it’s under SAR orbat, any check of military assets might just miss it, giving a small ace in the hole, though it will require luck, not something you should count on.
Pure military side, maybe a small buy of one or two GMG/HMGs annually over 10 years for fitting on landrovers might be good, maybe some bulletproofing for them and runflat tires if the budget can be stretched that far.
One good buy might be 80 or so paintball rifles for “real life” training, budget allowing. It would allow platoon vs platoon level “live” training which would be very helpful in battlefield acclimatization, like feeling how it’s like to be pinned under fire, fast movement to avoid being hit etc.
Hovercraft
Oh, and 4 to 6 Viking Mk II with SRAM 120mm mortars with precision ammo – would not cost much but ruin a landing forces, or raiding parties day……
I would like to see typhoons capable of actually dropping bombs as well as some form of anti ship missile. Also a few batteries of mlrs possibley armed with atacums and a few cvr(t)s. We have almost all of this kit available and surplus. Not sure why we can store some of our armoured forces and artillery at mpa. We could even train the FIDF in its use.
Jed,
*Smacks forehead* did I leave hovercraft out of that lot earlier? Really didn’t mean to. Lends tactical and cross-island mobility (I still have a gut feeling West Falkland is a territory worth keeping a better naked-eye view of.) Because frankly I like the idea of Griffons mounted with twin SRAM pintles as well. Talk about a “coastal defence ship” in the literal sense, that bar steward will follow you up on the beach like a soap bubble in “The Prisoner” ….
Martin,
Absolutely have to get the Tiffs FGR capable. At the moment the RAF remains in the stages of grief when it comes to buckling down and properly developing its capability (vs. waiting for Godot, er, Dave-C.) But I have hopes, more than suspicions, that the onrushing Afghanistan wind-down may change that.
Marcase,
This is one of the reasons why (islands or oil?), in the other thread, that I suggested a discrete attack on West Falkland, with a “combined arms” approach of joint military/civilian “activist” landings by air and sea (civilians give the uniforms cover, uniforms give civvies armed protection against eviction) daring Bluefor to overreact. Lets you splice the EEZ if regional neighbours (up to US) and UN decide “maybe this is a mess the two sides can learn to live with and quit barracking about it.”
Marcase also,
Thanks for the reminder about minelaying trawlers. Another reason for both a more extensive civilian fisheries protection/SAR service for plainclothes intel, and a proper warship to deter or engage such targets.
I’m not sure if hovers are the best way to go, they’re notoriously maintainance intensive and any damage is going to be hard to repair due to parts rarity.
On a side note, the FI govt has offered to pay a share of the costs of defending the Islands.
Hi Observer,
PP. 12-14 in this http://www.foils.org/01_Mtg_Pres%20dnloads/ACV%20Devels%20Brian%20ForstellCDI050609/ACV%20Developments%20to%20SNAME-IHS%209Jun05.ppt will give you answers both to
- “notoriously maintainance intensive”
- and any (battle) damage, ie. survivability
The further generation derivation of the battle hardened LCAC (only built in prototype, that one)carried RBS15s on the sides and VLS SAMs in the middle
- also built in prototype only, but this was due to primary mission statement being changed from anti-invasion duties “in a coastal enviroment with rough archipelago and rigged coastline and shallow passageways” – if that rings a bell – to securing seaLOCs
I would suggest that defence of FI should be focused on the various degrees of increasing interference from Argentina not just the end game – invasion.
I would suggest the following:
* Another Clyde to guard the Oil rigs and to intercept / search suspicious merchant vessels.
* Permanent basing of a few ASW Merlins / Lynxs to provide additional anti sub / surface capability. Perhaps as part of a training facility?
* UAV surveillance.
* Upgraded Typhoons with sea attack capability – we really could do with this generally.
* Lastly, in true British style, an inflatable SSN to bring out when things are looking hot.
Last thing we need is more defence ground troops in my opinion. Any future FI conflict is likely to be fought in (plus above / below) the seas that surround them.
Slightly humbled to be named as one of Jackstaff’s favourite Tories…, now, if only we had a proper Tory Government instead of the current lily-livered lot, but that’s a different website….
Two thoughts occur to me, unrelated:
If the oil and gas thing is real (there seem to be conflicting reports), then the military task of defending the Falklands, assuming a credible and enduring threat, gets more difficult and more air/maritime focussed on a long term basis. I googled a few maps of the oil prospecting areas, and they seem to be 100 miles offshore to the north, east and south of East Falkland. If we get to a stage in 10 years where there are rigs and production out there, then we are going to need another Clyde-type asset to keep an eye on them. The AO just got a lot bigger.
Second, and initially more diplomatically difficult, is to present to the world the FI as one of our major training bases, akin to BATUS, but a fully joint asset. Put in the RAF Regiment to form the nucleus of a defensive Battlegroup along with some helos, FIDF and FGR Typhoons, but in addition Infantry BGs deploy for 6 weeks of training 6 times a year. We might even have a season long OPFOR down there. BATUS in the SA. This is probably more cost than TD envisioned in his opening remarks, but we need to train somewhere and there should be some compensating reductions, it keeps the AT fleet and our power projection capability well-oiled, and once established as routine, it is fairly innocuous on the global stage. It should also bring in a reasonable amount of money and employment for the FI.
Incremental spending: a troop of GMLRS at MPA, and a flight of 4 x AH-64 at Stanley, with a dual role of being part of the training setup and part of the defensive posture.
And a UAV/airship development and training centre on West Falkland, getting around UK flight restrictions.
On the bright side, if there IS oil there, paying for new equipment is going to be fairly easy.
APATS, think the FLDF budget from their own coffers is about 500k pounds annually thereabouts. All the equipment that people casually discuss here are totally out of their budget range save for the UAVs.
….offer to the USA the use of our training base in the FI for USMC / Carrier BG training when we are not using it, maybe even some joint exercises? Ties them into us diplomatically.
@James
If they accepted, my opinion of US intelligence is going to go way down.
After all, what is really being offered is the chance to stand between two people about to go at each other, hammers and tongs. On the other hand, historically, America seems to love that position. Deep racial S&M psyche?
@ACC
I looked through your presentation. I’ll take “maintainance intensive” as a yes. ~450 hours before skirt replacement??!! Once every ~20 days? Can you imagine having to change your tyres once a month?? And your bank account is going to bleed!
About hovercraft, when not used as amphibious transports
- make the current surveillance radars dual mode (like seaGiraffe); they might well be, already(?)
- hovercraft are not like ships, moving around 24 hrs a day; they are like aircraft: doing missions
- aircraft: high speed with only a couple of hrs endurance (OK, we have the VC10 there); hovercraft 50 knots but much higher endurance
- conclusion: need both, but today only A2G (not AShM) with Typhoons. Covering the approaches to the limited facilities for non-amphib shipping with land-based RBS15s (just an example) and the gap to West Falklands (and around it) with the same on hovercraft
…just an idea (btw: the prototype is for sale, Nigeria has been rumoured to have been interested to counter the hit-and-run attacks on oil installations in their Niger Delta)
@ACC
Sorry, still not sold on the need for a high maintainance hovercraft that needs to pull into a shop for a total skirt replacement every 20 days. That’s a cash bleeder. You want persistant surveillance, get a USV.
Plan B, deterrence.
RAF
As was mentioned in the previous thread, move one the the RAF Regiment squadrons to MPA on a permanent basis. On a six month tour it would be three years before the same squadron returned. Get them back to their main role airfield defence, with responsibility for the area around the airfield.
Increase the Typhoon numbers by a minimum of two to six. So with downtime and maintenance there should always by four readily available.
Army
The RIC is fine but I would also sent a reconnaissance squadron (CVRT) with a ATGW troop attached for six month tours. One from sixteen squadrons, gives plenty time between deployments. The nature of the landscape gives them an ideal theater for training. To support the infantry and cavalry, they need at least a troop of 105mm guns. This could be a FI force (same as the Gibraltar Regiment) which would reduce the pressure on the regular army’s pitiful resources.
An Army Air Corps flight of four Apaches should also be deployed. As with the CVRT Squadron an ideal training area. Also with hellfire gives us some anti-shipping capability.
Navy
Here is where we fall down, there are just not enough hulls at present. Any increase would cost a significant amount. But we could change the RAF Sea Kings (which are near end of service anyway) to navy Merlins, for SAR but with an added ASW capability.
Finally can anyone remember the Reforger exercises of the 1970/80′s? I can remember watching the 82nd Airborne jumping into Germany after flying from Fort Bragg. The planes flew over the major cities on route, a grand show of force by the US. Well I would do the same with one of the Multi Role Brigades every three years. We hear loads of talk of how we would reinforce the FI if there was any threat. Well lest see them do it. The ability of the RAF to transport the heavy equipment is doubtful, but we can pre-position vehicles if not on the FI then close by. Better then parking them in Germany as there is no space in the UK (did not think we were that overcrowded). How long does it take to sail there from St Helena? This ability seriously needs to be practiced. It would also be experience for any other war/dispute we get involved in, some time in the future.
Cost wise only the reforger type deployment, and the six month turnarounds would increase spending. The training opportunity’s of the FI should be exploited more then at present.
Now that my beautiful plan was shot down by penny-pinching Observer… will have to go budget-model
RE ” Also with hellfire gives us some anti-shipping capability.
Navy
Here is where we fall down, there are just not enough hulls at present. Any increase would cost a significant amount. But we could change the RAF Sea Kings (which are near end of service anyway) to navy Merlins, for SAR but with an added ASW capability.”
As every Merlin with ASW kit on it gets its price tag about doubled, I would stop at the Apaches (we have plenty) and Hellfires.
- the budget & combined solution to the lack of hulls and rapid anti-invasion reaction would be a local fleet of some CB90s. Put Hellfires on them (a la Norway) to deal with ships and whatever “connectors” are being used for landing and AMOS (a la Sweden) on some, to deal with the already landed elements…cheap and cheerful?
As has been pointed out on some previous threads, it is not the lack of forces that would be suitable for the op but the lack of amphibious capacity that is the effective constraint(so the invasion to be countered outside preknown locations would not be large scale, but either an initial or supporting act)
Agreed but I was thinking more of those two SSKs landing the unbeatable SF’s. Gives any sub commander something else to think about being caught in shallow waters with ASW helos available.
Plan A:-
- raise the issue of AR claiming South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and a rather over-large slice of Antartica with the UN as a colonial issue. Use the latter as a lever to prise Chile away from Argentina
- talk loudly about the issue of self determination to neutralise the self hating Left at home and “against the Brits always” crowd abroad
Plan B:-
- mention as an aside that the Argentinian mainland cannot be considered as a safe haven as it was 30 years ago. Mention Operation Algeciras when mad bint starts frothing at the mouth. Wait
- Integrate Storm Shadow on Typhoon, and deploy some to MPA without fuss a few months later
Plan C:-
Bearing in mind the need for simplicity, not loads of different types:-
- increase Typhoon numbers to 8 (10 with spares), equipping them with an off the shelf anti-ship missile like the Norwegian NSM and Brimstone for landing craft. This should allow a QRA of two, with another pair available for short notice use for air to ground. Cost minimal since we’re not likely to buy more
- deploy a troop of MLRS, both with GMLRS and the submunitions for the “oh shit” moments when the hordes are on the beach or gate. Cost minimal
- put in some C-RAM on MPA for last ditch defence and to negate those pesky ATGW and mortars. Cost around 30m
- build a berm around the base fence of MPA to screen what we can from direct fire (MPA is higher than the surrounds to the south: I wish I had an OS map). Cost 1m?
- increase the garrison to a battalion. Use the FI to trial a “medium” formation, partly mounted in Spartan/Scimitar. With one company tagged for local defence of MPA, one doing patrols and training, and one for QRF. Cost minmal since we already have spares
- mine Mare with remotely controlled sea mines to deny it’s use if necessary. Cost 10m
- install a Jindalee over the horizon radar system for long range warning at reasonable cost to the west. Cost 100m
- fit C17′s with probes to allow for extended trips down south. We should have done this already
- buy another Clyde, but withdraw the guard ship. A T45 or T23 have many qualities, but given that the high end threats they would be useful for are all likely to be found around MPA, having them hang around MPA is a bit pointless and makes them vulnerable. Cost: neutral overall
- rationalise the RAF contingent at MPA by withdrawing the VC10 and replacing with a second C130 with AAR gear.
Plan D:-
- cancel F35C order, but F18E/F off the shelf instead. Accelerate CVF so that IOC with QE is achieved in 2015
- stand up 12 F/A-2′s from those stored. Form a reserve group of aviators capable of flying them, and have them exercise from Illustrious to cover the gap until 2015. We could add this to deterrence….Cost 100m
- in 2015, hold a no notice Purple Warrior. Announce a major amphibious exercise on the E coast of the US, sail off CVF and the majority of the amphibs with escort, then break the news at sea and have them sail south. Once the news breaks, deploy spearhead and additional Typhoon’s as per reinforcement plan. Using in place forces as red, conduct a series nearly simultaneous live TLAM strikes on Onion range, launch an AVBG from St Helena on MPA, amphibious landing at Teal. Conduct a public FIBUA exercise in Stanley with the FIDF. Tea and cakes all round, job done for the next decade of deterrence
‘Defence of the Falklands’ is never going to win a budget arguement.
At the end of the day, we need a reason to spend a billion pounds a year, sheep, self determination and drakes passage are not them.
I can see three grouped reasons.
Littoral/Islands.
Nato lacks a large scale littoral training ground.
West falkland is a maze of islets, channels, coves. If we worried about fighting on it, why not try and make it natos ‘forced entry amphibious assault’ warfare centre?
Politicaly, attacking it becomes an attack on Nato, maybe even militarily if that new big radar is based on top of the usmc flag officers quarters.
If thats not a goer.
Europe lacks a large scale training ground, we do things like laser guidance certification in the US or Canada.
As far as I’m aware, theres just no where in europe to practice with longer ranged equipment or grand scale exercises.
An armoured division scale advance with artilery, naval and air support could be squeezed onto the west islands.
The terrain in punishing, but with modular armour, an ‘all in’ 70t chally 3 could be stripped down to 40t as an adjuster.
And if thats not a goer, suggestion three
The UKs initial training, ocu, ect.
The army recruits about 1000 people a month and puts them through a 4 month training program.
If we moved all of the initial rifleman training out there, we’d have 3000 trainees on the islands along with training staff.
Most poorly trained, but enough to sit in a trench and return fire?
Add in the cooks, clerks, and instructors.
But why just the army infantry?
Why not move trainee tankies down, and formation rec, and apache, and lynx, and typhoon.
We have a 36 typhoon ocu, does it cost more to relocate that force to the falklands, or run 4 just as a security force?
Two point class ships to handle lugging everything down is really the only additional expense, maybe away from home costs for trainers, but suddenly the falklands have an in training mrb and a three multi role fighter squadrons.
@ ACC re RAF RPs sea surveillance
I have wondered about that too. The fancy systems that give OTH are expensive. Obviously The closer to the sea the smaller the horizon. seaGiraffe only “sees” out to the horizon, but is a very good system. As I have said the sea is the key to this. I still question Typhoons; it cancels out the air threat yet, but doesn’t seem to do much to help things on the “surface”.
I still think Stanley is the key. Still think the FIDF need some proper vehicles to work out of. We mustn’t be fooled by pictures of Stanley just because it shows a village on a small headland. Time will be of the essence. Mobility is a force multiplier. A couple of 4 tonners and Land Rovers and quads doesn’t seem adequate to me. I think they need Javelin. I know this might be another of X’s odd takes but when I read about April 2 82 it is the ships out in the harbour seemingly invulnerable that make me shudder; “They are coming.” Perhaps it is just me but I would rather they be dealt with at sea than them be fought from a slit trench on Stanley front. There would be precious little the Argentines could do. They would have just to sit there as 18.5lb HE comes in through the ships side. This will be anathema to James but I am bit fond of fortifications. So as I have said before I would have the RE prepare (concreted) hull down positions for the FIDF’s Vikings/Bulldogs/whatever at key points. If the balloon appears to be going up all they will have to is muster, jump in the wagon, drive to the prepared position, get a brew on, and wait.
Further to Observer’s militia idea it does appear that the FI, like the Isle of Man, Channel Islands, and Gib’ has different firearm laws to the UK. Shooting seems popular. It does appear they are treated as adults and can hold handguns too. How much of a crossover there is between the membership of the shooting clubs and FIDF I don’t know. Perhaps there is some scope for shooting clubs members who aren’t FIDF to get some training to help out in extremis. Not sure if the garrison commander would think it is a good idea.
I have concerns about things maritime too.
Hold on guys, we seem to be going from defence on a shoe string to dominating the local battle space/ On a shoes string Plan D, take the 4 AHR 2 Griffins from Cyprus and replace with Night SAR capable units as is proposed . They have NVG and a radar for limited mar surv. can carry 6 or 8 troops. Mount unguided rocket pylons or a machine gun like in Vietnam.
1 Squadron RAF reg to take over security duties and free up the RIC for more mobile duties.
Command control mines for enterance to ECMP and Stanley, deny a conventional offload capability.
Cut teh roofs of some of the hubdred of landies down there and get a welding torch and HMG or various other odds and sods to make some FI technicals.
Invest in 3 or 4 armoured radio controlled traing rhibs to use as bomb ships.
Cheap and cheerful and not very conventional but increases the punch against an invasion.
I do think the NATO/Training ground idea is really worth trying for, followed by incremental upgrades of the FIDF. Same with transfering in existing equipment.
I disagree in the purchases of new equipment as the 200M+ budget set by TD cannot handle too many UOR purchases without going over. In real life, armies get small batches of equipment and accumulate to basic capability, not everything in one fell swoop. It makes the budget flow much smoother instead of sudden “over the budget” cost spikes.
Cant help thinking:-
RAF regiment idea a good one deploy one battalion for Airfield defence.
Freeing other forces for general defence
Plus CVRT Squadron
Some 105′s (Not many)
Beef up Falknads defence force.
Above all else how about keeping some tranche 1 Typhoons as based there when they go, 8 there 8 back in UK ready to fly out.
None of that should break the bank, and would so up the anti.
Also like the idea of regular annual medium scale para and Marine exercises with supporting naval units.
First replace vc-10 and herc with a400m equipped for aar. As part of there wider uk service entry 2 cn-295 with the us coast guard configuration are moved in. These could be part funded by FI gov as they conduct SAR, fisheries protection and environmental protection.
The south American area and west Africa can be vulnerable to natural disasters. As part of a wider rejigg of uk internal aid the Falklands is designated as a fwd uk base for disaster response to the UN disasters emergency committee. Additional supplies can be carried by the rfa in area with the a400m or cn-295 avaiable for tasking also form an initial small international rescue team in the Falklands. The army company replaced with raf reg unit and a sqn of Viking vehicles if the argies land we’ve had 2 major failures already. One in not spotting the build up and two letting them land without interdiction. Typhoons remain as is. Little point fitting an anti ship missile what are we going to shoot them at. If as suggested the argies are using civi vessels to move troops I can see the headlines now if we shoot one off and actually hit a civil vessel. Paveway brimstone will do fine. Send 4 hover craft and 4 cv90 boats down with a FPG RM unit especially if oil infrastructure reguires protection.
Final conduct regular rc-135 flights in the area and move the support assets to support that. Finally 2 merlin mk3a a/c in the long range SAR role and can support the disaster response force.
“vindicated?
yes i am.”
Hardly, you just fell more easily and more early than others to the threat fantasy that’s now being hyped (again) in order to fend off Royal Navy budget cuts with fearmongering.
Hovercraft !!!
No seriously though, why do you all want to spend so much money and turn the islands into fortress Falklands ?
We certainly don’t need to turn the Islands into a SA version of BATUS – for a start that pushes up the political tension ten more notches.
All we need is the bare minimum to deter the potential threat – some hovercraft, the Griffon’s from Cyprus was a good idea. Some BVS10 MkII with a .50 cal in a good RWS is probably good enough (rather than very old CVR(T)’s).
Observer: “I’m not sure if hovers are the best way to go, they’re notoriously maintainance intensive and any damage is going to be hard to repair due to parts rarity” – seriously ? How very 1950′s…..
Modern diesel powered HC as produced by Griffon Hoverwork are far less maintenance intensive than any helicopter, although they probably do need more than an armoured vehicle for example.
Jed, The Griffins I talk about transferring are 4 helicopters, upgraded Huey variants.
@Jed
The link posted by ACC quoted a “time to replacement” of the rubber skirts of 440 hours. That’s once every 20 days if it has to go patrolling.
I agree that the direction of the proposed defences seem to be going towards the overkill side. With extreme emphasis on overkill. Now the question is would the mythical Argentinian SF be killed 1st, or the MoD budget? My bet is on the budget.
Observer, whilst some people have stretched the idea a bit far, lots of the proposals merely reallocate and move equipment around. How much does it cost to replace the rubber skirts, are old ones then refurbished? if running a hover craft was that expensive nobody would have them and they would not patrol 24 7. Not that I have suggested them just think you have grabbed one fact like a dog with a bone.
Think the best suggestions I’ve seen so far are the NATO/US training ground solution, which gives free diplomatic deterence and physical troop size increase without extra cost.
Against new vehicle type introductions, new vehicles tend to cost a lot and while most likely extremely effective, it’s also extremely overkillish.
Opinion wise, I still think that the best course would be the training ground option combined with a gradual increase of the FIDF capabilities. A conversion of 3-4 landrovers per year with bulletproofing, runflat tires and a pintle mount for a GMG/HMG/Spike ER (I know the UK uses Javelin, but Spikes are cheaper per missile) over a period of 10 years would give them a fairly solid rapid reaction force with decent firepower and trooplift within budget. (My proposed “squad” would be similar to a fireteam organization, 2 HMG, 1 GMG, 1 Spike, but 1/1/1 is also possible).
A pair of thermo-equiped UAVs buried under SAR would also be something worth considering. SAR for normal days, SF spotter during times of war.
No expensive new vehicle buy except for the UAVs which can be cost shared with SAR, upgrade of preexisting equipment, not too much overkill for the situation and since it’s upgrading, might go below the arms race radar.
@APATs
From observations of SAR ops here, hovercraft are kept in long term standby to reduce wear and tear, and are only deployed when huge, fast lift is needed, like SAR on passenger liners with lots of people. Most of the time, you just see them sitting in their docking bay gathering dust instead of patrolling. Still got to have them though. Just in case…
From the report ACC posted, it seems that the skirts get overstressed and tear through the middle, don’t think they can be refurbished.
Can you melt and reform rubber? Can’t recall, but my guess is no.
Accepting the need for improving capabilities is tenuous but equally accepting that a modest improvement in one or two areas would reduce the risk here is my starter for ten;
Intensify diplomacy and intelligence gathering. The answer is rarely a military one so the FCO and associated government agencies should get the lions share of any increase in funding. I do wonder sometimes how joined up these departments actually are when faced with an overwhelmingly clear and simple objective with little nuance or rooms for ‘shades of grey’
It seems to me the whole defence plan rests on timing. We assume we will have enough time based on intelligence to enable the reinforcement plan and we assume, should that reinforcement plan not be enabled, that the defence forces on the islands will have enough time to get to a sufficient readiness state in order to ‘repel borders’
So, anything that provides more time should be the priority, hence my preference for intelligence and diplomacy but at a tactical level the fact remains that time is the essential factor in success or failure.
This means that we need to have greater real time awareness of what is going on at multiple levels, like layers of an onion.
Improving such awareness does not have to be expensive or indeed look like belligerence, which are both important.
I would concentrate on dual use systems that aid the economic development of the islands but can be used either day to day or in extremis to assist with the defence effort.
Sponsoring Cable and Wireless to build out their GSM and WIMAX network provides an economic stimulus, improves safety and enhances the lives of the Islanders, tourists and others. Given the terrain of the Islands and lack of built up areas the cost of this would be pretty tiny, if you read some of the C&W Falklands newsletters they talk of such small sums. WIMAX provides decent enough data bandwidth and there are even WIMAX mobile telephones available now. There is equally no reason why the same infrastructure (especially sites) could not also be used for something that is perhaps better suited to public safety and military needs, TETRA or TETRAPOL for example.
This then provides a network onto which we could attach any range of sensors at key points, an inner layer of the onion, the outer layers being provided by the RAF radar stations.
It might seem rather amusing but if you click on the link below you will get an idea of what can be done
http://www.cwfi.co.fk/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=94
http://www.cwfi.co.fk/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=104
Upgrade the bandwidth, increase the refresh rate, add in some movement sensors , scene change detection and change the cameras to be day/night or thermal and you get the idea on how an Islands wide CCTV network could be established for a tiny cost and with zero political fallout.
As offshore economic activity continues there is an obvious need to provide protection and security. Building up offshore response would provide a huge uplift in military capability again for a modest cost. FIGAS needs (according to Wiki) a number of new aircraft, instead of buying a few more Islanders why not upgrade to something like the Turbo Twin Otter?
Proven in harsh environments, able to be fitted with floats, skis and wheels it has the ability to operate in all the same area as the existing Islanders but with a greater capability. The Vietnamese Navy have just bought 6 Viking Series 400 Twin Otters (3 in a maritime patrol variant) at a cost of less than £4million each including training and support. They have tiny operating costs and could be used for both the intra settlement transport and maritime patrol role.
If the oil industry takes off an offshore response and emergency towing vessel would seem to be an essential requirement given the wind and wave conditions, this could be armed and be configured to carry a helicopter.
How about sponsored reserves or offering 6 or 12 month postings to personnel coming out of the regular forces, we get their costly experience at a knock down price?
The suggestions of replacing the C130 and VC10 with an A400 make perfect sense, as does improving protected mobility, thinking about how we provide helicopter SAR, a handful of fast craft like CB90’s or hovercraft.
Reinforcement exercises and maybe carrying out additional training on the Islands also seems to be a bit of a no brainer, improves mass on the islands, provides benefits to the wider defence mission and introduces an element of variability
So in summary, I don’t think we need a hugely ‘offensive’ range of extra capabilities and the majority of them would have little political impact because they have a legitimate and civilian use.
That is of course, if we think there needs to be an improvement!
Jackstaff – shocked i am not on that list!
re the matter at hand.
if ever there is a purpse for the rock apes it is raf mt pleasant, why the hell isn’t it their show?
bvs10 mk2
griffin 8100td with ramp
three rivers as a falklands fisheries vessels, new clydes to replace.
Anyone know if there are any plans for a comprehensive survey of the potential oil sites in the Falklands? If they really do find oil, the threat possibility is going to go up a fair bit.
I don’t see much of a need for increasing our day-to-day presence; the Islands’ defence can be beefed up as and when required. The A400 sounds quite sensible though, and put the RAF Regiment into the roulement plan.
If I can see any deficiencies, then the lack of a fast-jet launched anti-ship missile -air launched Harpoon perhaps (I don’t know if FASGW is meant to deliver something in the Harpoon/SeaEagle class?), and the lack of an MPA to send down if the threat were to increase; but these are gaps in the UK’s arsenal generally, rather than costs specific to the FI’s defence.
Observer, they are drilling offshore in several locations, I do not know about onshore oil although even without being a geologist the rocks look very shale like.
One point that I did not see raised in this or the previous thread (apologies if I missed it!) was the actions that Argentina might take to interfere with British sovereignty over the Falkland short of an all-out invasion. Obviously, any defense plan for the South Atlantic needs to be prepared for the absolute worst-case scenario, but a sensible integrated plan for political, deterrence, and defense of the Falkland perhaps ought to consider the ways that Argentina could pressure Britain while also driving up security costs (as noted by many, an especially important consideration in the current economic environment).
Persistent, low-end harassment of commercial shipping in the area (similar to the activities of the Sea Shepherds or the Chinese coast guard in the SCS – cutting cables, fouling screws, and creating a general nuisance) or larger maritime protests (a la Gaza Flotilla) could provide opportunities to embarrass Britain diplomatically and tax existing high-end security forces in dealing with such low-level threats. Argentina could also pursue more provocative actions, such as intentionally causing a major oil leak in the vicinity of the Falkland, sinking a large hulk at the entrance to Port William to block the channel, covertly mining approaches to the Islands (even one or two mines could cause a major mine-hunting headache), or other inflammatory acts.
None of these actions would grant Argentina control of the Falkland, but they could allow the Argentine government to score political points at home while attempting to remain below the threshold of even a limited war with Britain. They could also drive up the costs to Britain of defending the Islands’ sovereignty. How might existing or future defense arrangements be structured to deal with these sorts of short-of-full-war contingencies?
If viable oil was found, then -with a nod towards a couple of comments above- perhaps a new three ship class of corvettes might be worthwhile to protect offshore facilities and to meet a higher perception of the threat.
Three corvettes might provide a more suitable package than the current patrol vessel and high-end escort pairing; more capably armed than the Clyde, and less provocative than a type 45 – and stops tying up one of our rare frigates or destroyers on a permanent basis.
http://www.griffonhoverwork.com/applications/1