Published recently is the Public Accounts Committee 59th report, the subject being The Cost Effective Delivery of an Armoured Vehicle Capability.
Click here to read.
Under the previous Chair (Edward Leigh MP), the PAC had a formidable reputation but since Margaret Hodge took over it is finding that reputation a little harder to live up to. Its previous defence related report, on project CVF, was cut through with many inaccuracies and dubious statements, hardy the incisive and ruthlessly effective as reports of old were.
So, it is with some interest that I looked at this report, the subject of which should be a an open goal with a goal mouth that is 200 feet wide. The MoD’s attempts at defining and delivering a coherent armoured vehicle programme over the last 20 years have been woeful to say the least and let us not in any way make light of the fact that this inability to bring into service modern and relevant vehicles without resorting to urgent operational requirements has cost many service personnel their lives or limbs, it is not an abstract concept but although it probably doesn’t need saying, it is very real.
Reading the oral evidence is always more interesting than the final report and this is no different but what seems painfully evident is that the chair is straight off the mark with ignorant questions and develops a combative attitude straight away.
There also seemed to be some confusion about who was attending from the MoD and why.
This is incredulous, these are vitally important matters; accountability to the people through their elected representatives might be an inconvenience to the MoD but it is fundamentally important that both parties approach this from a position of cooperation, not some sort of ‘grilling’ or to be treated as a platform for grandstanding or word games.
Evidently, both parties need to work on making sure the sessions are well informed and attended, relevant personnel and not cut short by parliamentary business.
This nonsense would not be tolerated in any business so why when discussing multi billion pound programmes that contribute to the defence of the UK and protection of service personnel should it be tolerated.
Maybe before they start blaming each other, the MoD and PAC should ask themselves if they are doing everything they can, I doubt somehow, the answer would be yes.
The Chair then put forward what I thought was a pretty simple proposition that is well accepted by almost everyone, that the lack of appropriate vehicles cost lives.
This was met with what seemed a collective feet shuffling exercise.
This simply beggars belief and perhaps cuts to the heart of much of what is wrong with the MoD, an inability to admit failing, be frank, reflective and recognise that mistakes and poor decisions have been made.
It might sound trite, but recognising there is a problem is the first step on the road to recovery. Arrogance and self denial will simply mean more dead and limbless service personnel in the future.
Ursula Brennan then waded in with a classic quote about people being killed whilst the MoD was shilly shallying, again, living in abject and utter denial of the reality.
If there is one person on the PAC who can cut through the bullshit it is Richard Bacon MP, read the evidence from Q24 where he repeatedly asks who at the MoD has paid the price for the failings. Despite multiple attempts at avoiding the question when all three from the MoD know the answer is not a single person, Mr Bacon pressed the point.
Again what is obvious is that no one has paid any sort of price because obviously the MoD does not think anyone needs to pay the price.
The next line is about needing UOR vehicles that were an appropriate response to specific threats and specific environmental conditions.
I find this line from the MoD to be rather annoying actually because it paints the IED and hot weather as some sort of magical new things that we could not have possibly predicted, hot weather, I mean come on.
The reason I find this defence frankly nonsensical is two-fold;
One, the British Army has been fighting in harsh climates for hundreds of years and especially in hot climates. I wonder if they see the irony in complaining about extremes of heat and dust when in Afghanistan elements of the Desert Rats have been struggling with vehicles that could not cope with either. We are constantly reminded that one of the reasons anything vaguely defence related is so expensive is because it has to operate in environmental extremes and have defence standards to make sure they can.
Second, the IED is, contrary to the MoD’s blinkered view, not new. The British Army has been dealing with mines and roadside bombs for decades. Off route mines with explosively formed penetrating fragments have been available and in service equally for decades, the IRA even used them. In Bosnia we developed extensive route proving and clearance techniques and specifically modified blast protected vehicles to deal with TM6 mines, mines with explosively formed penetrators. The very same vehicles were sold and turned up in Afghanistan with Estonian forces where they were used alongside our Land Rover derivatives. To say they the deployment of IED’s by an asymmetric enemy force came as a surprise is equally inexplicable, surely all that was needed was a trip to the library at Shrivenham where extensive materials on Namibia, Rhodesia and Afghanistan could be signed out, many of which would provide ample information on which to avoid being surprised by.
I don’t want to get into the specifics of Snatch, WMIK and Vector and fully appreciate the need for smaller vehicles but that is not the point.
Let us not pretend that we could have not have predicted or reacted quicker because both are plainly wrong and a little less self-denial would go a long way.
Whilst we may applaud the UOR process the scale of them is a fundamental admission of failure to equip and adequately plan for likely eventualities.
It seems to me that despite the perception that the RN and RAF have somehow ‘lost’ in recent defence reviews quite the opposite has happened, with the Army and especially, its vehicle programme, being victim of deep cuts.
Of course making those cuts even worse is the MoD’s inability to step outside military fashion and make its mind up.
The conclusions and recommendations of the report boil down to ‘do try harder next time’ and in all fairness there are some reason for optimism, GVA, Foxhound and other programmes seem to be breaking free of the TRACER/MRAV/FRES debacles and delivering capabilities.
Quick message to the PAC, go and read a few books.
There was also a supplementary note that might be of interest on Chinook costs…
The unit production cost for the aircraft is £34 million at 2011 economic conditions including engines and those items purchased by MOD outside the Boeing prime contract (of which £27 million is the recurring cost of each aircraft alone at 2011 economic conditions). These figures have, due to commercial sensitivities, been rounded to the nearest million pounds.
So there you go, £34m apiece
As our recent purchase of 14 chinooks and 5 years support just cost us a billion quid the support costs must be pretty high for this helicopter.
Then you’ll approve of Peter Luff’s retort:
“The PAC is AGAIN misrepresenting the facts.” (my emphasis added, also ‘misrepresenting’ is a different kettle of fish from ‘drawn wrong conclusions’) and that’s from the released public consumption response! (http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/EquipmentAndLogistics/EquipmentMinisterRespondsToPacReportOnArmouredVehicleDelivery.)
Relatively strong language for this sort of thing. Ministries can and do ignore conclusions from oversight offices, but criticism usually only goes one way PAC, NAO, etc -> Ministers.
I remember FRES being headed up by a consultant bought in by DE&S to lead a joint MoD/Industry team called Phil Rielly. Developed an incredibly complex procurement approach for Fres, and was a law unto himself. Clearly MoD memories aren’t very long – oh so convenient. He was hired by COO Andrew Tyler another industry secondee and in between General Macklin. So here are some names, hope this helps PUS, CDM, DCDS(Cap) and the PAC.
What I would really like to know is this. With only £5.5 billion to spend on ground vehicles between now and 2021, will we be able to afford many FRES vehicles at all? I am wondering especially about FRES UV.
The £5.5 billion must include money for the Warrior update and probably for some more Foxhounds (possibly for those we have already bought). Does it also include the cost of Terrier, for instance? Doesn’t seem to leave much for FRES SV or FRES UV, does it?
To be honest I can understand the hostility of the Chair person. Some of the answers being given were just pure evasion. While a cooperative attitude may glean more results in general, I think sometimes the shit has hit the fan so much and so often that it becomes time to just take off the gloves and let the people responsible take a bit of a beating for an hour or two.
The attitude of those being questioned reads almost blase’ at times, as if this was a great annoyance for them to have to come and answer for the faults.
The section regarding the “broadly in balance” was a perfect example, as questions were repeatedly dodged and almost a lack of comprehension of a fairly simple question seemed to exist.
Personally I think the committee were right to unload in the way they did.
@ Jonesy,
I didn’t know Phil Reilly was an external consultant – I assumed he was DE&S. I met him on FRES business a number of times, and you are right, he was very much a law unto himself. Among the top end members of his IPT, not one of them could explain the logic of the procurement process that he came up with. Complex wasn’t the word.
I once took my US boss to meet Phil after my company had won a smallish contract to write a scoping study for elements of FRES SV. After the meeting on the train back to London my US boss observed that the FRES procurement was “bullshit” and predicted Reilly would get sacked. I don’t know if Reilly was actually sacked or merely moved on quietly, but he wasn’t there for much longer.
In my opinion, Phil Reilly was squarely and personally responsible for the FRES procurement turning into the disaster it became. He wasn’t responsible for the outlandish requirements (Chally 2 lethality, loadable onto A400M, etc). That blame needs to be focussed onto the pointy heads in the Doctrine Centre and their acolytes in ACGS’ domain. The two elements together combined to effectively kill off the programme.
mark
assuming 200 flight hours per year, £71k per hour.
I’d guess the plan is that they will be at least double that 200 hours because of how wrecked the rest of the fleet are post afghanistan.
@ James
Firstly, are you able to give us any deeper details on what exactly was the problem with the procurement process for FRES, at least when Reilly was in charge?
Secondly, why is the Army not writing its own scoping studies?
@ Chris B,
it’s not correct to go into too many specifics on a public blog. It was massively over-complex, relied upon some heroic assumptions about industry giving up IP for free (the very reason GD walked away from FRES UV a year after winning that competition), and the IPT were, in my opinion, seriously hampered by requirements not so much “creeping” but zinging about all over the place. The blame, also in my opinion, should not be ascribed to those DE&S civil servants or military officers below the rank of about Colonel or equivalent, but rather at the Head of the IPT, and military officers / senior DE&S staff at one or 2 star level. Those people should have seen that the whole thing was becoming a total nonsense. There were, in my opinion, 4 centres of power all pulling in different directions, with the result that the programme went nowhere.
1. The IPT and DE&S senior management: someone wanted to make a name for themselves with a brand new approach that was massively over-complex, not explicable in language either industry or the Army understood, and turned a blind eye to some very real issues (e.g. the IP issue).
2. The Joint Doctrine Centre, who burgled the original and fairly simple requirements and tried to use them to create a fantastic capability for power projection on a global basis. They were the ones who came up with the phrase “go first, go fast, go home”. At the heart of that was an understandable desire to create a modern capability that could nip problems in the bud rather than respond in slower time and need to send a Division in a month when a Brigade in a week could have nipped out the problems. The problem was that they made FRES into a system so big (i.e. including the A400M procurement) that the whole concept became unmanageable.
3. The DCDS(EC) staff and to an extent, the approvals process itself. Constant trade offs, review notes, reliance on other systems like A400M just glued everything up. Because of the complexity of what was proposed, the IAB had to consider FRES at the highest levels, requiring endless preceding staff work, commissioning of reports to “prove” something to 2 and 3 star levels of scrutiny. They were also dealing with a mountain of UORs for both Afghanistan and Iraq. DEC GM (as was) had some very smart staff officers working in the branch, but they were absolutely snowed under. 15 hour days for weeks on end, a friend of mine in the branch told me. FRES probably took second priority to UORs.
I also think that the decision to insist upon IP being given up should have been set aside by DCDS(EC). What was being asked for was for the winning prime contractor – GD(UK) in FRES UV’s case – to hand over design authority to the MoD to enable future competition on upgrades and enhancements. As the three candidate vehicles were also being offered to other armies, or already in service, there’s no way on God’s earth that was ever going to happen, but someone with authority thought that it would and proceeded on that assumption.
4. The senior element of the Army itself, who saw the RAF and RN getting all sorts of really expensive programmes approved (Typhoon, Carriers, Astutes etc), and wanted to protect the Army by having a big green programme.
Industry and DSTL are also somewhat to blame. All sorts of sexy capabilities were assessed – electric armour and so on. Someone drank the Koolaid that all of these things would be integrated together in a lightweight vehicle. Was never going to happen, at least not for the amount of money we were prepared to pay. But it is in industry’s interest to dangle these capabilities under the MoD’s nose (and quietly not mention the real costs of further development beyond powerpoint engineering), and in DSTL’s interest to make themselves useful by conducting lots of studies.
FRES was always a joint system, being managed by a joint staff, so while the Army had primacy, it was not an entirely green disaster.
RE “With only £5.5 billion to spend on ground vehicles between now and 2021, will we be able to afford many FRES vehicles at all? I am wondering especially about FRES UV”
- Warrior stands for the first bn; don’t know how the Terrier delivery is accounted for (present or future)
- we know the Scout roll-out plan for Recce formations (not the rest) so guessing at £4m a piece and using the current org charts would return that slice of the 5.5… there must be a contract price, because the contract is in the form of minimum x, and an option for more (it is just not disclosed, the price scale must be degressive over and above the minimum quantity)
On the Committee matters, I was surprised how nasty the Chair came across on the radio; now I understand that she had reason to!
On the FRES history, it was probably the first major project where the integrator of integrators contract structure was used. I worked with some people from a very respected consultancy who won that, at the time the programme was quoted as for 1 bn. I congratulated them and did not understand it at all when they resigned the commission a year later. By now we know the programme was headed for a £16 bn total and from James’ description also why. Suffice to say the consultants whose advice was not heeded still have a good name, so the right thing to do.
Should have included the fraction: 2/3 for the multiplication in “using the current org charts ” times £4m a piece
- two heavy = Scout
- one light = wheeled, not disclosed yet which model, or a mix of those in use
@ACC
Thanks very much for the info, ACC. £4 million apiece for FRES Scout seems very much on the high side to me, though. So, in layman’s terms do you think we shall get very many FRES SVs with the money left from the 5.5 billion (after Warrior update cost has been subtracted). Sorry, ACC, I am not an accountant or anything approaching that, so it will have to be in fairly simple, accessible language. And then what about FRES UV? Any money left for that at all, do you think?
Perhaps I am asking an impossible question, until we know the cost of individual vehicles within the contracts.
Hi Mike,
It does sound a lot. A BTR90 is under 1m $, a more survivable AMV is 2m, the sophisticated Italian (still wheeled) made in many versions and thus in small production runs comes close to 5m euros. I guess we would get quite close by averaging Puma and CV90 as for their price?
My guess has been just over two hundred turreted ones and another hundred in other versions. If we make it 3.3 average, that’s the second bn gone then, out of the 5.5 total
- but isn’t that a total for all new vehicles, or is it for just armoured combat vehicles?
For clarity, that £ 3.3m unit price is just a wild guess as I don’t have the Puma and CV90 information.
But to put the 5.5.bn £s to 2021 into perspective, over the same period we will be spending 7 on ssbn’s (and the start to build them, maybe).
@James
I understand that he was on a fixed term appointment which the MoD messed up and didn’t terminate and he transitioned into a DE&S liability to employ. There are some big salaries and those in command must be brought forward – it is sheer stupidy not to do so, plus the MoD will not move on in its professionalism (or lack of it) in the organisation if this isn’t done.
The oral evidence contained some remarks about what the Army thinks of the Mastiff long-term option, too, which i found interesting.
It is considered in the class of what was FRES UV, but it is judged incapable to cover the “maneuver” requirement due to its limited mobility on rough terrain once loaded up.
Still, the Army seems set to put it in Core budget, if nothing else then for pure lack of realistic alternatives.
As for what 5.5 billion could/should buy, i’ve tried to make some wild guesses on my blog. Hope it is not a problem if i put a link in here.
http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2011/12/55-billions-10-years-many-programmes.html
@ACC
Thanks for your response and estimated of the cost of vehicles
“- but isn’t that a total for all new vehicles, or is it for just armoured combat vehicles?”
I thought it referred to specifically to armoured vehicles. In fact, Defence Minister Peter Luff, in his response to a report by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), published on the delivery of armoured vehicles, said:
“”We recently announced a £1bn upgrade to the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle fleet and over the next ten years we plan to invest a total of £5.5bn in armoured vehicles.”
@ Gabriele
Re: your comments on Mastiff:
“It is considered in the class of what was FRES UV, but it is judged incapable to cover the “maneuver” requirement due to its limited mobility on rough terrain once loaded up.”
It occurred to me that if Mastiff 2s and 3s are put in as a temporary measure to serve with Mechanised units until FRES UV, or some similar wheeled vehicle,becomes available, then they could make them (Mastiffs) one hell of a sight more mobile and manoeuvrable if they did something about the extra armour. If the slab?/plate? armour, which I think the British put on the sides of the Cougar vehicle, were removed that would certainly result in one hell of a lot less weight and make the whole vehicle more agile. “Normal” mechanised infantry tasks (i.e. where there is not the IED threat)probably would not need such heavy armouring. So make the vehicles revert to being the base Cougar vehicles. No?
Thanks for you other comments and the link. You certainly run a stimulating, thought-provoking site.
@Mike W: the additional armour isn’t primarily for anti-IED use although useful re EFP attack. It’s for protection from direct fire weapons like RPG’s, and given the profusion of these in most conflict zones, I would expect the extra armour to be retained
@Mike W
I think it is unlikely that a strip-down back to Cougar standard would even be considered.
Realistically, all the armor would have to be put back on if another mission started.
The Slat armour may be removed for normal service. But all the other additional stuff that turns a Cougar 6×6 in a Mastiff will stay, included the additional vertical side armour. Also because removing it might have a relatively important cost: i don’t know how extensive the modifications are and if the additional panels can come off that easily once installed.
One modification absolutely necessary, for what i read, will be some kind of enhancement to the driver’s sight of the surroundings, before a Mastiff ever travels on british roads.
But by the way, thank you. It’s a pleasure for me to talk and i’m glad that you find something useful up on my blog too.
@Rupert Fiennes and Gabriele
Thanks both of you for the information. If I’d thought aboout it at all, I would have realized the the purpose of side armour was not primarily for protection against IEDs. Ah well, bang goes another bright idea!
Without the additional side armour that makes it a Mastiff, the Cougar is likely to be as good as Saxon is (i.e. small arms and fragments) so as an artillery-resistant support vehicle it would probably be OK. Certainly better than Saxon.
The trouble is, FRES UV will replace FV432 as a lower-cost, second-line APC to complement Warrior IFVs.
argh!!!!!
Cougar has *one* purpose!
To be blown to pieces on ied infested roads whilst protecting the occupants.
Just an uninformed question but when the bulk go back to the UK in 2014 what (if any) of the UOR kit gets left behind, e.g. ditches, and will this be an informal rationalisation?
Talking to veteran of the 1st Armoured Regiment (Aust) he described post VJ day, lining his Matilda II in front of a cliff, getting it going and jamming a brick on the throttle then jumping off. It was too much bother getting them back to Oz. Just wondering if a similar last day bonfire of unwanted gear is going to happen
My question is, where does the Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle stand in all this?
Will it finally gain priority, and will we see lots of retired Warriors being re-built to cover additional roles without having to buy new (and expensive) vehicles?
I hope so. Because the most realistic alternative is vehicle shortage. The money just won’t be enough to buy enough new hulls.
I don’t think anyone has decided anything yet on what kit is coming back. I imagine it will get to the point where close to pulling out we will just start to write kit off when it comes to battle repairs or major services etc
@ phil
oh yeah come 2013 oh christmas tree oh christmas tree!!! expect a steady stream of vehicles to sit in the corner of the workshop getting smaller every week.
Reminds me of BATUS when the TA REME specialists would come for their 2 week annual camp and hit the cast vehicle park and strip all the pranged stuff for spares, 1990 when i was there first time and they reckon they salvaged about £60k of spares minimum
@Phil and @PaulG
I suppose I was wondering if anyone is going to make rational decision about future unit organization and kit and say “these UOR vehicles are not going to be part of future inventory so let’s flog them off to the ANA” or something similar. A rhetorical question this far out but made with a nod to TD’s ruthless rationalization rationale. (Say that six times slickly)
So what have I missed (other than match of the day?)
@ James,
Cheers for the detail. It does sound like a bit of a mess.
I think “despair” would adequately sum up our armoured vehicle situation right now.
@Gabriele
“My question is, where does the Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle stand in all this?
Will it finally gain priority, and will we see lots of retired Warriors being re-built to cover additional roles without having to buy new (and expensive) vehicles?”
A good question. I am very confused about the ABSV programme. If memory serves me correctly, it started out as a separate vehicle programme (although I woudn’t be a hundred per cent confident about that) and then seemed to become one based on a turretless Warrior being used to create quite a number of support variants. More recently it has appparently become one simply to refurbish/update the recovery and repair variants of Warrior. Can you, Gabriele, or anyone shed any light on this?
Mike, I think ABSV is as dead as disco
@TD
You are probably right, TD. However, in a recent article in “Soldier Magazine” (December 2011) on the Warrior upgrade, it mentioned that “the repair and recovery and observation post models, used by REME and the Royal Artillery respectively, were also in line for a facelift.”
Later in the same article an Armoured Infantry company commander stated that a key strength in the improved fleet was a new support variant – the Warrior ambulance. He talks about it as a “purpose-built model”, as opposed to the couple of vehicles that were converted to the ambulance role in Afghanistan.
So where does that leave us? I dunno.
mike
with a bit of luck, warrior will get an oveehaul and a few new builds.
It’ll come at the price of frres, but does anyonebelieve thats really going to be purchased anyway?
@Mike W
ABSV was definitely a separated programme when it began. It considered a wide array of vehicles, including Singapore’s Bionix. I think it was also known as M1P1 or something like that, and had its wheeled equivalent in the MRAV Boxer.
In 2005, both died, victims to FRES. The ABSV became part of the Warrior CSP, as stated in the then Defence Industry White Paper, with up to 300 vehicles expected to be rebuilt for support roles.
There was an order for three prototypes (an APC, an ambulance, and, i think, a command vehicle) on Warrior hulls, but i don’t know if they were actually ever delivered or if the development was abandoned even before that.
More variants were widely expected, and the BAE 120mm turret mortar AMS, shown on a Warrior hull, was possibly intended for adoption in the ABSV family.
Warrior ambulances were delivered as UOR by converting a number of Warrior FV515 Battery Command vehicles, but i don’t know how many.
There were only 19 or so FV515 to start with; i think the FV515 is (was?) issued one x each AS90 Battery.
“the repair and recovery and observation post models, used by REME and the Royal Artillery respectively, were also in line for a facelift.”
They will get armour and electronic updates as of Warrior CSP.
The RA is separately pursuing an upgrade for the electronic fit of the FV514 Artillery Observation warrior, to make it capable to do its work on the modern battlefield, directing artillery and air attacks under-armour. This would be additional to CSP, it is not included.
As for the article you mention, i’m off to search it right now! I have to read it yet. Sounds interesting.
@DominicJ
I hope that Warrior does get an overhaul and a few new builds. I don’t think that will necessarily come at the expense of FRES, though. I think we’ll get at least a few FRES SV Scout vehicles. We have to because of a deficiency in numbers but we’ve been into that before.
Anyway, Dom, the programme seems well advanced. According to the December issue of “Desider” (the magazine for defence equipment and support), a Defence Minister, Peter Luff, has been visiting the new £12 million facility for the Specialist Vehicle (SV) being built by General Dynamics UK in south Wales . Still, I suppose you can always pull a factory down again if the project is cancelled! Another article in the same publication deals with how Scout will be fitted with one of the latest sighting systems – the Thales UK Orion sight. So, as you can see, the work is ongoing.
@Gabriele
Thanks very much for the detailed reply. You obviously know a lot more about the subject than I do.
So it is fairly certain that REME and the Royal Artillery will get the armour and electronic updates for the repair and recovery and observation post models as for Warrior CSP? That is good news. The BAE 120mm turret mortar AMS variant sounds extremely interesting but I suppose it is now deemed unaffordable!
I suppose what I am really trying to find out is whether the versions of Warrior being introduced (updated recovery and repair, observation post, ambulance, etc.) are all part of a coherent umbrella programme (ABSV or a similar successor) or whether they are rather loosely connected individual programmes to be carried out as and when the need arises or the money becomes available.
We will probably offer the UOR platforms to the ANA as freebies.
I thought the 120mm AMS shown on the Warrior platform was an export demonstrator mainly aimed at the Middle East and not something considered by the MoD. We are wedded to the 81mm for vehicle use with anything bigger the domain of the RA.
As mentioned in the 2012 post and raised by the Defence Sellect Committe, there is a huge gap between the aspirations and actual future funding for the numbers of AFVs needed to equip FF2020 and although on the surface improvements in procurement appear to be being made, don’t hold your breath. With most economic forecastes pointing to a downward trend for the UK until 2020, the growth in GDP central to the MoDs future funding plans is looking less and less and I can see FF2020 being ditched in the 2015 SDSR with the size of a persistent deployment deing reduced to a reinforced battalion, or at most a reduced brigade of 2-3 battalion sized BGs.
Regarding IPT heads etc although their remaining in post longer would be far better it isn’t going to happen until they cull senior officers, Civil Servants the industrial equivilent seconded to the MoD. This is because there is a desire to retain a number of posts at each respective rank/grade to maintain career advancement paths.
Back to the Army’s need for AFVs, well the corner stone of the FF2020 MRBs was going to be FRES UV but how many of you think this is going to actually end up in service. If it does it will be off the shelf in a pseudo UOR and in limited numbers, with one or two battalions recieving t and a number in reserve for deployments.
There is so little to be really positive ablout in this topic, and others as nearly everything stated by the Government is aspirational, with few major funding decisions before 2015, and so most can be put in the fantasy catagory until a later date.
This link describes the M1 business
http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Armour-and-Artillery/M1P1-armoured-personnel-carrier-Armoured-Battlefield-Support-Vehicle-United-Kingdom.html
The BAe mortar thing was a demonstrator that was only sold to the Saudis and that it, never went anywhere and unlikely to be resurrected
ABSV has been in the pipeline for ages but never went anywhere and likely never will.
The best we can hope for is as the Armoured Inf downsizes a few surplus Warrior are made available for applications that are currently fulfilled by 432′s although my outside fiver bet is still on Warrior CSP being sold as an 80% solution to Scout and used as an excuse to bin FRES
“The best we can hope for is as the Armoured Inf downsizes a few surplus Warrior are made available for applications that are currently fulfilled by 432′s”
You mean Warriors without modifications…?
Because if you mean Warriors modified, then you are back into what ABSV is since 2005′s Defence Industrial Strategy.
And of course, now the BAE AMS is surpassed, and close to being obsolete.
But when it was presented on a Warrior, i guess that the hope of the day was to get the MOD interested.
“the corner stone of the FF2020 MRBs was going to be FRES UV but how many of you think this is going to actually end up in service.”
A bit excessive. FRES UV has practically gone down to being the aspirational mount for a total of five mechanized battalions, in addition to 5 + 1 armoured ones on the Warrior.
It is very important, but cornerstone of the MRBs, no. It’s a bit excessive a definition.
Gabriele
How is AMS ‘surpassed’ ?
Sure Patria Nemo and AMOS offer auto-loaders for increased rate of fire, but other than that, its 120mm smooth bore tube, and if you want to use it in direct fire support (as I would) and not just as the infantries pocket artillary, then a manned turret has some advantages, so hardly surpassed then………… just depends on what you want to do with it
@Lord Jim
You might very well be right about the difference between aspirations and the actual money available for spending on AFVs. I was merely going on what seemed like a categorical statement from a Government defence minister that £5.5 billion pounds would be available between now and 2021 for that very purpose. However, economic cicumstances change and politicians being politicians …
Mike
The FRES SV factory can no doubt be used to renovate Warriors, the new sights designed for FRES doled out to commander vehicles ect.
When I referred to the FRES UV being the cornerstone of the FF2020 MRBs it was because it would be the largest batch of new vehicle bought and is needed to replace a large number of older platforms not just in the Mechanised Battalions, probably becoming tractors for the 105 light guns, firld ambulances to supliment the Warrior conversions, transport for MANPADS teams etc. Without FRES UV the MRBS become a mish-mash of equipment and in all possibility not fit for purpose, if the idea really ever was.
“How is AMS ‘surpassed’ ?”
I think it is not in production anymore, to start with, and its technology is already old. From quite some time BAE ceased to offer it, and decided to get fully involved with AMOS and NEMO instead.
The only success of AMS remains the 73 on LAV hull that Saudi Arabia ordered in 1996.
I’ve long been collecting up info about all mortar and mortar-guns that are around, and i plan to write an article sometime soon, but i’ve not yet found the time to deal with the subject.
I’ll let you know when i get around to it. Something tells me that you could help me, too.
“replace a large number of older platforms not just in the Mechanised Battalions, probably becoming tractors for the 105 light guns, firld ambulances to supliment the Warrior conversions, transport for MANPADS teams etc. Without FRES UV the MRBS become a mish-mash of equipment and in all possibility not fit for purpose, if the idea really ever was.”
I don’t know if this is really, really true.
For L118 towing there are countless possible solutions, from BV206D to Warthog, from the HX60 MAN truck with the Marshall Prime Mover configuration (NBC-proof, armoured shelter for the gun crew plus crane and flatbed space for pallets of ammunition, for at least 70 rounds of 105 mm or roughly half that number in 155 mm) or the Wolfhound.
A replacement gun-towing truck is part of what was OUVS and now is the Multi-Role Vehicle Protected, not FRES UV.
From FRES UV, ideally, one would squeeze out an APC, a Command variant, an Ambulance, and possibly a mortar carrier, to equip the five mechanized battalions.
Remember that FRES UV, up to 2008 when Pirhana lost its status of preferred solution, had its closer european comparison in Italy’s Freccia. It is not a vehicle for the whole army. It is wheeled medium armour.
For the Freccia, for example, there’s:
IFV
Command
Mortar (120 mm semi-automatic, in the back)
Howitzer (155/39)
Direct Fire (Centauro II, technically, but are “relatives” so to speak)
C-RAM/Air Defence/Indirect Fire Support (DRACO turret)
Ambulance
Engineer
Repair
But this is because Freccia/Centauro is destined to equip Medium Brigades which will only have Freccia/Centauro vehicles and Lince jeeps (Panther for the British Army), with the Heavy Brigades getting the tracked Dardo IFV, the Pzh2000 howitzer and the Ariete MBT.
In the British Army, now, the role of FRES UV has reduced considerably as they won’t be in specific brigades, but only equip part of a MRB:
where an italian Medium Brigade uses Centauro II for recce and armoured maneuver, the MRB will have FRES Scout and Challenger II.
Engineer variant, for FRES UV it is very unlikely, as the brigade Engineer Regiment will have other kit.
Artillery, there will be AS90 and L118 for it.
Mortar, at a stretch you could do away with a FRES Mortar Carrier by buying the new Viking mortar carrier instead, which would be cheaper by far. Not optimal, as ideally the battalion would have FRES in all roles for commonality, but you could do it.
The point is that the effective roles that FRES UV has to cover as of now are a lot less than once thought.
Possibly, one would want to get a FRES UV-mounted NBC recce vehicle, however, i might add, since the Fuchs is gone, and i don’t know if this was ever really envisaged before.
@DominicJ
“The FRES SV factory can no doubt be used to renovate Warriors, the new sights designed for FRES doled out to commander vehicles ect.”
I think that is highly unlikely as the Warrior updating is being carried out by Lockheed Martin UK while General Dynamics UK are responsible for the FRES SV programme.
@Mike W: agreed. No love lost between GD and LM. That being said, I still see precious little point updating Warriors with 20+ years of hard use when simultaneously buying new FRES with the same turret, same size and weight class. Renegotiating the FRES contract to add another 600 vehicles to the 250 SV’s without the specific recce equipment should get us a handy discount…
@Rupert Fiennes
There might be something in what you say. We would certainly get a discount. However, the Warrior update is costing £1 million. 380 vehicles are to be upgraded and, by my Maths, that is something over two and a half million pounds for each vehicle.
The question is whether we are likely to get a brand new modern vehicle for anything like that price. Mind you, I might be very wrong.
We must remeber that upgrading AFVs and such like isn’t like changing the stereo in the GTI. The vehicle is stripped right back to bear metal and disassembled, and then reassembled in its new guise. It is almost like new build with the clock reset to zero. Well that is what is supposed to happen but if the bean counters start meddling we could be dealing with the GTI example.
Turning to numbers of FRES UV, if it goes into production I can see more than the 5 battalions worth being purchased over an extended period of time and in more variants than initial plans. I see possibly more similarity to the LAV/Striker families. The Canadians use a variant of their LAV as gun tractors for their French 105s. There will be a need for engineering variants as most of the Heavy engineering kit will possibly not handed out to the individual MRBs but held centrally. But of course a lot depends on what platform ends up being purchased and how far it is tweeked to make it UK spec.
Mind you my preference for the MRBs is to scrap FRES SV, use the Warriors for this role and equip all the Armoured Infantry/Mechanised battalions with FRES UV, in a similar way the French are replacing the AMX-10p with the VBCI, but we would need more as unlike the French we do not have and existing platfrom (VAB) to carry out many of the support roles.
In the meanwhile, talking of armour, it seems that Ocelot just got screwed in Australia.
http://news.ninemsn.com.au/national/8388555/aussie-armoured-vehicle-gets-go-ahead
The first big export chance is gone to hell.
@Mike W: it depends. Since the ES government got development and a 300 unit production run of the original vehicle for 900 million USD, you would think it would be possible. Then again, MOD(PE) is in charge
The other items to mention are the additional maintenance required by the now very old Warrior, as well as the cost of two support tails. Can’t imagine operational effectiveness counts much, as it never seems to be mentioned….
@Rupert Fiennes
“The other items to mention are the additional maintenance required by the now very old Warrior, as well as the cost of two support tails. Can’t imagine operational effectiveness counts much, as it never seems to be mentioned….”
A very good point. I would very much like to see FRES SV in service – a new vehicle. Otherwise, placing all our eggs in the Warrior basket, we really are going to be faced with block obsolescence within a decade or two.
mike w
isnt cv90 going to be obsolete just as quickly?