Building Vehicles in the Old Days
Share by EmailWhen I was in the middle of writing the last post in the bridging series it struck me just how far the UK’s indigenous armoured vehicle industry has sunk and how little imagination we now seem to possess.
The Titan bridgelayer, one based on an existing bridge and existing vehicle, has taken over ten years to bring into service, the Terrier another decade long development limping into service.
Burnt by TRACER, MRAV and FRES we have taken what is in effect, the last chicken in the shop option for Scout and the latest piece of smart engineering (Foxhound) to come out of the UK armoured vehicle industry has a supply chain and ultimate ownership that is decidedly un-British.
I have mocked the ‘British to Its Bootstraps’ claim on The GD Scout and the Warrior upgrade programme was awarded to a non UK company.
The UK has an embarrassment of riches in automotive engineering excellence as amply demonstrated by the Light Protected Patrol Vehicle competition and Jackal for example, but at the heavier end of the fighty scale we have lost the ability to innovate and more importantly create equipment that has export potential.
Centurion, Chieftain, Saladin and CVR(T) all achieved significant export orders and for good reason, what happened?
We used to in source the design and development effort, the Fighting Vehicle Development Research Establishment (FVRDE), Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment (MVEE), Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE), Defence Evaluation and Research Establishment (DERA) and of course the Military Engineering Experimental Establishment (MEXE) combined with a wealth of commercial organisations such as Alvis and Vickers were a power house of innovation, design and production.
Of course all these are history, now we have DSTL and commercial organisations such as BAE, Supacat, QinetiQ with a number of smaller component manufacturers or integrators such as Horstman, NRP, Ricardo and Cook Defence.
All that seems missing is vision and money, unfortunately, both in short supply.
So, just as a whinge, look at what we used to do when we had a bit of imagination, even if it was in partnership.
Nothing can beat Britsh Pathe for a spot of nostalgia click here;
Finally, at 3 minutes into this video, is it fair to say that the need for vehicle design to accommodate mines and IED’s has been known for some time.
Category: History, Humour and Culture
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To play devils advocate, we should look at just how successful the latter British vehicles were on the export market; Warrior, Challenger and AS90 have all proven very poor exports. LMUK may not be British by origin but it is old school UK defence industry having previously been Hunting Engineering (INSYS after a management buy-out) who ironically became famous for their anti-armour weapons.
Of course I agree with you- the complete destruction of the UK armoured vehicles industry is a travesty of the highest order, but we should be wary about the tint of the glasses through which we look back on history.
” look at what we used to do when we had a bit of imagination, even if it was in partnership.”
Are those vids good examples, TD? The Vicker MK7/2 is a Leopard II hull with the turret off the Vickers Valiant and the VFM5 was the FMC CCV(l) with the autoloader and high-tech electronics taken out. They’re not so much examples of what the british AFV industry could do with a little immagination and money but more examples of what the Vickers did in a desperate attempt to stay in business.
Pete, they weren’t meant as examples of world beating, just the simple variety of what we could do, without public money. Maybe not the best examples granted, but illustrative
Ideally we need some of the smaller independent companies back, get them to manage the projects, deal with the MOD and do the early design work.
But we face the problem of the skills shortage, lack of companies(therefore lack of movement in the job market) and too many arsewipes, like ex ministers working for the defence companies after leaving office.
My father is an aerospace engineer, local to us are 2 aero structure companies, they have some very senior positions going but he is not interested in them.
Why?
The companies are run poorly, so why would he leave one badly run company for another?
You soon see people don’t want to join them, one job he had an interview with was doing the rounds of every recruitment company for months.
Its not a lack of skills shortage which is the problem, its the lack of movement higher up and poor management, its always the same companies!
Ahahahahahahaha!
Without public money? Come of it, by the time these vehicles were made (or in the case of the Mk7/2 what the Germans had made, as Pete said, it was a Leopard 2 hull and auto-motive chain) Vickers was being kept in business by the Army being forced to take a tank it didn’t want- Challenger 1, a tank so bad Vickers had to be paid to make an improved version, the equally unsuccessful (from an export perspective) Challenger 2. Not to mention the fact that Chobham was a product of FVRDE (state funded) and the L11 came out of RARDE (also state funded), which does not leave much.
So when did the rot set in then and is it too late?
Instead of investing in a CR2 upgrade programme and various flavours of FRES would it be better to simply throw the towel in and buy US or German
Or
Is there enough innovation, design skill and political will to invest in the future combat vehicle concepts with hybrid power generation, in hub motors, band tracks, active protection, blah blah blah; a CVR(T), Centurion and Saracen for the 2030′s?
If we look at the last time the UK defence industry actually had significant export success its funny, because much of it came out of these dusty old fashioned research establishments
81mm mortar
CVR(T)
Medium Girder Bridge
To name just 3
Perhaps that is the answer, get back to properly funded in house design and integration but using components that don’t necessarily come from the UK
“Vickers was being kept in business by the Army being forced to take a tank it didn’t want- Challenger 1, a tank so bad Vickers had to be paid to make an improved version, the equally unsuccessful (from an export perspective) Challenger 2.”
I believe, Bob, that Challenger was a product of ROF Leeds and was in competition in the early 80′s with the Vickers Mark 4 (Valiant). Challenger and Challenger II would probably have enjoyed more export success if they had the option of fitting the german 120mm smoothbore gun. (In my opinion, the rifled 120mm was the right choice as until fairly recently the 120mm smoothbore was a modern 2pdr – great AT weapon: sod all use for anything else.)
Privatising the FVRDE along with all the other defence research establishments as ‘Qinetic’ was an act of stupidity almost as dire as allowing Bae to buy every AFV manufacturer in the UK.
I served on challenger 1 in the first gulf war and thought it was excellent we were hitting targets over 2000m with APFSDS and HESH rounds the rifled barrel was awesome we had bae engineers asking for our imput for Challenger 2 at least they built challenger 2 with the crews in mind
@Think Defence: that is a tad selective list of sucesses. But I think the idea is sound in that given the impossible on/off funding streams and endlessly changing gold plated specs, no private company could justify maintaining a proper AFV design team and manufacturing infrastructure.
Welcome to TD Michael
@Rupert I agree that no private company could maintain an AFV design team under such circumstances but the real exports don’t come in the form of multi-billion pound MBT projects. The real export winners are the simple things that any small country can afford; CVR(t), Ferret, Cadillac Gage Commando, virtually everything ever built by Panhard. You see these relatively cheap vehicles all over the world and their success is what keeps a company going. MBTs and other gold plated projects should be designed, at least initially, by a re-nationalised Qinetic.
Couldn’t agree more, Pete.
In Jordan they are working on those lines and have more of an AFV industry than we (soon-ish) do. Finland of all places building thousands (close gvmnt/ industry partnership, but no subsidies), Turkey winning contracts in the Far East…
@TD – “Is there enough innovation, design skill and political will to invest in the future combat vehicle concepts with hybrid power generation, in hub motors, band tracks, active protection, blah blah blah; a CVR(T), Centurion and Saracen for the 2030′s?” Yes, Yes & No, in my recent experience. After many years working in the defence industry I set out to do just as you say here. Those in industry that have been briefed seem impressed; think the vehicles are what the forces need. But from the heights of MOD down through to the procurement teams the message has been that the Army has excellent equipment, exactly what it needs to do its job, and will be the best equipped force in the world once FRES SV (which is also exactly right) is delivered. I have colleagues who are vehicle designers who have had the same message. So yes, this country does have the innovation skills and capability to produce designs that would bear comparison with the work of RARDE and the other Establishments, but our Ministry doesn’t think it needs them.
To a large degree we are still suffering from the effects of ‘Peace Dividend’ mentality. It has been in effect since the wall fell in Berlin – all the fear that held politicians’ resolve to fund defence evaporated with the break up of USSR. It was the same mentality that reduced defence spending after the Great War (“there will never again be a war on this scale”) leaving the country with equipment largely ineffective against the Nazi war machine. Be very thankful for Tommy Sopwith, an engineer who could be hailed as the saviour of this country, for he and his Chief Engineer Harry Hawker designed and built the Hawker Hurricane apparently from their own funds, the War Department considering it to be an unnecessary expense. Had the Hurricane not been available and in adequate numbers early in the war, the RAF would probably had too few fighters to hold the Luftwaffe back. History would have been quite different Mein Herr.
So spare a thought for the designers; the engineers who would move mountains to provide our forces with better equipment. And be glad we are, by and large, a stubborn bunch who will keep beating on MOD’s door until they take notice or our money runs out.
@Pete Arundel: yes indeed, although I would add that Centurion proves the product doesn’t have to be small to be a success. Given that our future MBT requirement even from my pov as a tank advocate is unlikely to be more than 500, I can’t see the need for us to design our own, and even manufacture is debateable
Welcome to TD Chris, good post, if you ever fancy a soap box to stand on, I welcome guest writers with open arms
Pete,
Challenger 1 was procured to keep Vickers, what was then RR motors and RO in business following the cancellation of the massive Iranian Shir 2 order. The Army never wanted it and its procurement caused the cancellation of the more advanced MBT-80 programme. Challenger 1 performed very poorly in international exercises which was what drove the development of Challenger 2 with the principle aim being to rectify issues with the gun and sighting stabilisation system. RO Leeds undertook final assembly of Challenger 1 and was purchased by Vickers in 1986 (after several years of back and forth with the government), Vickers was anyway a major subcontractor to the Challenger programme as the original design authority on the turret (they had designed the Chieftain turret on which the Challenger one was based). Back to Vickers export tanks, The Mk7/2 shown here used a Vickers turret on a Leopard II hull, the earlier Mk7 used the same turret mounted on a Challenger hull. That turret was then developed as the turret for the Engesa EE-T1 Osorio (which also used Dunlop suspension as used on the Challenger).
TD,
Where did the rot set in? I would suggest there are 3 angles (at least of looking at it):
Commercial: The Iranian revolution took away the UK’s biggest tank market overnight whilst the US came to dominate the rest of the Middle East, Warrior and Challenger were marketed heavily throughout the region but only picked up scraps compared to Bradley and Abrams.
Product: The decision to abort the FV4211 programme and spend several years messing around with the Germans in FMBT instead effectively handed the Leopard 2 the European market, only for the British to have to resurrect FV4211 as MBT-80 afterwards. MBT-80 could also have been a highly marketable tank and in some respects more capable than Challenger II (Aluminium chassis and more powerful engine). The decision to put the most absurd turret (A Vickers product- the hull was made by GKN) and gun combination on Warrior imaginable did for that and gave the European IFV market to Hagglunds and CV90 (acquired by Alvis in 1997).
Throwing the baby out with the bath water: I think it was absurd that RO still held a massive manufacturing capacity, but that the Army had the ability to design its own vehicles was very sensible and logical and would have been very useful when we discovered are entire inventory to be inadequate for the IED threat.
There is still some innovation, DSTL is doing some great stuff with materials for armour which has made its way into the MRAP fleet whilst Ricardo’s rough sketch idea for Foxhound shows that industry can still think. There are also a range of smaller sub-system companies doing interesting things. The fact that FP (now GD) was able to stitch together a UK supply chain for Foxhound shows we at least have some of the foundations for a credible industry.
Chris,
I am afraid I do not entirely recognise the situation you describe. Whilst the percentage of GDP invested in defence has declined from the end of the Cold War it has still been substantial. I have been looking at pre-1989 RAF planning for the 1990s recently and what is apparent is that Typhoon could have been cancelled in 1990 and combined with retirements of older aircraft it would not have been missed (the RAF basically shrunk to the point where it could have been all Tornado and Harrier- instead they kept Jaguar). There are other examples, the Type 23 programme continued, SSN20 was cancelled but was replaced by Astute (ultimately), Type 45 continued, C130J was procured etc, etc. What seems to have happened in the AFV field is a special sort of gross incompetence that has basically seen 20 years and large piles of taxpayers money wasted whilst an industry withered and died.
Pete,
Re small cheap vehicles; this was certainly true in the past, and British industry did it GKN had Saxon (was originally a private venture, was acquired by the Army due to rising costs in the MCV80 programme), Vickers had Valkyr (only sold a couple to Kuwait), Alvis had Stormer and RO had the RO2000 tracked family- but they did not sell in sufficient numbers either. And French industry is increasingly struggling to compete against lower cost emerging market manufacturers.
And lets not forget that Alvis also had the Scarab.
Personally, I think one of the major problems lies in how we now do military research and development in the UK. Most of the R&D subsections were subsumed into DRA in the 90s and then even moreso into DERA which was just too big an organisation. In 2001 this was split into Dstl and QinetiQ, but at the same time, the R&D work was refocused out of government. QinetiQ is the largest example of privatised miltiary R&D but many other companies also run MoD funded R&D.
The main problem with QinetiQ is simple. Surviving on MoD R&D funding (even with a mandated workshare) was just a stupid idea. As a business plan it’s just bonkers and this same disease spreads into the other companies as well.
Giving money to private companies results in research being done. However, it creates a massive contracting nightmare with inbuilt delays and additional costs. This also removes any flexibility whatsoever should the MoD change it’s mind as to what is the priority (as is often the case). Hence you are left with companies sucking up R&D funding into non-priority areas.
Really it’s the exploitation where the privatised route fails. R&D by itself is nothing, it’s about getting the new technology into a final product. This means the people writing the contracts (say an Army major with lots of experience in killing people but absolutely none in contracting or project management) have to be really hot on making sure that the MoD gets access to the Intellectual Property created by the MoD-funded research. However, exploiting research done by one private company into another private company is almost a complete non-starters. You’ve got fairly massive trust issues and the manufacturing company is going to make far less profit after incorporating IP and expertise from another private company. As a result, pretty much nothing actually happens.
We really need a return (which is happening in some areas) to the private-government partnership approach. With direction and leadership coming from MoD, and Industry working closely to incorporate those ideas and develop the product that the MoD actually wants whilst making sure that Industry has a stable approach and good knowledge of what’s actually happening in the programme.
I don’t hold out too much hope for the future however.
Hannay,
Whilst I am inclined to agree with you about the current structure of the UK military R&D establishment it does not explain the relative lack of competitiveness that the UK AFV industry has experienced since the end of the 1970s.
We sometimes seem to take great delight in rejecting UK designs as well, look at Panther, what a complete and utter abortion of a project delivering overpriced foreign tat, especially galling when we might have had something like the Scarab or Acorn
We should also bare in mind the change in the economics, for instance, prior to OFC the British Army had 19 armoured regiments, each with either 45 or 57 MBTs depending on armoured regiment type for a total requirement of over 1,000 vehicles, look at the Challenger Fleet now.
Thanks for the info, Bob, my most up-to-date source being a 1982-83 Janes Armour and Artillery . . .
I think that in twenty years time the British Army will be entirely equipped with foreign weapons. From the infantryman’s individual weapon to the vehicles he rides to war in. Can you imagine the French ever being in that position? (other than after they’ve just been liberated, of course . . .) I doubt gallic pride would ever allow them to get into such a position.
“when we might have had something like the Scarab or Acorn”
Would they have been any better, TD? Lack of space seems to be the most serious problem with Panther and the Alvis Acorn may have been cute but it certainly wasn’t big! Not sure if Scarab was significantly bigger than Panther but I doubt it.
Mind you, what is Panther actually used for?
Given the scale of the modifications that have been undertaken to the Panther for it to reach the TES standard it does not seen to have been one of the finer moments of procurement.
I forgot about this post from ages ago
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/04/blasts-from-the-past/
I just looked it up and Scarab was designed for a maximum combat weight of over 11 tons and used a 6 litre engine. Panther, uses a 3 litre engine to haul 6.5 tons – assuming the interweb got the numbers right!
Panther is a disaster. I daresay it was bought to polish our “Euro” credentials, but the idea of a vehicle bought for liaison purposes only, even though other vehicles on the same type and weight class are also required, is insane. Pity we bought I whole load of ambulances on the same basis
“We sometimes seem to take great delight in rejecting UK designs as well”
http://www.military-today.com/trucks/rb_44.htm
And don’t reject the ones we should reject.
Fair point X, RB44, father of Panther!
13 MBT regiments I recall. 19 regiments including recce.
I think 14 MBT regiments…
Just looking at that older article, didn’t realise the Alvis Simba had had some export success.
RAC 1991
1 Training Regiment
1 RAC Centre Regiment
1 MBT Regiment with UKMF
11 MBT Regiments with BAOR
2 Recce Regiments with BAOR
3 Recce Regiments with UKLF (1 going to BAOR on mobilisation, 1 5X and 1 UKMF).
So 12 actual MBT Regiments exclusive of the RAC Centre Regiment providing the Sqn for Berlin.
We were both wrong.
Cost of Panther, after theatre adaptations, has been said to be over 700,000 quid. I assume for that price, the interior has been tastefully finished with the finest baby cow and mahogony that money can buy.
And let’s not forget, brought into the competition after the competition had closed; and Andrew Simpson, the MoD civil servant who initiated the Panther contract and saw it through to introduction, landed himself a tasty consultancy job with Iveco. Coincidence, I’m sure.
Thank You T.D
The main reason challenger 1 performed so poorly was due to a very poorly thoughtout fre control system Bob also all the other teams in the canadian army trophy had the commanders hunting for targets with independent sighting systems.
The problem we have in this country is our service personnel have the can do will do attitude we make do with poor equipement and make them work as were other countries don’t. I was in the RAC from 1986 to 1996 we had divisional exercises prior to 1990 after we had to have german civil police escorts to travel to the locl training areas the worse thing that happened as far as defence goes was he fall of the Soviet Union since then the peace dividend has been too expensive I don’t care what the planning assumptions are we will struggle to put a full divisional formation into the field without a t least 6 months prior notice and wars don’t usuallly give you that notice.
the problem with AFV production in this country is BAe took over all production there by there was no other players to drive down costs as the political price for sending it abroad was too great for the last government so they just payed what BAE asked.
Or bought poorly with regards to the panther we paid far too much for a poorly equiped 4×4 we could have bought Range Rovers cheaper
@MichaelP: I too am saddened at the reshaping of UK’s AFV industry. I worked at Alvis when it was in Coventry and I have to say it had the most loyal and committed workforce I have ever seen – every employee from director through drawing office, fitters, machine operators, all the way to Norman who brought things from stores to line, had only the good of the company at heart. Some were fourth generation apprentices, following great grandfather, grandfather and father into the company. If only the spirit of that workforce could have been bottled and sold to the rest of UK manufacturing. Sadly I don’t think there will ever be another manufacturer of the same spirit as The Alvis. It ended when Alvis took over GKN’s AFV section and moved out of Coventry to Telford (a bigger site), eventually moving again when Alvis and Vickers became one company. The real sadness is not that Alvis-Vickers were bought by BAE, but that BAE passed control of all Land Systems (as they relabelled the AFV group) to the ex-United Defense group in Pennsylvania which BAE also own. So all of the decisions are now made from a US perspective, and I suspect the Land Systems group pays more attention to the Pentagon’s desires than those of Main Building. And while the UK defence procurement process demands MOD only deal with large organisations that can carry the risk cost of their contracts, from the BAE Land Systems perspective I am sure the MOD is seen as a minor customer compared to the DOD. Where once the future of British defence companies depended on the benevolence of MOD, in the case of BAE now, the MOD will have considerably less leverage than it believes it has.
@ all: Personally I despise the compete-everything, industry-must-accept-all-the-risk UK procurement policy. It has been (IMHO) the destruction of the UK manufacturing industry. Where once the MOD through its reserach establishments would design new equipment, using purchase orders to capable companies to buy components and services, and in some cases join forces with an industry partner that had a bright idea to develop the idea into military equipment under Cost-Plus, now every procurement must be squeaky-clean competition against highly detailed comprehensive requirements.
If the process works well, there will be a Pre-Qualification Questionaire (PQQ)- requiring a detailed company capability document in response – to weed out those the MOD feels are too small to be worthy of consideration, followed by the first Invitation to Tender (ITT) – requiring a detailed response against the detailed requirement; normally several thousand pages of data, design, commitment, justification, etc – which may in turn be followed by a second revised ITT but only to those considered worthy based upon their responses to the first ITT – another multi-thousand page response – eventually getting down to Preferred Supplier and contracts, at which point the MOD starts modifying and moulding the winning bidder’s designs into what they think they want. An industry bidder, to do that which this process requires well, needs a very large reserve in the bank. The process normally takes years to get to the point of starting product development. FRES was extreme, particularly if you add in the abandonned precursors of FFLAV, FFLAV2 and TRACER, but now that every procurement must follow this process it is always going to be long-winded. Bear in mind these bids are compiled by commercial concerns, and while they use their own funds to generate the mountains of documentation with the clear understanding the chance of losing is greater than the probability of a win, when they do win they will find a way to claw back the costs of the lost bids. Companies are not charities. So all these big competitions ultimately are paid out of the taxpayer’s pocket. Added to the complex and prolonged competitive process, industry must agree to cover all costs of programme risk, cost support packages for the expected decades of service and costs of eventual disposal under whatever laws and regulations apply at Out of Service Date. Industry naturally puts as much into its proposal as it thinks the customer will bear to cover these costs, but once the contract is made, its up to industry to make sure these are paid for. Hence only the biggest companies can be given contracts, which explains the PQQ at the very beginning of the procurement process.
Remember all of the small proud companies that used to supply good sturdy equipment to our armed forces? Under competitive procurement they could not continue unless they could show they had adequate reserves and could pay for the bid document creation over the months – years – required. These fine companies had stark choices – turn their back on defence and trust they could survive on civilian trade alone, accept they would never be more than a subcontractor to a large, probably non-UK prime contractor, allow their company to be taken over by said large probably non-UK corporations, or go to the wall.
Coming back to armoured vehicles then. The MOD made its own decision to stop working cooperatively with UK industry and to compete ruthlessly and endlessly. Whereas it at one time had a range of UK AFV companies vying for their business, it now runs competitions between BAE (Anglo-US) and GD (US), with Rheinmetall (German), IVECO (Italian) and Nexter (French) as fall back if neither BAE or GD make the grade. What value competition if there are so few suppliers?
I suggest that it was not that BAE were allowed take over all AFV production, but that the procurement process guaranteed it would happen this way. Probably with quiet approval from MOD whose self-importance was no doubt growing as the corporations they dealt with grew ever larger. The current programme problems, cost over-runs and delays (MRA4, Astute, CVF, FRES, Typhoon, etc) have shown the current process delivers little if any advantage over the earlier procurement method – it might be interesting to compare and contrast Nimrod MRA4 (competitive process) with Nimrod AEW3 (Cost Plus) and see which went further off the rails and why.
Following a TD link I looked through the Public Account Committee report on AFV procurement. Its main suggestion was that the MOD must apply its competitive procurement process with more discipline and vigour. Oh good. One of my (American) bosses once defined the act of doing the same thing over and over again in the hope of achieving a different outcome as ‘insanity’.
As far as I see, until MOD recognises in global terms it is not such a big player, and in the eyes of the huge corporations it prefers to contract with it is no longer the biggest, most important customer, it will continue to create over-expensive, slow-to-delivery equipment programmes. If it choses to change its way of working, to work with industry at all levels for the good of our armed forces, to take its own risk on board rather than paying up front for what might not happen, then there might be a win all round.
Hmmm. I didn’t mean to write such a lengthy dissertation when I started. Sorry…
Great post, Chris.
I agree, but on top of that I learnt a lot.
@Chris: I agree with most of that. I suspect that until the DPA is whittled 90%, the documentary requirements will remain at the insane level
So, basically, it all seems to be Levene’s fault….
I wonder what he is doing these days?
Funnily enough I have had e-mail conversations with Lord Levine on this very subject and in the end we had to agree we differed. He is adamant that competitive acquisition will be the saviour of the MOD, that it has provided significant benefit since its introduction, that there can never be anything better.
He has spent the past few months running the committee tasked with fixing the problems in defence procurement. I believe their findings state the current problems are due to the procurement teams not following process and that a more vigourous disciplined application of competitive acquisition will fix all.
When the committee was set up it did seem a little like asking a butcher if we should all be eating more meat
If the panther was so bad, and I’m not disputing it.
Howcome it has so many 1st world operators, Austria, Britain, Belgium, Italy, Spain etc. And according to Wikipedia, Russia have ordered over 1755..
Surely its a stupid idea to have dedicated light vehicles for specific jobs, its no effort at all for the enemy to determine who/what is coming.
How does the size of the Ocelot compare, isn’t it feasible to use that for CLV?
(I know it wasn’t available when we choose the Panther.)
Chris
Please don’t be offended but I sense the Rose tinted specks looking at the sepia tinted photo’s, and remembering ‘the good old days’
A lot of the British kit from boots to bombs was at best mediocre and sometimes downright crap. We sent millions on prototypes of all sorts of armoured vehicles which were either bizarre or downright ridiculous.
One senior arm officer looking at a 180mm recoiless rifle fitted heavy tank remarked
‘That gets built over my dead body’
When it was discovered that Chieftain trial crews were flick ramming the bagged charges, and not using the extra soft ramming device; they got a very strong lecture on how many hundreds of thousands of pounds of taxpayers money had been spent on developing it, so they better bloody use it.
Rarden Cannon either it is a stupid idea, or the rest of the world has missed a trick.
I am sorry, (and I have been through the PQQ an ITT cluster fuck procedure myself); it is precisely because we are small we need to stop reinventing the sodding wheel to British specks.
Are Lepoard 2 or Abrams crap? – No they are not! Is ch2 better? probably but so much better it’s worth losing the joint support capability of using the same tank as our allies? Is Warror better than Bradley? if so is the difference worth it?
What we do not need is loads of little companies supplying little bits of kit here and there, great for jobs; f*ck all use for warfare.
So in terms of a logistically sane, buying in bulk , for maximum discount, modern army I am afraid I could not disagree more.
“Rarden Cannon either it is a stupid idea, or the rest of the world has missed a trick.”
The rest of the world was using either 73mm low pressure guns or 20mm cannon when the Rarden was adopted. It was, and remains, a brilliant piece of design that put a much more effective weapon into the small turrets of British AFV’s. It’s easy to criticise it’s lack of dual belt feed but back when it was designed, nothing had dual feed and if your gun is accurate and powerful enough then you don’t need to blast belts of ammo off at the opposition. It’s major fault, as usual, was the lack of investment in it’s later development and the development of it’s ammunition.
“Are Lepoard 2 or Abrams crap?”
Leopard 2? Who knows. Nobody’s ever fired anything dangerous at one but as for Abrams, yes, it is crap. Crap powerplant, crap side armour and a gun that until recently was great at killing tanks but sod all use for anything else. Like Betamax and VHS, sometimes the best doesn’t come out on top.
Anyone interseted in postwar British AFV development might enjoy this; http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=HMx_6FtHBcUC&pg=PA129&lpg=PA129&dq=cold+war+hot+science+chieftain&source=bl&ots=_kNegRJfie&sig=YWiDZQM1As7fMks6DHdzGJ5h7YI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=8Sz7Tsm3Fcjl8QORotylCg&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q&f=false
Buy the book. I did and, though it’s very dry, it’s also fascinating.
The RARDEN cannon is much maligned, but as a feat of 1960′s technology, it was the most powerful gun in it’s weight class. It probably still is.
However, the value of the ability to fire a few slightly more powerful shots when the opposition can fling three times as many back is questionable.
That we have made the same decision again with the CT40 either indicates that our procurement chaps know something the rest of the world doesn’t, or they don’t want to lose face, or something worse.
The trend seems to be to fit bigger and bigger autocannon in AFVs with most nations choosing 30mm or 35mm with only the Swedes curretnly fielding a 40mm. The 40mm provides a superior dual purpose capability in addition to its APFSDS rounds. Yes there are semsor fused rounds under developement for the Bushmaster 35mm and AHEAD has existed for quiet a few years but bot require both a large gun and the ammunition is large as well. The CTS is quite a compact piece of kit and even more so with its ammunitions allowing it to be installed in smaller turrets or more easily in RWS. The size of the ammunition allows more to be stored and reduced the size of the feed mechanism.
Yes the CTA hasn’t been adopted worldwide but it is still to enter service and its true performance is not known to the general public. Having seen both the gun and ammunition up close it has great potential, especially in upgunning exisitong platforms that use either 20mm or 25mm, where space is a premium as it the need to use the existing turret or RWS.
Regarding AFV design, the days of the UK being able to design and field home grown AFVs are numbered if not already over. Without significant orders form the MoD, which is highly unlikely, off the shelf platforms with minimum UK modification should be the order of the day, be it Striker, Boxer or VBCI. FRES SV should be the last UK only spec platform we purchase. Partnerships are a possible future but countries like France and Germany seem to be willing to invest public money in their defence industry either as loans, orders or simply bailing them out when in difficulty. Their Defence contractor in turn produce products that have good export potential as well as those for the domestic market.
The Challenger II is a very good platform but needs improvement if it is to stay relevant post 2020. Key are the powerplant and gun. However surplus Leopard 2s are still available and if upgrades to A6 or A7 variants are very nearlu as effective. User of this platform sing its praises and the aftersales support and warranty put most car manufaturrs to shame. Both ethe Danes and Canadians have used their in Afghanistan to great success, and unlike the L30 CHARM, further developements are still in the pipeline regarding the tube and ammunition.
We need to stop thinking too far in the future when running AFV programmes, stop trying to cover all eventualities and new technologies. Sure a platform must have growth potential but it should be designed to handle that if and when changes are needed. In the US it is called the “Vanilla” approach I believe. Platforms are brought into service at a basic spec but have a maaped out but flexible developement programme. Our current policy of trying to future proof everything means the assessment and developement phases of the procurement cycle end up going round and round in circles whilst fixating on their crystal balls.
My solution is to set up a multiyear procurement programme for an existing platform, my preference being Boxer. Fit it with Bowmen and a RWS with and exisiting bit of kit and get it into service. Its modular nature support evolutionalry developement and the Dutch and Germans have already developed a number of variants, again these should be purchased off the shelf. UK only modules could be developed but if possible cooperation should be the way forward. AS for how many variants well think of the M113 and Boxer as its wheeled decendant and you get a fair idea.
Next the Panther, much maligned but I belive it has a role. Much like we used the Landrover snatch because it was less threatening that a true AFV, Panther’s appearance makes it suited to low level patroling. Ideally some should have some to the kit stripped out to allow more people to be carried or possibly a longer wheel base version be developed, but their are other platforms out their also ideal for this job such as the Dingo and Australian Bushmaster.
Finally the Viking and Warthog. Both of these a superbe platforms for difficult terrain. The Viking was designed for the RM and they love the things. Warhog was a UOR for the Army. I personnaly would stick to the Viking and expand the fleets and its variants, allowing a whole Commando Btn to be mechanised if neccessary. The same number should be available to the Army but these would be manned by the TA Yoamanry.
Re Chally2 powerplant
Do you mean the British one should be fitted with the export spec’ engine?
The Rarden design has gone much further on the waves (Seahawk, by now in many varieties)than on land.
I think LJ’s piece ” the CTA hasn’t been adopted worldwide but it is still to enter service and its true performance is not known to the general public. Having seen both the gun and ammunition up close it has great potential, especially in upgunning exisitong platforms that use either 20mm or 25mm, where space is a premium as it the need to use the existing turret or RWS”
captures exactly what I am thinking
- though outside of Europe there are other 40mm AFV users
- and inside Europe there are active plans to go to ‘supershot’ to get to the same position (which would then sort of equal CTA, perhaps not for the within-the-turret ergonomics)
ACC,
Seahawk does not mount a RARDEN – it’s a Mk44 in most versions.
Mr. fred,
I should have used more words, i.e how Rarden actually got
- a stabilised mount
- an autofeed
… all those things that it has been critised for, on land/ on AFVs.
After evolution/ mergers the current Seahawks for sale are based on an “int’l standard” ( Mk44) and have add-ons, as advertised on this site, for e.g. SIMMS as entry-level kitting out.