A Grand Strategy – Part 4 (Defence Policy)

309 Comments

1. John Hartley says:

   December 17, 2011 at 1:01 pm

   I think it is a mistake to drop the army below 100,000 strong. How would you deploy 13,000 to the Olympics while fighting in Afghanistan? If we are not to run out of troops then 100,000 is the minimum.
   Agreed heavy armour is under used as it is difficult to deploy. In an ideal future our MBT would be similar to the Brazillian EE-2 Osorio, weighing 41 tons while armed with a 120mm gun. Great tank, stillborn by terrible timing. 65 ton MBTs are too hard to deploy.
   Shame the A400M can only lift 37 tons. It should have been designed to lift 45 tons.
   If you want to increase the number of A330 Voyagers, you need to sort out the abomination of the PFI. Perhaps widen the 1977 unfair contracts act to cover PFIs.
2. Chris.B. says:

   December 17, 2011 at 1:12 pm

   @ JH

   No MBT is really that deployable though. In general you’d expect them all, whether they weight 60 tons or 40 tons to come via the sea. I guess it depends where you plan on sending them and how many you need.

   @ Martin

   I think I’ll have to repeat what I think it was Jed(?) said about my post; love the time and effort put into it, love all the various angles that are covered… but completely disagree with it!
3. martin says:

   December 17, 2011 at 1:42 pm

   @ John Hartley – The Army numbers I propose are based in a post Afghan world. An army with 100,000 troops cost around £15 billion per year. That’s a hell of an investment of the tax payer and I don’t think we can justify it with events like the Olympics. For civil matters be it large scale world events or even national emergencies I would like to see the TA take the lead. We might even find that using civis to police civis is better than using regular army units. It certainly allows us to look at being able to deploy a greater number of regular army units abroad if needed and reserve forces cost around 20% of the price of regular forces.
   @ Chris B – Thanks for your comments. I feel the same way about your post. I don’t think we will ever be able to reconcile the Greens and Blues on a common strategy. While I would love to see a bigger Army I just don’t think we can justify a budget for both a large Army and Navy and I personally feel that we get more bang for our buck this way.
4. jedibeeftrix says:

   December 17, 2011 at 1:50 pm

   “Our current set up really only allows us to do one thing. Provide assistance to US lead operations. If we cannot conduct independent operations then our current force and the £40 billion a year we spend on it simply adds up to a subsidy of US foreign policy.”

   Precisely my concern.

   It gives you a force that will perhaps give the the 2IC slot in a yank operation.
   It removes funding for all other expeditionary military capability due to the need to support a eight-ten brigade COIN force.
   It would pin all our military capability in one theatre for extended periods of time, leaving zero flexibility to respond to new events.

   In short, your entire military capability is pinned on one task, and its a task that the public does not like.

   Once the public get sick of the second or third COIN war in a row they refuse to allow the next, at which point you have a one-trick pony that is not even allowed to perform that trick.

   Then you have a military that is useless insofar as acting as a tool to leverage british diplomacy.

   It is a losing proposition, all round, every time!
5. Chris.B. says:

   December 17, 2011 at 2:06 pm

   I think there’s an unfairness directed at a large army re; tying it to COIN operations.

   Just because a larger army can be used in COIN operations doesn’t mean that’s all it will ever do. A 100,000 man force could just as easily be used to put two or three brigades down for a one off scuffle, while still being able to maintain deployments to Cyprus and Northern Ireland for example, and maintain a brigade in reserve for deployment to new flash points.

   If anything it is the smaller army that becomes pinned to one task. It can only hope to deploy a modest force to a one off task, and with committments like Cyrpus etc it is left with no deployable reserve.
6. paul g says:

   December 17, 2011 at 2:49 pm

   of course with this large army costing so much why not copy the US engineers and go for civvy contracts? spend thousands to train a guy to be a chippy/sparky/plumber and then he just goes off to his unit
7. martin says:

   December 17, 2011 at 3:02 pm

   @ Chris B – I agree a larger Army give us more options however I cannot envisage any set of circumstances that would see us having to enter a ground deployment alone. Morally and legally we can only invade someone else’s country or intervene in a conflict with a UN resolution or at the very least part of a coalition of the willing. If this is the case then other armies should be with us. Over contributing to coalition operations as we do now does not represent value for our boss the British tax payer.
   The Kosovo operation would be the only area were a large British commitment was necessary for the initial incursion and if we had had to invade we would have bore the brunt of the fighting as the door was kicked in. However I feel operations such as this and even Kuwait 1991 and Iraq 2003 could be largely performed by a highly skilled reservist force with the bulk of our heavy armour. It’s the much more difficult, dirty and dangerous missions like Afghanistan where the professional Army can really shine.
8. martin says:

   December 17, 2011 at 3:08 pm

   @ Paul G – Not a bad idea. Every little helps. I think army engineers are something we do not exploit enough. The Romans used their Army to build roads why not us today?
9. Chris.B. says:

   December 17, 2011 at 5:03 pm

   Martin,

   There are plenty of situations where we could find ourselves on our own, or at the very least with few partners. “Them Islands”, Sierra Leone. Had Libya turned really nasty and a resolution was passed for ground forces, it would have been us and France leading the charge.

   The trouble with coalitions then crops up. While indeed our history is ripe with examples (one day I’ll finish the mammoth article I started on this subject) in the modern world our allies are simply unreliable when it comes to land forces. Not in their quality, but in their committment to the needed numbers.

   Many nations like Holland are giving up their tanks completely in favour of lighter forces, which means there could be a time soon where we end up as one of the few European nations capable of deploying these assets.

   And as we’ve seen, even nations with large ground contingents have been reluctant to deploy them.
10. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 17, 2011 at 5:26 pm

    @ Chris B, other than the Islands that must not be named neither of the other options requires many troops. A modern mech brigade equivelant would have knocked over Libyan resistance in as long as it took to drive from Benghazi to Tripoli. I think between ourselves and the French we could have managed that, also the Italians would have been forced to join in in order to influence in post G Libya and the Turks would have been in there like a shot. Their contribution to the whole Op was massive and hardly reported. One of Martins Amphib BGs is all that could ever be required in Sierra Leone.
    So i guess the question comes that can we foresee an ocassion where the UK has to deploy on its own a large ground force. I personally like Martins idea it takes us back to our military outlook of the Napoleonic era where even in the era of huge armie Wellington never commanded more than 55,000 british troops on the continent. Instead using his well trained infantry and advisors to supllement and train portugese and Spanish during the peninsular campaigns and then as a solid core to the allied armies during Napoleons escape and eventual defeat at Waterloo.
11. Chris.B. says:

    December 17, 2011 at 5:48 pm

    That’s a hefty assumption re; one battlegroup against the entire Libyan army. With deployments to Afghanistan plus our various overseas committments, that would have stretched the outlined ground forces quite significantly.
12. John Hartley says:

    December 17, 2011 at 6:01 pm

    60 ton or 40 ton MBT. Its not just the ships & planes to carry them, its also the roads/tracks/bridges when they get there. A 40 ton tank can get around with less hassle than a 60 ton tank. Remember most large lorries are 40 tons, so roads/bridges designed for them….

    An army smaller than 100,000 cannot do more than one thing at a time. You could be comitted to one thing, then face trouble, out of the blue, somewhere else, with no means to do anything about it.
13. James says:

    December 17, 2011 at 7:12 pm

    “7th Armoured has done very little in 20 years”.

    Total bollocks. Gulf 1, four tours in Bosnia, one tour in Kosovo, Gulf 2, 2 further tours in Iraq. Brigade units have in additional done a total of 9 tours in Afghanistan at Battlegroup level. Much the same applies for the other Brigades in the Army. As for deployability, they are the same as any other Brigade or indeed the RM. It takes air and sea lift.

    7th Armoured Brigade, or any other Brigade of the Army ALREADY operates as a combined arms group. And has done since 1980. In fact, 3 Cdo Bde is less combined arms than a modern armoured brigade, and routinely have to be supported by non-Bde assets when deployed (medium lift helicopters, armour, attack aviation, 2nd and 3rd line logistics, depth fire assets – all missing from the Bde ORBAT).

    “4 Main Battle Tanks”. Are you serious? Armour’s unique capability is the ability to achieve shock reaction through a combination of mass, firepower and manoeuvre. Are we trying to kill the enemy by having them die laughing?

    You tell me when a UK Brigade is commanded by a Major General (or a Lieutenant General). It hasn’t happened. Maybe you are confusing the UK Theatre Commander with a Brigade Commander.

    You appear to mix up the long endurance of some ISTAR UAVs with the short range of weaponised UCAVs. They are not at all the same.

    Your budgeting figures look way off as well, but you don’t provide any detail as to how the figures are constructed.
14. Jed says:

    December 17, 2011 at 7:20 pm

    MMM’ I would echo my own comment as already quoted by ChrisB – I think you have done some splendid out of the box thinking here, with some good writing, but I again I can agree with very little of it.

    Although I am totally for “unbalanced – towards Maritime” I think trying to rebuild the British Army on the USMC model is a mistake. Also you I am sure Phil and maybe even Sven will be along shortly to educate you thoroughly on schwerpunkt, massing your force for maximum effect, etc etc… By your reckoning a maximum effort “division” would basically be a light infantry force with 6 x 4 = 24 MBT and 6 x 16 = 96 AIFV – well under-armed for anything except (and maybe even including) COIN !!

    RAF – don’t have a problem with your focus here.

    RN – well having been to Penang when I was in the jolly old Andrew, I can applaud your thinking but really a Far East Fleet running out of Malaysia !! To fight China ??? Oy-vay….

    If your that concerned about countering Chinese influence, then why not concentrate your efforts (based on your previous article) around alliance with India, and confine ourselves to the Indian Ocean (allowing Indian Navy to move ops further east?) and to alliances with African nations (South Africa, Kenya ???) to counter Chinese influence on that continent ?

    To link back to you previous posts, and the idea of climate change – in 2050 both the U.S. and China could be bullying their way through various ice free ‘North West Passages” against the desires of my new homeland (Canada) – perhaps if Canada does not want to move to SSN’s, they would be very happy of bi-lateral agreements where we provide them, and maybe even arctic capable amphibious forces to counter Chinese (and Russian) resource exploitation ambitions in the high arctic (and again, working with our natural allies Norway and Denmark).
15. Jed says:

    December 17, 2011 at 7:27 pm

    By the way, totally agree with a properly funded and organised TA / general (cross service) reservist capability.

    For ceremonials, how about some para-military force, whereby young adults can join the “Reserve Ceremonial” force, being taught parade ground, drill skills only, serving for 3 years while a portion of their wage is set aside for university ? They would also get adventure training and in-depth introduction to the regular forces. NCO’s and SNCO’s might come from retiring regulars who might see it as a well paid “easy draft” tacked onto the end of their careers (as there would be no requirement to deploy on ops). Perhaps just massively expand the Beef Eaters and go all “historic” for London tourist traps, why have military uniformed “Guards” at all – similar in some respects to the Vatican’s Swiss Guard:

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Group_of_swiss_guards_inside_saint_peter_dome.jpg
16. x says:

    December 17, 2011 at 7:41 pm

    It isn’t just the ships to move them an infrastructure of the destination but the massive logistic tail that MBTs’ have. Not for nothing do MEUs only have 4 M1Ax.
17. Jed says:

    December 17, 2011 at 7:55 pm

    Article on new Aussie army structures, including reserves: “According to the Commander 2nd Division, Major General Craig Williams, the reserve division will be realigned with the regular army, with two reserve brigades linked to each multi-role maneuver brigade.”

    http://defense-update.com/20111216_australian_reserve-under-_plan_beersheba.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DefenseUpdate+%28Defense+Update%29&utm_content=Google+Reader
18. Gabriele says:

    December 17, 2011 at 9:08 pm

    @Jed

    2 reserve brigades for each australian MRB.

    In the UK,
    10 TA regional brigades, of which 2 had to go as of SDSR, but were reprieved.
    5 regular MRBs.

    Do you think that Australian officers have been having lots of talks with british ones in the last year…?
    Because their army reform very much reminds me of the UK’s one.
19. Phil says:

    December 17, 2011 at 9:14 pm

    There’s only so many ways to skin a cat.
20. ChrisM says:

    December 17, 2011 at 10:06 pm

    Just a few thoughts:
    Your Med squadron is based in Cyprus. We dont have a port there do we, and they arent very friendly?
    If your first night strike relies on a large scale reservist call up it is either not going to be much of a surprise or you will have to regularly call them up (and pay for it).
    Your idea of an air transport RFA…when not transporting stuff that goes bang we can lend the capacity to aid agencies and take the cost out of the foreign aid budget. They get experts at the job for free, we get good training and flag-flying. EAW!
    Ceremonial Guards – morph several of the Guards regiments’ traditions into the MPGS. A non-deployable gig for those leaving active duty, with nice uniforms for the tourists, and a better name for recruitment.
    Trying to get rid of the Red Arrows is not worth the bad publicity for the relatively small saving. Better to make them more commercial with endorsements etc.
    Space – a number of naughty countries can, or soon will be able to, launch satellites and make nuclear weapons. If I was them I would be making a satellite that can go boom over Washington/London/Paris. Not all the bad publicity of frying lots of people, but the EMP would be hugely damaging. The West couldnt retaliate with nukes, and the poor of the world would have little sympathy with us bitching that our iPhones dont work. How the hell would we defend against such a threat – could we/would we be prepared to blow an only suspect satellite out of orbit?
21. Mike W says:

    December 17, 2011 at 11:03 pm

    @Martin

    I read your posts with great interest and they seemed to me to be argued cogently and expressed very lucidly. I found myself agreeing with much of what you said regarding trends and what our foreign policy should be.

    However, I then came to your fourth post and I must say I found much of what you suggested there pretty unrealistic. Your suggestion regarding the future of the Army (reduction to 60,000 regular personnel, and that including the Royal Marines) I found fatuous. We have an Army of 100,000 “running hot” trying to carry out one medium-sized campaign in Afghanistan! What we often forget is the number of personnel needed behind those in the combat area in order to support them adequately. The old Second World War adage, I believe, was “10 men needed behind every man in the front line.” Obviously not quite so many needed today but you get the general idea. Here I must agree with John Hartley: “I think it is a mistake to drop the Army below 100,000 strong. ….. If we are not to run out of troops then 100,000 is the minimum.” and Chris.B.: ““If anything it is the smaller army that becomes pinned to one task. It can only hope to deploy a modest force to a one off task, and with commitments like Cyrpus etc. it is left with no deployable reserve.” Moreover, I felt you very much deserved the broadside from James regarding the record of 7th Armoured. Overall your practical suggestions concerning the structure if our forces (as opposed to your very readable theories) are lacking and leave our forces incredibly unbalanced. We should all be writing to our M.P.s and to the press etc., pushing for an increase to our Army not resigning ourselves to year-on-year reductions!

    Be very careful too before you argue for the removal of ceremonial troops. Tradition, ritual, symbolism lie very deep in the British psyche. The first thing Vaclev Havel did on assuming office in Czechoslovakia was to restore the symbols, flags etc. of that nation. An intelligent man who knew.
22. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:05 am

    Thanks for your comments guys I really do appreciate as much feedback as possible especially on the Army as it’s by far the most controversial idea. Obviously if we cut the Army budget by 40% we have to accept we cannot do everything as well as we do today.
    @ James – I concede your point on 7th armoured deployments. In terms of combined arms I realise that all formations already deploy with artillery and helicopters however my focus was to find a way to integrate fixed wing aviation directly with the Army. I think allot of the issues we have faced in Afghanistan i.e. RAPTOR pod data not being available to front line forces fast enough is caused in part by a lack of integration at ground level between the RAF and the Army. The marine ethos of every man being a rifleman and the fixed wing aviation being there to support the grunts on the ground is far superior to what we have today.
    In terms of 4 MBT’s, this is the number deployed by a Marine Expeditionary Unit and they seem to be fairly capable formations. Many of our forces deploy without heavy armour and I don’t think that any one will disagree that even battling the Taliban there are certain instance when a tank comes in handy. Other Armies have successfully deployed armour in Afghanistan why can’t we?
    If you read carefully you will see that I don’t suggest getting rid of heavy armour all together but instead transferring it to a reservist force along the lines of the US National Guard. This should still allow us to conduct Kosovo and Gulf war types of Actions. Let’s not forget that 40% of deployed US forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan are reservists and these operations are far harder than the first gulf war or the opening phase of Iraq in 2003.
    In terms of UCAVS the Taranis program is certainly envisaged to have intercontinental range. At the end of the day the plane does what it’s designed to do and if we design it right there is no reason why it could not fly all the way to Baghdad and back. It’s also envisaged that these aircraft will have AAR capability although there would be no way to deploy 150 on a mission if they all had to be refueled.
    In terms of budgets. If we cut the Army and Marines down by 40% then we can cut the budget down by 40%. If we want to double the Royal Navy we have to double the budget. RAF is a bit speculative I agree as there is no way to know the cost of an intercontinental UCAV. Also not really able to get a handle on what the expanded reservist force would cost. Current TA budget for around 30,000 personnel is £350 million. Increasing the force to 50,000 and tripling pay might bring us up to around £1.5 Billion. Might mean I would have to increase the Army budget to say £ 10 billion but I think I am pretty close on the back of the fag packet scale.
    @ Jed – My major focus with Penang was twofold. After seeing what the Chinese have been doing in the South China Sea over the past few months I am increasingly alarmed. Not looking to fight China unless it’s an all-out global war at which point carriers and armoured divisions will probably not matter. My previous suggestion had us deploying this fleet to Diego Garcia. However I don’t feel that we could support such a large fleet on such a small island. I think India would be a little pissed off if we did this as well. Penang is close enough to India so that we can still conduct exercises without pissing in their backyard. If we are to expect real and meaningful cooperation from India and Indonesia then we need to have some major capability in the region. Trying to replicate what the US Seventh Fleet does all be it on a smaller scale is the best way to achieve this in my opinion.
23. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:08 am

    @ Jed – Great suggestions regading the use of para military forces for cerimonial duties. I think we really have to think outside the box in a world of shrinking budgets but unfortunatly the prevaling culture at the MOD seems completley unable to cut things like guard units (surely the easiest things to cut)
24. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:56 am

    @ X I agree about the logistics of tanks. I still believe that in many situations when deploying in a battalion sized force even a few tanks can be useful and it won’t stretch the logistics too much to deploy 4.
    @ Chris M – We had a squadron deployed at Akrotiri Mole until 2010 although the boats were much smaller. Not sure if the facilities could handle large frigates but we could always build on them. Cyprus may not let us do this but as they are really broke just now is suspect if we offer them some cash (from our foreign aid budget) or IMF assistance of need be we could probably leverage a few decent sized berths.
    I am all in favour of raiding the foreign aid budget to pay for heavy lift however I would much rather scrap it. We should not forget that organisations like UNHCR pay for commercial heavy lift all the time from the Russians so why not us. I don’t think any aircraft in the world is as well suited as the C17 to perform this task. However after reading the US studies I was amazed by how many other civilian companies and agencies would love to get their hands of one.
    With the Red arrows I have been unable to get a hold of their budget so I don’t know what it costs however I estimate that it cost £18 million for a new hawk and at least £7 million to train a pilot( let alone a display pilot) I still feel it’s silly for a force the size of the RAF to expect to be able to have an entire squadron set aside for this. If we can turn a profit on sponsorship then buy all means but if it cost us anything it should go.
    I agree that the space dimension offers some terrible possibilities for naughty people to do us harm. However the catastrophic effects of anti-satellite weapons could be just as bad. Not sure how we square this circle we are kind of dammed if we do dammed if we don’t. I do believe that any missile defence capability should have some form of anti-satellite capability incorporated although maybe not actively deployed. Again though space operations not even in the MOD’s vocabulary.
    @ Mike W – I would love to see an Army of 100,000 + and a big navy and large RAF but we are not a super power and can’t afford to be all things to all men. We would be insane to ever commit to any ground campaign unless part of a coalition. If we are part of a coalition focused on a stabilisation operation then why should we look to deploy forces larger than that of France or Germany? How many stabilisation operations have Russia or China conducted in the last 20 years? Where is the value for the tax payer in over committing? Even with an Army the size that Chris B suggested the thought of ever getting into a situation like we were with both Iraq and Afghanistan is too much to bare. Politicians can’t send soldiers they don’t have and calling up reserves to fight in messy protracted COIN’s is probably too much for them to counter. We have to remember that wars like Afghanistan and Iraq are wars of choice we can always just say no.
    In terms of the tradition effect on the moral of the Army and the psych of the people. I would doubt that most of the British people have any notion of the names of any British Army formations. If they do they are likely to know the Para’s and the Royal Marine Commando’s both constructs of the Second World War. How many guys in the street would know of the Mercian Regiment? For the interest of history and retention of pride I do suggest transferring over the regimental and battalion standards to the new reserve force think this would help the new reserve force to build its independent identity in the army structure.
    About UCAV’s – I do not agree that having a reserve of these in civilian hands will give the enemy an unfair advantage. We would have to call people up weeks in advance anyway to get everything tested and ready to go. It’s not exactly been a secret that we were preparing to bomb people any time we have done it in the past. I am not envisaging us carrying out a pearl harbour type operation any time soon.
25. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 6:29 am

    Akrotiri Mole cannot support a frigate, it would not fit through the gap. The inside of the harbour is tinu and also quite shallow. it could be extended sea ward to create a large artificial garbour and dredged I suppose. We already have facilities at Gib though that is only notionally in the Med. I would suggest that old friend Malta, there was excellent cooperation from them during the Libyan criscis and it would boost there economy.
26. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 6:32 am

    Martin,

    Whilst i agree in theory with the aim of your piece i belive that scrapping years of regimental tradition for the sake of it is a bad idea. You scoff at people having heard of the Mercians and maybe the general public may not have, local will. what about, the Black watch, the Highlanders, the Royal Scots, The Rifles, The Royal Green Jackets? Regiments with a massive international and national reputation.
27. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 7:10 am

    @ All politicians

    Thanks for the info on Cyprus. I was very unclear what the facilities were like. I would certainly consider Malta if Cyprus proved unacceptable. I always though the UK’s withdrawal from Malta after the people voted to stay in the BE was wrong. Did not want to use Gibraltar as I feel it’s too close to the UK to make any real difference when forward deploying forces.
    In terms of cap badges I really feel these historic regimental and battalion standards can be better utilised by the reserve force. It should help them to recruit in the local community better. It may also help to improve the reserves image with the regular army. In my experience in the TA the regular army viewed the primary function of the TA as an easy place to knick kit from when on joint exercise. I remember one regular army sergeant telling us to leave our kit over there “don’t worry we will watch your bags”. The entire cap badge debate really galls me. Every time we are forced to cut the budget the top brass seem far more concerned that we keep the rifles name or the scots guard than troops in Afghanistan having proper body armour. The rifles, 2 Para and 42 Commando were all formations formed with resistance of the main body of the Army. Times change and at some point we have to move on. Why can’t the 7th BEU develop a reputation every bit as fearsome as the Black Watch. I also feel the “quant view” that other armies view our naming system with does not help us.
28. Repulse says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:31 am

    @Martin, have enjoyed reading your blogs and I agreed with much of the first 3. The fourth was always going to be most contentious and although I agree with much of the maritime thrust it would push the pendulum too far in the other direction.

    The overall message that the UK should look to 18th / 19th century history to help analyze the likely 21st make is pretty sound in my mind. The UK has to play to it’s strengths to remain relevant and allow it to influence globally.

    The ability to field large land armies are not one of these, it never will be when you have the 22nd largest population in the world but want to be in the top 10 militaries in the world. I never understand the argument that we need a regular army of 100k ready to do large scale interventions at a drop of a hat… It’s not the size particularly that confuses me, though needing 100k to support 10k in Afghanistan (which is around 7% of the total troops deployed) is hardly playing to our strengths nor is it maximizing our amount of influence per buck. It is the fact that we need them at a drop of a hat… Outside of a small rapid reaction core we should be trying to get the best mix of regular to reserves to reduce costs whilst maximizing effectiveness. The money saved can go on true ways differentiate ourselves.

    The RAF should focus on transport, UK (and dependency) air defence and global presence (including ISTAR) through the use of UAVs. Manned UK fighter operations should be solely through the Eurofighter which is primarily for air superiority first and ground/sea strike second – the first strike option should be through missiles (such as TLAM) or UAVs.

    The money saved from rebalancing the army should come to the RN. This will not have the massive increases you suggest, but would be significant enough to make a difference. The RN should have:

    * 2 Carrier Groups
    * 2 Amphibious Groups
    * A presence in every ocean of the world
    * Minor vessels tor coastal defence of the UKs EEZ (and those of it’s dependencies) and MPA.

    Aside from having 12 – 16 first rate escorts to do the first 2 points. The biggest area of investment would be the third point – more SSNs and as many Type 27s as money as the money can buy (or even a cheaper vessel if there is not enough dosh).

    The FAA should be equiped for area air defence (with a small strike capability), but the main strike element would be through missiles and RAF UAVs operated either from land bases or the carriers. I also think that removing the primary strike requirement, but we could look at coverting the 50 tranche 1 Eurofighters for the FAA…

    Making the RN the 2nd largest Navy on the planet is within our technological and more importantly financial reach. Combined with a RAF with global UAV reach and an army with small high end rapid reaction forces, will give us real influence without risking the security of UK.

    BTW, Gibraltar should be our base in the Med, it is part of the UK, has the facilities already and can cover the west coast of Africa (å place of likely conflict in the next 50 years).
29. John Hartley says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:36 am

    Red Arrows are great PR for the RAF, but in austere times they need a dual war role to justify themselves.
    BAE workers were protesting that a lack of Hawk orders could put them on the dole.
    2 birds, one stone.
    Order 11 new Hawk for Red Arrows, with secondary light strike capability (DM Brimstone, Asraam, Aden 25mm gun pod) ideal for Libya/Afghan close air support.
    Then a T-45K , perhaps 9 for FAA, latest engine , built in UK with unique Goshawk bits from Boeing. A more powerful Goshawk would probably also appeal to the USN.
30. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:46 am

    @ Repulse, thanks for your comments. I think we agree on the basis on my strategy. The Amry’s a tricky thing to get right. I do certainly agree that we need to focus on rapid deployment on light forces which was my reasoning behind trying to Mirror the US Marines. However there is more than one way to skin a cat. My choice of three carriers and LHD’s was the need to be able to deploy a permanent fleet to the far east. I don’t think we can hope to build the type of Alliance I recomended without a major asset in the region. We could do this with two perhaps but it would be more difficult. Especially if we had to use one outside on the Indian Ocean. Penang is a long way from Libya.
31. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:56 am

    Your last sentence says it all. The 7th BEU would become just as coveted a title and will be just as fiercely defended. Then one day there’d be a budget cut and then we’d have the 6/7th BEU. You could have a unit called the Royal Retards and exactly the same reputation mystique and myth will grow around it. The regimental system brings a number of advantages and is a symptom of how effective human organisations work.

    It needs occasional manipulation but you’ll never sweep it away in a good unit because when a human organisation needs to merge the objectives of the individual with that of the organisation then the individual takes on a lot of the identity of that unit, the name doesn’t matter. As history is built up pride develops. You can’t get a less glamorous name than the 5307th combat unit (provisional). Yet they became Merrils Marauders. It is entirely in human nature. You can’t fight it. You just have to manage it, which we’ve proven able to do since FAS and in the 50s and 60s.
32. BertramPantyshield says:

    December 18, 2011 at 10:05 am

    Re: capbadges

    If we were to disband all seventeen regular regiments of the infantry, or transfer them to a TA role, what are the actual savings or practical benefits? I don’t think the savings are quite as huge or tangible as some people think. Indeed, if they were transferred to TA, and all officers above captain were permanent, then would there be any savings at all in regimental headquarters?

    Would the newly expanded Royal Navy like to simply number it’s ships? With R07 being scrapped rather than HMS Ark Royal, and D32 ready to deploy as first in the 32-Class. Do you think there’d be a sense of belonging to The Mighty R07?

    Re: the entire series.

    Rebalancing must happen. It already is in sorts, but budgets must realign to reflect the smaller army. On that premise I agree with the articles. I also agree with the United Kingdom becoming the biggest face of Europe, a friendly and less imperial alternative to the US or China. With economic, military, and diplomatic dominance in Europe this would become a real opportunity. Greater military coordination at a European/NATO level are a must.

    Of course should this not happen; I, for one, welcome our new Chinese overlords.
33. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 10:07 am

    The Red Arrows are much more than the sum of their parts. They’re value is not just in PR. The world of air combat is extremely individualistic. There’s a good reason why the knight analogy crops up time and time again. In the air individuals also bring disproportionate effects, most air to air kills go to a small number of aces. There is no other realm of combat where one person can make such a consistent difference in a campaign. The Red Arrows harnesses the aspirations of these good pilots, they nurture their egos, confidence and sense of pride. They reinforce that individuals sense of elitism which can be distasteful in general life but decisive in the air. One can argue that this might breed hubris but 2011 shows this doesn’t happen or self corrects very quickly.

    The Red Arrows infuse a biggleesque essence into the RAF. Which is entirely appropriate in an organisation where skilled, confident tally ho chaps like old ginger who went down over the channel, make a disproportionate contribution to victory.
34. Repulse says:

    December 18, 2011 at 10:58 am

    @Martin, I think going for 3 CVFs is a bit too ambitious and would impact too much on the rest of the defence force. An annual fleet exercise east of the Suez would probably be enough. Along with UAVs flying from Diego Garcia… Plus the SSN and warship presence I mentioned of course.
35. jedibeeftrix says:

    December 18, 2011 at 11:41 am

    “The Multi-Role Maneuver Brigades will include infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, logistics and communications and will be fundamentally alike in structure, to enable sustained operations within a new 36-month Force Generation Cycle.”

    So, three brigades on a three year cycle, presumably one year on followed by two years off, with a mid-season break.

    Seems like a demanding schedule, but rather calls into question our need for five brigades on a 30 months schedule based on six month tours.

    Can we split the difference and have four MRB’s running eight month tours over 32 months?

    It seems rather likely, and you Jed have always seemed to favour a 3:1 deployment ratio…………
36. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 11:56 am

    @ Repulse I accept the third CVF is a great expense. However central to my ambition is building the second largest navy in the world. While I know I am going to go bashed for saying this carrier’s send a message. We can all argue the points of their effectiveness vs land based aircraft. Maybe there days are numbered. However India, China and Brazil are all trying to acquire carrier capability. They obviously feel that they are important. When trying to influence Indonesian politicians or Indian ones a permanently deployed carrier along with a substantial fleet of SSN’s and Escorts send a very clear message. I agree that helping countries develop better ASW, MCM or anti-piracy is actually far more important however these are not the types of things that will sway political leaders. These guys are all bricking it about an old Russian carrier with a few knock off planes on board sailing the South China Sea. In reality we know that dealing with this would be 5 minutes work for an Astute but they don’t.
    The US is also paranoid about a lack of carriers (god knows why they have more than enough). They will soon go down from 11 to 9 and they will have to pull one deployment. In my mind they won’t pull from the Pacific or Atlantic but will likely pull the fifth fleet Carrier in the Indian Ocean (post 2015) or at least combine with the 6th fleet in the med. Being the only nation with a credible large carrier permanently in the India Ocean gives us major influence with countries from Saudi Arabia to Singapore (I know India is developing a carrier but it’s hardly the same) this type of political influence should not be underestimated. I take your point about having as many T27 and Modular Minor war vessels but I felt 12 T27 and 32 MMWV’s was sufficient for the task especially if we have 2 spare T45 and 2 spare T26. I also think it’s important to have one major war ship (T45) in the Gulf at all times. This little stretch of water is so vital to the world how we cannot.
37. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:00 pm

    @ BertramPantyshield – Ship names and cap badges are different. Ships get scrapped evry 20-30 years and there name goes with them. Regiments last for hundreds of years. I know its petty what I suggest but I just don’t see any other way than to be petty. As I said when top brass are more concerned with maintaing cap badges thna making sure there troops have the right kit we need to make some major changes.
38. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:06 pm

    In terms of savings from reserve force. Yes having full time profesional HQ’s would add to the cost but we would still save allot. US estimates are that National Guard Units cost 20% of full time units and they have full time profesional leaders. The pension saving’s alone of Regular vs Reservist are likley to be massive. As a smallish country with limited resources we really need to think outside the box for ways to provide capabilities with out the need for standing capabilities. The MOD especially the Army seems completley incapable of doing this to me. In the last 20 years the TA has been cut from 70,000 to 30,000 while the regular Army has only gone from 120,000 to 100,000. Why such and over whelming cut in reserve forces given there realtivley low cost?
39. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:09 pm

    And before any one says anything I know we having been fighting two wars. However the US forces in thise wars have been made up with 40% of reservists (and they have done a pretty good job) why can’t we try to mirror the same thing.
40. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:15 pm

    @ Martin,

    second largest navy in the world? Already, the Chinese, Indians and Brazilians (and probably some other countries as well) have larger navies than we do. I’m not talking about competency here, merely size. Data from a quick Wiki:

    US Navy 284 ships, all top end.

    Chinese Navy:
    1 Aircraft carrier (well, coming in soon)
    3 Amphibious transport dock (LPD)
    25 Destroyers
    47 Frigates
    63 Submarines
    30 Landing Ship Tank (LST)
    58 Landing Ship Medium (LSM)
    332 Coastal Warfare Vessels
    219 Auxiliary/Support vessels
    140 Landing Crafts

    Indian Navy: 175 ships

    Brazilian Navy: 100 ships

    Your prescription sounds pricey to buy, and expensive to maintain if part of the RN is to be based in Asia.

    Also, navies are only part of the equation. The RN has had a part in all of the conflicts of my lifetime, but only in one (Falklands) were they decisive. On the balance of probabilities, is that ratio likely to change in the future?
41. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:16 pm

    Martin, 6th fleet has not had a permanent Carrier this year, only during the transit through Med to 5th fleet and on way back has 6th Fleet had OPCON of a CVN
42. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:18 pm

    “As I said when top brass are more concerned with maintaing cap badges thna making sure there troops have the right kit we need to make some major changes.”

    It won’t happen. Too many vested interests. And it would be cutting off your nose to spite your face. As I said, organisational pride and history are a natural characteristic of these sorts of human organisations. You can’t deny it.

    But all this is besides the point, we just eliminated a whole tranche of famous names, there was some outrage but there’s outrage when a comedian takes the piss out of a disabled person. Someone is always outraged at something, the point is it happened anyway.

    And the fact is as you say it is petty, you are telling grown, professional men that you’re taking away their pointless little toys.

    That will go down like a shit sandwich.

    Like all organisations, the Army has insitutions, this one broadly does more good than harm, all these nay sayers who say it hobbles re-organisation are wrong, the regimental system has changed several times these past two hundred years alone. Loud voices speak up in protest and old Colonels get upset over their eggs Benedict but it still happens.

    And the Army adapts. Managing it is different from effectively insulting grown, professional, experienced men by telling them the identities and esprit d’corps they work very hard to belong to and instil in their units is a silly little boys game and banning them.
43. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:18 pm

    James,

    I think that Martins whole piece is scripted upon the belief that the next area of crucial interest and possible conflict will be in the Pacific where Naval forces have always been the crucial factor simply due to the Geography.
44. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:32 pm

    “I think that Martins whole piece is scripted upon the belief that the next area of crucial interest and possible conflict will be in the Pacific where Naval forces have always been the crucial factor simply due to the Geography.”

    Air, sea and land forces have all been critical in the Pacific.

    We always come back to the same conclusion, a balanced force is needed.
45. Julian says:

    December 18, 2011 at 12:55 pm

    Your element on RAF EW (which will also apply to Army and Navy EW) is that by purchasing the F-18 Growler, you will concede sovereignty over ‘pre-flight messages’, ‘mission data sets’, ‘countermeasure threat generator’ programmes. Do you seriously believe the US will allow the UK access to the programming of the Growler electronic countermeasure (ECM) equipment?

    We will have our own ‘ELINT collectors’, our own analysts, and our own ECM programmers, but they will most likely not be granted access by the US to the Growler equipment necessary to programme the ECM/radar warning receivers (RWRs). Modern air combat operations require ECM platforms as part of the ‘strike package’; why not task BAE Systems with modifying a Tornado, say, and Selex with providing the UK EW wherewithall for the BAE Systems platform? This way, the UK retains its sovereignty, and the UK gets employment (not the US), and the UK retains more of an indigenous defence capability (we don’t handover our defence capability hook, line, and sinker to the US).

    What your article shows, in respect of EW, is a total absence of knowledge on matters EW Operational Support (EWOS); this charge can also be levelled elswhere in the UK Armed Forces and procurement agencies.
46. DMN says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:00 pm

    Good post Martin, I like the idea of having Mini-MEU’s. However I can see the Cap badge brigade welcoming it with open arms.

    How about 4 MEU’s all based around an RM Commando plus supporting arms/units? Four allows for one to be ship based as an MEU, one working up, one rest and the 4th to be split up across various ships (smuggling, anti-piracy etc).
47. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:13 pm

    @ APATs & Phil

    any proposition that does not put the prime effort into forces that cannot effect the situation on the land, for long periods of time, is a total waste of intellectual effort. People don’t live in the sea, nor in the air. Naval and air forces have only two purposes, to enable decisive operations on the land to occur, either by shipping/ flying the land forces to where they need to be, or by providing protection for them. Sea and air blockades are ultimately futile, and in any case require huge numbers of ships / subs / aircraft that we cannot afford.

    Name me one campaign – just one – that the UK has achieved success in that did not involve land forces. The most recent – Libya – was fundamentally changed for the better when land forces (disguised, and deniable) were in place. Success in the second world war was enabled, but not guaranteed by the battle in the Atlantic. The Falklands were not liberated by ships, but by boots on the ground. Maritime forces are totally peripheral to Afghanistan or Iraq. The Armilla Patrol did not stop the strategic development of either Iraq or Iran. The no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq did not stop Saddam being a threat to his neighbours, nor having to be finally dispatched. The RAF in Northern Ireland did not contribute much, nor the Navy with some dinky little boats on Carlingford Lough.

    The only exception is the strategic deterrent.

    The Navy and Air Force are entirely supporting or enabling providers, and important for those reasons, but ultimately their force posture, balance and resources should be designed to allow land forces to do what they can do, and most of this web site seems to be some mutual fan club of pointy sharp air and maritime forces pored over by some excited civvies.
48. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:25 pm

    @ James – Really talking about gross tonnage (that can put to sea) not vessels not to mention quality. If we look at vessels North Korea has some 800 nearly 4 times the US Navy number. I agree that the Navy has only been decisive in the Falklands War and was pretty dammed useful in Sierra Leon. Interestingly enough these are the only two solo operations we have committed to.
    £15 billion per year on the navy and sticking a third of it in Asia is obviously expensive. It’s just as expensive as £15 billion on the army and sending is full deployment capability to Asia as we do today. The question is whether or not it’s worth the expenditure. I can’t see any way for us to properly engage in with the super powers of tomorrow without deploying a major asset to the Far East. In my mind the best asset to deploy is a fleet rather than an Army Division or an RAF wing.
    I have still not had a single person come back to me about the value to the tax payer of over committing to coalition operations like Afghanistan. While a large navy does not let us do everything on our own it does allow us to do some major things on our own. In order to build an Army capable of letting we act on our own in a major way we are talking 250,000 men with a budget of £40 billion and that’s before we look at air power. This is simply too much for us to swallow even if the Army could recruit that many men.
    I think we need to stop justifying our armed forces by looking and new and painful ways to exploit them. It really should be a case that if we have to fight we have not done the job right. Sending this fleet to the Far East is far more about defence diplomacy and winning friends than it is about bombing people or invading their country to give them a better life.
    @ All Politicians – I was not aware of that looks like things are already getting worse for the USN. What will happen when they go down to 9 carriers?
    Your point about the pacific is exactly what I am trying to say. If we start getting into Army deployments in this arena then we start to look really silly. A little Island in the North Atlantic with 60 million people can’t hope to compete in an area with almost 3 billion people when it comes to counting numbers. Steel is cheap and people are expensive. Basing our diplomatic and military efforts on a force that requires shear weight of numbers plays to our weakness. A force that relies principally on technology and high Tec manufacturing plays to our strength. We can afford a world leading Navy but we can’t afford a world leading Army it’s as simple as that.
    @ Phil I keep hearing balanced banded around but really what is balanced. Having the capability to do everything is balanced. The USA spends $700 billion per year and has a balanced force. $60 billion per year does not allow us to do everything we have to choose capabilities. On that basis any force structure we build is unbalanced. Are 100,000 troops with a small navy balanced? Are 60,000 troops with a decent sized navy balanced? There is another name for balanced forces with a small budget-Salami Slicing and we have had more than enough of that.
49. jedibeeftrix says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:33 pm

    @ Phil – “We always come back to the same conclusion, a balanced force is needed.”

    Define balanced? ;)
50. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:36 pm

    James

    You maybe cannot win the war in the air or at sea but you can lose it. WW2 after the army was gubbed in France the RAF (battle of Britain) and RN supported by the RAF (Battle of the Atlantic) stopped us from losing it.
    The Army has always been an option for the UK to use in wars of choice abroad but the security of the UK, first duty of any Govt has always been provided by the RN or RAF.
    No offence James but the Libya op was fundamentally changed by great utilisation of French AH power and there rather Liberal implication of ROE.
    Your point about Libya is guess work as there have been no official report on use of ground forces, the Qataris freely admit they had them on the ground but they mainly supplied cracking HUMINT which allowed precise application of air power, especially the French AH force which was vital in breaking every deadlock in the last month of the campaign.
    Of course only the army can fight large wars on land but why should we? If we accept that the days of the Empire are truely over then what good is an ability to send 1 division anywhere?
    Let the French or the Germans or the Italians do it, they all can. If it is in Asia and we need to contribute let the Indians, Indonesians or Viernamese supply the ground sloggers. We do not have the numbers to make a difference. what we could supply that they cannot is SSN capability, MCMV capability, ASW capability all of which we are simply miles better at than anyone else. Maybe one day we can supply carrier strike. Current UK forces in a major conflict consists of a Navy not large enough to guarantee landing a force that is too small to make any difference in a major conventional conflict anyway unless the US are playing. By rebalancing we can have a Navy large enough to guarantee landing a force of our partners and our own that will make a difference.
    That is a bit of a rant and is just as unbalanced as your post!
51. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:36 pm

    “any proposition that does not put the prime effort into forces that cannot effect the situation on the land, for long periods of time, is a total waste of intellectual effort. People don’t live in the sea, nor in the air. Naval and air forces have only two purposes, to enable decisive operations on the land to occur, either by shipping/ flying the land forces to where they need to be, or by providing protection for them. Sea and air blockades are ultimately futile, and in any case require huge numbers of ships / subs / aircraft that we cannot afford.”

    James, I am sure others here could tell you that you are preaching to the choir on this one.

    In fact my next piece for the site will be an historical evaluation of the “maritime” strategy, or, to use a phrase I have become fond of and used by a contemporary, breaking windows with guineas.
52. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:39 pm

    @ Martin,

    I’d suggest that a more useful starting point than most on this website choose for creating fantasy forces is “what do we want to achieve?”. 9 times out of 10 the result of any sensible thinking would be something along the lines of what we have already got, not a detailed list of precise numbers of planes and ships (some of which only exist in the mind of the poster – Astute+ or T46, for example).
53. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:40 pm

    “No offence James but the Libya op was fundamentally changed by great utilisation of French AH power and there rather Liberal implication of ROE”

    I find it hard to believe that the course of an entire and wide-ranging campaign was decided by the use of a few attack helicopters.

    This is not to deny their effect, but really, decisive? What’s the evidence base for that?
54. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:44 pm

    “Define balanced? ;)”

    An armed force that has capabilities proportionate to their utility in achieving a range of realistic objectives as set by a risk assessment and a realistic evaluation of government security policy and intentions.

    That will do for a first draft Sunday afternoon definition!
55. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:50 pm

    @ DMN – You may be right. It’s a difficult thing to come up with what structure the Army should have be it MEU’s, Brigades or Divisions. My choice of reorganising the entire professional army into MEU’s was because I saw this as the area we could get most effect with our limited numbers. These formations are great for small scale deployment’s and work well being inserted inside US formations as part of a coalition. They ain’t great for fighting it out with the Reds in the Northern German Planes but I feel we have to accept that no matter how we slice things there are capabilities we simply cannot have.
    @ James – You are really missing the point I was trying to make. What I am saying is that the next 50 years may well be very different to the previous 20. In a world of resource constraint where all nations rely on resources from abroad control of the sea will be vital. We may not be fighting pissy little brush wars but actually staring down the barrel of a pier to pier conflict. How long could China last if it was cut off from the sea? If god forbid we did go to war with China what could we hope to achieve with a land based Army?
56. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:56 pm

    @ Phil, re Libya, correct. Land-based Humint, land-based “advisors”, land-based targeting, land-based diplomacy and liaison, land-based planning and strategy. Nationally-based Sigint, nationally-based political activity, internationally-based activities around communications and finance. And a few planes dropping bombs or firing missiles, which in the manner of all air forces, required a 9:1 ratio of support missions to be flown (a little known fact that most air forces are squeamish about revealing: 80% of all air missions are for self-protective purposes).
57. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:57 pm

    Phil, The Libya Op was actually fought at a very low level towards the end, stalemate areas were measured in hundreds of metres and assets involved often measured hundreds of troops and less than 10 armoured vehicles on each side. The ability of the French AH group to neutralise these pockets of resistance allowed the rebels to advance on numerous occasions.
    Without getting myself into too much trouble I do eat a lot of Pizza in my current job and have a bit of an in.
58. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 2:57 pm

    @ Phil – On the basis of that statement I feel my proposed force is balanced then. It can meet all my objectives with in a feasible budget and guard against any conceivable conventional threat to the UK or its national interest in a way that the current force cannot hope to match.
    No one has yet told me what I can achieve with 100,000 in the Army that can be done with 60,000 and a big reservist force.
59. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:00 pm

    @ Martin,

    we wouldn’t go to war with China in any conventional way, so designing a poxy little force is irrelevant. Particularly one that can put ashore precisely 4 tanks (how did you come up with the number 4, not 3 or 5, or 632, or 9915, or 22? Was it a complete guess?).
60. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:01 pm

    Martin

    I don’t agree it is because you can’t.

    As I said, I hope my next piece will be a critique of the maritime strategy and its failings, from an historical perspective. There is a lot of evidence that shows it is just wishful thinking.
61. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:01 pm

    James

    Ahaving seen the OUP ATO your comment about 80% missions for DCA is just made up!
62. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:04 pm

    “Without getting myself into too much trouble I do eat a lot of Pizza in my current job and have a bit of an in”

    Well I will have to defer to you then since everything I know about the Libyan campaign has come from the internet.

    Do you know of any info on their contribution ie how many, how many sorties, weapons expended etc etc?
63. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:08 pm

    @ APATS,

    not made up, a comment made by AVM Sir Brian Burridge when he was commandant of the Joint Staff Course in Bracknell in 1999-2000. The wider context was that he was looking to encourage the development of air capabilities that did not need huge support packages, and in that respect was quite a fan of naval aviation. As he later became the UK Theatre Comd in Iraq, I believe his thinking has some credibility.
64. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:10 pm

    @ APATS,

    just spotted your line about DCA. DCA is probably the easiest (in terms of needing support) mission. Deep strike is probably at the other end of the spectrum, CAS a little less so. I’m not knowledgeable about OCA.
65. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:14 pm

    @ James – The number four was derived from the use of US Marine MEU deploying 4. I assume they did a little research not to having a vast amount of experience in expeditionary warfare to come up with this number. The number four also means death in Chinese which I hoped may well strike the fear of god into the People Liberation Army as we come storming ashore.
    If you read the article I am very much talking about the world in 40 or 50 year- time when ballistic Missile Defence is a real capability and the prospect in a world starved of natural resources does lead us back into pier or pier engagements principally with China. If history teaches us anything defensive and offensive technologies eventually balance out. It would be silly to think the ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads will always be an undefeatable threat. We can shoot them down today (not very well granted) what will we be able to do in 50 years. A world were Nuclear Weapons can be defeated will be a very different one to the world of today.
    @ Phil – I look forward to reading it.
66. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:25 pm

    @ Martin,

    you are probably correct about ABMs, my thinking was more in terms of other powers (e.g. diplomatic alliances , cyber, etc). China would be a very tough nut to crack, but trying to do it militarily is probably the least hopeful way.

    The last time a USMC MEU deployed tanks from the sea was in Panama in 1989. Even then, they didn’t do anything much. The last time the USMC used tanks as an assault formation was in Gulf 2, from a land base, and they used 242 of them. I wouldn’t base too much on what the MEU’s have “on paper”. In reality, they prefer and are indeed optimised for a campaign in which they can be sailed relatively quickly to a friendly port, and look tough while they are reinforced by sea, and then deploy from the land over a border when they are up to proper fighting strength. Such a course of action is not open to the poxy little forces you suggest for the UK.
67. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 3:25 pm

    James, I think the amount of aircraft allocated to either DCA or OCA depends on the stage of a campaign and what we are trying to achieve. I am not an expert. If the enemy still has a fuctioning air force and air defence network then yes the percentage of aircraft flying protection missions will be higher. I wonder what the AVM classifies as self protection? If we classify everything other than strike against non air defence related targets and CAS as self protection then yes it will be quite high. You are then classifying DCA, OCA and SEAD as self protection. Obviously if the campaign goes according to plan then hopefully the number of aircraft allocated to these roles should decrease and the number allocated to Strike and CAS roles should increase.
    @Phil They tended to fly nightly sorties deploying Tiger and Gazelle and had some nights where they were reporting up to 20 armoured vehicles and numerous trop concentrations, outposts engaged. The problem is that CTF 473 as they were did not like to share things like ordanace expended etc, the final OUP reports are still being collated I have no doubt it will all come out in the wash next year. Where the french had the advantage over UK AH was they would launch and go and find stuff to engage the UK Apaches were not allowed to look for dynamic targets. They had to have an allocated target. The situation improved towards the end of the campaign with spotters being deployed in MPA aircraft on SCAR missions with the authority to call in CAS or even on occasions NGS.
68. Mike W says:

    December 18, 2011 at 4:33 pm

    Re James’comment:

    “Any proposition that does not put the prime effort into forces that cannot effect the situation on the land, for long periods of time, is a total waste of intellectual effort. People don’t live in the sea, nor in the air. Naval and air forces have only two purposes, to enable decisive operations on the land to occur, either by shipping/ flying the land forces to where they need to be, or by providing protection for them.”

    By far and away the most sensible thing said so far on the subject. Since the end of the Second World War, the British Army has been in action in over sixty campaigns/conflicts. I have neither the time not the energy to type out all sixty plus but, in order to eliminate the charge that I am being selective in any way, let’s just take the last twenty more or less in chronological order: Zanzibar, Kenya/Uganda/Tanganyika, Radfan, Mauritius, Oman, Hong Kong, Libya, Northern Ireland, Anguilla, Dhofar, Cyprus, Belize, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Falkland Islands, Lebanon, Gulf 1, Kosovo/Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Gulf 2, Afghanistan. In which of those can it be said that the Army or land forces were not of paramount importance (in the sense of being the dominant, chief or principal force employed to influence the outcome)? Against such a list, opponents can only list the recent Libyan campaign and James has demolished that theory by saying that the campaign was “fundamentally changed for the better when land forces (disguised, and deniable) were in place.”

    And some of you want a smaller Army? Madness!
69. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 4:40 pm

    Mike W lets look at your camapigns, the dissolution of the Empire covers 90% of them. Kosovo and Bosnia are peace keeping missions which do not require an army of 100,000 to carry out. The disasters of Iraq and Afghanistan are probably reason enough to ensure we dont have that capability which leaves the Islands that must not be named and they cannot be retaken without a bigger Navy than we have now and do not require a large army to defend.
    As for James demolishing that theory did you bother to read my posts?
70. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 4:47 pm

    @ James. I have made no requirements for the MEU’s to have to be deployed by sea. Although it’s useful if all Army elements have that ability just the same as amphibious units going across land. Obviously if given the choice a land incursion is always the best way to gain access. US Marine MEU’s have deployed to Afghanistan with 4 MBT’s in the past. Which is 4 more MBT’s than the entire British Army has ever managed to deploy in Afghanistan. Also in my piece I advocate retaining a deployable heavy armoured division as part of the reserves allowing us to reinforce any BEU’s should we feel it necessary to go driving through the desert invading any ones country.

    Again are not ever going to do this unless we are part of a coalition so we could stick our “pissy” little BEU’s inside a US division and save the tax payer a bucket load of cash rather than trying to send our own Medium sized brigade that no US theatre commander understands because he speaks in divisions not brigades.
71. martin says:

    December 18, 2011 at 4:52 pm

    @ Mike W – In how many of those campaigns post British Empire was the British Army the decisive factor? Can a British Army of 100,000 men have a decisive effect on any campaign that a British Army of 60,000 can’t? If not why spend the extra £5 billion on it? Where is the value for money?
72. Jed says:

    December 18, 2011 at 5:08 pm

    So it’s James and Phil versus the world then ? Serving and ex-Army who constantly remind us that in the end it’s all about “boots on the ground”.

    Maybe it was, maybe that has changed, or will.

    Maybe it still is, and yet with Phil’s own comments about economy of force, weight of effort, and size of force that guarantees political influence (Division or above) can we ever again as a nation afford to be able to deploy the right numbers ?

    As other commentors note, “wars of choice” are supposedly about influence, not defence.

    Let us do a quick compare and contrast, which I my turn into an article:

    Japan, slightly bigger than UK, much bigger population, slightly “richer”, spends slightly less on defence. Has more men in uniform, bigger army but considerably less armour, more destroyers and frigates, and lots of SSK but no SSN. Bigger air force, more fighter-bombers but less transports.

    Japan has a constitution that prevents it becoming involved in “offensive” operations, it has provided UN peace keepers and got peripherally involved in some coalition operations, but this is still provoking heated debate at home.

    So you could say that for Japan the military is actually about “defence” not “influence”. Now put your hand up if you don’t think Japan is an influential nation ?

    The fact that Kaizen, quality circles, just in time logitstics, blah blah blah did not come out of Rover, is not merely coincidental. It is no accident that there are Japanese car factories in the UK, but no UK owned electronics factories in Japan churning out big plasma screen tv’s etc.

    Japan’s “influence” in the world is based on economics, industrial prowess, engineering and education etc. Now, please be aware I am not saying they’re the ultimate to which we must aspire, the nation has it’s problems, and has had series economic issues in the recent past. However when you have no oil, little coal etc then you make “grand strategy” decisions to build large amounts of nuclear stations to keep the lights on (despite being sat over an earth quake / tsunami hot zone) meaning that the shennagins of the middle east are less important to you, and you don’t have to “influence” it quite as much.

    In summary, despite whatever an excellent article Phil comes up with on how history has been misinterpreted, that armies are far more important than their supporting naval and air arms, because “boots on the ground” are the only thing that provides persistence an victory – we still don’t have grand strategy, we still don’t have a good clear understanding of what we want “influence” to gain us, because we don’t have a clear strategic objective of our place in the world, and we still don’t know without a shadow of a doubt, that a big (bigger) army is what will bring us what we want.

    At least Martin built up his articles looking at the threats, opportunities, political aspects, foreign policy etc – as stated I agree with very little of it, but once again we degenerate into “Navy versus Army” …… rant over, quiet depression returns…..
73. Jed says:

    December 18, 2011 at 5:20 pm

    On reserves; having been one, having deployed as one, and also being of the opinion we should use them more:

    Caveats: reservists maybe a cost effective (not necessarily “cheaper”) way to keep capabilities, allow regeneration in a required timescale BUT large scale mobilisation of reserves has severe economic impact and as Martin has used the U.S. National Guard as an example, look at the individual trauma caused to ‘Guard’ members and their families who lost their jobs due to the length of deployment, and have not been able to get a job upon their de-mobilisaton ?

    So like Denmark, and Japan, and many other nations, we could indeed use our reservists more effectively;

    However, Martin asks why, since the cold war has the TA numbers been slashed compared to the regular Army ?

    The answer is because the HMG policy has been one of expeditionary warfare, and that meant a smaller “hard core” of professional, full time regulars, backed up by professional, part timers, many of who bring specialist “civvy” skills sets to a military role. This force structure did not require a large role for reservist infantry, gunners, tankers etc.

    Again, military involvement as a way to gain influence on the world stage, versus pure ‘defence’ of national interests against military threats. So when we consider how to increase the size, utility and capability of reservist elements, lets keep in mind all the potential limitations of the existing and proposed models.
74. John Hartley says:

    December 18, 2011 at 5:22 pm

    A few points.
    The British Army at the end of the Cold War was 160,000 strong. It has lost 60,000 troops,approx, not 20,000 as stated.
    A 3rd CVF, nice , but probably unaffordable. A replacement for HMS Ocean, i.e a simple assault carrier with a handfull of F-35B, would be easier to justify.
    Most nations pay 0.5% GDP in foreign aid, not 0.7% the coalition wants. If the UK returned to 0.5%, that would free up £3.45 billion a year.
    100,000 army against 60,000 army. The 100,000 army gives you greater resistance from shocks. You can have more specialist units. There is more time for training between active tours. Morale is better(not away so much).
75. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 5:29 pm

    You know it’s going to be a controversial post when it gets attacked before I’ve even started writing it!
76. All Politicians are the same says:

    December 18, 2011 at 5:32 pm

    @Phil, I promise to read it thoroughly!
77. Repulse says:

    December 18, 2011 at 5:51 pm

    @Martin, the SDSR of 97 concluded we needed 30 significant surface vessels in the fleet. This is still true I believe.

    14 first class vessels would allow for 6 to be on active service at all times, 4 for the CVF group and 2 for the ARG. If the resources were available these would all be a general purpose T45 class which would be the RN equivalent of the US Arleigh Burke class.

    16 second rate vessels would be the main presence force with one in every main ocean or sea in the world (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Caribbean, Med, Indian Ocean, Gulf, South China Sea, Pacific). These could be T27s (T26 minus towed sonar).

    12 – 14 MHPC vessels for EEZ patrol, MCM and survey would be enough.

    16 SSNs would allow for one to be based in each of the oceans / seas I mentioned earlier.

    This would be real power / influence for the RN – not the 2nd biggest in numbers but name me a navy that would get close. It would probably be another 20bn over twenty years on the equipment budget, and a 50% uplift on the RN operational budget given from the army.

    Get the RAF the number 2 airforce for UAV projection and the Army the 2nd best for rapid reaction and we are a world player.

    The UK could afford this without significantly raising the defence budget.
78. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 6:30 pm

    @ Repulse,

    what on earth are all of those ships doing with the CVF group? Surely not protecting it? If a CVF requires 4 T45s merely to protect it, then it’s hardly an asset worth having, particularly as we haven’t got any planes to launch from it.

    2 x CVF groups to maintain one at sea, probably in the wrong place knowing the proficiency of the intelligence services. That one CVF eventually capable of launching some F-35s – maybe 6 on a strike mission. So, 2 x CVF and 8 x T45 to drop a few bombs. Hardly cost effective over the years.

    What else does this amazingly expensive force do? Can it keep the peace in a country returning from civil war? Can it deliver aid into the middle of a jungle? Can it retake the Falklands? Can it deter a middle east dictator from killing his own people, as Assad is doing, or from launching an attack on a neighbour, as Saddam did? Can it effectively close down constrained sea lanes from submarine use? Can it mount enduring surveillance operations over hostile territory, as satellites and special forces can? Can the aeroplanes reach more than 500 miles inland? All of those are examples of the sort of operations we have actually done in the last 30 years, but didn’t need a floaty little airport for.

    Lots of things it can’t do, this force, but it can break the defence budget all on its own. Probably host a nice little cocktail party as well, which will please the admiral.

    What wins the UK world influence is a combination of things, not one involving an expensive toy like a CVF. Political will, submarines, air (and in the future space-) based ISTAR, a seat on the P5, the strategic deterrent, and the best mid-sized army in the world that we don’t mind deploying for years. Not a pair of expensive boats that need to be looked after by other little boats.
79. Mike W says:

    December 18, 2011 at 6:48 pm

    @Apats

    I have now re-read your posts. Even if I concede your points concerning the application of air power in Libya and its effectiveness, I still take the view expressed by Chris.B. when he says, “Had Libya turned really nasty and a resolution was passed for ground forces, it would have been us and France leading the charge.” If I ceded the whole argument over Libya, that would only be one sole campaign to support your view, as opposed to a multitude of others where land forces have been decisive or, at the very least, the dominant element that has been employed.

    If our Army gets any smaller we shall not have the ability to conduct even a medium-sized ground campaign, conventional or COIN. Take Afghanistan, for example. There one of our main deficiencies was our lack of ability to deploy in sufficient numbers to hold the ground we had taken. The troops had to fall back on periodic sweeps, operations labelled so graphically by our PBI as “mowing the grass yet again!” It has really only been since the “surge” by the Americans took place that any noticeable headway has been made. The Chief of the Defence Staff has said as much. Boots on the ground are needed.

    @martin

    “In how many of those campaigns post British Empire was the British Army the decisive factor? Can a British Army of 100,000 men have a decisive effect on any campaign that a British Army of 60,000 can’t? If not why spend the extra £5 billion on it? Where is the value for money?”

    Yes, I grant that you might have a point about the early examples that I gave but they are hardly 90%! You have actually mentioned five exceptions yourself, ones which were not caused by the dissolution of Empire. What is far more to the point is whether YOU can quote examples from British campaigns (recent or otherwise) where land forces have NOT been of paramount importance and where naval or air power has been the predominant force in terms of success. I bet you can’t!

    Furthermore, I think if the Army gradually goes down towards 60,000, we shall see increasing examples of capabilities being cut by salami slicing. The recent SDSR has seen the removal of the main element in our recce CBRN forces (the Fuchs) and more recent cuts have involved the removal of our wide wet gap crossing capability (namely the M3). There would come a point where you really cut so deeply into core capabilities that you could not conduct any worthwhile operation.

    John Hartley’s points are also incredibly important:

    “100,000 army against 60,000 army. The 100,000 army gives you greater resistance from shocks. You can have more specialist units. There is more time for training between active tours. Morale is better(not away so much).”

    and he makes them more succinctly than I do!
80. Jed says:

    December 18, 2011 at 7:05 pm

    MikeW said:

    “Take Afghanistan, for example. There one of our main deficiencies was our lack of ability to deploy in sufficient numbers to hold the ground we had taken……..Boots on the ground are needed.”

    There is nothing untrue in this statement, the problem is, the U.S. with the most massive defence budget, many many times the size of ours, with an Army many many size the times of ours is UNABLE to put enough frikkin boots on the ground to do what is required, which is why we, NATO (ISAF) are there “helping” – so if they can’t afford enough boots on the ground, we are never going to have enough to be anything other than a small part of an alliance / coalition.

    So, for the outlay, we are minor partner, achieving what exactly ? Lasting peace and transformation of Afghanistan into a stable democracy ???

    If the U.S. is now examining the failure of a COIN based doctrine, admitting that even they will never have the will power, manpower or treasure to do it again, why should we (UK) be all “boots on the ground” about it ??
81. jedibeeftrix says:

    December 18, 2011 at 7:16 pm

    Agreed Jed,

    Can’t help feeling I have already covered the; Britain cannot play the COIN game, argument already and yet it continues to rumble on.
82. x says:

    December 18, 2011 at 7:52 pm

    We could have an army with 2 deployable corps, every soldier equipped with jet packs and plasma rifles. But if the US decides it ain’t going to deploy it ain’t going to deploy. The build up for GW1 took 6 months because the vast majority of equipment, fuel, ammunition, and food had to come by sea. Better one well equipped brigade with the specialist shipping to move it than a division where general shipping has to be charted.

    As I have said before it isn’t the RN the British Army depends on but the USN.
83. Chris.B. says:

    December 18, 2011 at 7:59 pm

    I really don’t understand the obsession with China based scenarios? Do we really believe that the US and China would allow their relations to descend to the point of war? Given the historical example of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

    And what role would the UK really play in such a conflict? It would be nuclear, that’s for certain. While ABM’s may get better, it’s pretty widely acknowledged that MRV’s make ABM defence incredibly difficult. We’re always going to be talking about trying to knock multiple objects out of the sky that are travelling at speeds measured in miles per second.

    For me the China argument is a complete waste of time. What is taking place in the South China Seas is essentially just a high stakes negotiation, in which the primary Western strategy will be containment by providing cheap(er) arms and equipment to the neighbouring countries in that region. A UK Carrier battle group will be almost of no consequence to the outcome.

    People also seem very keen to point out the size of other nations armies. And?

    Germany wasn’t exactly falling over itself to provide soldiers to either the Iraq or Afghanistan campaigns. Having a large army and having the willingness to deploy it are two very different things. Size and quality are also two very different things.

    And I continue to fail to see the “influence” that people think comes from possessing a carrier. Influence is a myriad of factors; military, economic, political.

    Britain has retained that influence which it has through the use of the Foreign and Commonwealth office, plus small training deployments, BG teams etc. Economic support, in the form of trade deals, is also hugely important. If you want to influence India and Indonesia, don’t send carriers, send a trade delegation.

    Indonesia is poised to become the new China. It’s massive population is under paid when compared to China, and has the potential to take over as the worlds low cost manufacturer of choice over the next two decades. Helping them along that path is more influential than sending a few planes or ships to drop in and visit once a year.

    I just find the notion of military influence through “gunboat (or fighter jet) diplomacy” to be one completely devoid of reality.
84. x says:

    December 18, 2011 at 8:11 pm

    Well who do we fight then?
85. James says:

    December 18, 2011 at 8:20 pm

    @ Chris B,

    I very largely agree with you. Military forces are not a purpose in themselves. Military power is just one of the tools Governments may use, wisely or unwisely, with many years of forethought or as a knee-jerk reaction, in combination with other tools of Government, or in isolation.

    What grips me is yet another post along the lines of “New scenario! What we need is 17 Type 45s, some new Type 64(+) I’ve just made up which is stretched, and 172 fighter jets with X, Y, Z characteristics, etc, etc, etc” And then someone comes back with “No! the fighter jet needs to have waterskis!, etc, etc, etc.” All bollocks, frankly.
86. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 8:36 pm

    I knew you’d become jaded eventually James. Welcome to our club.
87. x says:

    December 18, 2011 at 8:48 pm

    Perhaps you two can do what the army always does when it can’t make progress? Dig a hole, sit in it, and get a brew on.
88. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 8:56 pm

    That’s probably one of the most incisive comments made about the army on here.
89. Chris.B. says:

    December 18, 2011 at 8:57 pm

    Nooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo, there goes a post lost to the ether of Javascript errors and cookies enabled.

    To summarise what I previously wrote and lost;

    - James, hopefully my post didn’t fall into that category,
    - Equipment decisions have important implications in terms of cost and capability, which we need to get right,
    - Jed, waiting on your thoughts about NGS in my thread,
    - X, many possibilities, many countries that have wide ranging political, economic, religious and historical swords hanging over them.
90. x says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:10 pm

    @ Phil

    Thought you’d like it……..

    Pity poor TD. He has to dig a hole big enough for an ISO container.
91. DominicJ says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:20 pm

    i can only repeat, the entire armed forces budget spent entirely on the army gets us an enduring deployment of 65,000 men.

    The US has 90,000 men just in afghanistan.

    Short of a 10% of gdp defence budget, your wishes for a vast land army are utterly fancifal!
    Will a 50,000 strong army lose some specialities, maybe, maybe not, our resident medic seems perfectly capable of effectivly using a .50 hmg and one assumes everything smaller.

    Thought…
    Why not do away with infantry?
    Everyman a rifleman, as a secondary skill?
92. Chris.B. says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:26 pm

    Dom,

    Nobody wants an enduring deployment of 65,000 men, not on today’s budget. But the army has gone about as low as it realistically can. It has to cover N. Ireland, Cyprus, various UN peacekeeping assignments, Afghanistan, and find time for training and rest.

    The idea that the army can be removed and all its various tasks replaced by a combination of ships and aircrafts is fanciful.
93. x says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:33 pm

    @ DomJ

    Infanteering is a skill. To it well it needs to be practised by specialists.
94. DominicJ says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:34 pm

    chris
    indeed, hence why i say **** the enduring land commitments.
95. DominicJ says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:59 pm

    x
    but does it buy influence?
    What does isaf need more, 1000 extra infantrymen, or 1000 extra bomb hunters?

    Not only do all of our allies have army heavy establishments, they have ‘teeth’ heavy armies.

    Would 5 pionier/combat engineer/assault bridging regiments give more influence than 5 regiments of infantry?
    Whats influence?
    To me, influence comes in two forms, without us, it cant be done, and without us, its a ****ing bloodbath.

    To me, that means forced entry assault fleet, and small support/combat contingent.

    But thats just
96. Phil says:

    December 18, 2011 at 9:59 pm

    “Why not do away with infantry?
    Everyman a rifleman, as a secondary skill?”

    Hmmmmm…
97. ArmChairCivvy says:

    December 18, 2011 at 10:26 pm

    Chris,

    It is just time expiry
    “Nooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo, there goes a post lost to the ether of Javascript errors and cookies enabled.”

    Army doctrine says:
    1. when you get beaten , retreat (back arrow to previous session)
    2. dig in (copy , it will still be there)
    3. now you are using your location to your advantage (ie. the text is stored on your PC)
    4. you find a new avenue for advancing (= new browser window, click on TD)
    5. Charge! = paste into the appropriate thread comment window

    … TD’s provider was doing the house keeping at the time I get up for my coffee; how many windows of deep thought were lost to this! (???)
98. ArmChairCivvy says:

    December 18, 2011 at 10:33 pm

    I felt tempted to attempt an answer, but Jed got in a perfect one:
    “However, Martin asks why, since the cold war has the TA numbers been slashed compared to the regular Army ?

    The answer is because the HMG policy has been one of expeditionary warfare, and that meant a smaller “hard core” of professional, full time regulars, backed up by professional, part timers, many of who bring specialist “civvy” skills sets to a military role. This force structure did not require a large role for reservist infantry, gunners, tankers etc.

    … So when we consider how to increase the size, utility and capability of reservist elements, lets keep in mind all the potential limitations of the existing and proposed models.”
99. x says:

    December 18, 2011 at 10:37 pm

    DomJ who is going to provide protection for those bomb hunters?
100. DominicJ says:

     December 18, 2011 at 10:49 pm

     x
     the eods could defend themselves.
     the world doesnt lack for riflemen.
     We could provide a bomb hunter a close protection section. 250 such teams would pass influence under bloodbath prevention, for 2500 men we get more influence than we get for 10,000 combat troops.
     Maybe?
     At the end of the day, all we’ve achieved is to swap 3300 dead americans for 3000 american and 300 british
101. Phil says:

     December 18, 2011 at 10:51 pm

     “the eods could defend themselves”

     Searching and neutralising IEDs is not a task that sits well with cordon work and fighting insurgents. And very often they need far more than a section to protect them.

     Some IED finds are company level ops to get them cleared.
102. DominicJ says:

     December 18, 2011 at 10:55 pm

     phil
     so a british eod, with british close protection team, embeds with allied company.
     Or all 250 are flown around for big clearances, whatever works.
103. x says:

     December 18, 2011 at 10:58 pm

     Dom IMHO being a “rifleman” is a harder job mentally than say driving a wagon. I just don’t think you get that soldiering is a hard job.
104. DominicJ says:

     December 18, 2011 at 11:11 pm

     x
     its not a matter of ‘hard’.
     But availability.
105. Phil says:

     December 18, 2011 at 11:18 pm

     Im not following what your idea is here Dom.
106. James says:

     December 19, 2011 at 12:32 am

     @ DominicJ

     precisely what is your personal experience to make these sort of judgements?
107. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 19, 2011 at 1:04 am

     I really don’t want to get into any personal spat, but as I am a “little bit of a self-made historian” as well, I have detected that
     - Dom’s undercurrent (propelling him in these discussions; he is a self-professed politician) is something like:
     - in the Imperial days the Scottish regiments were over-represented in the army, not because of their warrior-like qualities, but because it was convenient to send a good proportion of that age male Scottish population overseas, to be slaughtered in great numbers (even when winning in the end… to whose benefit)

     And in today’s politics Dom says [?? I hope this is not true]: We are recruiting cannon fodder from the estates

     Come on Dom, is that your line – or not?
108. martin says:

     December 19, 2011 at 5:25 am

     @ Jed – I agree we are getting back to the same old Army vs. Navy debate. Not really what I wanted but I did expect it after proposing such large cuts to the Army.
     It’s good that you brought up the personal issues that guards men are having. We would obviously have to take every precaution to protect our reservists and sufficiently compensate there employers.
     @ John
     ‘A replacement for HMS Ocean, i.e. a simple assault carrier with a handful of F-35B, would be easier to justify.’
     I do recommend purchasing 3 Juan Carlos style LHD’s each operating 6 F35B’s as well as the 3 CVF’s
     An Army of 60,000 can rest its troops just as well as an Army of 100,000 we just send less to a coalition commitment, 6000 rather than 10,000.
     @ Repulse – This is very similar to the numbers I propose. We could come close with the present budget but not without unduly cutting Army numbers by too much.
     @ James – You are just being silly now- Why does a CVF need 4 escorts. Why do 250 tanks need 50,000 men to support them?
     @ Mike W – Thanks for reading the article. In terms of your questions what would have happened if Libya went wrong and only the UK and France would have gone. Very simple solution to this problem, If the USA and the rest of Europe don’t want to go then we don’t go. We leave our troops in the UK and let the Libyan people sort out their own problems. We have to stop helping people by invading our country. If Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us anything we really are unable to do this even with 100,000 guys on the ground and the people won’t thank us for it later.
     In terms of recent campaigns were land power has not been required mmmm, Kosovo, Libya, Initial Assault of Afghanistan. We must not confuse land power i.e. 100,000 man army with Special Forces or even peace keepers. I am all for sending in Special Forces to spot for airstrikes. All for committing to peace keeping operations which almost every nation on earth will send forces to there is a big difference between keeping the peace and trying to make it.
     In terms of when we intervene. Libya crossed the line by using heavy weapons against its people. It’s only right we use our airpower to take those heavy weapons of them. If this facilitates a new government then great. If the people are unwilling to over throw their own government then we should not go in and make that decision for them.
     If we can send in a small force as with Sierra Leon to support a democratic government or reinforce a peace keeping mission then we should. If it takes 100,000 men to bring the peace then we should not do it. If it takes that many men there is obviously a significant proportion of the populous who don’t want the peace of the current government.
     We should never do any of the above without a UN mandate. Simple
     @ Chris B – Obsession with China is caused by the fact that. Number 1 they are a massive power country. Number 2 they are a belligerent nation still occupying Tibet, Claiming Taiwan and preparing to annex the entire South China Sea paying no attention to international law (please see link below for map).
     Again if you read my article I am very much talking about the world of 2050 which might have severe resource constraint and may well have very effective missile defence negating the effectiveness of nuclear weapons.
     What could the UK do? As I said in the article our Navy especially SSN’s could deny the India Ocean to China cutting off its oil and food supplies rendering them helpless. Worked pretty well against the Germans in the First World War. What we could not hope to do is make any significant man power contribution. This would have to be done by India, USA, Indonesia and anyone else we built into our coalition.
     In my article I do advocate working very closely with Indonesia through the 7 powers defence agreement and turning a major part of our foreign aid budget over to helping them develop economically. Nice to know we agree on something.
     @ James – I have seen allot more guest post’s on this sight advocating butchering the RN to keep numbers up in the Army than the other way around. You still have not come back to me about what exactly we can do with 100K rather than 60K in the Army and what the benefit of this is. Until you do I think you should really stop bashing my proposals. Maybe you should write your own article I would truly love to read it if it provides such justification.
     @ X – Agreed that being a rifleman is a harder job that driving a wagon. Just look at the waist lines if you need proof. That’s why I advocated turning the majority of our Regular Army across to being riflemen while letting the reservists drive the wagons over the desert on the once in 10 year deployment scenarios like GW1 or GW2
109. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 7:04 am

     phil
     simple reall, whats isaf need most, and what does it need least?
     Influence comes with need.

     James
     yes james, we know, anyone who isnt an officer should be quiet and accept the gospel according to dannat/sharkey (delete as per prejudice)……
     For the record, which ‘judgement’ are you refering to exactly anyway?

     Acc
     wtf?
     Where did that come from?
     I want senior officers court martialled because their incompetance cost the lives of those infantrymen!
110. Chris.B. says:

     December 19, 2011 at 7:25 am

     Martin,

     China’s claims to the South China Sea are just a basic negotiating tactic; claim the whole lot, so when you get parcelled out more than your fair share (and you know it) everyone feels like they’ve won.

     The likelyhood of an actual war starting over this are slim, given that Vietnam (who are also taking the piss a little with their claims) and China have recently signed agreements in an effort to cool some of the tension between them. When China is negotiating with Vietnam, you know that the US and Europe has little to fear.

     As for looking 50 years into the future, that’s a bit too far I think. China’s rapid growth model is unlikely to survive past 2025, though it will still remain a fairly hefty (top 5) economy. Peering 40 years into the future is likely to serve little useful purpose.

     And even if you do presume a conventional war with China, will can still support the army that we have now and deploy 2 SSN to the far east (with notice) to do whatever it is you plan on doing out there.

     In the interim, a land force of a similar size to the one we have now can continue doing what it’s been doing for a while now; contributing to UN operations, helping to keep the peace in N. Ireland, and serving as a reasonable force in significant sized deployments.
111. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 8:08 am

     Dom I still am not following this particular line of your legendary thinking outside of the box. ISAF needs a range of capabilities and density in key areas.
112. Repulse says:

     December 19, 2011 at 8:10 am

     @Martin, I agree we are not that far apart, though I’m being a little less ambitious with numbers and equipment as in the short term the defence budget will only go one way. The main point for me is that money saved from rebalancing the army should be invested in SSNs and Patrol Frigates, freeing up the current T26 budget for the RN to ensure we have a credible / sustainable first rate fleet. The numbers we are discussing are pretty close to what the RN had 10 years ago.

     @James, You do not fight tomorrow’s wars by equipping yourself to fight yesterday’s. You can learn a lot from history, but the most important thing is to plan for the most likely outcome over the next 20 years and make some provision incase you get it wrong. The very damaging distortion of the UK armed forces for COIN operations is over, unless there is a world war we will not be deploying similar ground troop numbers any time soon. The public will not stand for it and quite frankly (with respect to everyone that has fought, died or got injured) we were found wanting in a number of areas such as the inability to provide enough numbers to hold Basra. A world war could happen but it is unlikely – our mitigation of the risk is to have the same numbers in the army overall, but at a much lower level of readiness i.e. significant proportion of reservists.

     My view is that atleast for the next 20 years we are going to enter a global cold war with China seeking to enhance it’s power, the US managing it’s decline and the rise of other regional powers. Much of this will be focused in the far east, but it will actually play out virtually everywhere. The UK has global interests and without a global presence to monitor, influence (primarily through soft power) and building local pacts the world will leave us behind to the detriment of everyone. Having a “large” standing army sat in Europe smacks of isolationism (which the French and Germans want) and will reduce Europes influence even further.

     The CVFs are a very contentious point, though most of the financial impact is due to politics. They are absolutely required in the world I’m describing, not primarily as fully loaded strike carriers (i don’t think they will ever be used like US carriers), but as flexible platforms. As I suggested one of the biggest costs, the F35, should be scrapped and we should look at other ways for the FAA to provide local air superiority (such as converting the initial tranche of eurofighters) coupled with the T45s. Apart from keeping an ARG safe from air attack however, their true value will be operating deep strike / surveillance UAVs or transport helicopters from the RAF. You could even pack it full of ASW Merlins if you wanted!
113. martin says:

     December 19, 2011 at 9:33 am

     @ Chris B Two SSN’s is hardly grand strategy. Also I think peering 40 years into the future is exactly what we should be doing. Many of the weapons we argue about today be it CVF, FRES or F35 will be serving in the UK forces of 2050. How can we hope to make the right decisions on what to have if we do not make some attempt to understand the world they will be fighting in.
     You make it sound as if the current strategy is a good one. What has it really gotten us except allot of dead squaddies and a very large bill? More over I just don’t see Northern Island descending into violence because the threat of 20,000 British troops on the streets is removed. Indeed putting boots back on the ground is more likely to inflame the situation. It was a mistake in the 60’s and 70’s and it would be an even bigger mistake today.
     @ Repulse-Agreed, 3 carriers, 15 SSN’s, 36 Frigates and destroyers is exactly what we had in the 1990’s pre SDR 1998. I am hardly calling for the rebuilding of the British Empire its well with on our means. I support he move for more SSN’s but I still feel there is only so much a frigate can do and we should not have too many of them.
114. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 9:42 am

     “We can shoot them down today (not very well granted) what will we be able to do in 50 years”

     We’ve been able to shoot down re-entry vehicles since the 1960s. Both via hard kill impacts and proximity detonations, conventional and nuclear.

     That is why such a huge fuss is made about it. People believe it is destabilising but the reality is completely different, ABM will encourage an arms race in defensive weapon systems at the cost of a nuclear arms race. Vastly preferable.
115. Repulse says:

     December 19, 2011 at 9:52 am

     @Martin, I think that frigates still have an important purpose, not necessarily as primary warfighting vessels (though they could if needed), but as platforms for MCM, surveillance and amphibious operations in a “warm” environments.
116. Aussie Johnno says:

     December 19, 2011 at 9:58 am

     Nice dream fellows, but………..you guys pulled out of Asia nearly 50 years ago and you are not coming back.

     Basic problems:

     the increase of defence spending from 2.0% to 2.5%. The assumption seems to be that cutting back on foreign aid will release all the money to Defence. Politics don’t work that way, there would be multible claimants (education, infrastructure, health and so on) your MOD would be lucky to get crumbs.

     Why would Malysia, Indonesia and the Philipines risk offending China, after all you have just cut foreign aid? If the Chinese pull off their IRBM anti carrier missles, US carriers won’t be safe, wacking a`UK carrier would would be a nice firepower demonstration.

     Things will get better economically after 2015! Will they? It is atleast as likely that we are looking at a fundalmental realignment of wealth and power between the west and emergent nations. Since about 1980 under ‘globalisation’ we have seen a massive transfer of previously secure and reasonably well paid factory jobs from UK, Europe, USA, Canada and Australia to Asia and south American, and you expect it to put pressure on economies in the west, including Defence spending?

     I am not sure what the UK’s future in the world is but it is not the one outlined, sorry.

     My bet is that we end up with a multi-polar world, US, Europe, China, India, posibly Brazil rubbing up against one another in the chase for available resources. Last time that happened was the end of the 19th centuary, and the result wasn’t good.
117. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:19 am

     Phil
     “Dom I still am not following this particular line of your legendary thinking outside of the box. ISAF needs a range of capabilities and density in key areas.”
     Indeed it does, but some of those areas are oversubscribed, things like fast jets, which everyone has, everyone wants to send, at at one point, someone (ISAF related) was complaining the very last thing ISAF needed was another wing of fighters, but it was all anyone was offering, whereas combat troops willing to go into Sangin, were not being offered by anyone.

     If there are 50 people willing to do a task, they have a limited amount of control, if there are only two, you can make much bigger demands.
118. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:23 am

     Has anybody a link to a source that proves these anti-carrier ballistic missiles work?

     I know the warheads used with Trident have a CEP of 150m or so. I doubt Chinese warheads on their ICBMs have that level of “accuracy.”

     A Nimitz is what 300m or so in length and will be cruising at 25kts or so.

     And if this tech’ was viable where is the American version? And why are the Chinese building carriers of their own if they are so vulnerable?
119. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:25 am

     “Indeed it does, but some of those areas are oversubscribed, things like fast jets, which everyone has, everyone wants to send, at at one point, someone (ISAF related) was complaining the very last thing ISAF needed was another wing of fighters, but it was all anyone was offering, whereas combat troops willing to go into Sangin, were not being offered by anyone.”

     So what are you getting at re EOD chaps v infantry? We need both. And you can’t just turn either one of those into the other.
120. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:27 am

     “Has anybody a link to a source that proves these anti-carrier ballistic missiles work?”

     Didn’t you get the memo, they are the new Wunderwaffen. They are going to change everything. Hold on to your pants because one of the most important weapon systems in 70 years is about to be rendered instantly obsolete. Yes, again.
121. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:34 am

     @ Aussie Johno

     Your country has a Third World economy. If the US is stuffed then Australia is stuffed too. Well an independent Australia. It isn’t hard to imagine China buying into Australia as it has Africa and South America. It isn’t hard to imagine them shipping in ship loads of migrant works to work their mines. What the Whites did to the Aboriginals will pale into significance.
122. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:36 am

     On what planet does Australia have a third world economy? Enlighten me.
123. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:47 am

     @ Phil

     All I know is that anybody who buys Chinese copies of Russian weapons tends to wish they hadn’t.

     I know China is turning out graduates by the millions. And I know from my time at uni’ Chinese work damn hard.

     But when I compare how far China has come in twenty years to how far Japan progressed in those 20 years following WW2 well the former seems to be lacking.

     Take the cyber-threat. The scale is impressive and frightening. But there is little innovation. Most of the time they are using well known techniques developed in Europe, the US, and Israel. Where is the Chinese Stuxnet? IT systems are constantly evolving. It is a myth that most of the world’s IT infrastructure is unsafe. Most of it is very secure, especially those used in utilities and military systems. For every publicised breach there are 99 more other systems that are safe.

     All I see when I look at China is a giant sweat-shop where a crooked ruling class is more bothered about its own pockets. I don’t see China as solid; I see it more “fractured” than India.
124. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:49 am

     @ Phil

     Australia’s wealth comes from the primary sector.
125. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:59 am

     X/Phil
     “Has anybody a link to a source that proves these anti-carrier ballistic missiles work?”

     “Didn’t you get the memo, they are the new Wunderwaffen. They are going to change everything. Hold on to your pants because one of the most important weapon systems in 70 years is about to be rendered instantly obsolete. Yes, again.”

     Proof, no, but the GMLRs when it still had a submunition was supposed to be able to clear a square kilometre.
     It takes 100 such loads to clear 10 square km.

     Then of course, have the US Brilliant Anti Tank system, with introduced guided submunitions.

     Trident was never designed to be pin point accurate either.

     Personaly, I remain to be convinced, but if these Carrier killers are actualy simply launch platforms for a Harpoon Swarm, suddenly they look much more worrying.

     The Battleship was perceived as invulnerable all the way up till they started dropping like flies.

     Phil
     “So what are you getting at re EOD chaps v infantry? We need both. And you can’t just turn either one of those into the other.”
     But EVERYONE has infantry, in vast numbers. Its not a rare commodity.
     Skilled bomb hunters are not available in numbers.
     I posit that 1,000 skilled bomb hunters would buy much more influence in a COIN war than 10,000 skilled tank hunters.

     X/Phil again
     “On what planet does Australia have a third world economy? Enlighten me.”

     Australia exports coal and imports machinery.
     Thats not a good sign.
     Its not a third world country, but it is a primary resource country.
126. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 10:59 am

     It also has high levels of innovation, a mature services industry, some of the best internet and communication access in the world, a high level of R&D investment and social, political and personal plurality, it costs a relatively small amount to start up a business as well as it having one of the best education systems in the world.

     Hardly a third world economy. Even if her wealth primarily comes from the primary sector as you say, the other attributes are complete polar opposites of a third world economy.
127. Rupert Fiennes says:

     December 19, 2011 at 11:04 am

     @x: apparently the Chinese nicked the US Pershing 2 guidance system, which used radar for terminal guidance, producing a CEP of less than 50m. It’s not a wonder weapon for sure, but it’s potentially something of the same threat level as an Yakont, for example. Personally, I think we should flog a nuclear powered CVF to the US as a better fit for both the CV and LPH roles than the current design, and at around 50% of the cost, the ability to spread those eggs around baskets is very useful :-)
128. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 11:06 am

     “Proof, no, but the GMLRs when it still had a submunition was supposed to be able to clear a square kilometre.”

     You mean MLRS. GMLRS by definition cannot clear a square kilometre, that would negate the G in the name.

     “The Battleship was perceived as invulnerable all the way up till they started dropping like flies.”

     A modern battleship is arguably an immensely powerful combatant when it is part of a task force, which they were always meant to be a part of. Out on their own on a limb they are as vulnerable to air attack as any other single surface combatant. Combined arms at sea.

     “I posit that 1,000 skilled bomb hunters would buy much more influence in a COIN war than 10,000 skilled tank hunters.”

     In an abstract sense perhaps. If all you wanted to do was find IEDs.

     “Australia exports coal and imports machinery.
     Thats not a good sign.”

     Australia has some serious ecological problems but this is the first time I have ever seen that country accused of having a third world economy. This site doesn’t half come up with some strange, contrarian definitions sometimes.
129. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 11:14 am

     @ Phil

     You could say similar things about the infrastructure that supports the Indian and Chinese middle and upper classes. Actually you could compare Malaysia with Australia.

     If you take the mining sector and agriculture off their balance sheet there isn’t much left.

     I think you are reading too much into the sheen of Western culture and being a tad conventional.

     Such thinking wouldn’t have got you far with my Australian GPE professor. ;) :)
130. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 11:17 am

     @ Phil

     Accused is an odd word to use. I didn’t say it had a Third World health care system or a Third World transportation system or anything similar.
131. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 11:34 am

     Phil
     “You mean MLRS. GMLRS by definition cannot clear a square kilometre, that would negate the G in the name.”

     Meh, close enough :)

     “Australia has some serious ecological problems but this is the first time I have ever seen that country accused of having a third world economy.”

     I was correcting X, rather than agreeing with him.

     Generaly and historicaly speaking, third world countries have primary economies, they dig stuff out of dirt and sell it.
     As it became harder to dig stuff out of the dirt, or technology increased rate of production (think deep sea oil rigs and gm farming) that ceased to hold as a rule, however raw materials are the small part of the value pyramid, behind turning them into something useful, and designing the something useful.

     Australia has a lot of “digging up” but not a lot of making something useful or designing something useful.

     A Primary Economy is not the mark of a third world country, but its rarely a good sign either.
132. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 11:34 am

     x

     You know as well as I do that “third world” is a value laden term and its value is usually negative except to the most post-modernist of thinking. This is why I accuse you of describing the Australian economy so.

     You might have said it has certain characteristics, but you didn’t, you ascribed negative values to those characteristics through the use of a very conventional western centric conception of a third world.

     I suppose using this contrarian definition one could describe Norway as having a third world economy. Right.
133. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 11:37 am

     Or Saudi Arabia?
134. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 11:40 am

     “Australia has a lot of “digging up” but not a lot of making something useful or designing something useful”

     Australia has some of the highest relative investment in R&D in the world. Its service sector is several times larger than its mining or agriculture sector. It is a modern market economy. Just because part of it is based on exporting commodities doesn’t make it a third world economy. Seriously. It’s contraryness for the sake of it.
135. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 12:06 pm

     I repeat.
     It has a primary export economy, not a third world economy.

     Did you know Australia once had the worlds highest GDP per Capita?
136. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 12:09 pm

     “Did you know Australia once had the worlds highest GDP per Capita?”

     I also hear its sunny a lot.
137. James says:

     December 19, 2011 at 12:23 pm

     What about advanced torpedoes against carriers? I don’t know anything about torpedoes (apart from just watching an old frigate having its’ keel broken by one – see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cwWzFSePevw).

     It seems to me that China could more easily develop a range of modern torpedoes with adequate range (50 miles) that could be launched from many platforms – even fairly simple ones – and in great enough quantity to seriously ruin a carrier group’s day. There’s not much manoeuvre room in some of those bottlenecks between islands.

     Might be cheaper and more productive for China to follow that route than developing a super-missile.
138. martin says:

     December 19, 2011 at 12:25 pm

     @ Repulse – I totally agree about Frigates the question is how many really. I felt 24 with 12 destroyers and 32 MMWV was sufficient for every task.
     @ Aussie Johnno – “We pulled out of Asia 50 years ago”. Yes we did but who is to say we can’t come back. We pulled out because the big area of concern was Europe and a soviet invasion. Who is to say we can’t come back. I you read the post I specifically say I don’t want to work with Vietnam and the Philippines as they are too close to China. If these countries don’t want to rub China up the wrong way then why are the Philippines pleading for assistance and why has Singapore just allowed the US to base a Squadron of LCS’s and why has your own country just allowed a permanent deployment of a Marine MEU.
     In terms of budget what I am trying to show is that we could if we wanted to build this force. Not that we will. I have no faith what so ever in the UK’s political and military leaders to actually achieve this but remember the website is called “think defence” not this is the reality of defence.
     In terms of the west being under f**ked and on a continue down ward spiral I seem to remember no so long ago Asia and Australia being in a similar position and they came through it just as we will. It amazes me how short people’s memories are.
     As for Anti Carrier Missiles. These things have to be the most over rated weapon system I have ever heard off. I might be concerned if I ever intended to sale a fleet within 300 miles of China which I don’t I might be concerned if I thought that there was any way for a ballistic missile to be targeted against a ship maneuvering at sea which I don’t and I might be concerned if we did not have an AAW destroyer able to take out such missiles which we do.
     @ Rupert I think sticking a reactor in CVF would bring it up close to the cost of a US Carrier. Never really got the point in nuclear carriers. They are just so dammed expensive.
     I don’t see any need to bash Australia. The Aussie economy is very dynamic and vibrant given the relatively small size of the population and I am sure if we were sitting on all those resources we too would exploit them to the fullest potential.
139. Rupert Fiennes says:

     December 19, 2011 at 12:54 pm

     @martin: capital costs for may be higher, but running costs are far less, especially with modern naval reactors being designed to not need refuelling for their service life. CDG carries 3600 tonnes of aviation fuel, while CVF carries 3400, despite the former being 2/3′s of the displacement. The difference is due to the lack of 6000 tonnes of bunker fuel for the main engines. Given that at present plans, CVF can maintain air operations for three days, the number of additional tankers required to maintain operations on a conventional carrier vs a nuclear powered variant, the life cycle costs are going to look rather good.

     On a nasty, but necessary consideration, a nuclear powered carrier does have higher decomissioning costs. For example, a government could not make silly decisions to decom a carrier force overnight, because costs and timelines of such would be extended….
140. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 1:22 pm

     Rupert
     I’ve wondered a few times if we should build a line of small nuclear reactors, as small as is economic, for “baseline” power on ships.
141. martin says:

     December 19, 2011 at 1:57 pm

     @ Rupert- Reactor’s in vessels lasting 50 years have to be refulled at least once. The decomissioning costs incorporated with the high upfront cost are just too much to bare. I seriously doubt any through life savings on this basis.
142. Rupert Fiennes says:

     December 19, 2011 at 2:00 pm

     @DominicJ: you can see the advantages. That being said, I suspect the additional maintenance and guarding required by nuclear propulsion loom rather large when the payoff is lower. I’m in favour of CVN’s because the consumption of aircraft fuel is so much greater: the 6000 tonnes of ship fuel can take CVF 19000 km, while 3400 tonnes of aircraft fuel go inside of 3-5 days for example.

     I often think of this sort of calculus when you hear lots of Race To the Swift type talk of heliborne operations in “deep battle”. Even a cursory look at the figures makes it fairly obvious that resupplying such a force looks like a nightmare, compared even supplying an armoured brigade :-)
143. B.Smitty says:

     December 19, 2011 at 2:20 pm

     Martin,

     Penny packeting fixed wing airpower out to battalions works in the USMC MEU CONOPS, but is a bad idea otherwise . Centralized organization but distibuted execution is the way to to.

     There are other ways to acheive better air-ground coordination
144. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 2:25 pm

     Why don’t some people just admit they want to turn the British Army and Royal Air Force into the United States Marine Corps?

     And move Britain to the Pacific.

     Way cooler.
145. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 19, 2011 at 2:40 pm

     Who is “they”?

     Surely not I?

     ;)
146. Phil says:

     December 19, 2011 at 2:54 pm

     You’re in the frame!

     I have to ask, what’s with the user name?!
147. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 3:10 pm

     He’s a Cow that uses his Jedi Powers to perform tricks, like commenting on defence…..
148. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 19, 2011 at 3:12 pm

     Shocking!

     I have always been quite plain in my support for a roughly 2:1 ratio of regular (stabilisation) brigades & lighter (intervention) brigades.

     Not really an articulation of the USMC model now is it?

     As to the name; was drunk with friends some years ago, invented the name and swore i’d have it as a website one day. Ten years later the dream came true, and you poor buggers have to live with the consequences.

     :D
149. andyw says:

     December 19, 2011 at 3:22 pm

     “These are not the cows you’re looking for”
150. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 3:24 pm

     JBT even uses it on the Telegraph’s comments. :)
151. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 19, 2011 at 4:02 pm

     “I am more powerful than you can possibly imagine!”
152. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 19, 2011 at 4:36 pm

     DJ, apologies, I must have misread your remarks. I was wondering… as you are an active contributor, it would have been at cross-purposes
153. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 19, 2011 at 4:48 pm

     Hi x, RE
     ” know the warheads used with Trident have a CEP of 150m or so. I doubt Chinese warheads on their ICBMs have that level of “accuracy.””
     - the missile (unitary warhead, as far as I know) is dependent on satellite targeting in the late manoeuvre phase
     - easy answer: take out the satellites
154. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 19, 2011 at 5:07 pm

     Further on the carrier-killer:
     - in size and end-manoeuvreability (fins at the front and all that) it is very Pershing like
     - never heard before that the guidance would be somehow based on the US “cousin”
155. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 5:34 pm

     @ ACC

     Do you know what it takes to hit a “stationary” target (given that the planet is rotating and moving through space) with warhead doing hypersonic speeds? Not saying it can’t be done. But on the balance of evidence given Chinese technical ability verses the US technical ability I do think this system is vaporware.
156. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 19, 2011 at 5:53 pm

     X, I hope so (and keep reading the assessments, almost all American, btw)

     Like someone mentioned, they can be shot down (becomes a numbers game). US & Japan have together upgraded the current Standard missile to this end, and S.6 is well under way
157. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 6:14 pm

     Yep. The other thing is that there is at least evidence of the US ABM tests.
158. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 6:18 pm

     Jedi said “I am more powerful than you can possibly imagine!”

     Really? Can you wind Phil up and get DomJ to agree with him while typing one handed? I think not… ;)
159. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 19, 2011 at 7:08 pm

     Some things remain even beyond my considerable* talents. :(

     * ever the modest chap that i am
160. DominicJ says:

     December 19, 2011 at 7:45 pm

     winding phil up is well easy :-)
161. x says:

     December 19, 2011 at 8:10 pm

     Yes. But I do it from a locked trunk which is at the bottom of a swimming pool.

     Dangle a few buzz phrases and use them in a very general manner and he bites without fail.
162. aussie Johnno says:

     December 20, 2011 at 9:35 am

     Martin, ‘Who says we cannot come back………..’.

     You will find there is absolutely no support out here for somekind of rebirth of the SEATO treaty, which, UK lead, is what you are advocating.

     I don’t think you have the slightest idea how fast things are changing out here. Today’s financial news here is the China is proposing a new $A9Bil open cut coal mine in Queensland. Something like 60% of Australia exports are going to Asia and much of the investment is coming from Asia.
     Without that trade, the Australian economy would be in a bigger mess than Europe’s.
     The days when the UK could organise military events in Asia have gone, in the nicest possible way, please get over it.
     The policy discusions here are about we avoid getting caught between the elephants (US, China and India). The RN doesn’t rate a mention.
163. DominicJ says:

     December 20, 2011 at 10:06 am

     “The RN doesn’t rate a mention.”

     I believe Martin once suggested a fleet of 32 Astutes.
     8 operating out of Diego Garcia could blockade China without trouble

     Not to say we should of course.
164. viceroy says:

     December 20, 2011 at 10:47 am

     @ Aussie Johnno – you are quite right of course, but Australia does not have the strength to avoid being caught between the elephants without allies (any more than the UK does). Hence the value of allies…
165. martin says:

     December 20, 2011 at 12:16 pm

     @ Aussie Johnoo – I actually live out here in Malaysia so I think I am well versed in the geo politics of the area. If you remember I advocated expanding the FPDA which includes Australia at present and although a greatly slimed down organization it is still a functioning one. While Australia is obviously keen to preserve good trade links you surely cannot deny Australia’s concern over the rise of China. The governments naval expansion seems to indicate to me that Australia is preparing to become more heavily involved in the area.
     As Europe has now settled down to a relatively dull area in terms of geopolitics and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future the UK is left with two options. One we can cut our armed forces down to nothing claim neutrality and go about our merry way. Option two we can begin to refocus our attention on the India Ocean (not the Pacific Ocean and nowhere near China). The USA does not have the type of defence agreements and pacts in the IO as it does in the pacific. I feel there could be a real role for us to play in this very important part of the world. Especially after 2015 when I believe the USA will cut out much of its presence in the region to re-focus on the pacific. Furthermore I believe that many nations like India and Indonesia may well prefer to partner with the UK than the USA. Firstly partnering with the USA comes with allot of strings that smaller nations like Australia may well accept but rising super powers like India may not. Secondly we are far less offensive to the Chinese than the USA is. Allowing basing rights for a British fleet is likely to be far less controversial than an American one.
     In public every leader from Malaysia to Australia is praising the rise of China and emphasizing their desire for close economic cooperation while at the same time spending a fortune on enhancing the naval and air power. Any idea why they are doing this if it’s not concern about China. Singapore has just allowed permanent basing of US naval vessels in the area however the over stretched US navy can only send two littoral combat ships.
     Other than the USA there are only two other western countries with the ability to help. We have the technology and economic muscle to do this. It’s only a matter of will on the part of our political leaders.
166. martin says:

     December 20, 2011 at 12:20 pm

     @ Domonic J – I did advocate building 32 SSN’s which is quite an amazing number but actually well with in our budgetary capabilities. I think if tensions ever did rise with China this would be our best measn to combat them. That fact that we are one of only two or three nations on the world that can build such awesome weapons is our real saving grace.
167. James says:

     December 20, 2011 at 12:29 pm

     “8 operating out of Diego Garcia could blockade China without trouble”

     Yes, well we don’t have 8 Astute submarines, nor do we have 16 which is probably what we would need to keep 8 on station. And we don’t have the ability to stop the Chinese getting an ISO container in London, or Liverpool, or Southampton with a dirty bomb on board to give us an indication that they are pissed off with our little submarine game.

     Given our spastic little Navy, I’d agree with Aussie Johnno. The RN doesn’t rate a mention in real life in 2011, nor will it for the next 20 years on current plans. Carriers without planes? Submarines that ground themselves off Skye (map reading 101 for the plonkers in charge)? No floaty little boat to protect the UK while we were doing Libya? Two submarines bumping into each other while on a nuclear patrol in the whole north Atlantic? No MPA? Matelots getting caught by some Iranian gunboats and then having a good cry when their iPod is taken away?

     For a maritime nation, the Royal Navy is shockingly underfunded, and also shockingly inept.
168. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 20, 2011 at 12:39 pm

     Lol, at this rate we are going to have to create a “Stick-up-for-the-RN” club to match our “Don’t-diss-the-RAF” party!
169. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 12:40 pm

     James, that post is going to see a few folk here admitted to A&E with stroke.
170. Topman says:

     December 20, 2011 at 1:02 pm

     He does have a point. What’s all this talk of blockading China and to what end?
171. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 1:07 pm

     China is the next bogeyman!

     Entire swathes of sexy defence projects, and sexy sounding think tank documents will be destroyed or never written unless we get a new bogeyman.

     Insurgencies are SO 2001.
172. viceroy says:

     December 20, 2011 at 1:14 pm

     @ James – no human organisation is free from inept behaviour from time to time. Unless you want the Army to fight alone (or infallibly), we will need to consider how to expand our list of allies and partners to reflect the emergence of new powers and the diminution of older ones. The Royal Navy has a role there, I should have thought.
173. Topman says:

     December 20, 2011 at 1:21 pm

     I’m not one for high level strategies and the such like, but all this talk of sending subs to China sounds like some people have been reading too many Tom Clancy books.
174. Think Defence says:

     December 20, 2011 at 1:43 pm

     Slagging the services off is one thing, invoking dead service personnel to make a point is another

     Deleted a post that did just that so lets all take a chill pill can we
175. DominicJ says:

     December 20, 2011 at 2:04 pm

     Topman
     Anymore Tom Clancy than sending Force Z to Japan?
     Admitadly, that was a bit of a disaster.

     Or the SAS to Malaya.
     Or the Korean War?

     China is cvurrently the worlds second largest economy, and probably the worlds most populace nation.
     Anyone who reads their Ambrose like a good boy will know Chinas economy just fell off a cliff, 30% fall in Beijing property prices in one month.
     Those of you who been to China should be able to confirm the casual racism thats all pervading.

     Its no more Tom Clancey to suggest they will respond by eating south east asia then it is to suggest in 1935 that War between France and Germany was possible in the short term future!

     Should we get involved?
     Well, thats harder to argue, but if the answer is yes, 5 SSNs will be a lot more useful than 50,000 infantrymen.

     They could of course surprise us all and eat Siberia.
176. martin says:

     December 20, 2011 at 2:04 pm

     @ James – Not going to get into an inter service slagging match with you.

     I am still waiting for an explination on what we can achieve with 100,000 soldiers that we can’t with 60,000. I would have hoped someone with your Army back round could have shown me some real benefits for this £5 billion per year expenditure.
177. James says:

     December 20, 2011 at 3:00 pm

     @ Martin,

     sorry, I had missed your question (there’s too many threads and too much else in life going on, and I mostly read TD / respond while one of about 15 on a conference call, so I am often distracted).

     I’d be delighted to be more specific on 100,000 versus 60,000 in Army numbers if you can give me the context, but at a very high level the simple answer is 166% of the capability. In reality, I’d say that looks like a 6 month major deployment plus an enduring Brigade deployment, as against either / or.
178. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 20, 2011 at 3:53 pm

     @ James & Martin

     Was that “plus” an “or” in
     ” specific on 100,000 versus 60,000 in Army numbers if you can give me the context, but at a very high level the simple answer is 166% of the capability. In reality, I’d say that looks like a 6 month major deployment plus an enduring Brigade deployment”

     On the more general front: 5-powers upped to 7-powers would be absolutely fantastic. But where does the famous seabed come into this? Are Australian and Indonesian interests congruent enough to bind them into a strategic relationship? Or would we be getting another Turkey/Greece bind as within NATO?
179. Chris.B. says:

     December 20, 2011 at 4:19 pm

     I think the Tom Clancy-esque aspect of this is presuming that you can deploy SSN’s to block off Chinese imports without any kind of response.

     I suspect they might take a blockade of their ports and sea channels to be very unsporting, causing them to deploy their numerous SSK’s (30-odd) as a defense against such aggression.

     So let me just recap, see if I can understand where you’re going with this. You want to build 30 or so SSN for the purpose of deploying 8 to the far east…. so you can blockade a major nuclear power?

     Definie insanity?
180. Topman says:

     December 20, 2011 at 4:22 pm

     @ DJ, I think you misread my post. I’m not saying there will no conflict in Asia in the future, I’m saying that, yes, to me talk of blockading China in 25 years time is so remote it’s not really worth worrying about. But like I said that’s just me, I tend not to get into grand strategies and the such like, I haven’t had the time, training or inclination for such thoughts.
181. James says:

     December 20, 2011 at 4:30 pm

     @ ACC,

     One large scale deployment (35,000) for six months (e.g. Gulf 1 or 2),

     PLUS

     one enduring medium scale (12,000) for years on end on 6 month rotations.

     …is what 100,000 gets you, ignoring some of the minor details.

     60,000 gets you EITHER the large scale for six months, OR the enduring medium scale.

     If we go down to 60,000, we have to accept that we’ll never put a large scale deployment together if we also have a Brigade away doing something medium. So either we then never send a Brigade away “in case” the big one crops up, or we say “no, we’ll be a one brigade on ops country”, in which case we could come down to about 50,000 (allowing for a non-deployable training and admin base).

     Anyway, soldiers and their kit are cheap compared to the other forces. There have been a number of £ assertions as to what forces cost on this blog, but they’ve never been broken down and to my mind and memory of Defence Planning rounds, the figures look completely wonky. The values I remember date back to 2000-2003 so clearly are not up to date, but the relative proportions are if anything likely to be even more weighted the RAF being most expensive in terms of combat capability, then RN, then Army / RM in that order. Of course, that preceded the assignation of the strategic deterrent to the MoD core budget, so the RAF / RN figures may have swapped.
182. martin says:

     December 20, 2011 at 4:34 pm

     @ James – Thanks for answering my question. Essentially it allows us to deploy and enduring brigade. Now is there any context in the last 50 years were an enduring brigade has been necessary other than in a coalition operations with the USA? Can we justify the extra £5 billion to commit 10,000 rather than say 6,000 to these operations? What does it get us? Not trying to be funny with these questions I am just trying to really understand the desperate need for 100,000 troops post Afghanistan.
     @ACC – That’s an excellent question and one I had not thought of. As far as I can see relations between Canberra and Jakarta are improving all the time. I certainly can’t see any major issues on a par with Greece and Turkey but perhaps Aussie Johnno can shed more light. There may be some points of contention between India and Indonesia around the Adaman and Nicobar islands however I don’t think there is any major issue.
183. All Politicians are the Same says:

     December 20, 2011 at 4:43 pm

     @James, yes for a maritime nation the RN is very underfunded, thanks for that admission. As for inept, inevitably mistakes invoving high tech complex and expensive bits of kit make the headlines. When a ship grounds or a helo or plane crashes it makes the headlines. When D company Witherspoons Yeomanery get lost on mvres for 6 hours or (as I have seen) a 105mm battery fires at the wrong target on Salisbury Plain it is simply a bollocking end of.
     I will answer your points in detail though.
     I thought you were opposed to carriers, yes matching the CVF with AC is a major issue and one that I am still not certain how it will end or if I am being honest how i want it to end.
     HMS Astute was a shocking error, these things do happen but see my point above, they happen throughout the services however they are more public when it is a SSN.
     The Vanguard incident here and i will be careful, it was hit by a French SSBN, the French do not inform Nwood what waterspace there SSBNs are using, every other NATO sub has its waterspace managed by either a HQ in Norfolk, Nwood or Naples. It was 1 in a million, neither submarine could detect the other and they ended up in the same bit of water. What it does prove is that even the best sensors in the world cannot detect (and hold) another SSBN at short range.
     MPA is a Government decison and they were an RAF asset.
     The Cornwall incident led to a full review and a comprehensive training package in conduct after capture package.
     The no floaty boat bit as you insist in calling it is just BS, stop believing the Daily Mail.
     There is a document called the Fleet Operations Schedule(FOS) which will normally allocate tasking including Ships to be Duty Towed Array Patrol Ship(TAPS)and the Fleet Ready Escort (FRE). They are short notice reaction units, they have been combined in the past, during the period mentioned there was not only a TAPS ship available but HMS York was in the Channel fully worked up and with a full war load ready to deploy and relieve Liverpool in the Med.
184. Topman says:

     December 20, 2011 at 4:43 pm

     James, are your figures right? That sounds a lot of troops away from 100,000. If it is why is afghan a struggle right now? About 6500 are regular army from a force of 100,000 we should be able to double the regular army’s commitment, plus deploy 35,000.
     I’m not looking to knock your figures they just seem out of kilter with the current noises about deployment strech right now.
185. All Politicians are the Same says:

     December 20, 2011 at 4:53 pm

     Whether I agree or not I read Martins posts with regard to the Army as being. We will no longer do the large scale bit. Why should we deploy 35,000 troops. We will support such a deployment but let our continental allies with large land armies provide the infantry and armour allowing us to support with more niche and high tech capabilities across all 3 environments.
     When will we ever have to deploy 35,000 troops. I mean “have to” not choose to. We have no land borders to defend. We choose to get involved in such events as GW1 and GW2.
186. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 4:57 pm

     Afghan isn’t a struggle. Afghan and Iraq WAS.
187. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:03 pm

     “One large scale deployment (35,000) for six months (e.g. Gulf 1 or 2) PLUS one enduring medium scale (12,000) for years on end on 6 month rotations. …is what 100,000 gets you, ignoring some of the minor details.”

     Out of curiosity, what does 82,000 buy you? I ask as that appears to be the plan.
188. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:04 pm

     Negative!

     The plan is 82,000 plus reserves!

     There’s a culture that is going to need changing – there will be 120,000 odd in the Army. Not 82,000.
189. Topman says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:05 pm

     Afghan isn’t a struggle. Afghan and Iraq WAS.

     So we could double the amount of army regular personnel there easily (assuming no other issues)?
190. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:06 pm

     It might seem like pedantry but it is not. If we are to start using our reserves more effectively the first thing we need to do is start to think of them as being one and the same army. Without that change the culture won’t change.

     Every journey…
191. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:07 pm

     “So we could double the amount of army regular personnel there easily (assuming no other issues)?”

     It’s not a question of doubling numbers, there is more slack in some capabilities than others.
192. Chris.B. says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:10 pm

     “… let our continental allies with large land armies provide the infantry and armour,”

     – This crops up often and in an ideal world of relative balance then we would provide most of the sea stuff and Germany and Poland would provide the bulk of the land component.

     But unfortunately our allies have shown a significant reluctance to deploy men and tanks abroad. Any plan that relies on Europe providing the manpower while we provide the toys is likely to end in a situation with a lot of toys and no manpower.
193. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:15 pm

     I was suffering just to regular personnel, but I accept the point of pedantry given that we are going to use the TA in a very different way in the years ahead as a result of the reserves review.

     But the question stands:

     If 102,000 buys what Phil describes (same as pre-SDSR), and 95,000 buys the ambitions described in the SDSR (FF2020):

     A new set of Defence Planning Assumptions
     The new Defence Planning Assumptions envisage that the Armed Forces in the future will be sized and
     shaped to conduct:
     • an enduring stabilisation operation at around brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel) with maritime
     and air support as required, while also conducting:
     • one non-enduring complex intervention (up to 2,000 personnel), and
     • one non-enduring simple intervention (up to 1,000 personnel);
     OR alternatively:
     • three non-enduring operations if we were not already engaged in an enduring operation;
     OR:
     • for a limited time, and with sufficient warning, committing all our effort to a one-off intervention of
     up to three brigades, with maritime and air support (around 30,000, two-thirds of the force
     deployed to Iraq in 2003).

     Do we still get the above on 82,000, on the presumption that SDSR2010 was no more than the first stage of the transition to FF2020?
194. All Politicians are the Same says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:15 pm

     @ Chris B, in that case we do not go. I am saying we need to redefine our outlook. If it is not in our Allies interests is it really in ours? Bet we wish we had followed the French lead in GW2. If a conflict requiring a deployment of a 35,000 strong force cannot find enough support from our continental allies to supply the mech inf and armour, chances are we should not be going anyway.
     Phil, do not let the Govt hear you including the reseves in your figues, or they will cut more.
195. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:16 pm

     “Let our continental allies with large land armies provide the infantry and armour”

     I was going to say it but Chris beat me to it. Even in the Cold War they were hardly straining at the leash to!

     If you want allies to do your bidding, you have to show leadership and share burdens to some extent.
196. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:21 pm

     “Do we still get the above on 82,000, on the presumption that SDSR2010 was no more than the first stage of the transition to FF2020?”

     I had a spat with old Bob boy over this. To my reading the SDSR aims and the Army figures are entirely compatible with SDSR admitting that future work would be done on the size of the Army and that it had used an assumption of 95,000.
197. James says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:24 pm

     @ Martin,

     re the last 50 years:

     a Division in Korea, plus several Bdes in the ME, plus a Corps in Germany.

     An enduring Bde in British Guyana, plus 2 Bdes in Cyprus on rotation, plus a Corps in Germany.

     6 Bdes (top strength) in NI in the 70s, plus a Corps in Germany.

     A Division (-) in the FI, plus a Corps in Germany, plus 3 Bdes in NI.

     A Division in Gulf 1, and a Bde in NI.

     A Bde (+) in Bosnia, and later a Bde (+) in Bosnia and a Corps HQ and support troops in Sarajevo.

     A Bde (+) in Bosnia, and a Corps HQ and another Bde in Kosovo.

     There was a bit of a slowdown in 2000-2002. Most out of Ireland, and the Balkans. But we still had a Bde in total deployed in bits and pieces in Cyprus, FI, W Africa, etc.

     A Bde (+) to Afghanistan

     A Division in Gulf 2 plus a Bde(+) in Afghanistan, drawing down to two Bde(+) after the war in Iraq ended.

     In addition to those operational deployments, we have a Bde or so committed to places like Cyprus and FI and Borneo as part of normal life.

     Why is it difficult to generate a Division from 100,000? Well it’s not, for a one off-shot of six months. Here’s how the numbers break down:

     100,000 – 5,000 for training base = 95,000.

     95,000 – 5,000 for the paramilitary wing of the London Tourist Board = 90,000. Touch at your peril. Break bearskin only in times of national peril.

     90,000 – 5,000 in joint or non-deployable posts like DE&S = 85,000.

     5,000 various admin / HQ / MoD including sick lame and lazy posts leaves 80,000.

     80,000 is about the strength of the Field Army, organised variously at different times, but typically about 6 fighting Brigades and 3 Brigades of support troops e.g. aviation, artillery, Signals etc. Plus 2 combat service brigades of trucks, repair, medical etc.

     Gives you two full divisions. In theory, you could do 6 months on 6 off at divisional strength, but we can’t because we haven’t got enough kit because the RAF and RN have historically been very good at burgling the defence budget for their sexy toys. Plus we’ve normally got a Brigade away at any one time, so that’s how we end up with the ability to deploy a Division for six months, and have a Brigade away, and those 2 last non-deployed Brigades rotating with the deployed Brigade. And a similar pattern in the combat support and combat service support Brigades.
198. Rupert Fiennes says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:24 pm

     ChrisB: seconded. Grand assertions that our “allies” will pick up the slack for capability A, B, C etc have historically only proved accurate when the ally was the US, and relying on that is foolish. Our colleagues on the continent *will* let us down: we need a balanced, but not world beating force. Examples of choices we coud make:-

     - 2/3 CVF with F18E/F, without F35
     - buy ASCOD off the shelf, without 0.5 billion of “development”
     - buy C17 off the shelf, not A400

     We waste massive amounts of money. The trouble is, it’s either the brass gold plating solutions, or it’s the politicians going for “collaborative” solutions that cost far more, with delays on top…
199. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:24 pm

     Hi Phil,

     A strong answer, but probably you, like the rest of us, are still waiting for the details of the reform proposals (incl. funding):

     - in the US National Guard, the officers are regulars (?, not sure)
     - in Sweden, this plays out as 10.000 officers for the regular force (small, a training and on the watch cadre) and 12.000 officers to lead the mobilised force

     Do you have a view on what level (Officer, NCO) and in what numbers would need be permanently enrolled, to be able to take on ’0.000′s on mobilisation, full or partial?
200. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:32 pm

     “in the US National Guard, the officers are regulars (?, not sure)”

     No they are reserve commissions but do the regular OCS course.

     As for mobilisation figures, I could do some research on that.

     As a ball park figure a US division when it was activated in the Second World War started off with a cadre of about 10% its intended fighting strength and was brought up to strength with its “fillers”.
201. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:36 pm

     Cheers Phil,

     I am ‘content’ with 82,000 provided the ambitions of the SDSR (listed above) are realisable, given that it will lead to a better balanced force (re: the RN/RAF elements of the SDSR).
202. Topman says:

     December 20, 2011 at 5:59 pm

     Gives you two full divisions. In theory, you could do 6 months on 6 off at divisional strength, but we can’t because we haven’t got enough kit because the RAF and RN have historically been very good at burgling the defence budget for their sexy toys. Plus we’ve normally got a Brigade away at any one time, so that’s how we end up with the ability to deploy a Division for six months, and have a Brigade away, and those 2 last non-deployed Brigades rotating with the deployed Brigade. And a similar pattern in the combat support and combat service support Brigades.’

     @ James on paper it’s seems possible, but if you do that would mean you would have to deploy the entire field army? 3 bdgs to rotate the deployed op, 3 more for the division 6 month push. How often has that happened? Even if you did stop the ‘burgling’ the defence budget and give it to the army I’m not sure it would give the army enough support from the RAF/RN. By it’s nature they deal in few people/kit but very expensive.
203. James says:

     December 20, 2011 at 6:22 pm

     @ Topman,

     I think we’re in agreement? One 6 month large scale PLUS one enduring medium scale is doable, if only just.

     We last did it in 2003 for Gulf 2 (I can’t lay my hands on the precise numbers from where I am now, but from memory we had about 8,000 in Afghanistan, and sent 30,000 to the Gulf). We’ve been doing “double-medium” just about for a decade now, despite the fact that the SDR in 1997 and the “New Chapter” in 2002 promised we’d only do that for short periods of less than 2 years, and that the nature of a double-medium would not be war fighting, which may have been a bit of a surprise when that’s exactly what we are doing in Afghnistan, and for a few years in Iraq. But jolly old Gordon Brown provided all of that extra funding…. or did he?
204. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 20, 2011 at 6:35 pm

     @James Indeed we have been doing double medium and though it may not be what we traditionally view as high intensity war fighting, casualties are being taken and it is wearing down men and kit. Time we stopped being Deputy USA, basically if they want to invade Iran or Syria let them get on with it.
     The argument is not “well this is what we have been doing” The argument has to be “this is what we can afford to do and this is what we should do”
205. Mark says:

     December 20, 2011 at 6:36 pm

     So when you include the marines ta and army regulars the 120K ground forces (you could add raf reg also) should be more than enough for any conceivable future UK operation enduring or otherwise.

     Well while I may agree we cant trust some of our European allies when were in a bind it kinda defeats the purpose of joint capability sharing with anyone but the US.

     For why should we have 9500 personnel in afghan when germany and france have 5000 or less for any other reason than and ill say that phrase punching above our weight.

     For all the argument the only area we will most likely ever operate independently above small scale will be the south Atlantic so why not have the C4, ISTAR, S/F and logistics as our main contribution on coalitions of the willing?.
206. Phil says:

     December 20, 2011 at 6:37 pm

     James

     We had a battlegroup in Afghanistan in 2003.

     The closest we got to two medium operations was in 2007-2009. It wasn’t until we ended Iraq that our Afghanistan commitment got to its current level.
207. Topman says:

     December 20, 2011 at 6:53 pm

     on paper maybe. But i don’t think you could in reality. I think the numbers include all 3 services so i think you would have to trim down your numbers. And like someone else said i think your dates are out. I’m not saying your a million miles away. I just think it’s too much.
208. James says:

     December 20, 2011 at 7:16 pm

     @ Phil,

     granted, but don’t forget HQ 3 Div from 2001 as AISAF, and later HQ ARRC: that’s about another 1,000 UK soldiers, albeit in a C2 role. Plus supporting national logistic elements, air movements staff, aviation, etc. It all mounts up! But yes, technically not a medium role until later. I’ve just Wiki’d the list of ships as well in the early days – quite a few.
209. DominicJ says:

     December 20, 2011 at 8:47 pm

     we would not be at war with china alone.
     If south east asia was at war with china, and we get involved, what would be best to send, 4 ssn’s, 40 fast jets or 10,000 soldiers?
     Because they all cost the same….

     Except of course, the submarines self deploy, and need only food.
210. Topman says:

     December 20, 2011 at 9:06 pm

     it all depends what you want to do and what the overall aim is.
211. James says:

     December 20, 2011 at 10:35 pm

     @ Topman,

     precisely, and that’s a subsequent consideration to “what is the situation”? China might be having a land conflict over perhaps a disputed border with Myanmar, or having a naval ding-dong with Vietnam and the Philipines over the Spratly Islands, or an air dominance face-off with Taiwan over the skies of Taiwan, or even trying to duke it out with the USA over western Pacific sea routes. Or supporting a bellicose North Korea massing troops and looking threatening to South Korea. Perhaps supporting Pakistan in a confrontation in the Kashmir with India. Involved in a trade war that’s looking nasty with Singapore.

     The best response to any of those scenarios may or may not be met by DominicJ’s 3 options alone, a combination of them, or none of them at all.
212. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 20, 2011 at 10:58 pm

     James, Can we afford to maintain forces that can actually make a difference in all those scenarios. Thats the question? Or do we have to accept that actually the UK can only offer certain capabilities and good as they are, they are only useful in certain scenarios. We are not going to be able to interject in Myanamar or Kashmir as we could not get enough troops and heavy equipment out there to make a difference. Taiwan, well we could forward deploy some Typhoons, possibly a carier group as the US does over Taiwan in few years and let the Chinese guess whether or not we have an SSN somewhere to play havoc with there amphibs should it go that far. We could also deploy troop to Taiwan to make out Political point very clearly.
     The other scenarios fall between the 2.
     It is about offering wht is required by the coalition we are involved in at the time. US military plans ref Iran have only one UK asset listed that they cannot provide to a suitable level themselves and they are the 4 plastic Mine Counter Measure Vessels in Manama. Not flashy, total crew for all 4 under 200 but they bring a niche capability that the US cannot replicate to teh same level.
213. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 20, 2011 at 11:52 pm

     “It is about offering wht is required by the coalition we are involved in at the time”

     Minor correction; it is about offering what is valuable in order that HMG sees some payback in terms of policy direction.
214. aussie Johnno says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:08 am

     Martin, What Australian navy expansion?

     The plan to expand the submarine force is a fantasy. The navy struggles (and fails to provide) 4 crews for the existing submarines. The so called new submarine project is backpeggling from a ‘Mark 2 Colins class’, which was the intent. At the moment they have called for technical data on the S-80, the Scorpene and the 212/214 sub design’s. 12 Subs plan will not survive a change of government which is very likely in 2013.
     Apart from the subs, the RAN has had a constant force of 10 to 12 surface combatants since the 1950′s. The planned Offshore Combatant Vessel, if it happens, is purely a secondary warship (policing, MCMV and Survey).
     Australian Defence policy is to stick close to the US, and replace what we have got. Have a good look at our procurement record, 90% of it is simply replacing existing capability. You have, therefore you replace; when you have the funds.

     Viceroy, I agree, Australia’s problem is that we have always doubted our ability to defend ourself so we have always sought a great power protector. Initially, the UK and then when the roof threatened to fall in at the end of 1941, the US.
     We will stick with the US while they remain a viable power in the Western Pacific. We have followed the US into a number of doubtful wars in the name of that alliance and can only hang on for the ride, and hope for a not too dangerous rise of China and India. However prodding China with a sharp stick is definately not on the adjenda.
     Those interested in the UK’s defence need to accept that it is nolonger a world power, it is a major European power (no insult intended) and that its interests lie principally in Europe and the trade routes through the Atlantic, the Med and the Seas around the Persian Gulf (or is the Iranian Gulf now?). Time to practice concentration of force, I think.
215. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:39 am

     @ APATS,

     you are right, but it’s about choices. There are probably 1 million possible scenarios that the UK could face, of which about 100 are actually in the realms of probability / possibility. The best balance between forces that would be relevant (assuming deployment in time) in those scenarios is for forces pretty much as we have now. Of course, as the FI showed, sometimes real life pops up and offers a fait accompli that no one in Northwood had thought of as remotely likely, and the PM says something as unheard of as “bollocks, they’re ours and we want them back, find me some top brass who’ve got the balls to make it happen”.

     The problem with all of these fantasy fleets or Strategic Raiding type posts is that inevitably the scenario is predicated on the poster’s specific focus, and largely involve a force balance that is relentlessly focussed on one scenario among 100, even if it is unsuitable for the other 99. So 99 times out of 100, plus the left field FI and ballsy PM scenario, the proposer is completely wrong. And 101 times out of 101, the forces will make do with the wrongly shaped and sized forces that we actually have.
216. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:02 am

     James(damm these night shifts). I agree that the only way the sort of force balance Martin talks about works is if UK Gov is prepared to accept that it cannot participate in some scenarios in the same manner that it can now.
     I disagree with the FI though. first I believe that we should garrison them so we dont have to retake them. If we did though then the force composition Martin advocates is exactly what is needed. The army would still be big enough to put 8,000 or 4 of his BEUs ashore which would be enough to get the job done given the fact that before they get ashore we need to have taken sea control and have at least air parity otherwise no point in having 40k troops. The naval forces he has proscribed would be able to achieve sea control and air superiority. I am afraid that the current and possibly furute RN cannot guarantee getting anyone ashore.
217. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:39 am

     @ APATS:

     some examples of possible scenarios in which the UK’s current strategic interests are more threatened than Gulf 2, but yet which don’t make the headlines:

     (no likelihoods implied, but all “possible” based on a jaundiced view of the world and what has happened before or could reasonably happen in the future. List unranked – as it occurred to me).

     Piracy spreads to Singapore straits area with state backing, Malaysia a hostile power with new Government, seeks imposition of new tariffs for maritime transit.

     Major (possibly nuclear) conflict between Pakistan / India, with massive civil unrest in UK cities between 2nd+ generation immigrants.

     Greek / Turkish trade then hotter war spreads to ME, Suez shut.

     Ethiopia collapse, warlords with anti-shipping missiles threaten Red Sea.

     Major oil/gas resource found close to Rockall, existing argument between UK / Ireland / Iceland over territorial boundaries escalates.

     Uprising in Saudi Arabia spills into UAE.

     Popular Pan-Maghreb Alliance on northern Africa coast and refugee diaspora hits Europe.

     War on Europe’s doorstep, one of several ex-Soviet clients has a pop at another one (anywhere from the Baltic to the Black Sea).

     Ex-colony still with strong links to the UK (pick one of many Commonwealth countries, the more populous the more problematic) erupts in ghastly civil war, Rwanda style. Everyone looks to UK to step in.

     Indo-Chinese war causes global trade to come to a grinding embuggeration.

     Panama government falls to insurgency, canal shuts and regional antagonisms re-emerge to repeat the 1970s standoff.

     North / South Korea cold war escalates to hot war, Japan and China both involved.

     (then there’s bound to be some awful scenario to do with climate change if you believe in that sort of thing, or some global disaster to do with whichever of the Canary Islands is about to fall into the sea sparking some global tsunami and refugees on several continents, etc).

     I do promise you, I’m the epitome of fun and optimism normally.
218. Chris.B. says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:05 am

     Three cheers for being up a 5am!

     That’s all really. Unless you want me to rant once more about the haphazard nature of the Argentine air force and lessons learned from the first FI war.
219. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:14 am

     James just lost my reply. Damm it. Will try again.
     1. Piracy, Singapore and Malaysia would have to be sorted out by regional powers with influence from US and China. (Uk forces prob nil)
     2. Pakistan India and British cities (Uk forces as few as possible as aid to civil authorities)
     3. Greece and Turkey in a hot war, both NATO allies, spreads to ME suez shut? Depends where in ME. Israelis and Egyptians along with NATO and 6th Fleet reopen Suez. Massive diplomatic pressure put on Greece and Turkey, (Uk forces Possible reinforcement of Sov base areas Cyprus, RAF assets forward deploy Akrotiri, Naval Assets EMED, possible RM or light Infantry in Suez zone)
     4. Ethiopia collpase warlords with ASM. (UK forces a contribution to forces commited, which will be UAV, strike aircraft, TLAM, AH and SF)
     5. Saudi Uprising spills to UAE. watch and hope that whoever comes out on top will sell us petrol. Or conquer whole ME which isnt going to happen. (Uk forces, only enough to conduct a NEO)
     6. Refugee crisis (Uk forces, Naval assets for blockade, medical and other specialist units to help at refugee centres)
     7. Ex Soviet client states, leave them to it, monitor and interven only as part of UN mission through NATO. (UK forces as required to support UN mission)
     8. Ex colony. yes we should intervene. (Uk forces, dependent completely on the scenario, are we intervening on one side or the other or as peace keepers. Once we decide to intervene we should use overwhelming force and tech advantage. So yes TLAM c2 nodes, Gr4 and Typhoon if we can base them close enough, AH 64s and then Paras and Royal backed up by mech and armour if required to show we are not pissing about)
     9. Indo Chinese war (UK forces from none to everything we have dependent on how crisis evolves)
     10. Panama *UK forces nil, US national interest would see an immediate and overwhelming response)
     11. N S Korea, Japan and China (UK forces see 9)

     That has cheered me up thanks.
220. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:31 am

     Look what came of Zimbabwe, when we last intervened (albeit indirectly), RE
     “8. Ex colony. yes we should intervene.”
221. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:35 am

     Well, “last” of course left smaller ones out (Anguilla, Sierra Leone, Belize) all of them with no more expats than can be accommodated on one ship, and no economic importance on the world scene whatsoever
222. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:43 am

     Not to get too serious over breakfast coffee
     http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u1EX–vdxh4
     - wrong thread, but anyway…
223. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:43 am

     ACC Morally we should intervene to prevent a massacre of civilians. If you note in my point I asked whether we were taking sides or keeping the peace. I do not know how true it is but one of my favourite stories ref the Rhodesia crisis was when harold Macmillan summoned the CDS to his Office and told him that he wanted British Soldiers on the ground to interevene. To be allegedly told that certainly CDS could deploy UK troops but he would not be responsible for which side they fought on.
224. martin says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:44 am

     @ Phil – I agree about the reserves. I think British Army culture has much to do with this always looking at reserves as something that can only be used in a Third World War or to provide a couple of niche capabilities. I think the USA has shown reservists can be every bit as capable in many task performed by the regulars. Maybe not underwater knife fighting but at the end of the day much of the Army are either driving trucks or fixing those trucks and other vehicles.
     @ Chris.B There are 27 counties in the EU and soon to be 30. I agree that many have proven reluctant to provide forces especially in GW2 however there reluctance might have proven the fact the operation was not worth committing to.
     @ All Politicians – Could not agree more I think people keep forgetting there is no requirement for us to invade other people’s countries and conduct COIN operations. It’s a choice.
     @ James – Thanks for the info, very interesting. Other than Bosnia early stages and off course NI every operation you describe is either post-colonial or US lead. As we no longer have an empire, I presume we can discount this need in the future. I don’t think we should ever consider stick the Army back on the streets of NI so again we come back to the point that 100,000 men only really allows us to subsidies US operations. I am interested in your point about the two division rotation. Being able to deploy and sustain a division sized force would allow us to lead many medium scale deployments and at least properly contribute to a US coalition. The ability to deploy and sustain a division would be of interest even if it could only be done for 1 year but you say the Army has insufficient kit. Could you elaborate on this point? What don’t they have and why don’t they have it. Given the fact that the Army now receives 60% of defence spending I don’t think you can blame that on the Navy 17% or the RAF 23%.
     @ Dom J – Let me think 10,000 troops versus 2 million mmmm. Think I will take a job on the Astute when I am called up for that day.
     @ James – you miss the point. Weather China is duking it out on Land Sea or air they will still be importing several million barrels of oil and day thousands of tons of food and paying for it by shipping it thousands of containers full of plastic Barbie dolls. None of which they can do if our 4 poxy submarines sink everything heading in or out of their ports. That’s how you fight China when you are a pissy little island with a small army.
225. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:49 am

     Hi APATS,

     Yes “ACC Morally we should intervene” (and a good story, yours) but the fact is that we did, on moral grounds, the first thing that happened after “peace” was Matabeleland burning (straight from Orwell favourites) and currently there are 15 million people starving
     - are we responsible? Yes. And the morals – well, they need thinking about before the fact
226. martin says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:56 am

     @ Aussie Johnno – Weather or not Australia does go ahead with future plans there is obviously some desire in Canberra to beef up forces especially in Submarines. There is obviously some concern in Canberra about security in the region. No one is saying you have to stop being major allies with the USA nor do we. However would it not be in Australia’s interest if one of its major allies deployed substantial naval forces including 5 SSN’s in the neighborhood? I’m not talking about sailing in to the yellow sea but in the India Ocean thousands of miles away from any Chinese territory. I hardly think that is pocking them with a stick. Both the UK and Australia are already part of the FPDA. If we are going to remain legally bound to come to Australia or Malaysia’s aid surely we should commit substantial forces to the area to act as a deterrent if nothing else. Surely we should try to involve India and Indonesia in that defence also.
227. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:57 am

     Hi Martin, RE
     “Maybe not underwater knife fighting ”
     - funnily enough, if you take the ratio of reserve formations to active bns in any speciality, SAS and Paras come up very high on the list (not sure about headcount, but that’s how it looks on paper)
     - of course you can always finesse special areas and come up with counter argument (medical?)but talking about formed units for the front line
228. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:07 am

     Hi Martin, RE
     “Both the UK and Australia are already part of the FPDA.”
     - there is another x-power arrangement pretty much for the same purpose (keeping the straits open)
     - this year was the 13th when USA, Singapore, India and Japan held exercises on both sides of the straits, to both train and demonstrate (sadly, because of the tsunami aftermath, Japan had to drop out this time)
     - so India is in, even though the alliance has not been formalised in the same way (Singapore is a big base for USN although there has been no permanent basing until now, when the LCS squadron – all two of them, the ships arrives)
229. Chris.B. says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:28 am

     @ Martin,

     I’m quite worried by the talk of cutting off China’s supply lines with submarines. This would be a major, crippling act of war. There would be no reason for China not to send a message to the PM that in a roundabout way said “stop being a twat, or you can kiss London goodbye”. If you’re going to try and bring their entire country to a halt, they’re not just going to take in on the chin and congratulate us on our craftiness. What PM in his right mind would order such an action in the first place. A limited trade embargo, perhaps limiting Chinese exports into Europe would maybe be acceptable, but even that would be dicing with death.

     As for our friendly neighbours across the continent and deploying land forces abroad, you’re mistaking legality and national interest for playing second fiddle to the States.

     PM’s want to keep the special relationship special. If nobody in Europe lends ground forces to a US led op, the UK will happily continue to do so. We all know Blair and Campbell fudged the intelligence about WMD, just as Bush did, but most PM’s would do the same thing if it meant they got to visit the White House more often.

     There is no evidence to suggest that the current or likely future government will change this approach. Europe will persistently sit on it’s hands, because European leaders enjoy going on television and talking about how morally robust they are, while simultaneously making back door economic deals that will shaft many of the poorest in their nations.

     And while we may not possess an empire any more, the remenants of it are still important and in many cases (Belize, Brunei, Turks and Caicos Islands) give us important staging posts for operations in various regions. While the sun may indeed have set on the British Empire, it actually doesn’t set on the British overseas territories and military bases.

     We still need to be able to go ashore and protect certain areas or liberate others. For all the maligning of the Afghanistan campaign, it plays a major part in helping Nuclear armed Pakistan fight against the insurgency in the North and North West of its territory (people forget that the groups linked to the Taliban blow up just as many suicide vests in Pakistan as they do in Afghanistan).

     Global stability is in our national interest and sometimes that means we have to send our forces to shit hole places around the world that don’t appear to have obvious strategic advantages, and fight dirty, shitty wars in which our men and women are killed and seriously wounded, something which the general public abhors and doesn’t always understand, but there are underlying interests that need to be addressed.

     And our ground forces have been at the centre of all this as one of the most useful and versatile tools in our arsenal.
230. Tubby says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:39 am

     I have kept out of this thread until now as it was running a bit hot under the collar in places! Anyway, I know bugger all about IR but it seems to me a strategy based solely on providing part of a US coalition to stem Chinese ambitions may be dangerous – what happens if the next threat to European and British security is a resurgent Russia (especially a resurgent, nationalist Russia whose ties to China are sundered and therefore not seen as a threat by the USA and therefore our defence is solely based on our European allies)?
231. Tubby says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:44 am

     Just seen Chris.B’s post and it reminded me that I wanted to add a postscript – I think that both the Army centric and the Navy centric ideas put forward are to be frank a bit shite, if we unbalance the armed forces one way or the other the Government of the day is still going to treat them as multi-spectrum and having unbalanced forces is going to lead to unnecessary deaths as I bet my life savings that the Government of the day is going to send them off into impossible situations. I never thought I say this, but I think the best option is to continue to salami slice the armed forces and the only time I might accept a cut in the army numbers would be if they cut numbers for total recapitalisation of the army vehicles and a net increase in rotary lift, and only if no further cuts were made to the RN or the RAF.
232. Chris.B. says:

     December 21, 2011 at 8:13 am

     But this is the problem Tubby; we have a reasonable army now. Given the budget constraints the army is in ok shape size wise. And we still have six top of the line Destroyers to come for the Navy (3 delivered, 3 on the way), plus advanced SSN’s, a reasonable amphibious assault ability, some high quality aircraft and orders for future ships and aircraft that will give us excellent capabilities.

     Yet people want to trade away that pretty balanced force for one that is overly Navy or airforce centric. When we’re talking about a 100,000 strong army that’s not an increase, that’s a flat continuation.
233. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 8:21 am

     @ APATS @ 5:14

     …it was just a follow on to my earlier submission that “4 SSNs or 40 fighters or 10,000 soldiers” was a bit simplistic as a set of options. Point is, we need balanced forces to cope with a range of unpredictable scenarios.

     I didn’t go as far as the “bio terror weapon hits London, sparking mass panic and civil disorder”. As a reservist, I’d be likely to be called up to go and wield a pitchfork at my local crossroads to stop looting, but once I’d got the family into safety somewhere abroad, I’d immediately put in for a transfer to the RN and a posting to of of those 4 SSNs to do a bit of underwater floating for 6 months.

     Back on the nameless islands, I see that Argentina has managed to persuade 3 other S American countries not to trade with FI registered ships. Next step, any vessel of any flag that comes from the FI, and pretty soon it’s not going to be economically viable being an FI farmer. Argentina must have learned a few lessons from 1982, and clearly economics 101 is now part of their strategy. If the islanders are the prime impediment to the international politics, make sure there aren’t any islanders….

     http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-16280613
234. Chris.B. says:

     December 21, 2011 at 8:34 am

     Interesting quote from that article James;

     “But you should know that when you are signing something on the Malvinas in favour of Argentina you are also doing it in your own defence”

     Is that Argentina subtly saying support us or we’ll get you? Given the past history of statements from Uraguay, there is a political weakness there that can be exploited.
235. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 21, 2011 at 10:13 am

     @ James – “The problem with all of these fantasy fleets or Strategic Raiding type posts is that inevitably the scenario is predicated on the poster’s specific focus, and largely involve a force balance that is relentlessly focussed on one scenario among 100, even if it is unsuitable for the other 99″

     Do you consider the FF2020 where we possess carriers and an 82,000 strong army to be Strategic Raiding, as intended by the RUSI authors? Because I do.

     If the balance of land-forces shifts to 2:1 in favour of stabilisation forces (MRB’s) vs intervention forces (3Cdo+16AAB), as seems likely post SDSR2015, then as far as I am concerned we really have adopted SR as RUSI envisaged it.

     While SR may be a convenient label for all maritime/intervention doctrines there is obviously a spectrum from which we go from balanced-force to USMC, and I don’t think that latter is anything like what RUSI envisaged.

     Although this argument is framed through the concepts of Strategic Raiding and Global Guardian, I do not not advocate a fixation on one to the exclusion of all others, nor too do I believe the doctrines are intended to indicate a total polarisation of defence capability, merely a focus around which to sustain strategic capability in a time of greatly diminished resource.
236. DominicJ says:

     December 21, 2011 at 10:13 am

     “Ex-colony still with strong links to the UK (pick one of many Commonwealth countries, the more populous the more problematic) erupts in ghastly civil war, Rwanda style. Everyone looks to UK to step in.”

     But, if South Africas 45mn blacks and 2.5mn coloureds decided they no longer wanted to share their nation with the 2.5mn whites and gave them 48 hours to leave the country, we *couldnt* intervene.
     Even if we went “big army” and ignore the deployment and sustainment needs of said force, its still only 65,000 men on an enduring basis.
     Suppressing the Boers took more than that!

     “Three cheers for being up a 5am!”
     It was howling chiouhies rather than cheers, I was in no mood to reply then :)

     APATS
     Quite possible, ZANU and ZAPU were (and are) horrific organisations, entirely paid for by the USSR and China, with very little actual support amongst the “blacks” they claimed to be liberating. The African Hitlers first act was to have his own little genocide.

     Martin
     “@ Dom J – Let me think 10,000 troops versus 2 million mmmm. Think I will take a job on the Astute when I am called up for that day.”
     Exactly my point.
     People tend to forget we usualy had at least numerical parity in Iraq. Who knows what would have happened if Sadam had gone on the offensive again before we had half a million men in Saudi.

     If we deployed 10,000 men to Vietnam, theres every chance China could over run them, and plenty of reasons to do so, quickly, and at a high price. Does anyone really believe we’d even be able to run away successfully if we were outnumbered 10:1?
     Politicaly, if they could knock us out of the war, theres a good chance we’d drag a few other powers out with us, or at least stop any more joining in. And of course, they can afford to pay a horrendous blood price, we cant.

     What would they do against 4 Astutes?
     The resources required to hunt them down are pretty vast, and they are also the resources China doesnt have a near unlimited supply of.

     ChrisB
     “I’m quite worried by the talk of cutting off China’s supply lines with submarines. This would be a major, crippling act of war.”
     Which is kinda the point….

     “There would be no reason for China not to send a message to the PM that in a roundabout way said “stop being a twat, or you can kiss London goodbye”.”
     Not my subs guv, must be the Americans / Indians / Australians.

     As a side note, Russian strategy if the cold war went hot *was* to close the sea lanes into Europe.

     “For all the maligning of the Afghanistan campaign, it plays a major part in helping Nuclear armed Pakistan fight against the insurgency in the North and North West of its territory”
     But its not that simple, because Pakistan IS one of the biggest supporters of a certain sort of Taliban.
     Afghanistan is part of a “Great Game” between China and India.
     China supports Pakistan, because it wants a second front in the second Sino-Indian war. India supports Iran and Karzai, because both are threats to Pakistan (Economy and Durand Line). So Pakistan supports some form of “Taliban” to destablise Karzai, or at least keep him too busy to press the issue. But sometimes, they help the wrong Taliban, and they capture the Swat valley. Unless of course, that was actualy a botched Indian attempt to further push over Pakistan.

     “Global stability is in our national interest and sometimes that means we have to send our forces to shit hole places around the world that don’t appear to have obvious strategic advantages, and fight dirty, shitty wars in which our men and women are killed and seriously wounded, something which the general public abhors and doesn’t always understand,”

     But what if, instead of sending our own Brigade, we paid for a Bangladeshi Division?
     No claims of western occupation, just brother muslims, helping out.

     Tubby
     “what happens if the next threat to European and British security is a resurgent Russia”
     Well, either Europe mans up and defends itself, in which case British ground forces are an after thought, or it doesnt, and British ground forces are a waste of time.
     At the end of the day, Russians can drive to Rome, not Romford. A situation in which we have more ground forces on the Polish border than Italy sends is questionable at best.

     I think we’d be much better served doing what was our main contribution anyway, keeping the Russian fleet penned up, and I would add, pushing round the north.
     At the end of the day, the Russian Naval Yards at Murmansk are far more important to Russia than control of the three Baltic Republics. If we seized its submarine pens, it would need them back during the peace talks, and we could name our price, unless Germany fell or something daft like that.

     I’d also add we would be best served countering russian agression by encouraging it from China

     Chris
     “we have a reasonable army now.”
     Reasonable for what purpose though?
     Reasonable based on the budget?

     That way leads to an RAF flying a toy helicopter, a Royal Navy with a rubber dinghy, and a single section with a rifle between them.
237. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 21, 2011 at 10:14 am

     JamesB – “Yet people want to trade away that pretty balanced force for one that is overly Navy or airforce centric. When we’re talking about a 100,000 strong army that’s not an increase, that’s a flat continuation.”

     Only if you ignore the stated plan to reduce the army to 82,000.
238. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 10:32 am

     “Only if you ignore the stated plan to reduce the army to 82,000.”

     Ahem…
239. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 21, 2011 at 10:45 am

     Yes?

     http://www.army.mod.uk/territorial/24649.aspx
240. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 11:01 am

     “An integrated, trained Army of 112,000 by 2020″

     Bad boy.
241. jedibeeftrix says:

     December 21, 2011 at 11:19 am

     yes, yes.

     accepted.

     but when we talk above of the army as 100,000 strong, so it doesn’t appear irrelevant to discuss it in terms of regular soldiers when talking about capabilities and appropriate budget splits.
242. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 11:36 am

     @ DomincJ,

     just how the hell are we going to seize the submarine pens in Murmansk, and hold them until peace talks? With what? Just looking at even a Google map shows that the 7 naval bases in the Murmansk region are spread over 200 miles of coastline, and the pens are reported to be evenly distributed among those 7 bases.

     Anyway, why would we want to seize the pens? Half will be full of rotting old hulks, and half empty.

     Given the scale of the nuclear clean up and decommissioning the Russians have with their submarine fleet, I don’t think they be too fussed about paying any price we name to have them back.
243. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 11:46 am

     @ Jedibeeftrix,

     I don’t regard the SR concept or RUSI’s advocation of it as at all convincing. In fact, I think it is bollocks, but equally many could easily take my advocation of balanced forces capable of a full spectrum of operations as bollocks.

     We don’t have the kit, we don’t have the global reach, we don’t have the political alliances in place where it could potentially be useful. The one nation in the world that does have the capability is the USA, and they last operated a raiding party in the conventional sense in Grenada and Panama.
244. DominicJ says:

     December 21, 2011 at 12:21 pm

     James
     “just how the hell are we going to seize the submarine pens in Murmansk”
     Sail some soldiers there….

     “and hold them until peace talks?”
     Forcing Russia to pull several tank divisions out of Poland and send them North sounds like winning to me…

     “Anyway, why would we want to seize the pens? Half will be full of rotting old hulks, and half empty”
     And when the submarines run out of food and need to resupply?
     And thats just the immediate term, in the long term, where will Russia base its SSBNs if its lost Murmansk? Kalingrad?
245. Topman says:

     December 21, 2011 at 12:55 pm

     Invading N russia, is this before or after we’ve blockaded china?
246. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 1:00 pm

     “And thats just the immediate term, in the long term, where will Russia base its SSBNs if its lost Murmansk? Kalingrad?”

     Dom you play too much Risk. You’re talking about starting a world war. You’re not on the same plane of reality as most of us I think when it comes to your thoughts on how to achieve things in the international system.
247. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 1:17 pm

     @ DominicJ

     “sail some soldiers there”.

     OK, how many? 7 major naval bases spread over 200 miles of coast: my instinct is that is at least a Divisional deployment, but more probably two in order to take and hold the connecting coast roads. Even if one Division was enough, we don’t have enough ships to deploy a Division by sea without taking up ships from trade.

     We have precisely 2 ships capable of air landing assault troops (Illustrious and Ocean), and even then not many of them. We have two ships that can put ashore a total of 8 landing craft (Albion and Bulwark).

     Russian subs can replenish in other places – normal ports or at sea. They don’t have to come home.

     We don’t have any fast jets we can get there, our land forces would be essentially immobile without transport until we have built up supplies (that took about 3 months for both Gulfs), there’s 300,000 people in Murmansk to look after and feed.

     We’re going to have to run a major logistics operation over 1,000 miles of opposed sea lanes to keep our forces supplied. We haven’t got any MPA, we are short on frigates (13 in service, but some no doubt in dock for upgrades).

     I’m afraid that with what we currently have, your notion seems like pure fantasy.
248. DominicJ says:

     December 21, 2011 at 1:41 pm

     Phil
     “Dom you play too much Risk. You’re talking about starting a world war.”

     The question I was asked was, what do we do if a resurgent Russia invades Europe?
     Or words to that effect,
     There is no doubt a chance I could push a world war nuclear, but blaming me for starting it?

     James
     “I’m afraid that with what we currently have, your notion seems like pure fantasy.”
     Hi James, its me, Dominic, the person who frequently suggest the biggest alteration to UK forces since 1914….
     ***Waves***

     “Russian subs can replenish in other places – normal ports or at sea. They don’t have to come home.”
     True enough, but which port exactly?
     Russia doesnt exactly have many going spare, and as far as I’m aware, none of them are set up to allow ease of access, supply and eggress for a submerged submarine.
     Any that pop up in Kalingrad are unlikely to make it back out of the Baltic, much the same goes for Sevestopol, and if they head east, they are effectivly out of the war.

     “there’s 300,000 people in Murmansk to look after and feed.”
     I have no intentions of becoming the occupying power of the oblast….
     Just a few bits of it
249. Topman says:

     December 21, 2011 at 1:45 pm

     Hi James, its me, Dominic, the person who frequently suggest the biggest alteration to UK forces since 1914….

     You want a force capable of invading Russia and holding it’s N ports?
250. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 1:54 pm

     “The question I was asked was, what do we do if a resurgent Russia invades Europe?”

     Dom ask yourself why there were no serious plans to invade Soviet Northern Fleet ports in the Cold War. I know you like to think so far out of the box you’re drinking brews on Pluto but there is very often a good reason why certain things never happened or were never seriously entertained.

     Of all countries, in all the world, Russia is the least likely to appreciate the insult of NATO forces sitting on her northern fleet ports. They are strategic targets, vital to Russia in many ways.

     Russia is quite plain with what it would do when it comes to dealing with strategic threats.
251. DominicJ says:

     December 21, 2011 at 2:18 pm

     Topman
     “You want a force capable of invading Russia and holding it’s N ports?”
     Only when the Russians go shopping for land in Poland.

     Phil
     “Of all countries, in all the world, Russia is the least likely to appreciate the insult of NATO forces sitting on her northern fleet ports.”

     But the insult of T72 leveling Warsaw? Berlin? Paris?

     “They are strategic targets, vital to Russia in many ways.”
     Which is exactly the point of targetting them.

     “Russia is quite plain with what it would do when it comes to dealing with strategic threats.”
     Russia threatens nuclear weapons more often than I take a ****.
     It roughly translates as “oh fudgecicles, I’m in trouble, I better act all scary before I give up and go home”

     Russia would no doubt demand we withdraw, we would reply likewise, a casefire would be called, everyone would withdraw as per status quo ante bellum.

     Without those ports, they can seize Poland, a declare a ceasfire, threatening nuclear sanction if anyone continues the fighting.
252. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 2:37 pm

     “But the insult of T72 leveling Warsaw? Berlin? Paris?”

     Eh?!

     “It roughly translates as “oh fudgecicles, I’m in trouble, I better act all scary before I give up and go home””

     Dom a Nobel Prize awaits you. You have just encapsulated thousands of man-years of thought, research, testing and theory on the subject of nuclear weapons in one sentence. What will you do with your £1million? Hopefully buy some books.
253. Rupert Fiennes says:

     December 21, 2011 at 2:42 pm

     @DominicJ: I suspect the main reason why the occupation of the northern ports was not considered was that the Barents was seen as an SSBN bastion, and an attempt to destroy that was quite close to initiation of a strategic “exchange”. No idea if this is still the case of course. Quite right that Russia would have to pay a price for aggression, and right that such a target need not be in the Baltic: but I must admit Kalingrad does look a tempting target
254. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 2:52 pm

     “I suspect the main reason why the occupation of the northern ports was not considered was that the Barents was seen as an SSBN bastion, and an attempt to destroy that was quite close to initiation of a strategic “exchange””

     Or it might have been the fact that it would have been utter, utter, utter suicide. No two ways about it. Complete suicide. A pointless dead end. There is no way on this planet it could have been done or done today.

     It’s completely pointless. Or it was completely pointless.
255. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 2:58 pm

     @ DomincJ,

     OK, I’ll accept that you want to change force structures, so don’t feel constrained by what we currently have.

     What forces would you need to seize and hold the Murmansk area ports? Remember, there are 7 spread over 200 miles of coastline. How would you get the forces there? How many land, sea and air force elements would be needed? How will you resupply them, if necessary for months while the UN sorts out the mess that is Europe? I take it we’re not going to give them back until we get something in return at the peace conference.

     Don’t forget to winterise all of the kit that goes ashore, and to provide heated accommodation for the occupying forces, and winter training in things like skiing. There is deep snow on the ground 8 months of the year, there is a single coastal access road that needs to be kept clear of snow, and the 7 ports are either side of Murmansk. That means no mutual support for those holding the ports, unless they go through the city. In practical terms, you’d probably have a floating reserve force, but then that will need protecting as well from submarines and air attack

     Aside from our Murmansk excursion, how do we protect our own sea lanes in the North Sea and the Atlantic?

     The whole idea strikes me as barmy, and even if there was a good reason to do it, it would require a truly massive effort that would need forces and capabilities way beyond what we currently have, so I don’t know that it’s all going to fit into 2.5% of expenditure.
256. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:02 pm

     “it would require a truly massive effort”

     And a nuclear war. Honestly, Russia would not be able to tolerate an invasion fleet sailing for its port.

     Could we have pulled off Overlord with every landing area being defended like Omaha, with foul weather and poor sea states whilst having a full arsenal of NBC weapons thrown at it?

     All the while the main front being in Central Europe?

     It’s beyond barmy. It’s just childish.
257. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:02 pm

     @ DominicJ, don’t forget that most of the ports have piles of nuclear rubbish in them, which are probably “stable enough” at the moment, but wouldn’t be if a bomb hit them, so you’d better have prepared lots of decontamination facilities and medical care, just in case the Russians decide to teach us a lesson and write off one of the port facilities.
258. Topman says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:20 pm

     Dom J do you really think all these plans are realistic, because they sound bordering on the absurd to me.
259. DominicJ says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:29 pm

     Phil
     You said Russian wouldnt stand for the insult implied by us occupying Murmansk.
     I’m wondering why you think the insult of T72s leveling Berlin should be accepted.

     “Hopefully buy some books.”
     I have lots of books.
     Russia frequently makes vague threats about escalation, it hasnt actualy “escalated” yet.
     Do I really need to go and find quotes of Russia threatening nuclear exchanges over Syria, or Libya, or Iraq, or Afghanistan, or Cuba…..

     Rupert
     “an attempt to destroy that was quite close to initiation of a strategic “exchange”. No idea if this is still the case of course”
     I hope so, theres no bloody other reason to go there…

     Kalingrad for Estonia and Latvia, seems a good trade for Russia, especialy if 6 months later, Kalingrad voted to rejoin the Russian federation.
260. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:37 pm

     “I’m wondering why you think the insult of T72s leveling Berlin should be accepted.”

     Dom if T72 are levelling Berlin then there is a war happening. Invading Murmansk would achieve nothing, except the complete destruction of the invasion fleet. It’s bizarre to even contemplate stripping a central front to launch an operation that could not be more dangerous and least likely to succeed, and right at the very periphery at that.

     “Russia frequently makes vague threats about escalation, it hasnt actualy “escalated” yet.”

     Nobody has sailed a freakin’ invasion fleet at their country yet.

     You’re constantly inventing wars and then proposing the MOST bizarre ways of trying to win them.
261. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:43 pm

     @ DominicJ,

     from Globalsecurity.org, an overview of what Russia has up there:

     “The Russian Northern Fleet underwent significant changes since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Since the end of the Cold War the total number of ships in the Northern Fleet declined by 40%, with many ships placed in reserve status. As of 1996 the fleet provided home ports for thirty-seven nuclear submarines, twenty-two other submarines, forty-seven principal surface combatants, and ten coastal and smaller ships. The naval aviation contingent included a complement of twenty Su-39 fixed-wing aircraft and ten antisubmarine warfare helicopters on board the Admiral Kuznetsov , which heads the air defense of the Barents Sea. Shore-based naval aviation included 200 combat aircraft and sixty-four helicopters. The Northern Fleet has two naval infantry brigades, one coastal defense regiment, and an air defense missile regiment.

     …..

     The harsh Arctic weather and continuous ice flow experienced by the Northern Fleet makes basic maintenance difficult and complex. Operations like underway replenishment are nearly impossible. These problems, coupled with allied controlled choke points and long lines of communication, present serious obstacles for the Russian Northern Fleet.”

     Now, that’s probably a bit dated, who knows what sort of condition the kit is in, how much training the pilots have, etc etc. But you’ll need to consider that sort of force level in your invasion plans. And the last paragraph gets reversed onto our difficulty in maintaining our logistics and our little fleet offshore, even assuming the initial assault is achieved.
262. Think Defence says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:45 pm

     Do you know that as soon as we invade the Russian northern ports we will be responsible for the environmental clean up.

     Greenpeace would be all over us like a tramp on chimps

     :)
263. DominicJ says:

     December 21, 2011 at 3:54 pm

     James
     If Russia has mounted a full invasion of Central Europe, I wouldnt have thought we would need much, if the area is heavily defended, then thats a large force that isnt fighting in Poland, which is a win in my book.

     Theres a pretty hefty limit as to how long Russia can hold out, because they need those yards back quickly, and all we are calling for is a return to the borders Russia drew in 1945.

     “The whole idea strikes me as barmy”
     Possibly, but yoiu havge to adit, its outside the box.

     Phil
     “And a nuclear war. Honestly, Russia would not be able to tolerate an invasion fleet sailing for its port.”
     I disagree, it would not be able to tolerate the loss, but it would declare victory and a return to prewar borders, it wouldnt nuke London.

     “Could we have pulled off Overlord with every landing area being defended like Omaha, with foul weather and poor sea states whilst having a full arsenal of NBC weapons thrown at it?
     All the while the main front being in Central Europe?”
     Well either the coast is defended, or Central Europe is the main effort, Russia cant do both.
264. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:04 pm

     @ DominicJ, sorry for all of these questions, I’m on a staggeringly boring global telcon with the phone on speaker, and no one can see me surfing the internet.

     “But what if, instead of sending our own Brigade, we paid for a Bangladeshi Division?”

     You clearly never made the acquaintance of the Bangladeshi Battalion that the UN accepted for service and placed into the Bihac pocket in NW Bosnia in 1995. 1,800 strong, triple the strength of a normal Battalion. Unfortunately, they had 600 rifles between them and operated in 3 shifts. They still had 1800 mouths to feed though, and none of their own logistics.

     ““You want a force capable of invading Russia and holding it’s N ports?”
     Only when the Russians go shopping for land in Poland.”

     Have you noticed that the one thing the Russians are not short of is land?

     Re other northern ports, Archangel is now ice-free all year with some ice-breaking work done in the winter to maintain a few clear channels. It may not be perfect for subs, but any port in a storm etc. Now, unless you want to extend the reach of your northern invasion force by another 700 miles, the operation has not effectively succeeded in the primary aim of closing down the Northern Fleet.
265. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:06 pm

     “Well either the coast is defended, or Central Europe is the main effort, Russia cant do both.”

     Of course it can! Dear God the Soviets used to keep a Front up there just for that purpose. Dom seriously, Google Earth the place – its a defenders paradise. You wouldn’t need much up there.

     “If Russia has mounted a full invasion of Central Europe, I wouldnt have thought we would need much, if the area is heavily defended, then thats a large force that isnt fighting in Poland, which is a win in my book”

     Let’s mirror this shall we. If the Europeans are fighting us on the Central Front and divert their entire fleet and several divisions to a peripheral battle-space that is easily defensible and thus weakens their effort in the decisive theatre, that sounds like win in my book Comrade!

     “Possibly, but yoiu havge to adit, its outside the box.”

     Its out the box and in the bin.

     “I disagree, it would not be able to tolerate the loss, but it would declare victory and a return to prewar borders, it wouldnt nuke London.”

     So we’d twiddle our thumbs if the Northern Fleet was chugging its way toward Faslane? Just give up?

     You don’t seem to have a clue how the Russians even remotely think.
266. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:10 pm

     @ DominicJ,

     the Northern Fleet has its’ own naval infantry, coastal defence forces, and over 200 fixed wing aircraft. That force is for the purposes of defending the Northern Fleet’s ports. It wouldn’t be taking part in the invasion of Poland, so you need to address that. It is not going to be an unopposed landing (particularly as Russian satellites will be tracking the invasion fleet all of the way around Norway). And it is going to need to be an amphibious operation, at least in the early stages as the troops in passenger ships can hardly pull up and dock like the Dover ferry is the quayside is swept by fire. And there’s seven ports to repeat this on.
267. DominicJ says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:25 pm

     James
     Interesting about the Bangladeshis, but hardly impossible to solve problems, right?
     Maybe its just me being naieve, but I kinda figure vaguely keystone copish fellow muslims would be a lot more acceptable all around as people to guard road construction and the like.

     I didnt invent the scenario, frankly, given recent performance, I dont believe Russia could or would invade Eastern Europe, but if they did, there are more ways to stop them than blocking fulda.

     Phil
     The Soviets may have kept a front up there.
     The Soviets had a rather larger pool to conscript from.
     Amazingly, I did google earth it, I google earth everything…..

     “So we’d twiddle our thumbs if the Northern Fleet was chugging its way toward Faslane? Just give up?”
     You raise an interesting point.
     Whilst the UK tank divisions are slugging it out with Russian Guards divisions, what exactly is the Northern Fleet doing?

     If we invaded Kalingrad, and Faslane was conquered n reponse, I have no doubt we accept a return to pre war borders.
268. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:34 pm

     Faslane’s a bit easier to conquer than 7 ports spread over 200 miles which are collectively guarded by a division of naval infantry and 200 fixed wing aircraft, and sea bound by some of the nastiest seas on earth outside of the southern ocean. Particularly if the UK doesn’t have any troops or aircraft or ships immediately to hand, as they are all away either in central Europe or fighting Russian marines in Murmansk.

     Do you know Dom, I think there’s a chance that your northern invasion is a riskier operation than you think. There’s a possibility it wouldn’t work.
269. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:36 pm

     Dom the Murmansk area is the home to a portion of the Russian nuclear deterrent. The Northern Fleet, believe it or not, exists almost solely to protect that nuclear weaponry. It is a defensive force. That should tell you the type of reaction you would expect if you attempted to go anywhere near it. There were serious debates in the Cold War about whether to even bomb the place in case it started a nuclear exchange. So what you would like to do is the following

     –weaken the decisive theatre of war

     –send the entire fleet north hundreds of miles on a completely predictable objective and approach

     –deliberately target Russian nuclear weaponry

     –Invade Russia, with a small force, using the entire fleet, under nuclear and chemical attack and hold the ports hundreds of miles from the nearest friendly base with your entire fleet sunk or irradiated.
270. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 4:39 pm

     … mind you, we could offer the ‘Wegians some free Buckfast if they stroll over and give the Russkies a bit of an Old Firm kicking. See you, Ivan…
271. Kentish Paul says:

     December 21, 2011 at 5:42 pm

     “If we invaded Kalingrad, and Faslane was conquered in reponse, I have no doubt we accept a return to pre war borders.”
     “Faslane’s a bit easier to conquer than 7 ports spread over 200 miles which are collectively guarded by a division of naval infantry and 200 fixed wing aircraft, and sea bound by some of the nastiest seas on earth outside of the southern ocean.”
     I know Christmas is coming but i think we are getting a bit carried away. What with 8 SSN’s operating from Diego Garcia holding back the Chinese hoards we are now invading Russia and defending Faslane from a force that managed to get past Arran and up the Clyde without being noticed.

     OK,OK. No MPA and limited surface fleet cover,but what about our intelligence resources. Were they all asleep?

     I love fantasy fleets/scenarios as much as the next man, but lets keep it in perspective.

     Happy Christmas all.
272. ChrisM says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:09 pm

     The Russians would just carpet nuke the invasion fleet. It wouldnt be that much of an escalation as it would be at sea and in their waters.

     Getting back to the blockading China idea…
     Could we actually do that with submarines? The tankers and ships full of Barbies would all be civil registered, and probably not to China. Wouldnt it be rather a large breach of international law to start sinking them? Particularly as we wouldnt be giving warnings and wouldnt be stopping to pick up survivors.
273. DominicJ says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:19 pm

     chrism
     wouldnt be legal, but neither was the falklands exclusion zone.

     And whos going to kick up a fuss if the us blockade sinks the cargo ship that ignored it.
274. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:40 pm

     @Chris M, did you really just say that the first use of Nuclear weapons. the first release, the thing that has not been done since 1945! the decision to go Nuclear “would not be that much of an escalation”. Really?
275. ChrisM says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:45 pm

     @apats – nowhere near the same escalation as nuking a city or a troop concentration on land. Especially if they waited until we were in their territorial waters.
     @Tom, what was illegal about the Falklands exclusion zone? Very different situation as well. Where exactly is your blockade? In the Indian Ocean or are you going to be mucking about off the Coast of China?
276. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:50 pm

     @ Chris M It is a igger escalation than a conventional missile strike on a city. they have crossed the Rubicon and used Nuclear weapons in anger. the genie is out of te Bottle and I guarantee you people on both sides are argueing for a massive first strike. I think you massively underestimate how much it would change the planning assumptions and options.
277. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 6:57 pm

     There was debate and some sort of unspoken agreement that nuclear weapon use at sea would not have anywhere near the same implications as use of nuclear weapons over land. Nuclear tipped torpedos and depth charges were standard munitions in the RN and Soviets fleets. There was nowhere near the level of stigma attached to dropping a WE177 on a Soviet sub. There’s a lot of literature on the distinction. An invasion fleet headed toward a good part of the Russian nuclear deterrent would get the good news in the form of instant sun rise.
278. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:02 pm

     Phil, The distinction was for use against submarines. They have also been withdrawn from service. It is also the 21st century now. The Russians would not go Nuclear against an amphibous fleet. Otherwise it would all end up nuclear very quickly.
279. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:03 pm

     One nuke into their own territory* before the invasion fleet gets around the top of Norway and a warning that the next one takes out the biggest boat should be enough to stop DominicJ’s plan dead in the water. What are we going to do? Risk total loss of our fleet and forces (which, given the scale of the task, are likely to be about 50% of the current Army and 300% of the current Navy)? Nuke St Kilda to show them that we too can bomb our own island? Nuke them back, as a first strike?

     The worst the Russians have done is to break some test ban treaty, slap on the wrist from the UN or IAEA or someone which I’m sure they can put up with.

     * there seem to be a number of islands off the northern coast without anything much on them.
280. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:05 pm

     APATs. There isn’t going to be fleet sailing toward Russia anyway. But, you’d be very naive to think that going for the Northern Fleet would result in anything but a nuclear exchange. The Siviets and the Russians would never allow their nuclear weapons to be neutralised. We know it. They know it. They’d use them or lose them. The distinction between different escalation levels is a western concept anyway.
281. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:10 pm

     @ DominicJ,

     don’t forget the minesweepers. I’ve just read that as late as 2008 the Northern Fleet had the ability to lay 200 mines a day, as well as the existing minefields around the Kola. Hopefully our intelligence services will have the GPS location of every mine of those pre-laid, but those laid as the fleet chugs up the coast of Norway will need some attention being paid to them.

     This invasion fleet, it’s getting to be an armada at this rate.
282. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:11 pm

     Phil, I agree, they would possibly use them all. They would not commit a small tactical strike against a possible amphib group that would never happen anyway. They would go for a major world ending first strike option or do nothing. ( Human nature and survival complex must be factored in). This is the reason why even in whatever scenario we are in at the moment, neither side would deliberately target the other Strategic assets for fear of provoking a first strike.
283. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:15 pm

     @ Phil,

     you are right, but I do have the vision of poor old DomJ frantically re-calculating the invasion plans with every cruel and barbed comment (me probably most guilty) thrown into the thread. At least DominicJ has had the good spirit to advance an idea that is certainly “out of the box”. Having had my views on how “relatively” easy it would be for the Argentines to take the Falklands shredded (I still stick with them though), I suspect know how he’s probably feeling!

     Good on you for your ideas, anyway DominicJ.
284. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:16 pm

     Thinking about the Unthinkable is another thread entirely! They probably would go big since it makes no sense to only go after some of their nuclear deterrent, so the fleet must be part of a wider attack on their nuclear forces. Oh they’d let fly I imagine. On this imaginary fleet. In this bizarre Operation Dom.
285. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:19 pm

     I must re read all the posts, when I went to bed this morning we were merely blockading China, get back to the office and we are invading Russia. I though we were meant to get less involved in mad conflcits.
286. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:28 pm

     Dom is thinking outside the box.
287. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:31 pm

     “Good on you for your ideas, anyway DominicJ.”

     Dom and I have clashed over his ideas for a few months now. He never seems to take it personally. I’m terrible for biting. But luckily he hasn’t had a Bobesque meltdown yet!
288. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:34 pm

     Would it be wrong of me to throw in the hand-grenade that DominicJ’s aim could be more easily achieved with a land invasion from Kirkenes in Norway? Norway’s in NATO, which given everything else that DomJ says is kicking off in central Europe wouldn’t mind us coming up north to help out. It’s only 50 miles from Murmansk, and would include the 4 major of the 7 ports to the west of Murmansk. Easily achievable for a mechanised division cooperating with some RAF deep strike on AD and some infrastructure to stop Russian counter-movement, and maybe the old Norwegians could help out with some mountain troops. TLAM could close the remaining three ports on the east of Murmansk (and Archangel as well, for good measure). Taking out the two bridges at Kola would also isolate any reinforcement from Murmansk: the river is only wide for enough for standard combat bridging or pontoons at one 400m long spot. It would take the Russians weeks to bring up strategic bridging for the one mile width gap elsewhere, limiting their options to heliborne, para, or amphibious against NATO forces in defensive positions. Changes the dynamic somewhat.

     Of course, that would completely ruin the thread as it would appear that you’d need a beefed up Army and theatre logistics capability, not a beefed up Navy which is of course the ultimate strategic purpose. Sorry, I’ll withdraw the suggestion.

     The whole Russia northern ports things is still however in my mind completely barmy when there’s a proper punch up going on in central Europe.
289. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:36 pm

     An image:
290. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:37 pm

     Boo it didnt work! Nevermind!
291. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:46 pm

     Hi James, RE “throw in the hand-grenade that DominicJ’s aim could be more easily achieved with a land invasion from Kirkenes in Norway?”
     - Germans tried with 300.000 men (they threw in two mountain divisions for good measure) and advanced 30 km!
     - good point about the river; always wondered why there is a specialised pontoon pioneer regiment in the area (the marine infantry is down to one bde these days, plus the specialised coastal defence bde)
292. All Politicians are the same says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:47 pm

     @ James but then the wholde Division would get nuked. I say lets not attack Northern Russia at all.
293. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:50 pm

     “James but then the wholde Division would get nuked. I say lets not attack Northern Russia at all.”

     Everyone! Step away from the drugs.
294. x says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:51 pm

     If we had a home guard proportionate to our population as the Norwegian home guard to its population we would have a force 750,000 strong.

     Don’t tell him Pike.
295. x says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:53 pm

     Drugs? I thought you lot had been on the pop or had too much sugar. Always gets kids angsty too much sugar.
296. James says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:54 pm

     @ ACC,

     yes you are right (I do say it’s barmy…), but it is “easier” than the whole seaborne charge across the beaches thing.

     I’m not an expert on WW2 Norway campaigns, but I dimly recall that there was a winter attack? Winter making things much more difficult than the summer. Maybe there were summer attacks as well – not my field of knowledge.

     Modern manoeuvre divisions are substantially more capable than WW2 divisions, with integral helicopters and joint support from FJ, etc. So “doable” I’d say, particularly if against only one Bde, but I’d not claim “easy”. But “easier” than doing it from the sea.

     They’d also need to nuke their own mainland territory or the LoCs in Norway, both of which are upwind from Murmansk. That may be a different calculation for them than nuking some ships 100 miles offshore. But who’d want to risk it? I don’t think it’s going to happen, anyway.
297. Phil says:

     December 21, 2011 at 7:57 pm

     “They’d also need to nuke their own mainland territory or the LoCs in Norway, both of which are upwind from Murmansk.”

     We’d nuke them anyway, they’d probably just let our own nuclear weapons destroy our own forces.

     Norway wasn’t massively keen on NATO forces on her soil in peacetime during the Cold War. It’s why NATO forces only went up there for an exercise, and weren’t permanently based there.
298. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 21, 2011 at 8:16 pm

     Hi James, they were two weeks late from Barbarossa just because logistics were so difficult. Came to a quick halt, took 2-3 months to build up enough stocks for the rather big force force, and just when they made the push, winter came (end of Sept!).

     Anyway, after the Russian retreat from E.Germany, three divisional mob. centres were built in the general area, with all the kit at the ready. Lots of aviation as you pointed out, including anti-ship bombers and a big force of AH. An airmobile/ airborne rapid response division within easy reach near St. Petersburg… barmy in all variations, smacks of Churchill’s Dardanelles/ Greece/ Norway and the general soft belly thinking
     - damn busting in Argentina a much better venture
299. Kentish Paul says:

     December 21, 2011 at 8:20 pm

     “There was nowhere near the level of stigma attached to dropping a WE177 on a Soviet sub.”

     Depends where and when. There were two yeilds depending on water depth. 1KT and 10KT. Get it wrong in the North Sea and a lot of nasty water drifting over friendly countrys.
300. Tubby says:

     December 21, 2011 at 8:53 pm

     I am really wishing I had not suggested that in the future we might end up with a resurgent Russia on our “doorstep” as I had no idea it would go nuclear so quick, or at all! I thought the proposed strategy post 2020 to deal with a Russian incursion in the Baltics was to move the ARG screened by CVF and T45/T26 while simultaneously deploying a MRB by land to link up with German and French forces – the only problem I can see is that there is no guarantee we will have a real capability to either generate the sea based forces or the land based forces given the current trend (i.e. there’s a rumour that the Puma upgrade is going to be cancelled which will see Puma scrapped, which along with the withdrawal of the Sea King will see a massive drop in our SH capabilities).
301. John Hartley says:

     December 21, 2011 at 9:15 pm

     I leave the debate on this fantasy forces post for a few days & now you lot are invading Russia!
     Well it did not end well for Napoleon or Hitler.
     Back to favourite fantasy toys(tanks/ships/planes/missiles & other things that go bang) please.
302. Aussie Johnno says:

     December 22, 2011 at 2:46 am

     Martin, ‘….there is some intent in Canberra’….
     You shouldn’t mistake politicians words for politicians actions.
     If the UK was to establish an Indian Ocean task force on a permanent basis, the best place to base it would be Deigo Garcia not in the Straits of Malacca. Even at Deigo Garcia you would be across their supply lines to the Persian Gulf and their various projects in Africa. The risk is that you would simply speed up China’s development of a blue water Navy, which is not in our interests.
     You may have noticed that the Seychelles recently offered China base facilities for its anti piracy patrols (for the income and security benefit), I imagine India is somewhat agast at the thought.
303. ArmChairCivvy says:

     December 22, 2011 at 7:30 am

     Hi AJ, RE “You may have noticed that the Seychelles recently offered China base facilities”
     - makes a nice string: Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Seychelles, Tanzania (tbc) and Eritrea
304. Chris.B. says:

     December 22, 2011 at 2:08 pm

     Invading Russia now? I see. Blockading China wasn’t enough.
305. Mike W says:

     December 22, 2011 at 7:14 pm

     I didn’t know whether to put this on the Open Thread or this one. This thread has been active recently in discussing matters such as future British Army structures and whether we have sufficient kit, so I have plumped for this one. If I have done the wrong thing, TD, I’m sorry!

     I have just seen an item on the MOD website today that says that Defence Secretary Philip Hammond has announced a £400m package of protected vehicles and Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) technology to further improve the protection of British Forces in Afghanistan. (I don’t know whether this has been mentioned elsewhere on the Think Defence site. I am usually years behind with news!)

     Apparently, the package includes around 100 additional Foxhound protected patrol vehicles. I believe approx. 200 were ordered previously. I think that although the number of extra vehicles is less than that originally intended (200?), the new vehicles can only improve the protection for our troops in Afghanistan. As the Mod says: “Foxhound is at the cutting edge of protected patrol vehicle technology and will provide unprecedented levels of blast protection for its size and weight.” What a pity, though, that we cannot afford more at the moment (to replace Landies and other less well protected vehicles. There certainly won’t be enough (yet,anyway) to equip the light infantry or the TA, etc.

     Owing to the nature of the C-IED procurement, no other details have been released on this procurement because of security reasons. Still, that looks very hopeful too. I don’t know what the relative cost of the vehicles to the C-IED technology is.
306. Mike W says:

     December 22, 2011 at 8:50 pm

     Forgot to say, in connection with Foxhound, that one of the other things we don’t know about the new order is which versions of the vehicle have been included.

     They are probably going to be all the the basic vehicle type (Patrol). However, there are two more variants: the Fire Support (a WMIK-type vehicle) and the Utility (a kind of cargo-carrying variant, I believe). Would be good if some of those are included in this second order.
307. JS123 says:

     December 30, 2011 at 5:52 pm

     If Martin is still reading, I would suggest eliminating the eastern carrier group but keeping the eastern amphibious group. Use SSNs to replace the lost ground attack and type 45s for anti-air. Use the saved money to bolster the army past 65000.
308. Peter Elliott says:

     January 22, 2012 at 7:01 pm

     Integration of fixed wing and ground forces is not just a USMC idea. Looking at our own history I think Lord Slim got there first.

     One of the reasons 14th army beat the Japanese in Burma was becuase its close air support was so well integrated with the ground troops.

     Topically (and on the subject of co-operation with India) 14th Army was also an international rather than a British force.

     Peter
309. Peter Elliott says:

     January 22, 2012 at 7:08 pm

     And on the subject of how many tanks to deploy Slim said: “use many, lose a few; use a few, lose them all”

     If we really are thinking about fighting a future war against China in East Asia then we really should study what this man wrote. Possibly the best British general of the 20th centuary.

     And you can bet the Chinese won’t have ignored what he wrote.

     Peter

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