A follow on Guest Post from DomJ
Thank you everyone who commented, requested clarification and helped, I’m resubmitting with explanations, detail and the pound of flesh Jed demanded J
So here goes
I’d start, with the “war fleet”, of which we would have two, each one “active” for 6 months of the year, or 8 months, or 4 months, or whatever else makes everyone happy.
Active would be “ready to at short notice go and beat some unfortunate foreigners to a bloody pulp”.
Inactive would be everything else, overhaul, training, diplomacy, exercises ect.
| First Fleet | Purchase Cost | Operating Cost | |
| Carrier | QE Class |
3,700,000,000 |
400,000,000 |
| 24 Fast Air | Rafale |
1,680,000,000 |
288,000,000 |
| 6 Infantry landing ships | Juan Carlos |
2,940,000,000 |
600,000,000 |
| 24 Heavy Lift | Chinook |
720,000,000 |
192,000,000 |
| 6 Armour Landing Ship | Bay Class |
1,368,000,000 |
600,000,000 |
| 6 AAW Destroyers | T 45 Daring Class |
3,900,000,000 |
420,000,000 |
| 6 Light Helicopter | Lynx |
180,000,000 |
24,000,000 |
| 6 ASW Frigates | T46 |
4,500,000,000 |
420,000,000 |
| 6 ASW Helicopter | Merlin |
180,000,000 |
48,000,000 |
| 3 Guided Missile Cruiser | T47 |
3,000,000,000 |
210,000,000 |
| 5 SSGN / Deterrent | Astute+ |
15,000,000,000 |
900,000,000 |
The Carrier and fast air is I hope fairly self explanatory, shoot down enemy aircraft, possibly bomb enemy targets, provide close air support and reconnaissance.
It’s the QE class, because that’s what we have, and the Rafale, because I believe thatFranceandGermanyare about to have a massive falling out, and we’ll buy it hoping to influence French opinion in our favour.
I assume some sort of ISTAR platform will also arrive, hopefully not that silly Sea King, but have no real idea whether we will end up with the Hawkeye, something funky based on the V22 or something else entirely.
This will also function as the flag ship, to what extent that means anything anymore
The Amphibs, the reasoning behind numbers simply being so that the entire force could be landed in a single group. Well, obviously not quite, a single group, each ships group of four Chinook would need to make 5 trips to offload the ship “battalion” and even with 4 LCUs it would take 13 trips to deposit the 50 warriors of an armoured infantry battalion. But we’re talking 11 hours rather than the 11 days Sutton took, or so I hope. To my none military mind, that sounds like a smashing capability. I’m wedded to neither Bay nor Carlos, feel free to suggest better ships, or just assume they are better. I’d much prefer something with a much greater cargo handling capacity, but am open to a third heavy landing ship specifically to vomit ISO boxes onto a beach.
Why Chinook? Again, its that realism (lol) bit, I’d prefer a bigger lift, I’m sure that there is something bigger than the CH53-k planned in the long term, but we have Chinooks.
AAW Destroyers
Standard Darings, so PAAMS, a gun and a Lynx. Bow Sonar, Harpoons, Torpedo tubes ect would be nice, but not worth squabbling over. There purpose is, rather predictably, to shoot down enemy aircraft that Carrier Air misses. Why Lynx? Why not? Again, I’ve just taken it “as is”
ASW Frigates
Daring Hulls with towed array sonar, bow Sonar, torpedo tubes, Harpoon (or similar), a gun and a dumbed down PAAMS (would be nice if it can still speak to PAAMS for a joint radar picture) and ASW Merlins because again, that’s what we have. Why Daring hulls, well, because steel is cheap and air is free and we already designed the things and made the tools. Purpose, sub hunting and “sacrificial” outer pickets
Missile Cruisers
Daring hulls, a dumbed down PAAMS and say, 256 cruise missiles each.
Purpose is to provide a massive opening barrage that even the most phallicly challenged would be satisfied with. Shock and Awe gets kind of a bad deal, but if anything, it worked too well. Destroy out enemy air capability, either direct hits on aircraft, or just by knocking out airfields. Yes I know, airfields can be repaired, but BROACH is going to seriously damage an airstrip, and if you put 50 holes in an airport, just how quickly can it start launching aircraft again? How many military airports is the other side likely to have. Don’t we have 4?
On top of that, command links are an obvious target to bombard.
After that, its hard to say, it really depends on the situation. Are we issuing a “back the hell off” warning, or do we intend to topple the government come hell or high water. Transport links, mobilised ground forces, “die hard” military, infrastructure. Communications are iffy. We certainly want them disrupted, but I can see the advantage in allowing just enough to survive to allow terror to spread through the ranks, what’s the point in winning if the people shooting back don’t realise its time to give up . Personally, I think slaughtering a load of conscripts is a bit unfair, I’d much rather they rebelled and joined us or buggered off home.
SSGN
Astutes with 4/6/8 Trident Tubes. Iffy I know due to nuclear/none nuclear issues.
Purchase Cost is now £37,168,000,000 and operating costs £4,102,000,000 for each of the two fleets.
These would kick the doors in, deploy a pocket division and support it in theatre, as part of a coalition, great, or alone if required.
Said Pocket Divison, I know even less about, but I would put manpower somewhere around 5000, and would hope it contained some heavy armour, some IFV and a rather large light infantry component.
The original suggestion was 10 “Battalions” each of roughly 500 men.
Armour Battalion.
Now, this, is probably going to sound really really really stupid, but since no one will provide more accurate numbers, you’ll just have to live with it.
12 Challenger 2s, 24 CVRTs (and a replacement PDQ), unknown number of logistics/engineering vehicles and a 500 strong crew.
I realise its not exactly Kursk, but until the enemy can get heavy and/or numerous anti tank weapons into the area, and if/until it gets its own armour into the area, 12 Tanks are likely to be a bloody scary force.
I’m not a massive fan of electronic land scouts, if you want to see what’s going on on the ground, its likely to involve being shot at and shooting back. Or so my “land warfare papers” tell me. Not that I have a problem sticking longbow on top of the 4 Chally leaders and some audio grabbers on the rest.
2 Armoured Infantry Battalions,
Fairly easy, 50 warriors a piece, each with 7 dismounts and three crew. I realise theres a logistical failing there, I may have a solution. I can only hope 10 guys have the technical wherewithal to keep a warrior serviceable for a few weeks.
An Artilery Battalion
12 Rapier
12 AS90
12 105
I figure they don’t all have to in use at the same time?
4 Light infantry battalions (possibly one Para and one RM special forces lite)
I’m quite happy to distribute weapons to whoever wants them, I don’t really get why we have separate SHORAD/LRATGW troops. Motorised, (landrovers) rather than Mechanised (bulldogs). I kinda figure these can follow on behind the Armoured infantry, making sure logistics keeps functioning, manning strong points after the warriors seize them ect.
An Engineer Battalion
I kinda figure these would like, build a port/dock type thing, or operate a pre existing one, deal with damaged vehicles and maybe logistics?
And a “Headquarters” Battalion
Which would cover command, signals, medical and I suppose an RMP detachment.
Its interesting to note the entire Royal Marines budget in 08/09 was £620mn, I assume that includes Warthog/Viking ect. 6 Royal Marine Brigades of over 8,000 men would come in at a mere 3bn. Unless the Army funds any RM work Do the RM have any sort of organic engineer capability?
I’m happy to break the Engineer Battalion down into REME/Eng/Log Detachments if that improves things
So anyway, what does the Strategic Raiding Pocket Division do?
Well, my thinking was based on the Falklands, roughly fight a 120 day “war” that involves around 30 days of positioning (sailing there), 30 preparatory work (bombing everything), a further 30 days of high intensity fighting (shooting anyone who hasn’t yet surrendered) and then a further 30 days of “clean up” and awaiting relief (tea and medals).
But in the real world, I suppose the first “big” task, is it in a single stroke solves Europes Rapid Reaction Force problem. It provides a force the rest ofEuropecan latch onto if and when it decides it wants to do something violent.
Perhaps its “headquarters” aren’t big enough for this? I don’t know, the huge command staffs in NATO armies confuse me, I cant remember the last time my line manager told me to do something, I occasionally bug her for help, but maybe once a month? Even if it cant “command” a division, its certainly the forced entry / teeth components of one. I don’t know enough to create deployable divison HQs
As a NATO component, it would counter attack against the Northern Fleet in Murmansk Oblast, which would hopefully have a “Pariseffect” on the Russian leadership and force a ceasefire. It wouldn’t matter if they were at the very gates ofBerlin, withoutMurmansk, they don’t have a nuclear deterrent inEuropeand so would be forced to retreat back to pre war borders.
In the future?
Well, who knows what the future holds, but I cant imagine we will ever be in a position where we have too much forced entry capability, currently only the US can do that at any scale, and France on a small scale.
Nor do I imagine that we will ever be in a position where we have too much available firepower.
It gives us the capability to act alone in protection of our interests, and to enable our allies to act in coalition interests, we bombard the target to create a crack, go in first and seize a port, they follow on and overwhelm the defences entirely.
It was mentioned that “what we really need, is forward based allies”, and I very much agree. But what is more likely to win us friends overseas than both the capability my fleet represents, and the commitment to use it?
What would make Chile feel more secure? The status quo? Or my fleet?
The lead elements held at 2 days readiness and taking an active role in combat 10 days later (northernArgentinacomes into range). Within 30 days, the Pocket Division will have landed in theTierra Del Fuegoand seized the island. What more could anyone ask? An armoured division forward deployed inGermanyis only of any use toEastern Europe. Its very useful to them of course, but only them
Lets assume War betweenIndiaandChina, how should we secure Bangladeshi Independence? A UN resolution? A 6 month long build up of ground forces that arrives after the wars over, and would be over ran in days anyway? Or deploying my Raider Fleet and threatening to join the war against the side that first infringes Bangladeshi neutrality? We couldnt hope to win a land war against either, or occupy them even if we did, but in the midst of a war, neither can afford us bombing the crap out of their airfields and such, it would be a near instant loss.
In the past?
Libya 2011
Preparation – Bombardment destroys much of theLibyaheavy core.
Invasion – Land forces deployed in support of Libyan rebels, providing logistical support, specialist functions, and for lack of a better term, “Stop Lines”, frequently, the TNC ran out of ammunition, and in the face of a mild counter attack, retreated 200 miles. If a British Light Infantry Battalion and a couple of Tanks dug in a mile behind the rebel Lines, retreats would have a fixed rally point, behind which we could protect and resupply the rebels.
Iraq 2003?
Shock and Awe – We could have provided far more support in the bombing campaign, fireing some 600+ missiles in a single barrage.
Al-FawPeninsula– Could have been taken without additional US forces.
Basra– Little land contribution, Fast Air from the carriers and transport helicopters possibly detached from the Al-Faw Occupation ground forces.
Umm Qasr – No change (suppose I need to specify some mine sweepers, but they could have come from the Diego Garcia fleet
Occupation – Al Faw, Umm Qasr, training of Iraqi army within that zone. Someone else would have to manageBasra.
Afghanistan 2001
Shock and Awe – Again, much greater contribution from Submarines, Cruisers and Carrier. The Carrier allows some recon capability rather than simply destructive force.
Special Forces – Para Battalion can be dropped in with US forces, rest can be airlifted in without heavy equipment once airfield secure.
Occupation – Possible occupation support, again, realism about areas controllable, 20:1 ratio to be respected, which puts Laskhar Gah out of reach, requiring two “Pocket Divisions”.
The Development Solution budget to be put under the control of the PD and spent on their terms, by them if they wish (IE, not sub contracting out toUKstaff who wont leaveKabul). Personaly, I believe the best bet would have been to erect temporary accommodation, bribe the locals, level the town, and rebuild from the ground up. Add a curtain wall with towers, train the second sons as a town militia, build in water, sewage, solar lighting, gobar gas and build out narrow alleys, funnels and ambush points.
Sierra Leone
Pretty much do what we did, but on a far grander scale. Barras unlikely to be required, but doing it with Rafales bombing enemy heavy machine gun posts would no doubt have been much easier.
Kosovo 99
Preceding Bombardment – Carrier air (supported possibly by land fighters) and cruise missile bombardment would be far in excess of what we actually did.
Ground War – Ground forces could have been deployed to directly challenge, or at least threaten, Serbian forces refusing to retreat.
Bosnia 92
Well that was a complete disaster, but who knows what a small but military capable force ready and able to deploy aggressively could have accomplished. Cant imagine how things would’ve been worse.
Iraq 91
Preceding bombardment.
Much stronger barrage from cruisers perhaps negating need to send tornados against airfields.
Much smaller land component
Falklands 82
Air War – Proper Carrier air defeats Argentine Airforce, cruiser strikes against mainland disable airbases.
Sea War – Argentine fleet forced to port by submarine threat, directed on to target by AWACS
Land War – Availability of armour and helicopter logistics sees Goose Green surrender with little loss. Remaining Argentine positions fall under combined arms advance, Argentine forces incapable of harming Chieftain, aggressive use of which only curtailed by mine fields.
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Wow, even as far as fantasy fleets go this is pretty damn impressive…
On a specific detailed point, how would the 24 Chinooks be transported? They would either need to go on the CVF or parked on the flight deck of a Juan Carlos… The CVF will not have enough space and the latter option is far from perfect as you will not be able to operate any other helis. You might as well buy another CVF…
“and we’ll buy it hoping to influence French opinion in our favour.”
Do you know that the british soldier is very estimated in France, much more that the americans, we like you. Except you are too with the americans
Just a thought… Should we not consider the option of using flying boats for supporting amphibious ops? Something like the H-4 Hercules “Spruce Goose” built back in the 40′s could transport 700 troops… Just have the LHDs / CVFs to move the helicopters / assault craft, initial assault marines also on the escorts, heavy equipment on RFAs / points and then just fly in the troops as needed. The T45s could secure the perimeter of a sea (air)port…
I don’t understand about Chinook on a aircraft carrier. The HMS Ocean is there for that, with an aircraft carrier in air support, with his escort, it is more logical.
“The HMS Ocean is there for that, with an aircraft carrier in air support, with his escort, it is more logical.”
It would be.
But the reality is that HMS Ocean is expected to bow out in 2016, replaced by Queen Elizabeth, and there is no funding for a replacement LPH programme.
The LPH role is going to be passed on the CVF carriers.
LPH(R) has been “on hold” ever since 2006, and it is effectively dead, effectively if not officially.
The CVFs are going to be, effectively, Landing Helicopter Aviation ships.
Or “Forward Staging Afloat Base” as the americans called USS Kitty Hawk when it worked in this way in 2001 outside Afghanistan. Back then, the carrier had aboard just 12 or so fixed wing airplanes, the rest being Special Forces troops, Marines and the helicopters and crews of the Special Forces aviation regiment of the Army.
DomJ
Your not a million miles from things I have suggested (“modest proposals”) in other articles.
I have always thought our Balanced Force (TM) should be able to be delivered quickly by sea, and that would be the “Niche Capability” (TM) that we provided to NATO and other alliances.
I would not go Juan Carlos route, expensive. I have posted on here before on how we could buy a modified Bay with a hanger and more troop capacity; that plus two Damen Schelde Enforcer derivative LPH (so 2 x LSD, 4 x LPD(A), 4 x LPD(A)(Enhanced) and 2 x LPH). Buy some Dutch Joint Support Ships to replace older RFA’s and they could help in this role too (delivering Chinooks). I would stick with mostly Merlin for the amphib assault role, so I think your overly ambitious with the Chinooks. Mores to the point, all amphib shipping has inherent flexiblity (anti-pirate small boat mothership) and non-war fighting roles (disaster response – get DfID to pay for them).
If your T47 is a T45 Batch II with more Slyver A70 for 16 to 32 SCALP-N – then why not ? But bump it up to 6 (then we have 12 “gold plated” or “proper warship” units) plus T26 based on Absalon able to deploy towed array, and or USV for littoral ASW, and 2 x Merlins; et voila – world domination on the cheap !
I will not comment on your scenarios, and leave it to the proper ex-Squaddies to comment on the Army side of things.
Thanks to taking the time to respond to all our comments with an update article.
Your MoD is mad, an aircraft carrier requires an escort, it needs its aircraft to defend himself, he needs an escort, with destroyers and frigates, plus a tanker and a submarine, all this for landing marines and some tanks ?
” I don’t understand about Chinook on a aircraft carrier. The HMS Ocean is there for that, with an aircraft carrier in air support, with his escort, it is more logical.”
Chinooks can land and be refuelled on HMS Ocean but is too big to go in the hanger. The CVF on the other hand has been design to support Chinooks properly.
Frenchie
Thus begins wisdom re CVF.
Chinooks
i’m not averse to something smaller.
Anything would have to be internaly stowable, if that means smaller whirlybirds or bigger ships i leave to you.
Further qe’s aint a problem, except they’re big targets, and if one gets hit early, can the rest carry on?
Frenchie
6 oceans is fine by me
jed
meh, bugger all else to do at work, and its as much for me as anyone else
You’ve a lot of fleet there for what amounts to a pocket brigade. What about a heavier and more numerous land force delivered only in part by proper amphibs and partly by ro ro + flexiport/barge causeway
“Your MoD is mad, an aircraft carrier requires an escort, it needs its aircraft to defend himself, he needs an escort, with destroyers and frigates, plus a tanker and a submarine, all this for landing marines and some tanks ?”
“Frenchie
Thus begins wisdom re CVF.”
No, here begins only the nonsense.
HMS Ocean goes in loaded to the brink with Marines but without escorts?
What’s that, magic, or folly?
The carrier instead because it is a “carrier” can’t go out of Portsmouth without the rest of the fleet following?
So a operation abroad with an amphibious landing needs aircrafts only if there’s the carrier to be protected?
Men, it is not quite how it works.
The amphibious assault needs air protection and air support, and to get it where it is needed, there comes the need for the carrier.
Not the other way around, unless you think that the same enemy will attack the task force if the carrier is there, and ignore it and let it work unopposed if the carrier is not around.
Excuse me, but it makes absolutely no sense.
Escorts and Embarked airgroup will be shaped by the mission, and by the perceived threat to the Task Force / ship.
The rest is nonsense. Pure and simple.
It’s not a dig, more enlightenment but engineers and royal electrical and mechanical engineers are 2 very different beasts and are not located together. REME workshops for armour are big buggers as well, recovery mechanics and fodens(or MAN) charrv, gun fitters and armourers with 4 tonne mashy trucks, electronics with all their box bodies (each with a large generator towed behind vehicle mechanics and a complete RLC unit with shit load of spares trucks. RE normally stay close to inf and armd units. Again it’s just an info comment, can’t remember exactly but GW1 i think we took 450+ vehicles, most 4tonne plus!!
repulse i can’t help but this “in development” plane from beriev ref your sea plane.
http://www.beriev.com/eng/core_e.html
‘kin hell!!!
You REME will go where you’re told! We did a patrol one day to deliver a REME type to PB Bahadur as the Quad refused to start. Dangerous patrol, past the choke points and Murder Wall. Get there in one piece, REME type rummages about the Quad, stands back, thinks, reaches out, turns the key, presses the starter and off it goes. Stupid bastards had left the ignition on off and were trying to start it just using the starter button. And off back to the FOB passed the Murder Wall and the choke points. Ooh I got carried away with a ditty. Exeunt.
why do British writers and commentators continue to drool for the Rafale?
why is the F-35C seen as such a dog by some in Europe? the Rafale is extremely expensive, doesn’t have stealth, its performance is spotty at best (electronics, sensor fusion and the ability to work with British kit) and you get that all out of the box with the F-35C…additionally you support a UK company (BAE)…
i personally don’t care if the Brits drop out of the F-35 program…i just don’t understand the love that the Rafale is getting.
@ Dom J,
forgive me, but this whole force construction seems to be a Navy fest. Spending 80% of the defence budget on the Navy seems unbalanced, particularly when *this* scenario seems only likely to play out in a minority of occasions, and particularly when this scenario delivers a tiny little Brigade of limited effectiveness. Can’t we have a little less self-protection of gin palaces and a few more combat troops?
I’m just wondering what the RN have done of campaign-winning effect since 1944, apart from the Falklands? A few TLAMs here and there and I&W sniffing are important, but don’t I think win the campaign. Good effort in 82, of course, really great, and all credit to the personal bravery of the matelots. But considering every other campaign, from Korea to both Gulfs via Malaya, Kenya, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Aden, and now Afghanistan, isn’t the best balance on funding a force that actually does the business in the mud, not floating about protecting itself expensively?
James
So you would rather have an unbalanced force, as long as its unbalanced towards a land force?
If I refuse to take the bait on Korea, both Gulfs (oh and the long standing Gulf Patrol and MCM efforts of the Iran-Iraq war) not to mention RN and RM contribution in Afghanistan……..
Then do you at least accept that HMG actually does not want to pay for an army which would be big enough to provide critical mass to COIN campaign, boots on the ground and all that, BUT as our deluded politicians do continue to want to interfer, sorry, intervene as part of international coalitions (but not on our own) why should we not make our major contributions to such operations maritime ones? Why not let continental countries with bigger armies lead in land campaigns?
Phil – dit on! The lanterns are swinging in my mess (or ‘front room) and tot of rum raised to ya – you rock
@Jed, I couldn’t agree more with your comments…
To be a world superpower you need a first tier army, navy, airforce and a nuclear deterrent. Fact is the UK can only afford one of these, now choose…
We are an island nation who has been bitten badly by land campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. With all respect to our brave troops, the last two has not increased our standing in the world. Our fickle friends in the US have already started to look for new friends now that we are broke on the military front…
@PaulG, great spot on the Beriev seaplane. A-40 looks good. Not sure how many troops it could carry, but the range looks good. Wonder if you could fit a hovercraft in the back…
@ Jed,
I’m certainly not advocating an unbalanced force in favour of the Land component. I would argue that Armilla patrols and MCM were not strategically game-changing, but they were useful, and the RN and RM contributions in Afghanistan are not essentially Maritime by nature, but rather efforts operated by RN that could equally have come from the RAF or Army, depending on the roulement plot. I may be wrong, and if so happy to be corrected, but RN air could equally have come from the RAF flying from Kandahar, and within Helmand, the RM operate in a non-amphibious way and are indistinguishable from the Army.
I’m not sure I agree with you wider point about letting others take up the Land cudgel. It seems to me that the bulk of western military operations “tend” to require Land forces to force the decisive tipping point, even if that is not to ignore the many maritime operations that there have been and will continue. Perhaps 80:20, across NATO and western interests since 1945? As a country which has always sought too inspire and lead on a world stage (which I fully support), I am content that this nation has a Land component that is more capable than most, and it would to me be a sad day if all we could mount was a piffling little Brigade.
Hear hear James. I’ve been banging the same drum for some months now. This notion of strategic raiding is a bankrupt one. As is the idea of firing a brigade from the Navy and imagining that it will have a Clancyesque time of it on land rather than a Dieppe. Some folk though have latched into some combined neo Correlian / Splendid isolation paradigm and think we cannot and should not engage globally and that somehow, having no say in world on which our way of life depends, somehow makes that way of life safer. They think they have stumbled upon reality when in actual fact they have stumbled on denial and defeatism.
Jed we shouldn’t do as you advocate because maritime strategies have a time and place, by being all we can do we render ourselves irrelevant globally most of the time. Land forces remain the most effective means of applying pressure on an enemy or force. As I have said, I don’t discount an air force or a navy but not at disproportionate cost to the force that gives us the most leverage in world affairs.
@Phil, “…the force that gives us the most leverage in world affairs.”
Really – how is this? There are two things that would make our army relevant in the global arena, size and equipment. We are a small nation (in population) with high labour costs so we are never going to have enough soldiers outside of a major war to do anything but limited / short term ops. We can bring equipment, but when you think about it apart from MBTs and artillery, most of the high tech stuff is either delivered from the air or sea. Plus, why we were important to the US was the fact we could deploy quickly and support ops far from the UK – guess what, from primarily air / naval assets.
I would love to have a big / powerfull army, navy and airforce; the fact is we cannot afford it. Do the choice is to have a little of everything or focus on one area where you can lead.
Viceroy
Maybe. Personaly, I just like the idea of everything being deployable virtualy anywhere.
Once you start adding none military ships, you need to seize a dock, or build one.
You lose your rapid deployment ability.
And of course, more men means more cost, more heavy kit means a lot more cost.
Paul G
What, are you actualy saying people who repair gun sites and people who fill HESCO barriers arent interchangable?
See, we see engineer, and it all just blends into one. I’ll be sure to break them out in future.
I could of course, be entirely wrong, but if all vehicles are given a “full service” en route, and everything thats near its last legs is swapped out, that should limit the need for any serious repairs in a 30 day war.
Some stuff will still break, but hopefully, there shouldnt be hundreds of breakdowns.
Its just supposed to be enough keep most things running for 60 days, not 60 years.
Soloman
“i just don’t understand the love that the Rafale is getting.”
Neither do I, but sadly, I aint minister for defence :’(
James
Is it a navy fest?
Its certainly Navy centric, for a country that doesnt have a standing army*, I dont see that as a huge problem.
Your date range is less than perfect. Push it back 5 years, and the worlds first and only motorised army broke and ran, leaving behind all of its heavy kit. The Germans were stopped at the channel, and the Navy kept the sea lanes open.
Korea? Would the world have missed our ground forces?
Considering Inchon was the most important act of the war, followed by bombing the dams required to irrigate the fields that fed Pyonyang, I’m not sure they would have.
Malaya, fundamentaly, we lost,
Kenya, fundamentaly, we lost,
We managed to install friendlier governments than might have happened, but at the time, we had an 8% defence budget, so could afford three full size forces.
Northern Ireland, is a constitutional cluster **** of epic proportions, that fundamentaly, we have lost.
*The British Army is formed on a yearly basis, every year, the HoC holds a vote, agreeing to maintain the army for another year.
“isn’t the best balance on funding a force that actually does the business in the mud, not floating about protecting itself expensively?”
And I think my force “does the business” thats worth doing in the mud.
Repulse
“To be a world superpower you need a first tier army, navy, airforce and a nuclear deterrent. Fact is the UK can only afford one of these, now choose…”
Nuclear Deterrents are cheap!!! Thats why everyone wants one.
We arent a super power, currently, I’d argue we are a regional power with global ambitions.
With a bit of careful spending and the current budget, we can be a world power, in that we can force people to do what we tell them in some circumstances.
“With all respect to our brave troops, the last two has not increased our standing in the world. Our fickle friends in the US have already started to look for new friends now that we are broke on the military front…”
That is of course the huge problem.
Iraq/Afghanistan have sapped the publics will for military intervention and the militarys capability (even the most outspoken interventionists admit the army will need until 2020 to recover following a 2015 withdrawl). That sort of thing wont go unnoticed, nor will Syrias success in defying world opinion.
James
I agree.
Afghanistan is a strategic blunder, its a strategic blunder wether the boys getting killed and maimed are RAF Regiment Rock Apes, Royal Marine Commandos or Army Infantry.
It would still be a strategic blunder if we had 10 nuclear carriers.
“I am content that this nation has a Land component that is more capable than most,”
But we dont.
We have the weakest land componant in the world.
I Germany revoked our basing rights and France blew the Chunnel, the British Army could have 600 Armoured Divisions, they couldnt act anywhere outside lands end / john o’groates.
I’m not saying land forces are bad, I’m saying they are bad for the UK.
Equaly, I find German insistance on an 8000 mile range for its submarines and 4000miles for its frigates utterly bonkers.
Phil
Phil Phil Phil Phil Phil.
“As is the idea of firing a brigade from the Navy and imagining that it will have a Clancyesque time of it on land rather than a Dieppe.”
Dieppe was a disaster. It is a disaster that has no bearing on ANYTHING I have suggested.
Dieppe was a head on charge against dug in forces with little attempt to even locate defences, never mind suppress them.
The Defences faced at Dieppe we heavier than those faced by much of Overlord. Thats how big a disaster Dieppe was.
“Most notably, Dieppe highlighted:
1.The need for preliminary artillery support;
2.The need for a sustained element of surprise;
3.The need for proper intelligence concerning enemy fortifications;
4.The avoidance of a direct frontal attack on a defended port city; and
5.The need for proper re-embarkation craft.”
Which of those have I failed to account for?
“Some folk though have latched into some combined neo Correlian / Splendid isolation paradigm and think we cannot and should not engage globally and that somehow, having no say in world on which our way of life depends, somehow makes that way of life safer. ”
Once again, you are either misunderstanding, or activly confusing the issue.
How is an armed force that cannot operate outside Central Europe “engaging globaly”?
Did you even bother to read the article?
“Land forces remain the most effective means of applying pressure on an enemy or force”
Of course!
Thats exactly right!
China is absolutly terrified of the mighty Tank divisions that cannot leave Germany!
How are immobile land forces that cannot reach the theatre capable of applying pressure? HOW!?
While I don’t necessarily agree with his force structure, and sometimes find him a little bullish I think that DomJ makes a very good point here.
Having the biggest most blinged up army in northern Europe does us no good if it;
a) can’t go anywhere, &
b) can’t support itself in the field when it can get there
I recall reports from GW2 in which RMs complained that they had no ammunition.
I think that the question of balance must be looked at in minutiae, as a large force with no logistics capability is no force at all.
Cheers, Alan.
Dom.
Dieppe is more than relevant. It tested, if we can use that word, the ability to seize a port, ie a contested enemy position. Your little brigade comes up against a problem if it cannot chose precisely where it wants to land.
To you both.
A maritime strategy has repeatedly failed this country throughout its history. Every idea you think is so novel about strategic raiding has been tried since Tudor times and almost always been found wanting. I can list them all if I had the time. In every case, the big issues were decided by land armies as part of coalitions. Land forces are the crux. They are, to use an often misused word, the schwerpunkt. I have never advocated a weak navy. All this arguing that we can’t afford both is defeatist toss. Throughout history land forces have been decisive, even at the pinnacle of Royal Navy strength in 1914 a land army was decisive. Same in 1945. Same in 1850. Same in 1815. Same in most other wars between nations.
What’s the national benefit of “Strategic raiding”.
What’s the ratio of benefit : costs ?
Looking back, I don’t see how several billions GBP p.a. could have been justified by the benefits arising from 1982-2011 actions, escpecially after taking into account the various cost of the conflicts themselves.
It seems odd to assume that the ‘deterrence’/'influence’ benefits could be so large as to fill the multi billion GBP p.a. gap.
The forces involved are rather small, after all.
I don’t see how such forces could be a cost-efficient contribution to alliance defence either.
I think there’s a fetish here with the USMC and some testy eyed notion of waving the war fleet off from Portsmouth to land a tiny brigade to slash and burn a tiny bit of an enemy country. Done before. Several times. And everyone was left scratching their heads when the enemy just ignored them and carried on. This was happening in The Hundred Years war for gods sake. The enemy can’t ignore huge land forces bearing down on its territory though. Oh but we don’t have a huge army. Never have, hence coalitions. Not as sexy as a wannabe USMC though and some make believe ships.
Breaking windows with Guineas all over again.
Phil I did not advocate a maritime strategy, nor did I advocate strategic raiding. What I did advocate was taking the point that our army can do do nothing until it arrives in theatre, and can do nothing there if it out runs it’s supply lines and/or cannot be maintained.
Just to clarify I think that both the global guardian and strategic raiding models are a crock.
And regarding force balance having 36 infantry battalions is pointless if they can’t be deployed, likewise having a T46/47/whatever ship that is missing it’s principal weapons system (fitted for but not with ring a bell?) is equally as pointless.
The point is that all three services need to be deployable AND sustainable once deployed.
Alan.
Sorry Alan you were caught in the cross fire.
There’s nothing new in what you say, it’s all logistical truths. But the Army is eminently mobile. We are fighting a campaign in a landlocked country thousands of miles away right now. As for sea lane control China straw man argument (not yours but I’m on one) we’ll no more be fighting China alone than Denmark would have fought the Soviets alone. We have a capable and potent navy, we have a capable and potent air force, we have a capable and potent army that is strategically mobile. Arguing that the enemy might try and disrupt a deployment is no argument against deleting that capability, a key and fundamental capability. I cannot see how people her can escape the conclusion of history, strategic raiding is a five hundred year old idea in this country and countless times it’s simply resulted in death, defeat, or simply nothing at all. A waste of money. As I said, it’s breaking windows with Guineas, a phrase coined in the Napoleonic wars when we dispatched ‘pocket division’ sized forces to France, cut around a bit, left and then wondered why France and her half a million strong Army didn’t immediately collapse.
Phil
“Dieppe is more than relevant. It tested, if we can use that word, the ability to seize a port, ie a contested enemy position.”
But thats insanity.
The whole point of manouver warfare is to NOT charge headlong at enemy strong points.
“Your little brigade comes up against a problem if it cannot chose precisely where it wants to land.”
Indeed it does. But what enemy can guard every section of the coast line?
You mention Dieppe, but there were hundreds of Commando raids in the second world war, more than a few in France, some were expensive wins (St Nazierre), some were expensive disasters (Dieppe), other were cheap, quiet war winners.
We repeatedly parachuted in commando units to draw/photgraph/measure/steal radar componants who got in and out with little loss.
But your land army comes up against a bigger problem, because it only has troop transportation for 1000 men. I’d love both, but at the end of the day, what matters, is deployable strength. A tank that cannot be deployed to the war is less than useless.
I’d love to deploy an armoured divison, if it makes you feel better and someone explains what one entails, I’ll have a crack at the force required, but it quickly gets expensive, and I dont believe a 5% defence budget awaits us come 2020.
“even at the pinnacle of Royal Navy strength in 1914 a land army was decisive.”
No it wasnt.
In 1914, what mattered, was a small elite army, and a Navy that was starving Germany into submission.
Come 1916, what mattered, was a massive Imperial armym and a Navy that could transport them across the world, and starve Germany into submission.
Come 1918, what mattered, was a massive American Army and a Navy that was starving Germany into submisson.
The Indian Army was of no use, unless it could be transported to the warzones.
Come 1944/45, The American and Russian Armies dwarfed ours, and we were junior partners, kept out of much of the decision making.
SO
Benefits. Competant military adventurism.
Ratio, unknown.
I have little arguement against reforming the UK military as a national defence force, pulling out of NATO and spending 0.5% of GDP.
“I don’t see how such forces could be a cost-efficient contribution to alliance defence either.”
As I said, in the event of a war with Russia, I believe the UK should seize the bases of the Northern Fleet.
Germany/France/Italy/Spain/Portugal should be more concerned with the defence of the Mainland, what with them being on it.
Phil Again
“I think there’s a fetish here with the USMC and some testy eyed notion of waving the war fleet off from Portsmouth to land a tiny brigade to slash and burn a tiny bit of an enemy country.”
Its funny, Suez seemed to provoke quite a reaction…
“The enemy can’t ignore huge land forces bearing down on its territory though”
And how do you propose to move huge land forces from Caterick to….
@ Dom J,
just a couple of points in between meetings:
Your belief that the Land* force you mention of 5,000 men is capable of doing the business in the mud is only true of some vanishingly small number of scenarios.
The Army managed to get a Division to Gulf 1 using STUFT and a mix of RAF and commercial airlift. I didn’t do Gulf 2, but suspect it was about the same. Your proposed Maritime Fleets x 2 could no doubt also do the same amount of lifting very well (less the 62 container ships of logistics that 1 Div took for Gulf 1), but to posit that the Army is incapable of getting itself anywhere without RN support is a little disingenuous, I feel.
I think it is a “brave” assumption to make that a full service and some new bits would be enough spares for a 60 day campaign. Battle damage doesn’t care if the gearbox is brand new, tracks and wheels blown off by AP mines, optics shattered by shrapnel, etc. My Challenger 2 even when fairly new broke down every 100 or so miles, and not through a lack of TLC but because it was inherently unreliable.
Regarding GW2, logistics, deployment from the sea and general issues to always keep in consideration when doing this kind of thinking on strategic raiding:
- over 90% (90 to 95%, in fact) of freight and kit deployed for Telic with ships. 4 Point Class RoRo, in those days just arrived in service, transferred, alone, 11% of the load. 60 commercial ships were chartered to carry the rest, for an expense of 70 million pounds. The merchant ships were escorted all along by the RN, since terrorist attacks at sea were feared: 16 High-Value RN and RFA ships and over 50% of the deployable escort fleet were involved.
- Remaining 10% of the stuff, mostly personnel, were moved by air, with roughly half carried by the RAF, thanks mostly to the, again back then brand new, 4 leased C17.
Chartered civilian flights cost 53.5 million pounds. In particular, access to AN124 Condor airplanes was judged “critical”.
- Size of deployment summarized in 73 ship moves and over 1200 chartered and military aircraft sorties. The daily air resupply peak was 254 tons per day delivered.
- Kuwait was tiny and filled to capacity: there were only two points of entry for sealift and one for airlift, shared with the americans. The issue was serious: the americans kept some formations back and on the ships simply because there was no way to land them, and it was assessed that, even with more strategic lift assets, deploying faster would have been impossible for lack of entry points.
A little-considered issue of basing support abroad. It was actually a big issue, due mainly to Saudi Arabia denying use of its own bases.
Even more significant was the declaration of Brigadier Dutton after the war:
‘The ships were critical, not just for 3 Commando Brigade but for the whole of 1 UK Division. Unlike 1990, the deployment happened very quickly and it took some time for the land logistical system to catch up. So, in fact, during the entire build-up to the operation, and even when the assault had actually started, 1 UK Div were heavily dependent on the seaborne stocks originally designated for just one brigade, that is, for 3 Commando Brigade.’
Rear Admiral Snelson also added:
‘It is perhaps worth mentioning that, of the 30 days of supply that we took for the Brigade at sea (3rd Commando), 20-plus days of supply were landed into Kuwait for the use not only of the Brigade but also of the whole UK Division. It had had to move from the north, from Turkey, in its planning, to the south, and we were able to provide significant logistics support from the sea to help the Division until its own logistics flowed in. [note: the UK initially had been planning to act mainly in the North of Iraq, from Turkey, alongside 4th Mechanized brigade US. The whole plan went to hell when Turkey denied support] The fact that much of our logistics support was in amphibious ships meant that we did not have to get involved in the blocked-up Kuwaiti ports, we could put it over the beaches and land it in a quasi-tactical way and then drive inland. So three countries, fundamentally. Yes, we did get the support required. Personally, I would have liked to be authorised to approach those countries earlier in the operation to set up the arrangements, but they were very helpful and it worked.’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmdfence/57/3120306.htm
Ships also provided helicopter mainteinance facilities and engineering support: helos were flown in regularly to be checked and fixed. This also is important.
In terms of influence, i do not think i can agree with Phil on the Army being the greater provider of influence and relevance for the UK.
The willingness to deploy forces on the ground, certainly buys influence, and a lot of it.
But this is not exactly the same as saying that the British Army buys the most influence for the UK. It is not an armoured brigade that buys the UK support: it is the ability and political willingness to deploy efficient and well trained ground forces where they are needed.
This may seem to make little difference, but it is actually a fundamental one.
As it is, even the biggest efforts made by the British Army, once you go and look into them, turn out being shaped, enabled and made relevant by capabilities provided by RN and RAF.
Kit-wise, honestly, the list of things that buy influence for the UK before arriving to Challenger II is immense, and starts with Trident, followed by SSNs, TLAM, RFA, AWACS, ISTAR like Sentinel and Rivet Joint, and other enablers.
In operation Telic, the USMC 15 MEU was put under command of 3rd Commando Brigade, only case of US forces subject to UK ones in the campaign.
It was not a case.
@ Dom J,
the Land* is meant to be inclusive of RM, RAF Regt, not only Army.
Thank you Phil, I am occasionally guilty of early retaliation.
I we take the position that Strategic Raiding is flawed as a national strategy for defence, and is an option best kept in the kit bag. Where do we end up with over all force structure and ratios?
I had heard somewhere that the British field army (rather than the administrative entity) numbers around the 20-25,000 mark, is this the case?
If so, bearing in mind that more cuts ARE on the way where will this leave us when the army drops below the 100,000 strong mark?
Personally I think that the “pocket division” has it’s place as an option, I think that the changes should occur in field HQs to allow them to cope with troop surges in theatre.
I’m harking back to Major General Cordingley’s “Eye of the Storm” where he remarks on the strain placed on his HQ and him personally by the swelling of his brigade to a brigade group.
Cheers, Alan.
James
“The Army managed to get a Division to Gulf 1 using STUFT and a mix of RAF and commercial airlift.”
But only because we sailed their under US protection and Saudi/Kuwair let us base in their country.
Neither of which can be guarenteed*, and both of which are “black marks” against us, along with “dont bring own ammo”.
During the second world war, Nationalist China took to conscripting an army. It went into a village, tied up all the men it could capture, marched them to a US base, and said, heres an army, all it needs is food, weapons, uniforms, ammunition and training. It was far from ideal.
*Remember, in the second guld war, the UK was supposed to come in North from Turkey, but those bases were denied to us.
“but to posit that the Army is incapable of getting itself anywhere without RN support is a little disingenuous, I feel.”
It needs someones support, either the RN need to deploy it violently, or Saudi/Kuwait need to ensure it can be deployed peacefully
“I think it is a “brave” assumption to make that a full service and some new bits would be enough spares for a 60 day campaign. Battle damage doesn’t care if the gearbox is brand new, tracks and wheels blown off by AP mines, optics shattered by shrapnel, etc. My Challenger 2 even when fairly new broke down every 100 or so miles, and not through a lack of TLC but because it was inherently unreliable.”
And thats where the expert knowledge comes in, which I am always grateful for.
Battledamage, you’ve got me that, that would of course need repairing.
But a Challenger 2 that “is unreliable” shouldnt be in the army.
Some of the comments made are pefectly justified, I dont have any close in or technical knowledge, but others simply arent, and thats one of the “simply arent”, send it back to factory for a rebuild or dump if off a ship as a fish habitat, if it doesnt work, it doesnt belong in “my” army.
“Your belief that the Land* force you mention of 5,000 men is capable of doing the business in the mud is only true of some vanishingly small number of scenarios.”
Maybe, as I (meant to say?) said, this is just a general plan. If 5000 isnt enough, I’m happy to review (within reason) Its just operating on a 6 brigade level is tricky.
I’m not averse to one pocket divison going in “over the beach” and another being held on Point type vessels further back, but you dont get more men, you just use them more, and thats predicated on one pocket divison not being over seas already.
Gabriele
Not sure if you’re agreeing with me or not there?
I accept 6 T45′s sounds a lot, but really, once you split off carrier to do something, decide to land at 2 sites, and keep your oilers far back, well, you’ve got 4 sites to defend.
“The willingness to deploy forces on the ground, certainly buys influence, and a lot of it.
But this is not exactly the same as saying that the British Army buys the most influence for the UK. It is not an armoured brigade that buys the UK support: it is the ability and political willingness to deploy efficient and well trained ground forces where they are needed.
This may seem to make little difference, but it is actually a fundamental one.”
Exactly!
Its not having land force that matters, its being able to use it.
And an honest look has to say we cant.
We have 10,000 men in Afghanistan, but the vast majority of supplies arent flown in by the RAF, they are sailed in, by the Points, but the points can only function because Pakistan lets dock at Karachi, and truck through Balochistan and then through Afghanistan, bribing tribal militias all the way.
If Pakistan closed Karachi, I think the next most viable route would be the trans siberian rail road. Or of course, if the tribals decided they didnt want bribes anymore.
Its hard to argue we have influence in Afghanistan, when at any point, Pakistan can shut us off.
Going to war under US aircover, getting there on US troop ships, protected by US escorts and fireing US ammunition in theatre isnt (to my mind) the hall mark of an equal partner, or even a junior partner.
It honestly sounds more like we’re a tributory state paying a levy….
I don’t think Dom’s proposed land or naval force structures are 100% right. That said, I hope to goodness that we aren’t going to be facing down 500k-strong armies any time soon but it seems to me that if we did need to do that the only way to survive while it gets to us is to have a basis from which to regenerate a larger force than we wish to maintain in peacetime. Whether in coalition or against a coalition if we have limited capability across a range of (sorry) warfighting tasks then we stand a better chance of scaling up than we do if we’ve decided not to bother maintaining that seedcorn capability. That applies I think across all the services. Furthermore, as states totter and fail across the world, new powers come to the fore and competing world views clash who can honestly say that we won’t need to intervene in some limited way somewhere? Alan’s point about the logistical imperative is also right. Whether in coalition or not, having the ability to deploy and support a formation of some size or other is surely the difference between having something and having nothing, IMHO. Just my two cents.
All
As I’ve said, I’m very happy to accept changes to this, providing they fit within a justificable remit.
I fully accept 5000 men is a very small number.
But 10,000 men, times up by 6 Brigades/PocketDivisions is 60,000 men, add in ancilliaries, for training, development and the like, and you’ve pretty much hit the 80,000 limit thats funded in the SDSR/FF2020
No spare funds means not improved logistics train, no on site spares shelf, no additional transport assets to deploy the larger army and so on.
@DomJ
My own force structure probably would be less… dramatic a change from what FF2020 is about. I’ve long been planning to do a series of posts on my Blog to show how i would do SDSR15 to fix the route, and the force structure emerging from it will be different from your own here and there.
But i agree with you on the general concepts backing the reasoning.
@ DominicJ,
there may be some terminology problems here that are obscuring clarity.
Your Land component is nothing more than a small Brigade. It’s not a Division, pocket or not. The Regiments / Battalions you outlined in your first piece are completely sub-optimal in size. The Division is missing many of the vital combat support and combat service support enablers, such as supply, transportation, medical and repair organisations, organic ISTAR and aviation. Without those, the Land force is going to get about ten miles from the beach and then run out of the ability to do very much.
A Brigade of the size you posit (even with the missing organisations) is going to be able to take on and defeat perhaps two enemy Battalions in prepared positions, or to conduct peace enforcement operations over an English county size (we had at one point that I can remember 12 Battalions in Northern Ireland, it may have been more in the 70s).
I really think if we want to “do” something of strategic importance on land we are going to need the capability of fielding a proper Division, and supporting it for 6 months, which strangely enough is I think what the MoD call these days a large scale commitment. I may be out of date on terminology.
I think you and I are probably coming at this from opposite perspectives. Mine is: given a need to do something on land for X months, what forces do I need to achieve the aim (which come from the pointy bits from all three services, plus SF)? Composition, etc. Then working back, how do I get them there? How do I keep them supplied, etc. Then working on from there, what supporting military forces (floaty things, air transport, Int, air control, etc) do I need to maintain an adequate level of security for the duration of the operation? What level of supplies do I need to support the operation? Are the air and sea lines of communication guaranteed, or do I need to protect them? etc etc. Not trying to teach you to suck eggs, merely illustrating my thought process. Clearly, if the planned operation is exclusively maritime or air based (e.g. Armilla or the Iraqi No Fly Zones back in the 90s), then the service delivering the main effect will not be the Army, so this is not an Army-centric view.
With very great respect, your original post did not include any strategic background or rationale, but started with what I can only describe as a chuffing great Navy costed in huge detail, and a Land component that would struggle to evict the smallest conceivable prepared enemy, so long as it was conveniently close to a beach.
In the numbers game, compare
RM + 16AAB =15.000
leave behind some base personnel, perhaps even some army support for the RM (depending on the type of Op)
add back SF, their recce rgmnt and the SFSG
=> you are back at the 15 thousand
The current intervention force is substantially larger than the one posited, even if you cut all the rest of “Land”
Just to remind everyone
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/04/libya-liam-dave-mike-bob-and-the-sdsr/defence-planning-assumptions/
yep that’s what i’m saying, and to back james up, deploying onto thetford/salisbury/otterburn for a 2 week exercise you will find that the last packet out is a REME recovery section, for a very good reason!!!
Plus on that exercise you would recieve an absolute mountain of work, i mean thousands of manhours and that’s just optronics, back in germany 80′s 90′s pack section would be running out of spares end of 2 weeks. If everything could work hunky dory for 60 days REME would’ve gone years ago.
Phil i could fill a thread with stories like that, ones like the life guards 2lt with more surnames than a school register and the plummy voice ripping me a new arsehole about the radio not working in front of everyone in the comms tent he didn’t look a tw@ when i turned the tx power selector from 0 to 50!(1 click left)
@solomon
many think it’s alright, not brilliant, but it works, however with all this joint carrier business and us being as poor as church mouses, well you can see where it’s going!! although someone needs to have a chat about how much they think it’s worth. I find the general feeling on here is the super hornet is prefered by more. Perhaps, and it is a perhaps people over here got a little pissed off when congress got all shitty about software transfers.
What with your A400 post and this i’m thinking you’ve got a downer on us, c’mon fella c’mon let’s have a big hug, aww come on you know want to!!
Paul, Ruperts and Radios should never be allowed to mix
Doms force exists in a world where all those pesky logistical problems, and those annoying medical concerns, and those irritating maintenance problems don’t matter because he has decided that they do not. I see 10 infantrymen need to do the VM course now. And the CMT course. At last count. And all command staffs have to get extensive experience in amphibious, air assault and mechanised operations all at the same time.
Gabriele
I’d be very interested to see it.
James
“there may be some terminology problems here that are obscuring clarity.”
Almost certainly.
“A Brigade of the size you posit (even with the missing organisations) is going to be able to take on and defeat perhaps two enemy Battalions in prepared positions, or to conduct peace enforcement operations over an English county size (we had at one point that I can remember 12 Battalions in Northern Ireland, it may have been more in the 70s).”
I dont disagree.
But how many Battalions does the enemy have?
Theres a pretty hefty limit to what they can defend if they need three battalions to keep us out.
If they have 30 infantry battalions, they can defend 10 targets.
Do they defend the Presidential Palace? The Central Bank? I’m not above arresting the president and confiscating your gold reserves.
Do they defend their 4 military airports? I’ll happily crater the run way and arrive to confiscate the stranded planes and munitions.
Their equivilant of Horseguards? I’m sure if we walked in and stole all the filing cabinets, computers and servers, we’d really ruin their day if we wiki leaked it.
And of course, three battalions dug in, how much artilery ammunition do they have? How much air defence. How long can they hold out against our airpower, missiles and ground attack? We dont need to close in, at what point do they surrender?
They cant be reinforced or relieved, not without someone else coming out of those prepared positions, and engaging us in a manouvere war, where we own the air.
How long can the government survive before the populace loses confidence and turns on it?
“I really think if we want to “do” something of strategic importance on land we are going to need the capability of fielding a proper Division, and supporting it for 6 months, which strangely enough is I think what the MoD call these days a large scale commitment. I may be out of date on terminology.”
Maybe, but 20,000 Men and 600 armoured vehicles, plus all the “other” kit, I dont see how we can possibly deploy that without being a drain on someone elses transport.
And without increasing the size of the army or stamping all over the harmony guidelines.
“With very great respect, your original post did not include any strategic background or rationale, but started with what I can only describe as a chuffing great Navy costed in huge detail, and a Land component that would struggle to evict the smallest conceivable prepared enemy, so long as it was conveniently close to a beach.”
My first post, was little more than hastily scribbled together notes, the second isnt much more
But there was some thought behind it.
Lets pick on Argentina, thats always fun.
On the Argentine Coast, there is a place, Rio Gallegos.
In Rio Gallegos, there is the
11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade HQ (Río Gallegos)
24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (Río Gallegos)
11th Mechanized Signal Company (Río Gallegos)
11th Intelligence Company (Río Gallegos)
Logistic & Support Base “Río Gallegos” (Río Gallegos)
11th Army Aviation Section (Río Gallegos)
In my understanding, the Deployed Brigade I outlined should be able to kill/capture that force quickly and easily.
Maybe I’m wrong.
And also, in my understanding capturing signals and intelligence equipment people is usualy disasterous for the other side.
Maybe I’m wrong
Argentina isnt likely to collapse over the matter.
However, one does wonder, why exactly they would consider such a disaster “acceptable losses”.
Even better if Chile decides its a perfect time to raise the Tierra Del Fuego question.
ACC
But is that the Case?
Neither one exists as a “ready” formation, most of the time, at least one of them is heavily commited in Afghanistan, if they arent, they are “commited” to NATO operations in Norway/Germany.
And thats only two forces. If one covers emergencies 6 months of the year, and the other covers it for the other 6 months, well, things are different, but in my understanding, thats not the way the army works.
PaulG
I’m struggling to conceive of equipment that runs for an hour and then needs to be rebuilt by REME
Not saying it doesnt exist, but, wow.
Surely I cant be the only one who thinks that is really really wrong?
Phil
I repeat, if you arent going to contribute constructivly, please go elsewhere.
I do contribute Dom. I’ve told you your whole idea is flawed. I’ve told you why. And others have said the same. You just don’t like what I have to say. Your idea is a stratrgic nonstarter and history has shown time and time again that this is the case. You over simplify. Landing a brigade, driving inland a bit, having a brew and then pissing off again wouldn’t impress a Sudanese warlord let alone a peer enemy. That’s before we get to the idea of using the nations armed forces to hold a building hostage. Guineas with windows Dom.
@ Dominc J,
a few thoughts on your outline scenarios, some of which I either took part in or was on the plans team back in the UK:
Libya 2011: No ground forces allowed by mandate, so your force is probably adequate (assuming some air ISTAR, C2 and refuelling assets available). But I was out for 8 years by that point, so my views are only those from watching the news / reading the papers.
Iraq 2003: You mischaracterise the fighting that took place in the area, especially in Basra. SCOTS DG took out 13 tanks in the centre of Basra: air power could not for Rules of Engagement and collateral damage reasons. Two armoured infantry battle groups needed to back them up. “Someone else would have to manage Basra” seems to me to be an admission of a reduced role for the UK. It took a complete Division of about 25,000 to manage the area we were assigned.
Afghanistan 2001: Your occupation notes also imply a reduced role for the UK. You are going to need to airlift in the vehicles at some point, so C17s needed. Knocking down whole towns and rebuilding them is completely beyond my ability to comprehend (why?), and I’m not an engineer, but it sounds to me as though that is a massive construction task that would need massive amounts of troops to protect and to train up all of those second sons. And a huge logistics train to truck in all of the supplies, which would need protecting as well. There was an operation to move some heavy plant equipment up to a dam a couple of years ago: that move took an entire Brigade to secure a route, and over a month to plan. Your town rebuilding sounds about 100 times more effort!
Sierra Leone: you will need ground forces to find and either laser designate targets or pass accurate grids up to the air, plus a controlling HQ. Do-able by your forces though.
Kosovo 99: Achievable by your forces, assuming access to a coastal port for immediate reinforcement.
Bosnia 92. Not a disaster at all through our efforts, but grossly hampered by UN ROE. Again, you would need access to a port (we used Split) and a fairly serious logistics train to move an armoured Brigade into Bosnia. We had an entire Logistics Brigade of about 7,000 and something like 1500 trucks to get us in, which then reduced down to a steady state of about 3,000 and 500 trucks. Most convoys needed close protection and escorting on the supply routes once over the Bosnian border, which took an entire armoured infantry battalion.
Iraq 91: Your land component would have been a pimple and too small for the Theatre Commander to care much about. Your force is smaller than the French half Division of around 12,000 which was shoved out onto the western flank to get it out of the way, and who had the most enormous problems as a result running a logistics train of around 800 kilometres. I’m also not convinced that light infantry would have been much use beyond perhaps seizing some terrain with an airmobile assault, but you’ve only got enough heavy lift helicopters for one battalion.
Falklands 82: The only tracked vehicles that could manoeuvre in the Falklands were CVR(T). Everything else is too heavy for the boggy ground (less BV202). Everyone would be walking. 24 Chinook would make logistics a lot easier than they were in 82, but assuming availability of 75% there would not be enough for much in the way of troop lift. And I don’t think our Land forces want to go back to Chieftain: they’re on Challenger 2 now!
@ Dominic J,
The force you point out in Rio Gallegos would need something of the size of a Division to take on – possibly two Brigades if their readiness was not so high. How quickly can your land two of your Brigades, and do you need port handling facilities or is everything coming across the beach?
After initial success which would only come with a combined and rapid attack (and you’ve only got enough airlift for a single light infantry battalion: everything else would have to fight inland so they’d better all arrive together to achieve the necessary concentration of force), you will not have the consent of the local populace, meaning escorts and protection for every logistic convoy until you extract the force.
I don’t think your single Brigade is enough for the task you outline, even assuming air superiority.
dom, it’s not quire an hour, but the nature of the force means the equipment is used to the max, admitally i painted a bleak picture, but again it’s the same for all forces worldwide not as bad as it sounds really! another point is the kit in camp has an easy life and then it’s full on, which ironically means at the end of exercise/tour the kit gets more reliable as it and the people operating it “settle in”
BTW nothing wrong with the posts, the joy of democracy! christ try posting on some other sites and the fur really flies
Phil
Ok, you dont like my idea, but until you elaborate on what you think should be done differently, you are just repeatedly saying “this is shit”.
Ok, Phil thinks its shit, I get that, but saying it again and again doesnt add anything to the conversation.
James
“Someone else would have to manage Basra” seems to me to be an admission of a reduced role for the UK.”
Oh absolutly. In some areas, but then, improvements in others.
But enduring effect would take a massive hit.
Afghanistan
“Your occupation notes also imply a reduced role for the UK”
Just a realistic one.
Why rebuild towns?
Afghan Towns are built, like UK city centres, as an open fortress, in which the defender (Taliban) can kill the attacker (UK). As long as the murder walls remain, the UK is ****ed.
So remove the murder walls. And whilst your at it, build the farmers who are unsure of us proper houses, with doors, with cast iron stoves and chimneys, with electric lights powered by solar panels, architecturaly designed so that thermal mass mitigates hot days and cold nights, with running water and piped sewage.
Thats things that matter, not educating girls on their human rights.
Kajaki Dam, we own the dam, the Taliban charge for electricity. Not out finest moment.
Iraq 91
Apart from a few bruised egos, whats the danger in not being the unit assigned to the most dangerous meat grinder?
We might even have been relegated to reserves as casualty replacements, logistics escorts and PoW handlers.
Bruised egos, and certainly a different contribtion, but is it a lesser contribution?
Falklands
But we had Chieftain then!
I must admit, when I waswriting it, I was very unsure if it would survive the boggy ground. Might be something to consider for chally 3 though.
“The force you point out in Rio Gallegos would need something of the size of a Division to take on”
Really?
Why? Not saying you are wrong, but the only “teeth” segment appears to be the Mechanised Infantry Battalion.
The 11th Mechanised Infantry Brigade is a much larger force, including a tank regiment, artillery, engineers, scout cavalry and more mechanised infantry, but its scattered over a massive area.
“How quickly can your land two of your Brigades, and do you need port handling facilities or is everything coming across the beach?”
If its just the one Brigade, everything would be deployable over the beach, obviously, if port facilities are readily available, they’d be preferable.
“I don’t think your single Brigade is enough for the task you outline, even assuming air superiority.”
I’d be very grateful if you could expand on why.
To the ignorant outsider, being outnumbered 4:1 in “proper” soldiers and 1:1 over all seems like a very quick way to lose.
PaulG
I’m quite happy to be corrected, even if sometimes my response is “thats just not acceptable!”.
I just kinda insist on actualy being corrected.
Rather than told I’m wrong and must accept the gospel according to…
Well, except for TD obviously, his house his rules.
Dom my suggestions are on other threads and in other posts. I simply don’t have the time to say the same things all the time. And you haven’t offered any defence to my assertion that history tells us strategic raiding is a gross waste of time, money, effort and lives. There’s no point debating the details of I fundamentally disagree with your entire premise. Others are doing that. I just offer another perspective. I don’t have the encyclopaedic knowledge of kit that others here have so I defer.
All – Dom is trying to do some “out of the box” thinking to contribute to the overall debate – don’t be too hard on him, unlike some of us he has never worn a uniform and does not have direct, relevant experience to draw on.
James – I understand your response to my comment, and your input in general, but don’t see HMG paying for an army of a size, and equipped with quality equipment that could ever again gather the required mass for a single large high intensity conflict (GW2) or long term multiple ongoing (simultaneous Iraq and Afghanistan) – to them it’s simply cuts and balancing the books; and better to do that through defence than to “attack” the provisions of the welfare state, eduction or forgein aid. So will we ever again be able to commit a division to a major coalition operation, or just piffling Brigades ???
Phil – we will of course always disagree, where it comes to whether or not a maritime focused strategy is good for the country or not. I can’t see how an army is inherently ‘strategically’ mobile, unless it is based in Germany and can drive all over Europe (and use rail, and internal waterways too), or is based in South Africa and can ignore sovreignty and drive all over that continent.
Your army revisionist history always make me laugh though. As you have pointed out in the past, we have always had small armies and relied on coalitions; and we quite often had bigger fleets than our allies, and sometimes bigger than our enemies, and without them our armies would not have been deployed, supported, or for example during some periods partly funded by the prizes of the privateers, while the bad guys economies were squeezed by blockade etc etc.
Not saying Navy is better than Army, not voting for “strategic raiding”, just noting that sometimes your good for a giggle….
Phil
You say Strategic Raiding is a waste of time.
But what were Overlord and Dragoon?
If not vastly oversized Strategic Raids?
What was Inchon, the battle that saved Korea, if not a strategic raid?
What was every land battle in the Pacific, if not a strategic raid?
Were the “Descents” of the 17th century perfect? No, but thats not what I’m suggesting either.
Bugger me I’ve been SNAFUd!!!
Jed it’s not revisionist. It’s a well established school of thought going back 40 years. You’re looking at a very narrow perspective. While the British Army was poncing about in the Peninsular huge armies were clashing in enormous battles the other side of the continent. France didn’t lose the Napoleonic wars because of our army or navy, but by having allies smash ten bales of shit out of her armies France couldn’t afford to concentrate on us. We played to our strengths in a coalition and the outcome was favourable. All the little poncy raids we did achieved the square root of FA. In WWI pissing about around Gallipoli achieved the same, Germany was defeated by massed land warfare. Ditto WWII. Gunboat diplomacy and maritime strategies are for amateurs which we so often have been in this business of waging wars. The Royal Navy might save this islands arse but it has never defeated a continental foe on its own. Land is the decisive theatre, where decisions are forced.
And Dom. Overlord was the crossing of the start line to one of the largest, most thorough land campaigns in history.
On the list of examples, Afghanistan 2001 is the most evident and perfect example of Strategic Raiding there is.
Ever since 2003, Afghanistan has been a Land mess and all people only reminds this, even forgetting that the US Navy is still being asked to contribute 2 Carrier Strike Groups constantly to the area.
But the original 2001 campaign is a massive poster of Seapower. And also, in the Air Campaign + SF + local rebels aspect, a massive exercise for the concepts of Libya 2011.
Her’s another good example, Mogadishu for the US
oops
I know this is one of your pet themes Gabby but the USN is providing carrier fast jet aviation because it wants to ‘be seen’ doing so
If anything, Afghanistan was yet again, a poster for combined arms with local conditions dictating at different times a preponderance of one arm or the other.
Proves nothing
Except the need for a balanced force
Strategic Raiding is the Revolution in Military Affairs for the twenty teenies, old wine, new bottles
Is it? Because at the end of the day it didn’t deal with anything on a fundamental level. We’re still there. If it had worked I’d have spent Christmas 2010 at home.
Kosovo is another good example of a 12 year strategic raid.
Phil
Except our “poncing about” in the penisula was a constant wound that bled France to death.
British presence in Lisbon allowed the Spanish guerrilos to pin prick France to death. Impossible without the Navy
For every Red Coat in the British Army, we paid for and armed two more soldiers in the Coalitions against France. What transported the gold and the guns, why, the Royal Navy.
Not only that, the actions of the Royal Navy stripped France of a good deal of its mobility. If a soldier was redeployed from Berlin to Barcelona, he had a very long walk ahead of him.
“We played to our strengths in a coalition and the outcome was favourable.”
Which is exactly what I suggest.
We can play to our strengths, our allies play to theres.
“In WWI pissing about around Gallipoli achieved the same”
But what would a full invasion of Pomerania have achieved?
“Germany was defeated by massed land warfare”
But not OUR massed land warfare.
Our naval blockade starved them into submission, their last throw of the dice brought the US into the war, and their nation collapsed.
“And Dom. Overlord was the crossing of the start line to one of the largest, most thorough land campaigns in history.”
Indeed, and one in which a single British army Army, a single Canadian army, 5 American armies and god knows how many Russian armies, overwhelmed Germany.
We turn the beach into a port, our land power allies flood through the port and overwhelm the enemy.
Like Overlord, Like Dragoon, Like Inchon.
Under plan, we offer a stunning capability to our allies, we can smash the back door in and they can take the castle.
How is that worse than offering an armoured division, without fuel, food, ammunition, or transport?
Dom no serious historian argues that the Peninsular campaign was the death of the French. The almighty battles to the east were. And I’m sure the RN did escort plenty of ships, which it is perfectly capable of doing now. I don’t advocate binning the navy Dom. Never have. It has a critical place, but naval power cannot bring about the final defeat. I dispute the claim about starving Germany too, she was defeated by millions of soldiers, including several million British ones Dom. And what would have invading Pomerania have accomplished? Square root of FA too.
Phil
How many Fr3enchmen died in the peninsular?
Not just in the battles, but from disease, and tangling with the Spaniards.
How Many French Armies were pulled away from Russia to hold spain?
And of course, why did Russia pull out of the continental system and precipitate war with France?
“And what would have invading Pomerania have accomplished?”
It would have bypassed every German fortifcation and trench line on the western Front….
“I know this is one of your pet themes Gabby but the USN is providing carrier fast jet aviation because it wants to ‘be seen’ doing so”
The f**k are you saying????
It is CENTCOM that asks for 2 carriers to be in the area, actually.
The US Navy has indeed been unable lately to provide more than 1.7 carriers to the area in an enduring way, with CdG filling the hole a bit when possible.
It is not a matter of US Navy showing off as you present it, as you always do when talking about what a Navy (not even necessarily the RN) does.
“Because at the end of the day it didn’t deal with anything on a fundamental level. We’re still there.”
It removed the Taliban from power.
I think that it makes for interesting thinking to try and imagine if Taliban insurgency would have seen so many adepts coming had the NATO armies pulled out instead of staying.
Staying was a choice. And very possibly not the best one, especially not in the way it was done.
The holy insurgent war or whatever was only declared in 2003, with ISAF forces in Afghanistan growing more consistent and with efforts of destroying the remains of the taliban forces having been downsized.
As a matter of fact, things became a mess.
I wonder, though, if it would have gone differently, or plain better, if we had moved out, instead of in.
“Except the need for a balanced force”
That IS NOT THERE and WON’T be there tomorrow.
Instead of having forces balanced in the way they are all limited in what they can do, It makes some sense to choose a main path to follow.
Phil
“The Royal Navy might save this islands arse but it has never defeated a continental foe on its own.”
I never actually suggested it had, I did suggest that looking to the future, not the past, that a maritime centric strategy would serve the country better – which by the way does not mean disbanding the Army or not getting involved in land campaigns !
“Land is the decisive theatre, where decisions are forced.” Again I did not actually say it was not, even though I think your being oversimplistic, black-and-white and ignoring the subtle strategic nuances.
But like I said, it’s something we will never agree on, so don’t feel the need to respond if you don’t want
“which by the way does not mean disbanding the Army or not getting involved in land campaigns !”
This is what people never seem to understand, isn’t it…?
We are down to planning assumptions of brigade-sized interventions, of 6000 men.
It sounds already a lot like a strategic raiding / contributory stance mix.
But without the correct, healthy attention and focus on Strategical Enablers that should go with the approach.
That is the issue i see.
“How many Fr3enchmen died in the peninsular?
Not just in the battles, but from disease, and tangling with the Spaniards.
How Many French Armies were pulled away from Russia to hold spain?”
In 1814 Wellington’s Army was what, 45,000 men and it WAS the British Army. Compare that to the east where 480,000 Frenchmen perished in the Russian campaign in 1812, there were 200,000 combatants at the Battle of Lutzen, 350,000 odd at the Battle of Dresden and 500,000 men fought at the Battle of Liepzig where there were more coalition killed than there were men in the Pensisular Army.
I do not deny that the Peninsular War contributed, but it must be seen in context – it was a slow ponderous sore, not comparable to the titantic and relentless hammer blows Napoleon was suffering and inflicting in the East. It was hard enough to re-build 6th Army in 1943 let alone replace a 500,000 man force with the bureaucracy of almost 150 years previous.
Saying the Peninsular War was decisive is like saying the Italian campaign decided WWII or like the re-conquest of the Philippines was decisive in the Pacific War.
Like I said, it was not a pointless exercise, but it was essentially insignificant compared to the efforts of the remainder of the coalitions.
“It would have bypassed every German fortifcation and trench line on the western Front”
Tell me, what moves faster, a British column of foot or even Cavalry, or German troop trains carrying thousands of troops on internal lines using one of the densest and most efficient rail networks (largely designed specifically to move troops) in the world at that time?
“I think your being oversimplistic, black-and-white and ignoring the subtle strategic nuances”
If nuances are not present it is only because of the medium. In the end, I’m writing posts on the internet not a peer reviewed article so there’s got to be some give and take!
“But like I said, it’s something we will never agree on, so don’t feel the need to respond if you don’t want
”
Well, one mustn’t flog a dead horse then. I’m no missionary. Even if I think you’re a pagan
I always think that a division with a regiment of recce, two armored regiments, six armored infantry battalions, six artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, about 10.000 men, 120 Challenger, 360 warriors, 90 AS90, etc. .. . and yet I take them into account that your material available. This is a minimal force to make war.
Phil said:
“If nuances are not present it is only because of the medium. In the end, I’m writing posts on the internet not a peer reviewed article so there’s got to be some give and take!”
Fair point matey ! I am sure we could have a blast in the students union if we both took the same military history course (opening there for the Open Uni ?) but I am no pagan sir ! I am a militant aetheist
I started War Studies at KCL but London was too expensive and after the first year I finished my degree in History. Now I’m doing a distance learning MSc in Emergency Planning Management. Which eats into my time massively – in fact, in another window is my essay I am trying to get to grips with!
Salfords the only place I know that does a military history degree, although I concentrated heavily on international and military history in my degree. Oh to have the money to do an MA in War Studies and finish what I started there!
“In 1814 Wellington’s Army was what, 45,000 men and it WAS the British Army. Compare that to the east where 480,000 Frenchmen perished in the Russian campaign in 1812, …”
Actually, about half of those weren’t Frenchmen, but auxiliaries of satellite and subjugated states.
“The f**k are you saying????
It is CENTCOM that asks for 2 carriers to be in the area, actually.”
Commanders ask for many resources. CENTCOM would ask for a floating Star Destroyer if there was a chance to get hands on one.
Their requests and their actual needs are rarely the same. CENTCOM itself is partially comprised of USN personnel and has a lot of internal politics. It’s unreasonable to pay so much attention to their requests as you appear to do.
The USN is certainly happy to be invited to play in the conflict. Look at how paranoid the U.S.Army grew after the TF Hawk debacle in ’99 when they didn’t get ready for the game in time.
sven
indeed, people dont ask for what they cant have, they ask for what they can get.
Which was quite a problem when writing this….
Because theres no body of evidence in favour of anything but the status quo, even when thats flawed.
“Actually, about half of those weren’t Frenchmen, but auxiliaries of satellite and subjugated states.”
My point still stands, enormous forces were clashing in the east which made the British effort rather piddly in comparison. Not useless, but it would have been engulfed in the east and almost irrelevent. But, in the context of a coalition we contributed towards victory – we were not decisive but the coalition land forces on the whole were.
Navies, alas, were not. Which, before anyone jumps me is not to say they are pointless, very far from it, but, they could not bring victory on the continent.
“even when thats flawed”
Why is the status quo flawed Dom?
RE “theres no body of evidence in favour of anything but the status quo, even when thats flawed”
- there’s evidence that 4 Commandos came in handy… then we went down to three as East of Suez was not our business anymore; why do we still have three (rather than four!)?
Well, Dom is right, status quo can be flawed (need not be)
I have reviewed both these posts an comments and feel 2p’s worth coming on.
DJ
I am not sure the cash is there for your fleet.
Others.
I still do not see any of the ‘we need armoured divisions’ crowd writing posts of this type, come on guys! Put your thoughts where your mouth is.
Big army means reduced Navy and air force, so what gets cut, and putting it bluntly what good is it all stuck on Salisbury Plain?
Come on Phil stand up and be counted!
Put up a ‘Big army’ or ‘balanced force’, post.
And are you genuinely suggesting we are OK as we are
“Come on Phil stand up and be counted!”
I don’t have time right now. When my work load reduces I shall hopefully put pen to paper nearer Xmas.
I am thinking of writing a piece regarding historical perspectives on the concept of strategic raiding. Or shall I say, neo-strategic raiding.
Phil, I think I prefer my working title
‘Strategic Raiding is a Load of Old Cock’
Your wish is my command!
TD
As opposed to the balanced well run force we have now?
Or how about the title:-
‘I don’t care about how they work as a defence, but big armoured divisions give me the horn’
RE: Amphibious transport aircraft.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convair_R3Y_Tradewind
http://www.g2mil.com/c130seaplane.htm
http://msacomputer.com/FlyingBoats-old/
Don’t worry IXION. My argument will hopefully be more rigorous than that. I shan’t use the word horn or cock once. But probably five times at least.
All joking aside, there seems to be no doubt that all things being equal, a balanced force would be perfectly acceptable to everyone.
The problem is, we don’t live there and in the context of a reducing defence vote there are two choices, remain balanced but at a smaller scale or be deliberately unbalanced with the degree and direction of imbalance being dependant on your point of view.
This the underpinning argument behind strategic raiding or a maritime centric approach and it is perfectly reasonable to argue for that, doesn’t make it right for the UK though.
My own personal preference is for a balanced force at a scale to allow us to hedge against strategic uncertainty whilst still being able to mount operations alone that we might likely face (few I know, but they are there) and then surround this core with shards of specialism (like over developed thumbs) that deliver influence in are most likely mode of engagement i.e. a coalition, this select few specialisms allows funding to be concentrated in areas of excellence and basically over deliver in comparison with our size.
I call this ‘Capability Plus’ and it’s my own har brain scheme
I thought it was pretty chuffing obvious a balanced force is vital, in everything. If you have too much of a leaning in one area, an enemy will find that weakness of the others….from the Taleban to a ‘Malvinas redux’ situation.
Well I’m about half way through my own crack on the subject. It’s looking balanced so far. Kind of.
The trouble I’m having at the minute (other than spending two hours reading the comments) is I keep hearing the words Strategic Raiding brought up, yet so far the definitions of that term have covered;
- A company sized attack on a coastal listening post,
- A Brigade sized attack on a small port,
- A multiple Division sized landing and the ensuing 3-5 year campaign,
- An invasion by a largley untrained (conventionally speaking) army with special forces and air support,
That’s quite a broad range of operations. It just strikes me that everything that can be used as a definition is being used, diluting the term until it just becomes a phrase that people throw around in a hap hazard manner.
@ TD – Just to throw some fuel on the fire… I mean stimulate debate about balanced/unbalanced budgets;
http://fantasyfleet.blogspot.com/2010/10/towards-maritime-doctrine-super-power.html
@ Chris B,
“Strategic raid” at least as taught on the Joint Staff Course and further confirmed by national and NATO doctrine is an operation designed to achieve:
Strategic effect, particularly on the enemy’s centre of gravity,
Operational impacts lasting for more than the duration of the raid,
Tactical surprise,
And as such, will tend to be characterised by the following:
Coordination and massing of joint fires,
Precision of application,
An unorthodox approach both geospatially and in the application of force,
Temporary ground presence where ground forces used,
If combined with conventional assaults, will typically be in a part of the battlespace not directly concerned with the main assault, or separated by time from the main assault so as to maximise the chances of achieving operational surprise for the main assault.
There’s about half a dozen reasons in there where conventional thinking would think that some of the concepts outlined in some of the posts above could never be considered as a “strategic raid”. I’m not trying to force everyone into conventional groupthink, merely that conventionally, DominicJ’s force is not by itself a strategic raiding asset, it is an amphibious force with significant reach and sea capability, and insignificant ashore capability against reasonably trained, equipped and prepared abilities.
See to me that sounds like a supplementary operation, something that is done to divert attention from the main effort and on a very limited scale. Perhaps simialr to the Pebble Island raid during that war down south. Quite different from many of the suggestions put forward as Strategic Raiding.
Phil – good luck with the MSc! I did both my BSc in computing and my MBA from the Open Uni while in full time work so I can empathise fully….. if I had the cash it would be MSc or PhD in Information Warfare at Leeds uni Institute of Communication Studies is.Leeds.ac.uk , Prof. Phil Taylor used to come down and do lectures at 15 Psyops frequently.
All – who said “maritime centric policy” = strategic raiding? I thank James for the official NATO or UK staff college definition, but I think its used more on this site in the context of pre-SDSR papers from RUSI, where it was used as a term to describe an option for overall defence policy.
TD – do we need some glossary pages? Whadya mean you don’t have time……….. Phil can do them between writing essays
Oops last post won’t edit – typo, URL should be: I cs.Leeds.ac.uk
I do not like the term strategic raiding, it suggests that we are going to go around the world lobbing the odd cruise missile here and blowing up a nuclear weapons plant there…
I believe that the UK should and can afford a global presence with the aim of stabilization and conflict prevention. Nation building is out. We focus on the conflicts that have happened (such as the falklands), but what about those that have been prevented by the rapid deployment of a small number of troops? Am invasion of Belieze was prevented by a company of soldiers and two Bucaneers (with swift follow up reinforcements). Could the Falklands been prevented by the appearance of a SSN off Argentina?
The key question for me is what do we need at what level of readiness?
I believe that a high readiness navy with global presence (without “occupation” basing), a rapid reaction “commando” force and first class intelligence capability will allow us to help prevent conflict. It would also allow us to assist in non military tasks such as humanitarian relief. Alongside that a relatively small but strong high readiness capability to defend our airspace and EEZs both for the UK and our dependencies.
Without direct threats to the UK, field. armies with MBTs is not the weapon of first resort so can be held at a level of low readiness (e.g. made up of a large number of reserves).
I’ll subscribe to that “I believe that a high readiness navy with global presence (without “occupation” basing), a rapid reaction “commando” force and first class intelligence capability will allow us to help prevent conflict.”
It took a few more Buccaneers, in a long chain, than just those two that did the fly-past (show of force). But another example is Kuwait 1961: Bulwark, with an RM Commando and a couple of helos onboard turning up made Iraq (then) think twice about their sabre rattling and invasion threats.
Ixion
“I am not sure the cash is there for your fleet.”
We could EASILY pay for what I suggest if we reduced the army significantly. Like, to 6 or 7 times the current Marine Force.
Chris B
In my mind
A Strategic Raid is the second one, a Brigade level over the beach landing, which then moves on an objective, be that, a port, an oil terminal, a defence headquarters.
The attack on the listening post doesnt have a strategic effect, but it is achievable.
The multi division attack is facilitated by the strategic raid, but isnt directly part of it.
As I have repeatedly said, theres nothing wrong with ground actions, we have dozens of allies all with armoured divisions, I’m happy to sieze a port and facilitate their entry into the target country for occupation / war fighting.
James
“If combined with conventional assaults, will typically be in a part of the battlespace not directly concerned with the main assault, or separated by time from the main assault so as to maximise the chances of achieving operational surprise for the main assault.”
I’d say its quite possible to meet that, with an ally to provide the other section.
If we allied with Chile against Argentina, Argentina would no doubt want to concentrate on its “main war” with Chile. But we could sail into BA and arrest the president. So they’d need some sort of defence to stop us, not to mention, the “Raiders” would be able to provide Close air support and fire support to Chile well in excess of anything they themselves posess. A war on two fronts is never fun.
Much the same goes for Russia, the big contental powers, Germany, France, Spain and Italy can slow the Soviet main thrust, whilst we go over the top and come down on the bases of the Northern Fleet.
We cant occupy Archangel, but we could demolish Russias submarine pens and steal anything portable. Russia either loses its western nuclear deterrant, or pulls forces away from the main thrust.
Chris B
But to be a distraction, it must be suitably worrying on a grand scale.
That was the problem with the early “descents”, they were ignored, because they didnt represent a strategic threat.
Repulse
But thats kinda the point of my force.
60,000 Challenger Twos in Germany are of no interest to Argentina. 6 in a tank landing ship are a threat that cannot be ignored.
If My Brigade and war fleet is held at two days readiness, it can be landing in Argentina within two weeks, and bombing targets within a week.
We cant occupy Argentina, but we can inflict massive amounts of damage to them, so much that falklands wouldnt cover a fraction of a percent of the costs.
You’re just talking to attack Argentina ? You don’t have the capacity even after 2020. You will need a coalition.
Lets assume we find oil off Stanley or our financial situation improves enough through other means so we can think about increasing military spending instead of constantly shrinking it. Then lets assume the pocket division is on the table, maybe sometime after 2015. Just trying to take a little of the fantasy out of this fleet.
Ok, here goes;
Maritime component
Don’t see the merits of Rafale in British service at all. We are in competition with French kit around the world, how would buying French go down at a pitch to the Indian, Saudi, Japanese military? If the UK were to lose F35 for whatever reason I’d personally love to see a naval Tiffy but the F35 seems too far down the line now so makes that unlikely.
A more economical solution to the amphibious composition would be thus- forget Juan Carlos and T47, fit both current carriers with cats and traps and, given that they were designed to carry up to 60 airframes, move the helo force over to the carrier in a TF which could operate both fixed wing and rotary wing. Secondly I’d buy as many T45′s, T26′s, Albion’s(or replacements), and astute’s as my budget can afford, fit the 45′s, 26′s with TLAM and with Astute’s missile’s you should have plenty.
Hopefully you’ve now got air cover and air assault from QE/POW, landing forces/armour from several Albion’s and Bay’s, AAW,ASW,ASuW,strike from 45′s 26′s SSN.
Land Component
This needs a purpose for composition so I’m going to pick a second Falklands intervention (composition would change as needed). It’s main mission is to force a beach head then exploit inland. I’ve made 2 assumptions based on my personal preference.
1. Amtrak’s for the RM’s instead of Vikings/Warthogs because I’d like to see a true amphibious capability as well as raiding.
2. All rotary under AAC. I’m sure most would disagree but for me it removes an over complicated command structure.
Deployable HQ responsible for signals, medical, logistics etc, as well as command of 1xsqn AS90 and 1xsqn 105mm.
Armoured BG
2xSqn CR2=28 Challenger
1xSqn Armd Inf=14 Warrior
1xRecce Troop=8 Scimitar replacement
1xsqn mortars=14FV432
1xsection LLAD=3 Stormer replacement
1xsection ATGW=3 Striker replacement
1x Armoured engineer detachment
3x company groups.
Marine Unit.
1xsqn AAV=14 AAV each with Javlin ATGM
1xtroop Recce=8 Scimitar replacement
1xsection LLAD=3 Stormer replacement
1xtroop mortars=8FV432
1x Armoured engineer detachment
AAC
1xsqn Chinook=14
1xsqn Merlin/Lynx=14
4x Wildcat
4x Apache
While it’s mission would be to land and exploit I think this formation would be more than capable of mounting a successful amphibious operation for The Falklands on its own, has twice the number of CR2′s than the pocket division, other than AAV’s is made up of current or planned kit (just more of it), and while still fantasy is do-able with an increased budget.
“2. All rotary under AAC. I’m sure most would disagree but for me it removes an over complicated command structure.”
My thinking was to put the amphib and the landing assets (chinooks/LCUs) under the command of the battallion Lt Col they transported.
Probably barking….
**********
All, I’m considering a third version of this, with a much a much enlarged land componant.
I have two “conditions” if you will.
Firstly.
I’m going to need some help translating
http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0008.html
Into something I can understand.
Is anyone cool with me emailing them the odd question?
Secondly.
You only get three of them, so the army loses enduring operations (ie peacekeeping) capability and the Brigades will be on “active” for 6 months in 18, not 6 in 36/42
@DomJ
Obviously deployed the whole force would need to be commanded by one officer. Personally I’d put overall command of the TF under an Admiral until the amphibious operation was complete. Then once the land invasion started move the helo force to the land forces commander (would probably need to be a general) but I’m not military so I’m open to correction.
@ Alan Garner,
unless the laws of physics have changed since 82, most of the armoured vehicles you propose are going to bog down once they get off the beach and onto the peat. CVR(T) is OK at 10T overall, but Challenger, AAV, AS90 and Warrior are going nowhere on the Falklands. 432 is right on the edge at 14T. The Vikings are OK at less than 10T.
Disregarding the ground pressure issue, or if you pick another place to go to make your example work better, you’ll need to get them ashore. I know nothing of the RFA ships (Bay, Juan Carlos etc), so from memory I’ll give you some linear metres figures that we used when using STUFT (normally Ro-Ros) that you may be able to convert into “number of RFAs needed”. Presumably they can deliver AFVs right onto the beach, as prepping CVR(T) for swimming is a long process and you cannot fight immediately on reaching the land.
Armd BG: 750 linear metres for the fighting echelon, 1000 linear metres for support echelon.
Bde HQ: 500 linear metres.
Commando Company in AAV: perhaps 500 linear metres including all attached assets and some supply trucks.
I assume you’d leave the aviation repair sections onboard, at least initially. They’d need about 500 linear metres.
All up 3250 linear metres, not including helicopters. Goodness knows the gross all up weight – we had professional loggies to worry about that sort of thing. Heavy, anyway. As a wild guess, I’d say two north sea Ro-Ros would about cover it.
@James
Again disregarding ground pressure in theatre buy my calculations my formation would fit on 5 Albions and 5 Bays or 2-3 RFA ro-ro’s. I’m kinda stretching my knowledge with those numbers so don’t hold me to them.
Just on the ground pressure issue, didn’t the Argies use AAV’s in 82 or were they limited to Stanley’s roads?
TD
‘My own personal preference is for a balanced force at a scale to allow us to hedge against strategic uncertainty whilst still being able to mount operations alone that we might likely face (few I know, but they are there) and then surround this core with shards of specialism (like over developed thumbs) that deliver influence in are most likely mode of engagement i.e. a coalition, this select few specialisms allows funding to be concentrated in areas of excellence and basically over deliver in comparison with our size.’
Isn’t that a bit having your cake and eating it…
‘I believe in balanced forces, that can do all the things we need to do’. pre supposes that we can do all we need to do with a balanced force.. what if we can’t do what we need to do with a balanced force we can afford? (which is sort of where I am coming from)..
@ Alan Garner,
I don’t have any specific knowledge of how they used them, but a quick Google shows they were the LVTP-A1 predecessor of AAV, so weighed about 29T. All the images of them on the Falklands show them on tarmac, so it’s a reasonable assumption that they were restricted to roads / stone-based tracks. Personally, I feel that renders them fairly useless for anything other than patrolling in a limited manner, rather than reacting to anything.
A coalition with France would give you two aircraft carriers, so air superiority. Then it would take two helicopter carriers, the Ocean and the Tonnerre, imagine that the Tonnerre is equipped with 16 Tigre, they destroy the enemy armoured vehicles, your Ocean landing 3 Commando Brigade with Warthogs, and it’s won. This is enough to keep the Falklands, now for do a war like GW1 you have need an armored division, you must keep that ability.
with ref to the AAV-7 a video of it mud plugging here. Last time i was in the falklands (2000) it wasn’t too bad road infrastructure vastly improved since 82 and not boggy everywhere
@ Paul G,
thanks for that. Perhaps AAV-7 is more sprightly than I imagined. Ground pressure calculations are all to do with weight per square inch, very largely influenced by the width of the tracks. I’m not intimately familiar with the vehicle. Being amphibious, maybe the AAV-7 has wide tracks. Nevertheless, 29T is a lot of weight, and those AAVs squelching about in the video didn’t seem particularly comfortable in that sort of bog, and with an unstabilised cupola fire on the move is not possible, and not accurate from the short halt unless level in 2-D. I’d have taken CVR(T) through there, but not Challenger. There’s also the question of replen – can the bowser get to them?
I once got my Ferret bogged down in a coulee at BATUS. The Recy Mech who turned up to drag me out had a face that said “what the bl**dy hell did you think you were doing, going down there?” The answer of course was that I was chasing some Scimitars when I was doing live fire safety for them. They got through, I didn’t.
Would you take Scimitar 2 or FRES SV?
In fact what from the current vehicle fleet would go?
james i was range safety as well (77c) i went out as too much work for the R.sigs guy the year i was there one of the range safety ferrets parked off the brow of the hill (shape shine sillouette an all that) he got pinballed by a MBT coming over the hill, killed on the spot.
back on track looking at photos it has what would regard as thin tracks for 29t beast, TBH i would only have these if they were free,suppose could get BAe to put wider band tracks on and as mentioned before on a different thread at the moment the green lidded ninjas go ashore in landing craft and best protection is a viking.
@alan it would be viking and “normal” scimitars, there’s not that many version 2′s about and they’re in the sandpit, same with warthog.
@ Paul G,
that sort of incident was always a worry. We had several similar events in my 6 months, the worst of which was an old petrol LR getting squashed by a Warrior high speed reversing and then catching alight. I managed to rip a wheel off my Ferret completely coming over a hill and smacking into a large mostly buried rock. Both my driver and I fairly banged up and needing stitches in the forehead. Closed down visibility from a Ferret is rubbish. Next time I saw the vehicle it was as a target down range, BER and useful service life over.
The short answer to Alan’s question IMO is if you get a good vehicle for the Falklands it won’t be optimal for any other operation. In this context, I’d probably UOR some quad bikes and Chenowth LSV’s with an ATGW fit. If we are playing fantasy scenario, we’d already own enough of those to keep 30 of each in a warehouse, ready to lift and shift. I’d also try not to put all of the helicopters on one ship, as happened in 1982, but they may not have had a choice in that. I wouldn’t wish to try to second guess those who were there then.
cheap conversion kit for APC, this one on M113 it’s bolt on bolt off, could there be a use for all those parked up bulldogs or even a warrior version (even if was just buy the kit for warrior)
PDF
http://www.arisspa.it/inglese/pdf/ARISGINGL.pdf
Alan – “Just to clarify I think that both the global guardian and strategic raiding models are a crock.”
They might well be, but you later state the following:
“I we take the position that Strategic Raiding is flawed as a national strategy for defence, and is an option best kept in the kit bag.”
Which misunderstands what the SDSR was trying to achieve; not national defence, but to to preserve power projection on a scale that is compatible with the ambitions of our political masters.
That cannot be done under the current funding regime AND maintain this balanced force, as recognised by Jed at least:
“Then do you at least accept that HMG actually does not want to pay for an army which would be big enough to provide critical mass to COIN campaign, boots on the ground and all that, BUT as our deluded politicians do continue to want to interfer, sorry, intervene as part of international coalitions (but not on our own) why should we not make our major contributions to such operations maritime ones? Why not let continental countries with bigger armies lead in land campaigns?”
But here is Jed’s most important point:
“Idid suggest that looking to the future, not the past, that a maritime centric strategy would serve the country better – which by the way does not mean disbanding the Army or not getting involved in land campaigns !”
Which is to say that people should not view those RUSI doctrines as extremes, they are not meant to be, but rather that they indicate a prefernce for investment that maximises the political utility of the favoured arm. DJ’s idea is admitedly on the extreme end of that preference, but the preferences are necessary to keep our mid-rank budget capable of achieving the geo-political goals required.
@ Phil – “Every idea you think is so novel about strategic raiding has been tried since Tudor times and almost always been found wanting. I can list them all if I had the time.”
You said this in a previous article to which i suggested Louisberg, and heard no reply from yourself.
For reference:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Louisbourg_%281758%29
jedi, wasnt that part of the seven years war, some raid
So, a pivotal battle as part of a wider extended campaign that saw considerable land forces employed, a bit like D Day, or Anzio.
Are they raids?
I used the word almost. Every dog has his day. Put that in the context of numerous British harassing raids on France during the same period that accomplished absolutely nothing. And then the same type of raid being conducted AGAIN during the Napoleonic wars and again, achieving absolutely nothing.
Being able to launch amphibious raids is a useful capability, it is one mission of an MEU for example.
But to base your entire national strategy and tailor your forces entirely to that ends is a fundamentally dis-proven position. As I said, and I like this quote, its breaking windows with Guineas. Dom’s strategy essentially wants to utilise the entire armed forces to conduct a piddly raid or hold a bank hostage or some such. Skewing your entire force to meet that end, and changing national strategy to being capable of nothing more than gunboat diplomacy is a criminal end. History shows it’s been a lazy mans way of fighting wars in this country and we were knocked on our arse almost every time.
phil
i admit, i’m just a humble civillian, but if my memory serves,
maritime england won, land france lost
maritime england won, land germany lost
maritime england won, land germany lost.
The british army broke and ran in the face of germany
Td
overlord was a raid to capture (and build) a port.
The five us armies who followed made it a land war.
The only nation in the world with that capability is us.
The uk can not fight a land war withot an allied enabler. neither can anyone else in europe.
A maritime uk doesnt lose land power, we dont have it anyway. a maritime uk enables european land power, and we are the only people in europe who can possibly be that enabler.
@ PaulG re AAV and RM
Surely the Green Death would just get out and lift the AAV over anything too sticky?
Dom your trite comments are hardly the whole story. Each defeated country was defeated on land after a series of crushing land battles and advances. I’ve given some examples of these huge battles from 1813 and 1814. Explain to me what the British raids on France in the same war accomplished.
Dom, Overlord was a raid on what planet?! I have never heard that claimed anywhere by anyone ever in any source I have read. It’s an absurd notion. Overlord was an entry operation, crossing the start line. I suppose Barbarossa was a raid to?
I think someone said something about hyperbole or otherwise overstatement by DJ, but this is a good catch, to consider:
“A maritime uk doesnt lose land power, we dont have it anyway. a maritime uk enables european land power, and we are the only people in europe who can possibly be that enabler.”
phil
the british army broke and ran, leaving behind all of its heavy equipment.
The british army only held egypt because the royal navy intercepted german/italian supply ships.
The british army has *never* stood against france/germany until a long maritime war has worn them down.
@ DominicJ,
I think you understate some very real and tangible land contributions to national strategic success. The First World War was won by a coalition of nations that ground down Germany and Austro-Hungary’s will and ability to achieve a decisive effect on land, not because Germans had been blockaded. Blockaded they were, but it was only a contributory factor. The RN’s critical function in World War 1 was keeping the channel open to allow uninterdicted resupply of land forces in France and Flanders, the blockade of the North Sea was certainly useful, but not by itself the critical event. Similarly in World War 2, the critical function of the RN (and RAF Coastal Command) was in keeping the SLOCs open across the Atlantic, and of course during D-Day. At the operational level, the most significant contribution the RN made was in the Med, where Crete was evacuated, and the SLOCs from Gib to Malta to Egypt were a single point of failure for a couple of years, and the RN kept them going. Our RN activities in the Pacific were no doubt very well executed and professional, but barely affected the outcome.
What James said.
Two of you being wrong doesn’t make it right.
Do elaborate x.
Interestingly enough and a complete aside the mostpwerful RN fleet evere deployed was the pacific fleet at VJ day. 4 battle ships 18 aircraft carriers, 10 cruisers and 40 destroyers plus smaller units though many cruisers and below were Commonwealth assets.
dom you’re crossing lines there and starting to discredit your post continually stating the british army ran away is damm right rude and disrespectful to veterans. Yes i’m ex mil and obviously going to get on my high horse but i’ve been in situations that were quite scary and they were fuck all like what guys in the BEF etc had to face. Remember while those “guys were running away” to dunkirk others volunteered to stay behind to delay the germans.
dom i’m not arguing i’m just disappointed at the last few comments
@x 3 of us, and we’ve got a shitload of time served.
@Paul G i think what he is getting at in his own unsubtle way is that until possibly now we have never had an army capable of engaging and defaeting a major continental powers army in the field. We have generally historically relied upon paying for allies and providing a hardcore of professional support units backed up by the ability to effectively blockade the enemy.
Dom has a unique perspective.
Our problem as a country is mass. We don’t have the population base to raise an army big enough to push back a country like Germany who has a larger population and industrial base and who is on the defensive. I’d argue no country has, although its an interesting thought to consider if the Soviets could have done it. The closest we came was WWI with a 5 million man army and even with the French we were not quite strong enough to push them back. We just didnt have enough men pure and simple. Probably nobody did on their own.
Intersting that the population of germany in in 1914 was 60 million but france only 40 and uk was as high as 46 million, given the extra countries involved i believ ethat it had less do do wit the population and more to do with the fact that germany has always just had a better army than ourselves and and france
It has to be said Dom, that was a somewhat crass statement about the BEF.
It’s one thing to run away from a fight that you have a fair chance of winning. It’s quite another thing to withdraw in haste when first of all you’re cut off from your allied support and then it becomes clear that you have been – or at least are very likely to be – cut off from your only realistic deep water supply port.
Looking at WW1 and WW2 in general the Navy played a key role in keeping open the sea lanes while pressing hard on those of the enemy. But German Industrial production continued to rise right up until 1945. Ultimately it required men to go ashore, at some point and deliver the killer blow.
I don’t think our population hit 40 million until the 40s.
I don’t think they were better. They were just good. That and the particular ascendancy of the defence at the time.
i think it is defintely a fact that from the early 1900s we have not had an army as well equiped as wellas a continental army until the last 30 years. i would now put a Uk armoured division with C2 apache(all ours are d versions, warrioe, as90 and MLRS) against any other div in the world and easily against any arab corp but that is all we have no reserves.
@ APATS,
there are 2 or 3 US manoeuvre divisions who would probably having the beating of 1 (UK) Armd Div, but only really because of their better digitisation and organic air support and thus speed to react. I honestly cannot think of any other country, including Germany, who could put a Division into the field that is on a par with 1 Div. It’s a shame that it is now down to 2 armoured Brigades, not the three it had when I was part of it (plus the Danish Reaction Brigade), but even so it’s world class.
German troops in Kosovo were – how can I put this charitably? – mostly concerned with self-protection. They used to put an entire armoured infantry company onto even the smallest logistic convoy, and would not willingly do any proactive operations at night. From what I read, it’s the same now in Afghanistan.
APATs.
The BEF in 39 was completely mechanised. The German Army invaded France with horses and almost completely armed with tankettes no better than the contraptions we had. I can’t see how you could argue they were in general better equipped. They had some very fine weapons but overall they were in the context of a barely motorised army.
James
Without the naval blockade, the land campaign would still be going on.
Germany reintroduced unrestricted submarine warfare and launched the Spring Offensive out of desperation
Paul G
It wasnt my arguement of choice, but it remains the truth.
Of the 5 possible outcomes of a battle, throwing back the enemy, holding the line, retreating in good order, running for their lives and being annihilated, the BEF managed 4th.
Shouting “support our troops” doesnt change that fact.
I’m very sorry if you think less of me for refusing to call a crushing defeat a stunning victory, but I live in the real world, the one where next time, we might get 5th, not 4th.
APATS
I did try to say that in subtle ways, but it just wasnt getting through.
I’m actualy looking now for the last time the British army won against a continental power before the RN ground it down, the best I’ve got so far is 1914, when the BEF retreated in good order, remaining a viable force, but we were still diven back (not that retreating is in itself bad thing), Naploeonic wars arent looking good.
Nope, it seems we entirely sat that one out, except of course, outr actions around the world and in the peninsula, funny how we ended up in charge afterwards….
Phil/APATS
German strategy in the (later) first world war was to inflict a 2:1 casulaty ratio on the allies, hoping that although the allies could afford it, we wouldnt be willing to pay it.
Well, occaisionaly interspersed with dreams of still being able to win outright, rather than force an equitable peace.
They managed 1.5, including Russian losses.
ChrisB
I’m not argueing the BEF should have stood and died!
I’m argueing that the only two options its EVER going to have, are stand and be slaughtered or dump its supplies and run.
The channel is a double edged sword, its a moat that protects England from Europe, but it also makes it an utter bitch for us to supply an army on the continent.
“Ultimately it required men to go ashore, at some point and deliver the killer blow.”
I dont disagree!!!!!!!!
But how do you propose the British, French, German, Nordic, Polish, Spanish and Italian Armoured Army Groups (Yes, why the hell not have SEVEN complete Armoured Army Groups in this fantasy coalition) “go ashore” into Moroco, or Algeria, or Tunisia, or Libya, or Egypt, or Gaza, or Israel, or Libya, or Syria, or Turkey, or Greece, or Albania, or Montenagro, or Croatia?
Because unless Slovenia allows us to march through, we cant drive there, and even if this vast line of nations all give permission, its a long arse drive to Mauritania.
Much simpler if the British Amphibious Corps seizes Port Etienne and 6 army groups and their logistics trains are shipped in behind us.
Poland cant provide that capability, its military budget needs to be spent keeping out the Russians.
The Nords cant, again, keep out Russians.
Germany cant, Russians
France can, to a degree, its a long walk for Russians through hostile territory, but still a realistic threat.
Spain can, to a degree, its a long march and they have mountains to defend from.
The UK, we have the channel.
APATS
“i think it is defintely a fact that from the early 1900s we have not had an army as well equiped as wellas a continental army until the last 30 years”
Simply not the case. The BEF was the worlds first and only fully motorised army.
The first deployment consisted of 25,000 vehicles for 158,000 men, a vehicle for every 6 men.
The problem is simply that Germany (and France) attack with 150 divisions on the continent, and we will always struggle to deploy more than 15 in response.
Being better only takes you so far, eventualy, the other side just has more bodies than you have bullets.
And unfortunatly, thats ALWAYS going to be the British Armies problem.
A British Armoured Brigade would annihilate an Arab Armoured Division. But we’d struggle to deploy a Brigade, and they have 6 divisons.
All
***********
Our only hope, is to wear them down, with blockade, with bombardment and with carefully chosen semi surgical strikes that pit a British force against a portion of the enemy it can rapidly devestate, before retreating from massive counter attack, or by seizing a port and allowing massive allied support to back us up.
Still trying to write a third post, “less pocket, more division”
All
It is a fact worth remembering that our performance in WW1 lead the Germans to call us ‘Lions lead by donkeys’, and the Scottish regiments ‘the ladies from hell’; and they assessed the British infantry man as their ‘Most dangerous enemy’ in 1939.
However by the middle of the war they were less than impressed, with our performance. With exceptions like commandos, and the airborne at Arnheim. Rommel joked about the British armies poor performance in pre D Day briefings.
Sorry but even some of our senior generals accept our performance in WW2 was mediocre and patchy.
Dom you’re looking at things from a very narrow British perspective. You cannot explain global or continental events by focusing on the British perspectives. Germany in WWI had no realistic prospect of winning once the AEF started to arrive. She faced the same reality we faced, not enough strength to push the enemy back. With 100 fresh divisions arriving, and their last gamble failed, she saw the writing on the wall. You can also look at it from the German perspective wherein her Navy couldn’t stop her defeat. In WWII Germany suffered most of her losses in gargantuan battles, continuously for four years. Even when you include the western front, Germany was overwhelmingly weakened by the Red Army, not the Red Navy or the Royal Navy. Again in the Napoleonic wars, the armies of France were broken in the east. Continental powers can afford not to have navies for they know their strength and defence lies in armies. If maritime power was so decisive why did the two largest combatants in WWII barely have a fleet between them?
It’s not the Navy that’s ground down our enemies, it’s been allied armies.
Phil said “The BEF in 39 was completely mechanised. The German Army invaded France with horses and almost completely armed with tankettes no better than the contraptions we had. I can’t see how you could argue they were in general better equipped. They had some very fine weapons but overall they were in the context of a barely motorised army.”
Yes the Germans had horses in their logistical chain. But the proportion of their army which was mechanised was comparable in size to the whole of the BEF. And the French tanks were bigger and better armed, but what is important is how armour is used. The Germans arguably had better CCC too. And we mustn’t forget that though an independent sevice the Luftwaffe was primarily a tactical airforce with hardly any consideration to the silly concept of strategic bombing. The Germans must have been doing something right.
Yeah they did. They concentrated strategic density against strategic weakness and they possessed the operational mobility to exploit an initial success. I don’t deny it was genius although at the time a lot of senior officers thought the plan insane. Had the French been denser in the area I suspect we’d have had another Schlieffen running out of steam south of Paris. They divided the allies in two before a proper response could occur and defeated them in detail. Part luck, as ever in war, part aggression and excellent initial dispositions. I don’t think they quite believed it was working hence the pause to secure flanks and the panic at Arras when it seemed like we had just drawn them in and were now about to do the same to them. The Germans were good, flashes of daring and genius, but I don’t see the Army as being the super force people think. Where it came up against dense French and British positions it got its arse kicked plenty of times.
Phil
Since we’re British, and we are discussing the British armed forces, I’m not sure that its really all that narrow.
You keep knocking down the same strawman over and over and over, but it remains a strawman.
I’m not saying land power is worthless, I’m saying its of little value to us in great amounts.
Even if we had 50,000 Divisions, we’d never be able to deploy them outside the UK.
Germany, France and Russia can all deploy 100+ division militaries on the continent, because they can walk/drive there, we cant, because the channel bottles us up as much as it defends us.
@ Admin – “jedi, wasnt that part of the seven years war, some raid
So, a pivotal battle as part of a wider extended campaign that saw considerable land forces employed, a bit like D Day, or Anzio. Are they raids?”
It was indeed part of a wider war, one termed the seven years war rather than the fourteen year war it might. That “strategic raid” made the defence of quebec untenable by permitting no support from outside forces. This enabled british land forces to mop up french canada and signalled the beginning of the end for the french presence on north america.
A good result i feel.
“But to base your entire national strategy and tailor your forces entirely to that ends is a fundamentally dis-proven position.”
I don’t, and the authors of RUSI doctrine of Strategic Raiding don’t either, just as they don’t intend that the RN and RAF should be reduced to ~10,000 personal and half a dozen light frigates + some diesel subs.
To restate my previous point:
“Which misunderstands what the SDSR was trying to achieve; not national defence, but to to preserve power projection on a scale that is compatible with the ambitions of our political masters.
That cannot be done under the current funding regime AND maintain this balanced force, as recognised by Jed at least:”
“Then do you at least accept that HMG actually does not want to pay for an army which would be big enough to provide critical mass to COIN campaign, boots on the ground and all that, BUT as our deluded politicians do continue to want to interfer, sorry, intervene as part of international coalitions (but not on our own) why should we not make our major contributions to such operations maritime ones? Why not let continental countries with bigger armies lead in land campaigns?”
“people should not view those RUSI doctrines as extremes, they are not meant to be, but rather that they indicate a prefernce for investment that maximises the political utility of the favoured arm.”
“DJ’s idea is admitedly on the extreme end of that preference, but the preferences are necessary to keep our mid-rank budget capable of achieving the geo-political goals required.”
As far as i am concerned, land forced of two punitive-intervention brigades along with amphibs, carriers and RA assets, combined with five limited-stabilisation brigades IS strategic raiding!
[edit] the edit function is on the blink [/edit]
Me – “As far as i am concerned, land forced of two punitive-intervention brigades along with amphibs, carriers and RA assets, combined with five limited-stabilisation brigades IS strategic raiding!”
And I have been saying this since before the SDSR was published:
http://critical-reaction.co.uk/2783/17-10-2010-britain-and-the-world
Dom discussing how we won wars without discussing the contribution of allies or the wider picture is like trying to analyse the British economy in the 30s whilst ignoring the Depression in America. It’s a pointless exercise.
Phil
““Ultimately it required men to go ashore, at some point and deliver the killer blow.”
I dont disagree!!!!!!!!
But how do you propose the British, French, German, Nordic, Polish, Spanish and Italian Armoured Army Groups (Yes, why the hell not have SEVEN complete Armoured Army Groups in this fantasy coalition) “go ashore” into Moroco, or Algeria, or Tunisia, or Libya, or Egypt, or Gaza, or Israel, or Libya, or Syria, or Turkey, or Greece, or Albania, or Montenagro, or Croatia?
Because unless Slovenia allows us to march through, we cant drive there, and even if this vast line of nations all give permission, its a long arse drive to Mauritania.
Much simpler if the British Amphibious Corps seizes Port Etienne and 6 army groups and their logistics trains are shipped in behind us.
Poland cant provide that capability, its military budget needs to be spent keeping out the Russians.
The Nords cant, again, keep out Russians.
Germany cant, Russians
France can, to a degree, its a long walk for Russians through hostile territory, but still a realistic threat.
Spain can, to a degree, its a long march and they have mountains to defend from.
The UK, we have the channel.”
I’d love to hear your thoughts.
Jedibeeftrix
It’s getting confusing, when I am talking about skewing everything toward strategic raiding or a maritime policy I’m talking about Doms post.
As for your definition of strategic raiding, we don’t agree, and I think arguments over definitions create more heat than light in the long run so I won’t get into that one.
An amphibious raiding capability is an excellent and useful capability to have. I just argue, as per Doms post, it shouldn’t be our only capability.
Then um Dom we need ships to move them over. I’m not advocating no navy or that they have no use! I’m saying your concept is flawed based on historical evidence and the reality of operations, without going into the fantasy fleet. Sea power has utility, I’ve never denied but. But it rarely wins a war on its own. And having such a puny raiding force means sea power is essentially working alone because as you have said the force you want to land is useless as a tool of national strategy on any meaningful scale.
Phil
But More Amphibs cost more money
More Amphibs require more escorts to protect them, which cost more money.
Since we arent about to enter the sunlight uplands of milk, honey, and 5% defence budgets, that money can ONLY be found, by cancelling other stuff.
And of course, those extra men all need paying too.
If you want to deploy a division
“Estimate of Force Levels in 1 (UK) Armoured Division (1 Jan 2011 – our estimates)
Army Personnel 17,000
Challenger 2 MBT 100
Warrior AIFV 300
Other Tracked Vehicles 900
Helicopters (Army Aviation) 24
Artillery Guns 48
MLRS 0
AVLB 18″
You need 4x the landing assets I suggested, which even with some economies of scale, are going to cost the better part of £5bn per year.
We might, might, be able to afford that force 2x over, and the fleet to deploy it twice over.
But we have absolutly no capability to mount any sort of enduring op in those circumstances.
British sea power has shrunk. But one of the reasons why is that we now “use” American sea power by proxy.
Dom, is it a valid assumption that every operation will need an amphibious prelude and for that division to be needed to be transported into theatre only by sea and only by ‘our’ shipping?
Before we get to what we need we need to look at what we can do in the future legally and in the political climate of today and tomorrow. We can only legally attack target from UK sovereign territory or from ships in international water at every other instance requires the consent of the country were operating from. This consent will not be forthcoming in the future without UN approval which is also the standard now required by the UK parliament to conduct operations of choice.
The second issue is at what level of commitment do we expect the UK to be able conduct a single operation with a fully balanced force and fully support it independently. And how many small ops are we required to do simultaneously.
To what extent are we prepared to use the reserve force and at what scale of effort. For comparison the UK regular to reserve ration currently is about 20% to 80% reserves to regulars to US is 50-50 and canada, aus about 40-60.
The final issue is what are we expect to contribute to coalitions and how do we integrate with them. The US generally asks for s/f or specialist infantry, aar, istar assets, air transports and submarines. For the deployment of big land forces what extra influence do we get in coalitions for example in 2003 what extra influence did we achieve deploying a division as opposed to a brigade?.
On top of all this we must have all the ISTAR assets to attack and find targets from an individual to a company of tanks and be seamlessly able to transit this globally and across a theatre of operations what ever option we choice.
These scales and roles must be balanced by having a 2% defence budget. Once these are answered the forces required becomes much clearer.
TD
No and Yes and No.
However, none of your questions are realistic and/or fair.
Its valid to assume that some would benefit from an amphibious prelude, or at least the option of such. Some theatres will noly be assaulted by an amphibious operation, some may benefit from a combined land/sea incursion, some might be attacked only from land, but the amphibs function to confuse the enemy.
A divison can only be transported by sea, unless it wants to leave all its heavy kit behind, or move at a snails pace.
And if not our shipping, who’s?
Commericial shipping is not set up to move Challengers, will be in very high demand if everyone is trying to move gear and is only useable AFTER the initial assault has been a success. Is the UK going to rely on surplus capacity in the Portugese Amphibious fleet? If the UK doesnt have this capability, in what twisted world does it make sense for anyone too?
The UK is the only nation apart from the US, that has the capability to have the capability to mount large scale forced entry landings.
The Germans cant, the Russians cant, the Chinese cant, the French cant.
At great cost to everything unimportant to our territorial integrity, we can.
10 Bays are a better buy than 20 A400m.
Not if you need to get to Bastion or anywhere quickly
I also see shades of “Amateurs Talk Tactics, Professionals Talk Logistics” in this discussion.
@ TD
That is what UPS and DHL are for……..
@TD true, but you’ve got to question what is the purpose of being holed up in Bastion in the first place… The UK could have avoided many of the recent land quagmires and still have been relevant in the world.
X
I dunno, this is reading more like proffesionals talk tactics.
Repulse, the purpose of being there is rrelevant
Amateurs do talk tactics. Van Creveld has written a wonderful and thought provoking book on logistics. Called, spookily enough, On Logistics.
Phil
Except of course, I have made no attempt to discuss any sort of tactics, and very little strategy.
I have however, consistantly argued our logistical capacity is utterly inadequate.
The complaints generaly relied on, “you need more tanks and 3:1 ratios”….
Dom I wasn’t having a go. I just recommend the book.
@ Phil – “when I am talking about skewing everything toward strategic raiding or a maritime policy I’m talking about Doms post.”
That is fine, but when you say in the same sentence that “strategic-raiding is bunk” you are conflating two quite different things.
One is the concept developed over a series of papers by RUSI under the FDR title, the other is Dom’s very specialised maritime strategy.
As for my definition of what SR is, and whether the SDSR correlates with the intention of the RUSI authors, have read all of those papers on numerous occasions I am quite happy that it is a good enough match to justify the appellation.
IMO, what GG and SR boil down is no more than emphasis on one service that necessitates losing a significant strategic capability from the other.
SR being defined as medium-scale punitive intervention which limits the ability to engage in large-scale limited stabilisation.
GG being defined as large-scale limited stabilisation which limits the ability to engage in medium-scale punitive intervention.
Given that our politicians wish to continue to interfere in other peoples business, this is the choice they faced.
Phil
Is it new? or old? or not a “book”?
Its not on Amazon.
It’s by Martin Van Creveld. It might have a different title because his books seem to get different names in different countries. It is a decade or two old now. I recommend most of his books, he’s thought provoking. You’d also like some Corelli Barnett but he’s quite a dense read. And some Ralph Peter his earlier works are a fun read.
Jefibeeftrix
I think both concepts are flawed, RUSI and Doms. Hopefully nearer xmas I’ll post something laying out why I think it is.
I would very much like to read it.
Ten Bays would be a terrible buy but we can’t rely on 7 C-17s and the A400M to get brigade level+ forces into theatre (can we?). We don’t have enough lift, there may not be landing strips available etc etc. We need the sealift capability but I do not believe that we can afford specialist RN ships to achieve this either. Clearly we can’t when we’d need Point Class ships to land a brigade now (right?), let alone a division. With that in mind, surely what we need, when thinking about replacing Ocean, the Albion Class, and the Bays is to know what our personnel, linear vehicle meter and container lift movement requirements are for the three or four force structures the UK is currently talking about in reality. Small scale early effects force in various configurations depending on task, medium scale intervention force(s), 3do brigade perhaps, an MRB perhaps, and finally a division (of what ever sort). We could then plan the design and purchase of specialist amphibious assault assets plus general purpose heavy sealift accordingly.
I would like to see the first and second line ships optimised for the delivery of the small and medium effects while still fitting into the brigade and divisional lift effort when/if required. I think this optimisation could be improved. The Point class RO-ROs and STUFT would have to provide the heavy sealift when required. We would need the escorts it is true. We might want additionally the ability to create our our temporary port. Would this help us achieve our stated goals? Yes, would it help us land Dom’s force or any other, yes? Would this give us the ability to react or prempt in such a way that restricts the free hand of an enemy or potential enemy? Yes. Provided this effort can be supported logistically so that it does not become a limitation on our own ability to act. This is a matter of will, as far as I am concerned. The force make-up is secondary. As long as we can get it there, as long as we still think about where ‘there’ is, and who might be ‘there’, then we retain the will and something of the ability to influence world events in our favour.
Hi Jedi,
I think the characterisation is ok, as it is all about trade-offs in the end, in
“As for my definition of what SR is, and whether the SDSR correlates with the intention of the RUSI authors, have read all of those papers on numerous occasions I am quite happy that it is a good enough match to justify the appellation.
IMO, what GG and SR boil down is no more than emphasis on one service that necessitates losing a significant strategic capability from the other.
SR being defined as medium-scale punitive intervention which limits the ability to engage in large-scale limited stabilisation.
GG being defined as large-scale limited stabilisation which limits the ability to engage in medium-scale punitive intervention.”
But RUSI is only providing central characteristics, as a think-tank, and the intentions are in the SDSR (takes an expert to dig them out,though?)
Just a detail that jarred:
Being better only takes you so far, eventually, the other side just has more bodies than you have bullets.
“And unfortunatly, thats ALWAYS going to be the British Armies problem.
A British Armoured Brigade would annihilate an Arab Armoured Division. But we’d struggle to deploy a Brigade, and they have 6 divisons.”
- e.g Egypt has 1100+ Abrams (& other “stuff”)
- they have 400 mobile 155mm pieces of almost domestic manufacture, shooting out to 38-40km
Relating these numbers to Ch2 and AS90 (25 km, GMLRS there to take care of the gap, sure, but only in limited numbers)should give the scale when more than an intervention is sought.
“The complaints generaly relied on, “you need more tanks and 3:1 ratios”….
From my perspective, that wasn’t a complaint but an observation, although it was not explicitly stated as such and so my fault for not making things clear.
@ ACC “But RUSI is only providing central characteristics, as a think-tank, and the intentions are in the SDSR (takes an expert to dig them out,though?)”
prof lindley-french would certainly agree, being positive about the direction of travel but unable to directly attribute the ‘journey’ to the words in the sdsr.
@TD, “Repulse, the purpose of being there is rrelevant” – I take it you mean irrelevant…
I understand the point that you are making regarding speed and location. Flying kit is quicker than shipping it assuming it is light enough and you have a safe place to land. However, not sure how long it would take to fly a fully equiped armoured brigade somewhere…
My point is that if we have a maritime focused global presence, then we probably will not be going to places like Afghanistan any more. Or if we do it would be around providing intelligence / special forces capabilities. We cannot do everything, I for one think that not being able to do grand scale occupations is not something I will loose sleep over.
Well,
“prof lindley-french would certainly agree, being positive about the direction of travel but unable to directly attribute the ‘journey’ to the words in the sdsr”
- if even he is dropping the baton (for now), we need to pick it up!
- or there is no such expert that can decipher the misinformation?
“There is a very great danger that by default, if we hold our nerve, we could end up with quite a sound defence strategy. There will be two carriers, strategic mobility, Astutes-not enough, but in time you could build more over 20, 30 or 40 years-Type 45s and Type 26s. It is a concept whereby there is projectability, not globally but regionally-plus. We could actually have a defence strategy worth talking about, by muddling through and from the bottom up, which has nothing to do with the NSS or the SDSR. The issue is, can we hold our nerve over that longer investment period?”
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/uc761-vi/uc76101.htm
Have read and agree with ” we could end up with quite a sound defence strategy. There will be two carriers, strategic mobility, Astutes-not enough, but in time you could build more over 20, 30 or 40 years-Type 45s and Type 26s. It is a concept whereby there is projectability, not globally but regionally-plus”
- but what sort of prescription (for action) is this “hold our nerve”?
@Dom: Van Creveld, Martin, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
That’s the badger. I think the US edition is called On Logistics, but I might have even dreamt that, work addles ones brain. I know his Transformation of War is called On Future War somewhere. Anyway, he’s an interesting and controversial writer. Good research, I personally think.
Phil,
From my longer post on the Open Thread, I wonder/ hope if/ that you will bake these things into your soon-coming article:
“Our future conflicts… will occur…in a far more technically challenging environment… the fight will be much closer to a conventional military conflict, characterized by “intense electronic warfighting,” swarm attacks and cyberwar.”
“Our future conflicts… will occur…in a far more technically challenging environment… the fight will be much closer to a conventional military conflict, characterized by “intense electronic warfighting,” swarm attacks and cyberwar.”
Interesting, I’ll give it a shot.
My very first reaction, is that he sounds just like the narrators on the programmes I used to watch on Discovery back in 1995 when I was a kid – all that Army XXI stuff etc
Well, they must have had the same programming on the US TV (in 1995)
“A snippet from the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff” was my source, so I bet he was rather watching the same as me (RinTinTin, Black Fury and Skippy):
Born April 24, 1956 (age 55)
Coronado, California, U.S.
Allegiance USA
Service/branch United States Navy
Years of service 1978–present
Rank Admiral
Commands held Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
U.S. Northern Command
North American Aerospace Defense Command
U.S. Sixth Fleet
Carrier Strike Group Two
USS Enterprise (CVN-65)
USS Cleveland (LPD-7)
VFA-211
Battles/wars Operation Desert Shield
Gulf War
War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
Iraq War
acc
i am sometimes guilty of jingoism ;p
but of those 1100 how many are serviceable?
How many are in the actual zone of contention?
And of course, how many lions of babylon does it take to knock out a challenger
@ DominicJ (and Angus McLellan),
Martin van Creveld’s book “Supplying Logistics” is ISBN 0 521 21730 X in hardcover, and 0 521 29793 I (that’s capital “eye”, not “one”) in paperback. I have a lightly thumbed copy that I forgot to return to the library in the Defence Academy in 2003. I think there are a number of booksellers in the UK who have some form of online search for books website, if you want to pick up a copy. I can’t imagine it’s going to be more than £1 or so for a used copy.
james
its like 40 quid!
If its good i dont mind paying (i’m a bookshelf snob)
@ DominicJ,
I’m as sceptical as you about some of those high-emotion Araby claims – having been one of about 100,000 who faced down Saddam in the “Mother of All Battles”, which was somewhat easier than forecast. Nevertheless, and I can’t remember who said it, “quantity has a quality all of its’ own”. The real trick, even assuming reasonable training and reliability (and logistics!) among the Egyptians, is to fix that huge force in place. Let them get enough artillery and missile forces within range of the landing zones and watch those LSLs get pounded to pieces. We’re going to run out of TLAMs and Brimstones and Storm Shadows long before they run out of 155 pieces. The Suez Canal is also probably closed for years once they’ve sunk a few container ships in the narrow bits.
£40?!!! Send me an email to and we can swap addresses. Yours for a £tenner plus postage. Paperback copy, after page 30 it’s brand new and unread….
james
that was stalin
edit out your email, i have it from the comment form anyway
@ DominicJ, forgot to mention your £tenner goes to Help for Heroes and I’ll bung in half a dozen H4H wristbands I’ve got left over from our last event.
@ DominicJ,
thanks, can’t edit (nothing comes up for editing). It’s a throwaway address anyway.
£18 on Amazon, but a tenner to H4H is a better spend.
the 40 will have been hardback.
I’m rather embarrisingly decashed until christmas, (bastard ikea), but you have a sale at whatever amazon is charging, since its for a good cause.
@ Viceroy
I sometimes say (type?) stuff to provoke a reaction…..
I wasn’t trying putting questions in brackets to provoke it is because I am not sure of the facts in the case, and I am aware that my knowledge is very limited.
sorry if it’s annoying. I would like to contribute, if only to get shot down, in order to learn more, as I am interested
viceroy
just as long as you accept i’m idiot in chief!
by the way if we’re having a book club meet before xmas, may i recommend low level hell, helos in vietnam, well to be more accurate one bloke in the oh-6 baiting charlie for the cobras at 50ft, shot down 15 times, awarded instant MC etc etc, awesome.
And this looks interesting too…….
http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/Aviation-Assault-Battle-Group-Afghanistan/p/3141/
Ok, I’ve finaly finished my brief and outline for the land contingent, but before I get into detail, is the force we deployed to the Falklands roughly the sort of size (although not composition) people would accept might be capable of some sort of useful action?
two brigades (one spearhead + one follow on), plus divisional assets, special forces, RAF and RN assets.
@ DomincJ,
that depends upon what the Land forces are going to be required to achieve, what sort of terrain and distances to achieve it over, and who is the enemy and what have they got. Another factor is either war fighting on the UK’s account, or some form of intervention to stabilise or enforce separation in a civil war.
@Dominic, I believe the answer is yes, it would be the minimum useful size for independent interventions. Though it does rule out anything larger than the falklands or extended duration, but that’s the choice we have to make.