A follow on Guest Post from DomJ
Thank you everyone who commented, requested clarification and helped, I’m resubmitting with explanations, detail and the pound of flesh Jed demanded J
So here goes
I’d start, with the “war fleet”, of which we would have two, each one “active” for 6 months of the year, or 8 months, or 4 months, or whatever else makes everyone happy.
Active would be “ready to at short notice go and beat some unfortunate foreigners to a bloody pulp”.
Inactive would be everything else, overhaul, training, diplomacy, exercises ect.
| First Fleet | Purchase Cost | Operating Cost | |
| Carrier | QE Class |
3,700,000,000 |
400,000,000 |
| 24 Fast Air | Rafale |
1,680,000,000 |
288,000,000 |
| 6 Infantry landing ships | Juan Carlos |
2,940,000,000 |
600,000,000 |
| 24 Heavy Lift | Chinook |
720,000,000 |
192,000,000 |
| 6 Armour Landing Ship | Bay Class |
1,368,000,000 |
600,000,000 |
| 6 AAW Destroyers | T 45 Daring Class |
3,900,000,000 |
420,000,000 |
| 6 Light Helicopter | Lynx |
180,000,000 |
24,000,000 |
| 6 ASW Frigates | T46 |
4,500,000,000 |
420,000,000 |
| 6 ASW Helicopter | Merlin |
180,000,000 |
48,000,000 |
| 3 Guided Missile Cruiser | T47 |
3,000,000,000 |
210,000,000 |
| 5 SSGN / Deterrent | Astute+ |
15,000,000,000 |
900,000,000 |
The Carrier and fast air is I hope fairly self explanatory, shoot down enemy aircraft, possibly bomb enemy targets, provide close air support and reconnaissance.
It’s the QE class, because that’s what we have, and the Rafale, because I believe thatFranceandGermanyare about to have a massive falling out, and we’ll buy it hoping to influence French opinion in our favour.
I assume some sort of ISTAR platform will also arrive, hopefully not that silly Sea King, but have no real idea whether we will end up with the Hawkeye, something funky based on the V22 or something else entirely.
This will also function as the flag ship, to what extent that means anything anymore
The Amphibs, the reasoning behind numbers simply being so that the entire force could be landed in a single group. Well, obviously not quite, a single group, each ships group of four Chinook would need to make 5 trips to offload the ship “battalion” and even with 4 LCUs it would take 13 trips to deposit the 50 warriors of an armoured infantry battalion. But we’re talking 11 hours rather than the 11 days Sutton took, or so I hope. To my none military mind, that sounds like a smashing capability. I’m wedded to neither Bay nor Carlos, feel free to suggest better ships, or just assume they are better. I’d much prefer something with a much greater cargo handling capacity, but am open to a third heavy landing ship specifically to vomit ISO boxes onto a beach.
Why Chinook? Again, its that realism (lol) bit, I’d prefer a bigger lift, I’m sure that there is something bigger than the CH53-k planned in the long term, but we have Chinooks.
AAW Destroyers
Standard Darings, so PAAMS, a gun and a Lynx. Bow Sonar, Harpoons, Torpedo tubes ect would be nice, but not worth squabbling over. There purpose is, rather predictably, to shoot down enemy aircraft that Carrier Air misses. Why Lynx? Why not? Again, I’ve just taken it “as is”
ASW Frigates
Daring Hulls with towed array sonar, bow Sonar, torpedo tubes, Harpoon (or similar), a gun and a dumbed down PAAMS (would be nice if it can still speak to PAAMS for a joint radar picture) and ASW Merlins because again, that’s what we have. Why Daring hulls, well, because steel is cheap and air is free and we already designed the things and made the tools. Purpose, sub hunting and “sacrificial” outer pickets
Missile Cruisers
Daring hulls, a dumbed down PAAMS and say, 256 cruise missiles each.
Purpose is to provide a massive opening barrage that even the most phallicly challenged would be satisfied with. Shock and Awe gets kind of a bad deal, but if anything, it worked too well. Destroy out enemy air capability, either direct hits on aircraft, or just by knocking out airfields. Yes I know, airfields can be repaired, but BROACH is going to seriously damage an airstrip, and if you put 50 holes in an airport, just how quickly can it start launching aircraft again? How many military airports is the other side likely to have. Don’t we have 4?
On top of that, command links are an obvious target to bombard.
After that, its hard to say, it really depends on the situation. Are we issuing a “back the hell off” warning, or do we intend to topple the government come hell or high water. Transport links, mobilised ground forces, “die hard” military, infrastructure. Communications are iffy. We certainly want them disrupted, but I can see the advantage in allowing just enough to survive to allow terror to spread through the ranks, what’s the point in winning if the people shooting back don’t realise its time to give up . Personally, I think slaughtering a load of conscripts is a bit unfair, I’d much rather they rebelled and joined us or buggered off home.
SSGN
Astutes with 4/6/8 Trident Tubes. Iffy I know due to nuclear/none nuclear issues.
Purchase Cost is now £37,168,000,000 and operating costs £4,102,000,000 for each of the two fleets.
These would kick the doors in, deploy a pocket division and support it in theatre, as part of a coalition, great, or alone if required.
Said Pocket Divison, I know even less about, but I would put manpower somewhere around 5000, and would hope it contained some heavy armour, some IFV and a rather large light infantry component.
The original suggestion was 10 “Battalions” each of roughly 500 men.
Armour Battalion.
Now, this, is probably going to sound really really really stupid, but since no one will provide more accurate numbers, you’ll just have to live with it.
12 Challenger 2s, 24 CVRTs (and a replacement PDQ), unknown number of logistics/engineering vehicles and a 500 strong crew.
I realise its not exactly Kursk, but until the enemy can get heavy and/or numerous anti tank weapons into the area, and if/until it gets its own armour into the area, 12 Tanks are likely to be a bloody scary force.
I’m not a massive fan of electronic land scouts, if you want to see what’s going on on the ground, its likely to involve being shot at and shooting back. Or so my “land warfare papers” tell me. Not that I have a problem sticking longbow on top of the 4 Chally leaders and some audio grabbers on the rest.
2 Armoured Infantry Battalions,
Fairly easy, 50 warriors a piece, each with 7 dismounts and three crew. I realise theres a logistical failing there, I may have a solution. I can only hope 10 guys have the technical wherewithal to keep a warrior serviceable for a few weeks.
An Artilery Battalion
12 Rapier
12 AS90
12 105
I figure they don’t all have to in use at the same time?
4 Light infantry battalions (possibly one Para and one RM special forces lite)
I’m quite happy to distribute weapons to whoever wants them, I don’t really get why we have separate SHORAD/LRATGW troops. Motorised, (landrovers) rather than Mechanised (bulldogs). I kinda figure these can follow on behind the Armoured infantry, making sure logistics keeps functioning, manning strong points after the warriors seize them ect.
An Engineer Battalion
I kinda figure these would like, build a port/dock type thing, or operate a pre existing one, deal with damaged vehicles and maybe logistics?
And a “Headquarters” Battalion
Which would cover command, signals, medical and I suppose an RMP detachment.
Its interesting to note the entire Royal Marines budget in 08/09 was £620mn, I assume that includes Warthog/Viking ect. 6 Royal Marine Brigades of over 8,000 men would come in at a mere 3bn. Unless the Army funds any RM work Do the RM have any sort of organic engineer capability?
I’m happy to break the Engineer Battalion down into REME/Eng/Log Detachments if that improves things
So anyway, what does the Strategic Raiding Pocket Division do?
Well, my thinking was based on the Falklands, roughly fight a 120 day “war” that involves around 30 days of positioning (sailing there), 30 preparatory work (bombing everything), a further 30 days of high intensity fighting (shooting anyone who hasn’t yet surrendered) and then a further 30 days of “clean up” and awaiting relief (tea and medals).
But in the real world, I suppose the first “big” task, is it in a single stroke solves Europes Rapid Reaction Force problem. It provides a force the rest ofEuropecan latch onto if and when it decides it wants to do something violent.
Perhaps its “headquarters” aren’t big enough for this? I don’t know, the huge command staffs in NATO armies confuse me, I cant remember the last time my line manager told me to do something, I occasionally bug her for help, but maybe once a month? Even if it cant “command” a division, its certainly the forced entry / teeth components of one. I don’t know enough to create deployable divison HQs
As a NATO component, it would counter attack against the Northern Fleet in Murmansk Oblast, which would hopefully have a “Pariseffect” on the Russian leadership and force a ceasefire. It wouldn’t matter if they were at the very gates ofBerlin, withoutMurmansk, they don’t have a nuclear deterrent inEuropeand so would be forced to retreat back to pre war borders.
In the future?
Well, who knows what the future holds, but I cant imagine we will ever be in a position where we have too much forced entry capability, currently only the US can do that at any scale, and France on a small scale.
Nor do I imagine that we will ever be in a position where we have too much available firepower.
It gives us the capability to act alone in protection of our interests, and to enable our allies to act in coalition interests, we bombard the target to create a crack, go in first and seize a port, they follow on and overwhelm the defences entirely.
It was mentioned that “what we really need, is forward based allies”, and I very much agree. But what is more likely to win us friends overseas than both the capability my fleet represents, and the commitment to use it?
What would make Chile feel more secure? The status quo? Or my fleet?
The lead elements held at 2 days readiness and taking an active role in combat 10 days later (northernArgentinacomes into range). Within 30 days, the Pocket Division will have landed in theTierra Del Fuegoand seized the island. What more could anyone ask? An armoured division forward deployed inGermanyis only of any use toEastern Europe. Its very useful to them of course, but only them
Lets assume War betweenIndiaandChina, how should we secure Bangladeshi Independence? A UN resolution? A 6 month long build up of ground forces that arrives after the wars over, and would be over ran in days anyway? Or deploying my Raider Fleet and threatening to join the war against the side that first infringes Bangladeshi neutrality? We couldnt hope to win a land war against either, or occupy them even if we did, but in the midst of a war, neither can afford us bombing the crap out of their airfields and such, it would be a near instant loss.
In the past?
Libya 2011
Preparation – Bombardment destroys much of theLibyaheavy core.
Invasion – Land forces deployed in support of Libyan rebels, providing logistical support, specialist functions, and for lack of a better term, “Stop Lines”, frequently, the TNC ran out of ammunition, and in the face of a mild counter attack, retreated 200 miles. If a British Light Infantry Battalion and a couple of Tanks dug in a mile behind the rebel Lines, retreats would have a fixed rally point, behind which we could protect and resupply the rebels.
Iraq 2003?
Shock and Awe – We could have provided far more support in the bombing campaign, fireing some 600+ missiles in a single barrage.
Al-FawPeninsula– Could have been taken without additional US forces.
Basra– Little land contribution, Fast Air from the carriers and transport helicopters possibly detached from the Al-Faw Occupation ground forces.
Umm Qasr – No change (suppose I need to specify some mine sweepers, but they could have come from the Diego Garcia fleet
Occupation – Al Faw, Umm Qasr, training of Iraqi army within that zone. Someone else would have to manageBasra.
Afghanistan 2001
Shock and Awe – Again, much greater contribution from Submarines, Cruisers and Carrier. The Carrier allows some recon capability rather than simply destructive force.
Special Forces – Para Battalion can be dropped in with US forces, rest can be airlifted in without heavy equipment once airfield secure.
Occupation – Possible occupation support, again, realism about areas controllable, 20:1 ratio to be respected, which puts Laskhar Gah out of reach, requiring two “Pocket Divisions”.
The Development Solution budget to be put under the control of the PD and spent on their terms, by them if they wish (IE, not sub contracting out toUKstaff who wont leaveKabul). Personaly, I believe the best bet would have been to erect temporary accommodation, bribe the locals, level the town, and rebuild from the ground up. Add a curtain wall with towers, train the second sons as a town militia, build in water, sewage, solar lighting, gobar gas and build out narrow alleys, funnels and ambush points.
Sierra Leone
Pretty much do what we did, but on a far grander scale. Barras unlikely to be required, but doing it with Rafales bombing enemy heavy machine gun posts would no doubt have been much easier.
Kosovo 99
Preceding Bombardment – Carrier air (supported possibly by land fighters) and cruise missile bombardment would be far in excess of what we actually did.
Ground War – Ground forces could have been deployed to directly challenge, or at least threaten, Serbian forces refusing to retreat.
Bosnia 92
Well that was a complete disaster, but who knows what a small but military capable force ready and able to deploy aggressively could have accomplished. Cant imagine how things would’ve been worse.
Iraq 91
Preceding bombardment.
Much stronger barrage from cruisers perhaps negating need to send tornados against airfields.
Much smaller land component
Falklands 82
Air War – Proper Carrier air defeats Argentine Airforce, cruiser strikes against mainland disable airbases.
Sea War – Argentine fleet forced to port by submarine threat, directed on to target by AWACS
Land War – Availability of armour and helicopter logistics sees Goose Green surrender with little loss. Remaining Argentine positions fall under combined arms advance, Argentine forces incapable of harming Chieftain, aggressive use of which only curtailed by mine fields.
Wow, even as far as fantasy fleets go this is pretty damn impressive…
On a specific detailed point, how would the 24 Chinooks be transported? They would either need to go on the CVF or parked on the flight deck of a Juan Carlos… The CVF will not have enough space and the latter option is far from perfect as you will not be able to operate any other helis. You might as well buy another CVF…
“and we’ll buy it hoping to influence French opinion in our favour.”
Do you know that the british soldier is very estimated in France, much more that the americans, we like you. Except you are too with the americans
Just a thought… Should we not consider the option of using flying boats for supporting amphibious ops? Something like the H-4 Hercules “Spruce Goose” built back in the 40′s could transport 700 troops… Just have the LHDs / CVFs to move the helicopters / assault craft, initial assault marines also on the escorts, heavy equipment on RFAs / points and then just fly in the troops as needed. The T45s could secure the perimeter of a sea (air)port…
I don’t understand about Chinook on a aircraft carrier. The HMS Ocean is there for that, with an aircraft carrier in air support, with his escort, it is more logical.
“The HMS Ocean is there for that, with an aircraft carrier in air support, with his escort, it is more logical.”
It would be.
But the reality is that HMS Ocean is expected to bow out in 2016, replaced by Queen Elizabeth, and there is no funding for a replacement LPH programme.
The LPH role is going to be passed on the CVF carriers.
LPH(R) has been “on hold” ever since 2006, and it is effectively dead, effectively if not officially.
The CVFs are going to be, effectively, Landing Helicopter Aviation ships.
Or “Forward Staging Afloat Base” as the americans called USS Kitty Hawk when it worked in this way in 2001 outside Afghanistan. Back then, the carrier had aboard just 12 or so fixed wing airplanes, the rest being Special Forces troops, Marines and the helicopters and crews of the Special Forces aviation regiment of the Army.
DomJ
Your not a million miles from things I have suggested (“modest proposals”) in other articles.
I have always thought our Balanced Force (TM) should be able to be delivered quickly by sea, and that would be the “Niche Capability” (TM) that we provided to NATO and other alliances.
I would not go Juan Carlos route, expensive. I have posted on here before on how we could buy a modified Bay with a hanger and more troop capacity; that plus two Damen Schelde Enforcer derivative LPH (so 2 x LSD, 4 x LPD(A), 4 x LPD(A)(Enhanced) and 2 x LPH). Buy some Dutch Joint Support Ships to replace older RFA’s and they could help in this role too (delivering Chinooks). I would stick with mostly Merlin for the amphib assault role, so I think your overly ambitious with the Chinooks. Mores to the point, all amphib shipping has inherent flexiblity (anti-pirate small boat mothership) and non-war fighting roles (disaster response – get DfID to pay for them).
If your T47 is a T45 Batch II with more Slyver A70 for 16 to 32 SCALP-N – then why not ? But bump it up to 6 (then we have 12 “gold plated” or “proper warship” units) plus T26 based on Absalon able to deploy towed array, and or USV for littoral ASW, and 2 x Merlins; et voila – world domination on the cheap !
I will not comment on your scenarios, and leave it to the proper ex-Squaddies to comment on the Army side of things.
Thanks to taking the time to respond to all our comments with an update article.
Your MoD is mad, an aircraft carrier requires an escort, it needs its aircraft to defend himself, he needs an escort, with destroyers and frigates, plus a tanker and a submarine, all this for landing marines and some tanks ?
” I don’t understand about Chinook on a aircraft carrier. The HMS Ocean is there for that, with an aircraft carrier in air support, with his escort, it is more logical.”
Chinooks can land and be refuelled on HMS Ocean but is too big to go in the hanger. The CVF on the other hand has been design to support Chinooks properly.
Frenchie
Thus begins wisdom re CVF.
Chinooks
i’m not averse to something smaller.
Anything would have to be internaly stowable, if that means smaller whirlybirds or bigger ships i leave to you.
Further qe’s aint a problem, except they’re big targets, and if one gets hit early, can the rest carry on?
Frenchie
6 oceans is fine by me
jed
meh, bugger all else to do at work, and its as much for me as anyone else
You’ve a lot of fleet there for what amounts to a pocket brigade. What about a heavier and more numerous land force delivered only in part by proper amphibs and partly by ro ro + flexiport/barge causeway
“Your MoD is mad, an aircraft carrier requires an escort, it needs its aircraft to defend himself, he needs an escort, with destroyers and frigates, plus a tanker and a submarine, all this for landing marines and some tanks ?”
“Frenchie
Thus begins wisdom re CVF.”
No, here begins only the nonsense.
HMS Ocean goes in loaded to the brink with Marines but without escorts?
What’s that, magic, or folly?
The carrier instead because it is a “carrier” can’t go out of Portsmouth without the rest of the fleet following?
So a operation abroad with an amphibious landing needs aircrafts only if there’s the carrier to be protected?
Men, it is not quite how it works.
The amphibious assault needs air protection and air support, and to get it where it is needed, there comes the need for the carrier.
Not the other way around, unless you think that the same enemy will attack the task force if the carrier is there, and ignore it and let it work unopposed if the carrier is not around.
Excuse me, but it makes absolutely no sense.
Escorts and Embarked airgroup will be shaped by the mission, and by the perceived threat to the Task Force / ship.
The rest is nonsense. Pure and simple.
It’s not a dig, more enlightenment but engineers and royal electrical and mechanical engineers are 2 very different beasts and are not located together. REME workshops for armour are big buggers as well, recovery mechanics and fodens(or MAN) charrv, gun fitters and armourers with 4 tonne mashy trucks, electronics with all their box bodies (each with a large generator towed behind vehicle mechanics and a complete RLC unit with shit load of spares trucks. RE normally stay close to inf and armd units. Again it’s just an info comment, can’t remember exactly but GW1 i think we took 450+ vehicles, most 4tonne plus!!
repulse i can’t help but this “in development” plane from beriev ref your sea plane.
http://www.beriev.com/eng/core_e.html
‘kin hell!!!
You REME will go where you’re told! We did a patrol one day to deliver a REME type to PB Bahadur as the Quad refused to start. Dangerous patrol, past the choke points and Murder Wall. Get there in one piece, REME type rummages about the Quad, stands back, thinks, reaches out, turns the key, presses the starter and off it goes. Stupid bastards had left the ignition on off and were trying to start it just using the starter button. And off back to the FOB passed the Murder Wall and the choke points. Ooh I got carried away with a ditty. Exeunt.
why do British writers and commentators continue to drool for the Rafale?
why is the F-35C seen as such a dog by some in Europe? the Rafale is extremely expensive, doesn’t have stealth, its performance is spotty at best (electronics, sensor fusion and the ability to work with British kit) and you get that all out of the box with the F-35C…additionally you support a UK company (BAE)…
i personally don’t care if the Brits drop out of the F-35 program…i just don’t understand the love that the Rafale is getting.
@ Dom J,
forgive me, but this whole force construction seems to be a Navy fest. Spending 80% of the defence budget on the Navy seems unbalanced, particularly when *this* scenario seems only likely to play out in a minority of occasions, and particularly when this scenario delivers a tiny little Brigade of limited effectiveness. Can’t we have a little less self-protection of gin palaces and a few more combat troops?
I’m just wondering what the RN have done of campaign-winning effect since 1944, apart from the Falklands? A few TLAMs here and there and I&W sniffing are important, but don’t I think win the campaign. Good effort in 82, of course, really great, and all credit to the personal bravery of the matelots. But considering every other campaign, from Korea to both Gulfs via Malaya, Kenya, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Aden, and now Afghanistan, isn’t the best balance on funding a force that actually does the business in the mud, not floating about protecting itself expensively?
James
So you would rather have an unbalanced force, as long as its unbalanced towards a land force?
If I refuse to take the bait on Korea, both Gulfs (oh and the long standing Gulf Patrol and MCM efforts of the Iran-Iraq war) not to mention RN and RM contribution in Afghanistan……..
Then do you at least accept that HMG actually does not want to pay for an army which would be big enough to provide critical mass to COIN campaign, boots on the ground and all that, BUT as our deluded politicians do continue to want to interfer, sorry, intervene as part of international coalitions (but not on our own) why should we not make our major contributions to such operations maritime ones? Why not let continental countries with bigger armies lead in land campaigns?
Phil – dit on! The lanterns are swinging in my mess (or ‘front room) and tot of rum raised to ya – you rock
@Jed, I couldn’t agree more with your comments…
To be a world superpower you need a first tier army, navy, airforce and a nuclear deterrent. Fact is the UK can only afford one of these, now choose…
We are an island nation who has been bitten badly by land campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. With all respect to our brave troops, the last two has not increased our standing in the world. Our fickle friends in the US have already started to look for new friends now that we are broke on the military front…
@PaulG, great spot on the Beriev seaplane. A-40 looks good. Not sure how many troops it could carry, but the range looks good. Wonder if you could fit a hovercraft in the back…
@ Jed,
I’m certainly not advocating an unbalanced force in favour of the Land component. I would argue that Armilla patrols and MCM were not strategically game-changing, but they were useful, and the RN and RM contributions in Afghanistan are not essentially Maritime by nature, but rather efforts operated by RN that could equally have come from the RAF or Army, depending on the roulement plot. I may be wrong, and if so happy to be corrected, but RN air could equally have come from the RAF flying from Kandahar, and within Helmand, the RM operate in a non-amphibious way and are indistinguishable from the Army.
I’m not sure I agree with you wider point about letting others take up the Land cudgel. It seems to me that the bulk of western military operations “tend” to require Land forces to force the decisive tipping point, even if that is not to ignore the many maritime operations that there have been and will continue. Perhaps 80:20, across NATO and western interests since 1945? As a country which has always sought too inspire and lead on a world stage (which I fully support), I am content that this nation has a Land component that is more capable than most, and it would to me be a sad day if all we could mount was a piffling little Brigade.
Hear hear James. I’ve been banging the same drum for some months now. This notion of strategic raiding is a bankrupt one. As is the idea of firing a brigade from the Navy and imagining that it will have a Clancyesque time of it on land rather than a Dieppe. Some folk though have latched into some combined neo Correlian / Splendid isolation paradigm and think we cannot and should not engage globally and that somehow, having no say in world on which our way of life depends, somehow makes that way of life safer. They think they have stumbled upon reality when in actual fact they have stumbled on denial and defeatism.
Jed we shouldn’t do as you advocate because maritime strategies have a time and place, by being all we can do we render ourselves irrelevant globally most of the time. Land forces remain the most effective means of applying pressure on an enemy or force. As I have said, I don’t discount an air force or a navy but not at disproportionate cost to the force that gives us the most leverage in world affairs.
@Phil, “…the force that gives us the most leverage in world affairs.”
Really – how is this? There are two things that would make our army relevant in the global arena, size and equipment. We are a small nation (in population) with high labour costs so we are never going to have enough soldiers outside of a major war to do anything but limited / short term ops. We can bring equipment, but when you think about it apart from MBTs and artillery, most of the high tech stuff is either delivered from the air or sea. Plus, why we were important to the US was the fact we could deploy quickly and support ops far from the UK – guess what, from primarily air / naval assets.
I would love to have a big / powerfull army, navy and airforce; the fact is we cannot afford it. Do the choice is to have a little of everything or focus on one area where you can lead.
Viceroy
Maybe. Personaly, I just like the idea of everything being deployable virtualy anywhere.
Once you start adding none military ships, you need to seize a dock, or build one.
You lose your rapid deployment ability.
And of course, more men means more cost, more heavy kit means a lot more cost.
Paul G
What, are you actualy saying people who repair gun sites and people who fill HESCO barriers arent interchangable?
See, we see engineer, and it all just blends into one. I’ll be sure to break them out in future.
I could of course, be entirely wrong, but if all vehicles are given a “full service” en route, and everything thats near its last legs is swapped out, that should limit the need for any serious repairs in a 30 day war.
Some stuff will still break, but hopefully, there shouldnt be hundreds of breakdowns.
Its just supposed to be enough keep most things running for 60 days, not 60 years.
Soloman
“i just don’t understand the love that the Rafale is getting.”
Neither do I, but sadly, I aint minister for defence :’(
James
Is it a navy fest?
Its certainly Navy centric, for a country that doesnt have a standing army*, I dont see that as a huge problem.
Your date range is less than perfect. Push it back 5 years, and the worlds first and only motorised army broke and ran, leaving behind all of its heavy kit. The Germans were stopped at the channel, and the Navy kept the sea lanes open.
Korea? Would the world have missed our ground forces?
Considering Inchon was the most important act of the war, followed by bombing the dams required to irrigate the fields that fed Pyonyang, I’m not sure they would have.
Malaya, fundamentaly, we lost,
Kenya, fundamentaly, we lost,
We managed to install friendlier governments than might have happened, but at the time, we had an 8% defence budget, so could afford three full size forces.
Northern Ireland, is a constitutional cluster **** of epic proportions, that fundamentaly, we have lost.
*The British Army is formed on a yearly basis, every year, the HoC holds a vote, agreeing to maintain the army for another year.
“isn’t the best balance on funding a force that actually does the business in the mud, not floating about protecting itself expensively?”
And I think my force “does the business” thats worth doing in the mud.
Repulse
“To be a world superpower you need a first tier army, navy, airforce and a nuclear deterrent. Fact is the UK can only afford one of these, now choose…”
Nuclear Deterrents are cheap!!! Thats why everyone wants one.
We arent a super power, currently, I’d argue we are a regional power with global ambitions.
With a bit of careful spending and the current budget, we can be a world power, in that we can force people to do what we tell them in some circumstances.
“With all respect to our brave troops, the last two has not increased our standing in the world. Our fickle friends in the US have already started to look for new friends now that we are broke on the military front…”
That is of course the huge problem.
Iraq/Afghanistan have sapped the publics will for military intervention and the militarys capability (even the most outspoken interventionists admit the army will need until 2020 to recover following a 2015 withdrawl). That sort of thing wont go unnoticed, nor will Syrias success in defying world opinion.
James
I agree.
Afghanistan is a strategic blunder, its a strategic blunder wether the boys getting killed and maimed are RAF Regiment Rock Apes, Royal Marine Commandos or Army Infantry.
It would still be a strategic blunder if we had 10 nuclear carriers.
“I am content that this nation has a Land component that is more capable than most,”
But we dont.
We have the weakest land componant in the world.
I Germany revoked our basing rights and France blew the Chunnel, the British Army could have 600 Armoured Divisions, they couldnt act anywhere outside lands end / john o’groates.
I’m not saying land forces are bad, I’m saying they are bad for the UK.
Equaly, I find German insistance on an 8000 mile range for its submarines and 4000miles for its frigates utterly bonkers.
Phil
Phil Phil Phil Phil Phil.
“As is the idea of firing a brigade from the Navy and imagining that it will have a Clancyesque time of it on land rather than a Dieppe.”
Dieppe was a disaster. It is a disaster that has no bearing on ANYTHING I have suggested.
Dieppe was a head on charge against dug in forces with little attempt to even locate defences, never mind suppress them.
The Defences faced at Dieppe we heavier than those faced by much of Overlord. Thats how big a disaster Dieppe was.
“Most notably, Dieppe highlighted:
1.The need for preliminary artillery support;
2.The need for a sustained element of surprise;
3.The need for proper intelligence concerning enemy fortifications;
4.The avoidance of a direct frontal attack on a defended port city; and
5.The need for proper re-embarkation craft.”
Which of those have I failed to account for?
“Some folk though have latched into some combined neo Correlian / Splendid isolation paradigm and think we cannot and should not engage globally and that somehow, having no say in world on which our way of life depends, somehow makes that way of life safer. ”
Once again, you are either misunderstanding, or activly confusing the issue.
How is an armed force that cannot operate outside Central Europe “engaging globaly”?
Did you even bother to read the article?
“Land forces remain the most effective means of applying pressure on an enemy or force”
Of course!
Thats exactly right!
China is absolutly terrified of the mighty Tank divisions that cannot leave Germany!
How are immobile land forces that cannot reach the theatre capable of applying pressure? HOW!?
While I don’t necessarily agree with his force structure, and sometimes find him a little bullish I think that DomJ makes a very good point here.
Having the biggest most blinged up army in northern Europe does us no good if it;
a) can’t go anywhere, &
b) can’t support itself in the field when it can get there
I recall reports from GW2 in which RMs complained that they had no ammunition.
I think that the question of balance must be looked at in minutiae, as a large force with no logistics capability is no force at all.
Cheers, Alan.
Dom.
Dieppe is more than relevant. It tested, if we can use that word, the ability to seize a port, ie a contested enemy position. Your little brigade comes up against a problem if it cannot chose precisely where it wants to land.
To you both.
A maritime strategy has repeatedly failed this country throughout its history. Every idea you think is so novel about strategic raiding has been tried since Tudor times and almost always been found wanting. I can list them all if I had the time. In every case, the big issues were decided by land armies as part of coalitions. Land forces are the crux. They are, to use an often misused word, the schwerpunkt. I have never advocated a weak navy. All this arguing that we can’t afford both is defeatist toss. Throughout history land forces have been decisive, even at the pinnacle of Royal Navy strength in 1914 a land army was decisive. Same in 1945. Same in 1850. Same in 1815. Same in most other wars between nations.
What’s the national benefit of “Strategic raiding”.
What’s the ratio of benefit : costs ?
Looking back, I don’t see how several billions GBP p.a. could have been justified by the benefits arising from 1982-2011 actions, escpecially after taking into account the various cost of the conflicts themselves.
It seems odd to assume that the ‘deterrence’/'influence’ benefits could be so large as to fill the multi billion GBP p.a. gap.
The forces involved are rather small, after all.
I don’t see how such forces could be a cost-efficient contribution to alliance defence either.
I think there’s a fetish here with the USMC and some testy eyed notion of waving the war fleet off from Portsmouth to land a tiny brigade to slash and burn a tiny bit of an enemy country. Done before. Several times. And everyone was left scratching their heads when the enemy just ignored them and carried on. This was happening in The Hundred Years war for gods sake. The enemy can’t ignore huge land forces bearing down on its territory though. Oh but we don’t have a huge army. Never have, hence coalitions. Not as sexy as a wannabe USMC though and some make believe ships.
Breaking windows with Guineas all over again.
Phil I did not advocate a maritime strategy, nor did I advocate strategic raiding. What I did advocate was taking the point that our army can do do nothing until it arrives in theatre, and can do nothing there if it out runs it’s supply lines and/or cannot be maintained.
Just to clarify I think that both the global guardian and strategic raiding models are a crock.
And regarding force balance having 36 infantry battalions is pointless if they can’t be deployed, likewise having a T46/47/whatever ship that is missing it’s principal weapons system (fitted for but not with ring a bell?) is equally as pointless.
The point is that all three services need to be deployable AND sustainable once deployed.
Alan.
Sorry Alan you were caught in the cross fire.
There’s nothing new in what you say, it’s all logistical truths. But the Army is eminently mobile. We are fighting a campaign in a landlocked country thousands of miles away right now. As for sea lane control China straw man argument (not yours but I’m on one) we’ll no more be fighting China alone than Denmark would have fought the Soviets alone. We have a capable and potent navy, we have a capable and potent air force, we have a capable and potent army that is strategically mobile. Arguing that the enemy might try and disrupt a deployment is no argument against deleting that capability, a key and fundamental capability. I cannot see how people her can escape the conclusion of history, strategic raiding is a five hundred year old idea in this country and countless times it’s simply resulted in death, defeat, or simply nothing at all. A waste of money. As I said, it’s breaking windows with Guineas, a phrase coined in the Napoleonic wars when we dispatched ‘pocket division’ sized forces to France, cut around a bit, left and then wondered why France and her half a million strong Army didn’t immediately collapse.
Phil
“Dieppe is more than relevant. It tested, if we can use that word, the ability to seize a port, ie a contested enemy position.”
But thats insanity.
The whole point of manouver warfare is to NOT charge headlong at enemy strong points.
“Your little brigade comes up against a problem if it cannot chose precisely where it wants to land.”
Indeed it does. But what enemy can guard every section of the coast line?
You mention Dieppe, but there were hundreds of Commando raids in the second world war, more than a few in France, some were expensive wins (St Nazierre), some were expensive disasters (Dieppe), other were cheap, quiet war winners.
We repeatedly parachuted in commando units to draw/photgraph/measure/steal radar componants who got in and out with little loss.
But your land army comes up against a bigger problem, because it only has troop transportation for 1000 men. I’d love both, but at the end of the day, what matters, is deployable strength. A tank that cannot be deployed to the war is less than useless.
I’d love to deploy an armoured divison, if it makes you feel better and someone explains what one entails, I’ll have a crack at the force required, but it quickly gets expensive, and I dont believe a 5% defence budget awaits us come 2020.
“even at the pinnacle of Royal Navy strength in 1914 a land army was decisive.”
No it wasnt.
In 1914, what mattered, was a small elite army, and a Navy that was starving Germany into submission.
Come 1916, what mattered, was a massive Imperial armym and a Navy that could transport them across the world, and starve Germany into submission.
Come 1918, what mattered, was a massive American Army and a Navy that was starving Germany into submisson.
The Indian Army was of no use, unless it could be transported to the warzones.
Come 1944/45, The American and Russian Armies dwarfed ours, and we were junior partners, kept out of much of the decision making.
SO
Benefits. Competant military adventurism.
Ratio, unknown.
I have little arguement against reforming the UK military as a national defence force, pulling out of NATO and spending 0.5% of GDP.
“I don’t see how such forces could be a cost-efficient contribution to alliance defence either.”
As I said, in the event of a war with Russia, I believe the UK should seize the bases of the Northern Fleet.
Germany/France/Italy/Spain/Portugal should be more concerned with the defence of the Mainland, what with them being on it.
Phil Again
“I think there’s a fetish here with the USMC and some testy eyed notion of waving the war fleet off from Portsmouth to land a tiny brigade to slash and burn a tiny bit of an enemy country.”
Its funny, Suez seemed to provoke quite a reaction…
“The enemy can’t ignore huge land forces bearing down on its territory though”
And how do you propose to move huge land forces from Caterick to….
@ Dom J,
just a couple of points in between meetings:
Your belief that the Land* force you mention of 5,000 men is capable of doing the business in the mud is only true of some vanishingly small number of scenarios.
The Army managed to get a Division to Gulf 1 using STUFT and a mix of RAF and commercial airlift. I didn’t do Gulf 2, but suspect it was about the same. Your proposed Maritime Fleets x 2 could no doubt also do the same amount of lifting very well (less the 62 container ships of logistics that 1 Div took for Gulf 1), but to posit that the Army is incapable of getting itself anywhere without RN support is a little disingenuous, I feel.
I think it is a “brave” assumption to make that a full service and some new bits would be enough spares for a 60 day campaign. Battle damage doesn’t care if the gearbox is brand new, tracks and wheels blown off by AP mines, optics shattered by shrapnel, etc. My Challenger 2 even when fairly new broke down every 100 or so miles, and not through a lack of TLC but because it was inherently unreliable.
Regarding GW2, logistics, deployment from the sea and general issues to always keep in consideration when doing this kind of thinking on strategic raiding:
- over 90% (90 to 95%, in fact) of freight and kit deployed for Telic with ships. 4 Point Class RoRo, in those days just arrived in service, transferred, alone, 11% of the load. 60 commercial ships were chartered to carry the rest, for an expense of 70 million pounds. The merchant ships were escorted all along by the RN, since terrorist attacks at sea were feared: 16 High-Value RN and RFA ships and over 50% of the deployable escort fleet were involved.
- Remaining 10% of the stuff, mostly personnel, were moved by air, with roughly half carried by the RAF, thanks mostly to the, again back then brand new, 4 leased C17.
Chartered civilian flights cost 53.5 million pounds. In particular, access to AN124 Condor airplanes was judged “critical”.
- Size of deployment summarized in 73 ship moves and over 1200 chartered and military aircraft sorties. The daily air resupply peak was 254 tons per day delivered.
- Kuwait was tiny and filled to capacity: there were only two points of entry for sealift and one for airlift, shared with the americans. The issue was serious: the americans kept some formations back and on the ships simply because there was no way to land them, and it was assessed that, even with more strategic lift assets, deploying faster would have been impossible for lack of entry points.
A little-considered issue of basing support abroad. It was actually a big issue, due mainly to Saudi Arabia denying use of its own bases.
Even more significant was the declaration of Brigadier Dutton after the war:
‘The ships were critical, not just for 3 Commando Brigade but for the whole of 1 UK Division. Unlike 1990, the deployment happened very quickly and it took some time for the land logistical system to catch up. So, in fact, during the entire build-up to the operation, and even when the assault had actually started, 1 UK Div were heavily dependent on the seaborne stocks originally designated for just one brigade, that is, for 3 Commando Brigade.’
Rear Admiral Snelson also added:
‘It is perhaps worth mentioning that, of the 30 days of supply that we took for the Brigade at sea (3rd Commando), 20-plus days of supply were landed into Kuwait for the use not only of the Brigade but also of the whole UK Division. It had had to move from the north, from Turkey, in its planning, to the south, and we were able to provide significant logistics support from the sea to help the Division until its own logistics flowed in. [note: the UK initially had been planning to act mainly in the North of Iraq, from Turkey, alongside 4th Mechanized brigade US. The whole plan went to hell when Turkey denied support] The fact that much of our logistics support was in amphibious ships meant that we did not have to get involved in the blocked-up Kuwaiti ports, we could put it over the beaches and land it in a quasi-tactical way and then drive inland. So three countries, fundamentally. Yes, we did get the support required. Personally, I would have liked to be authorised to approach those countries earlier in the operation to set up the arrangements, but they were very helpful and it worked.’
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmdfence/57/3120306.htm
Ships also provided helicopter mainteinance facilities and engineering support: helos were flown in regularly to be checked and fixed. This also is important.
In terms of influence, i do not think i can agree with Phil on the Army being the greater provider of influence and relevance for the UK.
The willingness to deploy forces on the ground, certainly buys influence, and a lot of it.
But this is not exactly the same as saying that the British Army buys the most influence for the UK. It is not an armoured brigade that buys the UK support: it is the ability and political willingness to deploy efficient and well trained ground forces where they are needed.
This may seem to make little difference, but it is actually a fundamental one.
As it is, even the biggest efforts made by the British Army, once you go and look into them, turn out being shaped, enabled and made relevant by capabilities provided by RN and RAF.
Kit-wise, honestly, the list of things that buy influence for the UK before arriving to Challenger II is immense, and starts with Trident, followed by SSNs, TLAM, RFA, AWACS, ISTAR like Sentinel and Rivet Joint, and other enablers.
In operation Telic, the USMC 15 MEU was put under command of 3rd Commando Brigade, only case of US forces subject to UK ones in the campaign.
It was not a case.
@ Dom J,
the Land* is meant to be inclusive of RM, RAF Regt, not only Army.
Thank you Phil, I am occasionally guilty of early retaliation.
I we take the position that Strategic Raiding is flawed as a national strategy for defence, and is an option best kept in the kit bag. Where do we end up with over all force structure and ratios?
I had heard somewhere that the British field army (rather than the administrative entity) numbers around the 20-25,000 mark, is this the case?
If so, bearing in mind that more cuts ARE on the way where will this leave us when the army drops below the 100,000 strong mark?
Personally I think that the “pocket division” has it’s place as an option, I think that the changes should occur in field HQs to allow them to cope with troop surges in theatre.
I’m harking back to Major General Cordingley’s “Eye of the Storm” where he remarks on the strain placed on his HQ and him personally by the swelling of his brigade to a brigade group.
Cheers, Alan.
James
“The Army managed to get a Division to Gulf 1 using STUFT and a mix of RAF and commercial airlift.”
But only because we sailed their under US protection and Saudi/Kuwair let us base in their country.
Neither of which can be guarenteed*, and both of which are “black marks” against us, along with “dont bring own ammo”.
During the second world war, Nationalist China took to conscripting an army. It went into a village, tied up all the men it could capture, marched them to a US base, and said, heres an army, all it needs is food, weapons, uniforms, ammunition and training. It was far from ideal.
*Remember, in the second guld war, the UK was supposed to come in North from Turkey, but those bases were denied to us.
“but to posit that the Army is incapable of getting itself anywhere without RN support is a little disingenuous, I feel.”
It needs someones support, either the RN need to deploy it violently, or Saudi/Kuwait need to ensure it can be deployed peacefully
“I think it is a “brave” assumption to make that a full service and some new bits would be enough spares for a 60 day campaign. Battle damage doesn’t care if the gearbox is brand new, tracks and wheels blown off by AP mines, optics shattered by shrapnel, etc. My Challenger 2 even when fairly new broke down every 100 or so miles, and not through a lack of TLC but because it was inherently unreliable.”
And thats where the expert knowledge comes in, which I am always grateful for.
Battledamage, you’ve got me that, that would of course need repairing.
But a Challenger 2 that “is unreliable” shouldnt be in the army.
Some of the comments made are pefectly justified, I dont have any close in or technical knowledge, but others simply arent, and thats one of the “simply arent”, send it back to factory for a rebuild or dump if off a ship as a fish habitat, if it doesnt work, it doesnt belong in “my” army.
“Your belief that the Land* force you mention of 5,000 men is capable of doing the business in the mud is only true of some vanishingly small number of scenarios.”
Maybe, as I (meant to say?) said, this is just a general plan. If 5000 isnt enough, I’m happy to review (within reason) Its just operating on a 6 brigade level is tricky.
I’m not averse to one pocket divison going in “over the beach” and another being held on Point type vessels further back, but you dont get more men, you just use them more, and thats predicated on one pocket divison not being over seas already.
Gabriele
Not sure if you’re agreeing with me or not there?
I accept 6 T45′s sounds a lot, but really, once you split off carrier to do something, decide to land at 2 sites, and keep your oilers far back, well, you’ve got 4 sites to defend.
“The willingness to deploy forces on the ground, certainly buys influence, and a lot of it.
But this is not exactly the same as saying that the British Army buys the most influence for the UK. It is not an armoured brigade that buys the UK support: it is the ability and political willingness to deploy efficient and well trained ground forces where they are needed.
This may seem to make little difference, but it is actually a fundamental one.”
Exactly!
Its not having land force that matters, its being able to use it.
And an honest look has to say we cant.
We have 10,000 men in Afghanistan, but the vast majority of supplies arent flown in by the RAF, they are sailed in, by the Points, but the points can only function because Pakistan lets dock at Karachi, and truck through Balochistan and then through Afghanistan, bribing tribal militias all the way.
If Pakistan closed Karachi, I think the next most viable route would be the trans siberian rail road. Or of course, if the tribals decided they didnt want bribes anymore.
Its hard to argue we have influence in Afghanistan, when at any point, Pakistan can shut us off.
Going to war under US aircover, getting there on US troop ships, protected by US escorts and fireing US ammunition in theatre isnt (to my mind) the hall mark of an equal partner, or even a junior partner.
It honestly sounds more like we’re a tributory state paying a levy….
I don’t think Dom’s proposed land or naval force structures are 100% right. That said, I hope to goodness that we aren’t going to be facing down 500k-strong armies any time soon but it seems to me that if we did need to do that the only way to survive while it gets to us is to have a basis from which to regenerate a larger force than we wish to maintain in peacetime. Whether in coalition or against a coalition if we have limited capability across a range of (sorry) warfighting tasks then we stand a better chance of scaling up than we do if we’ve decided not to bother maintaining that seedcorn capability. That applies I think across all the services. Furthermore, as states totter and fail across the world, new powers come to the fore and competing world views clash who can honestly say that we won’t need to intervene in some limited way somewhere? Alan’s point about the logistical imperative is also right. Whether in coalition or not, having the ability to deploy and support a formation of some size or other is surely the difference between having something and having nothing, IMHO. Just my two cents.
All
As I’ve said, I’m very happy to accept changes to this, providing they fit within a justificable remit.
I fully accept 5000 men is a very small number.
But 10,000 men, times up by 6 Brigades/PocketDivisions is 60,000 men, add in ancilliaries, for training, development and the like, and you’ve pretty much hit the 80,000 limit thats funded in the SDSR/FF2020
No spare funds means not improved logistics train, no on site spares shelf, no additional transport assets to deploy the larger army and so on.
@DomJ
My own force structure probably would be less… dramatic a change from what FF2020 is about. I’ve long been planning to do a series of posts on my Blog to show how i would do SDSR15 to fix the route, and the force structure emerging from it will be different from your own here and there.
But i agree with you on the general concepts backing the reasoning.
@ DominicJ,
there may be some terminology problems here that are obscuring clarity.
Your Land component is nothing more than a small Brigade. It’s not a Division, pocket or not. The Regiments / Battalions you outlined in your first piece are completely sub-optimal in size. The Division is missing many of the vital combat support and combat service support enablers, such as supply, transportation, medical and repair organisations, organic ISTAR and aviation. Without those, the Land force is going to get about ten miles from the beach and then run out of the ability to do very much.
A Brigade of the size you posit (even with the missing organisations) is going to be able to take on and defeat perhaps two enemy Battalions in prepared positions, or to conduct peace enforcement operations over an English county size (we had at one point that I can remember 12 Battalions in Northern Ireland, it may have been more in the 70s).
I really think if we want to “do” something of strategic importance on land we are going to need the capability of fielding a proper Division, and supporting it for 6 months, which strangely enough is I think what the MoD call these days a large scale commitment. I may be out of date on terminology.
I think you and I are probably coming at this from opposite perspectives. Mine is: given a need to do something on land for X months, what forces do I need to achieve the aim (which come from the pointy bits from all three services, plus SF)? Composition, etc. Then working back, how do I get them there? How do I keep them supplied, etc. Then working on from there, what supporting military forces (floaty things, air transport, Int, air control, etc) do I need to maintain an adequate level of security for the duration of the operation? What level of supplies do I need to support the operation? Are the air and sea lines of communication guaranteed, or do I need to protect them? etc etc. Not trying to teach you to suck eggs, merely illustrating my thought process. Clearly, if the planned operation is exclusively maritime or air based (e.g. Armilla or the Iraqi No Fly Zones back in the 90s), then the service delivering the main effect will not be the Army, so this is not an Army-centric view.
With very great respect, your original post did not include any strategic background or rationale, but started with what I can only describe as a chuffing great Navy costed in huge detail, and a Land component that would struggle to evict the smallest conceivable prepared enemy, so long as it was conveniently close to a beach.
In the numbers game, compare
RM + 16AAB =15.000
leave behind some base personnel, perhaps even some army support for the RM (depending on the type of Op)
add back SF, their recce rgmnt and the SFSG
=> you are back at the 15 thousand
The current intervention force is substantially larger than the one posited, even if you cut all the rest of “Land”
Just to remind everyone
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/04/libya-liam-dave-mike-bob-and-the-sdsr/defence-planning-assumptions/
yep that’s what i’m saying, and to back james up, deploying onto thetford/salisbury/otterburn for a 2 week exercise you will find that the last packet out is a REME recovery section, for a very good reason!!!
Plus on that exercise you would recieve an absolute mountain of work, i mean thousands of manhours and that’s just optronics, back in germany 80′s 90′s pack section would be running out of spares end of 2 weeks. If everything could work hunky dory for 60 days REME would’ve gone years ago.
Phil i could fill a thread with stories like that, ones like the life guards 2lt with more surnames than a school register and the plummy voice ripping me a new arsehole about the radio not working in front of everyone in the comms tent he didn’t look a tw@ when i turned the tx power selector from 0 to 50!(1 click left)
@solomon
many think it’s alright, not brilliant, but it works, however with all this joint carrier business and us being as poor as church mouses, well you can see where it’s going!! although someone needs to have a chat about how much they think it’s worth. I find the general feeling on here is the super hornet is prefered by more. Perhaps, and it is a perhaps people over here got a little pissed off when congress got all shitty about software transfers.
What with your A400 post and this i’m thinking you’ve got a downer on us, c’mon fella c’mon let’s have a big hug, aww come on you know want to!!
Paul, Ruperts and Radios should never be allowed to mix
Doms force exists in a world where all those pesky logistical problems, and those annoying medical concerns, and those irritating maintenance problems don’t matter because he has decided that they do not. I see 10 infantrymen need to do the VM course now. And the CMT course. At last count. And all command staffs have to get extensive experience in amphibious, air assault and mechanised operations all at the same time.
Gabriele
I’d be very interested to see it.
James
“there may be some terminology problems here that are obscuring clarity.”
Almost certainly.
“A Brigade of the size you posit (even with the missing organisations) is going to be able to take on and defeat perhaps two enemy Battalions in prepared positions, or to conduct peace enforcement operations over an English county size (we had at one point that I can remember 12 Battalions in Northern Ireland, it may have been more in the 70s).”
I dont disagree.
But how many Battalions does the enemy have?
Theres a pretty hefty limit to what they can defend if they need three battalions to keep us out.
If they have 30 infantry battalions, they can defend 10 targets.
Do they defend the Presidential Palace? The Central Bank? I’m not above arresting the president and confiscating your gold reserves.
Do they defend their 4 military airports? I’ll happily crater the run way and arrive to confiscate the stranded planes and munitions.
Their equivilant of Horseguards? I’m sure if we walked in and stole all the filing cabinets, computers and servers, we’d really ruin their day if we wiki leaked it.
And of course, three battalions dug in, how much artilery ammunition do they have? How much air defence. How long can they hold out against our airpower, missiles and ground attack? We dont need to close in, at what point do they surrender?
They cant be reinforced or relieved, not without someone else coming out of those prepared positions, and engaging us in a manouvere war, where we own the air.
How long can the government survive before the populace loses confidence and turns on it?
“I really think if we want to “do” something of strategic importance on land we are going to need the capability of fielding a proper Division, and supporting it for 6 months, which strangely enough is I think what the MoD call these days a large scale commitment. I may be out of date on terminology.”
Maybe, but 20,000 Men and 600 armoured vehicles, plus all the “other” kit, I dont see how we can possibly deploy that without being a drain on someone elses transport.
And without increasing the size of the army or stamping all over the harmony guidelines.
“With very great respect, your original post did not include any strategic background or rationale, but started with what I can only describe as a chuffing great Navy costed in huge detail, and a Land component that would struggle to evict the smallest conceivable prepared enemy, so long as it was conveniently close to a beach.”
My first post, was little more than hastily scribbled together notes, the second isnt much more
But there was some thought behind it.
Lets pick on Argentina, thats always fun.
On the Argentine Coast, there is a place, Rio Gallegos.
In Rio Gallegos, there is the
11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade HQ (Río Gallegos)
24th Mechanized Infantry Regiment (Río Gallegos)
11th Mechanized Signal Company (Río Gallegos)
11th Intelligence Company (Río Gallegos)
Logistic & Support Base “Río Gallegos” (Río Gallegos)
11th Army Aviation Section (Río Gallegos)
In my understanding, the Deployed Brigade I outlined should be able to kill/capture that force quickly and easily.
Maybe I’m wrong.
And also, in my understanding capturing signals and intelligence equipment people is usualy disasterous for the other side.
Maybe I’m wrong
Argentina isnt likely to collapse over the matter.
However, one does wonder, why exactly they would consider such a disaster “acceptable losses”.
Even better if Chile decides its a perfect time to raise the Tierra Del Fuego question.
ACC
But is that the Case?
Neither one exists as a “ready” formation, most of the time, at least one of them is heavily commited in Afghanistan, if they arent, they are “commited” to NATO operations in Norway/Germany.
And thats only two forces. If one covers emergencies 6 months of the year, and the other covers it for the other 6 months, well, things are different, but in my understanding, thats not the way the army works.
PaulG
I’m struggling to conceive of equipment that runs for an hour and then needs to be rebuilt by REME
Not saying it doesnt exist, but, wow.
Surely I cant be the only one who thinks that is really really wrong?
Phil
I repeat, if you arent going to contribute constructivly, please go elsewhere.
I do contribute Dom. I’ve told you your whole idea is flawed. I’ve told you why. And others have said the same. You just don’t like what I have to say. Your idea is a stratrgic nonstarter and history has shown time and time again that this is the case. You over simplify. Landing a brigade, driving inland a bit, having a brew and then pissing off again wouldn’t impress a Sudanese warlord let alone a peer enemy. That’s before we get to the idea of using the nations armed forces to hold a building hostage. Guineas with windows Dom.
@ Dominc J,
a few thoughts on your outline scenarios, some of which I either took part in or was on the plans team back in the UK:
Libya 2011: No ground forces allowed by mandate, so your force is probably adequate (assuming some air ISTAR, C2 and refuelling assets available). But I was out for 8 years by that point, so my views are only those from watching the news / reading the papers.
Iraq 2003: You mischaracterise the fighting that took place in the area, especially in Basra. SCOTS DG took out 13 tanks in the centre of Basra: air power could not for Rules of Engagement and collateral damage reasons. Two armoured infantry battle groups needed to back them up. “Someone else would have to manage Basra” seems to me to be an admission of a reduced role for the UK. It took a complete Division of about 25,000 to manage the area we were assigned.
Afghanistan 2001: Your occupation notes also imply a reduced role for the UK. You are going to need to airlift in the vehicles at some point, so C17s needed. Knocking down whole towns and rebuilding them is completely beyond my ability to comprehend (why?), and I’m not an engineer, but it sounds to me as though that is a massive construction task that would need massive amounts of troops to protect and to train up all of those second sons. And a huge logistics train to truck in all of the supplies, which would need protecting as well. There was an operation to move some heavy plant equipment up to a dam a couple of years ago: that move took an entire Brigade to secure a route, and over a month to plan. Your town rebuilding sounds about 100 times more effort!
Sierra Leone: you will need ground forces to find and either laser designate targets or pass accurate grids up to the air, plus a controlling HQ. Do-able by your forces though.
Kosovo 99: Achievable by your forces, assuming access to a coastal port for immediate reinforcement.
Bosnia 92. Not a disaster at all through our efforts, but grossly hampered by UN ROE. Again, you would need access to a port (we used Split) and a fairly serious logistics train to move an armoured Brigade into Bosnia. We had an entire Logistics Brigade of about 7,000 and something like 1500 trucks to get us in, which then reduced down to a steady state of about 3,000 and 500 trucks. Most convoys needed close protection and escorting on the supply routes once over the Bosnian border, which took an entire armoured infantry battalion.
Iraq 91: Your land component would have been a pimple and too small for the Theatre Commander to care much about. Your force is smaller than the French half Division of around 12,000 which was shoved out onto the western flank to get it out of the way, and who had the most enormous problems as a result running a logistics train of around 800 kilometres. I’m also not convinced that light infantry would have been much use beyond perhaps seizing some terrain with an airmobile assault, but you’ve only got enough heavy lift helicopters for one battalion.
Falklands 82: The only tracked vehicles that could manoeuvre in the Falklands were CVR(T). Everything else is too heavy for the boggy ground (less BV202). Everyone would be walking. 24 Chinook would make logistics a lot easier than they were in 82, but assuming availability of 75% there would not be enough for much in the way of troop lift. And I don’t think our Land forces want to go back to Chieftain: they’re on Challenger 2 now!