The Pocket Division

A guest post from Dom J

 

In the Spirit of Ixions recent threads, I thought I would write down my thoughts on what the UKshould do.  These are my current thoughts, although I claim no ownership of them, and have stolen most of them from others anyway and I am happy to adjust my thinking.

I’ve suggested functions and ship classes, based on what we already own, whats already out there, and what we might conceivably end up with, fell free to make suggestions

I’ve guestimated purchase costs from wikipedia and a few other sources, and operating costs from the 08/09 Mod Accounts.

I’m not wedded to any of these numbers, and will not take it as a personal insult if anyone wishes to suggest better numbers, however I’d rather people didn’t just shout “that’s ****”.

So here goes

I’d start, with the “war fleet”, of which we would have two, each one “active” for 6 months of the year, or 8 months, or 4 months, or whatever else makes everyone happy.

Active would be “ready to at short notice go and beat some unfortunate foreigners to a bloody pulp”.

Inactive would be everything else, overhaul, training, diplomacy, exercises ect.

War Fleet Compostion Purchase Cost Operating Cost
Carrier QE Class

3,700,000,000

400,000,000

24 Fast Air Rafale

1,680,000,000

288,000,000

Assault Ship Juan Carlos

490,000,000

100,000,000

Assault Ship Juan Carlos

490,000,000

100,000,000

Assault Ship Juan Carlos

490,000,000

100,000,000

Assault Ship Juan Carlos

490,000,000

100,000,000

Assault Ship Juan Carlos

490,000,000

100,000,000

Assault Ship Juan Carlos

490,000,000

100,000,000

24 Heavy Lift Chinook

720,000,000

192,000,000

Landing Ship Bay Class

228,000,000

100,000,000

Landing Ship Bay Class

228,000,000

100,000,000

Landing Ship Bay Class

228,000,000

100,000,000

Landing Ship Bay Class

228,000,000

100,000,000

Landing Ship Bay Class

228,000,000

100,000,000

Landing Ship Bay Class

228,000,000

100,000,000

Destroyers T 45 Daring Class

650,000,000

70,000,000

Destroyers T 45 Daring Class

650,000,000

70,000,000

Destroyers T 45 Daring Class

650,000,000

70,000,000

Destroyers T 45 Daring Class

650,000,000

70,000,000

Destroyers T 45 Daring Class

650,000,000

70,000,000

Destroyers T 45 Daring Class

650,000,000

70,000,000

6 Light Helicopter Lynx

180,000,000

24,000,000

Frigates T46

750,000,000

70,000,000

Frigates T46

750,000,000

70,000,000

Frigates T46

750,000,000

70,000,000

Frigates T46

750,000,000

70,000,000

Frigates T46

750,000,000

70,000,000

Frigates T46

750,000,000

70,000,000

6 ASW Helicopter Merlin

180,000,000

48,000,000

Guided Missile Cruiser T47

1,000,000,000

70,000,000

Guided Missile Cruiser T47

1,000,000,000

70,000,000

Guided Missile Cruiser T47

1,000,000,000

70,000,000

SSGN/ Deterrent Astute+

3,000,000,000

180,000,000

SSGN/ Deterrent Astute+

3,000,000,000

180,000,000

SSGN/ Deterrent Astute+

3,000,000,000

180,000,000

SSGN/ Deterrent Astute+

3,000,000,000

180,000,000

 

Purchase Cost for the Two Fleets is £34,168,000,000 and operating costs £3,922,000,000

These would kick the doors in, deploy a pocket division and support it in theatre, as part of a coalition, great, or alone if required.

Said Pocket Divison, I know even less about, but I would put manpower somewhere around 5000, and would hope it contained some heavy armour, some IFV and a rather large light infantry component.

The original suggestion was 10 “Battalions”,

A dedicated Armour Battalion,

2 Armoured Infantry Battalions,

An Artilery Battalion

4 Light infantry battalions (possibly one Para and one RM special forces lite)

An Engineer Battalion

And a “Headquarters” Battalion

 

Its interesting to note the entire Royal Marines budget in 08/09 was £620mn, I assume that includes Warthog/Viking ect. 6 Royal Marine Brigades of over 8,000 men would come in at a mere 3bn.  Unless the Army funds any RM work  Do the RM have any sort of organic engineer capability?

Added to this, I’d want TD’s precious presence squadrons, however, I’d give them serious teeth.

 

Third Fleet Cost Operating Costs
Patrol Ship ClydeClass

47,000,000

10,000,000

Patrol Ship ClydeClass

47,000,000

10,000,000

Patrol Ship ClydeClass

47,000,000

10,000,000

Patrol Ship ClydeClass

47,000,000

10,000,000

Patrol Ship ClydeClass

47,000,000

10,000,000

Patrol Ship ClydeClass

47,000,000

10,000,000

Patrol Ship ClydeClass

47,000,000

10,000,000

Patrol Ship ClydeClass

47,000,000

10,000,000

Mine Hunter Absalon Class

269,000,000

30,000,000

Mine Hunter Absalon Class

269,000,000

30,000,000

Mine Hunter Absalon Class

269,000,000

30,000,000

Mine Hunter Absalon Class

269,000,000

30,000,000

Mine Hunter Absalon Class

269,000,000

30,000,000

Mine Hunter Absalon Class

269,000,000

30,000,000

Mine Hunter Absalon Class

269,000,000

30,000,000

Mine Hunter Absalon Class

269,000,000

30,000,000

SSN Astute

2,410,000,000

180,000,000

SSN Astute

2,410,000,000

180,000,000

SSN Astute

2,410,000,000

180,000,000

 

Base one fleet in theUK, one on Diego Garcia, and just to ensure there are no ‘misunderstandings’, one on theFalklands.

As above, these are just suggestions rather than absolutes, I’d be open to mixing some Bays in there, or something else?  TheUKfleet would probably want more mine hunters than the Diego Fleet and so on.  The SSNs are there to ensure any warship picking a fight with aClydedoesn’t make it home afterwards.  And of course, why not?

I haven’t covered the RAF, at all, and the army in very little detail, but, I have limits.

Feel free to make suggestions and I’ll try and write it up.

If my costings are within reason, and we accept the 6x Royal Marines in place of the army, then the suggestion clocks in at around £14bn per year, compared with the current budget of £17bn.

88 thoughts on “The Pocket Division

  1. James Bulloch

    @ Jed

    HCR? Please, I never joined the paramilitary wing of the London Tourist Board. 16th/5th The Queen’s Royal Lancers for 10 years, SCOTS DG for another 10.

    @ Chris B,

    very early calculations, certainly not including related costs from other lines of development:

    4 x Formation Recce Regts, each with 4 Squadrons, 2 each of Jackal and 2 each of either Stryker (unit cost $1.42M) or Bradley M3 CFW (unit cost $3.16M). Prices converted to £ at $1.50. Jackal unit cost £320,000. Each Regiment 4 Squadrons, each 5 Troops of 4 vehicles. That was about the establishment of Formation Recce when I served, and it worked.

    Stryker + Jackal Equipment purchase cost £202.7M
    Bradley CFV + Jackal Equipment purchase cost £388.9M

    Either option could have been in service from 2007 onwards, beating the FRES SV ISD by 2 years, and actually being useful in Afghanistan, as opposed to being the Army’s bargaining chip in SDSR in 2009 and not existing in the metal.

    I wouldn’t claim that that combination would be an enduring capability for FRES SV, but it has the possibility to become so. There’s all sorts of detail to be factored in, plus a few supporting capabilities such as recovery and C2. Even as a stopgap against running on CVR(T), Scimitar 2 costs, the FRES SV Assessment Phase costs, and UOR costs, it would have bought us probably better capability than we currently have, a reasonable service life of another 10 years at least without upgrades from the current baseline, and could possibly be sold on to countries outside Europe if we needed to further upgrade in 2020.

    FRES SV was always the case of a man with a dodgy credit record and a knackered old Escort pressing his nose up against the windows of a Rolls Royce dealership. He’d have been better off trading up to a 3 year old Focus.

  2. Chris.B.

    One thing that’s been brought up James is the value of CVRT and of vehicles like Land Rover and Jackal.

    So the old theory behind these vehicles goes that they are small and light(ish) and can be used to move forward slowly, using cover and concealment to get into a position from which to observe the enemy and gather intelligence.

    But then GW2 comes along and we’re getting after action reports from coalition forces that the pace of operations were such that the “sneaky, stealthy” route wasn’t an option, and that instead formations had to fight for information often using Bradleys and Abrams tanks, because the lighter vehicles couldn’t stand the heat.

    Now you said you’ve been out for a while, but maybe you have old friends and connections with knowledge of what went down?

    Is there is a place for lighter vehicles still on the modern battlefield? Would they solely serve in the pre-battle stages, then withdraw to other roles once the main force crossed the start line?

    Or was GW2 just an exception? Can light recce elements in fact continue to operate in their main role and fill a wide range of subsidary roles?

  3. Repulse

    @Dom, thought provoking post… I’m definately on board with the spirit of what you are trying to achieve; high end core, “army” based on a light rapid reaction force (with heavy assistance at low readiness) Andre forward presence / patrol vessels. Also, we should consider a stretched Astute class for the SSBN role (with fewer tubes if necessary) to maximise the overall SSN / SSBN fleet size; the NAO report to me enforces that building a fleet of less than 12 subs actually costs as much as having the 12…

    Your fleet does come across as a fantasy fleet though. I do not see a need to have 2 fleets, having a pool of vessels rolling in and out of levels of readiness would be enough to construct a fleet of varying size to match the requirement.

    I feel a second batch of 6 extended T45s with a mission bay would be better than creating new classes. Unmanned capabilities for MCM, ASW and surveying will be available in 10 years; therefore the key for any platform is to be able to support these. The differentiation between platforms would be operating threat level, endurance and speed of delivery.

    The T26 should be the forward presence vessel, but dumbed down such that it will never go anywhere hot without a T45. Also, the design should have an enlarged mission bay capable of supporting 120 troops or additional dry supplies / fuel for extended endurance or act as a ‘buddy’ supply ship. We should aim for 12 if these to cover every ocean on the world / strategic area. Again, the real value of the vessel will be its mission bay and endurance. This leaves a EEZ patrol requirement which again could be a Clyde with a mission bay.

    I can see where you are going with the amphibious fleet, but i feel having 2-3 larger LHDs instead supported by additional Point type vessels (with Heli capability) and the additional capability bought by the T45 / T26 we would get more for our buck. A fleet of 4 T45s + 4 T26s could support close to a RM commando with helicopter support similar to the current HMS Ocean capability.

    Finally, I think the UK should be looking at an amphibious EFV (expeditionary fighting vehicle) which could be operated from a mission bay or delivered by Hercules / strung under a Chinook. Flexibility is the key!

  4. Gareth Jones

    @ Repulse – “The T26 should be the forward presence vessel, but dumbed down such that it will never go anywhere hot without a T45. Also, the design should have an enlarged mission bay capable of supporting 120 troops or additional dry supplies / fuel for extended endurance or act as a ‘buddy’ supply ship. We should aim for 12 if these to cover every ocean on the world / strategic area” – Wouldn’t an evolved Endurance LST or San Giorgio type vessel be a better vessel for this role? It would have to be faster, probably larger, and carry the armament of a corvette/frigate – essentially a LPD/Frigate hybrid?

    Something similar is suggested in Twilight of the Superfluous Carrier article:
    “One near-term option would be to truncate production of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and replace both the LCS and the Dock Landing Ship (LSD) with a common hull displacing around 10,000 tons…

    That small amphib would have a flight deck capable of handling all naval rotorcraft and a well-deck that could accommodate current ship-to-shore connectors, as well as future unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles. Building 60 of these combatants would provide significant strategic flexibility to the Fleet, allowing ships performing LCS missions to be easily sortied as amphibs in support of a large amphibious mission, should the need arise. Those ships would be the utility infielders of the Fleet, providing a tremendous platform for engagement missions and humanitarian-assistance/disaster-relief response at one end and amphibious operations and sea control at the other.

    This sort of mission flexibility should be considered a key design attribute for any future combatant. In addition, numbers count in two important ways. First, more ships allow the Fleet to operate forward in more places. Second, more numerous, smaller vessels provide a resilient and survivable high-low mix. Technology makes this disproportionate ratio of small to large combatants possible.”

    http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-05/twilight-uperfluous-carrier

  5. ArmChairCivvy

    Hi Repulse,

    I think along these lines as well ” “army” based on a light rapid reaction force (with heavy assistance at low readiness)” and we hopefully get to discuss the heavier forces in the context of
    - what do the reserves train for/ what kit will they have
    - and cadre-ization of such bdes, i.e. a training formation with enough regulars (and kit) and then just filling the “skeleton” by inserting battalions at mobilization
    - – or even companies, i.e. there would be a company-level standing training unit through which the rest of the companies in that bn would rotate for short training periods (as opposed to longer mobilisation, either for higher readiness or actual fielding of the higher level formation)

    I also like your positioning of T45s and T26s on the capability (and therefore cost) continuum, and when to pair them up and what to do in the more normal times.

  6. ArmChairCivvy

    Hi GJ,

    The design you are asking for exists (at least fairly close to…)by the company that builds the Endurances, on their website. It is ST something (part of the same Group that builds Warthogs & other land kit)

  7. Repulse

    @GJ, I also like the Endurance class and have toyed in the past that these could do the presence role, but I’ve discounted them for the RN because:
    * Building the T26 is likely to happen come what may (as the government is committed to it)
    * the Endurance is really a half way house between what I am suggesting in the T26 and an LHD. We do not have the amphibious lift requirement (e.g. troop numbers) for them and the LHDs. We could replace the LHD requirement however…
    * the Endurance is too slow at 15kts
    * the T26 will have good speed and also allow for the potential to be upgraded to a more capable ship in the time of crisis.
    * the T26 will have export potential and will mean that there is not a lapse in warship building.

    @ACC, I agree company sized units for the RM (and other rapid reaction forces) is an interesting proposal. The options for equipping them around what a T26 could support is a topic in itself…

  8. Jed

    James – I apologize for my blasphemy ! My father was Blues in Korea, so don’t be too hard on the breastplate wearing, horse riding crowd……..

    Ref your “interim” model Formation Recce capability – we have discussed many elements of this on this forum (and my time in Army was with Psyops – so certainly no expert !) but would not mixed tracked / wheeled capability in a single unit have resulted in highly complicated the logistics ?

    Why not 2 regiments purely tracked and 2 purely wheeled ?

    Finally, would you have kept the M3′s existing cannon (again, adding a new weapon to the Army’s logistics trail) ?

    Asking from pure curiosity for a true professionals take on such things – if you could find the time to write an article many of use would be greatly impressed – if you browse this site you may notice we have many discussions of armoured recce; size, weight, protection, guns versus missiles (or both) etc.

  9. Frenchie

    @Jed, I think that the best organisation would be three recce squadrons with each two tracked troops of four Scout vehicles for recce and one wheeled troop for lighting and investigation with four Foxhound, or more light vehicle.

  10. All politicians are the same

    On the subject of recon in GW2 anyone who has not seen “generation kill” HBO mini series based on 1st Us Marine recon battalion should check it out. very gritty funny and realistic. They were certainly ahead of the advance but were HUMVEE based.

  11. Repulse

    If the T26 got a flex deck the same size as the Absalon class (250 linear metres) that would be enough for a dozen BvS 10s, enough for a company of marines…

  12. James Bulloch

    Jed,

    Mixing wheels and tracks in the same unit is to an extent more of a challenge for both logistics and things such as the training burden, so everything else being equal you’d probably not. However, even an old style recce, armoured infantry or armoured regiment had about the same number of wheeled vehicles (LR, 4T, bowsers, etc) as tracks.

    For the sort of operation that this thread is all about, I would probably favour Stryker over Bradley. Strategic mobility is far higher, and operational mobility and reach higher with wheels.

    Weapons on recce wagons is always a passionate debate. Personally, I tend to go for stealth rather than fighting for information, so the weapon would be more defensive in nature. A combination 0.50 inch MG and 40mm AGL or Javelin on a Stryker remote weapons station would work for me. However, those favouring greater firepower seem to have gained the upper hand recently. The Warrior upgrade to 40mm CTA is an example.

    Part of the attraction with both Stryker and Bradley is the room in the back for specific equipment, or a pair of dismounts (perhaps a sniper team). The space in the back would also allow for the internal installation of a mast hosting optics and sensors. I saw the design for one of those offering I think about 7 metres of electrically powered elevation, and it was fairly compact (like a wheelie bin, including power supply). Masts are not fitted to either Stryker or Bradley, so the costs of doing so would be additional, but I don’t see too many engineering and integration challenges. Put a Longbow radar onto a mast in a pair of Strykers per Squadron and you’ve got a serious ISTAR asset.

    Overview of a Stryker video:

    @ Chris B, re speed / stealth

    Formation recce always needs to have both. Local stealth, and the ability to move rapidly to get out front or to an emergency flank guard. I think that both Stryker and Bradley CFV have the speed, Stryker is much quieter than any tracked vehicle I know of. Both are however quite bulky in comparison to CVR(T). Both are significantly more armoured than CVR(T). This sort of trade off however influences my thinking of having 2 Squadrons of Jackal (or maybe WMIK) and 2 of Stryker in a regiment: it gives the CO options.

  13. ArmChairCivvy

    Been promoting both of these ideas (whether on SV Scout or some other platform):
    “The space in the back would also allow for the internal installation of a mast hosting optics and sensors. I saw the design for one of those offering I think about 7 metres of electrically powered elevation, and it was fairly compact (like a wheelie bin, including power supply). Masts are not fitted to either Stryker or Bradley, so the costs of doing so would be additional, but I don’t see too many engineering and integration challenges. Put a Longbow radar onto a mast in a pair of Strykers per Squadron and you’ve got a serious ISTAR asset.”
    - the radar is never going to have the same range as looking down from a helo, but experiments in European type of terrain (vegetation not as dense as a jungle, and fairly open spaces and mainly gently undulating terrain)have shown the spotting and classifying of highly reflective metal objects (e.g. tanks) going out to 20km (isn’t that good enough?)

  14. Think Defence

    James B, as the others have said, we have been back and forth through recce concepts, vehicles and equipment endlessly, almost more than containers and mexeflotes, but thats another story :)

    If you get a few moments

    http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/06/the-future-of-the-british-army-06-%e2%80%93-istar-and-formation-reconnaissance-01/

    http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/06/the-future-of-the-british-army-06-%e2%80%93-istar-and-formation-reconnaissance-02-a-sensible-future/

    and this one, which was my looking into the shop window with a dodgy credit card!

    http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/07/the-future-of-the-british-army-08-%e2%80%93-istar-and-formation-reconnaissance-03-a-not-so-sensible-future/

    Jed, Monty, Phil Darley and others have also written some bloody excellent posts on the subject as well

  15. James Bulloch

    @ TD,

    thanks for the links. Will read through them. My starting point will be that formation recce has had too much concentration on the equipment, important as it is, and not enough on the effect that we need a recce capability to deliver. There’s all sorts of non-equipment things that should be done alongside buying some new wagon. Battlegrouping, and a willingness to use soldiers’ feet a little more would be a good place to start.

  16. Chris.B.

    @ James

    “Battlegrouping, and a willingness to use soldiers’ feet a little more would be a good place to start.”

    It’s practically law that you now have to expand on this subject.

  17. paul g

    james, firstly scots DG, great blokes i was 7 armd in fally working with them, our FRG had an even bigger reason to like them in GW1 but that’s another story (blue on blue prevented).
    what do you think of the fennek? wheeled but nice and low with an (admitally small) elevating mast on the back. RWS takes care of your firepower, a sort of 21st century ferret.
    Ferret reminds me of the time i did a PRE on the QDG’s in wolfenbuttel (another cracking unit) and one of the ferrets had a saddle instead of a cmmdrs seat, when i failed it the subby said it was alright as it was his, i informed he may command it but it belonged to her majesty’s army. Turns out because the REME (god bless the corp) wouldn’t let him put a saddle in one, he went and bought one at a mil surplus auction!! gotta love young double barrelled named cav officers

  18. James Bulloch

    @ Paul G,

    re saddles. When I was a really fresh-faced subby, the Sqn Ldr of HQ Sqn 16/5L was a tremendous fellow called Terry Ghillyer. Born on a troop train somewhere in India to the Farrier Sgt of 16/5L. Joined as a Trooper, went all the way to become a Lt Col (QM) and probably the RAC’s senior QM commissioned officer. Wonderful man. Anyway, he had his father’s 1930s army issue saddle converted into a desk chair, and he bulled and beeswaxed it every day. Very sadly he died a year or so ago. Always the Subby’s and Trooper’s friend, with a big heart.

  19. James Bulloch

    @ Chris B,

    too late tonight, and I’m a bottle of Shiraz downrange. I’ll give you some thoughts tomorrow.

  20. Think Defence

    Paul, bit excessive, failing a unit’s PRE for having a saddle instead of a seat :)

    If it was a cav unit are you sure it wasn’t on the CES !!!

  21. ArmChairCivvy

    Thanks GJ, that’s more like it
    “semi-automated means,including slaving EO payloads to the targets spotted by the radar.

    The vehicle carries the new EL/M-2207 electronically scanner array (AESA) detecting man-size targets at a distance of eight kilometers”

    Camo nets nearly defeating thermal imaging exist, but I doubt there is anything (light enough to be practical) to suppress the reflectiveness to radar.

    Thinking about audiosurveillance, not all sensors need to be packed onto one vehicle. If science hasn’t changed lately, to cover a 20km depth, you will need your audio sensors a couple of km apart
    - there is a tender running for the SV Scout kit, have not seen any detail about it

  22. paul g

    @TD, only failed the vehicle,but as it was a private vehicle made no difference, couldn’t fail a unit that invited us to the 3 day waterloo celebrations!! Back on track, AAC back in the 80-90′s we had this grey stuff called urban cam which was put over vehicles in a box shape to make it a “building shape” it was supposed to cut down on the thermal picture of all the 16/24 generators. Trouble was when you were underneath it you were sweating like gary glitter in toys are us! December in germany and it was t shirts and this stuff oh and it was bloody cumbersome.

    off thread and going back to my germany days, 13/18th took over from QDG and when delivering PRE report was admiring a beautiful wooden table in RHQ, mentioned to a 13/18th guy and he ever so casually replied “it’s napoleans he did his battle plans on it and we nicked it at waterloo”

  23. jed

    We have discussed sensors before so would just like to chip in the reminder that reconnaissance and survaillance are not interchangeable terms for the same thing – which is why there is an S and an R in ISTAR :-)

    So a light weight sensor mast might MAY be appropriate for an ‘armoured recce’ vehicle which is meant to be fighting for information (and you can debate that doctrine all you like but FRES Scout appears to be predicated on it). A turretless FRES SV support vehicle with a more robust mast (taking longer to raise and lower?) And integration of off board sensors (UGV and ubiquitous hand launched UAV) seems more appropriate than attempting to overload every individual Scout???

  24. jed

    If the super-duper IAI system fits in a Sandcat armoured vehicle, maybe we should rob the Husky back from the loggies?

  25. ArmChairCivvy

    Yeah, Jed, Husky (70-ish) of them
    - go anywhere
    - well protected

    … and my post was cut off (PC, Internet connection, who knows!), but put those things on the existing platforms…should work fine

    In the end, it is a screen
    - not as in the light armour, of, get there quick and provide a (flank) srceen for the main force

  26. ArmChairCivvy

    Just wondering,

    Battery level (Forward control) or higher up?
    - sensors are not, of course mutually exclusive, but the more you have, the less coordination there will be (given the space and the number of crew members)

  27. DominicJ

    fleet is written and expanded, army is, as good as i can go.
    Gonna go through ‘britains small wars’ (kick arse site) and say what my srpd would do in those circumstances.

    Could still use a quick breakdown of what a javelin detachment is ect.

  28. Kristian

    The person who wrote this has no concept of logistics or what it takes to support ground forces. The force structure is very heavy in vehicles and would need a tremendous amount of support personnel, supplies and equipment to make it work. To say “can’t we just fix it all before deployment and rely on a few spares” is a very juvenile understanding of operations.

  29. DominicJ

    kristian
    it wasnt supposed to be a detailed plan, it was just a few thoughts banged together, i’m working a new version, taking in to account peoples comments (bigger ground force and more detail).
    If you wish to provide a bit of a breakdown of a logistics trail, i’d be happy to make use of it

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