There was an interesting story in the news recently that described a startling fact.
Eighty percent of the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) planted in Afghanistan (resulting in 90% of all U.S. casualties) are made with components that come from just two legally operating factories in Pakistan.
It would be fair to assume that a similar figure would be true for UK forces.
There is no doubt that the IED is the single largest casuse of casualties and serious injuries for UK forces and the UK has devoted an enormous multi agency effort to reducing the impact of IED’s and defeating them.
Surely after nearly a decade in theatre, hundreds of casualties and several billion Pounds direct expenditure and just as much spent on aid to Pakistan would it be a reasonable expectation that the issue of legally produced ammonium nitrate fertiliser coming from just 2 factories would have been resolved.
The report goes on to say
Each year, the two factories each pump out about 400,000 metric tons of ammonium nitrate—a common fertilizer used by farmers—and about 1% of that makes it to insurgents, Lt. Gen. Michael Barbero, head of the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), said in a breakfast meeting with defense industry representatives this morning. While NATO forces have a lock on where the fertilizer comes from and where it goes upon initial sale, “what we don’t understand is how this ammonium nitrate gets from these factories to the insurgents,” he said
This is not a new story.
Writing in the Daily Telegraph in September 2009, Christopher Booker wrote
In the same month US Marines captured a vast cache of IEDs made from agricultural ammonium nitrate fertiliser in 25 kilogram bags indistinguishable from the thousands of tons of fertiliser supplied to Afghanistan under Western aid programmes. It has long been obvious that many of the roadside bombs used to kill British and other Western troops are made from fertiliser paid for by UK and other Western taxpayers.
Overlooking for one moment the influence of the Pakistan government are there are any alternatives to Ammonium Nitrate to stop it turning into Ammonium Nitrate Fule Oil (ANFO) explosives?
I looked at this when the story in the Telegraph was published, the MoD issued a press release stating that steps were taken to ensure the convertible ammonium nitrate was not supplied by it or DFiD in its projects but this obviously misses the point that the volume provided by the UK to Afghan farmers is minute in comparison to the total amount used.
In the Think Defence post I looked at a Honeywell product called Sulf N.
What is a non explosive fertiliser and what is an explosive fertiliser?
The real problem in interdicting supplies of ammonium nitrate based explosives is the fact that ANFO explosive is in widespread commercial use, as are ammonium nitrate fertilisers. From above, there are 2 large factories in Pakistan churning out tens of thousands of tonnes of the stuff.
Used as a high nitrate fertiliser it is produced by a number of industrial and small scale processes and usually packaged in bulk or in bags as small pellets or prills. Although it is not explosive in itself it is an oxidising agent and has been the cause of many industrial accidents, for example an explosion aboard an ammonium nitrate loaded ship in Texas City that killed over 500 people. Subsequent investigations have resulted in a number of storage recommendations and regulations that cover issues such as nitrate percentage, storage conditions, bulk and other conditions. In the UK, the Health and Safety Executive issues these regulations.
It is probably fair to say that in conflict zones, such best practice and regulations do not exist or are not complied with.
Ammonium Nitrate can be induced to decompose explosively by detonation and it is this that makes it attractive as both a commercial and improvised explosive. ANFO type explosives are the largest type in commercial use, mostly in the mining and construction industries. This commercial product is often mixed on site and is considered to be very safe. With an ever keen eye on cost reduction, the mining industry has now worked out how to utilise waste oil in slurry explosives.
When used as an explosive it needs a booster charge to initiate explosive decomposition and in large quantities can be incredibly destructive. The Oklahoma and Bishopgate bombs were reported as using ANFO or ANFO variants.
Ammonium Nitrate based fertilisers are widespread and therefore difficult to control, they remain a common and effective means of creating improvised explosives even though increasing regulation has reduced the demand.
Recognising the commercial potential benefit of a non explosive alternative Honeywell has developed Sulf-N-26 that fuses ammonium nitrate and ammonium sulphate.
From the Sulf-N website
- Sulf-N® 26 technology fuses ammonium nitrate (a fertilizer and explosive) with ammonium sulfate (a fertilizer and fire retardant)
- The result is a “double salt” matrix with two AN molecules for each molecule of AS
- The AS in the Sulf-N® 26 matrix dampens the rate of AN combustion
- When used as a supplementary fuel source for high explosives, Sulf-N® 26 is less effective than sugar or sawdust
- When mixed with a sensitizer (as in AN/fuel oil bombs), Sulf-N® 26 is as ineffective as sand
Tests have shown that the product has a number of agricultural benefits and is effectively inert.
Because Sulf-N-26 is a patented product its widespread use is likely to be retarded by cost and licencing issues.
For the Trillions of Dollars in aid and military spending and tens of thousands of lives and limbs lost to IED’s are we aksing too much that some of that be diverted to persuading/funding the Pakistani government to licence Sulf-N and build out a couple of factories?
Can one imagine the transformative impact of having a low detonation potential fertiliser flooding the market in Afghanistan, cheaper than conventional products?
I’m no chemist, but I do know that there is a type of fertilizer that cannot, or only with great difficulty be used to make HME and this is the only legal type of fertilizer, at least in Helmand.
But really, there’s just no chance of controlling this stuff like we can in the west. No chance at all.
The point is though, if 80% of IED’s use fertiliser from 2 factories in Pakistan then surely it is logical to go to the source rather than try and interdict the chain from factory door to IED
Simple economics, subsidise the production and flood the market with N26
Well if its true its quite shocking. But then how many other factories are around there making that stuff?
It’s not just simple economics though, you have to persuade the farmer this fertiliser is as good or better – when your livelihood depends on it, and you know what works, are you going to bet your family on a new type of fertiliser? I’m not saying that it is a massive task, just an example of how hard it can be to effect even a small change out there.
Also, the bad guys are going to get it anyway. They get RPGs, PKMs, ammo – fertiliser is not a problem and never will be.
Batteries are harder for them to get.
Good points Phil
If we make it more difficult for the Taleban to get sufficient and suitably explosive ammonium nitrate from other factories in Iran or one of the other stans then we increase the cost of their operations.
Links in a chain
If we subsidise the production costs to a degree that then the farmer has a simple choice, use the cheap stuff or import from other sources at a higher cost.
It might not be a silver bullet, nothing ever is as you rightly say, but 80% is 80%
No I agree. Every little helps. But the culture is a real problem. Afghans listen to whoever they feel is an authority. It’s the nature of an illiterate society, the elders are their hard drives of information. So it’s extremely easy if you get the right folk on board to start some nasty rumours that become implacable fact when uttered by elders. So this new fertiliser ISAF is giving out with the seed, it won’t grow poppy. Or it isn’t as good. Works both ways, but it’s easier to spread a rumour that affirms the status quo in a deeply conservative country than it is to start a rumour that changes things. So even the cheap fertiliser trick sometime doesn’t wash. But, I do agree make it harder. I just wouldn’t expect dramatic results.
We’re getting close now to neutralising the IED threat to ISAF. Technology wise. Non metallic IEDs made with HME buried into the ground is as far as they can go. And we’re close to widely defeating them. Real game changing stuff when it if that happens.
Phil, If you call neutralising 222 ISAF IED deeaths so far this year then it is the strangest definition I have ever heard. 5 in the last 3 days in 3 seperate IED attacks.
Wish we were winning but they are just doing enough now and waiting for us to leave.
If you reduce demand for ammonium nitrate within afghanistan then you could just make it cheaper for insurgents. they may not be obtaining it locally but shipping it in, so local cost not an issue.
also while I like the idea of increasing the cost of insurgent activities you might export the transformation into an explosive and have only weapons grade materials crossing the border
I agree its worth trying but I think it would also be wise to have an idea of how ammonium nitrate is getting moved first before you encourage changes to the insurgent supply chain which could make it even harder to disrupt
dosing the ammonium nitrate with a tracker sounds difficult given the volumes but there might be a way to add dyes and observe usage from satellites?
I’m talking about British forces. I have no idea about other countries. We can already totally defeat one type of IED threat. And technologically we’re close to defeating another type. That doesn’t mean shit won’t happen, and mistakes not made. Already there could be so many more deaths. I’ve trod the same ground as the poor sod who copped it the other day. That place is littered, totally littered with IEDs and we can already defeat 95% of them through one way or another. The other two copped it not far from where we were too. NES(n) is untamed.
RW
But if N26 is virtualy free, anyone importing Amonium Nitrate is imediatly self identifying as shady.
TD
The problem is we dont have anyone in charge.
If we’d created a, for lack of a better term, military Governor of Afghanistan, and put that person (office) in charge of EVERYTHING, things like this would be sorted in an hour.
But we have half a dozen entities, all with competing budgets, goals, beliefs and staffs.
Explosives are a security issue, but fertiliser is an agriculture issue, the army doesnt have a budget otr authority to make the switch, agriculture may have the budget, but they dont have the authority, and even if they did, they care about fertiliser, not bombs.
Phil
Does the ANA have this capability?
Will they be able to operate it after we leave?
The ANA have Vallon – whether they get better kit after we are done I do not know, I imagine it depends on how sensitive that kit is secrecy wise.
They anyway have, a rather unique outlook on the IED problem and really don’t like even using Vallon. Inshallah and all that.