Second part of IXION’s guest post
I have been accused of being anti RAF Anti Navy but not yet anti Army, still the day is young..
Given that there is no credible, likely, short, or medium term threat of actual state invasion of the UK mainland, or any other member Nato we might realistically beable to help’s mainland. Jus because we are in Nato does not mean in land terms we can do any more good for some of our fellow members than our guarantees did Poland in 1939.
Just why do we keep an Army?
I mean it, I really mean it Why?
I can see a role for one but not the current one it clings to.
All of our wars since ‘The last unpleasantness with Germans’ (as my late father-in-aw always called it), have, including the Nameless isles been elective, (even if I was in favour of that one).
Korea, Gulf 1 and 2, Afghan: – We were not needed, (quiet at the back oh no weren‘t), It all would have happened anyway without us. I will ignore / not bother with the various Malaysian and African scraps of the imperial kind.
In short then we have been in the habit of sending our soldiers out around the world to fight and die; in cases where we felt able to, and justified in so doing. And mostly as part of a coalition.
But not just that.
We have sent proper armies, Divisions with heavy kit etc. In that we have been in the same league as the Americans for retaining that capability. Ok not in anything like the numbers but none the less we have tried to keep the ability to send a couple of armoured divisions worth of troops, (if not actual division structures), to the Middle East and beyond, and to try to support and supply them in fighting a ‘Hollywood style high concept war’. Only the French in Europe attempted anything like that capability. Even the Soviet Union would have struggled to do that.
However IMHO, It has frankly lead to little more than trouble and blood; some ‘prestige’ I am sure, but how much in Pounds Shillings and Pence, and real world influence?
More importantly; How has it contributed to our defence.
What would we lose if we ditched it the capability?
North Korea would have kept out of south Korea. Sadam would still have fallen. The US would have fought Afghanistan alone, but still would have fought it.
I genuinely struggle to see what intervention by large scale, heavy armoured forces that the UK has carried out have done us any good long term.
Before people start shouting ‘Special relationship’ the US is both suffering serious Relative economic decline; (in 1945 it was more than 90% of the world manufacturing economy, by 2011 less than 35%); A debt crises (but then aren’t we all), and more importantly a refocusing of its priorities, away from Europe.
It was special when it suited the US now it does not. I invite those who believe in it to consider how we got all that logistical support in Gulf 1 and 2 but not exactly a ringing endorsement of Suez or Northern Ireland….
Has the time come to stop trying to fool the world, (who increasingly aint fooled anyway), that WASAWPYK. (We Are Still A World Power You Know).
So the first challenge to the old order is this:- Construct me a scenario in which we:-
1) Would deploy support and supply unaided by allies a British armoured division abroad?
Or
2) Where a coalition of Heavy Land forces would not be sent because the UK could not contribute/ (in other words where our forces were necessary).
And
1) In either scenario why is it worth keeping it?
Our successful foreign interventions, like, Sierra Leone, and the Falklands have been with lighter forces in… Drum role ‘Strategic raid’ type scenarios.
But why!
Why mess with the current deployment of the army, or even the MRB plan?
We have had some successes, some tatty short lived glory and some benefit from doing it this way so why stop?
WELL….
If there is any of the HM armed forces that is long on fur coat and short in the Knicker dept it is the Army.
The RLC has never really been given the trucks the manpower etc to supply at distance large scale, forces we have been totally dependant on the US for G 1 and 2, and to a lesser degree in afghan. There were scandals! I say again Crimean type scandals, regard the supply of our forces in both conflicts, covered up in part by US largess. The tales of no bullets for officer’s side arms 3 magazines a man, body armour, etc etc. Much of our equipment is old (Bulldog for heavens sake is as old as I am)! And a lot of stuff is in desperate need or repair/upgrade. (The fact that FRES is a cluster fu*ck does not mean the idea is unsound). Many of our formations are in reality still at the Bedford and land rover scale of equipment. So Even if we can play big armoured formations we cannot play for long.
In short should we stop trying to play Goliath in high heals and padded jackets, and try and be a harder David….
MRB is an attempt at that but only an attempt, it is still wedded to some idea world power dom.
MY proposal is:-
First we need to take a serious axe to the upper ranks. Brigades need to be commanded by brigadiers beyond that there is not any reason for more than a handful major generals Lt generals and one 3 star in charge of the whole shebang. Up or out should be the norm, if you haven’t reach colonel by 40 sorry your out. We can lose 2nd Lt and Lt colonel from the rank structure as well. Whole areas of power point warriors and Ponti’s need to go.
Second ditch the guards in all their donkey walloping and bearskin wearing glory. They can become a territorial unit, trained in crowd control and security, and paid for out of the police budget, and the tourism budget.
Thirdly Rock Ape’s and marines go to the army. TD is of the opinion that the RAF should run anything that flies because it makes no sense to have 3 air forces 2 tiny and one small. For a variety of reasons I disagree, but the same logic applies to Popski’s private armies of the RN and Airforce.
Fourthly The marines the Raf Parachute section, Para’s SAS SBS/artillery spotters/ Forward air controllers etc should all be part of an special forces command with it’s own home and expeditionary units. Ranger Battalions for stuff like amphibious and air assault. We should have a full battle group with special forces support ready to go at the drop of the hat, with special forces support
I have heard many arguments about the difference in roles between the paras and the marines I have considered them all researched their past current uses, and have come to this opinion…. They are self serving bollocks. In practice both units have been used interchangeably for decades and it implies marines are too stupid to jump out of aircraft or the paras too short to wade ashore from landing craft.
Thirdly we need to reorganise and equip to fight strategic raids and nothing higher.
Eg why do we have 5 nominal divisional structures in UK ? I propose a 2 division structure for the army. One home Division and one expeditionary Division.
The home division should be made up of 3 brigades North middle south (feel free to argue amongst yourselves for boundaries and sexier names). The brigades should be structured for training and support and made up primarily of reserves / territorial’s and units on rotation from the expeditionary Division, working up or down. It would also have a role similar to US national guard to help in times of emergencies. I am not the only one who was annoyed that during the last 2 cold snaps lots of perfectly capable if not equipped with snow plough and gritter equipment sat idly by… It should be commanded by a Lt General.
The Expeditionary Division should be made up of nearly ready to go/ ready to go units units having worked up in the ‘home division’ before transferring to expeditionary command. The brigades deployed to the Expeditionary division should be 1MRB (in heavy configuration) and 1 (in Light Ratel style- see below), and one special forces brigade as proposed.
Equipment wise we need to upgrade / replace, but I do not want to be too equipment specific. Arguing about FRES SV etc. Above all else we need to be able to supply and support these units on our own. Frankly this is where it really gets controversial.
There remain on the historical a number of recent conflicts of the all out war variety; where better trained, better lead, more technologically advanced armies have destroyed ‘heavier’ armed forces of the massed formation variety. The Chinese for all their bogey man status are struggling to create a more professional better equipped army, that is smaller…
One of my favourite conflicts was the ejection of the markedly superior Libyan forces from Chad by opposition forces using missile armed technical’s to engage armoured formations. The recent Libyan conflict became was really one sided and the rebels barely had a tank or 152 mm artillery piece to their name…
Many people I respect on this site have argued strongly in favour of heavy armour and heavy artillery.
Both are serious logistical drags.
IMHO we have reached the point where the rising APC reaches the falling tank. It should be perfectly feasible to move to a single heavy chassis sharing engines/transmissions/ tracks internal systems etc. Merkava style but in the 40- 50 ton bracket. (This is a bit blue sky thinking I know) but we cannot afford specialist vehicles in the penny packets we can afford to buy. We should get out of the separate heavy tank business. 155 mm artillery should go truck mounted we should loose the heavy tracked heavy artillery.
One major thing what’s wrong with a Ratel style APC based on the MAN Chassis is?
It would fit the UK road and rail loading gauges, be self deployable, logistically cheap (relatively), give it GPMG and 40 mm grenade with anti armour missile capability, and use it in largish numbers….. Forget boxer etc.
This is not about flying armour everywhere but is about reducing the amount of logistics needed by each vehicle when it gets there.
The Air angle of this needs to be looked at. I remain of the view that the AAC are the right people to run Army transport helicopters and inter theatre transport, not the RAF where it remains very much a 2nd class part of the service. 3 air brigades 1 home 1 foreign (organised as above with units moving in and out of each as maintenance etc requires) and one for the special forces.
As for numbers all this would at a rough estimate reduce the Army to approx 55,000 regulars and 20,000 TA (I am prepared to see those numbers as approximations and they may vary somewhat either way.
The whole point is to cut the army to fit it’s logistical cloth, and to recognise that we cannot take on comers any more.
A harder David.
But not in terms of having some small units of top notch kit which we don’t train with properly or can support properly
The idea is what we have we can use and use fully. Such an army would be easier to move abroad and use in the way we have actually used it/had to use it in the last 60 successfully.
And by the way the reduction in numbers and dead wood should fee up some cash for proper pay rises for the fighting soldiers.
good article IXION, particularly interested in the home/away division structure.
Forgive my ignorance, but how do brigades rotate through the home/away structure for roulement in theatre?
Kind regards
JBT
One word: Bosnia.
The Balkan mess was a true mess, a for-real genocide. British troops did sterling work on the ground, especially when the “UN shackles” were cast away.
Liberia is another example where British troops did good.
I guess the last Libyan intervention (albeit without ground troops) is a sign on the wall that Europe – and especially a British-French coalition – will act in the future without US support. The US may provide supporting arms and services (specialist ISR, transport etc.) but the brunt of any future intervention might be carried by the UK plus “a coalition of the willing and able”.
Re scenario’s; one that comes to mind is Suez (again). North Africa is a mess and will remain so (now those economies are truly f*****, resulting in unrest which may last a decade or so) and it’s easy to see radical elements or a weak goverment fighting for control over the Suez. And the UK as an island (trade) nation needs that passage open and available.
JBTX
It is really a shift in the command structure above the unit level.
The unit comes home, and when it official gets phyiscally home; it is re-roled from the Expidition to the Home brigade and comes under the command of the local home commander and enter a pre planned de brief/ work down /leave plan.
Marcase
Suez really?
RE “I guess the last Libyan intervention (albeit without ground troops) is a sign on the wall that Europe – and especially a British-French coalition – will act in the future without US support. The US may provide supporting arms and services (specialist ISR, transport etc.) but the brunt of any future intervention might be carried by the UK plus a coalition of the willing and able.” is and should be the formula… West of Suez. With some hard thinking when any other geography pops up
- US Africa Command will have more importance than the one still in place for Europe… I wonder how the missile defence command structure will be, once there is more to it than ship-launched units
I’m not sure I agree with paying off senior ranks.
I agree with your “Brigades are commanded by Brigadiers”, one per Brigade, Colonels command Battalions ect.
But I dont think “paying off” the rest, makes sense.
Have “Fighting Army” and an officer corps for that army (and the same for the RAF/RN, if you want to be a wing commander, you better have a sodding wing to command).
But the ones who fall by the wayside, and there will be a lot of wayside falling as 2nd Lts dont make first and captains dont make major.
These would be perfect candidates to populate the none combat/command side of things.
Rather than sitting for 6 months on a project comittee being a step towards becoming Field Marshall, once your career dead ends, you can be put in charge of a project, from start to finish.
My army has 6 Pocket Divisions, each has 10 Colonels, but only one General. 60 into 10 leaves 50 Colonels who could be pensioned off, or they could be kept on. Who better to put in charge of FRES, from specification through procurement and implementation than a Colonel who has spent his military career, from candidate up, serving as armoured infantry?
When I suggested my pocket division, it was shot down because the General might be an Armour Officer, called to perform an Amphibious Assault, but if we kept on the Marines Colonels who “almost made it” we’d have a permanant staff who specialised in Amphib Ops and could be called upon to advise and help with planning.
I found it quite hard to read the article due to the extremely poor spelling, punctuation and grammar.
Nevertheless, good points. I especially agree with your points on SF, RM and RAF Regt.
On the other hand, the addition of a handful of CR2 MBT to 3 CDO BDE orbat in 2003 made a colossal difference to the combat effectiveness and speed of advance of the BDE, so not sure abut the idea of scrapping Heavy Armour.
It wasn’t shot down because of armoured generals commanding amphibious operations. It was fired at because the fact that a commander is nothing without his staff and the staff needs specialist knowledge for such operations. And the crap name.
P0cad
The French MBT is at the lower end of 50tons isnt it?
Doesnt have to be a 70t monster….
And you have a profound and fundamentally false idea about how the Army works if you think officers exist solely to exercise command of units.
IXION, your proposed army structure is somewhat similar to what the French had, before deciding to do away with conscription
- except that the whole conventional field army is represented by 1 (one) MRB!
Phil
You misunderstand, I am aware “ranks” are handed out as justification for pay grades. I believe thats a fundamentaly broken situation.
Captain is a military command rank.
Its not a title that should be handed out because little jimmys a doctor and we need an excuse to pay him more after 10 weeks at Sandhurst than anyone else.
A Brigadier should command a Brigade, not a surgical suite.
If that means some Captains earn more than some Colonels, who cares?
Personally, I’m not sure doctors should have a military rank at all, but unless a company reports to them, it sure as shit shouldnt be Captain!
Yea sorry everyone about Grammer spelling etc, Why I never see the mess untill its actually posted I will never know.
ACC
I knew my idea was probably not that original. I thought I once read the french had done something like that but it was long ago and far away that I read it…
I am sure virtually every idea for running an army has been tried by some country somewhere, and worked in some places and not other.
Eg the Joint force idea; – widely derrided in Canada; but that bunch of useless know nothing about how to fight, ameteurs the Isreali’s run things that way.. you pays your money etc..
DJ
I would agree, ranks should denote roles not pay.
I saw Someith in the Torygraph last month that indicated we have mmore officers of General rank than Infantry Battalions. I have not been able to check it, but if it’s true then it has got to stop.
@ IXION – “Yea sorry everyone about Grammer spelling etc, Why I never see the mess untill its actually posted I will never know.”
Lol, same here, and why everything i post is an absolute riot of edits for at least the first 24 hours, talk about shifting sands!
PQOs (doctors etc) have a status in society. Giving them officers rank simply reflects their status and authority in society. They are a distinct group and move in their own career paths, they do not command units. Every Army does this. Are you suggesting that an emminent Consultant should have to undergo the same training as a recruit? That’s simply not how the world works. They have skills that are extremely valuable to the forces and they have eminence and status in civilian life which must be reflected in their military life. In the Army nobody has any doubt who does what job and where the differences are between a subaltern or field officer and a PQO.
Don’t forget that not all officers are in (their own) single Service appointments. Unless you plan to do away with all Joint posts then QED you need more officers than required by your own Service.
Sorry, but I don’t agree with your somewhat insulting criticism of Canadian troops. Plenty of their blood has been spent on our behalf in the past and they’ve buckled down in Afgh. You also seem to be worshipping at the altar of the IDF…
Phil
“PQOs (doctors etc) have a status in society. Giving them officers rank simply reflects their status and authority in society.”
Do they?
How should I address my doctor next time I see him?
“They are a distinct group and move in their own career paths, they do not command units.”
If they are distinct, why do they have the same ranks? Do they not command medical units?
“Are you suggesting that an emminent Consultant should have to undergo the same training as a recruit?”
Pretty sure he does at the moment….
But no, if, by recruit, you mean, infantry officer, an infantry soldier should go to infantry officer school, learn to be an infantry officer and become an infantry officer
A Doctor should go to medical school, and be a Doctor.
If and When he is given a staff, say, our Doctor is sent over the Afghanistan, where he has a team of 12 doctors and 72 nurses, well, at that point, he is in a position to argue he is a Captain in charge of medical company.
“They have skills that are extremely valuable to the forces and they have eminence and status in civilian life which must be reflected in their military life. I”
I dont disagree, whats that got to do with military rank?
Holding a doctorate allows you to be called doctor, not Captain
A Colonel, should be a man who commands a battalion or equivilant thereof. A Brigadier should command a Brigade.
By the same arguement, a Typhoon pilot should be a private, he should earn more than an infantryman of course, but since he doesnt actualy command anyone, holding a rank is wrong.
You are of course free to disagree, but its not a situation in which you can accuse us of being factualy incorrect.
We (I believe I can speak for a group here) believe having more generals than battalions and admirals than ships is wrong.
If you have a 4 man army, then your highest rank better not be high than lance corporal, 8 men, you can have a full corporal, for sake of arguement at 50 men you get your first Lt, at 100 you can have a Captain. Around 500 you can have a Colonel.
The British Army has 1 officer for every 6.5 Enlistees
Illuminatingly, the Gurkas have one officer for every 24.
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/11/rank-inflation/
Heres me argueing much the same (in comments) two years ago almost to the day
Arcadian
No. Apt for jointness etc should of course take place, I am not suggesting we have 6 brigades so we should have 6 brigadiers, but perhaps 12 at most. Franklt 2 and 3 star posts above that should be rare can’t really even with ‘spares’ see why we need more that 25 or so officers above Colonel rank.
I was catagoricaly (if that’s how you spell it) NOT insullting the fighting men of canada.
If what I wrote was taken as such, then I appologise. I was merely repeating a widley held view that its Joint force organisation has not worked out well.
Arcadien just re read my post-
I was being sarcastic (in a good way) about the Isreali’s not in a bad way about Canadians…
Hi Jedi,
How did you hack the system? I only get 10 minutes… “is an absolute riot of edits for at least the first 24 hours”
I’ll agree with Phil on status ranks. There’s undoubtedly been too much brass in the military, but cuts should be made to surplus command structures rather than prestige ranks for medical personnel and the like – we shouldn’t expect to have Lcpl consultants out of some misguided idea of equality (you do come across as having commie sympathies, Ixion. And accordingly you have been added to my list).
The SDSR also already announced a reduction to two divisional HQs, alternating between operational and preparatory commands.
“By the same arguement, a Typhoon pilot should be a private, he should earn more than an infantryman of course, but since he doesnt actualy command anyone, holding a rank is wrong.”
1. Typhoon pilots don’t just fly aircraft. They exercise command even when they don’t have airmen directly under their control. All officers do, even when aimlessly strolling around base. The logic that only those with subordinates under their direct command should be officers is a rather narrow interpretation of what a Queen’s Commission entails. Officers are entrusted with certain obligations and are selected, trained and empowered to take command when required to do so.
2. Which Privates would be flight commanders and a sqn CO?
3. Musical ranks? Private on FJ sqn, SO2 at MoD, back to Private for next flying post… or should all staff appointments be held by Privates as well?
4. Rupert (on ground calling in CAS): ‘target that bridge now’. Pilot (‘private’): ‘No, there are people on it’
Rupert: ‘I’m ordering you to bomb the bridge’
Pilot: ‘I’m disobeying your order’
Rupert: ‘Private, you’re on a charge’
This opens up a wider point about rank being used as a measure of expertise rather than ability to command and/or hold a senior ‘management’ post
Can of worms that one!
DominicJ, don’t go calling Medical Officers ‘Doctor’, it really narks them. I think they feel ‘doctor’ should apply only to lowly general practitioners.
@ AAC – “How did you hack the system? I only get 10 minutes…”
Lol, don’t tell admin!
Just talking about stuff on my blog.
Hi BB,
I didn’t spot that alternating part anywhere? “a reduction to two divisional HQs, alternating between operational and preparatory commands”
- we can always go and confiscate ARRC if we need a third one, in a hurry
Arcadian
Point 1″Officers are entrusted with certain obligations and are selected, trained and empowered to take command when required to do so.”
And when exactly are Doctors going to be called upon to take command of anything but an Operating Room?
Having too many officers dilutes chain of command.
Had the world span a little differently, I could have joined the RAF as an accountant, and at the end of my 6 years been the equivilant of a Captain.
The idea that I’d be tagging along with an Army Platoon, who’s and captain and Lts were wiped out in a co-ordinated ambush and expected to take over is frankly too scary to contemplate.
With luck, there’d be a sensible NCO to knock me out if I tried…
Point2
There would of course be, for lack of a better term, a flying Lance Coporal for each “wing” of 4 aircraft, a flying corporal for each flight of 8 and a flying Serjeant for each Squandron of 16 and so forth.
You could of course put the engineering staff under the pilot, which I believe gives 9 people per fighter,
Point 3
You’ll have to forgive me my knowledge of the acronyms is limited, but if I’m reading that correctly, your asking,
If Colonel Smith of 1st Infantry Battalion, 1st Division goes to work as the adviser to Minister for Defence for 6 months, does he become a Private?
Two points, in that situation, yes, temporarily, he would become a Private, not a Colonel.
Secondly, in my view, that situation should never happen. Officers shouldnt be moved to “staff” appointments until their career has peaked and they are being booted out to make room, when staff appointments without active rank or redundancy/retirement should beckon
In response to point 4
Rupert: Rape that woman and shoot that child
Infantry Private: No
Rupert: You’re on a charge
Doesnt really work does it?
We already have army pilots who are seargeants not officers and refuse to fire on targets.
I’m just a civie, but I have a boss, and a boss’s boss, who tell me what to do, but there are people more senior than my department manager I say “no” to.
Point three does in retrospect seem a little harsh, perhaps as Ixion suggested, we “double count” Colonel and Above, but *only* double count
So, in my vision of the “Future (fighting) Army”, we’d have 30,000 men in 60 Battalions, organised into 6 Brigades, 3 Divisons (Work Up/Deployed/Work Down) and one army.
Working back down, that gives a field marshall (or two?) 6 Generals, 12 Brigadiers and 120 Colonels.
I then accept the need for some additionals, say, 10,000 to cover other duties.
But, every so often, 108 Colonels are going to lose their ranks as they dont make Brigadier but are cleared out anyway.
BB
I absent mindedly said “lord preserve me from the bone saws” to the nurse last time I saw one (Blood Pressure) when she said mentioned seeing a doctor, she did not look impressed.
Dom this issue over PQOs is just one you’ve created. There’s no friction or problems or issues in the Army over them. People know where they stand. PQOs never command units. They operate solely in their professional capacity. A doctor doesn’t command anyone outside of a clinical context.
Phil
If your not going to read my comments, please dont respond to them. It will save us both a great deal of time in the future
No where, at all, did I blame Colonel Doctors for causing issues in the army.
I used them as an easily identifiable example, of people who do not give commands holding command rank.
http://www.armedforces.co.uk/army/listings/l0086.html
The Army has 100ish Regiments, yet 1000ish Regimental Commanding Officers (colonels)
If you dont see something deeply disturbing there, fine, but some of us think thats a little weird, and yelling at us doesnt explain it away.
God only knows what the Captain/Ship ratio for the Navy is.
“PQOs never command units. They operate solely in their professional capacity. A doctor doesn’t command anyone outside of a clinical context.”
So why are they officers at all? Never mind officers two ranks above anyone else with their length of service?
I think rank should reflect nothing but your place in the command structure.
I’m not sure whats so horrible about that.
Hi Ixion,
I enjoyed reading your post. Yes, I agree the army’s role needs to be reviewed.
As always with UK defence, the resources provided to are not equal to the tasks given.
I would suggest that battle group deployment should be the maximum scale of deployment in most cases.
The SDR would have to be amended from sustainable brigade deployment down to battlgroup.
This would allow the army to have 3 multi role brigades, and 2 Light airmobile rapid reaction brigades.
The RM commandos, and Parachute regiment would each form 2 commando/ranger groups to support Special Forces and mount battle group size raids. We don’t have the ships or aircraft for an amphibious or air assault brigades, so lets get real, lighter, less top heavy, sustainable and affordable!
Phil (an ex pongo)
I’m not a great strategist but IMHO, the best organization is:
- Two heavy armored brigades with a regiment of recognition, two armored regiments, three battalions Mechanized with IFV, an artillery regiment. This is to win a war.
- After the war is won, we must pacify the country, for that three light brigades enough to rotate, but when I say small, it is still necessary a reconnaissance regiment, an artillery regiment and four light battalions but with APC, not Land Rovers.
Hello Dominic,
well done for raising a contentious issue.
Pt 1: sorry, I was responding to your point abt pilots not doctors. As Iraq & Afgh have proven, there is no front-line in a COIN campaign so the idea that rear echelon types might never find themselves in a dangerous situation where they may need to take charge is not far fetched. Far from ideal but far from impossible.
“Having too many officers dilutes chain of command.” And having too few limits command. What is ‘too many’? I think it is the levels of command that matter not how many are filled by officers.
Your ambush point is misplaced because your mixing Services. You might as well consider how an Army major would take control of a lifeboat in a storm when the Sub Lts have all been killed. Beyond skill specific expertise, you might find the junior personnel in your ambush would still look to you for intelligent judgment, a better grasp of the bigger picture, moral decisions and the maintenance of morale; for all of which you may be better placed to offer leadership. And if your convoy was an RAF Admin move where your Regt escorts were all KIA/WIA you had definitely fulfil your command responsibilities!
Pt2: FJ units don’t operate by rank but qualification. Hence a couple of JOs could lead their sqn Boss and several flt cdrs into battle. If the aircrew ranks were adjusted as you describe what would you do abt groundcrew ranks? Engineers are sorted by shifts, trade group and rank, not by ‘x’ per aircraft.
Pt3: Actually it’s the reverse. How would Private Smith become a Wg Cdr at MoD and then revert to Private on his next posting?
Isolating people from staff appointments until their career has peaked and they are ‘booted out’ would starve policy and command jobs of front-line insight and operational units from the benefit of people with broader understanding of the context tactical operations sit in. Flt cdrs with staff experience are often much better at looking after their subordinates, especially when it comes to important career assessments/guidance. Pure ‘operators’ have too narrow a field of view. The Command Staff/policy arenas are too important to dump on the leaving or retired. You need a mix. Active rank reflects that extremely important Command decisions are often sent from desks!
Pt4: Good point, we do have NCOs flying already. Mine was badly made. Interestingly, I think the Army may have changed it’s helo NCO/Off mix for the AH-64 to reflect the increase in capab? ANd the NCOs are SNCOS/WOs so not exactly short of experience, talent & authority?
Military Bosses v Civvy Bosses: Yes, Servicemen/women may choose not to follow orders when they are illegal or a changed situation dictates justifiable alternatives, but unlike civilians, they are legally mandated to follow orders that they may not like and which may be extremely dangerous.
What rotation would your three Div Army follow? Eg to conduct simultaneous ops? What abt the Combat Service Support Corps that don’t just support at Bn level? Did you really mean 10000 extra Cols?
What effect do you think 108 of 120 Cols knowing they are unlikely to be promoted would have on earlier retention? Of your 30000 how many would be fit for duty?
I think you are right to ask questions of the existing situation. Many elements may be legacies from the Cold War and earlier which should be binned/changed. But often there are good reasons why things are as they are. With the best will in the world, much of what happens in commercial/civilian life does not translate to the military and perhaps a number of woes over the past couple of decades have been because that distinction was not understood (e.g. Just in time logistics – works brilliantly for a supermarket chain when being late = an empty shelf, a reduced choice in brands or a drop in profit). Ammunition arriving too late is a different matter….
Hello Dominic,
please ignore the earlier version of this post – I ran out of editing time and can’t seem to delete it.
well done for raising a contentious issue.
Pt 1: sorry, I was responding to your point abt pilots not doctors. As Iraq & Afgh have proven, there is no front-line in a COIN campaign so the idea that rear echelon types might never find themselves in a dangerous situation where they may need to take charge is not far fetched. Far from ideal but far from impossible.
“Having too many officers dilutes chain of command.” And having too few limits command. What is ‘too many’? I think it is the levels of command that matter not how many are filled by officers.
May I suggest your ambush analogy suffers because it mixes Services. It would apply to any fish out of water: e.g. how would an Army major take control of a lifeboat in a storm when the Sub Lts have all been killed. Beyond such skill specific expertise, it might be that the junior personnel in your ambush would still look to you for intelligent judgment, a better grasp of the bigger picture, moral decisions and the maintenance of morale; for all of which you (despite being an Admin Off!) may be better placed to offer leadership. And if your convoy was an RAF Admin move where your Regt escorts were all KIA/WIA you had definitely fulfil your command responsibilities!
Pt2: FJ units don’t operate (fly) by rank but qualification. Hence a couple of JOs could lead their sqn Boss and several flt cdrs into battle. If the aircrew ranks were adjusted as you describe what would happen to groundcrew ranks? Engineers are sorted by shifts, trade group and rank, not by ‘x’ per aircraft.
Pt3: Actually it’s the reverse. How would Private Smith become a Wg Cdr at MoD and then revert to Private on his next posting?
Isolating people from staff appointments until their career has peaked and they are ‘booted out’ would starve policy and command jobs of front-line insight and operational units from the benefit of people with a broader understanding of the context which tactical operations sit. Flt cdrs with staff experience are often much better at looking after their subordinates, especially when it comes to important career assessments/guidance. Pure ‘operators’ have too narrow a field of view. The Command Staff/policy arenas are too important to dump on the leaving or retired. You need a mix of young & old. Active rank reflects that extremely important Command decisions are often sent from desks!
Pt4: Good point, we do have NCOs flying already. Mine was badly made. Interestingly, I think the Army may have changed it’s helo NCO/Off mix for the AH-64 to reflect the increase in capab? And the NCOs are SNCOS/WOs so not exactly short of experience, talent & authority?
Military Bosses v Civvy Bosses: Yes, Servicemen/women may choose not to follow orders when they are illegal or a changed situation dictates justifiable alternatives, but unlike civilians, they are legally mandated to follow orders that they may not like and which may be extremely dangerous.
Some practical points for your proposed model: What rotation would your three Divs follow? Eg to conduct simultaneous ops? What abt the Combat Service Support Corps that don’t just support at Bn level? Did you really mean 10000 extra Cols?
What effect do you think 108 of 120 Cols knowing they are unlikely to be promoted would have on earlier retention? Of your 30000 how many would be fit for duty?
I think you are right to ask questions of the existing situation and are able to do so without the jaundice that so many of us carry from time spent in uniform. Many elements may be legacies from the Cold War and earlier which should be binned/changed. But often there are good reasons why things are as they are. With the best will in the world, much of what happens in commercial/civilian life does not translate to the military and perhaps a number of woes over the past couple of decades have been because that distinction was not understood (e.g. Just in time logistics – works brilliantly for a supermarket chain when being late = an empty shelf, a reduced choice in brands or a drop in profit). Ammunition arriving too late is a different matter….
Arcadian
Sorry I did introduce a cross service element, but I’d expect an Infantry Sergeant, or even Corporal, to take command of a company, before the Medical Captain.
Maybe I’m wrong there, but it seems far more sensible.
“What rotation would your three Div Army follow?”
I’m stealing from Jedibeeftrix here, but work up for 6 months, followed by deployed/ready to be deployed, followed by work down.
Two Brigades in each, so at the moment, we would have two Brigades in “Work up”, one preparing for Afghanistan, one preparing for a crisis.
Two Brigades in “active”, one in Afghanistan, one ready to deploy for a crisis.
Two in work down, one from Afghanistan, one from, well, not a lot.
Over three years, everyone would go to Afghanistan once, and theres a small chance they’d be called into a crisis situation as well.
Obviously, it would be better not to mount coonstant operations, so two Brigades can be kept “ready”.
“What abt the Combat Service Support Corps that don’t just support at Bn level? ”
My thinking was, roughly, the main army force would be the pocket divison, which would, roughly, have an Armoured Battalion, 2 Armoured Infantry Battalions, 4 Light Infantry Battalions, 1 Artilery, 1 Engineer and 1 Headquarters Battalions, each battalion of roughly 500 men.
6 such “pocket divisions” is 30,000 men.
There would then need to be another central command, to handle things that cant be farmed out, procurement, initial training, deep maintance, the AAC.
I guedstimated that would need 10,000 staff, and I suppose, 2 generals, 4 Brigadiers and 40 Colonels
“What effect do you think 108 of 120 Cols knowing they are unlikely to be promoted would have on earlier retention?”
Well, we have two choices, we get rid of excess officers, or we keep them and give them fantasy assignments, its a fact of life that we need more Captains than Majors and Brigadiers than Field Marshals. A drop of 120 to 12 may be a little extreme of course, which is why I’d want to create real positions, outside the core military, and so unranked, but relativly secure employment and doing a real job.
Imagine if since 2003, 5 colonels a year had been kept on and had dedicated that time to being an Afghanistan think tank.
They couldnt give orders, but because their careers had officialy peaked, they couldnt be bullied either, and they could function as an advisary body, solving current problems and predicting future ones.
Others could be put personal and directly in charge of certain projects.
Hi Guys,
Just to add to my earlier comment.
As I understand the situation;
The number of battalions is too reduced to around 26, not including the 3 RM Commando units.
Giving the army 5 multi role brigades, with 4 battalions in each, 3 Commando brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade, again each with 4 battalions, and a battalion based in Cyprus.
There are rumours that this maybe further reduced to a total of 4 brigades.
Most of the heavy armour, Challengers, Warriors and AS90 are to go into storage.
Leaving just enough vehicles with units for them to train on.
Even then, there is only enough money left to upgrade some of the warriors, and the money has not yet been found to finance the FRES project.
The army does not have the budget for anything more, and the situation is likely to only get worse in my opinion. I fear more cuts in SDR 2015.
So as I said earlier, lets get real, lighter, less top heavy, sustainable and affordable!
Phil
BB
Me and Uncle Joe Like that we are..
I really aint a commie.
If I was in a political party, it would be the awkward sodds asking awkward questions party.
I have read your comments Dom and as I said they betray an incomplete view of how these things work.
PQOs are Officers because Officers have status in the Army. These people have trades, professions and skills that are immensely useful to the Army and deserve Officer status. Thus, they become Officers. It is the same in most western armies. Lawyers, veterinarians, surveyors, men of the cloth etc, all are given Officer status to befit the status of their professions and their dignity.
Furthermore, Officers don’t just exist to command units. They also manage, they also plan. They have desk jobs like Staff Officers, Director Infantry etc etc etc.
So you want Officer rank to only represent command status when Commanding is only part of an Officers job. A lot of those Colonels occupy very important jobs as hard as it is for you to fathom in your crusade to rationalise and see efficiencies.
What’s so horrible about your idea is that it is a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of Officers in any western army. And it’s a total non-issue in most western armies, the issue of Doctors being Officers.
unbelievably I agree with phil for a change. these people need to be officers in order to be effective.
I do disagree with the Bish status though, in the Rn Bishes adopt the rank that they are talking to, they are paid as Comanders but hold no Official rank making it much easier for them to speak to CINCLEET or AB bloggs.
Oh and Dom, the Army has 580 Colonels as of April 1, 2011. You’re out by half.
and the armies up by 400….
Ixion
I have to save I agree with lots of what you conclude in this post. The army need fundamental change in two basics areas a move to real information warfare and precision targeting and a much greater use and acceptance of reserves at all levels and unit size. War between states will change in this information age removing electic grids,tv, phone communication ect which one required bombs will in future require computer virus’s. Look at the Iranian nuclear plants as an example. I would tweak things to along these lines
The future for the UK will be 3 or 4 deployed battle groups operations simultaneously in multiple locations to target and remove terrorists or there grouping using intelligent targeting and precision effects an enlarged task force black of you like.
For places like failed state intervention setting up forces to hunt high value targets and providing specialist ground forces to assist is the way forward. At the same time providing the government of the country with training teams to expand their civil, police and military to allow them to expand their own security over time as well as the UK providing a/c, naval and SF assets they do not have to degrade their enemies capability. All the while providing them with humanitarian assistance and capabilities to allow them to improve their infrastructure and exploiting there natural wealth so providing jobs and employment to their own people.
PJHQ removed from an operational role. NSC provides strategic direction – MOD provides military intel/strategy only – JFHQ commander reports direct to MOD or NSC. PJHQ takes over the 3 services operational training function and has all the power of a FOST team today. PJHQ also organises the deployment and recovery of the force.
Reserve and Regulars should be allowed to move between the two organisations much more easily as the military requirements change over time. The reserves should contain both full time and part-time reserve personnel the full time posts being in specific specialist areas. Reserve force responsible for UK ATO requirement, major disaster support within UK and up to brigade support for stabilisation in foreign operations such a prolonged situation develop.
All UK home based HQs scrapped. A single 2 star HQ for home service command established and manned by the reserve forces. A 2 star deployable HQ manned by regulars and deployable as a theatre JFHQ for up to 1 year.
5 deployable army 1 star JFHQs 2 centred on armoured brigade configured similarly to US heavy combat units. 3 Rapid deployment brigades of 2/3 manoeuvre battalions specialising in para/air assault, jungle/desert warfare and an army commando brigade. Each brigade has access to 25 Mbps bandwidth access to allow multiple UAV and targeting operations.
The requlars would also consist of supporting force for Theatre ISTAR logistics medics engineering and pcysops at battle group strength and would attached to any brigade deployment.
This would reduce the army strength to 60000 and a TA of 50000 and would result in the FRES cancellation and use of a wheel apc like vbci for the TA units.
“and the armies up by 400….”
List every post you would delete and explain how that post warrants deletion.
Ixion, good post full of ideas to mull over. I agree with much of it especially the single expeditionary (commando) structure and that we should free ourselves from including heavy armour in this rapid reaction force.
I have posted elsewhere that I feel that the majority of the RMs should go to the army. Though I feel approximately a force of 1,000 marines should remain with the RN to be based on ships for maritime and coastal security reasons.
I hate to use the name, but I feel the falklands does give us a good guide on how maximum size the expeditionary commando force should be. Excluding the ancillary groups my understanding was that the UK force was based on two brigades with 8 battalions (5 from 3 cdo and 3 from 5th light infantry). Assuming that is the extreme example would a total of 12 battalions be enough for a short term (less than 6 month) intervention. These should all be trained for amphibious warfare as well as jungle / desert / polar ops. Also, the main vehicle should be light (e.g. can fit in the back of a Chinook, or slung under a Merlin) and also can float (in a landing craft role).
This commando force should be joined up with a joint strike (aircraft) / lift force and the high end RN force.
Home defence should be split over 6 brigades, each consisting of 4 battalions: 1 regular infantry, 1 armoured / mechanised and 2 reserve infantry. These would also garrison the Falklands, Gibraltar and Cyprus and made a small number for long standing UN commitments. They would also be used in emergencies to support the expeditionary forces, but on a 3 month notice arrangement. 50 / 50 split of reserves to regulars gives mass if required, but not immediately.
There would be no overlap or rotation between the two.
In my 3 tier structure, the commando would fit in the small high end “core” and the home defence mainly in the EEZ protection role. Some units could cross into the Global Patrolling / Presence tier (perhaps on UN ops) but this would be the domain of a small number of trainers / advisors, special forces and the RMs on the global patrol ships…
Phil, Dom may be a little strident but are you saying the Army, RAF and RN aren’t top heavy?
My instinct is it probably is. But, I do not have a list of posts and what they do, so I can’t possibly know how top heavy each service is or how many posts might or should go. A lot of the posts are tied to various commitments and liaison duties outside of the structure of units and sub units. Examples of these include representatives in various NATO headquarters, liaison Officers in other armed forces outside the NATO command structure, liaison and integration with UK Resilience, staff positions within organisations and agencies in the armed forces that actually do a vital role etc etc
Officers don’t just command, they manage.
So comparing Officer posts to command posts is disingenuous since if an Officer is not going to head up say the Combat Medical Technician Career Employment Group programme – just who is? A civilian? Somebody has to manage it – and in the armed forces that person would be an Officer.
So, considering in mind that a lot of Officer posts are manager posts and they are very vital, and without knowing which posts do what, I can’t honestly say how top heavy it is, or even if, the gut feeling it is, is correct.
So, I don’t see how Dom can say the Army is 400 Colonels over requirements. It’s just pulling figures from the air and constructing an argument around them.
@phil
not sure anyone even inthe army could list the 400 posts they are filling, never mind justifying them.
Where’s the consideration for growth potential in the text?
@ Ixion
You say,
“Korea, Gulf 1 and 2, Afghan: – We were not needed, (quiet at the back oh no weren‘t), It all would have happened anyway without us.”
and
“I genuinely struggle to see what intervention by large scale, heavy armoured forces that the UK has carried out have done us any good long term.”
Let’s just take Gulf War 1, shall we? Are you seriously claiming that the outcome of that war did the UK no good at all? The ousting of Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait was of immense importance to the whole world in terms of the restoration of international peace and security. It sent an unmistakeable message to every nation and to every would-be aggressor that international law and order was of paramount importance and would be enforced, if necessary (all other solutions having failed) by military force.
I suppose your argument would be that the necessary international police action would have been taken without us. Oh, I see! Those willing to take action are left to do so and the nasties sit on the sidelines and do nothing, eh? That is the very argument that has been levelled against various inactive NATO states in recent campaigns. World security is a collective responsibility, or it is nothing!
And just in case you think that heavy armour was not needed in that campaign, the UK sent a whole armoured division consisting of 7th Armoured Brigade and 4th Armoured Brigade. The 7th alone included 114 Challenger tanks, 45 Warrior MICVs, an armoured recce squadron of Scorpion and Scimitar vehicles, 24 M109 SP guns, as well as the Engineers’ AVLBs, AVREs, CETs etc. etc. And that is just the 7th! I don’t know enough about the 4th to say what they took with them. And then there were the divisional assets: another armoured recce regiment, M110 heavy SP guns and MLRSs etc etc.
Of course that was in an era when the West actually believed in paying the premiums
necessary for effective defence, a time before our collective will to defend ourselves had been watered down and enfeebled by bien pensant liberals. We couldn’t do anything like that now! But the time will come when we shall have to take major action and will be unable to do so. The people and the Government have yet to learn the universal, timeless lesson that, in the words of Lord Bramall, “What you plan for rarely happens, perhaps because you are seen to be ready. What you don’t plan for and make no funding available for invariably does.” How right he is about the unexpectedness of modern conflicts: Korea, Borneo, the Falklands and Gulf War 1, to name but four!
“not sure anyone even inthe army could list the 400 posts they are filling, never mind justifying them.”
They know what posts are there and what they do. Obviously there aren’t 580 Colonel posts, some of them will be overheads. Like I said, the gut feeling is that there is some fat to be trimmed, but that’s nothing more than a gut feeling – I have seen no empirical evidence that shows if the Army is too top heavy. The problem is defence is a huge organisation, and most managers will need to be Officers.
” A lot of the posts are tied to various commitments and liaison duties outside of the structure of units and sub units. Examples of these include representatives in various NATO headquarters, liaison Officers in other armed forces outside the NATO command structure, liaison and integration with UK Resilience, staff positions within organisations and agencies in the armed forces that actually do a vital role etc etc
Officers don’t just command, they manage…”
- and liaise, sometimes as in Forward Presence
- “liaison officer” as a term is not coincidental