We often think the grown-ups at RUSI and Chatham House have a monopoly on strategic thought but having been at home to increasing concerns about their lack of influence and thought leadership for a while now the latest output from RUSI kind of tells me why.
The survey can be found here
http://www.rusi.org/news/rss/ref:N4EB171FEE2471/
The survey puts forward ten propositions, or loaded self fulfilling questions depending on your perspective.
I know these kinds of things have their place and it’s hard to know them for doing it but if you asked a butcher if the UK should eat more meat and if they should be involved in setting food strategy then surely you would arrive at the same kind of survey results.
What I find most puzzling though is in the ten propositions which are pretty broad the inclusion of something very equipment specific, proposition 9;
The need for a carrier strike capability has become more apparent since last year’s Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Why not ask about armoured vehicles or future UCAV’s for example?
Am I alone in thinking that RUSI are pushing a particular agenda or have equipment programmes now become a substitute for strategy, or, equipment choices now dictate strategic thought instead of the other way around?
The survey also fails to recognise the importance of financial security in actual security, instead treating the lack of cash for defence as something separate, distant or someone else’s problem, when in fact they are intimately connected and ets not forget those doing the responding may well have been intimately involved in the fantasy fleets methodology of defence equipment planning that has been self evident for the last several decades.
This is an inward looking survey that unsurprisingly comes up with a predictable set of results, an interesting read though.
i’d only challenge you on budgets.
The health budget is 120bn
the pension budget is 120bn
the welfare budget is 100bn
the defence budget is 40bn
compare to a decade ago, defence has gone up a bit, the rest have doubled.
Its all well and good to accept defence will get shafted, its quite different to try and exuse it.
What’s the pension budget? Sure I’ve never seen that before. State Pensions are part of the welfare budget. And other public sector pension schemes come nowhere near that yearly expenditure and a lot of them are funded.
I wish i could make bets on you. I totally knew there would be issues with the CVF question and “hidden agendas” and all that theater.
The importance of carriers and the impact of the decision made about them, evidently, still does not dawn here.
There is, however, another question that should indeed have been made: Maritime Patrol Aircraft.
Carrier Strike and MPA are the two big, big issues. Of course, this is assuming that the stupid, stupid, stupid Sentinel decision is, in time, reversed as it appears increasingly likely to happen.
does it make you feel better then, you know, beng omnipotent and able to predict the future?
you have though, spectacularly failed to see the point, good lad
The carrier question is certainly an oddly equipment specific question in relation to the others. More odd though seems the certainty of the response, I really don’t see what has changed since the SSDR to make carrier strike any more or less relevant.
It is a very popular question though, matching only question two – military leadership having a greater role in developing strategy – in its positive reaction. Definately a question that the respondents wanted to be asked.
phil
pensions is its own budget on ukpublicspending.co.uk
I’m going out on a limb,. I think Britain should have just bought Nimitz class carriers from the usa as they seem to be cheaper then the elizabeth class.
Carriers could be useful the next time we have to beat up argintena, as we don’t have the harrier any more:(
No government likes defence as it dose not produce any vote winning policies.
There is a good formulation towards the end of the detailed survey report:
”
But the UK government could not even meet its
obligations for national security alone, for instance
in dealing with direct security challenges from
emerging major powers or for preserving the use of
the seas, space and information domain for British
purposes. So the UK needs to contribute capability
to Alliances to get something in return. What this
contribution should be is the question”
- a pity they missed the chance to ask the question!
RLC
The Nimitz has a crew of over 5,000, the QE a crew of 500.
We couldnt operate a Nimitz.
I think we should have built something much bigger (and nuclear) than the QE, but a straight Nimitz purchase just isnt possible
Hi BB,
Your analysis is better than what RUSI provided. So to paraphrase:
- there is general buy-in into the expeditionary posture
- but there is mistrust in the ability of the political masters to formulate either strategy (more permanent) or shape the missions (before handing over to professional military)
“The carrier question is certainly an oddly equipment specific question in relation to the others.”
But is it so hard to see why carriers make for a special question…? They are iconic for a shitload of reasons, and they have proven important when not fundamental in almost all wars since 1918.
- They are fundamental to proper power projection strategy
- They make a Navy into a global force instead of a regional, limited force
- They are universally seen as a sign of the country’s commitment and status
- They are a british invention that the world recognized as fundamental, but that in the UK have had to fight for survival for most of their history, leading at times to near catastrophes such as the Falklands.
And so along.
There is nothing strange in them being a special question.
For other reasons, a specific kit-related question could have been MPA, as i already said.
But if you think about it a moment, you’ll see that there would have been little point in asking about a UCAV (which is kind of in the plans anyway; but that for now is not too relevant as even the Taranis demonstrator still has to fly) or even less about armoured vehicles, where despite reductions in holdings there’s a general strategic (if not financial) certainty about them.
“I really don’t see what has changed since the SSDR to make carrier strike any more or less relevant.”
Libya.
USS Kearsarge contribution, Garibaldi contribution, Charles de Gaulle launching 1350 sorties in 120 days, the struggle to get Italy to allow use of the bases, Italy telling the RAF to move out of Trapani Birgi in October because it wanted the airport for well-paying tourists flights, Malta saying no to basing, Cyprus government making pressure to avoid launching any strike mission from Akrotiri, the difficulties and cost of sustaining ops from a base without suitable accomodations and 1.5 hours (and one AAR) away from the target areas and so along.
Libya may not appear at first as a carrier war, but when you go and look at the whole story, you start seeing why defence experts would consider it as such.
“you have though, spectacularly failed to see the point, good lad”
I don’t think so, TD.
Anyway, it is fantastic to see how, when carrier-support enters the frame, any kind of organization, expert, commenter or anything becomes either incompetent or biased.
You also give me the idea of having been pretty selective in saying you ask “butchers”. That channels the idea that you are asking only a part of the defence community, in this case, the Navy, to justify the apparent carrier-lust of the report.
Because the survey does not exactly talk about increases to the defence budget. We can assume they argue for them, but what they actually say is that they are in disagreement with the stated strategy and MOD action following the SDSR.
You don’t have to ask only “butchers” in your food survey. But for sure you don’t have to ask bankers about food, either. You ask who works in the food sector.
Defence experts, of Air, Land and Sea should of course be asked to provide their views about military matters, even if this means some bias filtering in.
When you need an opinion about something, you ask someone who knows what he’s talking about, not someone else that sits outside, as he might well be completely independent in his assessment, but still deliver wrong suggestions because he has no clue what he’s talking about.
Nellie and Dumbo get in as strategy because in effect they become the RN when then enter service. The cash strapped RN budget will be entirely centred (apart from Subs), arround feeding and cleaning out their cages of Anti air war and anti sub escorts.
The other forces procurement issues are not strategic realy. Do we buy Typhoons or f35′s do we keep tornados etc? These choices are only marginal capability swaps, not strategic decisions.
Like wise to Fres or not to Fres? We will still have some armoured boxes on tracks be they bulldog or Warrrior etc; again capability / cost compromises etc but not strategic as such.
Our big eared aquatic friends set the naval agenda for the next 30 years. Surface RN’s strategy will be all about and only about using/protecting them.
.
Hi Gabby,
I think I have to back TD on this one, there are lots of interesting equipment related questions that could have been asked, as you point out MPA is very good one, but they didn’t. Singling out carrier strike is the odd one out in terms of questions.
Gabriele
I like Carriers, but I cannot agree that they are in some way “special”.
They are a tool, like any other tool, they can accomplish many tasks.
A carrier is one way of projecting power, but we projected power before carriers, and there are plenty of ways to project power without them.
Before Jet engines, we used Zeppelin scouts.
After CATOBAR Jet Engine AWACS, we could use EV-22 AWACS launched from any helipad in the fleet.
An F35 can take off from a carrier and drop a 2000lb bomb on a target, but a cruise missile can bwe fired from a ship and hit the same target.
An F35 can provide CAS, but so can an Apache, so can a super sonic missile and a bloke named steve with a laser designator.
Equipment isnt strategy.
“but we projected power before carriers”
Considering that the carrier dates 1918, the correct definition is that power was projected before planes became an effective element to be used in war.
Ever since, air support has been fundamental in any power projection operation, and the aircraft carrier has been essential in securing that such air support was available and in the right place at the right time.
Where the UK has been unable to provide carriers itself, it worked under the umbrella of US Navy ones. The point remains.
“Am I alone in thinking that RUSI are pushing a particular agenda or have equipment programmes now become a substitute for strategy, or, equipment choices now dictate strategic thought instead of the other way around?”
Don’t get to breathless about the motive-fallacy; the fact that they might have a preference does not invalidate the conclusion.
There is a reason why the carrier statement gained support at a near 3:1 ratio versus the “no’s” and that is because it makes sense:
http://navy-matters.beedall.com/
“The Royal Navy then got one of the few pieces of luck that it has had in recent years. Ark Royal was decommissioned on 11 March 2011 after completing her de-storing (or rather gutting for spares). That was just eight days before the government committed the United Kingdom’s armed forces to a military intervention in Libya – Operation Ellamy (also designated Operation Unified Protector after NATO took control on 27 March).
If Ark Royal had still been available, or could have been quickly restored to an operational condition, there is little doubt that she and a scratch air group including temporarily reprieved Harrier GR.9 jets would have been assigned to Ellamy. There is also little doubt that she would have distinguished herself, and the ship would have made a triumphant return to HMNB Portsmouth around the end of August having flown hundreds of highly effective combat sorties.
However, it is also certain that the many long standing and influential critics of RN aircraft carriers would have discounted this success, claiming that the same effect could have been achieved more cheaply by the RAF from land bases in the UK and Italy – thus again proving that expensive aircraft carriers were not needed. They would then have continued to argue that new aircraft carriers were unnecessary and unaffordable by the country in the current economic climate, and that the best way to solve the MOD’s budget woes was to find a way to cancel them and scrap or sell the half built ships.
But thankfully Ark Royal was not available. As a result the government and the MOD became uncomfortably aware of just how big a loss she was, and (contrary to the view expressed in SDSR) just how useful even a small aircraft carrier with short range jump jets can be for military operations outside land-locked Afghanistan. Italy then proved the point by making very effective use of the eight AV-8B Harrier II’s based upon the ITS Giuseppe Garibaldi – an aircraft carrier even smaller than the 20,000 tonnes Ark Royal.
Despite the strenuous and unexpectedly costly (£3-5 million a day, including £40,000 a day for hotel rooms in Italy) efforts of the RAF, it could not fully plug the carrier gap and UK officials became increasingly defensive about the scale of the country’s contribution to an air campaign that the Prime Minister, David Cameron, and other Ministers had so strongly advocated. Perhaps the most telling statistic is that according to NATO figures, French aircraft were flying about 33% of all strike sorties (33%) whilst the British aircraft were flying just 10% (700 out of 7,223 total sorties by August 15). Even Denmark managed more than the UK (11%), and Italy flew about as many sorties as the UK despite not starting to participate in NATO operations until April 27. Possibly the RAF’s strike sorties were more effective than allies, but on the other hand if support sorties are included in totals then its percentage of missions flown becomes even lower.
The key differentiator for France was its aircraft carrier, FNS Charles de Gaulle. Positioned off the Libyan shore, the 18 fixed wing aircraft (10 Rafale, 6 Super Etendard and 2 E-2C Hawkeye) in her hard worked air group flew 1,350 sorties (most but not all being strike sorties) during 120 days of air operations. On an average day she was flying about twice as many strike missions as the RAF could manage! Additionally, aircraft from Charles de Gaulle could react to targets of opportunity in as little as 20 minutes, by contrast it would take six hours before RAF jets based in the UK could hit a target, or 90 minutes if flying from Italian bases.
As a result of the Libyan conflict – and the increasing recognition of the utility of aircraft carriers – leaks and media articles negative to the QE’s and the Carrier Strike programme have noticeably reduced. The promise of “the largest warships ever built for the Royal navy” has become an essential ‘fig leaf’ for ministers and officials answering criticism from all sides on the disastrous effect of the premature demise of Ark Royal and the Harrier jet.”
Why do we think that 6 short legged planes that can’t even carry a good few of the more effective air to ground weapons available would have been a better contribution than powerful dedicated strike aircraft able to operate over huge ranges and carry all the modern designation, targeting and weaponry in the RAF inventory? The Invincibles lost their role in 1990 or so. Excellent ASW ships and would have had a powerful air defence capability to protect the ASW group. But let’s not pretend they were something they weren’t. I’m all for CVF but a tiny, less capable air group over Libya was never going to be as good as Tornado Typhoon combo.
Well said, Phil.
I am amused when people put Invincibles and strike carriers in the same sentence.
“Why do we think that 6 short legged planes that can’t even carry a good few of the more effective air to ground weapons available would have been a better contribution than powerful dedicated strike aircraft able to operate over huge ranges and carry all the modern designation, targeting and weaponry in the RAF inventory?”
I don’t, and i don’t believe Beedall does either given that the premise of the article is about how it reinforces the case for CVF.
I am content (can’t speak for beedall here) that the Vince’s got the chop at the SDSR because:
1. Stuff had to go.
2. Might as well be stuff that is not essential for our current commitment
3. Our current commitment is absorbing all our energy, so no serious wars that would ‘require’ the Vinces anyway until 2015.
4. Even at 2015 the forces will still need a further five years to recover from fifteen years of war.
None of this invalidates the value of CVF in a post 2020 world.
If the facts on the (libyan) ground have made the relevance of CVF more apparent* then so much the better!
* i.e. the cost of HNS – such as Italy getting the EU to review its policy of originating nation liability for accepting asylum seekers.
I agree with CVF don’t get me wrong. And the Invincibles were probably the best in the business for their original role. But they were a poor mans conventional carrier with a reputation gained from the wing and a prayer Op Corporate. They were a bit like a Sheikh showing off his brand spanking new tanks his army can’t use or maintain, ie a prestige weapon.
But don’t get me wrong. We need CVF. There’s every chance it will outlive us all!
A lot of people who comment on strike carriers and Libya really no little about the OP. the main bombing effort of C2 nodes etc was a round and round and round show. lots of targets were hit 3 times. What made the difference on the ground was the ability of the AH and AV8Bs operating close to the shore to engage Pro Q forces as they emerged to fight and sometimes in a CAS role. This allowed the anti G forces to make break throughs. Yes Illustrious was never a proper Strike carrier but this was not what was required. whilst the RAF and company blew up gadaffis compound and lots of ‘C2″nodes around the country. The Gazelles, Tigers, Apaches and AVB8bs from Tonnere, Ocean and Garibaldi made the difference.
Of interest is that the Chief of the Air Staff has submitted a request to NATO to get all the info on every maritime aircraft in theater, every mission flown, cost, manpower and results. guess we will only ever see the result of that if it suits him.
Or you make an FoI request. Worth a shot. In fact past info on Harrier sortie generation rates would be interesting. Thing is the CVL had limited utility compared to its relative cost. Yes carrier aircraft may well have been helpful but they were provided by other nations, we played to our strengths. I do find it hard to believe that 6 little Harriers would have had any effect whatsoever. I also understand that a lot of strikes were part of very long patrols where endurance and payload mattered, Tornado has that in spades. A baby carrier costs loads and brings almost nothing to the party. A proper CVF would at least bring a capability that justifies the cost. CVF off Libya, perhaps. Ark Royal and, I’m going to say it Dom, her pocket air wing where the planes had more sand than salt in them, no thanks I’ll take the big bad Tornados.
When we look at Libya we should look at the support a/c employed. From our current tanker fleet of around 20a/c we were only able to provide 2 a/c out of the 40 or so that were used of which the us provided 30. Had the uk had to deploy around 30-40 a/c for an independ op or a European only op we simply couldn’t have done in the future with only 9 tanker a/c avail.
The other interesting thing with libya was why we continued to operate strike mission from marham for the duration of the mission or after much was made of co locating Astor with tornado near the end of the ops after typhoon had been withdrawn why was this not done sooner. Was there a limit placed on the ramp space in italy
What has this to do with cvf and f35 and say apache on the sane platform in the future well it would reduce the amount of support a/c to conduct an op like libya to within the resources we have in support a/c. If people don’t want to have carriers they we either have to accept a much reduced future deployed air component or explain how we get more support a/c.
“From our current tanker fleet of around 20a/c we were only able to provide 2 a/c out of the 40 or so that were used of which the us provided 30. Had the uk had to deploy around 30-40 a/c for an independ op or a European only op we simply couldn’t have done in the future with only 9 tanker a/c avail.”
Indeed, air tankers were another big issue during Libya ops, and planes have had emergency landings in Malta for lack of fuel with a rather alarming frequency during the ops.
“I do find it hard to believe that 6 little Harriers would have had any effect whatsoever.”
First of all, i agree with your point. I’m all for CVF and proper air groups, not so much for Invincibles and Harriers, as they both had evident limits.
At the same time, i think i have to note all the same that 6 Harriers were the ones available on USS Kearsarge, and they flew a good number of sorties, keeping up a 24 hours coverage near the targets.
A US Marines MEU has a standard fixed wing complement of exactly 6 Harriers, and they might well generate some 4 sorties per day each.
Likewise, Italy employed just some 8 Harriers at most from Garibaldi.
6 planes feel like little stuff, and in part it is. But you’d be surprised by how much they can do.
“I also understand that a lot of strikes were part of very long patrols where endurance and payload mattered, Tornado has that in spades.”
Again, true and false at the same time.
Rafales from CdG flew missions lasting around 2 hours, but those two hours were spent in the target area.
British missions never lasted less than four hours, but 90 minutes were spent transiting from Gioia to libya and 90 more were spent getting back. With AARs in the middle.
Time spent on the actual operations area was equal, if not shorter.
But it cost the Tornado fleet 7000 flying hours, the equivalent of 2 YEARS of standard operations in the UK.
When i sometime argue saying that Harriers and Ark should have been retained instead of Tornado, it is because of the massive financial savings of such a move. I’m totally aware that Harriers couldn’t do the same amount of work of Tornado, so it is not so much a position taken on capability ground, but financial reality.
I am in no doubt that Britain would have been able to contribute less planes to Libya if the Tornado had been grounded.
It would have still been a good contribution due to the Harrier’s own advantages, but smaller.
But then again, that is the financial reality we all argue for at words.
Having retained Tornado preserves more capability now, but involves worse financial difficulties in the next planning rounds, meaning further cuts to come. This is the issue.
But i want it to be clearm, when i argue for aircraft carriers, i refer to CVF and proper airgroup for them.
Once again the anti-carrier lobby is reduced to pejoratively labeling CVF as ‘Nellie’ and ‘Dumbo’ and patronisingly describing carrier proponents as deaf, blind or weak-minded despite their professional credentials.
I dont know names for any cows, sacred or otherwise, well, except heffer from Rock’s Modern Life
I see our operations over Libya are still being misrepresented.
The RAF released time stamped footage taken from aircraft sensors that shows most missions made it to Libya in about 60 minutes, not 90.
We also got the short end of the stick with GdC. Most other nations were operating from Sicily, Sardinia or Southern Greece. We literally got issued the furthest possible land base of all those that were used in the Med.
All this crying about sorties. The RAF conducted “armed reconnaissance” missions, which means they didn’t always fire weapons. A number of the missions were called back without weapons release.
The French contributed the most sorties, but they also contributed the most strike aircraft, at least among European nations. What a lot of people are glossing over is the fact that only a portion of the French Rafale effort was carrier based, along with their Super Etendard. Many of the strike sorties and combat patrols were conducted by Rafales various marks of Mirage aircraft, operating from both France and then later Italy.
I would add that sortie rates are largely irrelevant but for some reason people seem to clutch at them, what counts is effect delivered.
What was really important in Libya was the Aircraft that were allocated fixed targets at set times in the ATO and the ability to to attack dynamic targets whilst in the area. That is where the AHs and carrier based air spent there time.
Be interesting to see what the Air Marshall does with the answer to his CCIR.
ChrisB
Its about 800 miles from Bari in Italy to Tripoli so if they did it in a hour they’ve gone supersonic all the way. Other countries got stuck closer to libya because tornado and typhoon has a longer range than hornet f16 and harrier and as I pointed out above aar was in rather short supply.
French/UK forces involved as per the font of all knowledge
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Ellamy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Op%C3%A9ration_Harmattan
I would say sortie rate per a/c are the important number if the french or anyone else achieved more sorties per a/c than we did because they were closer then surely that means had we been closer to the action we could have delivered the same effect with fewer a/c.
Not though may I add does this mean a harrier from a carrier would have been better than a tornado, more an a/c with tornado like performance from a carrier would have been better.
td
i believe sortie rates came to the fore during vietnam, when ‘effect’ ceased to be relevent, or measureable.
And we never really got away from it.
It would be nice if they told us what was hit, when, why, and by who, but doubt they will.
Here is a question ofr two on Libya then;
Can anyone explain how the the lack of UK naval fixed wing aviation was detrimental to the UK’s strategic interests, it’s influence within the coalition/participants and the final outcome?
What additional advantage did France, Italy and the USA gain over the UK because they did have such?
Did the UK bring to a bear a number of unique or semi unique capabilities (land, sea and air) that delivered influence and effect whilst simultaneously operating beyond defence planning assumptions in another high intensity theatre?
What I am trying to get at beyond the over emotional frothing hyperbole that always seems to crop up about being a proper navy and who invented carrier aviation etc, how did it actually impact our interests?
“I see our operations over Libya are still being misrepresented.
The RAF released time stamped footage taken from aircraft sensors that shows most missions made it to Libya in about 60 minutes, not 90.”
Ah, well, thank you for reminding us that Libya is big and that some areas are slightly closer to Gioia than others!
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton: Each sortie typically lasted six to seven hours. In some cases, it transited 700 miles to get there and made the point that it could stay airborne and do the job for a long while when it got there. Thousands and thousands of miles have been flown, but actually, the vast majority of that was over the Libyan coast or mainland, providing the persistent support that was needed on the ground. Typhoon has a long loitering capability compared to many fixed-wing fast jet aeroplanes.
Q296 John Glen: We do know that an answer to a parliamentary question said that Tornado fuel costs were £5,000 per hour. We know from two weeks ago that Tornadoes completed 7,000 hours of flying ops. So that is £35 million to start.
Nick Harvey: There would have been further oil requirements on top of that, I fear.
John Glen: Absolutely.
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope: Using Libya as an example of the need, or not, for aircraft carriers can lead you to some false assumptions. If we had had a carrier with Harrier capability, as we used to, I suspect we would have used it as another option, and it might have been reactively tasked in some circumstances. But, let us be absolutely clear, it could not have provided the effect of Tornado with Brimstone and Storm Shadow. At that stage, Harrier was not capable of embarking those weapons. We would have had to have used the same effort to achieve the same effect. Of course, we had the advantage of local air basing rights and overflight rights, so we could position strike capability from Italy to be embarked into Libya. It worked-and it worked splendidly.
The Minister’s point is important, however. In future, we risk engagement elsewhere in the world where air basing and overflight rights might not be available. Without that option, all our possibilities might be closed down, so the Government have made a clear decision to build a future aircraft carrier and put on it the joint strike fighter that will be capable of embarking all the weapons that are currently in our arsenal-and probably better ones.
Nick Harvey: If we had instead deleted Tornado at the end of 2010, the first challenge for the residual Harrier force would have been to re-engage in Afghanistan. That being so, it would have been highly unlikely that it would have been available for the action in Libya. Even if it had, it would not have had the same fire power, as the First Sea Lord has observed.
Q280 Thomas Docherty: I will come back to some of the other points in a second, but I want to be clear: are you saying that had the Government disposed of Tornadoes and kept Harrier, there would have been a significant impact on our ability in Libya?
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope: Unquestionably, yes. The immediate challenge for the Harrier force would have been to work itself up again into being capable of performing the task in Afghanistan, and no one should underestimate how big a challenge that would have been. But whatever stage it was at in meeting that challenge, there was no possibility that it could have engaged in Libya at the same time.
Q281 Thomas Docherty: You will obviously be aware of the Committee’s discussions with Air Marshal Harper about the comments of-apologies to him if I get his name wrong-Rear Admiral Paolo Treu, the commander of Italian naval aviation. I do not propose to quote him verbatim, because I am sure that you have been briefed on that. But fundamentally, he said that the situation in Libya demonstrated the advantage of flying Harrier off a carrier. Remember that this is the Italians talking, who had the nearest basing. He said that it was far more cost-effective than simply using land-based forces. He said that using naval power in partnership with land-based forces resulted in less wear and tear on the aircraft. He also said that it was easier to do dynamic tasking and shift operations when using carriers because they were only five minutes away from target rather than being, in some cases, a round trip of six or seven hours away. Is the Rear Admiral wrong?
Nick Harvey: It depends what he means. If he is talking about the cost per flying hour or the cost per sortie, I should imagine he is entirely right, but you cannot consider that in isolation from the effect that you are trying to deliver. If we had sustained two aircraft types instead of deleting one at the end of last year, you would have to factor into any cost comparison the overall cost of sustaining two aircraft types. If you were simply looking at the action in Libya in isolation from that issue, you have to factor in the different effect that you are capable of delivering from a Tornado from that which, had they been available-a mighty big hypothetical-you would have delivered from a Harrier. The actual cost of getting the aircraft into the air, making a flight and coming back may per sortie have been cheaper-I readily admit that-but it seems an almost meaningless statistic.
Q282 Thomas Docherty: With due respect, Minister, you have already said that it was Treasury-driven need to take an air asset out of existence. So it is not unreasonable at all to ask whether you have made an analysis of the cost of running purely land-based operations.
Nick Harvey: Of course.
Q283 Thomas Docherty: Will you share it with the Committee.
Nick Harvey: I have answered innumerable parliamentary questions on the cost of doing just that but, with respect, how is it meaningful to compare the cost of a Harrier sortie with that of a Tornado sortie if the effect they are going to deliver is not comparable? It is of passing interest, but it is almost irrelevant.
Q284 Thomas Docherty: I would suggest that not all the sorties were carried out by Typhoons and Tornados had to be carried by those aircraft. The fact is that both the United States and the Italians chose to use Harrier. Were they wrong to have used Harrier?
Nick Harvey: Of course not.
Q285 Thomas Docherty: Were they ineffective by using Harrier?
Nick Harvey: Of course not, but they were using it for a different purpose. You are comparing apples with pears. If you were comparing the costs of two alternative ways of doing the same thing, it would be of some considerable significance. But if you are comparing the cost of doing two quite different things, I am struggling to see the relevance of it.
(It is known that Italy initially chose to attack only command and control centers and, in general, infrastructure, not troops on the ground. Pure political nonsense.
In the case of the Americans, though, the only difference is in what their AV8B fired, more than in the mission type. Harvey is kind of climbing on glass)
“I would add that sortie rates are largely irrelevant but for some reason people seem to clutch at them, what counts is effect delivered.”
Kind of bold a thing to say. I’d dare observing that you can afford to say such a thing only because there are no UK soldiers on the ground waiting for air support to arrive, but libyan rebels that no one know and really care about.
“The RAF conducted “armed reconnaissance” missions, which means they didn’t always fire weapons. A number of the missions were called back without weapons release.”
The others did, too. Where is the point of this statement? More sorties means more coverage.
As it is, the truth is that coverage of the libyan sky practically never was a genuine 24 hours coverage.
NATO could only afford a number of daily “orbits”.
I can assure you that, had western troops been on the ground, the lack of timely air support would have been a real cry.
“Many of the strike sorties and combat patrols were conducted by Rafales various marks of Mirage aircraft, operating from both France and then later Italy.”
That’s also because CdG could only be out for 120 days, as it had on her shoulders four months of ops in support of Afghanistan, deployed in the Indian Ocean. She’s been at sea for the best part of the year.
French planes based in Italy were an effort to try and substitute at least in part the fast-reaction capability that CdG used to provide.
This, of course, is why both the french navy and RN want a second carrier at hand.
Some more bits of hope for Sentinel in 2015:
Q275 Mrs Moon: Sentinel is one of the platforms due for retirement. Will you be sorry to see it go? Would you prefer it to be kept?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton: The requirement for Sentinel is in the SDSR paper, which talked about the fact that when it was no longer required for Afghanistan, we would look to take it out of service. Of course, in the interim, its quality and its performance in Afghanistan and in Libya have demonstrated what a fundamental part of the ISR and the whole combat ISTAR piece it is. I feel that as ever, we will have the opportunity in the next SDSR to look at whether, as the Chairman was asking earlier, that is one of the capabilities that we will want to look at again, to see whether it was the right decision to say that when it is no longer required for Afghanistan, it will go. I am sure that is what we will do.
Q276 Chair: You’re sure that you will decide to keep Sentinel?
Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton: No, sure to have a look at it in the next SDSR.
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/uc950-iii/uc95001.htm
Mark,
I’m not sure where you got your numbers from? The base at Gioia Del Colle >> Tripoli is about 580 miles.
detrimental?
Well thats a bit of a harsh criteria.
As someone said, the tornados range was useful, allowing deep bases to be used, but thats only helpful when you lack airstrips nearby, on a floating vehicle of some sort…
That said, whilst its lack may not have been detrimental, even accounting for harriers in ‘the stan’, 6 on a vincie, well, wouldnt have had ss, but would have had a lot more cas capability.
*has a bad fever, so if thats a grocery list, tough
wouldnt dumping tornado have seen typhoons integration program stepped up?
Ie ss and bs (who names these things) (and yes, i get it, hell fire and brimstone)
harrier couldnt have covered, but as i’ve said all along, it doesnt have to.
ChrisB
You maybe closer to the number than me most googles suggest its about 950km or 600 miles in a straight line. Still dont see a fully fuelled and bombed up tornado doing it in hour maybe split the difference an hour and 15.
TD
You pose a interesting set of questions. In Libya we achieved our objective could it have been done quicker with less assets and at less cost in airframe hours pilot fatigue and aviation fuel spent possibly. Would it have been more productive to have co-located apache and fastjet a/c together and like wise our strategic ISTAR assets together in Italy as opposed to cyprus allowing longer tasking over Libya, ramp space in italy may have been an issue here. Our harriers were not multi role as the USMC or Italy so arguably were less useful. They also couldn’t carry storm shadow or raptor pod a future f35 could I guess the question is if you can make life easy for self by getting you principle strike assets as close to the target should you.
This also has to seen in what the force structure will be like in 2020 with less fastjet and much reduced tanker assets available.
The strategic enablers of MPA,J STARS,SIGIT and AWAC again proved vital and are the very capabilities we are removing or reducing.
Its like saying did we take goose green in the falkland yes had we sent a squadron of light tanks along would it of been easier and less costly yes.
Finally we couldn’t we have done this without US enablers.
guys, we were at the mercy of the speed that the pro g forces moved. To quote General B. “Guys we are doing everything we can but when your land component composes lawyers, bakers and dentists we just have to be patient”. That was the reality!
@ Mark,
580 miles in one hour is about Mach 0.76, which is emminently doable. I’d expect the times to naturally ebb and flow, based on weather, payload etc, but around the hour to the hour-15 mark seems right.
The only reason I tackle this subject is the insistence of some in quoting the 90 minutes number which seems well off of everything we know, which I’m sure has nothing to do with trying to swing opinion against Tornados.
Personally I don’t understand the Harrier argument. a) we didn’t have them, so the argument over them is just that, a fantasy argument, and b) pretty much everyone seems to acknowledge that the Harriers are less capable in the attack role than Tornado, including ordinance carrying etc, so it kind of argues itself.
I just get bored of listening to some of the arguments about Harriers which are tenuous are best. The stupid thing is I happen to greatly respect Carrier capability, but what I wont buy is people over stating the case for them as if they’re the magic bullets that will solve all our defence problems, especially not when we lack sorely in so many other, more critical areas.
chris
tornado is better than harrier.
Its also much more expensive.
Dumping tornado freed up masses of cash to pay for typhoon weapons integration.
Typhoon beats tornado on every metric.
Harrier loses on everything except austere airfield performance.
Our primary aircraft is typhoon, the tornado/harrier choice should have been seen in that light. harrier wins because its cheap, and we need cash for typhoon upgrades.
@TD
- W.r.t. ‘effect’ being the only important consideration as opposed to ‘number of sorties’ or a/c based in closer proximity to the battlespace, was this the sort of effect you had in mind? (National Public Radio 25 Apr 2011: Rebels Claim To Hold Misrata After Two Month-Siege http://www.npr.org/2011/04/25/135711169/rebels-claim-to-hold-misrata-after-two-month-siege):
“CONAN (host): And, Marie Colvin, if rocket launchers and artillery pieces are outside of Misrata, they are, by definition, in open areas where, presumably, they can be seen by NATO aircraft. Any sign of NATO aircraft?
Ms. COLVIN (Middle East Correspondent, The Sunday Times, London): Absolutely none. And that is what is being asked by everyone here, I have to say, including myself… And we don’t know why NATO planes are not hitting because they come absolutely come under the definition of the U.N. Security Council 1973, protect civilians.
Civilians are dying here. The only sign we’ve seen of a NATO strike was on the faculty of science, where Gadhafi soldiers were holed up four days ago. They left four days ago. That was hit last night. It’s empty, luckily.”"
@Chris B
“580 miles in one hour is about Mach 0.76, which is emminently doable. I’d expect the times to naturally ebb and flow, based on weather, payload etc, but around the hour to the hour-15 mark seems right.”
- Agreed. And then there’s warp speed (Sky News 23 Mar 2011: RAF Pilot’s ‘Pride’ In Libya Air Patrols http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/15958514):
“However Wg Cdr Attridge, who has been a pilot for more than 20 years, did reveal it “only takes 10 OR 15 MINUTES to get to Libya…”"
- 580 miles = Mach 4.6 for 10 minutes and Mach 3 for 15 minutes. I’m sure this was not “trying to swing opinion” for Typhoon but I’m glad I wasn’t paying the fuel bill.
Chrisb
Speed of sound reduces with altitude A tornado cruising at FL250-350 would need to be doing m0.90 or higher to cover that distance in an hour. It will depend in traffic in Italian airports and any areas closed to military jets round the bottom of Italy.
Tornado is a fine aircraft the only way we could have removed it would have been to have dramatically ramped up typhoon numbers which simply wasn’t possible with the budget as the government choose to make afghan and ground forces the priority.
Ino this concentrating on carriers but can’t help but thinking 4 nimrod each with the ability to carry up to 6 storm shadow and massive range and endurance would have quite nice capability to have
Mark
I frequently argue rather than two fighters, the RAF needs a medium fighter and a heavy bomber.
Nimrod, maybe, but going forward, it seems perfect sense to have something fightery, Seaphoon/F35/Rafale the RAF/FAA can fight over, and then something the A400 to cover transport, AAR, AWACS and then also to carry and lob 20 odd cruise missiles.
@ Mark and DJ – Agree. Bombing things appears to be what gets the RAF up in the morning so I’m surprised they haven’t gone for the transport-bomber concept; perhaps not fast and sexy enough?
http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/benson.htm
http://www.g2mil.com/bm747.htm
and transport aircraft have been used for other roles:
http://www.flickr.com/photos/50486232@N05/6155338248/
“pretty much everyone seems to acknowledge that the Harriers are less capable in the attack role than Tornado, including ordinance carrying etc, so it kind of argues itself.”
No doubt on that.
But you deliberately ignore the 1 to 7 billion ratio in the “financial reality” picture that people here likes to bring out mostly only when the argument is CVF.
The UK is slowing down Typhoon production, delaying integration of weapons on it and on F35, reducing numbers of F35s to acquire, cutting precious capabilities in all three services, putting even Sentinel at risk, and accepting a 10 years gap in the capacity to deploy airpower abroad unless someone makes bases available, in no small part for retaining Tornado.
I’m definitely not sure that this makes any sense. And likely, when the Equipment Plan is revealed and new cuts announced, it will make even less sense and look even more absurd.
You are also oblivious to the evidence that mounting a Libya like operations, in the future, will be most effective and least expensive by using carriers for basing the strike force close to the target and without political issues over basing.
It is not so much a matter of calling for the return of Ark Royal and the Harrier. Retaining them would have made sense financially, less so in terms of capability.
Even so, i believe it was the right thing to do. As painful as it would have been, it would have eased the financial pressure to an incomparably greater level, and avoided some other cuts and pains.
Now as it stands, Harriers are gone.
It is in fact more a matter of underlining that going CVF for the future has many, many good points about it.
Gabby, do you have some form of reset switch where you keep coming back to the same argument, no matter what the reality?
The cost saving between the Harrier and Tornado is completely and utterly irrelevant because the Tornado could support the Defence Main Effort for the next 4 years and the Harrier could not, it was simply not sustainable. Plus a load of other reasons
Personally, I would rather personnel in Afghanistan had UK CAS for the next 4 years with enough slack in the system to enable us to support operations like Libya.
The decision to bin Harrier was fully vindicated by Libya
Its ancient history, can we move on?
@TD
Afghanistan could have been sustained fully. There was no certainty on the ability of providing a contingency force in addition to that. Had it been supplied, it would have been small.
The Harriers were 62 at SDSR date.
40 were judged adequate to sustain ops in Afghanistan.
Only 32 Harriers were being used due to reductions carried out since 2009 (with a Force Readiness of 10, nearly a third of the active fleet – http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/verbatim/119894/uk-minister-on-carrier-decision.html), but it was suggested that three 8-planes groups, one in Stan, one at home for Contingency and one in pre-Herrik training could have been made available if the decision of going Harrier was taken, bringing some more out of the hangars.
It has also been said that the Harrier was, until the very last few days, the preferred SDSR solution.
Libya has vindicated, with firmness, i have to say it, a pair of balls.
The SDSR is saving and upgrading a fleet of 96 planes costing billions and delivering a Force at Readiness of 18 planes.
18 out of 96. – http://services.parliament.uk/hansard/Commons/ByDate/20101124/writtenanswers/part011.html
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/88EA12B8-E08F-4EE4-9963-AFF82DBC665B/0/20101108_mod_business_plan_final.pdf
The total GR9 fleet, prior to 2009, had had the same Force Readiness level with just around 70 airplanes.
Tell me that Tornado is more capable and that the fleet can be stretched to do more, and you are right.
But stop there, because the rest just goes against evidence and turns out being an embroidery of scaremongering.
It is also curious, i must note, how quick you were and still are now and then, when it suits you, in reminding how Libya goes past stated defence planning and deployment assumptions. You also spent a good few words explaining how little interest the UK had in it when things started.
Changed your mind much?
No financial reality at play or even on the horizon here?
Surely, if the UK had not had as many planes to deploy, it would have deployed less, just like it has deployed no carrier having none at hand?
Maybe keeping at least Nimrod R1 for longer, and deploying it for the whole campaign, that one, yes, a quite unique capability to supply to the coalition.
A bit selective you can be. And stop talking about “reality”, financial or otherwise, like you were the sole guardian of it.
Clearly Gabs, there’s a difference between FRE and what can be deployed. The evidence for this can be found from counting the Tornado’s in Afghan, and then counting the Tornado’s in Italy and then the small number flying from the UK. Adds up to more than 18. FRE is the element ready to deploy at a certain readiness, I don’t pretend to know what that level is. But more airframes can be generated. How many and for how long I haven’t a clue but the evidence is there that 18 FRE airframes is not the ceiling.
The Harrier fleet was tiny, and carried less payload and had less range and power. There were absolute limits to how many Harriers could be deployed. We simply could not have deployed the same number of airframes as we did with Tornado. That’s a physical and mathematical reality.
So, we kept a fleet that was larger, more powerful, carried more weapons, had greater range was more versatile and was more suited to strike missions because of the two man crew.
I really cannot see how anyone could have thought twice once the evidence was compiled and presented. We made the right choice, its a crying shame we had to make that choice, but we had to and the right one was made.