The First Sea Lord
Share by EmailDefence News recently ran an interview with Sir Mark Stanhope, 1SL, in which he made some interesting comments.
In response to a question about selling sea power;
The sea blindness which we talk about a great deal is a simple feature of the modern world, where few people appreciate the importance of freedom of the seas to stocking the shelves and delivering the energy that makes my nation tick, in particular as an island nation but equally affects you in similar ways. You close the Suez Canal and you put a two-week delay on everything that is coming from the Far East.
When you look at the U.K., dependence on energy, oil and gas, if the ships don’t arrive, literally the lights could go out.
The whole mindset of the wider population has been captured by the realities of the day, which is the war in Afghanistan. They don’t see a maritime element of that war even in America, where on occasions, more than 50 percent of the air effort over Afghanistan comes from your carriers in the [Arabian] Gulf. But it is not seen as naval warfare.
At the start of October, over one-quarter of the U.K. effort in Afghanistan comes from the naval service, including the Royal Marines. Even when the Marines aren’t there, I have about 300 personnel on the ground, from driving trucks to medical, admin and logistics support.
My first comment would be on the question itself, why should anyone have to sell sea power. If it is sea power we need then it is sea power we should get. In other words, our forces should match security and strategic requirements, not be sold at the expense of other things.
But his answer troubles me even more.
If you close the Suez canal then commodities will find other means, especially oil and gas. OK, they might be slower but that does not mean the lights will go out. If he seriously thinks the UK is in danger of having significant cuts in energy provision because of closure of Suez then I would suggest he needs to go and ask one of his many paid staff to do a little basic research, maybe even talk to the energy generating companies or regulator about energy supply diversity and storage capacities.
Next comes the hoary old statement about the RN/RM providing a significant contribution to Afghanistan, why say that in the context of selling sea power. Its nothing to do with sea power but all about the UK directing its defence resources to the main effort in Afghanistan, does he think the RN should somehow be except?
And what exactly has the fact that sometimes (and they are very rare) the USN provides a significant proportion of the air effort. We might also ask for him to qualify the term air effort, does he mean ISTAR, CAS, AT, AH and AAR or does he just mean one of those acronyms?
This kind of article really gets on my nerves because it develops a victim culture and sells a vision where somehow the world is going to stop turning because the RN can’t re-open the Suez.
The next question concerns his vision for the Royal Navy.
and something that is unique to navies, which is our ability to conduct international engagement to be able to promote U.K. interests, and through that develop international partnerships to help to ensure the stability of world order.
So have I read this correctly?
Only navies can conduct international engagements to promote UK interests, develop partnerships and ensure the stability of world order?
Surely that is a slip of the tongue, a mistake, a mispeak?
I wonder what the other services might say about that, perhaps the various partnership and defence diplomacy missions they actually carry out don’t count when compared with holding cocktail parties on the poop deck.
Whatever the undoubted benefits of naval defence diplomacy, and they are many, please let’s not assume that they are in any way unique to naval forces.
End of rant!
Category: Land, Sea and Air
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I haven’t read the interview yet but based on what you’ve highlighted, I’d interpret it pretty differently:-
You have to sell the Navy because humies aren’t rational at the best of times – which these aren’t. It’s all trial by stupid and mendacious media, PR, vested interests, corruption and politics.
To its credit the RN doesn’t sully itself with such games as much as some other parties – but that’s why it often gets the poo end of the stick, and no sweets.
Yeah, it’d be lovely if the objective truth of the necessity for a strong Navy could shine forth, unassisted, like a beacon through the miasma of crap and BS these days, but you know….
Our economic system is based upon consumerism and imports – it isn’t just about energy but food and folks buying all those cack trinkets coming over from Asia etc, for blissful contentment and to keep the economy running. Even the manufacturing industry, such as it is, is reliant upon the cheap and nasty components shipped in.
The likes of ‘just in time’ have made the system extremely fragile, so there isn’t much room for slack, in terms of time for calm resolution, after the fact of someone playing silly buggers – enforcement needs to be pro-active and pre-emptive overall.
Not how I’d have set it up myself, but having done so the cost for this system is a strong Navy to protect those trade routes.
Re Afghanistan, I suspect that he wasn’t complaining about RN involvement but pointing out the not-obvious (generally) about the RN’s significant contribution even in such a conflict (‘selling the Navy’).
And re unique Naval Diplomacy, yeah ‘unique”s putting it a bit strongly but if you think about some of the good order at sea actions then you see partners that would never work together in a ground conflict: Off Somalia has NATO, Sweden, China, India, Pakistan and anyone else is welcome who can get a ship over there. Not exactly unique but certainly in that general direction.
[Edit time expired] By the way TD, if you haven’t read it already I’d massively recommend Geoffrey Till’s ‘Seapower (A Guide for the Twenty-First Century)’ Second Edition.
It goes into these kinds of things extremely well.
Its sad but true that the FSL has to sell sea power. We live in a heavily media dominated environment and we live in an age where many of our citizens fail to see the benefit of military expenditure.
I agree that I do not liek these type of articles. Very dumbed down but I don’t think the FSL is to blame for all that. Trying to explain to mondeo man why he needs to spend 0.5 pence on the pound to make sure the worlds sea lanes are safe aint an easy task.
A good point ” maybe even talk to the energy generating companies or regulator about energy supply diversity and storage capacities.”
- someone just put together the statistics for crude exports out of Africa. USA has 24-25% of its imports from(no choke points and that pesky Chavez can’t get in the way), China has only one choke point (and imports a lot); UK’s reliance on Gulf/ Red Sea terminals? And why do gas prices between UK and the Continent diverge when there is high demand? Ridiculously low transfer and storage capacity – turn this into a scenario of supply disruption!
Good point also by Tsz “The likes of ‘just in time’ have made the system extremely fragile, so there isn’t much room for slack, in terms of time for calm resolution, after the fact of someone playing silly buggers – enforcement needs to be pro-active and pre-emptive overall.”
- the tsunami aftermath brought this lesson home in car production: a small cog missing from that delicate chain would bring complete plants to a stand-still for prolonged periods
“If you close the Suez canal then commodities will find other means, especially oil and gas. OK, they might be slower but that does not mean the lights will go out. If he seriously thinks the UK is in danger of having significant cuts in energy provision because of closure of Suez then I would suggest he needs to go and ask one of his many paid staff to do a little basic research, maybe even talk to the energy generating companies or regulator about energy supply diversity and storage capacities.”
The UK came within days, under 72 hours of cutting off “none essential” gas users last winter.
Most of them were good enough to cut themselves off if they could. All the local brickworks I know of closed production and went into a maintenance cycle.
“Only navies can conduct international engagements to promote UK interests, develop partnerships and ensure the stability of world order?”
Not “only”, perhaps, but MOSTLY. Day after day, it is visiting ships that keep up the links between the Uk and most allied countries.
“And what exactly has the fact that sometimes (and they are very rare) the USN provides a significant proportion of the air effort.”
Those very rare occurencies include the second gulf war, the 75% of air sorties of Afghanistan invasion in 2001, and the two Nimitz (plus at times CdG) in the Indian Sea to provide airpower over Afghanistan.
Rare? Not really.
There’s also interesting aspects about CdG in Libya and many other things to say.
The MOD document “Lessons from Iraq ops” contains some illuminating observations in this regard.
But of course, many of these lessons have been forgotten in the meanwhile. And that’s why the 1SL has to “sell” its service to get the political awareness it needs.
To people for whom carriers = ‘bad’, routine operations over Afghanistan by carrier FJ for the best part of ten years will always = ‘rare’
For an insight into the almost invisible contribution of Naval Service personnel (RN & RM) to operations in Afghanistan, you could do worse than take a look at http://www.navy-net.co.uk/current-affairs/54790-royal-navy-active-service-afghanistan.html on Rum Ration.
Wing Commander TD Vested-Interest strikes again!
(Well he would do if his fast pointy thing didn’t run out of fuel so quick and his tanker force wasn’t so small and could refuel themselves and so on ad infinitum.)
TD.
“If you close the Suez canal then commodities will find other means, especially oil and gas. OK, they might be slower but that does not mean the lights will go out. If he seriously thinks the UK is in danger of having significant cuts in energy provision because of closure of Suez then I would suggest he needs to go and ask one of his many paid staff to do a little basic research, maybe even talk to the energy generating companies or regulator about energy supply diversity and storage capacities.”
It is easy to be sceptical about our dependency on imported energy, but the truth is the UK produces less and less gas each year. These bullets come from this year’s DECC Report (http://www.decc.gov.uk/assets/decc/11/stats/publications/dukes/2306-dukes-2011-chapter-4-natural-gas.pdf)
Since 2000 UK gas production has been falling by an average of around 6 per cent a year.
In September 2010, imports from shipped LNG surpassed the gas imported via pipeline from Norway for the first time. In 2010 LNG imports accounted for 35 per cent UK’s total commercial imports at 203789 GWh.
Of our imported gas 159,984 GWh or 78.5% comes from Qatar travelling though the Straits of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, Suez Canal and Straits of Gibraltar.
In extremis the UK has just over 8 days of full rate consumption supplies before restrictions occur.
What this means is that we are reliant on shipped gas supplies for a large proprotion of our domestic gas capacity. Much of that gas transits choke points and is vulnerable to interuption. Anything which impacts the smooth flow of those supplies will have 2 effects. Firstly, after a short time domestic energy supplies will be affected and choices about who gets priority between domestic and industrial users will need to be made (as witnessed in previous winters). Secondly, prices will increase (ditto). Now you might think this may not happen, but I beg to differ and believe that the facts and recent history support my assertion.
TD, (a supplementary)
If you want another rant – for the amusement of us all – then read these:
http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/About-the-Royal-Navy/What-the-Navy-Does
A few factsheets which set out the RN approach towards 2015 and Future Force 2020.
Is he really doing anything wrong by waving the flag for the Navy? I’m sure there are many people who forget about the Navy while the focus is on Afghanistan; but they still have plenty of work on their plates.
And if energy supplies are affected anwhere in the world, then prices rise across the whole global market.
As for his comments about Suez; has everyone forgotten the 2004 Suez crisis already? Santa couldn’t get his ship full of PlayStations through!
You close the Suez Canal and you put a two-week delay on everything that is coming from the Far East.
When you look at the U.K., dependence on energy, oil and gas, if the ships don’t arrive, literally the lights could go out.
My first question would have been: “So, Admiral, are you saying that the Navy’s role should be to keep the Suez Canal open? If the canal was closed tomorrow, by, say, the Egyptian government, what exactly could you do about it?”
“My first question would have been: “So, Admiral, are you saying that the Navy’s role should be to keep the Suez Canal open? If the canal was closed tomorrow, by, say, the Egyptian government, what exactly could you do about it?”
Don’t ask silly questions about practical matters. Just call the US Navy!
a
At the moment, not a lot, with a Carrier carrying 36 Rafales/F35C’s, an amphibiously deployable armoured bridge and a bit of back bone, 1956 MkII.
Dom,
Egypt has a bunch of Hawkeye AEW and over 300 fighter aircraft, the bulk of which (200+) are F-16′s. It’ll take more than one carrier load of Rafales.
If we had the US navy as our navy, I’d be all for it. The trouble is we here all these grand ideals, from all three services really, then you look at what we have and you realise we don’t have the clout to back up a lot of the ambitions of politicians and service chiefs.
Either we need a big increase in funding or a reduction in the yapping at the top levels.
DJ, do you want Rafales ? We don’t find buyers
)
Has as often been said you can’t build a navy overnight. In a hungry resource future control of the sea will become a major strategic interest. The Indians and Chinese are building ships as fast as their budgets will allow. Afghanistan has proven that intervening on the ground to shore up failed states or remodel them in the Western mould doesn’t work. Africa is already in China’s pocket.
This is a ranty post because this I am passionate about this subject, not because as many of you think, I am anti Navy.
What annoys me is the skewed nature of the comments and the fact that the person in charge of the Royal navy feels the need to both sell his service by presenting this nonsense. And for the record, before anyone else says anything, I would be equally critical of the other two service chiefs if they said something similar.
In response to individual comments;
@tsz52, why do we need a strong Navy, surely we need a Navy that is appropriate, not strong or weak. I don’t discount the value of Naval defence diplomacy or even joint operations but challenge the word unique. Thanks for the book recommendation, have read it.
@Martin, why does the head of the Navy need to explain the value of the world’s sea lanes to the man in the street? Surely that role is a politicians and the shipping industry.
@ACC, the tsunami did demonstrate the fragility of the global supply chain to disruption but did it cause a global meltdown or did industry just crack on with alternatives or simply manage the disruption, can’t remember world order being threatened but a few car makers having to cease production of certain types of model.
@Dominic, those gas users were on specific contracts that provided for supply continuity disruption in order to obtain lower tariffs. You pays your money…
@Gabriele, not going to even bother discussing carrier aviation with you because it’s like talking to a brick wall to be honest but on your point about maritime forces and visiting other nations, you are both right and wrong. As I have said, I do not discount the value but equally I value the role of defence attaches and the other services that regularly carry out similar and sustained defence diplomacy missions all over the world. This is my point, the Naval service is not unique.
@Dunservin, you are relatively new here so do not think I somehow see carriers as ‘bad’ I just question their relative merit in the context of a declining defence vote for the UK, not in the abstract or what the USN does. I have also run a number of posts on the value of nature of the RN contribution to operations in Afghanistan.
If you get a few minutes, have a read of this
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/05/naval-aviation-blogs-and-think-tanks/
@Bob, I am not sceptical about the maritime disruption and energy/food/trade but then I am not hysterical either.
If you get a few minutes I covered it in depth below
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/05/uk-security-needs-%e2%80%93-food-trade-and-energy/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/05/on-the-subject-of-strategy/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/11/energy-security-and-defence/
If we are so concerned about energy security, ask yourself how much gas storage capacity would CVF/JCA/FRES/Typhoon buy.
While I am pro-Navy, surely the most cost effective way of dealing with the fact that our energy supplies have very little resiliency would be for the Government to set up a massive LPG storage facility able to store 14 days worth of gas which it sells in the event of closure of the Suez, and subsidies for nuclear energy (as well as pushing through NIREX so that we can decommission reactors without having to store high level waste indefinitely above ground).
The South Africans and the Japanese both made good progress in researching gas cooled, graphite moderate reactors which used ceramic balls of uranium coated in graphite in a fluidised bed to build in passive protection in the event that the carbon dioxide coolant (or helium) leaked out of the reactor vessel. They were also very scalable.
Nuclear power and large gas reserves would be better use of tax payers money than building up a Navy which could single-handily open the Suez canal, or stop a Chinese carrier group from blockading Nigeria until they sign an exclusive contract with Chinese energy company to exploit new oil fields after already agreeing an exclusive contract with BP, or prevent Russia from seizing a research vessel chartered by BP in international waters which was surveying for hydrocarbons in the Arctic.
ChrisB
My understanding is that the F35 is supposed to be capable of 5:1 wins against F16′s.
Consider, Egypts F16s are not premium models, its pilots do not get 200 hours of flight time a year and we have an airbase on Cyprus.
Frenchie
I believe the UK and France intend to announce a joint carrier force in 2020, sharing PoW, renamed Invincible, and operating a shared airgroup, based on Rafale.
But thats just me….
TD
True enough, but assuming the interuptables were cut off, was that enough. Would North Sea production have been enough to keep the central heaters burning and the electricity flowing?
I honestly dont know.
Tubby
I believe France stores 100 days of Gas.
I think we have 14 days of storage already.
The problem is, gas storage was designed as a supplement to production, it was sized when we used less gas, and when the North Sea fields were more productive.
Far cheaper than all of the above options would be stop dicking around over shale gas, but then, everyone who invested in wind farms would be ****ed, and most of them sit in parliament.
Hi TD, I,m not too worried if consumers have to wait another two months before they can upgrade their car to the newest model. RE “@ACC, the tsunami did demonstrate the fragility of the global supply chain to disruption but did it cause a global meltdown or did industry just crack on with alternatives or simply manage the disruption”
- the lessons learned are on both sides of the word “or” above
- in defence supply, there is already a lot of emphasis on having onshore rather than offshore facilities to guarantee continuity/ ramping up capability
- there are technologies that should be promoted within the approved supplier chain, e.g. “Vacuum casting technology is suitable for production of small series of prototype as well as final parts, namely in dozens or even hundreds of pieces. The accuracy of such produced parts is comparable with the accuracy of parts produced by technology of injection moulding; however, production costs of metal injection moulds are eliminated.”
TD – in response to your response to all the other comments – you never struck me as naive before !
Of course 1SL has “sell” sea power, we have ten years of defence = Afghanistan, so you say you expect him to “sell” but then accuse him of using erroneous content to do so. Think about his target audience but also acknowledge that while you can remain sanguine about energy security or commodities arriving two weeks late and costing 20 % more, it his job to provide the assets to deal with worse case scenarios. We don’t have the assets, we don’t have the budget to create such assets and the numpty politicians can’t get past the expeditionary need for carriers.
What would you actually suggest he should be pointing out in an interview ?
To a point, I agree with TD
You dont see the field martial no longer in name or the Air Chief Marshal(?) doing these sorts of interviews….
If you have to make your case, you’ve already lost.
Hi DominicJ,
Not that by nature I am mistrusting and prone to checking other peoples comments
, but my comment would been different if I had read this first: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/gas/4944782/Britain-has-only-four-days-of-gas-left-in-reserves.html, we can store up to 15 days (leaves me with egg on my face) but typically store less, still think that there should be a separate Government reserve that covers at least 14 days in addition to commercial supplies, and a 100 days reserve sounds sensible.
Yes “we can store up to 15 days (leaves me with egg on my face) but typically store less, still think that there should be a separate Government reserve that covers at least 14 days in addition to commercial supplies, and a 100 days reserve sounds sensible.”
- and this is just to keep the country ticking over, nothing military per se
Compare when China decided to have a strategic oil reserve. They handed over $20bn in cash to the main oil companies and told them to build the storage as would best fit their operations… and “by the way,fill them yourself; as we are a major shareholder, we can be patient with the dividends”
@ DomJ
The problem is the idea of seapower is more subtle.
How much of what gets posted here amounts to “the Army shoots guns” and “the RAF fly planes” ?
I suggest the site owner asks Santa for a copy of this,
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Seapower-Cass-Naval-Policy-History/dp/0415480892
DomJ said: “You dont see the field martial no longer in name or the Air Chief Marshal(?) doing these sorts of interviews…”
Sure you do, you just need to pick up the right media – Air Forces Monthly is a high street title that jumps to mind for suitable RAF “propaganda”
I dont think this is news really, it happens with all heads of staff at one time or another… just that the past 10 years have been ‘Afghanistan’ or ‘Iraq’, only now has Libya really given the Navy a good showcase for the media.
Though havent you noticed all these channel 5 Navy documentaries? Or is it my Sharkie conspiracy senses tingeling? I kidd! XD
But yes, I can understand why he has to waste time with this, its not good, but its certainly not new.
“You dont see the field martial no longer in name or the Air Chief Marshal(?) doing these sorts of interviews…”
The horrible, empty “One nation, one air force” slogan says nothing to you? That horrible, far emptier selling of the RAF which is also a blatant spit in the face of AAC and FAA as well and which was actively used to try and kill both off?
Or statements about the “unique” nature of airpower, and its ability “to do the job on its own”, and other stuff, you and TD evidently missed it:
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/sir-stephen-dalton-modern-warfare-makes-the-raf-more-not-less-crucial-to-britain-1901558.html
Or interviews like these:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/apr/03/raf-budget-defence-dalton-libya
Which costed the first sea lord a bashing from Cameron when he said that Libya would mess up other standing commitments in the long term, to the RAF are not contested, but they are there all the same.
As to all the babble delivered by General Dannatt in SDSR period, don’t even get me started!
But the 1SL is not allowed to try and remember people of what the RN is and what it offers, because then he is “selling sea power”, betraying the other services, and trying to kill the Jedai knights to establish an evil dark blue empire…
If we are to bitch, we have to bitch on the complete picture. Otherwise it is a case of blatantly taking one’s sides over another service.
As it is, i don’t think i’ve anything to say against these declarations. They say the truth, and they make a case for balanced and capable forces in a climate of political hostility and public blindness. They might use over-simplified arguments, but most of the public wouldn’t get any more specific indication. And in this public we have to include many politicians as well.
Every service chief will release declarations of this kind. They do everywhere in the world.
There really is nothing strange, nor, despite what TD likes to imply, there is any specific plot of the Navy, or any malice in the words of Stanhope.
“Next comes the hoary old statement about the RN/RM providing a significant contribution to Afghanistan, why say that in the context of selling sea power. Its nothing to do with sea power but all about the UK directing its defence resources to the main effort in Afghanistan, does he think the RN should somehow be except?”
This is just plain cruel. It might have nothing to do with sea power (unless we remember, again, that the first british soldiers in Afghanistan, as the US ones anyway, came into Stan, 450 miles inland, from amphibious vessels and aircraft carriers, by helicopter; or that 75% of air attacks on the country came from aircraft carriers during the 2001 ops) but it has everything to do with the Sea Blindness of people who to this day believe the RN does nothing in Stan and that can’t tell the difference between a Marine and a Soldier.
We do know it is not true, others do not.
This article, i’m sad to observe, feels a lot like a pointless, misinformed and gratuitous attack against the 1SL and the Navy he leads.
Tubby
I can assure you, no matter what you say, I will have said something stupider
X: Lol, yeah I recommended ‘Seapower’ to TD too, up above: He’s read it.
TD: As Gabriele’s just pointed out (with examples), the last year has been nothing but sniping, bitching and back-biting by various members of the other Services… so the 1SL puts the Navy case forward, in fairly matter-of-fact, honourable and gentlemanly fashion, and it rubs you up the wrong way?…
Why ‘sell’ to the public? Well, in a democracy (I know, I know) you inform the public, who then inform their representatives what they want, and the representatives legislate accordingly, so 1SL took exactly the correct approach.
You seem to be advocating a reversed system where industry and politicians tell the electorate what they should want? Which is what got us into this mess in the first place.
[I'm just being playful, but you know what I mean.]
Cheers for your response to my comments (amongst others’) but the issue seems to be more semantic quibbles than disagreement about the substance.
‘Strong’: I take ‘strong’ (Navy) to mean ‘appropriate’ or ‘adequate’; which is more than what we have now (can’t meet standing commitments). I use ‘strong’ because when it comes to force, adversaries tend to be quite binary: If you’re not strong then you’re weak – stronger words (than ‘appropriate/inappropriate’) because it’s a serious business (economic-strategic survival in this case).
‘Unique’: Like I mentioned, defence diplomacy isn’t unique to navies, but there are certain dynamics and opportunities that are unique to naval power. Please note that whilst some of these things might not be unique on their own, taken together they compound each other for unique effect:-
1 Practically all land is owned, therefore territoriality comes into play in any land-based operation: there is no real land analogue of International Waters;
2 Though there are air analogues of International Waters, planes can’t stay up there cooperating for very long, in the way ships can – we’ll call this long duration contact;
3 Many good order at sea operations have non-controversial aims (unless you’re the pirate, drug smuggler or people-trafficker)and benefit every state; so in addition to the lack of territoriality you also avoid accusations of imperialism and stepping on client-state toes etc.
So yeah, I’d tend to qualify words like ‘unique’ but I don’t do interviews for mass consumption. Nevertheless, like I mentioned, how many land or air operations can you mention, over the last few decades, where India and Pakistan kind of cooperated (as they are in anti-piracy), or where China cooperated with NATO countries (as they are in anti-piracy)?
Tsz52, I think you are correct about us agreeing on the general substance but as I have been at pains to point out, I don’t care who makes comments like this, I condemn them all. Not sure if you have been following TD for that long but I have had similar rants about the other service chiefs talking out of their arses in order to position their service for maximum advantage to the detriment of balance. I do not subscribe to the view that only the RN are on the receiving end of shitty comments from the others, they all do it and its tremendously corrosive. Again, if you read back through the last 3 years of ranting, interservice rivalry is one of the key themes of Think Defence, apart fom containers and mexeflotes that is.
You have a good point about elements of uniqueness about naval defence diplomacy and cooperation but that still doesn’t make the comment any less wrong, he quite clearly said naval forces were unique in delivering that kind of output. Simply put, that is wrong, which is all I believe I actualy said
The problem with being critical of one service is that supporters of that service perceive it to be them being singled out, a victim mentality develops. Instead of taking those criticisms as valid and discussing the issues it all descends into whining and moaning.
Maybe that is exactly what I am in a roundabout way saying
Hi TD: Yup, I’m not accusing you of being partisan, and have read your even-handedness.
I’m just pointing out that in this specific case, I don’t think that this specific interview is at all out of order. He accepts that cuts were necessary and mentions how it has been hard for all of the Services, and will continue to be so until it’s all sorted, even mentioning that this does and will apply to other countries.
Compare the last two paragraphs of his answer to the first question to some of the ignoble and corrosive statements made by the brass of the other Services around SDSR time – there is nothing in here that hints that the Navy got it worse (despite that being in the question itself), or that Brigades or Typhoons should be cut (unlike Army and RAF brass who continually stated that CVF should be cut, say).
It’s just a Navy guy talking about the Navy of today (and explicitly *not* to the detriment of the other Services) to a primarily US audience – it doesn’t fit amongst the more venomous pieces said and written for UK mainstream press consumption that you rightly object to (and that disgust me too, regardless of which Service says them).
But it’s just a disagreement about interpretation – you’ve read things into his text that I haven’t… like I think that if he were to read this he’d go “No, I wasn’t realistically suggesting that we should have a Navy powerful enough to re-open Suez, but merely using an extreme example to open folks’ sea-blind eyes about how vulnerable we could be, and how utterly dependent we are upon the sea at all times, whether there’s a land war going on somewhere or not” and “No, I didn’t mean that only navies are capable of defence diplomacy – that would be ludicrous! – but that navies have a unique way of doing it which has created unique results.”
It’s a short interview with short answers so I can forgive him his little inevitable imprecisions in his wording; since his tone indicates no intent to harm nor score points (to me).
@DomJ
“My understanding is that the F35 is supposed to be capable of 5:1 wins against F16′s.”
Don’t believe everything you read from Lockheed Martin…
While the F-35 will undoubtedly be a good aircraft despite many claims against it, and the Rafale is better than the F-16, we musn’t swing too far the other way and turn them into super weapons.
And you musn’t mention Cyprus Dom. That would suggest that the RAF might get involved and we can’t be having that!
I just think all the service chiefs are being silly. The RAF boys claiming that they can control the worlds skies and sea lanes with a handful of Typhoons, the Navy thinking that a CVF and handful of escorts could bully most nations into submission, etc.
If Suez was shut down tomorrow the size of the multi-national task force brought together to open it again would be staggering. UK, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium, Greece. And that’s just the tip of the iceberg, before we even we start talking about calling out the Colonial Militia
People also forget, it’s not just the end users that require the canal. It’s the producers as well. I can’t see Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, and the UAE being too keen on having their incomes toyed with.
The first suez crisis came at a time when the world was very different than it is today. I think we need to stop thinking about problems as being “British” problems or “Anglo-French” problems.
Rather than hawking after are own special pieces of equipment, we need to get better at building up allies on every corner of the globe, so we can play the old hand of “Excessive Power”, forging together coalitions at the drop of a hat against anyone that becomes too big of a threat.
One assumes the FSL is preaching to the ignorant public because on closer examination what he says is more damning than supportive for his credibility.
No one is saying that we don’t need a navy. Its size, shape and mission are debatable but no one I know thinks the world has moved to a place where we wouldn’t want one.
It’s unfortunate then that the FSL tries to embellish the RNs place in the world by having people believe that all trade to and from the UK has an RN escort and sails in convoys, or if it doesn’t now it could if the navy had another ship or two; that the only way to protect ships is with another ship; and that for some reason international engagement requires the RN to be there. How would we engage with land locked country I wonder?
“One assumes the FSL is preaching to the ignorant public because on closer examination what he says is more damning than supportive for his credibility.
No one is saying that we don’t need a navy. Its size, shape and mission are debatable but no one I know thinks the world has moved to a place where we wouldn’t want one.”
So. Just saying. You are suggesting he should have avoided making big examples of possible scenarios, such as Suez blockade, but he should have said:
- No more cuts because i already have got more standing commitments than ships for them
- The RAF tells us constantly how decisive air power is, and at the same time ensured we only are able to project power from land bases, and over that small area of sea that we can cover from those bases
- We need more amphibious power projection because, despite the SDSR “forgetting it”, an amphibious force was the first thing used in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya (even if there was no landing of troops ashore in the last case) and will likely be what we’ll use most in the future as well.
And so along.
Yes. He should have said these great truths.
There’s a little problem.
10 minutes later, he would have had to resign because of the rage of the government, though.
“Again, if you read back through the last 3 years of ranting, interservice rivalry is one of the key themes of Think Defence, apart fom containers and mexeflotes that is.”
Yeah, interservice rivalry often figures in your attacks.
But, in just the last few months, you were quick to torpedo all the declarations of the RN heads in “rants” like this.
Nothing really to say against very mature arguments such as this pearl of the Air Chief Marshal instead:
“Air and space power isn’t an optional luxury that can be added to an erstwhile military operation on the ground or at sea; rather, it provides the essential foundation for any sort of military endeavour. Air power is unique. It sets and shapes the critical conditions before and during operations on the ground or at sea.”
Note the unique, or the spit in the face of FAA and AAC that exists to provide the air power to the land and sea environment.
Or this:
“Such mastery, as in any profession, requires years of training and practice and our advantage must not be squandered by non-experts who do not really understand the third dimension, or relative time and space advantage, that mastery of the air can deliver.”
Which reads a lot like: you can’t cut back the RAF! If you have to cut something, cut the AAC and FAA, poor morons that they are, and we’ll do their job better.
Never mind the “squandering” of their own experience and mastery!
Or this other:
[on ISTAR] “And third and finally, my key message today is that we can do this most effectively by using air power to dominate the timely acquisition of the information, the knowledge of every aspect of the operational environment that is increasingly becoming the “vital ground” in 21st-century conflict.”
Do not bother with the other services for ISTAR, that’s our job!
Surely you can’t agree with this kind of bold statements either…?
Oh, but yes. You do. I was forgetting the “Royal Air Force flies” argument for “rationalize” everything under the light blue.
While I agree that we shouldn’t see these things as a solely British or European problem I think the FSL was highlighting specific examples to highlight what he sees as a more general loss of maritime capability and, importantly, influence. Even in a multinational world, where joint task forces would be deployed in a Suez type crisis, the more capable hulls a nation can deploy in a JTF the more influence about area’s of operations, rules of engagement, and other, potentially, partisan interests can be expected.
On navies in general.
Maritime power has always been the best way to project a nation’s will, from the Romans, to the Spainsh, the British Empire of course, then the Germans, circa WW1, to the US. If any government has the pretension to grow it’s economy (and government’s should) it must grow it’s navy to the same extent simply because the more financial, strategic, and other interests your nation has the less your international partners (hate that phrase) will be willing to help you out-just watch US backing evaporate if 500m barrels of oil are found off the Falklands for proof.
Trumpeting the cause of the navy isn’t necessarily doing so over the cause of the other services it’s just, for various reasons, your navy is the biggest stick you have to bash over the heads of (ahem)non acquiescent foreign belligerents.
For all this talk of “coalitions”, I feel I should point out, it doesnt matter how many people are co-operating, if they’re all blind, they cant watch CCTV screens.
If the UK drops its carriers, that leaves France, with one.
Doesnt matter if you have ten other members, or 100, if they all only frigates, your joint flet is still going to be useless.
LOL – RichardW asks “how would we engage with a land locked country I wonder?”
Easy, by bombing it back into the 1600′s, invading it, setting up a largely corrupt central government, destroying it’s major cash crop, and spending 10 years there frakking around wasting money – that’s how we role with land locked countries
Oooh, should have said “by invading it from the sea” (no mention necessary of sea launched air craft and missiles in the “bombing back to 1600′s phase) !
The Navy does need to sell itself as it has a far lower profile with the general public than the other two services when it come to the effect of cuts over the past decades. The 2015 SDSR is going to be the biggest bun fight in history with the MoD, Treasury and other Government departments all going at it.
All three services will want to secure the funding for their part of FF2020 and there will not be enough for everyone.
The RN gambled a large part of its pre 1998 fleet on getting the two CVFs and lost and needs to de its utmost to prevent that happening again and protect the T26 programme, Cat and Traps for QE, new auxiliaries and additional funding to help with the Vanguard replacement programme. It also needs like the other services to get other departments to pay when the MoD provides support to civilian authorities such as SAR, fisheries protection, Fire fighting etc. Finally it needs to be legally binding that operations are paid for from the reserves by the Treasury.
Maybe that would make the powers that be think more carefully before waving the flag and committing forces to any and all operations.
@RW
Re “It’s unfortunate then that the FSL tries to embellish the RNs place in the world by having people believe that all trade to and from the UK has an RN escort and sails in convoys..”
- Maritime forces aren’t restricted to escorting individual ships or convoys along trade routes. In fact, ROE permitting, they are better employed in sustaining an overt/covert presence to monitor, deter or interdict the forces threatening them and, if necessary, destroy their bases, C2 and logistics infrastructure.
Re “How would we engage with land locked country I wonder?”.
- See Camp Rhino – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Camp_Rhino. “Forward operating base (FOB) Rhino, also known as Camp Rhino, was the first US land base established in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. It was located in the Registan Desert, 100 nautical miles (190 km) southwest of Kandahar… The FOB was captured by what is regarded as the longest amphibious raid in history…”
- The almost invisible work of maritime forces, including their contribution to the campaign in Afghanistan (e.g. the US and French carrier FJ performing CAS on a daily basis for the best part of ten years), is constantly rubbished or airbrushed out by people like you and TD. That’s why 1SL needs to set the record straight every once in a while.
Dunservin, I take issue with you aruing that I somehow diminish, airbrus or indeed rubbished any services contribution to operations.
This I have never done, not once.
What I try and do is argue from a balanced perspective and always attempt to rubbish the hyperbole that so often spews forth from people with extreme views that have no basis in reality, actual reality that is
Did you read any of those articles I linked to eariler by the way
Also, the operation to take FOB Rhino was a superb example of multiple services and capabilities combining to achieve a goal, not one service, but multiple services.
This again, being my point exactly so claiming Rhino was some wholly maritime affair is the kind of hyperbole that I make no apologies for calling out.
Hi LJ,
I see a direct line – with a few twists and turns in it – from “The RN gambled a large part of its pre 1998 fleet on getting the two CVFs and lost ” to 2020 seeing a cats&traps carrier and another able-bodied vessel afloat.
If it has ‘lost’ the gamble by betting the entire house on CVF what does this say about the leadership at the MoD?
I find it odd that also a single line and almost a take on a single word (unique) has caused such a reaction. I mean after all hes the boss of the navy speaking up for the navy would you expect the boss of any organisation to do anything different. I mean we’ve had coin wars rule for 10 years and how boots on the ground are the be all and end all of future wars. Even on this forum and else were many have used the words we have 10000 soldiers/troops in afghan which is as much a slip of the tongue as the FSL and the word unique IMO.
LJ it will be a bun fight and as vanguard is now to consume up to 30% of the annual equipment budget I would hope its now recommend to go if there is further cuts in the pipe line.
The idea of the Navy betting the fleet on getting CVF often pops up. However, the focus for the future RN has been on delivering a strike carrier and an ARG; and the trend has been to reduce escorts to the minimum required in order to deliver these two capabilities.
The loss of either or both of these key capabilities does not necessarily translate into more t45, t26 and Astute; rather, lose the prime assets and you might see a Navy of half a dozen gp frigates with a handful of auxiliaries to handle pirates and smugglers.
Gabby
Here is a list of the last 4 months of posts.
OCTOBER
Phil Hammond and the Tory Reform Group
The First Sea Lord
The £38 Billion Black Hole
Naval Mine Countermeasures
Addios Liam
Parliamentary Answers – to 14 October 2011
Typhoon – India and Japan
Mid Point Review and Look Forward
UAV Proliferation
A Growth Chinook
Sea Kings and Other Stuff
Projects of Concern
Parliamentary Answers – to 7th October 2011
Cats and Cards – Defence as a Political Football
But where are the melting flight decks
Labour Renew Thyself
UK Defence: Outfoxed by cuts?
SEPTEMBER
The Future of the British Army 12 – Wheels (Options – Part 4 Utility & Tactical Support Vehicles)
Thicker Than a Whale Omelet
A US Perspective on the Falklands
TYPE 27 – One tier, evolvable and affordable
Generic Vehicle Architecture
Charity Focus – Gardening Leave
Welcome to the Future of FRES?
What a bloody show off
155mm Artillery
Parliamentary Answers – to 17 September 2011
FRES Scout at DSEi
Vehicle Based Water Purification
Parliamentary Answers – to 16 September 2011
A Ship That Is Not a Frigate – Follow up and Feedback
A Quality Contribution to the Defence Debate
DSEI News and Updates
Guest post – The Future of Libya
Unmanned K-Max Making Progress
IR Adaptive Camouflage
Container Inventor Dies, age 92
Parliamentary Answers – to 9th September 2011
Amphibious Landings
The Choices We Make
Indirect Fires
AUGUST
A Ship that is Not a Frigate – Part 5 (Operational Concepts)
A Ship that is Not a Frigate – Part 4 (Modules and Payloads)
A Ship that is Not a Frigate – Part 3 (Design Discussion)
A Ship that is Not a Frigate – Part 2 (Roles and Requirements)
A Ship that is Not a Frigate – Part 1 (Introduction)
CVR(T) 2.0
Arse, Meet Elbow
Parliamentary Answers – to 21 August 2011
The Type 26 and India
Revolving Doors at the MoD, again
Capability Directorates
Hash Tag #GetTheArmy
An Interesting Blog Down Under
CBRN Role to Transfer to RAF Regiment
Taliban ‘don’t want to know’ in Warthog fight
All Mod Cons
Holy Tits Batman – SDSR A Load of Nonsense!
Nurse, Nurse…
Nothing New
The Future of the British Army 11 – Wheels (A Less than Sensible Future Part 2)
JULY
Another Blogs Idea on Future Army Structures
The Reason Nimrod was Cancelled
Second Hand News
The Future of the British Army 10 – Wheels (A Less than Sensible Future – Part 1)
FRES – What Might Have Been
Type 45 gets SSEE Increment F
The Future of the British Army 09 – Wheels (A Sensible Solution)
Warfighter Alert
FRES UV – a modest proposal for a family of “Protected Utility Vehicles”
LHD or not LHD, that is the question
Afghanistan – The Great Game of Two Halves
Parliamentary Answers – to 22 July 2011
When DE&S Doesn’t Do Acquisition
On Soft Ground
Battlefield Medicine, Afghanistan 2011
The Tipping Point
The Summer of Jam Tomorrow
The Pros and 7 Cons of an RAF Voyager
Defence Select Committee – Afghanistan
Mad Dogs and Englishmen
A light weight supplement to a medium weight FRE SV
What is a Global Guardian?
Future Army Vehicles
Parliamentary Answers – to 16 July 2011
Another Walk in a Russian Forest
A few interesting videos
A weakening NATO, a weakening Europe, and the US stance on Libya cast doubt on the UK SDSR
Parliamentary Answers – to 9th July 2011
That NAO Report
FRES, Here’s One We Made Earlier
A Reccy Mechs Nightmare
Skills, Drills and Being Very Very Cool
China’s Rare Earth Monopoly
The Future of the British Army 08 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (03) A Not So Sensible Future
Idle Speculation – Cuts Round 7
Care to elaborate in which of these I have been slagging off the 1SL?
@TD
Avoid acting butthurt. Your remarks about CVF and Admirals appear with disconcerting frequency in articles even wholly unrelated to the issue, to start with.
And i also do remember another bashing of admirals and sea lords. What was the title, “Admirals and Aircraft carriers”, or something like that. I thought it was more recent, but if it wasn’t in the last 4 months, it was 5 months ago. It isn’t that old.
I cannot recall a single note about generals and air chiefs and their own declarations appearing on here, and i’ve already highlighted some far juicer bits than Stanhope ever said.
“This again, being my point exactly so claiming Rhino was some wholly maritime affair is the kind of hyperbole that I make no apologies for calling out.”
So an amphibious assault aided by assets from other services is not an example of sea power and an argument for amphibiosity?
The Gurkha signalers and the Army personnel of 5 RAF Squadron then mean that operations over Libya aren’t essentially about air power?
I think not.
Sorry. “Joint” is awesome, and the contribute of everyone is to be highlighted and appreciated. But there are underlining concepts that just don’t change because of air refuelling coming from planes marked with the other service’s symbol.
“The RN gambled a large part of its pre 1998 fleet on getting the two CVFs and lost and needs to de its utmost to prevent that happening again and protect the T26 programme, Cat and Traps for QE, new auxiliaries and additional funding to help with the Vanguard replacement programme.”
What kind of fleet do we want?
More frigates but less auxiliaries and no carriers make for a largely USELESS fleet.
Auxiliaries mean range and sustainability and independence from host nations.
Aircraft Carriers allow to deploy the airpower, that as the RAF rightly says, is FUNDAMENTAL in any ops, everywhere it is needed.
A Royal Navy with a fleet of 3 frigates for each standing commitment but no power projection capabilities would be even weaker than now, considerably less relevant to the country’s needs, and next to insignificant on the global stage.
Even assuming that, yes, they traded frigates for carriers, they have done the interest of the country.
And as Brian Black notes, the absence of CVF means more frigates and destroyers (especially the second) only in the minds of some of the people here.
The 1SL would have even greater difficulties getting the government to “see” the Navy if all he could offer were frigates and destroyers, with the consequent limitations in what was possible to do.
Indeed, he’d struggle to justify all those “escorts” without having capital ships to protect.
The Navy has two main tasks:
-Securing sea lines
-Influencing events ashore
Influencing events ashore is fundamental, and what more frequently is done.
This means TLAM, air power from the carrier, and amphibious task forces.
Without these, and no, it is not an hyperbole, you have only a glorified, expensive coastguard, not a Navy.
I love the Camp Rhino example, because it does show both sides of the coin.
On the one hand, it was captured by heliborne marines. That’s good.
But those helicopters were indeed refuelled mid way by other assets. I thought the whole selling point of Maritime air power was that it didn’t need such assets to support it? No? Then on the ground, the base was kept alive by airborne reinforcments and supplies.
There are only two ways of looking at this I think;
1) This was a purely maritime operation, an “Amphibious Assault”.
or
2) This was a joint operation, involving assets from the Marine Corps and air force, and eventually supported by other ground units.
I just think examples like this do no favours to people trying to prove the superiority of the Navy over everyone else. If those helicopters had been launched form Deigo Garcia, carrying members of the British Parachute regiment or Gurkha’s, and the various refuelling had been done by RAF aircraft, would that be hailed as a sign of power projection from the air?
The only difference between the real and the hypothetical scenario is a) the launching platform and b) the badges being worn by the men in the helicopters.
Or has the definition of Amphibious assault grown now to include “any operation that at any point relied on ships”?
If so the RAF are missing a trick. They should be in the papers every day telling people how they’ve launched a 10 year, several thousand mile “air assault” on Afghanistan. After all, they fly the men in and some of them are Para’s etc.
That would be just a ludicrous.
I’m just tired of listening to these arguments again and again. I’m tired of listening to people trying to convince the world that a squadron or two of Harriers was somehow a feared tool of “power projection” that made the weak tremble at their knees, and made the mighty have sleepless nights wondering how they would possibly defeat the “Harrier Scourge”.
The Yanks must look at us and laugh, talking about “power projection” with our with one planned CVF with C&T, our 8 or 9 TLAM’s that we occasionally fire, the 4 or 5 Storm Shadows that we loose off here and there, and our plans to threaten foreign governments with “amphibious assaults” consisting of two companies in small boats.
No, we don’t have the financial resources of the Americans. Which is probably why we should stop trying to match them ability for ability and focus on what we need and what we can reasonably use.