A guest post from Jed
There have been a lot of interesting comments made in the various post-SDSR army articles written by TD (and guests), some by serving soldiers, some by us arm chair generals, but I am focusing here on the ones about the Warrior upgrade, and the Protected Mobility variants of FRES SV.
Those comments have prompted me to ask my contentious question which provides the headline for this article, is the concept of the Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV) or Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) passed it’s use by date ?
You can choose to interpret the question in its most broad sense, but I will attempt to constrain my meandering thoughts and arguments to the confines of a post SDSR British Army.
Contents
History
But first, the potted history of the MICV / AIFV, starting with it’s predecessor, the Armoured Personnel Carrier:
As is often the case these days, a succinct and reasonably accurate history is available from Wikipedia:
- APC : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_personnel_carrier
- MICV / IFV : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MICV
Apparently as early as WW1 the British Army built a “tank” variant with no main armament but designed to carry up to 30 troops, who were provided by armoured loop holes from which to fire their rifles, as the vehicle wadded through the mud, ran over German trenches, and protected said Tommies from machine gun fire. This was news to me, but hey it appears we invented the MICV before the APC !
Move onto WW2 and we have iconographic images of both German “Hanomag” and American M2/M3 “half tracks” providing “protected mobility” to infantry accompanying tanks formations. Already we are to the crux of the matter, the development of what we call the “combined arms” formations, tanks and infantry working together; each has its strengths and weaknesses, vulnerabilities and advantages.
For example the Hanomag (Sd. Kfz251) provided protection for Panzergrenadiers (mechanized infantry) from small arms fire and some artillery shrapnel, while also providing tactical mobility close to that of the Panzers. The infantry could use their personal weapons from within the vehicle, or de-buss to deal with anti-tank guns, infantry with Bazookers, PIAT’s or Molotov Cocktails etc, thus basically protecting the tanks by making up for some of their weaknesses (lack of situational awareness and all round vision, etc).
Post WW2 and into the Cold War era and the APC got a roof – not only to better protect against shrapnel (and the weather ?) but also as part of the efforts to provide some NBC protection. This era produced the iconic American M113 tracked APC and its wheeled Soviet counterpart in the BTR series. In the UK we got the home grown M113 look-a-like in the shape of the FV432.
Vietnam brought the re-learning of old lessons when the M113 went into action – gun shields for pintle mounted MG’s, and a disturbing realization of how vulnerable these vehicles were to Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG’s) spawning the first use of bar armour. Of course we have even more recently re-learnt these lessons again !
Evolution – APC to MICV
And then…… along came the BMP !
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMP-1
The Soviet Army thought that allowing the infantry squad in the back of the APC to bring their weapons to bear might be a good idea. At the same time they added a turret mounting a low pressure 73mm gun, which fired HEAT rounds which apparently were supposed to be able of defeating the front armour of M60A1, Leopard 1 and Chieftain MBT’s and, well just to make sure in case it didn’t, an AT3 “Sagger” wire-guided missile sat on a launch rail just above the main gun barrel.
Although the modern German Army had a small APC fitted with long barreled 20mm cannon during the 50’s, it had no firing ports for its small 5 man infantry team, so I will go with the conventional wisdom that says the BMP-1 was the first (modern?) MICV.
Western responses included the U.S. Army Bradley, with firing ports, a 25mm cannon and two TOW wire-guided ATGW, and the German Marder, with a 20mm cannon and later on a Milan ATGW launcher. As well firing ports for the onboard infantry, the early versions included a rear MG, with direct optics allowing it to be aimed and fired by the troops, but this was not an Remote Weapons Station (RWS) as we now know them.
In this era Britain got the Warrior. The main design differences from our allies (and enemies) was that instead of the fast firing auto-cannon, or large caliber low pressure gun (like the 76mm of the Saladin and Scorpion) we went with a bigger auto-cannon, clip fed rather than belt fed, with a much lower rate of fire. The idea being that well aimed high velocity Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) would penetrate the armour of BMP-1’s and other Soviet light armour, without recourse to a big and expensive ATGW. Meanwhile the co-axial 7.62mm and the embarked infantry weapons would take care of enemy infantry, and HEI shells were available to take on buildings, sangers, soft skinned vehicles etc.
As can be seen, perhaps the biggest difference between the British Army MICV and those of both our allies and potential opposition is the lack of a anti-tank missile on the standard squad vehicle.
Why not ATGW ? It’s just not British old chap………
I have never been able to find a book or scholarly journal that clearly states why British Army doctrine led to this difference. We can of course make our own inferences – in the combined arms battle group, the Warrior would be fighting alongside the MBT’s (Cheiftain, Challenger 1 and Challenger 2) which are considered the main weapon system for dealing with enemy tanks and other threats. In a mixed battle group setting with Armoured Recce assets the British preferred the “anti-tank” over watch methodology, with the Striker vehicle and it’s Swingfire missiles.
We can then add on the other elements of the “combined arms” teams – artillery and aviation. So if the tank-MICV combo come under ambush from enemy tanks or infantry anti-tank teams, we could call in fast air with cluster bombs, or a full battery of 155mm “HE dispensers”. Although not available in huge numbers, there might have been TOW equipped Lynx helicopters available too. Finally the infantry carried in the Warrior can always de-buss and take up their own ambush positions with Milan launchers or their unguided anti-tank rockets.
Non-the-less many other countries saw, and still see the benefit of equipping the standard squad MICV with an ATGW (including Kuwait’s version of the Warrior).
Continued evolution – back from Infantry Fighting Vehicle to Protected Mobility
Updated variants of all the main MICV / IFV vehicles featured improved armour protection, and all of them lost their firing ports because of this. So in some way’s we have moved full circle – the original aim of the IFV, be it the WW1 Mk X tank or the BMP-1 was to allow the carried infantry squad to contribute to the carnage with their personal weapons, while remaining behind armour.
As the weapon versus countermeasure battle moves inexorable onwards, we are now back to a scenario where protection levels mean the squad are back to being somewhat passive passengers, as they are in a simpler APC. So now the main difference between IFV and APC is the main and secondary weapons, the weight of protection and maybe the tactical (“keep up with the MBT”) mobility.
The most interesting element of this to me, and the of the various comments made on various TD articles, is the evolution of the main armament, the turret versus RWS and the “fire support” vehicle debates.
So while this applies to any modern armoured vehicle, lets confine this right now to the Warrior update and FRES SV Protected Mobility variants. Based on the good old British doctrine of accurate, heavy punching, low rate of fire auto-cannon development we have the introduction of the CTA 40mm Case Telescoped Ammunition gun, with its very high velocity APDS “kinetic energy” rounds designed to take on light and even “medium” armour (and who’s to say it is not going to penetrate the more thinly armoured rear or side portions of some MBT’s ?).
However now it also has an air bursting HE round, suitable for dealing with infantry in defilade cover, or in buildings. As you all know we are looking to standardize on this weapon for both the Warrior upgrade (or IFV) and our armoured Recce vehicle (FRES Scout).
Fine - but now we have the manned turret versus unmanned turret debate.
How much situational awareness do you need ?
I fully understand the arguments for a Recce vehicle retaining a manned turret. I am not so sure the same arguments are applicable to the IFV. If an unmanned turret allows all the crew to be lower down, protected by the thicker armour of the hull, we can probably all agree this is a good thing. However critics suggest that even with modern sights, periscope and TV sensor technology there is a potential loss of “situational awareness” in this arrangement. However as the most recent example of why “fighting heads out” is a bad idea, the U.S. experiences of Iraq once again seem to suggest that in a fire fight, sticking your head up out of the hatch is a bit suicidal !
But, do we even need the unmanned turret ? Do we need a medium caliber auto-cannon with co-axial MG (and maybe ATGW ?). Perhaps we could make do with a big RWS, able (as some on the market right now are) of taking say a 40mm auto-grenade launcher and a 7.62mm MG.
As someone noted in a comment, 40mm HEAT grenades are not really up to much, even against light armour. However with the right fire control system, 40mm grenades are also available as an air bursting HE weapon, providing a cheaper alternative to the cannon HE round when you want to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel. So if the primary role is to provide cover for the MBT against close in infantry anti-tank teams and to provide cover for the embarked infantry team as they de-buss to get “up close and personal” – then is this not heavy enough weaponry?
If we look at ASCOD 2 FRES SV Protected Mobility variant, CV90 Armadillo and Israeli Namer vehicles, they all have prominent “cupolas” with direct view armoured vision blocks, as well as the main sensors on the RWS and “situational awareness” enhancing CCD cameras covering the rear, front corners (or the driver) and even providing a panoramic 360 degree view.
ASCOD 2 based FRES SV Protected Mobility variant – note quite low profile commanders cupola between drivers hatch and RWS
CV90 Armadillo – note the much more prominent commanders cupola and vision blocks.
The APC variant of the French VCBI actually puts its RWS on top of a large cupola with 360 degree direct view “vision blocks”.
Many of the RWS are fully capable of adding a pair of Spike, Javelin or other ATGW to the mix, so does that cover the lack of ability of the 40mm GMG ?
Detractors of the RWS approach may point out the reduced ammo capacity, and the inability to reload under armour – which is a feature of some of the unmanned turrets. Good points, I guess it just comes down to the cost benefit analysis.
Adding “fire support” vehicles into the mix
At the same time as the so called “strategic” review and defence cuts see us reducing our fleet of Challenger 2 MBT’s – the plan for FRES SV includes an element for “fire support” vehicles, and we have had many a discussion in the comment threads about 120mm, 105mm or even 90mm medium / high pressure guns, and of course my personal favourite the turret mounted breach loading 120mm smooth bore mortar.
So, if we are going to have the following potential mix of vehicles in a armoured / mechanized battle group, do we still need the cannon armed IFV ?
- MBT – 120mm rifled gun, possibly to be replaced by 120mm smooth bore at some point ?
- FRES SV Scout variant – 40mm CTA
- FRES SV ‘Fire Support’ – who knows ? Medium caliber gun of some type ?
- FRES SV ‘Anti-Armour Over Watch’ – specialist anti-tank vehicle
Perhaps we could save considerable money on the Warrior upgrade by dispensing with the turret all-together and fitting a dual weapon RWS ?
Is the logical extension of this thought to simply put effort into keeping the Warrior in service just long enough to replace it completely with FRES SV Protected Mobility variants ?
Questions
So let me leave you with 3 questions to get the discussion thread heated up:
- If we have less MBT’s available to the combined arms battle group, are we really able to dispense with the turret mounted 40mm cannon
- If we are to have less MBT’s should we fit every standard squad IFV with an ATGW ?
- Should we dispense with the idea of dropping MBT numbers, and just use them instead of developing new fire support / anti-tank vehicles on the “medium” weight chassis ?
- Should we think outside the box, and examine a turreted 120mm mortar with extended range, guided and tube launched ATGW as a truly multi-purpose fire support platform (direct, indirect fire support plus direct and indirect anti-tank fires).
- Has the time of the IFV gone, and considering both current threats and budgets, is the RWS armed APC or “protected mobility” variant the way to go
If you go chaps, lets see how big we can build this comment thread J



About APC wheeled, the soldiers are angry.
http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=17822
Thanks Frenchie, I had read a shorter version before
“”Even the Americans, who have dollars to spare, went out and bought new vehicles because their Stryker vehicle – which was perhaps one of the vehicles we were looking to procure for our core programme – was overmatched by the threat. Even a well-equipped AFV (Armoured Fighting Vehicle) fleet is challenged by heavy IEDs and externally forged fragments.”
MoD chief Ursula Brennan said that the need to spend billions on the vehicles as Urgent Operational Requirements would have been the same if Britain’s planned armoured fighting vehicle programmes, such as FRES, had been successfully procured.”
Well, she is not quite the Chief of MoD ( I speak at my peril; in many companies the chief accountant is the chief!), but
- she is right
- as per the piece I put on the Open Thread; the next US Stryker Bde to deploy to A-stan is leaving their $4m Strykers behind and using $1m MRAPs instead
Let’s not bin them all; horses for courses
McZ
Ref the Cloggies getting rid of MBT’s – well it has absolutely N O T H I N G to do with strategy, and everything to do with budgets and cost cutting. So in this case I would say the Dutch are wrong, and we dont want to copy them!
Read an interesting piece the other day, I will look for the link, on the way Israeli doctrine is being modified in the context of the proliferation of sophisticated MANPADS and how this may deny them the traditional high level of CAS from both Apaches and fast air. This, in conjunction with the threat from modern Russian ATGW’s and RPG’s is pushing them towards heavier vehicles such as the Namer, and to start examing more organic fire support at lower levels, and it was thought that this will most likely mean more armoured 120mm mortars in the short term.
I’ve been trying to do some research on the cloggie issue purely to see if were possible to whack the turret onto the chally chassis, no need to buy in a huge stock of spares and retrain the VM’s. (and no outrage in the daily wail, or disgusted retired **** of tunbridge wells writing to the telegraph)
I note that they are now upgrading older MBT’s for urban warfare, so if we are going to bin/store a percentage would it not be an idea to also convert some, to be used if our “raiding” concept turned into a stan like prolonged occupancy?
leopard PSO is the urban version
Hi Jed,
Say what you like (I don’t mean you) about the Israelis, they are not stupid:
“, in conjunction with the threat from modern Russian ATGW’s and RPG’s is pushing them towards heavier vehicles such as the Namer, and to start examing more organic fire support at lower levels, and it was thought that this will most likely mean more armoured 120mm mortars in the short term”
- all of that right, even though some of it specific to their context
Next, about the Cloggies:
” absolutely N O T H I N G to do with strategy, and everything to do with budgets and cost cutting. So in this case I would say the Dutch are wrong, and we dont want to copy them!”
- everything to do with their chosen strategy
- read it: 3 Marine bn’s and 3 army Cdo bn’s to be made into a coherent and agile force.. in the context of NOT having to defend the country at its borders
- we have a different strategy, and as you say, we should not copy them… having said that: 3 Marine bn’s and 3 other cdo bn’s with almost half of our Apache numbers and better Pumas than we have got, to move them around… what is there to sniff at?
the idf might have the luxury of reverting to imprecise barrages if pinpoint fire is off the table, do we?
I remember the last time i pointed out how far we could go even within UN rules the reaction on here wasnt supportive.
DomJ
Ref the IDF – who mentioned imprecise barrages ? Not I, don’t leap to the wrong conclusion.
ACC -
NL policy is budget led, so called strategy being only one available to fit in with the budget cuts – which does not make it bad per se of course, especially as their politicians are less “adventerous” than hours. So lets see how they do with CV90 as their heaviest armour.
Sven
Just read the three articles you linked – ta very much, interesting discussion ! If only I had read them first……
I note B.Smitty was involved in the comments threads, and in response to my questions, he states at the head of this comment thread, that the answers to my questions very much depend on what it is we want our army to do.
If we don’t argue with the premise and outcomes of the SDSR, British doctrine is basically to fight our battles as far away from UK / Europe as possible – i.e. an expeditionary strategy. This gets us back into arguements about weight and how much we can deploy by air. Personally I am with Sven / the Israeli’s and favour heavier armour, so I will just say to me it boils down to how many amphibs / merchants we have to move heavy MBT and supporting vehicles.
So back to the questions at hand, IFV versus APC etc. Sven in his article seems to come down on a heavily protected Namer type HAPC, able to keep up with the MBT’s, but not heavily encumbered with turret and auto-cannon. He suggests an auto-cannon equipped vehicle on the same chassis the MBT / HAPC for direct fire support. Frankly I am maybe being swayed over to this side of the fence BUT lets face British Army is not getting Namer, or a family of front engined Chally 3 and Namer-type HAPC’s any time soon !!
So, out of what we might get, which way should we go ? Might it be better to upgrade more Warriors, in order that each Armoured Infantry Battalion get more vehicles, with more capabilities, rather than relying on what Sven describes as a “jack of all trades” IFV ?
Perhaps Warrior APC’s (or protected mobility) with no turret (or basket) and just a heavy RWS, and a full 8 man disembarking infantry squad. These could be joined by perhaps as many as 16 (8 in the “Recce” platoon, and 8 in the “Anti-Tank” platoon) turreted versions with not only the 40mm CTA, but also a turret mounted ATGW. By not carrying any infantry in the back, but using the space to carry additional ammo, these would perhaps make up for some of Sven’s issues with the paltry amount of reloads carried by the IFV.
Add to these 8 to 12 x turreted 120mm in the indirect / direct fire support role. Overall size of the Armoured Infantry Battalion goes up, but as the number of battalions is being reduced, this in someway ensures the ensuing battlegroups retain a certain critical mass of firepower capabilities ?
Of course if we could just hand all these to the TA and equip the MRB’s with brand new versions built on FRES (or even better in my opinion, on CV90) then there would be greater fleet commonality with the Formation Recce regiments !! Can’t see the budget for that arriving any time soon…….
I do wonder if advent of reliable, multi-shot active defense systems mean the APC does not have to be quite so heavy as the German Puma ?
Sven notes that all western armies are getting a bit thin on armoured transport of all varieties, and suggests less expensive IFV’s means more, cheaper, APC’s. If we only need them to be bullet proof and 155mm air-bursting shrapnel proof because RPG’s and ATGW’s are dealt with by a triad of: Mobility, active-defense and masking systems (IR smoke etc), then is something like the RG35 or RG41 (both less well protected and thus cheaper than the Boxer) good enough for the majority of the “mechanized” infantry.
I think to some it up, we end up with (build either on Warrior or FRES ASCOD 2 platforms for this fantasy)an armoured battlegroup triad of:
Chally 2 MBT
“Heavy” APC – up armoured Warrior with RWS (MG / GMG)
“Recce Tanks” – Warrior or FRES Scout with both 40mm CTA and ATGW but no dismounts
Additional “Recce Tanks” might mount MANPADS instead of ATGW’s (and the flashy Starstreak type laser guided 40mm CTA round).
Might this triad be capable of taking on the threat spectrum envisaged by SDSR for “expeditionary” operations – I think so, of course we will have to buy back that Bay class, and build a couple more
Jed
“Ref the IDF – who mentioned imprecise barrages ? Not I, don’t leap to the wrong conclusion.”
I think if you give infantry companies a 120mm mortar, they will use it, a lot, quite possibly against targets a Fast Air or Artilery platform would refuse.
Its really impossible to comment on the the RG vehicle without a clearer idea of the function.
If they (mechanised infantry) are Panzergrenadiers, fighting an identified enemy in a war, mine resistance is of limited value, and the RG’s resistance to .50 AP not much use against 20mm and up cannons.
If your going to operate as a quasi police force, well the RG series is great, the enemy has nothing bigger than a .50AP and you will face serious mine threats.
I believe the recent Royal Marine grabbing of a uncooperative tribal chief should be the way forward, even if we need to land 30 tanks 100 IFVs and 3,000 men to grab Christina…..
Personaly, I think gun ports are a bit of a waste in any vehicle. If you need any sort of close range fire power like that, I think some sort of “hedgehog” all around grenade weapon would be far better at dealing with close in enemy before the infantry debark.
Hi Jed,
I am with you on this one:
“perhaps Warrior APC’s (or protected mobility) with no turret (or basket) and just a heavy RWS, and a full 8 man disembarking infantry squad. These could be joined by perhaps as many as 16 (8 in the “Recce” platoon, and 8 in the “Anti-Tank” platoon) turreted versions with not only the 40mm CTA, but also a turret mounted ATGW. By not carrying any infantry in the back, but using the space to carry additional ammo, these would perhaps make up for some of Sven’s issues with the paltry amount of reloads carried by the IFV.
Add to these 8 to 12 x turreted 120mm in the indirect / direct fire support role.”
-but you omitted the word mortar or AMOS from the last sentence? (joke-joke!)
- the Canadians chose NEMO for their wheeled LAVs, i.e single barrel only and thereby much lesser first burst rate of fire (6-7 rounds land on the target simultaneously with two barrels)
Also this one is good (except for 16AAB and 3 CDO):
“Chally 2 MBT
“Heavy” APC – up armoured Warrior with RWS (MG / GMG)
“Recce Tanks” – Warrior or FRES Scout with both 40mm CTA and ATGW but no dismounts”
As there is no ATGW-version, I’ll offer my two pennies worth
- we all agree(?) that Brimstone is brilliant,and will be better still with the three-mode seeker head that the Americans are working on
-The MMW radar system can see though any kind of smoke, fog, heavy rain, and allows (as evidenced by the Russian Krisanthema system) to target metal vehicles at 6.5km at night, in heavy snow, fog, or even the special smoke screens that IR sights can’t see through. The radar is fully retracible and uses very low emission levels (the frequency as such does not lend itself too much for ARM-missiles to home in).
- as there is a lot of parts commonality between Brimstone and Hellfire already, we put a ‘Brimfire’ on the over-watch SV Scouts
- I forget the range of a ground-launched Hellfire, but the Russian one does 5.5 km
- guidance method can be different from target detection, eg. laser beam riding
Further, for recce the trials done in N. European type of vegetation have produced results for up to 20 km detection that are good enough for preliminary classification. Putting an MMW radar on a retractable arm (think of a miniature of the Giraffe AA-radar arm) on some SV Scouts and on others the same thing loaded with optical & TI sensors a la Fennec and Jackal would enhance unit-level ground surveillance greatly, while the gunned units (MBTs,Scouts/ WRs, AHs or the above proposed ATGW carriers) would then do the jobs themselves
- following the trend for off-board sensors here (holy cow, forgot to mention UAVs… have to keep up with the times)
Mine resistance is not a waste of time. Anything that gets a vehicle back into action quickly is not a waste. On the MoDs website right now there’s a pic of a REME fitter repairing a mine strike vehicle in the field as part of a CLP with their own assets. You think that would be valueless in a general war?
Israel can “afford” really heavy APCs because its forces fight at home. And Israeli doctrine puts crew survival first. It really isn’t a Western style heavy vs medium argument. Completely different context.
Is the MICV concept past it’s use by date?
Maybe.
It’s armament is not good for supporting infantry in the assault, it’s armour can’t keep the infantry it carries safe from ATGWs and incoming tank rounds like an MBT’s armour can and it carries fewer infnatry than a dedicated APC does.
A 25-40mm autocannon is great for killing light armour but poor for anything else. Even a 40mm cannon fires an HE round about as heavy as a hand grenade which, unless it’s backed by ludicrously expensive sighting and fusing technology, is incapable of hitting infantry behind dense cover or on the reverse side of slopes. A good mortar or even a GMG is a better weapon for such tasks. The old Scorpion’s 76mm HESH was better for taking out buildings and with the increasing amounts of armour that MICVs now carry, how long will it be before an ATGW is the only reliable way of killing one (short of a 120mm APFSDS round, of course)?
If your MICV is designed to support infantry on foot then does it need a stabilised gun? If it has a large-ish calibre weapon does it need expensive, electronically programmed airbursting ammunition?
Phil
“You think that would be valueless in a general war?”
Yes.
If we accept limited engineers time and resources, its likely that the highest availability rate will be maintained by writing off damaged vehicles and concentrating on keeping functional ones in the field.
Although it does of course depend on the exact circumstances and a vehicle by vehicle basis,
An Abrams was hit by such a blast that it was flipped over, the turret seperated and the vehicle pretty much shredded, probably BER.
The same tank that drove over an anti personel mine and lost a track segment, probably worth repair.
My point was more that vehicles to be used in Counter Insurgency should be built to be mine protected above all else, both keep the crew alive, and facilitate either easy repair and canibalisation.
Vehicles used in war, should be built to be protected against enemy fire first and foremost.
It rather depends on what sort of war you intend to fight.
If you favour long peace keeping operations, you need to keep vehicles going for long periods of time, and have a lot of time to effect repairs on damaged vehicles in the field.
If you favour quick “in/out” raids or dashing advances, a three hour delay to fix a vehicle is likely to be impossible.
Somewhere in between, its likely to somewhere in betweem.
Personaly, in the sort of wars I think we should be fighting, the resources spent repairing damaged vehicles would be far better spent bringing more vehicles in the first place.
I remember reading about somewhere in Afghanistan, fairly early on, 4 CVRTs were sent to an area, two fire support, one command and an engineering vehicle and thinking that was positivly insane.
X
A bay class can in theory carry 36 MBTs, thats an under strength battalion, more or bigger bays, its not a massive problem moving them, admitadly, keeping them supplied mught be harder.
But its not beyond possible.
Pete
I considered mentioning that for our light tanks, we went with a little cannon, a big cannon and a missile platform.
20mm cannon, 120mm mortar, javelins?
If you look at the information from WWII in Allied armies they returned huge numbers of vehicles to battle after repairs, it’s likely things would not have run as they did if vehicles had been abandoned. The more resistance to fire you have, the more your combat power. Mines are a legitimate and very widespread weapon in general war and designing vehicles that can largely take a hit and be repaired rapidly afterwards is a valuable concern in all scenarios. Vehicles hit by mines can still then dismount their infantry and the vehicle dragged back for quick repairs. There is much utility in mine resistance. I’m not talking about catastrophic kills, nobody is expecting an MBT with its turret popped off to be repaired in the field but every little helps.
Phil
But WWII lasted years, in that sort of situation, then yes, repair matters.
The Gulf war, less than 30 days, Khafji to Ceasefire.
Repairability either comes with a dollar cost or a performance cost, how much we can afford either of those to be varies depending on how long the war is likely to last.
Look at the campaigns. They were far more condensed in time and space. And surely the shorter the war the more valuable repaired vehicles are?!
@Jed
I know the Dutch ditched their MBT-capability due to budget cuts. But when you cut something, you take the capabilities first, where you think that the strategic need is lowest.
As I heard from a friend-of-mine living in Noord-Holland, the Dutch will in the foreseeable future never again fight another war on foreign soil. If forced to fight, there are hundreds of second hand tanks readily available on the market.
This is a strategic decision, one I would support absolutely if implemented in the UK.
Hence my counter-question.
Apart from this, I shit on political conventions and would want to have Merkava IV including Trophy.
Phil
Depends on the time required.
Sure, if the vehicle is modular, and it takes 20 minutes to bolt on a new piece of armour.
But if takes 10 engineers a day and a workshop, I have to wonder would it not have been easier to ship over spare vehicles than that level of maintenance kit.
Its impossible to say in isolation.
It’s not in isolation. It’s in the context of a general war. Not even the Soviets considered their AFVs disposable in the sense that they would not be worth repairing in battle. The tougher the kit the harder it is to completely break it. Look up the historical evidence that shows in a general war repaired AFVs comprised significant portions of AFV fleets even in condensed phases of different campaigns.
“It’s in the context of a general war”
And that was agreed when?
Yes, if the UK intends to shoe the seventh soviet shock army (I need an S for army?) at Fulda, repairability is probably going to be very important.
If we intend to land at Rio Gallegos, beat the shit out of the 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and leg it back to sea before reinforcements can mobile and crush our land forces, anything immobilised is likely to be destroyed rather than repaired in any event, simply for lack of time to effect retrieval before the ships leave.
You said identified enemy in a war. You then use GW1 as an example. So I am assuming we’re talking about a good old fashioned battle or two, conditions that represent a general war on the sharp end. Lots of firepower, attrition, etc etc
Phil
Perhaps I read “general war” and thought “total war”.
I freely accept, I have no detailed knowledge here, and am operating mostly on guess work, but were there many (any?) theatre repairs in the first (or second) gulf wars?
McZ – I understand the point and the arguments, I may counter that if the Neaderlands is suddenly looking for second hand tanks, because it’s next government has different strategic priorities, then others maybe too, and therefore they may not be readily available.
However, strategically we are going down the same route at a lower speed, we will have far less Chally 2 MBT available so what impact does this have the operational doctrine of the combined arms battle group ? Does it mean more heavily armed IFV, or less (but more APC’s) ???
Jed
My biggest concern must be that an APC/IFV group stumbles upon a concealed enemy MBT, and it kills half of them before anyone can debus and engage with ATGMs, if we’re lucky, and simply wipes them out if we arent.
Something must be able to engage and destroy an enemy tank with a few seconds notice.
Dont care what, but something, if theres nothing there, we are inviting disaster.
Happy to entertain everything from escorting MBTs, heavily armed IFVs, or even heavily armed “tankettes”.
Pete Arundel,
From what I’ve read from ODS & OIF, the 25mm on the Bradley and Marine LAV-25 has been very effective and versatile against a wide variety of targets.
While the Bradley won’t survive an ATGM, tank gun round, or large IED, it did prove reasonably survivable against just about everything else.
IIRC, it was praised by commanders as one of the most useful combat vehicles in theater due to its combination of mobility, firepower, protection and ability to carry troops. Swiss Army knives aren’t the best at anything, but they still are handy to have around.
Assumptions about threats goes hand-in-hand with the question about requirements. If we anticipate the future “norm” will be fighting Hezbollah-like forces in Lebanon (i.e. dug in, with large numbers of ATGMs), then HAPCs/HIFVs or even unmanned vehicles may be the only way to go. On the other hand, if we think threats will look more like the regular and irregular forces in ODS, OIF and OEF, then maybe the IFVs “Swiss Army knife” approach still has considerable value.
Just MHO.
@dom j, yes 7 armd wksp deployed with 2 MRG’s (main repair groups) and 2 FRG’s (forward repair groups) known as MRG/FRG 7 and MRG/FRG 22 in respect to the brigades they supported. In the actual 100 hour “war” they used the leapfrog method to support assets, ie 1 set up, takes a bit of time to get up and running to accept kit, while the other went past and started to set up. TBH it was all a wee bit hetic!! I was in optronics and we took in radios and stuff dunno about the black hand gang (who are mechanics not engineers)!!! TD knows the difference, handsome debonair, sophisticated and then there are engineers!!
@ DomJ
The USMC deploy a “platoon” of 4 M1A1 in a MEU and that small formation is a considerable drain on resources and takes up a lot of space too (as part of an all arms formation) within the ARG’s ships.
Israel is tiny. Though the IDF has transporters if needs be their armoured vehicles can self deploy. In the 73 war IDF reservists left their kibbutz, jumped in their tanks, and were in contact with enemy within the hour.
DomJ ref: “My biggest concern must be that an APC/IFV group stumbles upon a concealed enemy MBT”
Yes, understood. As mentioned, they should not be alone, should have tanks in company, or 40mm CTA/ATGW armed ‘tankettes’ though. BUT if they do, possibly more likely in urban scenarios, perhaps two of whatever the standard infantry disposable anti-armour rockets should be mounted on the RWS – cheaper, shorter ranged than say Javelin, meaning these vehicles are equipped for the emergency why the round a corner and a T90 is bouncing over the rubble….. ?
See YouTube for Greatest Tank Battles episode on GW1 – two detached Bradleys pop up over a rise into a large group of Iraqi T72′s and BMP’s, instead of poppping smoke and running (in the middle of sand storm, Iraqi’s may never of got a clean shot) they stand and start plinking the bad guys with TOW’s – one of the two vehicles is shot by a BMP resulting in one of the only U.S. KIA of the particular battle – should they have legged it ?
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MlgPkOw9xO4
TB.Smitty – I think the Israeli stance could soon morph into ours. What if the OPFOR in OIF, OEF, etc get their hands on more sophisticated ATGW’s – if Iran get their hands on the latest stuff from Russia and forward it on etc. Would the Bradley’s 25mm been of such use because it out-ranged RPG’s / PKM’s etc ? Could a 40mm MK19 GMG have done just as good a job against light infantry type insurgents in rural or urban scenarios ??
Hi DJ,
This is a good line (sets out the requirement, and has been uttered by some tank commanders I know):
“Something must be able to engage and destroy an enemy tank with a few seconds notice.
Dont care what, but something, if theres nothing there, we are inviting disaster.”
About value of repairing in the field, do read some of the better records of the battle of Kursk, as they utilise the war diaries of the entities on both sides (the Germans being more methodical in noting down, as you would expect), Despite the numbers involved, permanent write-offs were in dozens as long as the Germans were gaining ground and as soon as they could not retrieve the damaged tanks anymore, suddenly hundreds were lost, even though battle intensity diminished.
There you go Dom straight from the horses mouth. The thing with GW1 is that it didn’t happen anything like anyone was expecting it to. The US MEF and Arab forces pushing into Kuwait were expected to take 20-40% casualties in the opening days and move at best a few kilometres forward before being stopped by overwhelming fire-power and chemical weapons. The British forces in the Gulf actually had the equivalent to a battlegroup of kit manned and organised into companies and squadrons ready to rapidly replace the lead elements as they were destroyed in the advance. So we were expecting a lot of repair work, as was everyone else. As it happened, the ground war went rather better, probably a bit too well.
Paul, a legend in their own (extended) NAAFI break
Can I ask a simple question?
What is an MICV for? How is it supposed to be used?
Pete – have you actually read the article ? Did I do a really crap job of that part ?
To recap the original concept was (is) for a vehicle which can carry infantry to keep up with tanks, it was to be better armed than an APC (something heavier than MG’s) and was to have firing ports, so that the infantry could get into the battle without disembarking. It was therefore to be used as part of the ‘combined arms’ armoured combat ‘team’ for lack of a better term.
Jed
“and was to have firing ports”
Arse, my first thought was “and get rid of those silly bloody fireing ports!”
If I can add one more problem.
Its easy to say that the MICV will be protected by the “big Brother” MBT/MCV on a Powerpoint presentation, but those assets can be stripped away very quickly, either not deployed in the first place, or called away on “more important” matters
In its pure form an MICV wants to be far more than it can ever be because it represents a conflict between forms and any one product as ever will be a compromise – the key is getting the balance as right as you can.
An MICV wants to fight other AFVs and provide fire support yet it cannot yet be armoured sufficiently to give it the same level of protection as an MBT and fulfil other roles, yet it is expected to expose itself to the same level of danger.
It wants to have weapon systems that can engage and kill tanks but these weapon systems are substantially less effective and vulnerable to counter measures than the 120mm main gun of a tank that is smashing out APFSDS rounds.
It wants to carry infantry into the battle and utilise the infantry’s organic fire power through firing ports yet without the armour necessary to withstand most of the enemies counter measures who would clean the clock of any mounted attack.
MICV cannot do what they are wanted to do against a determined enemy.
Which is why Warrior is a good example of a well balanced MICV. It carries infantry under reasonable armour which balances well with the fact that it is not expected to engage weapon systems it cannot defend against and so it is not armed to tackle them; and it cannot attack mounted when it doesn’t have the armour to do so, therefore it has no firing points.
It therefore carries a useful infantry section under armour suited to its role which enables it to be mobile and it doesn’t carry weapon systems that would get it killed quickly against a competent enemy, but it does carry a weapon which can provide fire support to the infantry at opportune times and also engage other AFVs at opportune times.
The design and make up of the Warrior reflects a realistic appraisal of how it would be most useful. Let’s not kid ourselves that BFV and BMP mounted attacks against a competent and reasonably equipped enemy would be suicide and that in close country a BFV or BMP would stand a chance against a modern, well crewed MBT. So let’s stop encouraging it to do so – it can only end one way, a dead infantry section. Better to split the tank destroyers from the infantry like we did with Milan CT and Striker.
Phil – thanks for the summation
DomJ – I did cover it in the article – the firing ports where part of the whole reason d’etre of the MICV concept and soon became obsolete as the vehicles, be they Warrior, Bradley or BMP got up-armoured with additional protection that simply got in the way (of the firing ports).
Back to Phil – I don’t agree ref the tank destroyers, I have always thought that was very much a British solution to the Soviets in the Fulda Gap WWIII type scenario, much less applicable in other scenarios, and as I note in the article many other nations seem to agree, with both MICV (IFV) and less well armed APC’s having ATGW on their turret / RWS as “standard”.
I think IFVs serves for fire support and protection to a group of infantry during an assault, and secondarily they can to support the tanks, being as mobile as the tanks.
The tanks attack, the infantry protect tanks against infantry opponents (ambushes, antitank missiles …) and IFV support the soldiers and they serves to based mobile fallback in case of need for protect them against light fire (machine guns , assault rifles, RPG …).
That’s how I see it, but you are safe from anything.
FRES direct fire can be used to protect the APCs, here I understand.
Wasnt the point of Striker to provide an AT cover/owerwatch for CVR(T) i.e. a big brother with a very long arm, exactly because CVR(T) was meant to go places where it would bump into enemy MBT. Small, nimble, highly manouverable vehicle that go go and look but without the necessary means of having a stand up fight with an MBT, thats why we dont have ATGW on Warrior because the point is, Warrior is never meant to be anywhere (supposedly) where it will be without having it’s own big brother in the form of CR2.
This kind of falls apart though when Warrior deploys to or is used in scenarios where it operates alone because this reality can turn it into a light tank, unfortunately it doesn’t have the firepower to operate in this role so maybe it would be useful to have an ATGW mounted, personally, I would see far more use in the kind of scenarios we actually find ourselves in for a Warrior with a 90mm cannon or 120mm mortar than one fitted with a 40mm cannon/ATGW combo
I don’t think we should confuse how Warrior has been used and how it was envisaged it would be used. Obviously the context of its employment has changed quite a lot and as TD has pointed out it can be seen mission creeping into light tank areas but again, this is at the margins in that it only happens against less capable enemies. You would not see Warrior for example in an over-watch position in Lebanon firing with impunity and then scurrying about the battlefield.
I personally think other nations are wrong. Adding ATGW to an MICV detracts from its mission, adds weight, complexity and temptation all for a marginal capability frankly. MICVs should not be in the business of looking for trouble – they are there to deploy the infantry onto objectives and if they can, provide additional fire support. Now, they may run into a tank, but they may also run into a helicopter and we don’t advocate arming MICVs with HVM – it’s just the fate of war. Warriors were envisaged as one element in a combined arms battlegroup with other units taking on the tanks.
The Tank Destroyer concept is hardly a British peculiarity and represents a cost effective means of conducting a defence against MBTs without distracting your infantry tasks. A cheap vehicle that can fire from defilade or hull down position and which can concentrate entirely on stalking or ambushing tanks is far more effective than an expensive MICV which also has to operate and deploy its infantry section.
Yes, Jed, I have read the article and yet I still think the question needs answering! You did give the classic answer (a vehicle which can carry infantry to keep up with tanks, it was to be better armed than an APC and was to have firing ports, so that the infantry could get into the battle without disembarking.) which I always thought was crap! So did the british army, I think, since Warrior never had firing ports. Anyway, my question still stands but perhaps I should modify it to “What is an MICV for now”. If it’s to carry infantry forward with the tanks then, really, it should have tank level armour and sacrifice the turret and big gun for infantry. The tanks are there to support the infantry and vice versa.
Didnt West Germany field a HOT armed tank destroyer?
Yes Germany fielded a Jagdpanzer I and II I believe it was called, one with a canon (or Kanon!) and the other upgraded to HOT.
Pete A – Sorry, I take your point. Actually the whole article is basically framed in order to ask that very question !
TD, I think agree with the Warrior / FRES, whatever, fitted with a 120mm mortar, because it can hide behind hill (or other obstacle) and chuck guided top attack AT mortar rounds, or it could fire 8km ranged top-attack, laser guided missiles through the same barrel – so the “AT top cover” now has commonality with the indirect fire support role (note I am not saying you should mix the roles within say the same section of 4 vehicles).
Phil;
Jagdpanzer Kanone – 90mm gun
Raketenjagdpanzer 1 – unreliable HS 30 IFV with SS 11 ATGM
Jaguar 1 – Jagdpanzer Kanone design with (initially) SS 11 ATGM, soon refitted with an automatic high-performance HOT ATGM system
Jaguar 2 – used Jagdpanzer Kanone refitted with cheap manually-loaded TOW system
That’s them. And the Yanks had their ITVs too.
Are they still in service Sven?
What was their operational concept?
No all long gone. They were tank destroyers in the German tradition as implied by their names. Like the S Tank, probably the best tank destroyer made.
Jed,
IFVs should have tanks accompanying them too. However sometimes tanks are out of position for targets of opportunity (as you illustrated) or are otherwise occupied (e.g. lots of targets).
In your Greatest Tank Battles example, the Bradleys did kill numerous tanks and BMPs before one was knocked out. Should they have pulled back and let someone else deal with it? Maybe. But they gave a lot better than they got.
Can you improve the ability of an RWS-equipped APC to handle targets of opportunity? Of course. Would they be as good as the sensors (IBAS plus commanders thermal) and firepower (25mm, TOW, 7.62mm) on a Bradley? Not even close.
Of course there is plenty of room for improvement on the IFV front too.
A lot of these questions can be addressed with modeling, gaming and simulation using various configurations. But this depends entirely on our assessments of current and future threats.
Shall we reverse roles. Imagine it’s 1989. The Cold War has just got hot. You’re in the Blackhorse Cavalry in an M1A1 as part of the covering force and you’re hull down with excellent fields of fire. And then the Soviet vanguard drives into view, the infantry riding in their BMP2s hoping to over run you through speed. And you and your Platoon open up. Hands up those that think the BMPs won’t stand a chance? So why should it be any different of they were PUMAs or WARRIORS? A competent enemy will annihilate that force and it’s infantry will burn before they get a chance to fight.