A guest post from Jed
There have been a lot of interesting comments made in the various post-SDSR army articles written by TD (and guests), some by serving soldiers, some by us arm chair generals, but I am focusing here on the ones about the Warrior upgrade, and the Protected Mobility variants of FRES SV.
Those comments have prompted me to ask my contentious question which provides the headline for this article, is the concept of the Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle (MICV) or Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) passed it’s use by date ?
You can choose to interpret the question in its most broad sense, but I will attempt to constrain my meandering thoughts and arguments to the confines of a post SDSR British Army.
Contents
History
But first, the potted history of the MICV / AIFV, starting with it’s predecessor, the Armoured Personnel Carrier:
As is often the case these days, a succinct and reasonably accurate history is available from Wikipedia:
- APC : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armoured_personnel_carrier
- MICV / IFV : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MICV
Apparently as early as WW1 the British Army built a “tank” variant with no main armament but designed to carry up to 30 troops, who were provided by armoured loop holes from which to fire their rifles, as the vehicle wadded through the mud, ran over German trenches, and protected said Tommies from machine gun fire. This was news to me, but hey it appears we invented the MICV before the APC !
Move onto WW2 and we have iconographic images of both German “Hanomag” and American M2/M3 “half tracks” providing “protected mobility” to infantry accompanying tanks formations. Already we are to the crux of the matter, the development of what we call the “combined arms” formations, tanks and infantry working together; each has its strengths and weaknesses, vulnerabilities and advantages.
For example the Hanomag (Sd. Kfz251) provided protection for Panzergrenadiers (mechanized infantry) from small arms fire and some artillery shrapnel, while also providing tactical mobility close to that of the Panzers. The infantry could use their personal weapons from within the vehicle, or de-buss to deal with anti-tank guns, infantry with Bazookers, PIAT’s or Molotov Cocktails etc, thus basically protecting the tanks by making up for some of their weaknesses (lack of situational awareness and all round vision, etc).
Post WW2 and into the Cold War era and the APC got a roof – not only to better protect against shrapnel (and the weather ?) but also as part of the efforts to provide some NBC protection. This era produced the iconic American M113 tracked APC and its wheeled Soviet counterpart in the BTR series. In the UK we got the home grown M113 look-a-like in the shape of the FV432.
Vietnam brought the re-learning of old lessons when the M113 went into action – gun shields for pintle mounted MG’s, and a disturbing realization of how vulnerable these vehicles were to Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG’s) spawning the first use of bar armour. Of course we have even more recently re-learnt these lessons again !
Evolution – APC to MICV
And then…… along came the BMP !
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMP-1
The Soviet Army thought that allowing the infantry squad in the back of the APC to bring their weapons to bear might be a good idea. At the same time they added a turret mounting a low pressure 73mm gun, which fired HEAT rounds which apparently were supposed to be able of defeating the front armour of M60A1, Leopard 1 and Chieftain MBT’s and, well just to make sure in case it didn’t, an AT3 “Sagger” wire-guided missile sat on a launch rail just above the main gun barrel.
Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle layout, BMP-1 Firing Arcs
Although the modern German Army had a small APC fitted with long barreled 20mm cannon during the 50’s, it had no firing ports for its small 5 man infantry team, so I will go with the conventional wisdom that says the BMP-1 was the first (modern?) MICV.
Western responses included the U.S. Army Bradley, with firing ports, a 25mm cannon and two TOW wire-guided ATGW, and the German Marder, with a 20mm cannon and later on a Milan ATGW launcher. As well firing ports for the onboard infantry, the early versions included a rear MG, with direct optics allowing it to be aimed and fired by the troops, but this was not an Remote Weapons Station (RWS) as we now know them.
In this era Britain got the Warrior. The main design differences from our allies (and enemies) was that instead of the fast firing auto-cannon, or large caliber low pressure gun (like the 76mm of the Saladin and Scorpion) we went with a bigger auto-cannon, clip fed rather than belt fed, with a much lower rate of fire. The idea being that well aimed high velocity Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) would penetrate the armour of BMP-1’s and other Soviet light armour, without recourse to a big and expensive ATGW. Meanwhile the co-axial 7.62mm and the embarked infantry weapons would take care of enemy infantry, and HEI shells were available to take on buildings, sangers, soft skinned vehicles etc.
As can be seen, perhaps the biggest difference between the British Army MICV and those of both our allies and potential opposition is the lack of a anti-tank missile on the standard squad vehicle.
Why not ATGW ? It’s just not British old chap………
I have never been able to find a book or scholarly journal that clearly states why British Army doctrine led to this difference. We can of course make our own inferences – in the combined arms battle group, the Warrior would be fighting alongside the MBT’s (Cheiftain, Challenger 1 and Challenger 2) which are considered the main weapon system for dealing with enemy tanks and other threats. In a mixed battle group setting with Armoured Recce assets the British preferred the “anti-tank” over watch methodology, with the Striker vehicle and it’s Swingfire missiles.
We can then add on the other elements of the “combined arms” teams – artillery and aviation. So if the tank-MICV combo come under ambush from enemy tanks or infantry anti-tank teams, we could call in fast air with cluster bombs, or a full battery of 155mm “HE dispensers”. Although not available in huge numbers, there might have been TOW equipped Lynx helicopters available too. Finally the infantry carried in the Warrior can always de-buss and take up their own ambush positions with Milan launchers or their unguided anti-tank rockets.
Non-the-less many other countries saw, and still see the benefit of equipping the standard squad MICV with an ATGW (including Kuwait’s version of the Warrior).
Continued evolution – back from Infantry Fighting Vehicle to Protected Mobility
Updated variants of all the main MICV / IFV vehicles featured improved armour protection, and all of them lost their firing ports because of this. So in some way’s we have moved full circle – the original aim of the IFV, be it the WW1 Mk X tank or the BMP-1 was to allow the carried infantry squad to contribute to the carnage with their personal weapons, while remaining behind armour.
As the weapon versus countermeasure battle moves inexorable onwards, we are now back to a scenario where protection levels mean the squad are back to being somewhat passive passengers, as they are in a simpler APC. So now the main difference between IFV and APC is the main and secondary weapons, the weight of protection and maybe the tactical (“keep up with the MBT”) mobility.
The most interesting element of this to me, and the of the various comments made on various TD articles, is the evolution of the main armament, the turret versus RWS and the “fire support” vehicle debates.
So while this applies to any modern armoured vehicle, lets confine this right now to the Warrior update and FRES SV Protected Mobility variants. Based on the good old British doctrine of accurate, heavy punching, low rate of fire auto-cannon development we have the introduction of the CTA 40mm Case Telescoped Ammunition gun, with its very high velocity APDS “kinetic energy” rounds designed to take on light and even “medium” armour (and who’s to say it is not going to penetrate the more thinly armoured rear or side portions of some MBT’s ?).
However now it also has an air bursting HE round, suitable for dealing with infantry in defilade cover, or in buildings. As you all know we are looking to standardize on this weapon for both the Warrior upgrade (or IFV) and our armoured Recce vehicle (FRES Scout).
Fine - but now we have the manned turret versus unmanned turret debate.
How much situational awareness do you need ?
I fully understand the arguments for a Recce vehicle retaining a manned turret. I am not so sure the same arguments are applicable to the IFV. If an unmanned turret allows all the crew to be lower down, protected by the thicker armour of the hull, we can probably all agree this is a good thing. However critics suggest that even with modern sights, periscope and TV sensor technology there is a potential loss of “situational awareness” in this arrangement. However as the most recent example of why “fighting heads out” is a bad idea, the U.S. experiences of Iraq once again seem to suggest that in a fire fight, sticking your head up out of the hatch is a bit suicidal !
But, do we even need the unmanned turret ? Do we need a medium caliber auto-cannon with co-axial MG (and maybe ATGW ?). Perhaps we could make do with a big RWS, able (as some on the market right now are) of taking say a 40mm auto-grenade launcher and a 7.62mm MG.
As someone noted in a comment, 40mm HEAT grenades are not really up to much, even against light armour. However with the right fire control system, 40mm grenades are also available as an air bursting HE weapon, providing a cheaper alternative to the cannon HE round when you want to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel. So if the primary role is to provide cover for the MBT against close in infantry anti-tank teams and to provide cover for the embarked infantry team as they de-buss to get “up close and personal” – then is this not heavy enough weaponry?
If we look at ASCOD 2 FRES SV Protected Mobility variant, CV90 Armadillo and Israeli Namer vehicles, they all have prominent “cupolas” with direct view armoured vision blocks, as well as the main sensors on the RWS and “situational awareness” enhancing CCD cameras covering the rear, front corners (or the driver) and even providing a panoramic 360 degree view.
ASCOD FRES Protected Mobility
ASCOD 2 based FRES SV Protected Mobility variant – note quite low profile commanders cupola between drivers hatch and RWS
CV90 Armadillo – note the much more prominent commanders cupola and vision blocks.
CV90 Armadillo
The APC variant of the French VCBI actually puts its RWS on top of a large cupola with 360 degree direct view “vision blocks”.
Many of the RWS are fully capable of adding a pair of Spike, Javelin or other ATGW to the mix, so does that cover the lack of ability of the 40mm GMG ?
Detractors of the RWS approach may point out the reduced ammo capacity, and the inability to reload under armour – which is a feature of some of the unmanned turrets. Good points, I guess it just comes down to the cost benefit analysis.
Adding “fire support” vehicles into the mix
At the same time as the so called “strategic” review and defence cuts see us reducing our fleet of Challenger 2 MBT’s – the plan for FRES SV includes an element for “fire support” vehicles, and we have had many a discussion in the comment threads about 120mm, 105mm or even 90mm medium / high pressure guns, and of course my personal favourite the turret mounted breach loading 120mm smooth bore mortar.
So, if we are going to have the following potential mix of vehicles in a armoured / mechanized battle group, do we still need the cannon armed IFV ?
- MBT – 120mm rifled gun, possibly to be replaced by 120mm smooth bore at some point ?
- FRES SV Scout variant – 40mm CTA
- FRES SV ‘Fire Support’ – who knows ? Medium caliber gun of some type ?
- FRES SV ‘Anti-Armour Over Watch’ – specialist anti-tank vehicle
Perhaps we could save considerable money on the Warrior upgrade by dispensing with the turret all-together and fitting a dual weapon RWS ?
Is the logical extension of this thought to simply put effort into keeping the Warrior in service just long enough to replace it completely with FRES SV Protected Mobility variants ?
Questions
So let me leave you with 3 questions to get the discussion thread heated up:
- If we have less MBT’s available to the combined arms battle group, are we really able to dispense with the turret mounted 40mm cannon
- If we are to have less MBT’s should we fit every standard squad IFV with an ATGW ?
- Should we dispense with the idea of dropping MBT numbers, and just use them instead of developing new fire support / anti-tank vehicles on the “medium” weight chassis ?
- Should we think outside the box, and examine a turreted 120mm mortar with extended range, guided and tube launched ATGW as a truly multi-purpose fire support platform (direct, indirect fire support plus direct and indirect anti-tank fires).
- Has the time of the IFV gone, and considering both current threats and budgets, is the RWS armed APC or “protected mobility” variant the way to go
If you go chaps, lets see how big we can build this comment thread J
my cents
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-1.html
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/06/challenging-ifv-concept-part-2.html
Similar calculations as in here
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/02/panzergrenadiere-in-2010s.html
should be relevant for UK Army, too.
Btw “M113 in Vietnam – not the gun shields”; you misses an “e”.
this is probably a very stupid question, but why does the ammo box for RWS have to be external? If they are belt fed, can’t the belt be dropped into the interior with some sort of auto-loading mechanism? Alternatively, why not a very small turret allowing under armour access to the ammo box?
A very interesting article, and a lot to discuss.
It really depends on what you want your forces to do. Heavily armed IFVs were meant to fight outnumbered in the the Fulda Gap scenario against hordes of Soviet tanks and BMPs. Every vehicle needed significant anti-armour armament.
One could envision south east Asian scenarios that mimic this problem. Really in any mechanized vs mechanized combat it is probably better to have significant IFV armament.
ATGMs on RWSs might get you part of the way back, but they don’t typically support firing on the move, have limited stowed kills, and don’t usually support separate commander and gunner “hunter-killer” sight arrangements.
RE: 120MM Gun-Mortar for fire support.
Does it have to be turret mounted? Would a return of the German “Stug” assault gun be a good idea? Reduced profile, more weight for armour, easier to transport (particulary in aircraft)?
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/agm.html
andyw, I think it’s more of an issue of having to deal with gun stoppages outside, with a RWS, rather than where the weapon’s ammo is stored.
RE: Armament for IFV/APC’s. Perhaps the problem is the type of primary weapon used; The 73mm of the BMP-1 was replaced by the 30mm of the BMP-2, better range and use against IFV’s of the west. However, the BMP-3 has a 100mm (low pressure?) gun and co-axial 30mm and 7.62mm MG. This enables the BMP-3 to deal with more threats to its infantry? Perhaps if we are to keep the IFV it needs a new set of weapons to support the infantry, a merger of the IFV and fire support requirement?
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/IFVarm.html
I would be wary of giving up IFVs with cannon. There are plenty of places around the world, and realistic scenarios, in which British forces could expect to come up against enemy armoured vehicles.
On the other hand, I don’t think every IFV needs an ATGW as standard. The new CTA is claimed to be up to the job of defeating most everything short of a modern MBT. Without a clearly identified heavily armoured adversary, like the USSR, it’s a lot of money for limited utility.
Transport capacity is the cheapest if you don’t add much equipment (electronics, armament) to it.
Infantry transport capacity requires much volume, much volume leads to large surfaces and large surfaces + high weight/surface of protection leads to either inadequate transport capacity, inadequate protection or unacceptable weight and effort. The protection is thus typically inadequate in comparison to MBTs (and AT defences are meant to be effective against MBTs!).
There’s really no reason why an armoured vehicle should stick around fighting infantry if it’s not well-armed AND well-protected.
In the end the IFV story is a story of people who forgot the original (obsolete idea) and stick to a jack of all trades, master of none concept that is 360° unsatisfactory.
I think that British army will not change its organisation in terms of Formation Reconnaissance Regiment.
It was envisaged in the initial plans that FRES Scout are supported by FRES ATGW Overwatch, APC, command vehicles, repair, recovery, ambulance, radar, bridgelayer for manoeuvre support.
The big question is what use for 192 direct fire, it has no place in the usual recce organisation.
In the initial plan of FRES UV, it was envisaged a vehicle with a turret AMOS for artillery and un vehicle for CBRN recce.
Also, in the FRES SV block 2, it is supposed to have a FOV vehicle for artillery.
I can imagine that the direct fire will be used for something else than recce, perhaps to protect mechanised infantry, which will be equipped with FRES UV APC.
“RE: 120MM Gun-Mortar for fire support.
Does it have to be turret mounted? Would a return of the German “Stug” assault gun be a good idea?”
Not for a wealthy force.
Most firing will be done indirectly, and a rapid reaction requires a rapid traverse. The casemate tank has a lousy traverse and needs to pivot with the full hull (which is a problem in regard to calibration of bearing and effectiveness of cover such as a loose netting).
A poor force facing poor adversaries might make good use of a cheap direct/indirect fire AFV, though.
I think variety is the spice of life.
An RWS can go from 7.62 to 20mm Cannon to 40mm GMG quite easily.
Throw in 40mm CTA and you have every target short of an MBTs front armour dealt with.
Some sort of Javelin armoured box launcher on a CTA turret?
A Javlin Box, a 40CTA and 3 dual 40mm gmg?
Or instead of the javelin, the 120mm mortar, can that knock out a tank head on? Even if by that you mean an idirect fire top attack?
How expensive are 40mm grenades?
I just realised I was happy to fire them in their thousands….
Be bloody unfortunate for the blokes defending buildings though…
I’m just wandering here, no real plan, but sometimes my random thoughts are good.
Surely the key question with all this is who stays with the vehicles? Does the platoon commander stay with the vehicle or the SNCO? The more firepower the vehicle has the more weight this question has. Perhaps we should also ask should the infantry be driving armoured vehicles at all?
@Jed
Fine article, yet again. Thanks.
Like Brian Black I would be very wary of giving up IFVs with cannon. It it is not just the fact (as Brian mentions) that there are plenty of places around the world in which British forces could expect to come up against enemy armoured vehicles. They would also be confronted by enemy infantry (and not just the close-in infantry anti-tank teams that you mention in the article).
To counter that infantry, would the air bursting HE 40mm grenades which you say are also available as an air bursting HE weapons (the ones which are going to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel) really prove adequate? Surely a cannon is a precise weapon, able to be trained with extreme accuracyon enemy personnel, whereas 40mm grenades (albeit air-bursting) and shrapnel are a far more haphazard and hit and miss kind of capability. Correct me if I’m wrong.
“However critics suggest that even with modern sights, periscope and TV sensor technology there is a potential loss of “situational awareness” in this arrangement.”
Yes, haven’t there been reports of armoured vehicle crew relying only on modern sensors etc., feeling detached from the reality outside the vehicle, even disorientated? Another argument for retaining manned turrets?
Jed, a great piece, I will get back to some of the statements in a minute.
@ Mike W, RE
“To counter that infantry, would the air bursting HE 40mm grenades which you say are also available as an air bursting HE weapons (the ones which are going to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel) really prove adequate? Surely a cannon is a precise weapon, able to be trained with extreme accuracyon enemy personnel, whereas 40mm grenades (albeit air-bursting) and shrapnel are a far more haphazard and hit and miss kind of capability. Correct me if I’m wrong.”
Cannon: yes, accurate, even incredibly so, and needs to be. Think of the scenario: ATGW teams can be upto 5.5 km away (yes, there are missiles with a longer range but that is for deserts and coastal defence). You spot, laser measure the distance, choose the round(s) and then they are fused as fired… look at the muzzle velocities and if you get the laser measurement at all wrong the whole exercise is wasted. ie. the rounds have travelled so much past (or v.v.) that there is no effect.
Think of the automated GMGs as slow firing machine guns, with less range, too
- the way you aim them is still the same, and you rely on the saturation effect
@Jed
I’ve only just seen DominicJ’s point:
“How expensive are 40mm grenades?”
And it’s a very relevant one. Yes, how does the cost of 40mm grenades compare with that of cannon rounds?
Aother point. As you say, “the CTA 40mm Case Telescoped Ammunition gun, with its very high velocity APDS “kinetic energy” rounds is designed to take on light and even “medium” armour.” Can 40mm grenades do that as successfully?
On the more general point of Infantry Fighting Vehicle versus armed APC or “protected mobility” vehicle, surely the Infantry originally wanted an MICV because they needed a fire support vehicle UNDER THEIR OWN CONTROL. Then they would not have to call in ‘fast air with cluster bombs, or a full battery of 155mm “HE dispensers”’ or attack helicopters or anything else nearly so often.
Hi Jed, RE
” However with the right fire control system, 40mm grenades are also available as an air bursting HE weapon, providing a cheaper alternative to the cannon HE round when you want to fill the air around enemy infantry with shrapnel. So if the primary role is to provide cover for the MBT against close in infantry anti-tank teams and to provide cover for the embarked infantry team as they de-buss to get “up close and personal” – then is this not heavy enough weaponry?”
I buy into the philosophy, but
- right fire control system does not come cheap (whereas a GMG is a basic infantry weapon)
- to make full use of that fire control system, there is a need to computer-fuse a lot of rounds (ie. expensive fuses times a big number)
I would rather have a few SPGs or FRES SVs of AMOS-edition, keeping up and delivering organic fires, as directed
… takes us to the philosophical question: are fire control teams always RA, or should there be others, embedded in units that are within hundreds of meters of the OpFor and exchanging fire
Question Time:
“If we have less MBT’s available to the combined arms battle group, are we really able to dispense with the turret mounted 40mm cannon”
- The “if” is an “as” and the answer is a “No”
- Quite the contrary, two European armies that chose the CV90 with a specific gun are looking to up-barrell/ upgun them by using super-shot (the Netherlands which I have from a reliable source; they did away with all of their MBTs; the other one that I have put together from bits and pieces released reduced their MBT numbers by a half)
“Should we dispense with the idea of dropping MBT numbers, and just use them instead of developing new fire support / anti-tank vehicles on the “medium” weight chassis ?”
- I am for that, and that does not exclude the idea of doing a limited number of Infantry-support tank conversions
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lazar_BVT
In Afghanistan the Taliban likes to ambush NATO forces with Soviet HMGs. Personally I think having a 20mm cannon onboard is therefore still relevant.
This perhaps has nothing to do but the new turret work alone, there is thermal imager to identify targets capability that automatically detects and tracks potential targets from their thermal signature, alerting the crew to their presence.
Then in an urban combat, it’s important to defend the strategic points of a city. The tanks generally having less mobility, it must use lighter vehicles.
The use of heavy artillery using unguided munitions is almost impossible for the close support of troops, at the risk of fire on its own units.
If they don’t have cannon which allows them to directly support the infantry in combat, what is their utility ?
Hi x,
RE ” with Soviet HMGs. Personally I think having a 20mm ”
- those HMGs are incredibly capable, but more importantly, they are about the heaviest man-luggable pieces that you can take over the mountains (3 men) apart from mortars (where you won’t have that many rounds carried)
- so I fully agree, a fast firing 20 mm gives you the edge (and bigger can be better still, as 20mm does not have programmable fuses)
@ ACC
I saw a documentary about a Parachute Regiment patrol mounted in Jackals. They were exposed and came under fire from a compound by HMG. They weren’t enough of them to engage the compound or defend themselves. An accurate 20mmm would have silenced the opposition. As I often said here I wonder by what margin an organic (to the infantry) direct fire weapon would help lessen the work load of CAS aircraft. The West’s advantage is technological yet it seems NATO only wants its forces on the ground to be equipped to similar standards as the Taliban……
Hi x,
I have not seen any footage (who would be close enough anyway) but have read that those compound walls eat 20mm rounds like we eat popcorn, so nothing under 40mm (there are CV90s there with those) makes much of an impact
- in the open 20mm is perfectly fine
Many of those walls require a 105mm HESH.
The proper procedure if you cannot destroy it is to blind it. A RP rifle grenade might already suffice.
“Many of those walls require a 105mm HESH.”
Or a TOW.
(ideally TOW 2 BB)
Nice article Jed, good for a 200 comment thread at least!
Some thoughts for all to digest;
- Do we need that many more Warriors than we have Challengers? I’m thinking here that Warriors in an armoured brigade would come in the form of maybe 1 or 2 battlions worth, trotting along behind an equal number of Challenger battalions?
- What do we want Warrior to do? If we’re facing enemy armour and personnel carriers, are Warriors going to be the primary method of engagement? What about CAS/helicopters and the tanks? On the defensive, wouldn’t the infantry dismount and set up anti-armour position? I’m just worried by the scenarios popping up where our Warriors (not warfighters) are becoming the primary anti-material weapon.
- Is the focus on more armour the right way to go? Ships haven’t carried heavy armour into battle for years, so maybe there are alternatives we should be investing in?
- Isn’t a key tenet of the Warrior in British use to be a “battle taxi”, moving the men under protection to a drop off point from which they dismount and engage the enemy, with the vehicles then providing fire support? Should the weapons favour this role more (lighter chain gun with high elevation) over any sort of anti-armour role, with some new(er) version of the ATGW carrier as the main anti-armour weapon?
cb
i think armour should be our striking arm, the warrior dismounts are there to provide close protection of that armour and to hold ground after its been taken.
1:1, 5:1, 10:1
i can see arguements for any, but the more warriors to each tank, the more capable the warriors have to be.
10 warriors and one chally, the warriors better be able to pull their weight.
1:1, a hmg would no doubt be fine.
@ ACC
Of course the mud walls eat 20mm shells. But as you say timed fuzed shots above cover or through openings in walls or against “light” cover it is a good option. Scimitar is used all the time in overwatch. (Before somebody says RARDEN is 30mm I know……………)
As Sven says I am thinking of 105mm HESH. What I am advocating is a return to direct fire artillery. The 105mm light gun can only be used in direct fire up to 800m. But if you take a look through the catalogue of WW2 anti-tank guns there are several options with ranges up to 2km. And if you look at the engagement ranges in Afghanistan it seems that is adequate. I don’t believe firing Javelin (as good as it is) at £60k a go is the optimum solution. Even if using a gun means firing more than one round.
Another thought. I always interpret “light role” in British terminology to mean “we can’t afford to put everybody in a real vehicle.”
I don’t understand that, in french army the soldiers move always with at least a VAB, except in the jungle, you are traveling with land rover, it’s a bit dangerous as concept.
“I saw a documentary about a Parachute Regiment patrol mounted in Jackals. They were exposed and came under fire from a compound by HMG. They weren’t enough of them to engage the compound or defend themselves.”
How does that work a Jackal packet of 2 vehicles would have 4 crew served weapons including GPMG, HMG and GMG plus personal weapons. I can’t see that packet not having enough firepower to defend themselves.
Frenchie said “I don’t understand that, in french army the soldiers move always with at least a VAB, except in the jungle, you are traveling with land rover, it’s a bit dangerous as concept.”
Yep, this has baffled me for ages. With the Foxhound now coming in to service this should help. I hope the MRBs (Multi-Role Brigades will take it further and give us a rounded and well equipped “Battle Group” as we like to call units these days.
I must confess to not buying in to the reasons for not equipping our AFVs with ATGWs. It is supposed to make them more of a target, and threat to an MBT with a crew of 10/11 rather than 4 is likley to yield a higher number of casualties. This I understand, but, if your enemies AFV have ATGW and you don’t the result is going to be the same isn’t it? You have just made your vehicles more vulnerable not less. There were many examples in the Gulf war where US M2 (and certainly M3s) ran in to T72s and the like, did not have Tank support and if it hadn’t been for being with TOW woukld have been destroyed. Also I think more tanks were destroyed by Bradley’s than Abrams!!
I think there is a case for a least a percentage of our AFVs and certainly the new agrressive FRES SC Recce being so equipped.
Great post Jed…
PS I think the Navy are wonderful
@ Frenchie
“If they don’t have cannon which allows them to directly support the infantry in combat, what is their utility?”
Exactly. Well said, Frenchie.
@x
‘Another thought. I always interpret “light role” in British terminology to mean “we can’t afford to put everybody in a real vehicle.”’
Couldn’t agree more. But what do you do you do when only 200 new Foxhounds (Is that figure right?)have been ordered? Revert to Land Rover WMIKs?
@Phil Darley
“I think there is a case for a least a percentage of our AFVs and certainly the new aggressive FRES SC Recce being so equipped.” (with ATGWs, that is)
I agree on that point too, Phil, but is that prevailing doctrine or again a matter of cost? You also make the point very nicely about the need to develop “rounded and well equipped “Battle Groups”.
Nice to be able to agree with everybody for a change.
Hello all
TD thanks for posting – I have a deliberate “off line” family day, and come back to all these comments ! Also thanks for adding the YouTube vids.
Sven et al – I really apologize for the spelling errors !!
Everyone – I have no particular position on this, hence my questions at the end of the article ? I really wanted to promote some conversation on the subject, and we seem to have that going
So as Chris B. said, lets make it a “200 comment thread” ……..
Here is another contentious question for everyone, although on a slight tangent:
If the NL is getting rid of all it’s Leo 2′s, and Germany has just announced another cut in it’s numbers (and it already has a bunch in storage) AND it was decided it would be too complicated / expensive to fit a “NATO standard” smoothbore to the Chally 2 – then should we consider:
Replacing our Challenger 2 fleet with second hand Leo 2′s ?
Bought on the cheap from our allies, bringing standardized logistics with the remaining European NATO allies (Germany, Denmark, Poland, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, Spain……) and upgraded to 2A6M or later standard, this might be cheaper in the long run than upgrading the Chally 2. We are reducing tank numbers anyway, so 200 to 250 Leo 2′s ????
Hi Jed,
Great so far “have no particular position on this, hence my questions at the end of the article ?”
Not many commentators have so far pegged the value /uses of IFV to other than MBT numbers/uses.
- I would like to see a broader (perhaps another thread?) discussion of what else under armour, in what sort of numbers/ combinations.
If you take just the turreted Warriors and all the SV versions, and the MBTs…
- it is not a very big slice of the army (even though very important… the hard fist, as I like to call it)
Is combining the tank regiment, armoured and mechanised battalions practical? By which I mean two ‘combined arms battalions’ per MRB. Each formed around a Warrior IFV company (with additional platoon from the left-over third company), a Bulldog/ASCOD APC coy, and a Challenger sqn (four or three troops, or two squadrons, depending on how many C2 make the cut).
It’s not likely that a Warrior battalion, for example, would act as a single homogeneous lump within the MRBs. This alternative gives each MRB two battalion sized armoured manoeuvre units – a mini armoured brigade in themselves.
Hi BB,
I think you lose rather than gain when you start to go permanently ‘combined’at lower than the battalion level.
However, I has a similar thought on the army future ’04′ thread, but my Battle Group” was much bigger than what they tend to be in the British Army (and very self-contained, over a 2-3 day engagement span, at least).
If you combine two of mine, add some logistics and ISTAR, then there is a very hard hitting brigade to hand (but mainly for offensive action – hence not permanently combining them)
BTW, at the time Lord Jim said he had sent to TD a draft on a similar, perhaps not as armour-heavy structure
- we will get to see that one in due course
@ Philq
Sometimes a good number of heavy weapons aren’t enough! They broke contact pretty quick. I know sometimes recces are performed to see what’s out there (can’t think of the proper term) but in A-stan with everybody armed to the teeth I can’t think that would achieve much. Further I was talking about the fact they were engaged with a Soviet HMG so they were matched. I suppose we could speculate what would have happend if they had closed the enemy and found themselves under enfalide fire from another HMG or RPGs the situation could have become sticky.
@ Mike W
The Army has been short of proper vehicles since vehicles were invented!!
Hi ACC. The US army have introduced combined arms battalions to their armoured brigades. Each of two battalions formed around two infantry companies with Bradley, and two Abrams squadrons.
In peace-keeping or COIN type operations the Challengers, the Warriors will be used in packets much smaller than battalions – in support of other forces or as QRFs for example. In more traditional armoured manoeuvre warfare, the single battalion size lumps of tank, IFV, APC in our one expeditionary MRB won’t provide the same options as two CABattalions.
@ Brian B
Back in the mists of time it was envisioned that it would be the RTR driving the infantry around. Of course we all know that idea came to naught. I suppose the “all in one” outfit to look at are American cavalry regiments.
Hi BB,
The US army is structured to heavy and otherwise.
Within the heavy, when they come into play, they will probably always deploy with more than one brigade, and then we are close to Corps-type of operation; then these pre-packaged bn’s make sense
The standard practice is to pair tank and IFV units 1-to-1 (depending on the task), but in my view this is better reflected at the higher formation level (proportions); in our case at the Bde level and then the Battle Groups (as in the UK nomenclature) are drawn from that pool, and you can realistically expect to have the ingredients at hand
Further to the US practices:
They have a big initiative on the way to have “joint” fire control teams trained and readily available to standard formations – as opposed to today’s make-do and amend on the go
In my view this is a “necessary condition” to being able to divide up manoeuvre units to much smaller packets than brigades, and also recognising the fact that the next step “up” from the organic fires is more likely to be tacair and helos (if that is different) than Brigade-level artillery
Taking that comment to European armies:
- artillery seen as a bde asset needs the c. 40 km range and precision munitions
- that is all very well, but should not be at the expense of some artillery a) under armour, b) with similar mobility to the units they belong to, and then c) even a 20 km range is great (and targeting assets and coordination make all the difference)
.. not forgetting the force multipliers (tacair, AH, airmobility…); these are things that will always be scarce, and added when crucial
I think the MRB will be organized as a mechanised brigade with a regiment of recce in its usual form, with Scout, ATGW, tracked APC, etc …, an armored regiment with 60 Challenger, an armored infantry battalion with 50 warrior, two infantry mechanised battalions with approximately 100 “light” APC, protected by squadrons of 120mm direct fire vehicles, and an artillery regiment with 30 AS90 and possibly carries mortars 120mm vehicles.
With the possibility of adding squadrons or battalions from other MRB according to the mission.
Whilst the US army thinks in division and corps deployments, ACC, I’ve drawn from their brigade combat teams – small, independently deployable, self contained structures. We won’t readily have more than one brigade deployed, these combined arms battalions are exactly what is needed for this scale of operations, mostly.
If you do want to form a battlegroup around an IFV or APC mounted infantry battalion, then it’s still doable though not with a standing formation. CABattalions would have advantages and disadvantages, though I think the weight’s -probably- in their favour.
Hi, Frenchie. I feel that the three planned light and mechanised infantry battalions in the MRBs will, over time and due to cost, become a mixture of light and medium protected wheeled vehicles – Foxhound, a light armoured tactical Landrover replacement out of OUVS, and a few variants of a LAV/Stryker/Boxer type APC wrung from FRESS.
We’ll end up with essentially a straight forward infantry brigade with a little attached armour, rather than a true multirole brigade.
@Jed
“If the NL is getting rid of all it’s Leo 2′s, and Germany has just announced another cut in it’s numbers (and it already has a bunch in storage) AND it was decided it would be too complicated / expensive to fit a “NATO standard” smoothbore to the Chally 2 – then should we consider: Replacing our Challenger 2 fleet with second hand Leo 2′s ?”
If the NL is phasing out her heavy armour, and we traditionally share the same strategic goals, why bother having heavy armour at all?
Hi BB, You’re right, we will have probably, as you think, most of the brigade equipped with light wheeled APC, it’s cheaper than a tracked APC, it’s easier to repair, and there is vehicles such as the Patria, which are resistant to mines and IED, multifunctional, and have proved their worth in Afghanistan.
Phil D
Bradleys in iraq were guided onto targets by air platforms, and could happuily hit them from behind.
Acc
“I think you lose rather than gain when you start to go permanently ‘combined’at lower than the battalion level.”
Not sure I agree with that, not saying your wrong either.
X
Thats not quite true, the UK had the worlds first all motorised army, it just only ever used them to leg it from the Germans and never had the resources ever again