TYPE 27 – One tier, evolvable and affordable
Share by EmailA guest post from McZ
Since roughly ten years, the RN is struggling to bring up a viable plan to replace the current T22 and T23 classes of surface combatants. Four different projects fielding three workgroups were formed, and while they delivered on analyzing the strategic environment, they failed to translate into actual acquisition. Instead, FSC and predecessors fit well into the wider picture of the emerging funding gap.
To understand the funding gap, we need to know it’s driving mechanism. Armed forces in general, but air arms and navies in particular, have very long planning circles. The US Navy reflects this by their 30 years shipbuilding plan. This means, equipment replacement is planned to fall somewhere in a certain timeframe of a recurring 30-years cycle.
The funding gap is simply the quantity of maligned, delayed or outright-cancelled-but-reinstated requirements, measured in money. The strength of the fleet is the same quantity measured in numbers and quality of equipment. There seem to be three phases: for the first 10 years, the gap be handled with extending service life of equipment, the next 5 years will see lowering numbers, followed after another 5 years by an outright earthquake shaking the whole organization.
This is were we are now.
My proposal to fix it is radical, so please fasten your seatbelts.
BUDGET MAGIC AKA THE GAP
The current RN-plan for the next two decades looks as follows:
- MHPC is a replacement for MIW, survey and patrol vessels
- Type 26 is due to deliver 8 ASW-frigates and 5 GP-frigates to replace T23
- MARS is a plan to replace the logistics force
Bottom line, it is presumed to deliver 8-10 MHPC vessels, 13 T26 frigates, and an unkown, but ever decreasing number of logistics vessels, last count was 5. Costs are yet unknown, but there are rumours that MHPC is a £1.4b programme, that each T26 will cost at least £0.3b and MARS as a whole is tagged £0.8b. This means: 28 vessels spread over five tiers of capability for £6.1b! The thing is: neither is it believable, that BAE can or wants to deliver a major war vessel at £300m each, nor is MARS sealed, nor is anything known about MHPC. My conclusion is: better calc with £8b, or even £9b.
This plan collides with the simple and brutal reality, that we have already overspent the shipbuilding budget. If we count T45, Astute, amphibs, CVF and Vanguard-replacement together, we come to roughly £28.5b. According to NAO-numbers, the 30-years shipbuilding budget is £29.7b (((38b budget – 17% equipment) – 8% cuts) / 3 arms / 2 half of what is sustained shipbuilding = 29,716).
TDs SIMSS concept in this regards is quite right when it points out: we cannot proceed building high-end vessels only. This opens the question, if ANY high-end vessels are affordable and needed.
One notable observation is how high unit prices push the funding gap farther.
Let’s assume that we have relatively constant annular expenditure, but with variing portions for the surface fleet. Then we basically we have three cases:
(a) The SC-budget is on the high point
(b) The SC-budget is on the low-point
(c) something inbetween
When looking @(a), we can assume a 500m vessel would be affordable at this point, as there are £600m in the pot. We would still have to ask, if one vessel is better than two or three, but as long as we are here and we take no spending hollidays, anything’s OK. If we look at (c), we will see a delay, a drop in numbers or a cancellation, because we only have £400m to spend in this year. Still we would get a £200m-light frigate in time and budget, in fact two. Then we finally drop to (b), with only £200m available. The hi-end vessel gets built when Easter and Christmas falls together. Still, we could get a light frigate, and if only in a blank patrol config.
Conclusion: the current program is not hardened against fluctuations in the budget. If they are not hardened, they get messed up and widen the funding gap.
Using a (up to) £200m-vessel, we could adapt very well to any situation. In good and medium years, the balance moves directly to the equipment budget. In poor years, we get a vessel without bells and whistles, but certainly no delay, and therefore no drop in numbers.
THE IDEA
Change is required, but the truth is that the MoD lacks the expertise.
The simple fact, that people at TD are constantly making better and more mature yet cheaper proposals and that the guys at ShipBucket do constantly design vessels from existing parts without taking £127m for it, is a thing that I scratched my head since years.
So, how do we fix it?
When I talked to a mission planner of the USAF, he showed me some little piece of software. It was basically some sort of mission planner, which allowed him to provide his fighter jet’s with equipment according to mission, define how many extra fuel he needed a.s.o. The software could work on a cell phone or a tablet computer. A 8-year-old kid could arm that fighter with a week training.
If we look at other sectors, we can make an interesting observation: faced with deficiencies, most of the companies invest in tooling.
These influxes made me think. What if we give the MoD-staff the tools needed to develop a low-threshold basic understanding and skillset for designing and outfitting warships? What is required to make it work?
THE BASELINE
From the start, it was clear, that any freedom of action needs it’s limitations, because achieving economies of scale were one point that I wanted to incorporate. Clearly having the whole outfit of a vessel being subject to customization is contradicting this goal.
I solved this by defining a set of ‘irreducables’, a common set of equipment which allows even a ‘blank sheet’ to act as a patrol vessel. This equipment can be procured in large batches. Together with other functional requirements I incorparted them into a first outline:
(1) A shallow draught of max. 15ft; this opens around 1,000 harbours around the world to this day unaccessible to our vessels
(2) A blue-water capability up to SS7
(3) A basic kit of ARTISAN, a hull-mounted sonar, ECM system, a main gun (minimum Oto Melara 76), two smaller gunmounts, basic AD (Starstreak or CAMM), decoys and torpedo defence, electro-optical sensors
(4) One helo (as they will be in short supply) and one or two VTOL-UAVs
(5) Electric propulsion
(6) Range of 7k nm @ 15kn,
(7) Capability to store some ISO 20ft containers
(8) Cost below £200m, better under £150m
This vessel is the so called baseline-variant.
THE INTERFACE
The rest of the kit would be tailored to mission and could be modularized. First, I thought about containers, but while this is a valid approach to add below-deck facilities, it’s rather complicated to modularize weapons this way. It would also have made it harder to take over state-of-the-art equipment. So I dropped this for the on-deck kit.
To make adaption as easy as possible, I decided that a clear two-end-solution would be best. Have the standard kit and accomodation on the forward section of the vessel, and have a mission deck in the aft section, being open or closed depending on outfit. The helo-pad would be one part of the mission area. The mission area will have a basic ‘interface’ (the Lego-baseplate), which means a pattern of fixing points and networks-connectors. The beam should at least allow to accomodate 8 Sylver-VLS-cells abreast, to open the basic design to high-end options. Handling equipment and roofing get a set of standardized fixing point on both sides of the ‘box’.
CHANGING THE SKILL LEVEL
The ability to be a force in itself + the interface + the supporting low-threshold skillset in shape of a software is the core of the concept. The software allows defining a mission-tailored outfit of the baseline-vessel, and also delivers a fixed blueprint for contracting purposes, as all elements are standardized.
The software should get the following jobs done:
- ‘define’ requirements and generate solution proposals from a knowledge-base
- ‘plug’ existing components to the interface according to mission
- ‘control’ cost of the design process
- ‘assist’ the following contracting cycle
- ‘track’ effectiveness
- ‘deduce’ more efficient ways to keep the knowledge base up-to-date
Remember the Lego-analogy?
The software would act as a virtual brick builder, some type of pseudo-CAD. The software defines the contract, and the supplier has to make his offers against the software. If he cant’, no contract. If he tries to escalate costs, ask where the software described the cost-driver. What is not supported in the software, will not be contracted. To get equipment into the softwares knowledge base as pluggable, the equipment has to be cleared, which includes cost and time deadlines. If a supplier cannot meet the harsh conditions of the new procurement system, he may f*** off.
GREEN OR BLUE
Before we cut steel, one last word to the baseline. By design, I was searching for a predominantly green water solution. But there arises a question: can the basic concept be translated to blue water?
The answer is: absolutely. The baseline-vessel is interchangable, as long as the interface is featured.
So, at any time we could use a vessel which is
- larger overall
- having with deeper draught for better blue-water caps
- ice-strengthened to operate in the Arctic
- having a more risky high-tech hull, such as tumblehome, semiplaning, SWATH, trimaran, you name it
The interface makes sure, that the MoD/RN has the expertise to outfit any vessel featuring it. Using another platform would (at least partially) eliminate the large production run, but even this can be diminished if the basic kit remains the same. Also, the basic kit may not fit neatly into another platform.
INTRODUCING: TYPE 27 – ELECTRA-CLASS
So far, so good. Having laid out the environment, we can carefully begin to make a design proposal.
Due to harsh criticism of the Khareef, I set out a renewed search fo a valid design. Only lately I came across the DAMENs website and found the SIGMA range of frigates and corvettes. SIGMA is more or less a ship family, but far more sophisticated and well thought out than the french GOWIND designs. They use a standardized set of basic building bricks, which can be tailored (with a 13m beam) from 69m to 150m.
The first vessels were built in time and to cost for Indonesia. The last contract as signed in 2008 with Morocco, with the first vessel delivered this month. According to GlobalSecurity, the contract called for three vessels, one of them being slightly larger than the other pair, for €510m. Completely equipped with sonar, radar and a basic kit fulfilling the requirement mentioned above.
The article is a very good read, worth a look. It gives an insight into why BAE will never manage to be a major player on the warship world market. At least if they don’t manage to define such basic building blocks.
I also considered that tiny Austal-trimaran, in fact if we had a program togther with Oz, Nz, Canada or Malaysia or Singapore, I would take it. But my guts told me to go steel.
As my baseline vessel I choose the (yet non-existing) SIGMA 11213 (means: 112m length, 13m beam) light frigate design. The modifications are as follows:
- length of 112m to increase fuel capacity
- sustainable max speed is 26kn; we may improve this by adding more powerful diesel engines of 9-11k MW
- shorter superstructure and movement of helopad more to the midships, to allow for a mission bay
- replacement of the SMART-S radar suite by ARTISAN
- if matured and somewhat simplified, introduce a SkySail-system to lower fuel consumption (OK, OK, everyone has it’s engineering p**n, that’s mine
If we estimate cost, with the SIGMA 10513 a a basis.
- Original vessel £148m
- savings in the superstructure will pay for aditional section.
- Changes in machinery will add around £4m, this will have lower impact as we buy 64 instead of 2, 4 or even 16 engines, but we leave it.
- ARTISAN vs. current SMART-S adds £6m (it’s an estimate based on available public source docs +50% to quiet criticism)
- that’s it; bottom line: £158m, OK, let’s round it to £160m
As most equipment is procured at higher numbers, we could use management techniques from the corporate sector. Through this, numbers may fall – and thats a careful guess – by up to 20%. But this is not in the scope of this proposal and therefore not calced into the numbers.
This is the point, where I can see the large-ship-steel-is-cheap-and-air-is-free-chaps getting a rush of blood to the head. Calm down, boys. This is no cargo vessel and no Arctic-ASW-combatant BY DESIGN.
As mentioned above, making such would pose no problem, but this also is not in the focus of this proposal.
OPENING OPPORTUNITIES TO GET BACK ON TRACK
So we have a viable plan to replace T23. But we are still overspent, and we still lack the numbers. How can we fix this?
If we add-up the current surface fleet, we get something like the following picture, with all prices being the bare minimum:
- £6.0b = 6 T45 or eventual replacements
- £4.0b = 13 T26
- £1.4b = x MHPC
Makes £11.4b. Available due to the total 30-years budget are £7.5b.
This is were the concept of a one-tier surface fleet and the supporting tooling will show it’s power.
What if…
- we put a 24- or even a 48-cell VLS on the mission area?
- we put a hundred CAMMs aboard + adding a pair of those french land-based ASTER-launchers?
- we put that reusable hypersonic UAV fired from VLS into the mission area, that possibly makes up AD in 2030
All this would mean, short of SAMPSON, we could replace T45 by a T27. Certainly, we would pay more than £158m or even £200m, but we would not need any development of a whole new vessel. Each vessel would cost a third or a fourth of a large AD-combatant. This all means, if we take 12 AD outfits instead of 6 T45-successors, to current prices we would save up to £4.5b. This is more or less the number to build 30 baseline vessels. Plus we could use the MHPC-money for another 8 or 10.
So, the new plan would look like this, economies of scale excluded:
£6.4b = 40 T27
£1.0b = for developing/integrating new equipment options for the interface
Makes £7.4b
Savings are £4b, and we will just fit into the 30-years budget. In other words: back on track. In fact, with the 100m left, we build the SIMSS-prototype.
Also, we would have made a comback on numbers, and we would be ruthlessly common.
The only high-end capability not reproducable using this pattern is SAMPSON. Instead we would have a network of ARTISANs and UAVs. The connected computing power of the battlegroup will certainly outperform the single one-trick pony of today. One T27 may in itself never be as good as a T45 on AD. But if the T45 must compete with 2, 3 or even 4 T27 affordable for the price tag of one T45, it would be outclassed.
WHERE TO START
Well, the obvious is the nearest.
The next construction programme is MHPC. It looks as the RN is looking for something in the 90-100m range.
Why not taking the Type 27?
It adds actually very low risk to the program itself and it fits darn well into the price tag intended.
As it is, we could get 8 light frigates out of MHPC, and would still have some money to adapt the MIW and hydrography equipment.
When the vessels for MHPC are delivered, JUST KEEP BUILDING. Actually, we could instantly cancel the £127m T26-contract and turn it into something material.
GOOD PLAN?
Bottom line, let’s recapitulate a bit.
All numbers I mentioned may be hampered by the fact of general availability to the public domain. To prevent criticism, I have added a 50% margin of error, apart from numbers being backed by a source.
This proposal has shown evolving the surface force to the next decades by very simply, atomic measures:
- (re)introducing a very basic design-skillset into MoD by using a simple software, doing basic shipbucketing, cost analysis and contracting assistance
- connecting this skillset to the real world by introducing a standardized outfitting-interface aka mission bay + plugs
- using a basic light frigate seaframe featuring this interface as a baseline
- achieving economies of scale by ordering the baselines equipment in larger numbers
- this way getting an affordable alternative to T26 AND T45(-successor) to get the budget back on track
- avoiding duplication by always asking for adaption of the baseline, if a new requirement emerge
What it doesn’t deliver is anything kind of a high-end asset. No more floating imperial star destroyers.
What it delivers is a basic war vessel, patrol-capable OOTB and flexible by design, and an evolutionary fluid entry into a new set of thinking in acquisition. Individual vessels can well be outfitted with a VDS or even a volume-search radar, and can grow to the necessary height if required.
The latter is is just plain good old british tradition, isn’t it?
Category: Thoughts on the Future
About the Author (Author Profile)
Subscribe
If you enjoyed this article, subscribe to receive more just like it.
I’m in. I think your point about the interface is similar to the one I was making about SIMSS – designing around the space that connects up the various access points.
Meanwhile, watch a Kongsberg NSM do its stuff.
The plan sounds great, but didn’t the Dutch navy turn down the SIGMAs for being too vulnerable?
A v good and entertaining piece
… one of the billions saved will also give us the “floating imperial star destroyers” through the refit of the other carrier to cats&traps (in due course)
McZ
Loads of issues to chew upon.
My first thoughts on the MOD / RN attempts at ship design is that the issue is not one relating to a lack of skills it is to do with a lack of leadership.
This then multiplies as the vacuum at the top encourages every Tom Dick and Harry to go large on their own hobby horses and tie the whole process down into a never ending series of meetings and reviews producing nothing but spending a lot of money.
Also I think that we need to break the cost down of any vessel into basic hull and mission / war load.
The enemy at the moment is the Treasury.
Until the MOD / RN get one over them we will be into a long hard slog to get anything.
Start low, do things quickly and do them to budget then the RN may have a chance to move things forward.
To go over old ground the CVF programme needed a mild steel prototype to get things started.
Container ship at £100mill should have been the programme base.
Fill the slices that would normally hold containers with all the stuff needed.
Fit pre-fab hangars and accommodation on top and away we should have went.
Rent some F18 A/B’s from National Guard and start singing “We are Sailing” in a 1970′s stylee.
Any plan now needs to be fast, nimble and efficient.
That comes from leadership and not endless meetings.
Well said ” the CVF programme needed a mild steel prototype to get things started”
In their final form (which hasn’t been decided, or at least not communicated, yet) they will be the key ingredient to “carrier-assisted operations”.
What those are/ will be I can imagine, but still looking for a proper document on the concept (if priorities are not steered so that the “other” ingredients will also be in place, then we might be looking at a colossal waste of money… don’t get me wrong: I am for maritime-oriented defence posture and carriers as part of it)
McZ
What is the main driver in your analysis?
Cost, size or capability?
Cost – That is capital cost, manning costs, running costs?
Size – You go big on a 5m draught and then talk about a hull mounted sonar.
Capability – What is your benchmark?
Patrol / Presence?
War fighting?
Specialist?
You seem to want a lot of hulls in the water but what has happened to the RFA support element?
Consequently my thoughts on your design are that it is -
Too trad,
Too short legged,
Not VFM enough,
Too limited,
Too expensive.
Also could you redo the numbers as they are hard to follow.
Why Artisan over Smart-S?
What costs do you have?
SC budget – What is this?
McZ, good article and lots of things to chew over. My main question at the moment is why wait to start with the MHPC when the T26 design is not finalized? Also, I still see a need for the high end platform to have a different design otherwise there would be too many comprises (plus I think it would actually be a harder sell to get the high end kit past the treasury).
First, I’d like to thank TD for publishing my stuff.
To the questions:
@andyw
The rumours about the dutch I’ve heard. I guess, high seas operations were more of a factor than vulnerability, which is pretty much equal or slightly superior to the Holland-class.
@FBOT
Isn’t lack of leadership a lack of skill? Where is the leadership, when it takes 10 years to design a vessel? Where is the leadership, when we have no viable plan to reorganize warship procurement from scratch?
SC budget = part of the wider shipbuilding budget usable for surface combatants.
I did no benchmarks at all. My assumption is, that a flat-topped baseline will be better in the patrol role than a River and as such will always find a role. If money for equipment or equipment from other units is available, then it will rise in power.
The cost figures are acquisition only. As the SIGMA is diesel driven and has the capability to be run by down to 20 personnell, I don’t see running cost as a problem. In fact, we should look at the LCS-manning model.
You final thoughts are no surprise to someone who followed the other threads.
@repulse
In the proposal, T26 is cancelled and MHPC converted to T27. The recent rumours due to the RNs website suggest, that the RN plans something along the lines of my thinking, just with a T26.
What is a high-end platform? SAMPSON? VDS? The latter can be put on the boat without problems. SAMPSON is not feasible. I would put SAMPSON on the carriers or the amphibs. But is there really a need, if we have a battlegroup-wide real-time network?
McZ @ 2.57
I think we agree on the basic point – the issue with the RN / MOD is a lack of leadership – would JF find a role in today’s Navy?
Regarding my other points I am just trying to work out what the main drivers are for your plans?
Are fleet numbers too low?
Are the existing designs too high level / too expensive?
Do we have current needs that are not being met but the existing or planned fleet?
Is your “11213″ a patrol frigate in it’s baseline spec?
Is size important or is it secondary after cost?
Have you thought about boat handling / well deck?
My thoughts are driven by a viewpoint that the current plans are unsustainable / not fit for purpose.
Basic point is cost, the figures are far too high.
Second point is that because of limited funds and high costs the design has to do too much for too long – issue is the same for FRES / T26 / CVF – their use is envisaged into the far future no matter what the far future holds.
CVF – 50 years – copying the Americans.
T26 – building until 2033 – ridiculous.
FRES – in service until 2050? as a given at the start not a nice to have after 25 years service?
Need to up the pace of – Need / Develop / Design / Build / Service.
Need to lower the cost and introduce TQM – find a quality level then work to lower the cost.
Finally any thoughts on MARS / Ocean 2 / A+B replacement?
18 knots for the flagship is bringing the fleet back to the standards of 1895.
I read this at work; it has been bugging me ever since. I don’t want to see another Type-21 debacle.
Types 45 and 23 are better than what is on offer. MHPC is not a [fighting] warship…!
@FBOT
“Are fleet numbers too low?”
Yes, they are.
“Are the existing designs too high level / too expensive?”
Yes, they are. But I acknowledge the fact, that a future surface vessel will have irreducables, so I choose a baseline which is affordable but incorporates a basic outfit. The ‘core irreducable’ IMO is to use a vessel designed to act as a warship.
Replacing warships with SIMSS is not the way forward, as it will never become a warship with any money. I repeat, instead of the MARS farce, I could well imagine the SIMSS as a more flexible mini-Berlin-class.
“Is your “11213″ a patrol frigate in it’s baseline spec?”
Yes, this is the basic idea. If years are good, we can equip her with mission equipment, if years are thin we still get a patrol vessel capable of being routinely upgraded on first refit. Routinely is the keyword here: no talks about grandeur, just keep building.
“Do we have current needs that are not being met but the existing or planned fleet?”
This is not the key driver. Read the last sentence: as long as there is a capable vessel, e do actually quite well. We have too few capable vessels. We need to fit into the 7.5b window available for escorts. Fixing the escort part of procurement is the focus. A comeback on numbers is possible. Thiis is the message.
The current needs are the same as ever, in fact the same as in the 16th century. We fought barbary pirates for over 200 years, until the French finally invaded Algiers.
“Is size important or is it secondary after cost?”
The choices I made were out of the Green Water focus, and a 2500 ts vessel seems to be quite OK for this. Others will favour Blue water. I’m fine with that. As long as we keep the long production run and the baseline spec without f.e. SAMPSON, the paradigm is working.
“Have you thought about boat handling / well deck?”
Yes, but it will not be fitted. I think, with a crane on the mission bay, the vessel will have space for at least two CB-90.
“their use is envisaged into the far future no matter what the far future holds”
As I wrote, the interface will enable the change of the baseline vessel without reinventing the whole procurement process. It’s just one system in a system composed of systems. Personally, I think the hull-form of the Rolls-Royce Intra Theatre Logistics Vessel has it’s merits, who knows, maybe 2030.
“Need to up the pace of – Need / Develop / Design / Build / Service.”
Exactly! Apart from that the RN today has only knowledge in need and service. This is my approach: to fill the white points on the map to enable the MOD/RN to manage the whole process in a efficient, coherent and speedy manner.
This task should be software-driven. As long as the software is there, we will have the expertise. We will face a larger problem, if the civilian staff get’s cut as advertized. Is it stands, we can be quite sure that just the most profiled personnell will bite the bullet.
@Fluffy Thoughts
“I don’t want to see another Type-21 debacle.”
Wht debacle? A vessel put into service after barely coming from the drawingboard and to costs well below a third of a T22 is hardly a debacle. The shame on T21 is, we didn’t get the export variant and stopped after 8 vessels.
“Types 45 and 23 are better than what is on offer.”
Ship for ship, yes.
Are 19 T45+T23/26 more capable than 40 T27? No.
Are they more affordable? No.
And what part of ‘overspent’ did you miss?
Well done matey, BZ on a great article, well written, enjoyed reading it on my commute to work this morning. Which means I have not really had time to digest or fully analyze – Except to say, you appear to be way, way of the mark with characterization of the issues of air defence e.g. many Artisans are equal to or greater than a single SAMSON due to greater processing power – it ain’t that simple
Sill I applaud your efforts !
Oh dear, just been and looked at the Sigma – great 2500tonne ship for coastal navies patrolling their own EEZ – I would not want to live on one of these on a standard RN 6th month deployment…. don’t think the accomodation would be quite to the same standards as a T45 !
Why did you put the emphasis on green water ops, what is your strategic analysis that leads you to this focus ? How much money do you have left over to spend on “Corvette Tenders” to go with these wee things ?
McZ, A few points whilst I’m still digesting…
* Quoting 6bn for the T45, whilst true, is distorting the numbers and in my view is an anomaly which is unlikely to be repeated. My understanding is that this number includes all the legacy costs of the failed Horizon programme and the R&D for Sampson etc. This was compounded by the eventual reduction in the number of hulls for which the costs of the CVF programme was largely to blame. The real lesson is to get a better mix of new vs existing equipment on new ships and stick to the number of ships originally planned – which seems to be the message from the T26.
* You could link together multiple Artisan equipped ships to give the same area coverage as the Sampson, but I thought one of the benefits is that you can see things coming along way away so you have a chance to shoot it down. What you are suggesting would not give you this or things such as anti ballistic missile defence.
* Government budgets I don’t believe fluctuate as drastically as you suggest, there is no reason why not to plan ship deliveries for a five year period.
McZ @ 5.21
T21 – Wasted by Sea Cat.
If it had been built with a better missile or an up Market gun it would have been a world beater.
Now on the issue of the T27 – what displacement are we talking about?
112m x 13m x 5m = 3,500 tons full load.
Looking at 300 tons of fuel oil for 7K miles at 15 knots.
My numbers work at 15 tons per day at 15knots
Not sure how this compares with the T12 (L) / T21 / T23?
As you have probably guessed I see this as too small too short legged and too limited.
You seem to use the MARS money to finance the T27 build, that is take out capability from the RFA then give them a huge flock to look after.
My thoughts on the SIMSS / Colonial Sloop aka the Global Patrol Vessel to all the social workers lurking.
60 days endurance at 400 miles per day / 15 knots.
That would be 20 tons per day or 1,200 tons all in.
Colonial Sloop = 147m x 25m x 5-6m = 11k tons full load / 16MW for 22 knots +
Patrol Frigate = 177m x 25m x 5-6m = 14k tons full load / 32MW for 28 knots +
The driver here is parametric design.
Work out the cross section and then flex the length to suit.
Cost is an issue but the design is very efficient.
Capital cost has the following –
Navigable hull = £45mill.
HMS Clyde sensor suite or better = £5mill.
Warload = £10mill.
That would be my baseline.
To tie my ideas into the T27 then a patrol spec would need to be worked up.
Navigable hull = £65mill including £5mill of better sub-division / armour.
Sensor suite = £30-35mill – Artisan and CIC, ex T23 if required.
Interested in the Endurance Class fit out
Warload = £30-35mill – limited ASW / area AAW with 24 VLS tubes / S-S missiles and guns.
Hoping for ESSM levels of capability.
Second hand Harpoon if money is tight.
Looking at a price point of £130mill / €150mill.
VLS – Mk 41 or Sylver depending on cost.
Cost is the driver.
Big and simple = cheap to build and run
All the warload will be RO-RO / LO-LO / BO-BO.
Size offer utility, flexibility and growth.
Would aim to flog them after 15 years if the price was right.
Final point on their suitability to fight wars.
War fighters are whatever we choose them to be.
WW2 showed that the simpler the structure the longer the ship stayed afloat.
See IJN convoy escorts 1943-45.
Repulse @ 7.06
The T45 programme cost £6.6bill.
For that expense we got 6 limited Tier 1 AAW hulls.
Consequently the fully accounted cost of a T45 is £1.1bill.
Please note that this does not include the R+D money spent on the forebears of the Sampson radar in the dim and distant past.
Mcz
Thanks for the time you took to write the piece. While its an interesting take its not one I agree with.
I would say that the design stage is not where you want to be looking for short cuts or to reduce you program Ino this is a favourite area to look for cost saving as its difficult appreciate what’s happening. Material and design will contribute to less than 10% of the total program cost but influence minimum 44% of total cost. This is often were programs start going wrong as programs are rushed thru the design stages without having full maturity at each stage. The ship bucket design idea does happen at the start of all engineering programs using very senior engineers and parametric sizing models. That is in essence the easy bit.
While I like the idea of scale able hulls one of the problems with mono hulls is that to increase the length of a monohull you usually have to increase its beam and draught to give it its stability. This is a area I believe where the triton hull form has benefits in that the stability is provided by the outer hulls meaning your central hull with accommodation and machine spaces can maintain an constant cs allowing simpler scaling up of the hull length.
I think your budget for a 30 year ship building program will be type 26, mhpc and mars and nothing else. About 7b total for both the hulls and the modules that go in them anything else is wishful thinking.
McZ has some interesting ideas, but he’s focused all of his maths on unit price. This is only one part of the overall cost of such a force.
The compliment of the Type 45 is meant to be 190, and the Type 26 130. That’s a naval force of nearly 3000 sailors. The Sigma frigates have a crew of about 100; 40 of them would be 4000!
That’s a third increase in pay, training requirements, pension funds, military housing…and all that before you even start to work out the extra logistics forces required to maintain such a big fleet.
Mark @ 7.50
You are having a laugh.
You want to spend more time on the design phase.
The issues you raise are down to the complete lack of corporate knowledge within the MOD regarding the design of frigates.
Regarding the T26 we are in the middle of the Assessment phase where we are analysing options And designing systems.
£127mill and 45 months – Good work if you can get it.
You have to ask what systems are involved
Artisan – out a catalogue / off an upgraded T23
TAS – out a catalogue / off an upgraded T23
AAW – out a catalogue / off an upgraded T23
S-S – out a scrapyard
Gun – out a cracker
CIC / CMS – the big unknown.
Consequently what is there to design?
When all this is finished it will be onto design proper.
Do you really want to spend more time on this?
Fbot.
Exactly were in my post have mentioned anything to do with type 26 program.
Ive experienced a number of both civi and miltary programs and what I mention is repeated continually. However as you appear to know better than any of the professionals ive ever worked worth or the conventional engineering principles I suggest you open your own factories and shipyards and show us what we have been doing wrong all these years.
Mcz
I have staid out of this so far,
I like the Sigma design very much as a green water vessel and would like to see dozen in the RN.
I see you have done the maths on price on range etc, and I am not going to argue. The principle one basi ship doing all those jobs is again interresting.
However I am not convinved the vessel is the right sizem someone else posted about habitability, I am concerned about that range and seakeeping. As someone has already said the numbers or relativly (accent on the relativly) short ranged vessels, would increase the drain on the RFA unless they are forward based.
I am also not sure they meet the high requirement in its entirety,
In short not convinced.
@Steve
“The Sigma frigates have a crew of about 100; 40 of them would be 4000!”
Rather between 70 and 90. And you forgot the around 800 men of the current MIW-, hydrography and patrol force.
If you look at how many vessels are on deployment at any given time, we can also come to much lower numbers. I would adapt some kind of improved LCS-manning pattern: have around 30 crews to be available at any given time, to be swapped between deployed and readiness vessels only.
In general, I tend to think you guys are too much focused on the steel-part. The SIGMA is my preferred baseline because of the green water focus and because the price-tag allows numbers. The concept iself works with any other suited design.
@Jed
”
“Except to say, you appear to be way, way of the mark with characterization of the issues of air defence e.g. many Artisans are equal to or greater than a single SAMSON due to greater processing power – it ain’t that simple
We talk about 2030, when a T45-replacement would come into fruition. Distributed computing will then be commonplace. Laser-based high-density line-of-sight comms are already being conceived.
“Why did you put the emphasis on green water ops, what is your strategic analysis that leads you to this focus ?”
Marine infrastructure is located in Green waters, presence happens in Green waters, special ops are done in Green and indeed brown water, a.s.o. Even the FI war was from the RN-escort POV a littoral war.
The last push came from the Cheonan-incident. The (south) Koreans have built glossy high-end vessels, but they are prepared for the war they want, not the war they are actually fighting.
Re. accomodation: manning will be around 70-90 persons, so accomodation should be OK.
@repulse
“The real lesson is to get a better mix of new vs existing equipment on new ships”
Like Harpoons on T45?
“What you are suggesting would not give you this or things such as anti ballistic missile defence.”
As I wrote: no high end asset. Instead inteligent use of existing tech to push the system as a whole further.
SAMPSON is there and will stay until 2035. The question is, what will be state of the art in 2035? Long-range volume search already doesn’t require SAMPSON. BMD already is very much a software and computing power game. What I add is the connection of the battlegroup into a large distributed computing system. This is existing cloud service tech + 25 years development.
“Government budgets I don’t believe fluctuate as drastically as you suggest”
I don’t talk about government budgets, but the assumend part of the defence budget available in a given year for escort construction.
@FBOT
“You seem to use the MARS money to finance the T27 build, that is take out capability from the RFA then give them a huge flock to look after.”
Actually, I only take T45, T26 and MHPC.
Don’t want to dig into the rest again. I can only repeat, that none of my criticism of a SIMSS-style ship as a secondary warship has been answered, really. The concept you outline would look very bad compared to those tiny Singapore-LSDs, both in price, dedication and functionality.
Draught of the SIGMA is 3.75m, so I assume 2700ts. If the range of 7k nm can be achieved, will depend of the propulsinon option chosen. I extrapolated from the VT-C3-Khareef-derivate, that such a range can be achieved. Actually 7knm is just a little shorter than a T23 at 15kn, so when looking at the article in hindsight this appears just too bold. Despite 20 years advancement in diesel engines. But if it is achieved, compare this to the 4k nm of the german F125 or the 6k nm of the FREMM.
@Mark
“This is often were programs start going wrong as programs are rushed thru the design stages without having full maturity at each stage. The ship bucket design idea does happen at the start of all engineering programs using very senior engineers and parametric sizing models. That is in essence the easy bit.”
The idea is, to use one sturdy base-design which IS ALREADY MATURE, give it a MATURE interface and use a MATURE PROCESS to fill the interface ROUTINELY. In short: kill a whole lot of possible sources of error.
@IXION
“I am also not sure they meet the high requirement in its entirety”
They concept does not aspire to do. It is not a super-AAW-destroyer, it opens up the possibility to ask one crucial question when it comes to T45-replacement: how much of this replacement can be fulfilled using T27? Remember, not on a one-for-one-basis, how can we build the T45-capability using two or three T27. My guess is: strong separation of sensor-pickets and battery vessels, mixed in a 1:2 or even 1:3 ratio.
McZ said “My guess is: strong separation of sensor-pickets and battery vessels, mixed in a 1:2 or even 1:3 ratio.”
Yep I can see some merit in that approach. I have wondered for a while now if (perhaps a smaller) CVF should have been outfitted with SeaViper. And that such a ship would be accompanied by an escort of 4 diesel frigates (think Iver Huitfeldt but only with a PDMS system and two CIWS.) These frigates would the base for the balance of the ASW helicopter screen. (Two Merlin say as per Absalon.) This would leave T45 for other work.
McZ
Good point about T45 replacement I am of a similar view to X re CVF so it fits in.
In your case you are rather recomending a leander sized vessel. Tha should be enough. IMHO it seems fiesable.
I thought it was an interesting article with a different perspective McZ, so well done on that mate.
But the more I think about this kind of thing, the future of the Navy and all that, the more I lean towards just a Type 45 Mk.II
See the thing is, I look at the Type 23 frigate a lot. I mean literally, I have the picture of HMS Somerset that is used on the Type 23 wikipedia page as my desktop background, and I now can’t change it even if I wanted to.
But anyway, I look at the Type 23 and think to myself “complete package”.
It has sufficient radar and missile systems to protect itself. It has a gun. Sonar. Torpedos. Harpoon. Helicopter.
It can do some of the things a Type 45 can do and even some things it can’t (thanks to fitted for, not with).
So I think we should just resurrect the Type 45 from the production line bin. Put towed array’s on them. Maybe just fit it with Aster 15, not Aster 30. Take off the long range area search radar and just stick with SAMPSON, or maybe trade out Sampson for Artisan if that proves cheaper.
And then just get on and build them. Fitted with everything they need.
And I am never convinced about arguments about reducing draft. This is about sea power not harbour power.
I’d have to agree with X. I’d want a ship prioritised for blue water operations over green/brown.
A very intersting article.
1. The arguements for few and high end vs many low end will run and run on here without a doubt.
2. I struggle to see how we can justift spending 145 million pound on the design phase of T26. I do not often agree with FBOT but he is spot on here.
3. The problem with a 45 batch 2 is that they would actually need some mods to make them GP platforms, they are horrfically noisy beasts at the moment.
McZ @ 10.42
I struggle to understand your views on the Endurance class LPDs?
They are not small – 141m long for 8,500 tons full load.
They have a good sensor fit that can be thrifted and improved upon as it is 10-12 years old now.
It is a very capable and flexible platform and the going rate for a copy is £80mill approx in today’s money.
You also have the Absalon data point to add to the cost picture
£165mill each in 2005 with a very good patrol spec warload and a big boxy, capable hull.
Finally I have to ask two questions -
T27 – What is the main driver?
Is it cost, capability or size?
What issues do you have with the SIMSS concept or it’s second cousin the Colonial Sloop?
They are robust, capable and cheap.
Fit a warload of £60mill + on them and they will go toe to toe with a patrol spec T23.
Bullet points will do, I know it will be a pain but it will help the debate.
Either that or we ask TD for an indexing system.
Alpats @ 12.38
Why are the T45 ‘s noisy?
Has the MOD lost all it’s corporate knowledge that it gained in doing the T23′s and the Astutes?
I fear that when it comes to design we are far too much project based, starting from scratch with ever new ship type.
That is doing Right Hand Design with no Left Hand Side support.
@FBOT
Perhaps “noisy is a slight overstatement” but a lack of rafting and the use of gas turbines has made them “not quiet”. The 23 is an extreme example as they can run on 2 Dgs rafted and insulated on 1 deck when they go ultra quiet.
Apparently the 45 also has an extremely distinctive IR signature when viewed through a periscope.
@ APATS
Question; If £145 million has been earmarked for development work on the Type 26, plus the fact there will be additional development money that will have to be spent builidng a first ship and getting it tested, approved etc, will it cost more or less than the above to get a Type 45 Mk. II up to scratch for ASW work?
To clarify, we’re talking about dumping the long range area search radar (that BAE never wanted anyway), fitting it only for the shorter ranged Aster 15, fitting a towed sonar array, perhaps messing about with the arse end (where’s Mandelson when you need him?) to put in some kind of basic docking for small boats, and then adapting the design to make it quiter/harder to detect by submarine.
Will all that cost more than the full expense of developing the Type 26 from scratch?
As is painfully obvious, I’m not a Naval engineer. But I’m guessing that T45 Mk.II would come in cheaper.
Mcz
If your using a mature design your using everything that comes in that ship and what ever interfaces it has were ever they have them. If your planning to change any of the interfaces in the ship your using a mature hull design very different. I would say take a look at the mature design of apache and chinook we took and effective changed there interface.
T45 was specifically designed to be quieter than T42 which were mechanically similar to the T22. I can’t recall if the T42 had masking tech’. T22 was noiser than Leander.
Electric ships are quieter. No shafts. No need for variable pitch prop’s.
Further to my comment about draft if you go to your charts you will see that the six feet saved between something the size of T45 and say a T21 hardly makes any difference. A ship that is twice the displacement doesn’t have twice the beam or length!!! Which means there isn’t a great increase in deck space for weapons etc. But the increase in volume means bigger bunkers and stores and so less reliance on auxiliaries.
We should have given the French the £145m for the rights to FREMM. It is where T26 will eventually end up.
x
Was not one if the issued raised in the recent Desi briefing that the electric propulsion was too noisy for asw operations hence why it wasn’t being selected for type 26.
The type 26 “capability decision point” is (was?) scheduled for this October. So we might soon begin to see a few details of the ingredients for this particular recipe.
I’m particularly curious as to what form the general purpose frigate will take. Is that t26 without..? Or will it come with capabilities of it’s own. Perhaps a nod towards air defence to mitigate against the small number of t45, as with France’s AAW FREMM since cutting back the Horizons.
@ Mark
Yes. And though I concede t I am only an armchair admiral I did think it was utter bollocks. Are the diesels in T23 noisy? Is there any direct rigid connection between prime mover and the prop? No. Do electric ships have variable pitch propellers that have a large boss that increases the acoustic signature? No. Are the signatures of small primer movers scattered though out a hull easier to manage? Yes.
It should also be remembered that SSKs are the quietest things afloat. And what type of engines and drive do they use?
X @ 1.17
Electric propulsion -
I fear that we have a case where one design of one technology set when installed in a RN vessel is too noisy for ASW not that the whole suite / range of the technology is too noisy.
Hope they do better with the CVF.
As for the T26, the prime movers have to med speed diesel.
The last thing we need is a make work scheme for RR GTs.
The powertrain could full electric or hybrid, the main thing is no GTs.
McZ @ 10.42
On network centric, distributed computing AAW architectures. I am in IT, I get where you coming from. I was using Link 11 (via the archaic CAAIS as part of GWS 25)at the grand age of 17, so non of this is new. However datalinks and distributed processing are not the only part of the picture, as I think you know. The attributes of the sensor are equally important, be it frequency range, radiated power, antenna type etc. You can argue all day about dwell times and whether the SAMSON approach (back to back fast spinning antennas) is better for some things than fixed phased arrays etc. However even if the missile / air threat has not made a quantum leap by 2035 (hypersonic as opposed to supersonic threats ???) simply spreading a net of ARTISAN radars (with improved signal processing) does not equate to providing the same features / functionality of SAMSON. Also your base ship size is smaller, so you cant get the antenna as high, and thus your radar horizon against sea skimmmers has just closed in.
I am not sure what line of site Lasers has to do with this, sure they are secure, high bandwidth comms channel for datalinking, but “line of site” pretty much screws their utility for widely spreading your sensor net (Nelsons frigates had to be able to see each others flags, and visual comms is still used today but not for coordinating AAW)
So I think your vessel will never replace the area AAW specialist ship. Also T45 has a Chinook sized flight deck, a hanger for an EH101 or 2 Lynx, and good standard accomodation for 40 + additional marines (or whoever) – so while the requirement may change over time, as it stands your Sigma’s can’t do this element either.
I think if the UK wants to play with the big boys still in 2040, the RN still needs a balanced high / med / low mix of significant surface vessels. Probably in the ratio of 1:2:3 in terms of vessel numbers respectively, or £500mn/£250mn/£60mn in today’s money for cost per vessel.
Looking at duties per level:
* high: high value escort and area defence – AAW / BMD
* med: med threat patrol, escort and offensive attack – ASW / AsuW (T45 batch 2 or T26)
* low: EEZ patrol, humanitarian aid, surveillance and survey – (Clyde mk II, SIMSS)
One hull type could in my view meet two of the roles but not three. Trying to building a hull for the high end requirement would just increase the base cost of the low end.
Basing the budget on 7.5bn (which I think will be higher in reality) would give a ratio of 6:12:18 which spookily enough is quite close to what we have now and not far from 40 T27s.
To maximise economies of scale though, the high and medium vessels should share the same hull. Build one high/medium and one low spec vessel every 20 months and we are sorted.
@repulse
“if the UK wants to play with the big boys still in 2040″
SSNs, SSBNs, amphibs and CVF will put us to the big boys. Escorts are not startegic assets but workhorses.
“Basing the budget on 7.5bn (which I think will be higher in reality) would give a ratio of 6:12:18 which spookily enough is quite close to what we have now and not far from 40 T27s.”
Too bad, the T45 costs 1b apiece, T26 will cost not much below 400m, MIW replacement will also cost money. Spookily, this makes 11b minimum, which is exactly my argument.
BMD is not on the table, and honestly I fear the day HMG will get this capability on a warship, as the vessel will surely be moored in the Thames Estuary to protect the lads at Canary Wharf.
@FBOT
“T27 – What is the main driver?”
Capability divided by cost, aka value-for-money.
“You also have the Absalon data point to add to the cost picture. £165mill each in 2005 with a very good patrol spec warload and a big boxy, capable hull.”
The problem I have with Absalon is the fact, that the RN will prove incapable of stopping the oversophistication-hordes and will make it a 300m+ wonder.
“What issues do you have with the SIMSS concept or it’s second cousin the Colonial Sloop?”
You like to repeat discussions on and on, don’t you? OK, I sum it up, because just to be kind:
- Not survivable
- Easy to detect, as it’s an JHSV without J and S.
- No LO features apart from ‘civilian stealth’
- Symbolic value out of proportion to actual utility
- Does green water tasks, but has a nearly 20ft+ draught
- Does blue water tasks, but has not the speed to keep pace with blue water commercial vessels
- No sensors to speak of
- Substandard electrical generation
- Hull utterly unsuited to military tasks
- No capability to put a medium gun on the bow
- Ridiculous firing angles for small guns
- Cargo, where no cargo is required
- Has a well-deck, but no deck-space
- Topheavy
- Damage control?
- Compartments?
- Wiring?
- depends a hundred percent on mission fit; too bad you have to look into the future to guess what kit you actually need
- containerized mission fit can be fitted on every other vessel inclucing chartered civilian vessels too
- designed to be prepositioned, while the frenchies make very bad results out of this principle
- it’s not a sloop, because a sloop was always a small warship armed to the teeth.
And btw, we have no ‘colonies’ left.
- desperately seeking a mission most of the time (if we needed more boats, we would have them already)
, summed up by TD with ‘always finds utility’
- requires new operational concepts, which are untested
The proponents including TD are selling this vessel as a ‘blank sheet’, so nobody can have something against it and find a possible use. The wetdreamers see tons of ‘modules’ ie containers put on the back, to make it a secondary warship. Any criticism is answered with ‘can be fixed’. And me, I’m still I’m waiting for answers regarding some very basic questions about the desaster relief role.
The only advantage I can see is range the well deck, since you know this as well, you are consequently banging on this single argument.
As I said, we could build SIMSS out of the MARS-budget or better from other government agencies budgets. It is very much the same principle as the german Berlin-class. But still I believe, some Endurance-class LSDs would be better.
“Fit a warload of £60mill + on them and they will go toe to toe with a patrol spec T23.”
Again, strong words for a non existing vessel, lacking any evidence.
@x
”
“This is about sea power not harbour power.
How do we make partnerships with foreign navies? Hasn’t this something to do with RN and foreign matelots subsidizing local pubs?
@Mark
“I would say take a look at the mature design of apache and chinook we took and effective changed there interface.”
The interface the Apache has in my context is called ‘pylon’. No need to reconfigure. As I wrote, a infant can ‘arm’ this helicopter using the mission software.
mcz
not quite what i was getting at. In apache we changed the engine and the chinook the cockpit and they cost a fortune. You proposing to take a sigma vessel and change its power plant to electric and it radar and cms system. You are in essence just keeping its hull form and that’s the cheap bit.
@Jed
SAMPSON is a monster and has it’s advantages. No argument about that.
“However even if the missile / air threat has not made a quantum leap by 2035 (hypersonic as opposed to supersonic threats ???)”
We need a new concept anyway. A hypersonic missile will close-in in 3-4 minutes.
Tracking and illumination are the relative easy part, computing firing solutions and midcourse guidance is a tougher nut to crack, especially for BMD. Reaction times will also be a problem. For this, we need massive computing power. Look at the DDG-1000 and it’s electrical demands, and you get the idea. We cannot afford to build 3b-combatants. But we have a dozen or so frigates sitting on their arse on station. So let’s link-em-up and use the accumulated procession power, that’s the idea.
Btw, the USN is already doing sensor networking. The E-2D can be linked into Aegis. I bet, P-8 and BAMS at some point will be too.
“Also your base ship size is smaller, so you cant get the antenna as high, and thus your radar horizon against sea skimmmers has just closed in.”
Slightly off-topic, tech-p**n, not to be taken serious:
Last year, I played with a nasty solution. Just as a VDS is a towed volume search array for ASW, a VHT (Variable Height Radar) could be a towed volume search array for AAW. Think of a cable with a thousand AESA-transceivers, put to air by a small propelled probe. Operating height was 200m. Then my wife waked me up…
@Mark
“You proposing to take a sigma vessel and change its power plant to electric and it radar and cms system. You are in essence just keeping its hull form and that’s the cheap bit.”
Frankly, mods will be made to every OTS-solution we may seek, including Absalon, FREMM, younameit.
The article is maybe somewhat misleading regarding e-propulsion. It was required in the first baseline-concept, but when you read the SIGMA-part, you won’t find it. It’s not a must-have. Apart from this, there are already auxiliary e-machines in place.
Replacing SMART-S and maybe the CMS with ARTISAN makes sense, when adding crew training costs up.
Money-wise, I have calced all changes with a 50% margin-of-error.
Maybe it’s just unrealistic to assume that we can fill all these tasks without spending a bit of cash? Maybe we just have to accept that to build a frigate for ASW and General Purpose patrolling, we’re simply going to have to spend a few pounds. And with the budget the way it is, that’s just going to mean reduced numbers, and there’s no two ways about it.
The question, Chris.B, is what will the budget look like in ten years time? The elephant in the room is the unresolved funding for replacing Trident. It’s the perfect scheme to screw up today’s plans for the t26 programme.