Maybe one day the never ending saga that is CVF will come to a satisfactory end and we can all get on with arguing about which version of the latest plasma rifle we should adopt.
Until that point though, there is a constant stream of news, good or bad, depending on your viewpoint of degree of weary slope shouldered cynicism.
The latest group of individuals to throw another log on the fire is the National Audit Office, the taxpayer’s financial watchdog. The NAO does have teeth but in general, are roundly ignored by successive governments who think they either know better or alternatively, see their output as a means to bash the last lot with.
In its latest report, snappily titled Carrier Strike, it brings the financial and risk decision making process up to date on this unhappiest of projects.
It doesn’t tell us much that we either didn’t already know or could have made reasoned guesses about but there are some interesting snippets.
The first thing is the title; it’s nothing to do with defending the fleet but expeditionary strike. Beyond the semantics this is telling but what the report does not do is match the capability offered by CVF/JCA based carrier strike with defence planning assumptions.
Contents
The Cost of Cancellation
David Cameron, Liam Fox and the government maintained that it would be more expensive to cancel than proceed and that cancellation was not an option. The report comprehensively rubbished this claim which to my mind puts under severe doubts anything that comes forth from those very same people.
I have always maintained that cancelling CVF was always an option, even if we wanted to maintain shipbuilding skills. What the alliance wants is to build ships, not a specific ship, in other words it doesn’t really care whether it is building Type 45’s or CVF’s, work being work.
Timing might have been an issue but if we treat the shipbuilding industry as a strategic asset, which we do, why should the nation not fund this gap, we could have funded a comprehensive training and reorganisation programme that could have seen the industry emerge as a genuine global specialist shipbuilding industry.
There were many options but much easier to try and blame those big boys over at BAE, political cowardice of the worst kind.
The report states cancelling one would save £200m and both £1.2 billion, somewhat at odds with the comments from the Government. These savings might be offset by the costs mentioned in the letter from BAE but they would still be substantial
i.e. we could have saved money by cancelling
The Cost of Uncertainty
Yet another factor that has concerned me about the costs of the switch is the fact that the MoD made the decision on the basis of not having the first clue how much it would cost.
We can argue the details but the fact remains, the MoD made the switch based on a guess.
For the NAO, this risk is the most serious of all the issues, and let’s face it, the MoD does not have a good track record in predicting future costs, in fact, in this regard, you wouldn’t trust the MoD to hit water if it fell out of a boat.
It notes quite correctly that the MoD will be in a poor negotiating position when it comes to buying electromagnetic catapults, or in other words, we will be bent over a barrel and given the good news by a supplier who knows you have no choice.
The report notes it will take 2 years for the MoD to have a full understanding on the implications in cost, manning and operational issues of the switch.
2 years in which pennies will be dropping every day, confirming what an unmitigated disaster the decision will turn into.
Recent developments in autonomous carrier landings have been seized upon by those who simultaneously deny there is a training overhead, and thus a cost overhead, in maintaining carrier operations and at the same time point to technology developments that will negate those costs, just in case they actually exist.
We have to accept that CATOBAR operations impose a significant training penalty, it is not a skill one can pick up in a few days and must be constantly practiced to remain safe. With STOVL, the exact is true, land based pilots can quickly transition to all weather carrier operations with relatively little training, this being proven many many times over the years. Whilst the latest synthetic training systems may reduce this burden somewhat it is not likely for some time that it will be eliminated.
Likewise, the developments in autonomous landing systems, the recent US trials were an outstanding success and show the way for autonomous operation of UAV’s aboard a carrier. These systems may well be used to support carrier landings for less experienced aircrew, thus reducing or even eliminating the training penalty mentioned above, but, and this is a big but. There is a world of difference between using a system on an unmanned platform and a manned platform, the same manned platform where the pilot will be completely reliant on the system. It would take a significant degree of safety intensive integration, allied to lots of certification and equipment redundancy both on the aircraft and carrier that will allow someone, it is always a person, to sign off on the safety case.
Who knows what the future holds with reliable and safe autonomous landings aboard a pitching aircraft deck, but I think we should temper natural enthusiasm to leap upon this as the magic bullet that kills off the training penalty of CATOBAR with a degree of scepticism about the reality of taking a pilot and asking him to entrust his life to a system such as this.
The switch to CATOBAR or F35C is still a controversial decision.
The reason why the F35B was the preferred option for a decade or more was ALWAYS about more than just the aircraft itself. If the only factor was the aircraft itself then the B is possibly the least best solution, it costs more, has less performance in all areas, is more complex and difficult to maintain.
The MoD always knew this to be the case
So why would anyone want STOVL?
Quite simply, because it offered the most flexible option for the lowest cost, across the whole of the defence sphere, not just on an aircraft by aircraft basis.
We must remember that the UK has the most experience in operating STOVL aircraft aboard ships and drawing on this deep well of knowledge the costs were well known and articulated, with uncertainty risks at an absolute minimum.
STOVL allowed the CVF air wing to be surged with land based pilots thus reducing carrier operations currency costs, eliminated the cost of catapults and arrestor gear with their attendant capital and significant through life costs, provided for an increase in sortie rates, allowed operations to continue in extreme weather (amply demonstrated in 1982)and significantly improve operating location flexibility.
With CATOBAR aircraft the only place they can operate from at sea is another CATOBAR compliant carrier. This means alternate at sea landing locations have to come from elsewhere, it was always going to be unlikely that we would operate a pair of CVF’s together. If a returning F35C is low on fuel its options are limited should CVF be unavailable due to enemy action, bad weather or malfunctioning arrestor gear. An F35B could feasibly land on a T45, RFA vessel or one of the amphibs, this would of course be in extremis but at least the pilot and very expensive aircraft could be recovered.
The original operating concept for JCA called for it to operate from CVF and a soon as possible, transition to austere land bases was also enabled by STOVL, again, this option is now unavailable for the preferred JCA design. We have demonstrated the value of this flexibility a number of times, in 1982 Harriers used an austere forward operating base at Port San Carlos and in Afghanistan, when the runway at Kandahar was restricted by an aircraft fire, Harriers were the only land based coalition aircraft able to operate and provide reactive close air support until the runway was cleared and repaired. It is fair to say that F35B requires a greater level of ground based facilities than Harrier but these are not insurmountable problems.
CATOBAR operations also means that to protect the aircraft and pilot against a fuel intensive missed landing (bolters) there is a means to provide fuel to them. STOVL aircraft do not suffer from this problem and therefore a buddy buddy refuelling system was never specified. This has now changed and the MoD is actively looking at how this can be provided, the simple answer is of course to buy the system that will be developed by the US Navy, probably from Chobam but was this means is yet more capital and through life cost and out there in the real world, when operating aircraft we will have to dedicate two or three airframes aboard CVF as on deck recovery alert aircraft, this is fine when you have a CVN full to the gunnels with aircraft but CVF is no CVN and out of the likely air wing of 12 JCA we will have to dedicate a significant proportion of them to this task. His will reduce sortie rate so for the same given effect we will have to have more aircraft. Given that it is unlikely that we will routinely operate in this manner, the reality is F35C degrades capability in some areas.
So whilst the range, maintenance cost, payload and other performance improvements of F35C are to be welcomed, there is a price to pay.
Sortie rates have been reduced, the report notes that CVF will generate about 20 sorties per day from 12 aircraft and this is before the implications are fully known, see above about buddy buddy refuelling.
CVF is not a fast ship, but with F35B this didn’t really matter, with F35C and CATOBAR, speed is a vital aspect. The risks of being unable to launch the F35C because of being unable to achieve a high enough speed, would be a tad embarrassing.
It was rumoured that the decision to move to F35C was a surprise to those working on the project, who knows if this was true but given these issues it is credible.
The current forecast cost of £6.24 billion for 1 fully fitted and functional carrier, the other being stunted by its lack of catapults. We might of course use the second as some hugely expensive LPH, replacing HMS Ocean but this would be both operationally inadequate and hugely expensive.
This 1 carrier will be available for operations for 150 to 200 days.
Moving to F35C allowed the previously cancelled Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability requirement to be covered, thus pulling a billion pound of costs but I am rather sceptical of this and it smacks of typical voodoo MoD economics. Could this requirement have been met with Typhoon or even the F35B, maybe not as well as the F35C.
The F35B is the most troubled of the trio and it is fair to say that in balancing risks it might have seemed the sensible thing to do but I cannot conceive of a realistic scenario in which F35B is cancelled. That said, the F35B has been doing rather well of late.
A Secondary Capability
In all the debates we have had on the subject I have consistently said that carriers are useful but in the context of a declining defence vote and competing priorities they are not essential, at least not as envisaged by CVF/JCA.
Whilst the originators of Project CVF were quite accepting of the need to sacrifice capabilities to keep the carrier project alive more recent senior officers at the MoD have taken a different line, reality has bitten and it seems that they wanted to cancel CVF in order to protect the amphibs and surface fleet.
The report is crystal clear in this, if the government had allowed the MoD to cancel project CVF, they would have done so.
Maybe I have been rather harsh on the current RN leadership!
Being Opaque
Perhaps the biggest issue is that the NAO were denied access to crucial information, this very worrying because the NAO are one of the few truly independent means of oversight.
The Defence Secretary and MoD threw their dummies out of the pram because the NAO chose to publish without agreeing the final text with the MoD, perhaps they should have been cooperative with the NAO, you reap what you sow
So I think I can be Mr Smug Bastard, I do believe I have stated several times that cancelling was always an option and that the switch has repercussions yet to be fully realised J
Whatever, CVF is a salutary lesson in incompetence, political shenanigans and financial short termism that will be studied in business schools for decades to come.
Interoperability and the Real Reasons for the Switch
Another reason given for the switch was to improve interoperability with our allies.
This is curious because STOVL aircraft can operate from any flat top, Italian, Spanish, US or French for example (plus the non carriers with sufficient space in extremis) but the reverse is not true. The switch to CATOBAR actually significantly reduces our ability to utilise allied shipping. Our most likely operating partner, the USMC (officially no longer our friend) will also be denied because they have quite rightly seen the operational benefits of STOVL.
Interoperability is a two way street though and it is here that the true reason for the switch reveals itself.
It has nothing to do with the USN for a couple of reasons, first, they have more than enough carrier resources thank you very much and second, with a gradual move in strategic focus west, the US will increasingly become less involved with the UK.
France and the EU is entirely a different matter.
There are two reasons for the switch.
The first is the desire to save even more money than the F35B, joint force combination could deliver.
The second, and related but more pressing reason is the obvious desire to increase asset sharing with the French, leading to dependence and reinforce a political Europe wide defence posture built around the UK and France.
By switching to CATOBAR we can share training with the French but we can also share ships, not in a physical sense but in a virtual sense.
The Queen Elizabeth will be sold to France and Prince of Wales will be receive the modification. QE will go to France for conversion and together they will form a UK/French EU carrier force that will be the lynchpin of an EU Navy.
Whether we eventually go for F35 or have some Rafale’s in lieu of payment for CVF Number 1 is an interesting point.
Given that the terms of the contract for F35 expressly decouple industrial participation from amounts ordered it is quite feasible the UK could receive a sizeable return on its £2bn investment in the JSF programme and not buy a single one.
The report notes some uncertainty about JCA, Rafale and interoperability, is this pushing towards the Rafale perhaps?
A CVF/Rafale swapperoo is truly the lowest cost option and whilst we would sorely miss the capabilities of the F35 those that think this is an outrageous proposition clearly is no student of history!
It’s only a guess but my prediction, in best Mystic Meg style, is that the UK and France will each operate a single aircraft carrier of CVF design, training and aircraft will be pooled, maintenance likewise.
A single fleet of Rafale will be the order of the day.
On operations if two are available, we will operate separately and if not, we will cover for each other, i.e. a loss of sovereignty during refit periods, this being judged to be a risk worth taking.
The writing is on the wall so all talk of costs, extra range and bigger bomb bays is just piffle designed to distract from the true intent.
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1012/carrier_strike.aspx
Link is here for those who want to read it.
@TD, I think you are spot on that this is more about the interoperability with France and the ‘withdrawl’ of US focus. With the US looking West, it will be Europe who will be focused on ‘policing’ Africa and the key choke points between here and our important oil supplies in the middle East. To be taken seriously a joint carrier capability is a must.
If the US looking is West, I can’t help but think that Russia will be increasingly looking East and North, meaning that there is no credible threat to Europe for the next 50 years… With UK and France dependencies scattered throughout the globe, the only way of protecting them effectively is to operate closely together.
Where I disagree with your prediction is that the UK and France will only end up with 2 carriers. I think the QE will initially be a glorified Helicopter carrier operating Apaches and UAVs. PoW will be CATOBAR from the get go, and the QE will be modified to CATOBAR in the mid 2020s. France will replace the CdG with a new home built ‘QE’. All three will eventually operate cross nation airwings, though the UK will only have a small number of JSFs (60-70 max).
Alongside this, the UK will not replace Ocean and join a French / UK / Netherlands ARG. France will bring the mistral helicopter carriers to the table.
To be honest its not a bad future… Let’s make it public and get on with it!
@TD
I think that it is a toss up between your scenario and Repulse’s. Personally I think that the Rafale is a deal breaker for the RAF as while it might be slightly better than the Typhoon at low and medium levels tooled up with bombs it still has a similar RCS and its defence aids/ECM are broadly the same as well (and likely a less powerful AESA radar), it does not offer enough for them to fund 60% of them, and I cannot see the FAA being able afford to crew and maintain more than two squadrons.
I think we might end up still buying the F-35C’s – unless the rumours are true that QE will simply be to slow to allow a fully laden F-35C to take off (I have heard that CdG cannot launch a full laden F-35C, but while it has the same top speed it does seem to have a shorter deck, in any case F-35C is designed for a carrier with a longer deck than QE and a lot more speed, which it can sustain unlike QE). Maybe the swap will be Mistral’s for QE?
You want to keep shipyards as strategic asset for naval power?
Reform MoD’s procurement and fire at least a hundred responsible losers, civilians and in uniform. Turn the procurement around and procure a quality ship at a good price.
Your shipyard(s) might end up being capable of exporting warships in between MoD orders.
If not, let them go into bankruptcy, buy the remains and operate them as naval shipyard, as was common in many countries before WW2. Major navies used to have their own shipyard in order to be able to understand pricing and avoid getting ripped off by private shipyards.
That’s missing now, and as a result the ripping off of taxpayers by terribly inefficient and in some cases utterly incompetent shipyards has become epidemic and obvious.
@TD ‘The report is crystal clear in this, if the government had allowed the MoD to cancel project CVF, they would have done so.
Maybe I have been rather harsh on the current RN leadership!’
Your praise might be a bit misplaced.
I don’t believe for a minute that the navy top brass wanted to cancel CVF. I’d be amazed if the military view was unanimous. Of course, the Army, RAF and CDS would all be against it to protect their own little kingdoms.
Andy, I don’t think anyone of any service actually wanted to cancel CVF but looking at utility v cost v implications for other systems then the sensible thing would have been to get rid
The RN has been believing in the mantra of, we can always add surface vessels later for decades, never quite seems to pan out though and maybe they finally came to the realisation that CVF was and is unbalancing the RN to the point of irrelevance
I think we should give up on the F35c, go for the rafale or Super Hornet (RN only)both chaper. This means that we could get our air capability back quicker, by traing with the USN or French navy. Either pane does most of what a F35c does although I admit there is a gap in capability. I am convinced UAVs will fill that gap in years to come. This would leave the RAF a Typhoon only fast jet force(quicker retirement of Tornado) and the RN Rafale or Super hornet, Also on procurement, why not buy some German ssks (4 instead of the last astute, with 2 being built in the Uk), and Danish or Dutch patrol frigates (6). To give BAE a jolt.
Hi Tubby,
I go for Repulse’s scenario (is this a majority vote?). Of course there will be two ARGs: Atlantic & Med, with a lot of “swing” resource between them (Cloggies stay in the Atlantic and Italians in the Med?)
Now this speed thing, and about launching fully laden F-35s
- of course, EMALS of QE size/ length have not been built yet
- the projections are that they will be 25% more capable than steam
- that’s the good news; the bad news is that CdG will not have EMALS
But going further, considering that USN happily operates mixed types (between, not within, squadrons) off their carriers, what is the practicality that will stop that (other than taking off CdG would not be with full load for the UK part of the air wing)from happening here?
- the 16 week FAA language courses must be near the final exam by now?
RE “the mantra of, we can always add surface vessels later for decades”
- evidenced by the fact that we only build a few of each type (as templates, thereby driving up the unit costs)
- on the other hand, there is capability to “ramp up” across all hull types and a full spectrum of weapon & control systems
This should be spelt out clearly, and then we could refocus our debate
- either on whether it is the right choice
- or what remaining decision latitude is there, to optimise effect (if not bang) for the buck
– or why not both
Hi ACC,
So basically we cannot decide which aircraft to buy until we have a EMALS system/deck of appropriate length as at moment all with have is simulation of what it will do?
I begin to wonder if SAAB know something we don’t – with regards to a their proposed Sea Gripen demonstrator, as I have a feeling that the French would never sell Rafale’s to us, because the first thing the RAF’s going to do is DACT with Rafale vrs Typhoon’s and if Typhoon’s win bang goes Dassault’s marketing campaign.
See no problem with either CdG or QE supporting more than one type of fast jet, or a wide variety of helo’s in the deck guard role. Hell I imagine we could manage if the French have embarked Rafale’s and Hawkeye’s on QE and we were operating F-35C (or Sea Gripen), a mix bag of Merlin’s and Wild Cat’s as deck guards, CSAR and MASC.
“why not buy some German ssks (4 instead of the last astute, with 2 being built in the Uk)”
Out of interest do we need SSK’s and how would we use them? The best use for them I can think of would be to cover the Vanguard’s in transit freeing up are more capable SSN’s for other roles. Unless of course we are going to build some sub pen’s on the Falkland’s and deploy a SSK permanently in the South Atlantic.
“The report is crystal clear in this, if the government had allowed the MoD to cancel project CVF, they would have done so.”
Why no link to the report?
Let me quote a little:
“In the face of what, in August 2010, was anticipated to be a significantly
reduced budgetary provision, the military view was that the carriers were judged to be of
secondary priority to other maritime capabilities. The military view, therefore, would have
been to cancel the carriers before eliminating amphibious capabilities or making significant
further reductions in destroyers or frigates.”
In August the MoD was working on the assumption of a cut in the region of 17%, a level which would prevent Britain from maintaining a force capable of serious sovereign and strategic power projection.
A fact made clear in Fox’s ‘leaked’ letter at the end of September:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/8031385/Defence-cuts-Liam-Foxs-leaked-letter-in-full.html
I have absolutely no problem with a navy conclusion that assets that permit sovereign and strategic power projection are a lesser priority if you have a budget incapable of supporting such ambitions.
That. Is. Common. Sense.
That isn’t what happened in the end.
In fact Defence got a very favourable settlement of 7.5% and the promise of real-term increases post 2015, because as the published SDSR made clear Britain still intends to use its Armed Forces as a tool for geopolitical leverage.
In short; it still has ambitions towards sovereign and strategic power projection.
Now, this could still all go down the can if the Forces do not receive those real-term increases post 2015, which would call into question the utility of carriers for a nation without the wherewithal to employ them properly.
That decision has not yet been made, and is awaiting the outcome of the three month treasury review happening right now, the result of which is suspected to be known in Sept.
As the service chiefs said last month, if those real-term increases don’t arrive then our politicians had better scale back their ambitions, drastically!
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/8d6c92e6-a348-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F8d6c92e6-a348-11e0-8d6d-00144feabdc0.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.reddit.com%2Fuser%2FJedibeeftrix%2F#axzz1Rbi2Rlti
I have always said that nothing is sacrosanct outside the barest provision for self defence; four brigades, four QRA squadrons, and twelve frigates, but the notion that carriers were an afterthought that escaped deletion because of contract-termination penalties is errant nonsense.
The second Defence escaped a 17% cut, and did so because politicians still wanted to play with their soldiers, the carriers became an integral part of the defence review.
It is that simple.
why not buy some German ssks (4 instead of the last astute, with 2 being built in the Uk)”
Several reasons:
1) Cheaper to build and operate
2) Quieter than an SSN
3) Because of (1) more hulls available, means more Submariners have sea time, skill base and throughput of crews can be kept up.
4) Better for Perishers course than SSN
5) Costal work
6) With independent air systems, they are good performers these days.
7) Same argument as patrol frigates/Corvettes instaed of a few high end frigates. They can do much of what an SSN can do for far less cost.
Hi Rec,
I get smaller crews, cheaper operating costs, but presumably the submarines are shorter ranged even with AIP, and slower so we are going to need additional logistics, plus there is cost of supporting an additional submarine type and the fact that we need to maintain the skills developed during Astute’s development. Saying all that I think if we are going to build SSK’s we should do a joint Anglo-French project assuming French wants to do more than just sell SSK’s to countries unable to afford to operate SSN’s.
Hi Jedi,
The report we are discussing said that SDSR statements and reconciling them with budgets would be finished (ehmm) in July
- has it slipped again as in your “the result of which is suspected to be known in Sept”?
Exactly my question, too “but presumably the submarines are shorter ranged even with AIP, and slower so we are going to need additional logistics”
- how do we deploy (and keep) them where they are needed?
Oh no, not another CVF thread. To what good should that lead?
The arguments pro and con are not being held valid by the cons and pros. So we get another disucssion about white elephants and crude cost perspectives.
“The Queen Elizabeth will be sold to France and Prince of Wales will be receive the modification. QE will go to France for conversion and together they will form a UK/French EU carrier force that will be the lynchpin of an EU Navy.”
Perfectly put to start another flame war…
“A CVF/Rafale swapperoo is truly the lowest cost option and whilst we would sorely miss the capabilities of the F35 those that think this is an outrageous proposition clearly is no student of history!”
Surely the french will bang on our amateur politicians until we help to salvage their dying, subsidied and nationalized defence industry.
And naturally we will pay for integration of US weapons in the Rafale to make it even sweeter for exports, this way scrapping our own Typhoons prospects.
This way, we will pay the low-two-digit million savings per aircraft with high integration cost and lost export orders.
We are expected to get the carrier aircraft not before 2018, and the CATOBAR-carrier not before 2020. Until then, the USN will have operated Lightning-Charlie for at least five years.
I’m pretty sure, the F-35s unit price will be very comfortable compared to the Rafale by 2018.
“It’s only a guess but my prediction, in best Mystic Meg style, is that the UK and France will each operate a single aircraft carrier of CVF design, training and aircraft will be pooled, maintenance likewise.”
How will France fund the carrier? Will we donate them because we are such good friends? Would fit into the picture: we donate a carrier, while the french sell Rafale in a multi-billion contract to us.
My guess is: we will ultimately get PoW and then sell QE to Brazil, because Foch is already on the verge of it’s possible life. After this, we will build a class of small UAV+helo-carriers based on the UXV-concept.
If the UK is thinking of both creating an EU carrier force and maintaining sovereign force projection, surely this would be a complete contradiction of policy. Whatever your view of the EU it has it’s own strategic world view and it’s own military agenda, separate to that of the UK. Great if your a Europhile who doesn’t have an issue deferring foreign policy to Europe, but Europe isn’t paying for the carrier. It’s like California building a Nimitz then the federal government using it off the coast of Africa. Surely it’s one or the other? If you want a carrier to play with off Iraq or in the South Atlantic you don’t let the other kids play with it. Or if you want several EU CTF’s you cancel CVF and invest the money into an EU design, paid for by EU money.
Unless the Tories have changed more than we thought over the past 20 years, they’ve always been a US leaning party, which leads me to think they’ll continue with F35′s. This leads me onto another foreign policy question. US politicians determine export numbers, and customers, of sensitive military tech. Rightly so, but if the UK was to add say F18′s to it’s US built inventory furthering it’s US clienthood, would this not oblige it to further participate in future US interventions? And just as importantly NOT participate in required UK only interventions, which given implicit US support for Argentina at the UN could have big ramifications, at which point what would be the point of having an expensively assembled expeditionary navy at all?
I have my doubts about the deployability or divert-ability of the F-35B. I remember reading last year about it needing an extensive landing pad of specially formulated concrete as standard airfield surfaces of concrete or tarmac would shatter or melt in the ferocity of its exhaust. And worryingly, other areas I didn’t think would be affected such as holding points and taxiways were also listed as being vulnerable to damage from its exhaust.
And as for diverting at sea, would the decks of other vessels have to be modified or redesigned in order to withstand a landing or take-off from the F-35B?
The Rafale has always been my preferred option for the CVF, and it would force the RAF to properly fund the developement of the Typhoons full capability. WE would only have to purchase a maximum of two squadrons to tie in the the two the french operate. I think it would be a rare case when both CVFs were at sea at anyone time so a pool of four squadrons plus joint training unit would be more than adequate. When you add a joint E-2D unit you actually end up with a far more potent platform than the current plan of 1 CVF with 12 F-35C deployed. Also if the Uk’s and France’s amphibs are pooled in a similar manner we would not need to replace ocean and in fact would have a very capable amphibious force.
Naval operation are one area the EU should pool its assets given the reductions that are happening across the board, but any standing joint force must be composed of member nations who accept the caveat that these formations are going to be used in a war fighting role and nit just humanitarian roles. With the exception of the Falklands, most current UK maritime commitments have duplicate missions in other countries so again this should work.
Given that everything from now intil at least 2025 is going to be about saving money I hope this MoD moves in this direction. This should also have a bearing on how the T-26 programme evolves and how compatible we wish to be with our EU partners rather then the USN. Things like fitting Sylver cells to the T-26 even if they are loaded with CAAM, which infact might become of interest to other EU navies as an alternative evolved Sea Sparrow, with it and Aster 15 and 30 becoming the EU standard. Ok Standard is in use with many EU nations but Aster/CAAM would still be an option for others.
@ ACC – “The report we are discussing said that SDSR statements and reconciling them with budgets would be finished (ehmm) in July”
Yes, the report is due to be concluded round about now, but i’d read somewhere else that we may not know the reaction to the report until september.
The report should say how much the real-term increase needs to be to realise the SDSR and whether the Treasury is able/willing to meet the requirement, but that does not mean that our politicians are going to agree to implement the recommendations of the report.
Hence september.
Thanks Jedi “should say
- how much the real-term increase needs to be to realise the SDSR”
- if reserve forces will account for 30% of/ 30% on top of the regular land forces
- and of course, whether it will ever be implemented will be contingent on the next general election
There are several corrections to make to this article, i fear:
RE: F35B diverting everywhere.
Condition 1: dropping bombs into the sea. Vertical Bring Back weight issues have NEVER been solved. The F35B is set to need at least 270 meters long runway to take off (a bit less with skyjump) and is going to have to do Shipborne Vertical Rolling Landings.
No way you can do it on Albion, and no way on a Type 45. So either you are light, empty and take a risk, or you crash, exactly as with F35C.
Condition 2: you are going to hole the deck of your ship landing vertically on it with the F35B, so you do it once and then have to repair the ship. On CVF, before the whole deck was wisely specifically strenghtened, there were going to be 2/3 special Landing Pads built to handle the terrible temperatures and thrust. The F135 and F136 are quite monstrous engines. Remember the Spey engines of the 892 NAS Phantoms nearly melting Ark Royal’s jet blast deflectors at each launch, even as they were sprayed with water…?
It is worse with the F35.
Indeed, CdG is NOT F35C compatible either. At full landing weight and power, i heard that the F35 can’t land on her.
And forget about taking off vertically. At all. Or even landing vertically on an unpaved surface, as the aircraft becomes riddled with holes with all the pebbles and rubble literally shot upwards into the fuselage by the engine’s thrust.
“We might of course use the second as some hugely expensive LPH, replacing HMS Ocean but this would be both operationally inadequate and hugely expensive.”
Hugely expensive, perhaps, but operationally inadequate, really, no way. NO WAY.
I might also remember everyone that the first RN Commando Carriers such as HMS Albion were far from “operationally ineffective”, and all but delivered the first helicopter-assault of Marines in history, during the Suez crisis. And effectively shaped a role, tactics and ship type that still exists 50 years later.
Would i like a well deck? Yes.
Ro-Ro ramps? Nice too, and landing crafts even (these could still make their way on board at some point).
But operationally ineffective, is just, pardon me, bull.
“STOVL aircraft do not suffer from this problem and therefore a buddy buddy refuelling system was never specified.”
Maybe not for safety reasons, but the range issues and strategical issues meant that at one point the RN all but asked LM if some weapon-bay fuel tank could be developed, to convert some F35B into embarked tankers.
“out of the likely air wing of 12 JCA”
IF the aircrafts are your problem with the ship, force the RAF to embark more often, or give the planes to the Navy, and the problem is solved. Stop blaming the ship on problems it has not.
“Moving to F35C allowed the previously cancelled Deep and Persistent Offensive Capability requirement to be covered, thus pulling a billion pound of costs but I am rather sceptical of this and it smacks of typical voodoo MoD economics. Could this requirement have been met with Typhoon or even the F35B, maybe not as well as the F35C.”
You accurately avoid mentioning the fact that ever since the FOAS programme was cancelled in 2005, the RAF has been whining to get a Deep Strike Tornado replacement in the form of the F35C.
A Lockheed Martin spokeperson confirmed that the 138 figure (never confirmed officially by the MOD) came out of a revised MOD plan that would have seen 80 F35B acquired for the carriers/Joint Force Harrier replacement in 4 squadrons and the rest F35C for the Deep and Persistent etcetera, the name for the way found by the RAF to justify a dedicate shiny, pointy Tornado replacement. Effectively, the resurrection of FOAS, already shut down once before.
Ever since it became clear that JCA was the one and only, efforts of the RAF to switch to the C variant have been decisive.
Say things as they are.
“Sortie rates have been reduced, the report notes that CVF will generate about 20 sorties per day from 12 aircraft and this is before the implications are fully known”
As i have already noted, 20 sorties from 12 planes means that most planes do two sorties each. Why the other two couldn’t do it too?
F35C is planned to be able to generate 3 sorties per day in Surge and 2 sustained, as the F35B would have. At most, we can note that for the F35B it is suggested that even more sorties could be feasible, but then again, they might be with the F35C too.
The NAO might have calculated the 20 sorties by already factoring off two of the planes for Air Refueling duty or whatever.
It does not make sense to do 2 sorties with 10 planes and have 2 idle, unless you want to rotate planes at 2 at a time to extend the duration of the mission by ensuring you have “rested” airframes for a longer period, but i don’t exactly see the point. That figure is plain weird.
And anyway, a sustained sortie generation rate for 12 F35B (a squadron) in an embarked 3 squadrons airwing was to be 24. A reduction of 4 sorties is hardly something i’d bash my head in the wall for, particularly considering the longer reach and better load performances balancing it out.
I also see points made about EMALS length, here and elsewhere. Length is the same for US and UK EMALS, as is the same aicraft that needs launching: the difference is that a US set has four launch rails/catapults, the UK one has only 2.
RE: real reason for the switch and Rafale love story
It is wild speculation on your part. You might prove right, you might be wrong. At least, avoid presenting it as if it was a fact, and say “i think that”, otherwise it cannot feel other than partisan provocations and scaremongering in the best fashion of “oh, no, we are losing out to the french!”
“Things like fitting Sylver cells to the T-26 even if they are loaded with CAAM”
While you can fit CAMM into Sylver, you do not need Sylver to fire CAMM. While waste money for it???? If Type 26 gets a VLS, it must be a strike-lenght MK41 to get Tomahawk in it, full stop. Otherwise it is plain waste.
Something on the 12 JSF air wing.
Is this just speculation, rumour or confirmed? Again what would be the point in designing and building something for 36 airframes, as was stated, then equipping it with 12? Especially as the CVF concept was a direct response to the RN not being able to provide air superiority over the Falklands with Invincible class and small numbers of Harrier.
And what of the Americans? Wouldn’t they have been expecting an order of 72+ F35b’s for the RN? Are they now being told to expect the RN to order one squadron of F35c’s?
“Is this just speculation, rumour or confirmed? Again what would be the point in designing and building something for 36 airframes, as was stated, then equipping it with 12?”
It would help being very, very clear: NEVER, has the RN or UK had ambitions to field, two CVFs operative at the same time, each with embarked airwing.
This is a ridiculous myth.
Again, the peacetime standard airwing was kind of planned at 12 even at the time of the “150 F35 order”, with 24 to 30 being embarked every now and then for exercise.
36 F35 was, as still is now, the maximum figure, planned to be embarked for war operations.
Never it was planned to sail a CVF with full airwing on board constantly and in peacetime.
Now the “target” for plane numbers is for 40 by 2020, and “up to 100″ total fleet at the end of acquisition, with a likely order total believed to stand at 80.
80 means 4 Squadrons. One routinely embarked, the others ashore for most of the time.
This of course, like it or not, is also and especially due to the planes being RAF owned.
A peacetime mission for the carrier will likely involve 1 squadron, 2 max, or 1 + some elements, plus Merlin helicopters and other platforms. The airwing composition will be quite variable, and it was always expected to be.
People makes too much noise about the 12 planes routine figure. It was always planned this way. The important thing remains the availability of further squadrons to embark when needed. It was always unrealistic to dream about CVF always sailing with 36 planes on board.
And never was it planned to have both carriers loaded with planes at the same time.
2 hulls are needed to ensure one carrier is always around, not to operate two distinct carrier groups.
The actual maximum F35′s on board was originally planned as 40 I believe, which lead me to the conclusion of 36 being a more standard number.
So with 12 being the peacetime norm is this number itself just lip service unless they will just be training pilots for carrier ops, and for diplomatic functions abroad?
“The actual maximum F35′s on board was originally planned as 40 I believe, which lead me to the conclusion of 36 being a more standard number.”
There were very early ambitions to operate 40 or even 50 AIRCRAFTS (inclusive of MASC and Merlins) in the first few years of planning, but this did not last long.
A good, all-round wartime airgroup for CVF is indicated at 30 F35, 4 MASC and 6 Merlin HM2. Disembarking the Merlins, you can embark 36 F35s for high intensity strike operations.
Such an high intensity, indeed, that it won’t happen too often: 36 F35s would literally generate sorties with a much more ferocious rhythm than it happened during the Gulf War participation, so that is for a quite big operation only, simply put.
30 F35C, 6 Merlin and 4 MASC is kind of a fantastic airwing, anyway. Arguably the best ever fielded by the UK, and the most technologically advanced, in relation to its age. It will be a group of “world-best” platforms, after all. In particular in the (dream-like) case that MASC is fulfilled with an Hawkeye buy.
I know i will be bashed for suggesting this… but still, it is undeniably true that a CVF in the Med with 30 F35C (or even just 20 or 24) plus 4 Hawkeyes would beat the hell out of the current force employed for Ellamy, as good as it is.
The deck of CVF is the size of 49 tennis courts. I expect the decision to embark only a dozen F35 is to allow more onboard tennis.
I believe the original plan was to fly aircraft off the decks, and in a typical MoD fudge, the ships were to have been “fitted for but not with” tennis.
All this discussion will of course become academic when, due to a terrible miscalculation, the ships get stuck on the wrong side of the Forth Bridge.
Falklands.
I’d have to agree with Tubby’s earlier speculation, that if we were to give one of these fellas to France in barter rather than for cash, a mistral swap could be the likely option.
The French want a carrier, and have the capacity to build one. They are also a militant bunch, and I can’t imagine that French shipyard workers and unions would tolerate the receipt of a big English ship unless they could build and send a couple of French ones back.
I get smaller crews, cheaper operating costs, but presumably the submarines are shorter ranged even with AIP, and slower so we are going to need additional logistics, plus there is cost of supporting an additional submarine type and the fact that we need to maintain the skills developed during Astute’s development. Saying all that I think if we are going to build SSK’s we should do a joint Anglo-French project assuming French wants to do more than just sell SSK’s to countries unable to afford to operate SSN’
Butthe cheaper running cost of asn SSK would compensate for running 2 types of Submarines.
The reason to buy German off the shelf Submarines, and likewise buying a Danish or Dutch patrol frigate, is to get the RN to buy more of the shelf stuff (saves money)
ON CVF aircraft, SuperHornet or Rafale surely would be a better bet, could afford more aircraft and have higher sortie rates.
rec
no one else wants either the super hornet or rafale its poor sales attest to that. Rafale will be the most expensive option there isnt a huge mount between f35 and hornet despite what the doom mongers would say. Also super hornet will stop production in 3 years time and will be gone from us navy by about 2030 so we get saddled with nice thru life costs. And cant afford to place the order now. Also f35 range is almost double the other two and does not allow tornado replacement. a top of that there is major industrial implications for withdrawing from f35 anyone who us thinks otherwise is dreaming happy thoughts. So it really is f35 or bust.
Mark,
I see your point, just think that JSF is too expensive for UK to buy in serious numbers, So Silent Hornet/Super Hornet (or Rafale)now, and F35C later when there maybe more money?
@ rec re submarines
We need Ajax and Astute 8. SSNs are a world class capability; we are perhaps the second most proficient at operating them. Submarines are best operated in groups of 4.
As for the SSKs. Bang on what you say. For all the reason you give too.
@ All
I wonder if the same team who did the CVF contract did the one for FSTA too?
only a short point ref EMALS, in the trials that are on youtube they’ve launched a c-2 greyhound which weighs 36,000lbs (empty) can’t see it being a problem. note in the vid bloke says it’s the third different aircraft so that’s hornet,greyhound and “mystery” model wonder why no vid???
The mystery third plane type is the T-45 Goshawk training plane, in itself a modified, carrier-capable Hawk 60. http://www.silobreaker.com/emals-launches-first-goshawk-5_2264644904648966148
Rec
If jsf is too expensive there all to expensive f35 budget expense is not till after 2015. The other two we need to pay up now.
Paulg could be the goshawk
This is what I can see happening
Increasing costs on the F35 will force us to reconsider our options, especially given the additional costs of the switch to CATOBAR. Remember, we have not yet reached main gate for JCA
France has too many Rafales for its needs and given its rather poor showing in export markets Dassault and the French Government will be looking for options.
France and the UK are becoming politically closer every day, recognising the issues of a disinterested USA and rising other powers
BAE and Dassault are getting closer, especially on unmanned systems
F35 industrial participation is based on cash upfront in the development programme, not how many we buy or not.
CdG is a basket case that the French want shot of as soon as possible
Beyond India, UAE, Japan and Brazil, there aren’t many prospects for sales of either Typhoon or Rafale, the next big thing will be UCAV’s. BAE and Dassault would make natural partners
The logical choice is to do an equipment swap, CVF for a decent number of Rafales.
This allows a joint training, maintenance, OCU and logistics system to be created (big big savings)
These threads all converge to make this irresistible; France and the UK form the naval core of an EU force, making this possible is a common set of equipment and shared facilities
F35 industrial participation is based on cash upfront in the development programme, not how many we buy or not.
TD for lrip and test a/c only production contract not yet signed. If you think that lockheed won’t pull production from uk if we don’t buy your not living in reality. We don’t have a final line makes it much much easier to shift production. Bae doesn’t even need to lose the contract to shift country of origin. I also point out this threat has already been issued. F35 training will be carried out in the us and have a significantly better logistics system.Switching to rafale is daft.
RE “I wonder if the same team who did the CVF contract did the one for FSTA too?”
- I tried irony, but it didn’t get picked up
- namely, the team/person that was behind CVF contract is now behind the Carrier Strike NAO report; my contracts were good, but then it got all messed up…
“The logical choice is to do an equipment swap, CVF for a decent number of Rafales.”
I just don’t see it, and aren’t the naval rafales quite distinct from the land versions?
Hi TD, a good list there. I only disagree on some minor points, as follows:
“France has too many Rafales for its needs”
- not true, because Super Etendards really need t o be replaced
Beyond India, China and Brazil, there aren’t many prospects for sales of either Typhoon or Rafale
- drop China
- Brazil only a possibility for Rafale
… so half of the list gone
Which takes me back to the earlier point: Even though Rafale production line is going at full speed, the likelihood of it becoming to an abrupt stop soon-ish is getting greater all the time
Hi Jedi,
Why would that ” aren’t the naval rafales quite distinct from the land versions?” be important?
because i wasn’t aware that france had any kind of surplus of naval rafales, quite the opposite as far as i was aware, so i presumed admin was referring to rafales in general when he mad ethat point.
Mark, I didn’t say it was a good idea or a bad idea, just the way the wind is blowing. Would be interesting to see the terms of contract but we have invested £2b and a lot of IP in an aircraft so regardless of whether we buy any, we will be getting a good return, even if that doesn’t mean jobs in the UK
Perhaps I should have clarified, too many Rafale production slots for its needs. Without an export customer Rafale is an expensive millstone, does anyone see India buying French?
This puts production capacity on the market and a CVF for new build Rafale M becomes attractive
Did I really write China, have edited to cover my red face!
Gab
Did you not read my comments, I said F35B could be recovered to something other than CVF, in extremis i.e. an unusual situation, certainly not the norm but if you can save a pilot and 80 odd million pounds worth of aircraft, an aircraft that will be part of a very small fleet, then dropping your bombs and missiles into the water to do a vertical recovery is a small price to pay.
This option is not available to F35C, I am not saying its a big thing but it is what it is, a feature of STOVL unavailable to CATOBAR
The whole F35B burning holes in decks is a typical internet anti F35 load of rubbish that has both been wildly over hyped and now addressed with a simple nozzle change. So change the deck coating of your other ships and you have a means of recovering aircraft and aircrew, seems like a wise operational, financial and safety decision to me. Again, this would be for a one off.
Where did I say anything about taking off vertically?
Can you please refrain from delivering us your historical sermons, especially about things I have written about?
If we take HMS Ocean as a template of what a UK LPH should look like it has a number of features that given they were designed in, one might assume make them pretty essential to role.
Vehicle deck, wide corridors, roro ramp to interface with mexeflotes and shore facilities, landing craft, magazines and explosives storage in convenient places, placing of accommodation and staging areas to ensure a smooth transition to the helicopters and a host of other things, things that are not immediately obvious but essential nonetheless.
CVF will not have these things because the design has been optimised for a strike carrier role, CVF does not need a well deck because it creates compromise elsewhere, as Ocean does not have a well deck. If we need to store a Viking or even a quad bike it will have to be placed in the hangar, incredibly volumetrically inefficient. This means CVF in her secondary LPH role makes the embarked force less versatile and less equipped than would be the case if the same force was aboard Ocean.
Therefore CVF and Illustrious standing in for Ocean, are operationally inadequate. Can we accept the degradation in capability, I suppose we have to, but let’s not kid ourselves that a multi billion pound CVF sans catapult and any redesign to role is actually a desirable LPH
Whether the MoD asked if the F35B could use an internal fuel tank for AAR is irrelevant, I am sure they would have asked all sorts of things, the fact is, it was never specified and now is being seriously considered for safety reasons, an additional cost of the switch
What are you talking about, the RAF ‘whining’ to get a Tornado replacement, having a requirement is not whining. Again, what LM say about the RAF might have said is irrelevant.
We can wrap ourselves up in sortie rates forever or try and second guess how the NAO came to its figures but the simple truth, accepted by pretty much everyone, is that CATOBAR generates fewer sorties than STOVL. As you say there are compensatory factors but you quote those sortie generation figures like you have the IPT’s planning notes in front of you, which I kind of doubt, so shall we just agree there is uncertainty in the figures that we don’t know about.
How do you know the UK will be having 2 EMALS, do you work for the carrier alliance, do you know something the MoD doesn’t know because the last time the MoD mentioned it, it was pretty obvious they did not know the implications and therefore detailed design issues of the switch to CATOBAR. The NAO makes it patently clear that the implications of the switch will not be known for 2 years, given your clear ability to look into the future can I have next weeks lottery numbers please.
Given that I am not SoS Defence and this is just a blog I would have thought it pretty obvious that my comments on Rafale and CVF were just speculation and I do believe I actually say that later.
Your comment about the F35 being RAF owned and therefore not allowed to be aboard CVF is simply comical, do you really think this is how it works. It’s a joint force concept that we will see the aircraft deployed on the basis of training, fleet management and operational needs as determined by the JOINT team dictated by a JOINT HQ. How can anyone take you seriously when you suggest that the evil RAF will be hoarding F35’s all for themselves, seriously.
Hi TD,
RE “does anyone see India buying French?” Only with full technology transfer. This might be quite tempting because India will have its hands full with PAK-FA two-seater version. They get underlying IP for the current 1-seater plus engines (those not just on paper). It is still a big leap, but getting to practice with Rafale production might help.
- btw, full technology transfer is what has been offered to Brazil for Gripen
“How do you know the UK will be having 2 EMALS, do you work for the carrier alliance”
TD, all the concepts about CVF CATOBAR, all the drawings, graphics, and the PA2/CVF CATOBAR design once planned for France all had two catapults.
No one would ever think about fitting just one, and you can’t physically fit more than 2 on a CVF-sized hull.
There’s no need to work for the ACA to know this.
And ultimately, the NAO report states it itself:
“The United Kingdom [EMALS] system will differ (it is a 2-rail system whilst the Americans will operate a 4-rail system)”
Figure 8 – Risks with the conversion of the carrier using EMALS, page 34.
“Your comment about the F35 being RAF owned and therefore not allowed to be aboard CVF is simply comical, do you really think this is how it works. It’s a joint force concept that we will see the aircraft deployed on the basis of training, fleet management and operational needs as determined by the JOINT team dictated by a JOINT HQ. How can anyone take you seriously when you suggest that the evil RAF will be hoarding F35’s all for themselves, seriously.”
We will see. There’s not much joint about RAF Group 1 HQ. I’ll be all too glad if i’m proven wrong, but the worries remain.
“Vehicle deck, wide corridors, roro ramp to interface with mexeflotes and shore facilities, landing craft, magazines and explosives storage in convenient places, placing of accommodation and staging areas to ensure a smooth transition to the helicopters and a host of other things, things that are not immediately obvious but essential nonetheless.”
The CVF has been designed with a secondary LPH capability in mind. It did not suddenly happen overnight that from “carrier all the way” it became an LHA.
The embarked force and LPH role has ALWAYS been on the cards, and we have to assume that the design has the internal arrangements to make it feasible. CVF was always meant to be, secondarily, a Commando Carrier, and at least since 2006 the RN put on hold any and all studies for a direct Ocean replacement by planning for CVF to fill the slot. Let’s not exceed with the drama when there’s no need for it.
HMS Ocean’s vehicle deck and hangar are, summed together, a fraction of the hangar space of CVF. CVF is also largely equipped with empty spaces for growth, included many rooms that could be given furniture to accommodate additional Marines. The biggest room now is meant to accommodate 6 men, but i’m assuming that RM are not housed with the same “luxury” standards. On Cavour, there are several “21 beds” rooms for the embarked Marines when present, and with a similar arrangement CVF could expand its capacity by a great margin.
Embarking explosives, not a problem. CVF is meant to embark a huge number of pallets of bombs, missiles and everything, and if the strike wing is not on board, ammo for the marines and for the L118s can be embarked, with quick ways to bring the pallets up to deck or hangar.
Vehicles can be parked into the hangar and moved up to the deck with the lifts for helicopter transport. I agree that the lack of RoRo ramps makes things harder, but by no means the “loss” of HMS Ocean’s limited vehicle carrying facilities is devastating. CVF will have to carry only stuff that can be delivered underslung from Chinooks, so the artillery and lighter vehicles, ok. It could be better, but it is far from tragical.
The LCAC(L) are carried on the deck on HMS Ocean, and they will be carried on QE’s deck.
At most, the landing crafts loss will be the 4 LCVP MK5, unless CVF’s boat davits can take them: the chapter about her ship boats is an unknown one for now, save from a few drawings where i believe ample bays with RHIBs inside can be seen.
There will be a massively expanded and improved helicopter capacity in a task group with a CVF, with the chance to also have a number of F35C for support and protection in pure LHA US-style, with a limited setback in terms of landing crafts and ship to shore surface connection, due to the lack of a ramp allowing vehicles to drive onto landing crafts coming from other ships.
If this was to be judged an important setback, in 50 years there will be more than enough times to make improvements during refits.
I do not absolutely see it as ugly as you absolutely want to make it.
@ Gabby
but still, it is undeniably true that a CVF in the Med with 30 F35C (or even just 20 or 24) plus 4 Hawkeyes would beat the hell out of the current force employed for Ellamy, as good as it is.
- Since neither aren’t even operational I think it’s a bit strong to say it’s ‘undeniably true’ Plus I think E-3 would be a better asset than Hawkeye.
Acc
The indians will get a typhoon production line too and bae already has a hawk production line in place. There us almost as much industrial co-operation between Indian engineering firms and the big civil companies as there is with china.
TD development of f35 cost $54b we only have to pay 2b max. We are small beer. The job losses from pulling this will make the train thing look insignificant and most likely end this countries interest in national/ multi national fighter and ucav programs. That’s why it simply won’t happen.
There isn’t much spare capacity on the french rafale production line 3-4 a/c a year would be are lot