Pop over to Jedi’s blog for an interesting article on future Army structures. Haven’t read it yet but I am sure you will find it interesting
Think DefenceUK Defence Issues and the odd container or two
Pop over to Jedi’s blog for an interesting article on future Army structures. Haven’t read it yet but I am sure you will find it interesting
I think there will be not light role battalion, there will be two battalion mechanized in five multirole brigades.
cheers admin.
Jedi’s numbers show that we are losing
- infantry
- artillery
- signals
- fast jets
- and fleet resupply
while everything else is almost miraculously still there 2020/ 2024?
- infantry, yes for numbers
- artillery, yes (for abandoning the Cold War fixed lines – softening of – thinking)
- signals, yes, because much of it is now more embedded
- fast jets, yes, because air superiority (supposedly!)will not be fought over
- fleet replenishment? how is this in keeping with strategic raiding?
Gabby had good questions (over on that blog) on helo numbers (as projected).
My take (as for “where’s the budget” rather than “where’s the beef”)
- FRES Scout (incl. protected mobility) for abt 500
- putting artillery on wheels (155 mm & GMLRS)rather than just having lighter pieces in lieue of SPGs
Some of the issues seen as sticking points will be seen to by fungibility of assets in use by then
- e.g amphibious deployment (or, even menacing loitering about)
Where there must be something in the pipeline (not yet announced?) is ISTAR -strategic and theater level
- BAMS for the former, with the already joint SIGINT fleet? Germany has invested in the less-so-naval capability and the French in satellite imagery, so put in the pot, stir, and???
- UAVs/ UCAVs and F-35s for the latter?
Hi Frenchie, and AAC,
I welcome all the commentary, including over there, for as gabby has noted the exact ‘fleet’ numbers don’t quite tie-up.
I have not intended them to, and quite frankly i have no idea how many helicopters the army has, or the navy and raf for that matter.
If the figures can be improved for FF2020 then i am happy to amend them, but you’ll note that all non-bold numbers are multiples to 4,8,12 etc, it is the computer geek in me i’m afraid.
As AAC has grasped, the purpose of the exercise is to show the trend of reductions, using the RUSI balanced force as a baseline to juggle the numbers further in creating a more asymmetric force structure as they recommend.
I hope it is useful.
“I have not intended them to, and quite frankly i have no idea how many helicopters the army has, or the navy and raf for that matter.
If the figures can be improved for FF2020 then i am happy to amend them, but you’ll note that all non-bold numbers are multiples to 4,8,12 etc, it is the computer geek in me i’m afraid.”
Well, if there are no further cutbacks, i think the numbers should be, re-helicopters:
RAF
60 Chinook, of which 14 HC6 (the new ones from Boing, recently confirmed)
24 Puma HC2 (at least until 2024, unless the upgrade gets the chop in the September budget, which i think is not likely)
Army
34 Army Wildcats (but 6 are expected to be given to 847 NAS for the Commandos, so it might be better to count them as navy)
67 Apache
Gazelle and Lynx 9A should both vanish by then, but i believe/hope that the 9A might live on longer. That would add 22 helos to the total, in the case.
RN
30 Merlin HM2
25 Merlin navalized (HC4?)
28 Wildcats (+6 from the Army)
MASC/Crows nest???
“FRES Scout (incl. protected mobility) for abt 500″
I think the aim is for actually 270 Scouts, plus several hundreds in the other variants, mostly in the Protected Mobility type for replacing plenty of Spartans and FV430s.
I will eventually build up to writing an updated force structure plan myself on my blog, it is in my plan.
In the meanwhile, i’ve had a take on the Medium Weight Brigade concept, and on the “italian FRES UV”, the Freccia, which was only briefly considered in 2007 for FRES.
Back then it wasn’t mature, (the italian army was just ordering the first production in that same period) but now there’s a whole family of variants ready or almost ready and it is serving in Afghanistan since last year.
I guess the Freccia can be interesting. Most people knows the Boxer, but not the Freccia… but i actually think that it is the latter which gets closer to the original FRES aims, as there’s a Freccia variant for pretty much everything, up to a 155 mm self propelled howitzer.
For who’s interested, here it is: http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2011/07/medium-weight-brigade-and-8×8-italian.html
cheers Gabby.
interesting about the Freccia, i am quite taken with Jed’s RG35 thingy, but it comes down to price i guess.
Hi Gabby,
How much are they a piece?
BTW, one can get to your article through the TD link, but it is not in the site index yet.
one thing i would like to draw the TD crowds attention to once again is the previously unheard of 2024 defence structure mentioned by houghton in a defence select committee last month:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmdfence/uc761-vii/uc76101.htm
“The RAF, as well, will have its own sense of what the critical mass of its service is institutionally. It would speak to that better than I can, but I give you a flavour of it. The number of fast jets posited for the 2024 structure is close to what that institutional sense of the critical mass would be.”
“No, not at the moment, because in many respects we are drawing down elements of the force to the 2024 structure in terms of numbers of destroyers, the size of the Army and those sorts of things.”
apologies, as is ever the case with my slip-shod writing style the first twenty four hours post publication are a riot of edits.
now somewhat different, so i probably linked it here too early when i did so last night, but is now more or less as it will continue to be.
i’d love to see other people use the same model to suggest other force structures.
Hi Jedi,
I was doing it already, but can’t do a ‘live’ copy paste from your table to Excel
- poor me, had to do mental arithmetics to get the changes into comparable %’s
No, more seriously, I agree that the granularity is about right. Some things get hidden, like thinning out of armour, sealift measured in “deliverables” rather than in numbers of units available… but that will always be the case – and the stuff for commenting
“I was doing it already, but can’t do a ‘live’ copy paste from your table to Excel”
Apologies, i will host the excell file this evening.
“No, more seriously, I agree that the granularity is about right.”
I reckon so too, it is not accurate in minutiae, but can certainly be used for trends.
I have some expectations about the FRES SV, there are about 600 vehicles in recce block 1, about 245 will be scout version.
Recce block 1 is expected to be followed by recce block 2 comprising about 140 vehicles in three variants, joint fire control, engineer reconnaissance and command and control.
There are a further six roles in recce block 3, covers 280 vehicles, including minelayer, launched anti-tank missiles, radar, command and control brigade level, medical unit aid post and ambulance.
Medium armour covers about 200 vehicles in three roles, direct fire, recovery and repair.
Manoeuvre support will be 35 bridgelayer.
Hi Jedi
Not only that ” reckon so too, it is not accurate in minutiae, but can certainly be used for trends.”
- when there is jointness across nations (as opposed to our across the services, the new Command and all that), the count is normally taken at about the level you used
Hi Frenchie,
I wish those numbers still hold.
“some expectations about the FRES SV, there are about 600 vehicles in recce block 1, about 245 will be scout version.”
- if you thin out the tank regiments (for each of the MRB’s) then you will have about 1:1 of Ch2 and FRES (true) Scout)… from thereon, each commander can use them in formations he sees as the best fit for situation, tactics, terrain etc
I am still in the dark about
- the wonderful new armour
- the integration with other sensors (UAVs, Jackals with a mast etc)
Hi ACC,
I don’t know if it’s only the brigade at high readiness that will be equipped with all versions vehicles, and I also raised the question about 200 direct fire vehicles, it makes no sense.
Hi Frenchie,
In the US Army they have heavy bde’s and Stryker bde’s. The latter rely heavily on what they call fire support/ direct fire versions of the Stryker.
We will have (in each MRB) both an armoured rgmnt (bn) and a recce rgmnt (bn), so there is more “facility” to call for heavy support than in the US situation (where the “heavy” might not even be in the same theater).
As I understand that you are pointing out, the direct fire support version will come very late in the deliveries (if at all)?
Still have to read how they have figured this out in Italy (where all the relevant versions are available, perhaps all in line service, too).
The situation I know of is where
1. the very expensive CV versions are used for recce (mobility and enough fire power at least to disengage)
- when I say v expensive, at least 2m euro a piece (that’s why I asked Gabby if he knows at what price the Freccia’s come, see below)
2. Much cheaper/ older IFVs are used with MBTs
- ref. Warriors, last delivery taken in 1997, so even with fresh money used on upgrades/ refurbs they must come in much cheaper than the ASCODs. piece by piece, even tonne for tonne
Yes, I understand your point of view, a WARRIOR upgraded cost less than ASCOD SV, there is even a WARRIOR who used as FOV for artillery, but I think that Dr. Fox believes the sale to the abroad, perhaps a new vehicle concept enter as a part of “value for money”.
I don’t understand direct fire with launcher anti-tank missiles vehicles, it’s strange for me.
“How much are they a piece?”
As i say somewhere in the article, the Italian Army is paying the Freccia around 6 million Euro (5.3 million pounds, roughly) apiece, judging by the cost of the first tranche ordered, which includes IFV, ATGW, Ambulance, Command Post and Mortar Carrier variants.
At the moment, there is not a real “Freccia Direct Fire”, nor is it planned in the Brigade as of now. The Centauro with the 105 or 120 mm gun in the Cavalry regiment within the brigade will likely do RECCE and Fire Support/Tank Killing both.
But the FRECCIA fitted with the DRACO 76mm turret can do:
Direct fire to 15 km
Indirect fire to 22
C-RAM and Anti-Air fire with guided airbust rounds
If it was finally ordered and, say, distributed into the brigade on the fashion of the MGS in the US Stryker brigades, the italian Medium Infantry Companies would be in the enviable situation of having a very versatile provider of fire support, capable to even defend against incoming mortar and artillery fire.
Budget, of course, is the issue with it.
I was totally awestruck when Oto Melara pulled out the Self Propelled 155 mm howitzer variant, i will admit. The turret is fugly to the eye, but the idea i like a lot.
The medium brigade might very well be down to:
-Freccia in its variants
-Centauro (which in itself has some commonality with the Freccia)
-Lince
-trucks
Logistically, it would be a dream.
Compensating for the fact that the brigade is mortar-heavy and uses 60, 81 and 120 mm ammunition at once…
“Yes, I understand your point of view, a WARRIOR upgraded cost less than ASCOD SV”
Recent news of the Warrior Bridgelayer prototype suggest that some FRES SV variants might never happen, and retired Warriors could be converted instead.
“I wish those numbers still hold. [re FRES SV]”
I fear they don’t. Not all variants will happen, i suspect, and the tranches will be different.
But some variants, such as the bridgelayer, might be Warrior conversions. Still much, much better than nothing.
“In the US Army they have heavy bde’s and Stryker bde’s. The latter rely heavily on what they call fire support/ direct fire versions of the Stryker.
We will have (in each MRB) both an armoured rgmnt (bn) and a recce rgmnt (bn), so there is more “facility” to call for heavy support than in the US situation (where the “heavy” might not even be in the same theater).”
True, but this “ties” more Challenger IIs to direct infantry support than you’d like, at least in a scenario in which the enemy has got armored forces. In this scenario, the Chally regiment would be far too busy even without opening the path for the infantry down the town’s streets.
Scenario B, where the enemy has not got armored forces (say Afghanistan) and there are no allies with Leopards nearby (reference to Afghanistan experience), some heavily armored firepower would be high on the list of wishes, and the Chally could do, but at quite some cost and with deployment difficulties. A FRES SV Direct Fire, in this case, would be ideal.
If, however, the infantry companies came with 3 Mobile Gun Systems as in Stryker brigades, there would be a dedicated firepower element always present, and the Challenger regiment could focus on Maneuvering aggressively against the enemy, and/or fighting back the enemy tanks, while the infantry would have its “wall-breaker”.
I know that budget is the issue, but militarily i find that it does make a lot of sense.
Cruiser tank and Infantry tank, i guess we could dare saying.
A return, for vengeance!
final version tweaked, apologies, with spreadsheet file to play with now hosted, linked at the bottom.
Thanks Jedi,
The Round 11 was due to be finished in June, in a Parliamentary hearing in June it was not even promised for July
… but whatever comes out, can be mapped to the spreadsheet and the “Delta” better understood, as well as equipment options if the force structure becomes even slightly clearer 2015/ 2020/ even 2024 for some kit with long, stretched out production runs (carriers, frigates, half-frigates, F-35, even FRES in various variants)
i’d still love to understand the importance of the reference to future force 2024……….., but yes, hopefully we’ll understand more when the equipment list is published in September.
Hi Jedi,
I read the whole thing (thanks for the link)
- 2024 was mentioned for long-lead items (as you pointed out) perhaps requiring to keep Tornados and frigates/ destroyers in service longer than would be desirable
- 2025 was also mentioned, illustrating how many Defence Reviews would happen before we get there
- I don’t think any of these mentions implied that there would be a force structure different from FF 2020 (the parliamentarians deplored the fact that in the ten months since the announcements not much deeper clarity has been achieved, even questioning if anyone was seriously working on the gap from 2014/2015 to 2020)
Hi Jedi,
Tried to answer your specific comment, on your blog, but that did not work (maybe just have to carry on from the end of the thread, like here?)
Don’t you think we may have had a very savvy negotiating team turn up there? Reading this
“the restatement of the Armed Forces back to a conditioned precedent, as it were.” sounds more like a wording from the insurance policy “old-for-new”, rather than:
“if they get to absorb (the useful) equipment back into the main budget…………. but i’m not sure how that process works yet!”
@ AAC -
“I don’t think any of these mentions implied that there would be a force structure different from FF 2020″
Yes, i guess that makes sense, cheers.
“Don’t you think we may have had a very savvy negotiating team turn up there?”
Sorry for being slow. but who would have had the savvy negotiating team turn up?
“sounds more like a wording from the insurance policy “old-for-new”, rather than”
just reflects my uncertainty about what will survive the afghan mission to even arrive at the question of whether we want to keep it or ditch it afterwards…..
Exactly “uncertainty about what will survive the afghan mission to even arrive at the question of whether we want to keep it or ditch it afterwards…..”
- we are in the same boat
- at least the representations were quite good (without any grand totals being mentioned, just principles to get back to… following on from that, with much smaller detail: Did you notice that we have another* LPH after Ocean retires in 2016**?
– both * & ** news to me
– Lusty is going to have to work so hard! Then again, Hermes is still in service”
“Lusty is going to have to work so hard!”
Lusty goes in 2014.
I did notice the bit about Ocean and 2016 myself the first time i read that hearing document.
The last Ocean OSD dates i was aware of were 2018 and 2022.
My interpretation of the situation is that the “other LPH” is none other than HMS Queen Elizabeth, which is to be handed to the MOD in 2016, as industry continues to underline.
The date coincidence is not casual, i believe.
After all, a new-build is kind of unthinkable, as there is not even a study about it, a word, a rumor, a project, nothing. Unless France “gifts” a Mistral to the UK, i really can’t see a new LPH/LHD coming by 2016.
Nor do i imagine HMS Ocean bowing out and Lusty living on longer: the studies done after the SDSR were quite clear on Ocean being (unsurprisingly) the best LPH, and it is cheaper to run as well.
Either the general was epically wrong and made a mess out of dates and plan on that “detail”, or really Queenie is the only suitable ship that fits the slot he implies.
“Did you notice that we have another* LPH after Ocean retires in 2016**?”
I hadn’t noticed that, but i can only presume that gabby is probably right in assuming its QE…..
Hi Jedi & Gabby,
RE “Nor do i imagine HMS Ocean bowing out and Lusty living on longer: the studies done after the SDSR were quite clear on Ocean being (unsurprisingly) the best LPH, and it is cheaper to run as well.”
- if we had a “super”LPH that soon, fine and dandy
- Ocean, the best for the role until then, no qualms about it (and I recognise the 2018 date that Gabby quotes, too)
Just that these “the studies done after the SDSR were quite clear…” I am not aware of. What I read was Dr. Fox talking about MoD being contractually bound to Ocean refit/ refurb.
- against that background, Lusty being in sea trials already now, when it was only due back in service late first half of 2012 is what makes me thinking
“against that background, Lusty being in sea trials already now, when it was only due back in service late first half of 2012 is what makes me thinking”
That’s due to the fact she will soon have to take Ocean’s place flying Apaches off Libya.
I also read that HMS Daring might escort her in the mission, thus having not just its first operational deployment, but its first wartime experience too, but on this i have no certainty.
The Lusty + Apache is sure, instead. The 664 Sqn AAC has been training on board lately, and they will soon deploy to relieve Ocean and 665.
http://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/local/east-hampshire/lusty_prepares_to_join_libyan_warzone_after_40m_upgrade_1_2876844
The British Army intends to upgrade its Warriors to extend their service life to 2025. So the end of life of Warrior coincides with the end of production of ASCOD SV, would it not be simple to replace the Warrior by ASCOD IFV ?
I think Warrior is 2035, actually, not 25…
Update – 2011.09.11 – Gabrielle has taken a crack at the Future Force 2020:
Can I commend this to everyone interested, there is a fantastic amount of detail here, particularly in the linked explanatory document. I merely went with the RUSI figures, but Gabby obviously understands them and can provide a coherent explanation for why a particular configuration is desirable, who will likely fill the role, and how they will be equipped. Agree or disagree, this forms the foundation of an informed debate, and i think you will find this information helpful.
Thank you Gabby, this is exactly the kind of response I was hoping for.
http://www.mediafire.com/?6fr65odpibyf6h5
http://www.mediafire.com/?28yqkfecrfel88k
Hi,
Used a fag packet for something useful(?) and came out with this (relating to the 10-year budget idea and the trade off between equipping the forces to fit the job vs. retaining strength in numbers:
combat aircraft and ISTAR (bfr (UAVs/ UCAVs) 10 bn
- nobody knows what the Scavengers will cost and what that will do to their numbers, hence left that item and any follow-ons out
capital ships 8 bn (CVF/LHA/ the 7th Astute)
battlefield (protected) mobility 6 bn
- helos, medium armour in sufficient numbers
(other) surface combatants and constabulary presence ships 4.5 bn
There are many more items (any big ones?), but the above gives a total (w/o interest, we are talking ten years, so adjusting time profiles makes a big difference)of 28.5 bn over next ten years
Per year about the running cost of 3 bdes. How does this relate to what has been announced?
- out of memory, army down from 107 thousand to 82 thousand, 25/ 3= 8
- a not so scientific number for the cost of running a brigade is a bn £/ year
- call it 5-6 strength per bde and 2-3 in training and all other “direct” support (not adding HQ or DS&E on top, but this sort of “marginal” change won’t initially make a difference there as all the capabilities are still there to be looked after, though unit cost per kit will tend upwards as numbers to be ordered are ever shrinking)
The thread is titled “army structures”, but I conclude that to get a desirable force structure (not necessarily overall strength!)it is the army that pays for it
- no wonder initial announcements were to 2015 and the sights set for 2020 (which looks too short by 4-5 years anyway, because of the funding constraints and hence staggering or delaying of major items)
Hi AAC, cheers for the response.
“army down from 107 thousand to 82 thousand, 25/ 3= 8″
What does the “8″ equate to?
“no wonder initial announcements were to 2015 and the sights set for 2020 (which looks too short by 4-5 years anyway, because of the funding constraints and hence staggering or delaying of major items)”
This is related to the occasional reference to FF2024 at defence select committees in recent months.
Hi Jedi,
call it 5-6 (’000) strength per bde and 2-3 in training and all other “direct” support (not adding HQ or DS&E on top)
- as for your question “What does the “8″ equate to?”
Yes as for “is related to the occasional reference to FF2024 “, the extreme examples being
- buy JSF in two lots of 40 (?), to be able to operate a rudimentary carrier “wing” to work up a real one AND an RAF “deep strike” sqrn in the interim
- get one carrier as an LHA, another as a CVF and in the first refit of the lead ship, make it a CVF (,too, so that the other one can go to refit later, when it is required)
Further,
I would not be surprised if only the recce elements of MRB tank regiments get the the FRES Scout to begin with, and the procurement schedules will be so drawn out that at 2020 the 5 FRR’s still have what they have today
- lets start to call them forward-deployed fire support, to avoid embarrassment?
On the artillery side of things, creating flexibility first by having mix-and-match 105 mm LG’s and heavy SPG’s regiments(in the end, there are plenty of both, so why not just take what is needed for the job as long as the crews are cross trained), and by 2024 you might even have a few MRB’s with artillery on wheels (but better protected than in the towed version)so that the “medium weight” actually yields some benefit on operations (yes, I know, the term has gone out of fashion)
gotcha, cheers AAC.
“- buy JSF in two lots of 40 (?), to be able to operate a rudimentary carrier “wing” to work up a real one AND an RAF “deep strike” sqrn in the interim
- get one carrier as an LHA, another as a CVF and in the first refit of the lead ship, make it a CVF (,too, so that the other one can go to refit later, when it is required)”
I would be happy with that.
It all makes sense; the risk is what will happen between now and 2024 (or even 2020)