People have been predicting the demise of the tank since the first ones crashed through the barbed wire in the Battle of Somme in 1916. Since then they have shown remarkable resilience with the last major tank battle that involved UK forces less than a decade ago in 2003, other conflicts elsewhere has shown the continued utility of the main battle tank and their supporting arms.
The simple fact is that mounted close combat and the use of armour has utility in all spectrums of conflict, we might argue whether they should or should not be in Afghanistan and for a number of reasons the UK has declined to deploy Challenger 2 but other nations have achieved a measure of success with theirs.
General Brimms (GOC 1(UK) Armoured Division), credited Challenger and Warrior, as being the top 2 war winning assets in the initial stages of the Iraq war, operation TELIC. On the drive to Bagdad the after action report from the US 3rd Infantry Division clearly stated;
No other ground combat system currently in our arsenal could have delivered similar mission success without accepting enormous casualties, particularly in urban terrain
Their M1 tanks were used to break in to defended locations, provide security cordons, carry out patrols and secure supply routes. In the latter stages of Operation Telic, Challengers were often used to carry out strike missions, provide visible deterrence, compound wall breaching, route security and convoy protection.
A good quote from Director Royal Armoured Corps, Brigadier Simon Levy;
Tanks are agile and well protected, have a first class direct fire precision strike capability (minimising collateral damage), can be utilised as a surveillance asset (in overwatch and route protection for clearance and logistic patrols), have permanence and, once deployed, are cheaper and quicker into action than both aviation and air. They also serve as a deterrent; highly effective in both the prevention of engagements as well as demonstrating a proven ability to bring about the early cessation of hostilities. Critically, and fundamental to effective deployment, our tanks must continue to be maintained and our crews properly trained if they are to be used in the future.
It is estimated that there are in excess of 60,000 tanks worldwide and the brisk market in after market upgrades is fuelling this continued proliferation. These upgrades add considerably to older tanks lethality, incorporating the latest optics, sensors, and ammunition and fire control systems.
In the previous post on structures I suggested that armoured warfare or mounted close combat capability is something that should be retained, although at a slightly lower scale than at present. In a common theme to the ‘Future of’ series the thought process is to scale back on certain capabilities which frees up the funds to do 3 basic things; provide funds for capability plus, provide funds for forward presence and finally, to provide funds to harden what is left, the core.
The proposal was for 2 armoured brigades but instead of the existing triangular formation a square formation with 2 armoured regiments and 2 armoured infantry battalions. There is an alternative, instead of 2 square brigades you could make a greater number of triangular brigades and whilst this would make it easier to deploy and sustain I have been seduced by the ‘hitting power’ and resilience of going square!
Before you push on, have a read of this, it’s not a US, German, British or Russian example of the utility of tanks but instructive nevertheless.
Contents
Issues
Cost; The most significant issue is that of cost, although the capital costs have been absorbed some time ago the maintenance and training overheads are high.
Synthetic training is moving at a very fast pace and investing in networked artificial training environments may be wise, reducing training costs, equipment wear and maintenance. The new Terrier armoured engineering vehicle benefits from a very advanced synthetic training system from BAe and other training projects managed by the Joint & Battlefield Trainers, Simulations & Synthetic Environments Project Team will realise the same set of advantages.
Whole fleet management has been proven to be very cost effective for some time now and whilst the downsides are recognised, the cost reduction advantages are considered worth it.
The Big Gun; We are also faced with a number of obsolescence and homogeneous issues, with the Op Telic modifications (extra armour, remote weapon mounts, ECM etc) only applied to a small number of vehicles. The main obsolescence issue the Challenger 2 faces is that of ammunition. With the newer tank designs and cost effective upgrades the lethality of the existing stock of APFSDS ammunition is falling behind the state of the art. For a number of historic reasons (including wishing to retain HESH) the UK retained the use of rifling in its main tank gun, the RO L30, whilst the rest of the world and its armaments investors went smoothbore.
The latest depleted uranium round, the CHARM 3 has unfortunate political and environmental side effects and the separate propellant charges expire around 2015.
Despite the multi billion pound Munitions Acquisition – the Supply Solution (MASS) contract with BAe the UK no longer has the ability to manufacture propellants or machine depleted uranium blanks and this, coupled with the expiry and associate environmental issues means an alternative is needed.
It is here that we face a dilemma, the latest smoothbore APFDS tungsten rounds are superior to CHARM3 yet they need a smoothbore barrel.
We have 2 choices, withdraw CHARM3 and develop a new non depleted uranium round or take advantage of the military off the shelf smoothbore rounds. The problem with this last option is of course that it would need a new main gun for Challenger.
As long ago as 2006 Challenger was tested with the Rheinmetall 120mm smoothbore main gun.
Following a competition, the then RO Defence was awarded a £3.5 million contract from the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) for the 120 mm Smoothbore Option Technical Demonstrator Programme (SO TDP).
The programme demonstrated that the L/55 could be fitted into the Challenger turret and trials indicated that the Rheinmetall DM53 round had better performance than CHARM 3.
The DM63 is said to offer even greater performance. With a 120mm smoothbore main weapon the UK could tap into the global supply chain, manufacturers such as Rheinmetall, General Dynamics, ATK and IMI for developments such as combustible cases, tungsten penetrators and anti personnel natures. It would even open the opportunity to deploy the IMI/GD LAHAT guided missile with a range of 8,000m and the ability to be fired from a concealed position.
If only it were that simple.
Another feature of the existing L30 is that it uses 2 part ammunition, the projectile and propellant charge are stowed separately. There are a number of advantages to this model because it means empty cases do not need to be stored and the explosive propellant can be stored beneath the turret ring. One piece ammunition also allows the penetrator rod to telescope into the propellant case so its length to diameter ratio, and hence performance, is better than the 2 piece design, swings and roundabouts.
If the Challenger were to be upgraded to the L/44 or L/55 smoothbore it would need significant redesign to accommodate single piece ammunition (at least to carry a reasonable number of rounds)
The CHARM 3 development costs were in excess of £161million.
One of the advantages of a rifled barrel is its ability to fire High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) ammunition which has proven effective against a range of targets but sometimes the benefits of HESH are over stated. There now exists a range of smoothbore ammunitions from different manufacturers, benefiting from decades of development work that can outperform HESH.
We are therefore faced with 2 options; the first is to initiate a bespoke rifled ammunition development to obtain a small quantity of rifled natures. The second option is to go for the new barrel/turret combination that unlocks a wide variety of commercially available ammunition and delivers logistic commonality with all NATO tank operators. I suspect it will be cheaper to go for a bespoke development and therefore this will be the preferred option but is not the best option.
If we decide to upgrade the turret it might be worth comparing the cost of this with the cost of buying new Leopards for example.
Interestingly, the Jordanian King Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau has created an upgrade programme for their Challenger I MBT’s, assisted again by Claverham, that uses the 50 calibre RUAG CTG120 low recoil smoothbore cannon (same as the CV90-120) and the Falcon turret offers an interesting alternative. Developed with the assistance of a number of companies including Claverham Ltd and BAe, the Falcon turret uses a compact unmanned turret housing the same RUAG gun.
The latest development is the Falcon III which stores a greater number of ready to use rounds.
Another consideration is the FRES direct fire variant which would likely utilise an off the shelf low recoil 120mm main gun; the RUAG CTG-120, Rheinmetall LLR-47; Nexter LRF L/52, Oto-Melara LRF-120 or IMI RG-120. Combined with active protection systems and utilising new development in armour this combination may indeed deliver on the promise of similar lethality and survivability to a main battle tank.
Any investment in Challenger upgrades might therefore be wasted, accelerating the introduction of an actively protected direct fire variant of FRES is worthy of consideration. Because active protection systems do not offer any practical protection against high energy kinetic rounds from other tanks I think this is a risky proposition, as attractive as it might be from a standardisation perspective.
Bit sporty round ere; an issue facing tanks in the near and medium term is the proliferation of cheap and sophisticated anti tank weapons such as rockets and guided missiles. The performance of these are now beginning to challenge even the heaviest and sophisticated Chobham generation 2 armour of Challenger, although advances in armour will also likely keep pace.
Active protection systems are maturing and now seen as viable technology, ready for deployment. Armour technology continues to evolve, especially in advanced bainite type steels, plastic composites, perforated armour, stone sponge panels, fabrics, non explosive reactive armour, so called ‘electric armour’ and even the application of nano technology all combining to improve protection for the same or less weight.
As the world increasingly urbanises the likelihood of operating in urban or mixed urban terrain increases. The urban environment can be extremely dangerous and varied, in some respects the main gun armament, especially the longer 55 calibre barrels, is not always the best, especially if operating in support of infantry. Ranges can still be long or they can be point blank and the danger from above is another complication on the 3 dimensional urban battlespace.
Creativity is needed for this environment but many of the challenges have been addressed by others, fighting in built up areas is after all, nothing new.
Regimental Nonsense; make no mistake, the infighting between cavalry and armoured regiments about amalgamations, identities, what coloured trousers to wear in the mess and glorious history will be a serious impediment to meaningful change. It is the role of politicians to sweep these issues aside and tell them to get on with it. Personally I would scrap the lot and revert to simple numbered regiments but I doubt I would avoid being burned at the stake for suggesting such a thing.
Structure
The Royal Armoured Corps has shown considerable flexibility in recent operations, simultaneously manning Challengers, Bulldogs and Mastiffs in different theatres. It is this flexibility an inherent skill in operating complex vehicles in complex situations that should be strengthened.
We also have to recognise that armoured and combined arms warfare is changing every bit as much as it is staying the same!
The return from Germany will also pose significant problems for armoured units, the training spaces will be badly missed although there is no reason why we could not continue to utilise them in some manner. We might also take advantage of our defence cooperation treaty with France and utilise some of their spaces.
The current ‘lighter’ armoured regiments have a mix of Challenger and CVR(T), the CVR(T) being a substitute for FRES.
In the previous post on structures I suggested that the UK should retain 2 armoured brigades instead of distributing them across the multi role brigades but they would still retain the ability to detach individual armoured regiments or squadrons to support other forces on demand.
The thought process behind retaining armour as a discrete package is that armoured manoeuvre combat is a perishable skill and if we are to keep it, we should do it properly, even if at a modest scale. It is of such complexity that transferring them to the TA is not really practicable, even if the formation were split. There are capabilities that I think can be split in this manner but armoured warfare is not one of them.
This might be seen as anachronistic, a throwback to old fashioned ideas, in some respects it is but with the proliferation of tank upgrades and the move of Western forces to ‘go lighter’ enemies will seek to exploit these, it is not inconceivable that at some point in the near future we might face an enemy armed with comparable or near comparable equipment capabilities in a complex urban environment, the dividing line between winning and losing might therefore be training. We can only achieve and maintain this capability superiority through a combination of relentless synthetic and live training.
This approach also chimes with the harder core and shorter term approach to operations in the previous posts. Despite this, there is nothing to stop the 2 armoured brigades detaching individual sub units for other operations.
An alternative perspective sees the likely reduction of enemy tanks down to almost zero by air power before ground operations even begin and when they do, anything that moves will be destroyed by a combination of Hellfire and Brimstone but in complex terrain, obscured by smoke or obscurants, with enemy armour mixed in with civilians, the use of air power may be constrained.
The 2 armoured brigades would be structured on a square or 2+2 basis, 2 armoured regiments and 2 armoured infantry battalions but the two armoured regiments would not be equal in configuration.
Accepting Whole Fleet Management the nominal establishment would be;
Armoured Regiment 1; 4 sabre squadrons each with 4 troops of Challenger 2, each troop has 3 tanks. HQ troop also has a pair of CR2 for a total of 14 CR2 per squadron, RHQ has also has a pair of CR2 for a total of 58. A number of support vehicles also provide medical, protected mobility and command facilities. The armoured regiment would also have a FRES equipped reconnaissance squadron and other support vehicles.
Armoured Regiment 2; 4 sabre squadrons but instead of having 3 troops of CR2 each squadron would be equipped with a single CR2 troop and 3 troops of the Challenger Support Variant (to be detailed later) with the normal compliment of HQ functions. Same number of support vehicles, reconnaissance and RHQ vehicles
Between the 2 regiments, approximately 120 CR2 and variants or 260 odd across the 2 brigades and training/development functions, out of a total of just under 350 existing now.
More than the planned 40% SDSR reduction depending on how you slice the numbers, remembering that numbers can only ever be approximate
Armoured Infantry Battalion 1 and 2; same configuration, 4 full strength infantry companies plus associated HQ and support functions, broadly configured as today (ish)
For armoured operations in close terrain there can never be enough infantry and artillery, we should recognise that in some situations the infantry component should be reinforced.
Combat Support and Combat Service Support; including artillery and armoured engineers, again, broadly as configured today
This configuration is pretty safe and conventional but there is nothing to stop innovation in structures still being worked on in the longer term.
As I mentioned in the previous post, the rapid advances in communication, augmented reality, and an all round familiarity with information sharing might allow sub units to grow for the same overhead in command structures.
Radical solutions like eliminating the distinction between armoured, recce and infantry personnel are also worth serious consideration, forming them into single identities to avoid the barriers to reform. For example, Challenger is owned by D(RAC) whilst Warrior is owned by D(INF) and whilst this might not necessarily be a bad thing it does reinforce a distinction.
Another interesting solution would be to make brigades slightly smaller than currently, perhaps a reinforced combined arms battlegroup with extra engineering and other support functions.
Smaller units tend to be more agile and easier to command but the overall HQ overhead would be greater.
The key message to take out this section is that formation structures aren’t right or wrong and whilst I tend towards the larger, more robust and powerful structure a smaller, more agile construct might be more appropriate.
Who knows, the MRB might actually be the best option!
Equipment – Challenger 3
To say that Challenger is tough is a rather substantial understatement and I am sure we have all read tales of one taking multiple RPG and Milan hits in Iraq or the longest ever recorded tank kill at 5,100m, this quote from another site.
There seems to be some confusion about what happened and what shot etc. the range was just over 5100m. We had finished moving forward and had gone firm. i was scanning the horizon when picked up what i thought to be T62′s across the valley. We had been shooting at whatever targets presented. I lased the target and was surprised by the range that came back, we started talking about having a go at the target amongst ourselves and The Colonel ok’ed the shot. it was a normal fin round, and after lasing again i fine laid the ellipse onto the target and fired. It was central hit just below the turret, as to whether the target was manned, i don’t know however the shot I was really proud of is mentioned by Mad Pierre by mistake, which was a T62 mover reversing up and out of a hull down position at about 1500m, and was hit with a HESH first round through the top of the turret, again fine laid without autolay, never did like it much. Hope this helps. I was always a lucky gunner.
Challenger is also very reliable and has excellent cross country mobility.
In the short term there is not a pressing need to do anything, we have enough Challenger 2 at the latest theatre entry specification but in the medium term there is a need for a coherent plan that tackles obsolescence issues. It is not surprising that these plans exist but have struggled for funding, currently languishing in the early concept stage.
BAe proposed the Challenger 2E for export but it is no longer offered, this model incorporated a raft of improvements including;
- A more powerful engine, the widely used MTU 883, coupled with a Renk 295TM automatic transmission. The compact and more powerful 883 reduced engine volume, freeing up space for fuel and extending range.
- The Sagem (now Safran) MVS580 IRIS day/night sight
- A range of other enhancements such as an improved track tensioner, double pin tracks and improved suspension
Oman ordered 38 Challenger 2E (Export) that are now in service.
Newer versions of these combined with the latest TES fit might be included in the Challenger 3 upgrade programme (have decided to call it Challenger 3)
The real sticking point is of course the main gun, because this involves the greatest work.
There needs to be a decision on this, the Rheinmetall L55 would seem to be the obvious choice and this allows us to tap into a wide range of ammunition natures, provides commonality with pretty much everyone else and delivers lower long term costs. This would also be a good opportunity to divest ourselves of the chain gun and use a pair of remote weapon stations instead.
An active protection system should also be fitted as standard.
In line with my thoughts on quantities this would mean less than 100
This would no doubt be a costly upgrade but quantities would be limited and allow the Challenger to stay in service for several decades.
Equipment – Challenger 3 Support Variant
This is a bit of a departure from the conventional so bear with me.
As I mentioned above, the world is becoming increasingly urbanised and by a simple matter of statistics it is likely that conflicts will take place in this challenging environment where engagement ranges can still be significant but can also be extremely short with threats from all around and from tall buildings. In this environment, the 55 calibre barrels and high velocity 120mm ammunition can be overkill against targets other than main battle tanks, fortifications, buildings, troops in the open etc. Although manufacturers have responded to this variation with a number of different ammunitions natures there are still challenges.
MBT guns do not have a large elevation range, their muzzle blast can be dangerous to accompanying infantry, slewing speeds and barrel length make responding to targets of opportunity/fleeting threats difficult and traditionally, armour is concentrated to the frontal arc.
A nation that has experienced high intensity armoured warfare in urban areas is Russia in Chechnya and whilst the conduct of their operations against Grozny might be questioned and certainly not the conduct that would be acceptable to the UK, there are some interesting equipment lessons to draw. Israel also has a great deal of experience of fighting in complex and confusing urban terrains and again, many lessons can be drawn. The US Stryker operations in Iraq and USMC in Fallujah also have interesting parallels with the kind of demanding environment might be increasingly encountered in the future.
The second armoured regiment in each brigade would therefore be equipped differently to be able to operate in this environment either protecting main battle tanks (in conjunction with infantry) or acting in direct support of infantry where threats are predominantly not enemy tanks.
This would take the base Challenger 3 as described above but without the new turret and 120mm main gun, the inspiration for this is the Russian BMP-T.
The crew would sit within a hull down armoured capsule and a super fast slewing remote weapon turret fitted. Additional rear and top armour would provide greater all round protection and the turret would be fitted with an elevating mast on which would sit an electro optical sensor, laser rangefinder/designator, acoustic gunshot detector and optical scope detector.
The main weapon fitted would be a single CTA40mm cannon in a very high elevation mount, at least 80 degrees and should also be high enough to depress to a negative angle. Because in an urban environment a target might be beneath the horizontal, a bridge or by pass for example, this negative angle depression is essential. By using a small/medium calibre main weapon there exists the possibility of carrying a high volume of ammunition of multiple natures, important when you might be using the weapon to destroy cover for example.
In addition to the 40mm cannon it would also be fitted with a number of guided weapons. Choices abound here; Javelin for commonality with accompanying infantry, Hellfire for commonality with Apache and extra punch or even the new Lightweight Modular Missile
Although offering no commonality benefits the LMM might provide the best fit, lightweight, modest explosive effects and very low flight time, all useful characteristics.
By keeping the weapons turret relatively lightweight it allows slewing and elevation/depression speeds to be very high, this, combined with a ‘hunter killer’ sighting system is the key to its offensive capabilities.
Additional smoke generation, active protection systems, all round cameras, a remote weapon station with a GPMG and an obstacle clearance blade should also be fitted, the latter is an option on Challenger 2 and I think a few were deployed in the early Telic operations..
The weight saved by dispensing with the heavy turret does a few things.
First it improves mobility and secondly, if one is prepared to sacrifice some of that extra mobility, the vehicle can be even better protected, especially the top and rear aspect.
This vehicle might seem a rather strange hybrid, a main battle tank equipped with a medium calibre automatic cannon but the protection afforded by the basic design means it can go in harms way with a weapons package that is much more suited to the urban environment.
An even whackier alternative is to dispense with the 40mm cannon and LMM combination and revert to old fashioned high explosives. Instead of the high velocity limited elevation 120mm MBT cannon a low velocity 90mm or 105mm auto loading weapon might be useful. There are many off the shelf 90mm and 105mm weapons available with a very wide range of ammunition natures. It would still retain some capability against armoured vehicles but the ability to deliver a large high explosive or fragmentation round at high elevation or low depression would be unique. The Stryker Mobile Gun System (MGS) has proven extremely effective in the urban environment but its poor mobility over broken ground and limited protection tend to mark it down.
With the ability to deliver both high angle plunging and direct fire the Patria Nemo 120mm auto loading mortar might be an even more versatile combination.
The basic proposal is to make the Challenger more useful in a complex urban environment by taking advantage of its protection, presence, mobility and endurance but combining those with a more useful weapon system.
Equipment – Warrior
Warrior is another reliable, tough and highly mobile armoured vehicle that seems like the poor relation now FRES is on the horizon.
From the MoD’s Medium Armoured Tracks Team (MATT) IPT
The WCSP will update the current Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicle to meet the current and future requirements of the British Army. WCSP has four main sections; WFLIP (Warrior Fightability Lethality Improvement Programme), WMPS (Warrior Modular Protection System), WEEA (Warrior Enhanced Electronic Architecture) and ABSV (Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle). Capability upgrades will include a new turret housing and main cannon, enhanced electronic architecture, situational awareness, crew operating conditions and modular vehicle protection.
The programme hasn’t yet progressed to main gate and is looking increasingly vulnerable to budget cuts despite recent progress. It has been reported that of the 789 vehicles delivered, 643 vehicles were to be included in the programme with only 449 vehicles getting the full package, including a new turret.
A wide range of improvements have been recently introduced as Urgent Operational Requirements and these would be absorbed into the coherent programme.
One of the significant cost aspects of the sustainment programme is the turret and new cannon.
The first thing to consider; has the debate between the turretless armoured personnel carrier and the turreted infantry combat vehicle gone full circle. It is interesting to look at the Israeli army which has steadfastly refused to follow the MICV trend and instead concentrated on providing highly survivable infantry carriers, the Namer being the latest example of this approach. Support fires are provided by others. A turreted weapon is designed to suppress ATGW teams for example and provide fire support to the dismounted infantry.
A reduction in armour, higher profile, much higher cost and reduced carrying capacity all result from having an auto cannon turret and if we go back to basics, assuming that the vehicle is to get the infantry section as close to their objective as possible, the relevance of a turret can be called into question.
Removing the turret from existing Warriors but implementing the rest of the sustainment programme improvements would dramatically lower cost. Coupled with the fire support provided by the Challenger Support Variant the need for a turreted cannon becomes reduced and a pair of remote weapon stations, one with GPMG/HMG and the other with a 40mm GMG would still deliver suppressing fire, smoke and HE beyond 1500m.
The elimination of turret weight allows a few trade-offs to be made, simply reduce the weight for obvious benefits or trade that weight for extra protection. It also provides more space for the infantry section and their equipment, given the increase in size and weight of carried equipment since Warrior was introduced this is an important consideration.
BAe have proposed a similar concept with their CV90 Armadillo
This would of course require a doctrinal change in the way armoured infantry is deployed.
Stripping a Warrior of its turret does not a Namer make it and the solution is not perfect but it makes the best of what we have.
The reduction in overall quantity of armoured infantry battalions, down from 8 to 4, also frees up many Warrior chassis for conversion to secondary roles. This will allow the elimination of the FV430 series from armoured infantry combat support and combat service support functions with the attendant reduction in logistics overheads. It will also enable the elimination of CVR(T) variants within the armoured and armoured infantry units.
Actually, this might not be completely possible depending on final quantities available but the principle of moving towards common platforms is obviously sensible.
All vehicles would be crewed by specialist Royal Armoured Corps drivers and gunners, consistent with the suggested practice in the previous post to free up trained infantry personnel for infantry tasks. This frees up infantry personnel to bulk up the fourth company in the structure.
I will cover artillery (including organic indirect fires) and ISTAR/FRES/Formation Reconnaissance in another post.
The Future of the British Army Series…
The Future of the British Army 01 – Scene Setting
The Future of the British Army 02 – Tasks and Capabilities
The Future of the British Army 03 – Rank and Size
The Future of the British Army 04 – Structures
The Future of the British Army 05 – Heavy Metal
The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)
I question the idea of armour is expensive. As I have said elsewhere compared to what?
Until a definitive answer to the tank comes along we are stuck with it. So why not have the two home brigades doing this job. No problem with triangular brigades.
Shift the infantry over to Warrior to get rid of Spartan, FV432 Bulldog, etc. If a tracked vehicle is needed for RSM, engineers, why not use Warthog (a tad light perhaps?)
The FRES mystery confuses me.
I have two dumb questions:
1) Would the Stormer’s we have been any use in Urban warfare, are they just to lightly armoured to be much use? According to the Army web-site they are being withdrawn from service, it seems to me that if the Stormer’s can take take the weight they make idea platforms for NEMO, we could equip half with the turret and the other half as ammo carriers.
2) The Falcon turret suggest it is possible to re-turret a MBT, could we not buy Leopard 2A7+ turret and fit it straight on to the Challenger?
TD; is the Chally support variant you propose solely for close support on the groumd or would it also cover local air defence (if that’s the right term)?
@Alan, no, air defence would be sorted by others but it might have some limited air defence capability
@Tubby, not sure Stormers would be survivable in a dense urban environment. The problem with mating a Leo turret and CR2 hull is that it doesnt solve the stowage problems which needs a fair bit of work to make workable but its an interesting idea isn’t it
“The L30 does not have a fume extractor(…)”
Strange, for one is externally visible!?
The British Army has given up on the L/55retrofit option, the engineers were not able to solve the ammo storage problem. A retrofit would require a new turret.
About structures:
The paper TO&Es are for training.
Mixed battalion battle groups are for conventional warfare.
Historically, a ratio of 1 armour Bn to 1 infantry Bn proved to be the best compromise in most European terrains, but that was from a time when armour Bns had less tanks (and lighter ones) and infantry battalions had more infantrymen (IFVs squeezed the infantry strength because of their scarce seats).
Today’s mechanised forces are probably too light on infantry for conventional warfare in most terrains, but the repeated warfare in Arabian deserts has hidden this from plain sight.
Given we need the Challanger…
Why do we need 2 Brigades?
Why not a single division unit? keep them all at one base peace time train and support together etc. Can detatch small units as necessary…
I am not convinced about tanks.
There is a touch of ‘if all you have is a hammer everything looks like a nail’. About some of the arguments in favour.
Then there is the numbers arguement, we can’t fall below the proposal above or we risk Just having tanks to stay in the tank club.
did I write that Sven, just going to edit
I think the point about infantry is well made, especially in close/urban terrain which might be argued is much more likely. This is also why I would tend to reduce the MBT count and support them with direct fire support using more appropriate weapons and back filling the infantry component with drivers and gunners and get the tankies to drive the Warriors
@Ixion, for basic availability reasons and the need for a pair of brigades to execute any sort of maneuver
Going turretless on the Warrior would badly affect the justification for the CT40, even if a Challenger Mod uses it.
There is an opportunity here to consider as well. If we are going to replace the bulk of the CR2 turret then it might be worthwhile going the whole hog and replace the whole tank.
With something new.
It isn’t just the gun. The really expensive bits of the turret – the sights – are increasingly obsolescent as well. Bear in mind that these are 1990′s technology and, unless someone has done something sneaky that I haven’t noticed, the commander’s sight is still II/daylight only, not TI. The TOGS sight is also fixed to the gun line which precludes its use a extended ranges.
The CR2 has been in service for more than a decade already, which is getting close to the service life of the Centurion. Might it be worth starting to think about a replacement heavy family of vehicles to replace it and others? In the same way that Merkava now has the Namer APC in support, and the Challenger chassis has spawned Titan, Trojan and CRARRV.
With a modular armour system, the same automotive systems could be used for frontline vehicles and also as the base for heavy artillery (AS-90 weighs something in the region of 45 tonnes) that would be increasingly resistant to counter-battery fire with smart munitions.
So this could be an opportunity to lead the world with a family of vehicles based on a heavy automotive solution (thereby avoiding expensive reliability trials again and again).
For the sake of example, one could have:
MBT – High velocity gun, good protection. Secondary or tertiary weapons (possibly optional) with improved fire arcs
APC – Minimal armament, extremely good protection
IFV – Light armament with good elevation ranges in a possibly unmanned turret. Good protection. Intended to provide support to the MBTs against ATGW and elevated positions. Dismounts, possibly reduced numbers vs. the APC to secure/reconnoitre complex terrain, but with a remote turret, the internal volume need not be affected.
ARRV – Similar size, so able to recover/repair all the heavy battle-group’s vehicles. Protected for front-line use and fitted with self-defence weaponry. Potentially add some Atk capacity with a limited ATGW fit (i.e. Javelin/LMM either dismounted or on a RWS)
AVRE – much like Trojan/Titan. Maybe fit some kind of HE-chucker like a LMM launcher or Javelin. Have the capacity to add IED equipment (carried robots, IED-poking device on the digger arm, that sort of thing)
Artillery – Guns or rockets, but protected against artillery-launched smart muntions using modular armour that needn’t be carried when that threat is not likely.
Logistics – perhaps overkill to use this chassis for logistics, but strip off most of the protection and you’ve got a very large load capacity and something that can be protected against artillery-delivered smart weapons or IEDs as the situation demands. Plus everyone likes commonality?
As per usual, interesting though provoking concepts. I mainly disagree with the inability of the TA to handle the complexity of armoured manouvre warfare. Having seen the large ‘hanger’ (warehouse?) full of wheel-less Challenger and Warrior hulls at Rheindalen (?) all networked together for high intensity synthetic training – it would appear we have been doing that for years !
I came up with the same numbers (4 and 4) in my head for my structure, but actually put them in the TA (with regular cadre instructors of course). I have even postulated re-turreting with a Falcon derivative because that keeps a smaller number of TA crew down in the hull for maximum survivability.
I also had the same idea ref turretless Warriors – standard variants having double weapon RWS with 12.7mm and 40mm GMG, plus a Redback 40mm, 8 anti-tank variants with RWS mounting HMG and Euro-Spike (simply because I have never seen Javelin integrated in such a way) and 8 Recce variants with the 40mm CTA turret from the FRES Scout.
I even had a ‘Infantry Fire Support’ Challenger in my head too, but it mounts a BAe 120mm AMS smooth bore mortar with two RWS with HMG and GMG.
Great minds think alike …… ?
On regular army formations I had decided on 4 Armoured infantry mounted on APC versions of FRES ASCOD (armed as above) with the 5 ‘Formation Recce’ Regiments being ‘Medium Armour’ regiments and taking on a more multi-role appearance. I won’t mention how they would be armed as you have an article from me asking questions on that.
I know you won’t agree with that, as it’s ‘net new’ equipment, which means spending money we dont have, and I wont restate my political thesis on funding defence appropriately (although I am sure Solomon would agree !).
By the way, the ‘mechanised’ element of my future force would be 8 battalions in Warthog ! So MRB would be 1 x Medium Armour, 1 x Armoured Inf, 2 x Mech Inf. from which to build battle groups as required. Perhaps 3 x TA Chally regiments, with 1 x Regular, with 4 large Sabre squadrons on the 1 in 4 roulement would mean that at least there would be a ‘high readiness’ heavy armour element to reinforce an MRB if needed.
Mr Fred – just before TD gets to say it – where is the money coming from for all your great ideas ?
I had a more modest proposal, which would probably still cost too much – replace 250 Chally 2′s with 250 ex Dutch Leopard II (as they are getting rid of them all) upgrade as required to A7 – how’s that for ruthless commonality (with our allies) TD….. ?
Lots of points to make. For starters, like just about all “future of Army/Navy/RAF posts, there’s no context or strategy in which to fit our imaginary units. To start with, we really should be deciding what strategic requirements are: do we want to hedge against possible future requirements by maintaining expertise, deter Russian adventurism against Eastern Europe, maintain the capability to intervene in the Middle East unilaterally? Going by “this is what we have on hand, lets cut x% to save y%” is tail wagging dog. Yes, the MOD has been merrily ignoring long term costs in ordering equipment, but the way to sort this out is to think long term, starting now.
From here we can develop requirements for units. Going by recent history, a square armoured brigade was unable to take Basra back in 2003 without weeks of attriting a mostly irregular force down, so we might want to bear in mind when sizing our requirements.
Making our CR2 fleet into a mainly BTR-T type is interesting, but given that this will remove the majority of our high end antitank capability for a lot of development cost, I’m not sure it’s a very good idea. Given that most of our Warrior fleet is already 20+ years old, and FRES is effectively the same vehicle, why not just replace the lot with the latter?
Replacing manned turrets with unmanned ones makes excellent sense, as does moving to smoothbore. See http://defense-update.com/products/b/bradley.htm for BAE’s Bradley unmanned turret demonstrator: I really cannot understand why we’re sticking with manned turrets for the likes of FRES and WLIP
….
If we’re looking at requirements, Telic fairly obviously needed 3 armoured brigades to do properly. Assume we need the same amount to cover NATO responsibilities, and we have our requirement. Facile dismissals that reserves cannot cover some of this are all predicated on the TA being trained and sustained on current models; plenty of other countries manage to run reserve armoured units.
So, lets get on with it
I don’t know – I was thinking in a little longer term than the immediate, but perhaps it could be funded with the profit from the banks we bought.
Or we could look on it as a business opportunity. Invest in the family of heavy vehicles. Buy enough of the dratted things to get the unit costs down then sell them abroad to recoup some of the costs and create an upgrade market. It’s effectively what Germany did with the Leo 2.
What it won’t do is collapse the business case for the merville-canon (which should collapse under it’s own weight, but that’s probably my cynicism again). FRES Scout’s turret won’t fit on Warrior – GDUK are keen to tell everyone that the turret ring is 1.7m and Warrior is a fair bit smaller than that. On top of that, with a total market of what, 200 guns? It’s not really a viable number to be going on with is it?
In the near term, we could look at modifying LAHAT to be fired from a rifled gun. IIRC, it is subcalibre anyway (105mm?) and is saboted out to 120mm. Buying a whole new tank or a substantial turret design could jeopardise the opportunity to get a family of vehicles.
With the Chally’s main gun etc, go for the most common gun you can get instead of a bespoke design.
If you want to modify some of the Chally 2′s how about instead of an all new turret with the CTA40 Gun could you use turrets off the Warriors instead?
The advantage being that we have quite a few of them so have lot’s of spare parts etc.
Hi Tubby,
RE “According to the Army web-site they are being withdrawn from service, it seems to me that if the Stormer’s can take take the weight they make idea platforms for NEMO, we could equip half with the turret and the other half as ammo carriers.”
- always been for that ( a new caliber; never mind)
- stick to the 5 MRB x 18 (90 leaves still a good number of HVM carriers, should protection from tactical air while on the move become important)
- then study the number of flatbed Stormers available; would a ratio of one of them to 2, or 3 do? There’s a fair number of them (tank mine “layers”; I think they fire them up in the air first)
What I would find really helpful is knowing about all the info of the Army vehicle fleet, all the no.s, the capability of the operators to operate, maintain and make serviceable the vehicles in the fleet. Etc.
They’re so many different types of vehicles in the Army, and the whole universe of the fleet is not straight-forward at all. Anyone know of any Parliamentary Q&As or some succinct statements like that, that could enlighten me?
Sorry for the request but thank you anyway in advance to any who feel it worthwhile answering my queries.
TD, v good piece, and thought provoking, too.
Like your 1+1 tank formation, to cover all eventualities (some can stay at home, if that is not needed).
The Jordanian turret design? NIH & false pride?
- what’s wrong with it?
It is like when Iran first ordered improved Chieftains – Shir 1′s. Then the ones that had been manufactured but could not be delivered (turn of events)became Jordanian Khalids.
- Brassey’s say ” the tank that Chieftain should have been”, and paved the way for the Challenger design
- the minus 40% (Chally numbers) can be sent to factory (joint order; to push cost down?) and when they come back, the ISV variant can be worked on next
- strange idea, that Russian rockets; was it a private venture (and they stuck them on, for show, rather than fiddling with an (AT)GWS?)
@ Rupert re Strategy Scenarios
If I were to say where the next proper war will be I would look to Sub-Saharan Africa. I would follow the SANDF and look to wheeled vehicles as they have better range (look at the distances) and are more suited to the conditions. MICV/IFVS backed up with ATGMs. Think flying columns of the BOAR war. I don’t think the Chinese will be present in too great numbers; I suspect the West/Europe/NATO/US and allies/India and allies will be able to interdict the Chinese reinforcements at sea.
But this doesn’t really fit with our discussions on tanks.
good post admin. interesting read as always. thank you.
Excellent article TD. I can see your square tank brigade working, put personally I’d prefer not to have Tanks that are optimisied for Urban Warfare and nothing else. Having a new smoothbore gun and just fitting it to elevate higher would be more to my personal liking.
“The Jordanian turret design? NIH & false pride?
- what’s wrong with it?”
Germany went with an unmanned turret lately with the Puma IFV, but it’s still tricky at best.
External gun proof-of-concept vehicles minimise the silhouette, but actual for-service designs such as Puma add a lot of silhouette for sensors, radios, ammo and much more.
Poof, one big advantage gone.
Then there’s the big problem with situational awareness. It’s still a good thing if the TC can stick hid head out and look 360° instead of relying on video screens. This requires him to be in the turret.
Next is the issue with autoloaders in general (external turret = autoloader): They reduce the crew by one.
Sounds fine weight- and cost-wise. The problem is that this is one man less for maintenance and pulling security.
Then there’s the problem with external gun autoloaders, not the least the GDLS design: Their reliability is shit. Many Stryker MGS cannot fire their tiny ammunition load without a stoppage.
The reliability of that Jordanian turret is unknown to the public.
Then there’s the ammo issue (see Stryker): A turret has limited space, especially so if it’s silhouette-reduced. Less than 20 shots is not debatable. You need to make use of ammo storage in the hull. Few external gun systems do that because it blows away one of their pro arguments (separation of crew citadel and ammo).
And what do you do if the enemy uses EMP ammunitions? Can you really harden your turret or do you maybe want to keep the option of manual loading or at least an electrically simple autoloader?
Hi x,
Going to A-stan in theirs, as in ” I would follow the SANDF and look to wheeled vehicles”
- they figured it all out in the 70′s
- those are the vehicles they are now replacing
Range is one, if OpFor has nothing more than HMG and (nowadays) lots of RPGs, then the mine is (has been, too!) the main opponent
Not just the mines. Sub-Saharan Africa is quite dry. Tracks bring no advantage. Quite high average speeds can be maintained. Just watch out for termite mounds which are as hard as concrete.
Hi SO,
Good that someone seems to know about these things;
“Germany went with an unmanned turret lately with the Puma IFV, but it’s still tricky at best.”
- sorry to hear, so bloody expensive (what’s wrong?)
“External gun proof-of-concept vehicles minimise the silhouette, but actual for-service designs such as Puma add a lot of silhouette for sensors..”
- would you rather take a hit on a sensor (no periscope tube down anymore) or on the main body?
“Then there’s the big problem with situational awareness. It’s still a good thing if the TC can stick hid head out and look 360° instead of relying on video screens. This requires him to be in the turret”
- this v much agreed
- recce, especially, without that facility is computer game land…
“Next is the issue with autoloaders in general+ there’s the problem with external gun autoloaders”
- yeah, all the best (low profile) tank hunters used to have this… imagine hopping out in the heat of the battle
- does anyone actually field EMP rounds? Never heard of them before
“- would you rather take a hit on a sensor (no periscope tube down anymore) or on the main body?”
This was about the difference between proof-of-concept vehicles and actual production vehicles.
The advantage of radically smaller turret silhouette is in practice at least halved.
Have a look at the current Puma IFV; it has a towering CITV sensor on top in order to replace the TC’s ability to look for himself. This actually increased the vehicle height a lot.
http://h4.abload.de/img/puma_pressebild_02xral.jpg
- – - – -
EMP grenades are feasible; the explosive releases the energy for the pulse, and the munition explodes close enough to the target to do damage.
Even if nobody would field these (unknown to public) – to field an even more electronics-dependent tank smells like a provocation to field EMP shells!
The Challenger 2 should be sufficient for the British Army for the short to medium term or 2025. As has been pointed out there is a major problem looming with its ammunition but besides that the platform is very sound.
One solutiion would be for the MoD to contract RM to develope a APFSDS round based on either the DM53 or DM63 rounds. The charge system is very basic and again it should be possible to find a manufacturer for these. As for other specialist rounds such as HESH that is an other issue but where there is a will (and funding) there is a way. Sorting the ammo situation is going to be far cheaper than redesigning the platfrom to fire and store current smoothbore ammunition.
Sorry folks can you see the Army top brass let alone the MoD doing anything that radical abd sensible?
The treasury has made up it’s mind that tanks are so yesterday that they have already spent the savings from binning them!!!
Positive as usual!
Forget who it was but warrior upgrade for regulars is crazy. Go straight to FRES SV, move warrior to TA and upgrade as and when.
CR2. Definately new gun and engine etc
EMP is probably less of a worry if all your electronics are inside a large metal box – like, eg, a tank
“The thought process behind retaining armour as a discrete package is that armoured manoeuvre combat is a perishable skill and if we are to keep it, we should do it properly, even if at a modest scale. It is of such complexity that transferring them to the TA is not really practicable, even if the formation were split. There are capabilities that I think can be split in this manner but armoured warfare is not one of them.”
An honest question – why? For the benefit of those not initiated, could someone please advise the requirements for training with armour.
One can appreciate with a fighter jet that the pilot needs to be on top of their game to avoid pranging an expensive piece of taxpayer property flying nought feet from the ground, but does armour need that level of dedication? Put another way, recent experience suggests that Challenger’s might be deployed in small numbers every few years. So irrespective of inventory numbers how much training and resource is required to maintain the requisite number of crews to support that level of deployment?
Somewhere in this review of structures and equipment we have to be mindful of personnel cost. By virtue of the number of personnel involved the army’s wages bill is the single biggest enduring expense to the defence budget. It is no exaggeration to say that how efficient the army is with personnel costs determines the size and substance of all three services. So, is it beyond the bounds of reasonableness to give the TA a good chuck of our armoured assets as a reserve?
@Mr Fred, I like the idea of looking beyond the current CR2 and Warrior combination but this was a more short term proposal
@Rupert, if you read the opening pieces on the series and lots in between you will find lots of strategic context, have a wade back through the archives. Would you go oversquare then or just have more of the same?
The whole point about splitting the CR2 fleet into high end tank killers and something that supports them and infantry is close terrain like an increasingly urbanised world is to maximise investment. Although I made the point about lots of tanks still being out there we have not stood still either, Javelin and Hellfire make a big difference
Cokerill/CMI in Belgium have a 105mm guided missile/gun combo (the missile is called Falarick and is from the Ukraine)
http://www.cmigroupe.com/files/files/defence/cmi-defense-newsletter09-05-nocut.pdf
http://www.cmigroupe.com/files/files/defence/BATdefense-ctcv.pdf
http://www.cmigroupe.com/vpage.php?id=434
Look very impressive
@Michael, I suppose we could try and lash a Warrior turret onto a CR2 but why bother, its going out of service and armed with a not very good weapon.
@Joe, a might take you up on that offer and do a post of what we have already in service, its a big old beast though!
@ACC, Sven makes some great points about autoloader remote turrets. I wasn’t particularly advocating the Falcon turret just pointing out that modifying the Challenger is not an impossible task
@Lord Jim, I think this is exactly what is happening, RM will redesign their DM53 for rifled firing, its the cheapest option but not necessarily the best
@RichardW:
You can train a tank crew and even a tank platoon in a year (possibly a half) if you have competent trainers and equipment.
It’s more difficult to nurture the attitude and competence for armour operations, though:
# staffs need to be accustomed to the logistical requirements and limitations
# tactics that exploit the battlefield mobility of armour are very different than infantry tactics
(there’s even a huge tactical difference between mechanised infantry units and armour units in the German army; the whole thinking about how to advance is different!)
# lots of supporting equipment and units need to be fit for armoured forces such as bridging and the supply system.
# Infantry cannot be trained against armour attack-related panics if you have no OPFOR tanks for the training.
# the whole appreciation of terrain is different for armoured troops
Tank Training.
An armoured regiment normally takes 2 weeks to conduct their annual live firing. This is from a start state (on the simulator) through to Annual Crew Test (ACT). The ACT I believe, does not include troop level fire and movement which is covered under troop assessment. Therefore if the current TA model is kept a TA regiment will be able to field Challenger 2 crews, but will not be able to field any tactical capability at troop or above level.
I concur with SO on his points.
One of the big issues with losing an armoured capability is that the UK might then degrade its ability to conduct operations at a high tempo as a secondary effect. Armoured (heavy) units conduct operations at a high tempo. Their crews and commanders learn to think fast and act fast; it is in their ethos. Armoured infantry regiments do not, light role infantry certainly do not. My experience of generals is that armoured commanders are less focused on detail and more focused on effect and they and their HQs operate at a higher tempo.
Yep,
My BMW should not be the good old Landie, but neither the tempremental PC as in
” to field an even more electronics-dependent tank smells like a provocation to field EMP shells!”
I don’t think that it is necessary or desirable to separate the long term and the short term, but if we do keep to the short term then I think that the role of tank support (with large arc and lighter weapons) should be covered by the IFVs in mixed battlegroups. They have the weapons, plus they have the dismounts for security, complex terrain and the like. The IFV won’t be as survivable as the MBTs, but that’s something for the longer term.
The use of armoured infantry in IFVs like they are some kind of “Heavy mechanised infantry” is symptomatic of trying to do too much with too little, or not really playing to the strengths of the formation. Perhaps the German approach where Armoured infantry are an elite unit and operate closely with the tanks is a better use of the arrangement. Callum’s point regarding operational tempo is something to consider in this light.
Regarding EMP, it’s unlikely that you could hurt an armoured fighting vehicle with battlefield-size weaponry
Callum, you have hit the nail on the head there with your comment about structure of the TA.
I tend to think its the perishable skills that most seem to think should be in the TA or other reserves because they are associated with being out of date but you might consider it to be the other way around
Mr Fred, when I was mulling over the various combinations for this post I did consider using Warrior as the support component but in the end I thought we would get greater benefits from using them to cull off the old 430′s on the periphery to reduce the logistics bill a bit, although I take the point that the fuel usage of a Warrior will be gerater than a 430 based on basic weights etc.
I like the suggestion of thinking long term and binning Warrior completely in favour of FRES or some new common design as you suggested, its sounds like one of those sensible spend to save things I really like but as sensible as it might actually be, its hard to suggest it given the financial place we are in
This book;
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Panzer-Tactics-German-Small-unit-Armor/dp/0811732444/ref=pd_ys_iyr3
Will give you some idea of what is involved in high level, fully organised armour units. So many things to consider, from the conduct of road marches to the important finer points of laying out a defensive position.
And just in general, I can’t recommend this book highly enough. There really is nothing like it on the market, the detail that it provides. It is more like an operations manual as opposed to a history book.
I still strongly belive that as long as modern ammunition is available the Challenger 2 will be more than up to the task for as long as it cna remain in service.
However I do question the need for Armoured Brigades as such. I see the MBT as a support platform in future conflicts not as the tip of a juggernaught. AS such we should not be fixating on Infantry Battalions in IFVs supporting them. The Armys Medium Armoured Platform is going to be the core of FF2020. Now there is a strong chance this platfrom will be able to operate closely with MBTs fulfilling the IFV role but with less firepower but then again if you are with an MBT how much do you need. I see a 12.7mm HMG as more than adequate for an infantry carrier maybe suppliments with a 40mm AGL. IF the Army’s new Medium formations are equipped with such a platfrom and its specialised variants it will greatly facilitate the creation of modular formations taylored for specific operations. With Recce and GW platoons re-integrated into battalions we could have a very flexible order of battle. As has been mentioned many times before the Elephant in the roon is funding post 2015.
We do have to accept that we are not going to operate large Amoured formation ever again. Battalion sized battlegroups operating under a Brigade Headquarters is the future. Massed Armour is redundant on the modern battlefield. So much technology matred in the 1990s and 2000s with the aim of detroying such formations. Just lok and the USAFs skeet dispenser, where one can wipe out a large part of a Tank Battalion and mosr Aircraft can carry more than 6. Then there is the UKs Brimstone, again making the life of armoured formations very short. Modern land combat is going to be focused around the Infantry and that is where it should be.
A few points;
1) 120mm L30 can tackle any opponent it is likely to meet and HESH is, possibly, the best secondary round available. Any tank that can withstand a 120mm HEAT round can survive a 120mm HESH strike but will probably not be in fighting condition afterwards due to having no sights. HESH is excellent in urban situations and acceptable as a substitute for general HE so you only need to carry two types of round.
2)Converting Challengers into BMP-T is probably not a good idea. At the end of WWII, the prototype Centurion featured a coaxial 20mm Polsten cannon. It was deleted because when faced with a target that could be engaged with the cannon, crews just used the main gun anyway. The BMP-T is a silly idea which in practise will be of no real value. I better idea would be a Chalenger II Avre with a Dozer blad and high elevation demolition gun.
3) Gun fired missiles are a crap idea. Always have been. Always will be. A 120mm or smaller diameter HEAT round is just not effective against modern armour. Top attack options may give it a slightly longer lease of life but if top attack munitions become more common then armour packages designed to defeat them will soon become commonplace.
The medium weight FRES idea might genuinely be the right way to go but not with ASCOD or MCV80 – neither of which is any advance on Warrior.
TD interesting article. Interesting Idea about the challenger variant for urban warfare. The only issue I have with it is would politicians agree to its deployment? Russia and the Israelis are a lot less sensitive to putting that kind of fire power in a built up area than we would be.
I agree with you that this should be retained in the regulars but would not want them to train on the other vehicles this would along with 16AA and 3CDO be the theatre entry capability.
IF the warrior look a like (fres scout) chassis can be made to perform the role a APC and MBT and possibly artillery then that should be investigated now as the extra warrior and challengers should be used now to significantly reduce fleet types in the armoured vehicle fleets.
@ Lord Jim.
Tanks as support tools? Like the “infantry tank” designs of WW2, that proved to be completely inadequate in the face of action.
The tank is absolutely all about being the tip of the spear. That’s its job, its reason for being.
The tank is is used to punch through enemy lines and attack the rear, leading the path for operational penetrations of enemy territory.
“Massed Armour is redundant on the modern battlefield. So much technology matred [sic] in the 1990s and 2000s with the aim of detroying such formations”
That’s making the assumption that one side has air superiority. And you’re forgetting the advances that have been made in surface to air missiles.
Armour has a long way to go yet.
Chris B said “the tip of the spear”
Through the mud and the blood to the green fields beyond. As the saying goes….
Not sure if my point was clear. I was advocating using a Warrior, with turret, with infantry, as the support element of an armour formation, rather than cooking up a one-trick pony out of a limited pool of MBTs. Leftover Warriors can be used to replace 430s in armoured formations, other formations (i.e. Mech Inf) can use FRES variants.
The tank has been called dead more times than most people care to count, just because it becomes possible to destroy them. Anti-tank guns, airpower, ATGW, cluster munitions, the next generation of ATGW, attack helicopters, another generation of ATGW, smart artillery munitions and so on.
All of this effort goes into defeating armoured vehicles and people claim the return of infantry, but the infantry can still be stopped by a single machine gun and slaughtered by artillery.
The wonder of combined arms means that all your assets work together to cover each other’s weakness.
Medium armour as the panacea of modern warfare is the work of fools and responsible for much of the wasted procurement money and effort over the last two decades. Network enabled computer centric surveillance based wizardry is all very well, but a radio isn’t going to stop a 125mm shell.
We don’t have the money to deploy large armoured formations, so should we start looking at deploying units with organic armour at a lower level, so as to disperse it in the face of air attacks? Or does this run the risk of penny-packeting combat power?
The coalition will wait for the ammo to expire, then retire the Challenger 2 tank. British tank crews will train on French & American tanks, on our capability holiday. Smart people will say on telly that the tank is obsolete. More money will be wasted on foreign aid & EU contributions.
In the late eighties, smart people said we would never fight in the desert again & sold our desert uniforms to Iraq. Then they said we would not need main battle tanks. Then Saddam invaded Kuwait….
The ongoing credit crunch means a major war is coming & thanks to blinkered thinking on defence, WE SHALL LOSE.
I am interested in the ABSV (Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle) version (or conversion) of the Warrior. Not much has been said about this so far by the Army or MOD. If approx. 640 (latest figure?) Warriors are to get the full WCSP package, that leaves almost 200 for conversion to the ABSV role, if the programme goes ahead (or am I sadly out in terms of numbers here?)
Will the ABSV mainly consist of Recovery vehicles and Repair vehicles only or will there possibly be other variants? One of the reasons for my asking is that I was informed several years ago now that the explanation why armoured infantry battalions continued to use the FV432 81mm Mortar Carrier, was that the development of the Warrior Mortar Carrier had hit a snag. I think it was something to do with the width of the vehicle. Something about fitting outriggers (is that the term?) being necessary. Anyone know anything about this? I don’t know what the alternative would be if a Warrior mortar vehicle cannot be developed.
It was my understanding that ABSV would be a weapon, troop or supply carriers much like the FV430 series. Repair and recovery vehicles already exist for the Warrior chassis (FV512 and FV513, which make up a proportion of the 900 or so Warriors in service)
@Think Defense: yes, I read all the previous posts on the Army, RAF and Navy. There’s not enough baselining against previous operations, and there’s a lot of implicit assumptions that are not justified.
Regarding the difference between tank guns/high velocity missiles, the former will always have an intrinsic advantage as to the number of attempted engagements per period of time. They also have the advantage as a hedge against technological surprise, as millions of joules of penetrator will always be harder to defeat than a chemical attack, not to mention their relative vulnerability to active defenses
Regarding armoured brigade organisation, I’m more of a triangular man. I see increased requirements for infantry in likely terrain and would favour a 1 tank company, 2 mech inf company organisation with current equipment, with the proviso that the latter needs an antitank weapon mounted under armour if they are not to be a millstone around the tank company’s neck in the event of serious opposition. 3 “heavy” battalions would be complemented by a single light armoured unit mounted on CVT(T) Scimitar and Spartan.
A long term ideal would be a combined vehicle to replace both, with a fire team on board, with a 40mm cannon for light armour and suppression and HVM’s for antitank use, operating from an unmanned turret….but this is not what we can get right now.
I see some confusion about the Warrior CSP programme here, among other things.
Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme consists of:
WFLIP (Warrior Fightability Lethality Improvement Programme) which is the new turret and gun and stabilization system for firing on the move. Originally it was to be given to 449 Warriors. Now we are talking about 300 or so due to the drop to just 5 battalions.
WMPS (Warrior Modular Protection System) to add a modular armoring system: a ready system (sorta like the german Puma’s) that allows swift fitting of additional protection for Theater Entry Standard protection without having to modify the vehicle every time, engineering new solutions.
WEEA (Warrior Enhanced Electronic Architecture) to add a fully integrated set of modern, expandable electronics and communications gear, included hopefully an Open Electronic Architecture which would make future upgrades and obsolescence removal around 10 times easier…
ABSV (Armoured Battlefield Support Vehicle) to improve the repair and recovery variants that keep the fleet in the field: ABSV is the trademark of the various upgrades for the FV512 and FV513 recovery and repair variants, in other words.
Out of 788 Warrior IFVs received by the British army,
489 were FV510 Infantry Section Vehicles, of which 105 kitted especially for carrying ATGW teams (once MILAN, now JAVELIN).
84 Infantry Command Vehicles FV511 (instead of soldiers it carries officials and radios in the back)
105 FV512 Mechanized Combat Repair Vehicles
39 FV513 Mechanized Recovery Vehicles (repair)
52 FV514 Mechanized Artillery Observation Vehicles (the gun is dummy, so no CTA40 update either way, space is taken up by computers and other kit)
19 FV515 Battery Command Vehicles – command vehicles for AS90 batteries in the RA
WCSP was to upgrade a total of 643 vehicles with WEEA electronics and WMPS modular armoring upgrades. Within that group, 449 vehicles would also get WFIP program’s new turret and weapon system. Those will be FV510 for the most part, but FV511 too. Good part of the 512 and 513 will be upgraded, but no turret change.
I don’t know much about FV514 and 515, the two variants used by the Royal Artillery.
The 514 has a dummy gun, carries MSTAR radar, BATES systems and other artillery direction stuff, but the FV515 should have a real gun, and hopefully the ones still in use will have the turret change, so that the Rarden gun can be retired whole.
If someone knows how FV515 and FV514 are issued inside AS90 batteries, i’m eager to know.
Rupert, I make those assumptions based not on what I think will happen but what I think should happen. The future of series kind of loosely aligns to those assumptions but it is a rambling series of posts with only a loose set of boundaries.
When I have finished this I will have a go at tightening things up but there are only so many hours in the day!
Gabriele and no mention of an uprated engine. Warrior or MCV80 as it was originally called, started out at 24tonne, with a 550hp engine. The bloody things are nearer 35tonne and use the same engine!!!
The Ascod SV will have a 700-800+ hp engine, the German Puma has a 1100hp v10, christ, the engine on the Boxer is over 600hp.
This needs addressing, many of our armoured vehicles are under powered!