It would be the easiest thing in the world to write a post that demanded more, more people, more money and more equipment but as painful as shrinkage is, it is simply unavoidable. Having watched a medal ceremony on the TV tonight it brought home how the Army, like the other services, are not really about what calibre rifle, how many missiles your destroyer can fire or how fast your jet fighter can fly, but about people, people with families.
The Army is of course personnel heavy, it is the largest service but on the flip side, it has much lower cost equipment so whilst the ‘currency’ of the Royal Navy is ships, the currency of the Army is battalions or brigades.
It would be equally easy to think that this series is some race to the bottom, a cutters agenda with no thought for the future but I tend to think in terms of realism.
I simply do not believe in jam tomorrow, or hoping that the next government will suddenly decide to prioritise the armed forces over health or education. The MoD has been held over a barrel by successive governments for far too long, reducing budgets yet not allowed any semblance of strategic realism.
Not only is it forced into hopeless optimism it is often criticised for doing so.
Yet despite these external factors the MoD and services are equally guilty of optimism and must carry their fair share. FRES is the poster child for an equipment project that has suffered so much because of an underlying optimism and fickleness, following military fashion, in this case the RMA/FCS powerpoint fest. FRES was to equip the medium weight formations that were to form the backbone of the Army structure. Since then it has traversed the sunny slopes of Future Army Structure and now Future Army Structure (Next Steps) or the Multi Role Brigade. When first mooted FAS(NS) was for 3 deployable divisional HQ’s and 8 identical brigades, reality has of course overtaken this and now it seems 5 brigades is the latest aspiration but unless the pixies deliver a pot of cash to the door of the CDS’s office it remains an aspiration.
The Army knows full well that post Afghanistan it will be in receipt of a peace dividend, the same ‘peace dividend’ that it and the other services has been unwillingly receiving for decades. In the interminable internal struggles that seem to pervade the UK’s defence planning the Army is putting its future in the assumption that enduring low to medium intensity deployments will be the norm and therefore the 5x MRB plus 16AAB is a line which it cannot fall beneath, the other services will simply have to live with the remaining crumbs. THe 5 brigade structure copes with enduring overseas deployments and other deployed duties whilst maintaining the separated service harmony provisions.
Looking at recent history it is hard to disagree with this prediction and in the absence of any meaningful strategic guidance from government it is simply the most sensible way forward
Unfortunately the MRB concept, whilst eminently sensible in some respects, fails badly in others. Because it is designed to support enduring deployments at a low to medium intensity if the operation demands a higher intensity it starts to unravel.
It seems to be driven as much by deployment intervals or administrative neatness than combat effectiveness.
In the previous post on tasks and their underlying strategy I hopefully set out what might be considered a realistic, if admittedly depressingly modest, future. This is simply a reaction to the need for change, both in organisational composition, financial realism and a more cooperative approach to the use of violence!
I know it might sound a ‘bit yoghurt knitting can we all just be friends now’ but I do genuinely believe that the best strategy for the UK involves a reappraisal of the utility of preventative soft power, intelligence, diplomacy, building regional security, early intervention and a realisation that the armed forces might not actually always be the best solution for serving the needs of the UK. Would I be happy with a smaller armed forces in return for investment in energy, food and water resilience, no, but I recognise it might actually be the sane thing to do.
This means a realignment of resources, which means a different Army.
Contents
Thoughts on Violence
There seems to have recently been a trend away from the application of overwhelming force, graduated responses that focus on minimising risk and cost but this is counterproductive, if we make the decision to intervene it should be on the basis of applying this overwhelming force at speed, delivering a debilitating blow in one. This goes against the MRB concept to some extent which is light on firepower. The stumbling block is self evidently the enablers, getting where you want to go being constrained by transport and logistics capacity.
This is normally addressed by adapting your force to the level of transport available, the Royal Marines and 16 Air Assault Brigade being light role exactly because we don’t have the means to deliver anything but a lightly armed force!
So if you want speed you travel light and if you want heavy to travel slow.
Unfortunately this limits combat effectiveness and leaves a yawning gap in the middle. The simple answer is to improve your means of transport but there are obvious practical limits and the FRES equipped medium weight concept basically foundered on this simple limitation.
Whilst I am not advocating a return to the medium weight concept I do see a need for a dramatically improved logistic capability. The British Army, by a combination of unavailability of transport, the cost of maintaining heavy forces, a prediction that the future isn’t heavy and a desire to maintain infantry numbers is moving to a lighter armed force by default.
The Battle of Doctrines Past, Present and Future
Before we can even begin to look at structures there has to be an underlying strategy and resultant doctrine and this is where things can get hideously complicated because the academic and military theorists make entire careers out of calling tomatoes tomatoes if you catch my drift.
There are more military theories than you can shake a stick at, 4/5th Generation Warfare, revolution in military affairs, network centric, the non linear battlespace, human centric, COIN, special forces led, the comprehensive approach and effects based operations.
We can be forgiven for thinking that following the latest fashionable military theory provides a stimulus for constant change, constant study and a constant need for new equipment to meet the latest fashion i.e. keeping up with the Jones’s and showing how fiendishly clever you are.
If we look at history, were things fundamentally different in Oman or Aden that they are in Afghanistan, haven’t we always actually practised doing things for effect?
Is the tail wagging the dog here?
I ask this because when we strip away these theories the fundamentals remain, as they always have throughout the ages of armed conflict; appreciating terrain, knowing your enemy, knowing your objectives, knowing your capabilities, manoeuvring to achieve effect, clearly understood responsibilities, basic competence, trust, unit cohesion, discipline and applying decisive violence at the right moment etc etc
i.e a collection of common sense attributes that have been taught and learned for centuries.
A lot of these alternative theories seem to have stemmed from the worldwide media fuelled revulsion at the ‘Highway of Death’ in 1991, subsequent moral outrage at the use land mines, flamethrowers, cluster munitions, thermobaric weapons and god forbid, any small arms round that is actually designed to maximise tissue damage.
We must not lose sight of the advantages of not entering into even fights with our enemy.
In the earlier post in comments, we discussed the likelihood of a Slim or Hobart type figure appearing in the future and a US General, William DePuy, was mentioned. An interesting name drop because it is DePuy who wrote a number of excellent works on having a balanced approach, not forgetting the basics and understanding that in the end, it is attrition, not manoeuvre that defeats the enemy.
That is, killing them.
His paper, Towards a Balanced Doctrine, is well worth a read and still relevant;
Attrition is such an “ugly” doctrine that it claims no known or announced adherents, even though most wars finally have been resolved on that basis. Certainly it is permissible to be against attrition so long as the critic does not spread his anathema over the whole idea of fighting; not only fighting, but hard, bloody fighting, should that be necessary.
Victory in such combat has classically gone to the commander who concentrates (and applies) superior combat power at the point and time of decision.
The industrialised destruction of Iraqi insurgents by special forces contrasted with the so called COIN approach of softly softly elsewhere and it would seem that combat operations in Afghanistan have recently moved to a more violent, attrition approach where the objective is quite simply to kill the Taleban as fast as possible. Some complain that this approach eliminates those who we might negotiate with and hardens resolve so the ultimate success of the ‘kill em all’ approach remains to be seen but if there is no one left to negotiate with your job is done, surely?
The manoeuvre v attrition positions are two sides of the same coin, in some situations one or the other will be the most appropriate, sitting neatly in the middle is the non combat but seemingly enduring requirements that make discussion so difficult.
This leads me to the conclusion that we need to maximise combat power in our formations, units and sub units, not spread it thinly and whilst it is accepted that with a reduction in numbers forced by a reducing budget, a corresponding reduction in overall strength is unfortunate but accepted.
i.e. a more powerful but smaller force.
The second conclusion is that we need to stand aside from modern military fashion and get back to the basics, put transformational doctrines in their context and stop talking about the warfighter (please)
Finally, whilst recognising the academic debate about the nature of conflict accept that they are just as likely to be as varied as they are now.
Above all, flexibility and agility of approach are the key elements of success.
Becoming David
I might have over used the David v Goliath metaphor but it still remains valid. Rather than a lumbering, fitted for but not with spear and underfed Goliath, we should be moving to a hard as coffin nails David.
The Multi Role Brigade is Goliath.
As most readers will know, my depressing fiscal reality is a constant theme in the Future Of series, it takes the position that there is no jam tomorrow and if we want more capability x or system y, we have to move the levers within their existing constraints. I very rarely attempt costing because that is impossible without detailed knowledge of information that is both commercially and militarily confidential so only broad brush assumptions can be made.
If I want to improve one area and provide funding for the ‘capability plus’ and forward presence concepts the money has to come from within the existing budget, saving for larger buy to save or one off adjustment charges which might be viewed as one off transformational costs.
To generate my ‘cash kitty’ the main area for savings are quite simply personnel numbers and to achieve meaningful reduction needs two things
First is a reduction in overall numbers, this is where the majority of savings can be made, perhaps obviously.
Second is an increase in efficiency achieved as we discussed previously by altering the ratio of unit and sub units, reducing the number of senior ranks, increasing civilian and contractor use, not allowing expensively trained specialists to other jobs and generally streamlining the manner in which the Army’s does its thing.
Light role, the concept of light role infantry would seem to be more difficult to justify except for rapid reaction units whose operational existence is predicated on either rapid intervention or specialist units in particular terrain like mountains or jungles. The need for protected mobility and to enable operations to be conducted in a larger area means that vehicular or and/or helicopter transport is essential for most. However, history demonstrates that light infantry tends to have enduring utility and the opposing view, that they are vulnerable because of how they commute to work is too equipment centric to base your entire approach on.
Adaptable infantry, we need to adapt the mode of transport to the type of operation, not the type of unit. In some operations a tracked armoured vehicle is desirable and in others, something more akin to the Mastiff or Bronco makes more sense. The dividing lines between light role and mechanised infantry have been blurred over time but armoured infantry remains a specialism. The area of operations that a given force size can dominate will depend on many factors but smaller units spread over a larger area might be possible in one scenario and completely impossible in another, this influences the enablers like logistics, artillery and engineering support. Because of resource constraints we might also take a critical view of infantry soldiers carrying out HQ tasks, driving vehicles or even providing offensive support fires, As in the example above, where RTR drivers and Broncos provide an on demand transport service for the infantry, delivering them close to their objective, carrying out resupply and covering fire, might be a model of efficiency for the future.
The regimental system works against this flexible and adaptable approach, although an infantry battalion may have at attached REME light aid detachment you will still find infantry soldiers, with many hundreds of thousands of pounds specialist training under their belts, driving stores vehicles, operating signals equipment in the command post, manning unit stores or doing regimental police duties.
We know that future conflicts will be carried out in often confused settings where high intensity combat may be immediately followed with something more akin to policing, closely followed again by high intensity combat. That is not to say that long term peacekeeping operations should be the norm but a simple recognition that variation is normal. To cope with this variation, infantry soldiers need more training and more time to do that training that is important over and above the basics.
This a bit of a generalisation but the underlying desire is to see infantry soldiers only doing infantry tasks, unburdened by secondary activities. These secondary activities should be carried out by others.
Tanks and armour, people have been predicting the end of the tank for decades but whilst its form and function might have changed and the constant cat and mouse game of measure and countermeasure played out, their combination of mobility, firepower and protection has remained essential. The old myth about tanks being vulnerable, and therefore useless, in urban situations is only partially true. When integrated into a modern combined arms set-up they can be extremely effective, as shown by the IDF and USMC in Iraq. There is also a continual debate about the role of armoured infantry transport with decisions on tracks v wheels, APC v MICV and the position of the MRAP/PPV in tomorrow’s conflicts. A lot of these arguments are akin to dancing on the head of a pin but important nevertheless.
Building blocks or Nailed Up, moving away from the traditional armoured/mechanised/light model, where units are characterised by their equipment, towards a single organisation type i.e. the MRB might be extended by having additional force modules or building blocks comprising extra armour or engineers for example. Thus, whilst the MRB might be fine for some operations, where additional armour is called for, it could be provided by simply bolting on an armoured building block, there is some merit to this solution.
One of the postulated problems with the MRB is the sheer span of equipment and roles, this causes significant training and support issues, bloating the maintenance and repair function for example, I tend this think this is a little over exaggerated but still worth considering. There are advantages and disadvantages to each approach, there probably isn’t a right or wrong answer but at some point a decision has to be made. Personally, I am not enamoured with the MRB, it is too much of a compromise, based on rotational convenience and because of the span of equipment, will not likely save anything in the back office.
Because of this rigid structure we tacitly accept inefficiency; it’s the way we have always done it and therefore cannot possibly be wrong.
A completely modular approach, where the constituent building blocks including infantry, command and control, signals, engineering, logistics, artillery, vehicles and all the other building blocks are assembled depending on the mission might be radical but if we manage the underlying processes correctly, may just be possible.
An Army of Lego
Doing a simple, top down structure is pretty easy, let’s just have 2 armoured and 4 mechanised brigades, no real change and no underlying analysis but hey, where would be the fun in that?
In any proposal on Army structure we must start with the fundamental building blocks and ask where the centre of mass is; platoon or company, brigade or battalion, division or battle groups?
The US modular Brigade Combat Team has an interesting approach with three variations; the infantry, heavy and Stryker. The Infantry version has 2 light infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron plus associated support and artillery. The Heavy version has 2 combined arms battalions, a cavalry squadron plus associated artillery and support. The Stryker version has 3 ‘motorised’ infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron and associated artillery and support functions. The USMC organisation is equally as interesting and one could spend a month just looking at Israeli, Norwegian, German or French variations.
The common theme to each of these is that they each meet the needs of their respective countries; one is in no way superior to the other, just different ways of doing things.
The British Army (excepting 16AAB and the RM) comprises of 3 basic Brigade types, light role, mechanised and armoured although there are variations between even the same type of brigade, 7th and 20th differ in that the latter has a light role infantry battalion instead of an armoured infantry battalion in the 7th for example.
It is a bit of a myth that the British Army infantry is ‘heavy’ and driving around in cold war relics, even discounting the 5 battalions in 16AAB and 3CDO, light role battalions account for well over two thirds of the total. But of the remaining, the majority are armoured with only 2 mechanised battalions.
The medium weight brigade concept, centred on FRES, has evolved into the Multi Role Brigade discussed above. The MRB is very similar to the current mechanised brigades which have a mixed bag of 1 each of, armour, armoured infantry, mechanised infantry, light role infantry and formation reconnaissance.
The normal brigade structure has all manner of supporting units and capabilities closely tied in an enduring relationship. This allows the whole formation to train together, rotate into theatre together and fight together as a single unit; crucially it provides a day to day familiarity that translates into combat.
Despite these fixed formations one of the great strengths of the British Army is its ability to generate temporary, mission specific, groupings. Look at any operation for the last several decades and you will see a mix of units and sub units.
Could we formalise this approach so that infantry battalions form the basic fighting unit that are combined with enabling and supporting building blocks to form ad hoc formations that match exactly the mission at hand, instead of square pegs in round holes we have the opposite (no, that’s not square holes and round pegs!)
The means of transport would also sit outside the infantry battalion structure, crewed by specialist drivers and other crew from the Royal Armoured Corps. This is how Mastiffs and Broncos are being used in Afghanistan and the specialist knowledge they bring to bear has also demonstrated many advantages, this is also how the Israeli Army works as well the armoured branch operate the vehicles that the infantry are carried in. The same infantry battalion may in one operation use an armoured personnel carrier, another operation a helicopter and another, a protected patrol vehicle.
Above the battalion level, there would be a series of modular command capabilities that could scale up and slot into battle group, brigade and even divisional HQ’s. Depending on the nature and terrain of the operation the deployed unit might be heavy with logistics or light on engineering for example.
Each of these bespoke formations would need some time to assemble and get up to speed but in the context of larger deployments being preceded by political manoeuvrings or preparatory air operations, Libya for example, there would be time to prepare. Where time before a deployment was short, the traditional formed brigade structure of the high readiness units would remain, 16AAB and 3CDO (I will be doing a separate post on these) being the two obvious examples.
The traditional formed Brigade and Regimental HQ’s would therefore largely disappear, to be replaced by a number of scalable and deployable HQ units, dedicated solely to the task of command. To cope with wartime attrition, these HQ’s would be duplicated. For peacetime administration and local training each battalion would be managed by consolidated regional administrative HQ’s and a single training and development command function.
The deployable HQ units would have no peacetime administrative role and would concentrate on the art of operational command to the exclusion of all other duties.
Both the deployable and regional HQ’s would be multi cap badge, an important feature.
We already have single battalion regiments and there is no doubt in the value of the regimental system but it can also act like a millstone around our necks, the aim with this system would be to retain the best and ditch the worst.
This is not quite a proposal for the creation of a Corps of Infantry but it is not far off.
The combat support and combat service support functions would be structured in a similar manner but some of them are much more tied into their equipment than the infantry, where the infantry should really be vehicle agnostic (if vehicles are simply to get them as close as possible to the objective) armoured combat engineers for example, need specific vehicles and the concept of bridging in an armoured field squadron (assault bridging) is very different to that of a non armoured field squadron.
I will come on to battalion and below structures in another post but by cutting out the middle layers and sweeping aside much of the duplication involved with regimental and brigade HQ’s there is no reason a reasonable sized force could not be retained within the constraints of a reduction on overall numbers.
What about armour?
They might be cold war relics in some people eyes but there worth is enduring, however, the role of the tank will likely change as it always has. The role of the armoured infantry is generally to provide support to the tanks, destroying ATGW teams for example and this specialism is worth looking at. Although I make the case that mechanised and light role infantry are largely interchangeable I am not sure this is the case for armoured infantry.
Perhaps it would be a sensible middle ground to retain the armoured formations as formed brigades and go down the modular road for the rest.
Nuts and Bolts
The British Army currently has 36 infantry battalions, 5 armoured regiments and 5 Formation Reconnaissance Regiments plus associated combat support and combat service support elements.
The TD vision for the Army is as follows
16AAB and 3CDO retained as the high readiness, theatre entry force, each comprising 4 battalion sized units rotating into the high readiness role in sequence.
2 Armoured Brigades but changed configuration, rather than the triangular I would like to see them square, 2 armoured regiments and 2 armoured infantry battalions, concentrating not spreading their strength. Specialist armoured combat support and combat service support units would change to meet the new configuration and the formation reconnaissance force would also remain. If the armoured brigade were required to deploy it would be advisable to reinforce them with additional infantry from the modular battalions or non deploying armoured brigade if possible. There will also be some equipment changes detailed in a subsequent post.
9 modular infantry battalions, able to operate equally in a light or mechanised role.
2 specialist jungle infantry battalions, I see Africa as a key strategic landscape in the medium to long term and we should not lose this specialist skill, expanding our capacity in fact. The Gurkhas already provide one of these battalions.
2 specialist arctic and mountain infantry battalions, again, the Polar regions are likely to be of long term strategic interest and whilst this role is currently fulfilled by 3CDO RM I have other plans for them so this specialism would transfer to the Army.
A range of plugin combat support and combat service support capabilities including 2 formation reconnaissance regiments
This would result in a reduction of 1 armoured regiment, 1 formation reconnaissance regiment, 13 infantry battalions and their associated combat support and combat service support
This is a significant reduction with many risks but it allows a reprioritisation of resources elsewhere and more closely matches with the strategic choices highlighted in previous posts.
The Future of the British Army Series…
The Future of the British Army 01 – Scene Setting
The Future of the British Army 02 – Tasks and Capabilities
The Future of the British Army 03 – Rank and Size
The Future of the British Army 04 – Structures
The Future of the British Army 05 – Heavy Metal
The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)
The Future of the British Army 07 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (02) A Sensible Future
Supporting Articles
Medium Armour – what is it, and what does it mean for the post 2020 force structure?
funny you mention mountain warfare going to army, just the other day i was watching some bloke doing a programme up in the scottish munroes he was on some bleak island with OMG mountains covered in snow in june!!
I thought well if we are going to shitcan the RAF out of at least one of the camps, why put an inf batt (minimum) in and train them up in mountain/ artic warfare. I assume you could even have recruit training for scottish soldiers there which would help with initial shock of leaving home and end the 2 days of travelling on leave.
and maybe establish a decent instructor base.
On the medium armour note perhaps we should look at the other nations who developed the common chassis for many options (one of the things i liked about the CV90) ie from turretless chassis,going up through 25mm,40mm,90mm 120mm i note that the 25mm has ATGW on the side as well all on the same base.
just a quick thought on the post
Some interesting stuff there TD. I have read a little on the US concept (little knowledge a dangerous thing!!) and I think it suits the UK. They keep all there basic brigades at 2 manoeuvre battalions of about 3500-4000 personnel I believe which is a more manageable size for the UK to move.
So I would reduce 16AAB and 3 commando to 2 battalion each and keep them specialised in air assault (para and heli) and the commandos in amphib assault.
I like the the jungle and Arctic idea but id go and form 2 brigades of 2 battalions. The jungle one prob best made from the brigade of Gurkhas.
I also keep the heavy armour and for 3 brigades of it again 2 manoeuvre battalion (2 companies MBT and 2 companies warrior).
Id also increase the SFSG to 2 battalions and form a special service brigade.
I would move all the medium stuff to the TA and have them as a large more paramilitary force (this would change there terms of service quite a bit but thats for later).
The modular battalions is an interesting Idea could we maybe make them a sort of battlegroup size thinking along the line of a USMC MEU type for that can slot into any of the above brigade to add reinforcement Id have 8 of them.
I want to play.
Parachute Regiment over to SFS Group. But able to field 1 battalion as manoeuvre unit to Army Cdo Brigade / RM Commando Brigade. As pointed out elsewhere as percentage of the army’s budget 10 big Bays would only cost 1% of the current army budget to operate per year.
Army Commando Brigade: Mirror of 3Cdo. Initially recruited from the within ranks of line infantry and guards (and support arms.) Using Commando 21 organisation. Plus a FFR. (One FFR to 3Cdo.) Arctic / Jungle Warfare
Line Infantry: “Home” based units man armour/mechanised brigades. NATO declared. “Overseas” units for UN peace keeping. Army to establish a “School of Peacekeeping, Civil Support” (whatever!) A soldier joining for 3 years may never leave the UK (well trips to BATUS excluded.) Or he may have a couple of tours abroad wearing the light blue head gear.
Guards/HHC/RHA: Ceremonial. Used as garrison troops in places like the Falklands, Cyprus, etc. Light mechanised as per Cdo brigades.
RAF Regiment: Really need an FFR and artillery regiment.
Gurkha: Why not……?
That bit about bit Bays should be under the Cdo heading. Damn these little boxes.
Also I assuming traditional 3 infantry battalion organisations for brigades. So 3 Cdo would be 40,42, and 45 Cdo’s.
I disagree in principle with anything that “penny packets” armour. It was this practice that ultimately lead to the fall of France in 1939.
I’d be inlined to group all the armour (and armoured infantry) into a pocket division that could be expanded with additional mechanised/motorised infatry formations as required.
I keep harping on about the gripes of German panzer div. commanders in WW2, they always needed more infantry.
However TD I like your thinking on the rest of the infantry, and yes I would kill the regimantal system and create a Corps of Infantry.
I’d also like to see our recruiting practises reformed from the seperate officer/enlisted processes to a single stream of enlistees.
From this intake you would then select the leaders as they emerge, I would also like to see a “grow your own” policy on late entry officers from the ranks.
This probably reads like a bit of a rant but it’s not intended as such, so I appologise for the poor punctuation.
Cheers, Alan.
Hi TD,
Excellent post, and makes sense to leave the equipment discussion for later.
You are “crashing down” from mid-forties to about 30 as for the number of front line combat units. I have been thinking on the lines of about 10 more, but I include artillery in the category
- heavy/ SPG
- GMLRS (heavy, but can be used in small doses, to cover a Bde area of ops with a couple of fire units)
- light (as per terrain/ mission, and always so for RM/ AAB)
- and UAVs when operated as a persistent element, rather than by the (infantry/FRR) units themselves in the field
… so numerically, the difference comes almost entirely from this category.
I am very much against two bn manoeuvre units: three as ready to go, and four when the overall stretch needs TA mobilisation (that said, if the stretch is not “overall” the 4th unit could easily come from within the regular formations)
TD,
I tend to differ from you and my suggestions for the future structure of the British Army stick much more closely to the proposals contained in the SDSR. Here are just a few of my thoughts on the future shape and structure of the Army:
I take it that the high-readiness brigade (16 Air Assault) will be retained in its present role (rapid deployment, out-of-area, etc), with more or less its present organization. Most of the rest of the combat capability of the Army, so we are told, will be divided into five multi-role brigades. The structure of these planned brigades has already given rise to some differences of opinion. Some have asserted that the new-type brigades will not differ very much from the present Mechanized Brigade structure. Others take the view that they will be larger and augmented in terms of personnel and equipment. General opinion is that personnel of each brigade will number around 6,500-7,000.
So here goes with my two-pennyworth. I must confess that my suggestions are probably 25% based on what I think the brigades will actually look like and 75% based on what I think they should look like in order to be genuinely multi-role.
The basic brigade structure would consist of the following:
1 Armoured Regiment(30 Challenger2s)(See Note 1)
1 Armoured reconnaissance battalion (30+ FRES SVs or CVR(T)s) (See Note 2)
1 Armoured Infantry Battalion (60+ Warriors – upgraded 40mm version together with variants) (See Note3)
1 Mechanised Battalion (60+ Bulldogs)
(See Note 4)
1 SP Artillery Regiment (18 AS90s)
(See Note 5)
1 Light Role Infantry battalion (possibly employing Foxhound vehicles)
(See Note 6)
1 Engineer Regiment
There will be, so we are told, “a migration of combat support and logistic assets currently held at divisional level into these brigades.” The SDSR suggests that the brigades will be “self-supporting, having their own artillery, engineer, communications, intelligence, logistics and medical support.”
With that in mind, I would expect to see a full Engineer regiment included, rather than just a squadron, and this would include heavy engineer tanks such as Titan, Trojan and Terrier, as well as bridging assets such as BR90. The Engineer contribution should also include a sizeable EOD (Talisman, etc.) component.
I would imagine that there would be at least one Signals squadron for Brigade HQ as well as intelligence assets, logistics support units, REME equipment support units, a medical squadron and a provost unit.
Notes
(1) The heavy armour would provide protected mobility and firepower. Challenger2s would be very necessary, for instance, if we were to be called into a land operation such as Libya.
(2) Reconnaissance units would supply in-depth information about enemy dispositions. If the ASCOD2s were ready, then these would be the vehicles of choice. Failing that, soldier on with CVR(T)s?
(3) Let us hope that the upgrade 40mm cannon version of the Warrior is not cancelled.
(4) Presumably Bulldog/FV432s are the answer here until FRES Utility version is
procured, if ever! Warthog could perhaps be used as an alternative to Bulldogs in one or two of the regiments, if a very large number of the latter are withdrawn from service in the near future.
(5) I take it that Corps assets such as GMLRS and air defence weapons such as Rapier will remain as Divisional assets, to be drawn upon as required. Apparently Stormer is being withdrawn but the brigade could possibly include a battery of HVM AD missiles (LML and shoulder-launched). The question arises, though, whether some 105mm Light guns should be included in the new brigades or at divisional level. They would not necessarily sit awkwardly alongside the AS90s and remember, the brigade includes light infantry, which might need lighter artillery support.
(6) The SDSR states that infantry will be in “a variety of protected vehicles”. I would imagine that the Light Infantry would operate from Foxhound vehicles,(if enough are available) but all infantry should exercise from time to time in other mine protected vehicles (MPAVs) procured especially for recent campaigns. I am thinking especially of Mastiff, Ridgback, Warthog, etc. Not all of these will be “clapped out” by the end of the Afghanistan campaign and a good number should be retained against future use.
(7) The question also arises as to whether the new-style brigade should have Army Air Corps assets assigned to it, possibly with Apache and Lynx. If that detachment were to be integral to the brigade, then liaison, training etc. would
be so much easier.
Despite having some reservations, I think that the British Army might very well be generally on the right track with the idea of the multi-role brigade. Indeed, some authorities believe that the British are potentially establishing a world lead in such thinking. The advantage in terms of organizational cohesion, force management, training and readiness must be considerable.
The British force in Helmand now consists of a force in which the infantry and many supporting troops are equipped with heavy-wheeled APCs such the Mastiff, as well as some Warrior and heavy engineer tanks. In earlier years British divisions and brigades took part in operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq employing a mixture of heavy units (Challenger, Warrior, and AS90), CVR(T) armoured vehicles, medium-weight units (Saxon) and unarmoured light infantry. The new multi-role brigades will include the equipment necessary to undertake a wide range of operations across a variety of conflicts that could arise over the coming decades.
The structure of the new-type brigades will allow greater choice in the size and make-up of a deployed force. It is expected that small groups from within the new brigades, such as an infantry battalion with a small number of vehicles and supporting arms, could be deployed quickly to evacuate British nationals in an emergency (e.g. Lebanon in 2006). By way of contrast, with sufficient warning the whole brigade could be deployed as part of a larger formation to fight in a full-scale war. The matter of “sufficient warning” rather worries me, though, as the ability to regenerate a heavier armoured capability needs considerable warning time.
@ Alan re grow your own
Officers are interesting beasts. The Chinese envy the West’s NCOs. At the sharp end it isn’t the 21 y o graduate who leads the platoon but the 28-30 sergeant.
My point is that by the time “leadership” emerges from OR they are well, getting on a bit. Amongst TA OCs you will find lots of “old” captains promoted from the ranks. Men of great experience and character but the “system” doesn’t accommodate them. The system is set up for those graduates.
There are good reasons for keeping the leaders separate. I wouldn’t know how to come up with another system. I don’t think civilian structures would work.
Hi Mike W,
A lot of good thinking there, also the recognition that as a manoeuvre unit a bn is not sufficient, but needs the supporting arms (A battle group) or several bn’s supporting each others movements/ tasks ( a bde, with more supporting arms thrown in).
On the equipment side of things, there are plenty of C2′s to go with your 5 x 30 (some can be stored, and also factoring in “need 3 tanks for 1 at the ready[??]“), the Warrior upgrade has also been speculated at a number that could fit with your vision.
Very few Foxhounds and even fewer FRES, but we are discussing the future force here!
What is not going to go up in numbers are the kit procured for A-stan, so not enough, and leaving the earlier procurements out (as clapped out), maybe
- 100 or so Broncos (uparmoured to Warthogs)
- 200 or so MPAVs/ MRAPs
… can that make much more than 3 bn’s? Cfr. what is done with them today
AA needs a thought (which you gave to it: Stormers being already in the storage does not mean they couldn’t be brought back, but training needs to incorporate similar elements… other HVM configs/ Rapiers?)
ArmChairCivvy,
Thanks very much for the comments. Need more time to think about them, though, especially about air defence and numbers of MPAVs/MRAPs available. Will try to respond in more detail in the near future.
Ooo, ooo, I wanna play!!
- I concur with the single stream training system. Pluck your potential officers out of the mainstream. Perhaps an assessment at the Lance-Corporal, Corporal and Sergeant stages?
- The bigger question beyond “we need x number of brigades” is what do you need these guys for and what committments must you fulfil (Falklands, Cyrpus etc).
- Keep the tanks,
- Lighten the load,
- I think the army should be split into a “Heavy” division (armoured) and a “light” division.
- Battalions from both should be deployable to task forces.
- Can I shorten tour intervals? I’d like to see the armed forces as a whole come down to 6 months in/12 months out as a minimum. Obviously if you have the men and material to extend the interval then that’s better.
- Being swung by various arguments over time that the tanks should be a TA job.
- My worry is that we use modern equipment and methods as an excuse for less warfigh… soldiers in the early stages of an op. Thus we end up shooting ourselves in the foot long term (that’s American sights for you) and by not properly subduing situations in those critical early stages.
TD interesting and thought provoking as ever, especially your infantry reductions. No comments at this time only questions, and I know your going to provide details in later posts, but I want to put your numbers and structure in context:
1. Is this structure supposed to meet the SDSR requirements for force generation or are you aiming at reduced commitments?
2. out of your 9 multi-role and 4 special role infantry battalions how do we man activities such as Cyprus and London ceremonials ?
3. Are you reducing the head count to spend more on decent kit for those remaining (just yes or no will do for now)
4. Do you envisage an enlarged TA / resrrvist element (or broadly the same or even reduced in line with regular numbers)?
Interesting ideas TD, keen to see your plans for RM CDO. One comment / question I have is whether the jungle / polar specialisms should remain with enlarged 3 CDO / 16 AAB structures (perhaps 5 battalions each). This would allow more time for training and also allow a joint brigade to be formed quickly if needed. Also, as parachute jumping into battle seems to be a niche requirement for SFs, aren’t the 16 AAB effectively the army CDO force anyway? Seems they are as likely to be helicoptered in from HMS Ocean as any other form of theatre entrance.
Tour Intervals: In excess of 13 months operations in 36 months results in significantly increased mental illness rates (RJ Rona et al ‘Mental Health Screening in Armed Forces Before the Iraq War and Prevention of Subsequent PsychologicalMorbidity’ BMJ (Vol 333, No 7576) and other studies. Current UK harmony guidelines are for no more then 13 months in 36.
‘Grow your own officers’. A considerable number of Direct Entry officers now have previous non-commissioned experience. I am not sure what there is to gain from a system as envisaged by TD. I presume that he is referring to a system akin to the German system where officers serve as Officer Candidates in the ranks before moving to the Officer Academy? Or the Israeli system where everyone starts off as a ranker and then progresses on merit?
I tend to agree with critique of multi-role brigades; they really are a jack of all trades masters of none, seemingly harmony guidelines have trumped tactical utility. Personally, I would prefer to see a structure similar to the US, with brigades of light, medium, and heavy weights deploying 2-3 battlegroups. We then have greater flexibility over size and hardness of our deployments.
I’d prefer to see the creation of 16 Airborne Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade as 3 battalion brigades, deploying an ad-hoc airborne/commando force (see Falklands) and providing special forces support with detached units (around company level, one from each brigade). two battlegroups of paras and maureens would be on 24hr standby for jumping/shipping in. That does mean jumping as well. Both units work on Bruneval/St. Nazaire style work and US Army Special Forces style insurgency support; might be handy in Libya, Yemen, and certainly Afghanistan. Not only would this provide a sharp cutting edge, but also would expand in an area we are of particular use to the Americans, some might even call it a capability-plus.
The rest of the army then forms around 10 or 12 small brigades, with the majority of support elements being attached when and were required. I don’t really buy into the marketing fluff of ‘jointery’ and ‘organic’, units should work alongside one another, not merged with seams showing everywhere. Obviously there’ll be REME bods kicking around armoured areas, but attaching full support regiments to brigades is something the USMC has managed without for a long time. Furthermore, a similar structure would allow us to work alongside the US easier.
There are also a lot of intangibles under attack, for the sake of brevity, I will simply say that hacking at regimental headquarters and creating amorphous units may seem good on paper, but could have damning effects on morale and capability (note- this does not mean everyone is guilty, nor I innocent). These two areas will be particularly fragile over the coming ten years.
I have said before in my experience members of the Royal Marines and Parachute Regiment are different beasts. Um. I don’t think the “rivalry” between is simply “us and them” I think culturally they are very different. I find the former a lot more rounded than the latter. I think also in some abstract way less is expected of the latter.
Can somebody who is more knowledgeable explain “Cyprus” to me? It is my understanding it is garrisoned by two battalions. Why? Especially as the Falklands make do with one company. In what strength is the RAF Reg deployed there? Where is the threat?
One battalion is committed to the Theatre Reserve Battalion (TRB) role as the over the horizon reserve for Afghanistan. The other is committed to security duties on the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). This latter is fully committed. The SBAs are large and while the duties are akin to Internal Security (IS) duties in support of the SBA Police they have been called upon in the last decade to prevent major disorder and large scale incursions.
Currently the Cyprus commitment is being reviewed again, but strategically Cyprus is hugely important to NATO both as a forward basing area for troops and aircraft but also as an ELINT station.
You know what the Multi Role Brigade is…?
A small-size copy of URSS Motor-Rifle Divisions! The concept is identical.
http://www.armouredacorn.com/Orbats/Soviet/MRD64.pdf
But done the right way, i do not see it being a problem. If there ever was the need to deploy an armor-centric force, you’d have to take Tank Regiments and heavy infantry from another brigade and insert them into your “LEGO” MRB.
What goes to hell is Harmony. Guidelines just CAN’T be met in some trades.
With 5 tank regiments and 5 armored infantry battalions only, you can put on the ground only one of each at any one time with current guidelines.
Either the guidelines change, or each Tank Regiment gets a second line of crews, TA personnel trained in the weekends to work on tanks.
The vehicles remain the same, but each tank comes with two crews, and it is like a cheat that gives you 10 Regiments while there are only 5 in reality.
This way you can deploy 2 at a time.
It is not an easily solved problem.
However, i must note that engaging in a big battle in which you need lots of tanks at once to maneuver against another well-equipped rival is in conflict with all the rest of TD’s strategy and assumptions. And it quite goes against current funding and strategic assumptions too.
If we plan tank battles in the future, then we MUST get more money, as it is a whole different scenario that we are considering.
This, unfortunately, is just as true as the fact that money isn’t exactly there, and we must accept it.
As to the tank formations, if they are spread in each MRB, they are safer. It is harder to cut away the armor from a brigade than cutting back HALF the armor of one.
Can you see where i’m going…?
As TD proposes for infantry “LEGO blocks”, i believe the concept is just as valid for tanks.
If the tank regiments train the same way and, ideally, have some big exercise in BATUS and Salisbury every now and then in which more regiments work together, there is no reason why a MRB can’t mutate into an Armored Brigade was it necessary.
The strategic assumption behind MRB concept is: “We need armor, but not a whole brigade of it, to counter an enemy formation of similar structure and force”.
If the assumption does not change, MRB makes perfect sense.
In a huge OT of which i apologize, news are that the UK might soon buy 5 P8 Poseidon planes to replace the Nimrod. http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/2011/06/5-p8-poseidons-for-uk.html
Thanks Callum.
I know the SBAs are large and what goes on. I had completely forgot about the Afghan reserve.
All I need to know now is the size of RAF Reg deployment……..
Sorry Callum. That read a bit rude. Wasn’t meant that way.
@X Didn’t take it that way!!
ArmChairCivvy,
Have now had a bit of a ponder and in response to your points would like to say the following:
If you factor in: “Need three tanks for one at the ready” that would mean 90 tanks for each brigade (or 114, if going for the Type 38 formation). That means 450 (or 570 if Type 38) for all 5 Multi-Role Brigades. That is far in excess of the number of tanks the Army is intending to keep, so therefore not possible Is that what you meant?
You are right when you say, “the Warrior upgrade has also been speculated at a number that could fit with your vision.” I think the latest indication is that the Army intends to upgrade (40mm cannon etc.) 300 Warriors, so 5 x 60 seems feasible.
You have also made an intelligent estimate of the number of MPAVs/ MRAPs which will be left in a useable condition after Afghanistan. All the more important therefore not to scrap all of the Bulldogs. They will be needed for some Mechanized regiments until FRES UV comes in (2018?).
You’re right. AA does need some thinking about. I am of the opinion that one regiment of HVM needs to be attached to the fully deployable “Ready” Division (1st (UK) Division) and its component batteries (3) should be attached to the individual multi-role brigades (3 of them in that division). The brigades would need their own integral air cover, units which would exercise with the brigade at all times. Similarly with Rapier for area defence. The Rapier Regiment (16 Regiment) would be attached to the Division and each Multi-Role Regiment would have one battery allocated to it. Each battery would have 8 Rapier fire units.
Gabes
‘However, i must note that engaging in a big battle in which you need lots of tanks at once to maneuver against another well-equipped rival is in conflict with all the rest of TD’s strategy and assumptions. And it quite goes against current funding and strategic assumptions too.
If we plan tank battles in the future, then we MUST get more money, as it is a whole different scenario that we are considering.
This, unfortunately, is just as true as the fact that money isn’t exactly there, and we must accept it’.
In other words if we can’t do it properly are we right to try and do it at all? Could we look at acheicving the same effect some other way?
Alan
‘I disagree in principle with anything that “penny packets” armour. It was this practice that ultimately lead to the fall of France in 1939. I’d be inlined to group all the armour (and armoured infantry) into a pocket division that could be expanded with additional mechanised/motorised infatry formations as required. I keep harping on about the gripes of German panzer div. commanders in WW2, they always needed more infantry.’
I think I agree with both those (Gabes and Alans) statments surely it makes fiscal and training sense IF we are going to play with heavy armour to keep our heavy units together in peactime traning to deliver a big punch? They can also train with other units as support but small tank units can easily become exposed, over used, and vulnerable if not used as part of a team. (That’s why the can be vulnearble in built up areas, unless supported by properly trained infantry in which csse the combimend units can be formidable.
I am one of those who looks at Heavy Tanks – (and at 60-70+Tones deployed, they are not MBT’s they are heavy); and wonders what that 30 tons over a modern MICV based alternative, with its (relativly) reduced logistical problems actually brings to the party, that we could do without?
Light Infantry etc.
I am one of those who is a bit platform centric. I am sure in the mountains in the city and in the jungle we have not heard the last of the tread of the army boot, and possibly even the bray of the Mule or even the neigh of the horse! However ‘how they get to work’ is no small consideration. Such units should as a matter of course have access to (even if it is not integral), and training in, Light (relativly) armoured transport.
Surely the
’32 lads in the back of bedford and 4 guys in a landrover’ 70′s light infantry is of little use in any likely modern conflict being extrodinarily (and unacceptably vulnerable)?
Good enough for our jungle & mountain warfare units but not elswhere?
Just some questions that’s all!
Callum mentioned harmony guidelines and combat stress, so we must take this into account in a discussion of structures.
For example, to do a four stage roulement, you need 4 or more of a particular unit; apologies for this but I am not going to try a table in a comment:
Months 0 – 6: Training
Months 1 – 12: Advanced training, major exercise, high readiness
Months 12 – 18: Deployed
Months 18 – 24: Post deployment “reset”
Months 24 – 30: Training
Months 30 – 36: Advanced training etc (as above)
Months 36 – 42: Deployed
Months 42 – 48: Post Deployment reset
12 months deployed in a 4 year cycle, BUT with the possibility for deployment when in the ‘high readiness’ which would mean having to adjust the cycle – but on the other hand provides flexibility to the schema. Of course, if nothing is going on ops wise at any given time then the “deployed” unit might be away on a major exercise somewhere in the world.
I suppose if we stick with 3 x RM CDO and 3 x Para/Army Cdo but don’t rotate these units into theatre / ongoing ops as standard line infantry but keep them back as the high readiness, then they could live within a 3 stage roulement cycle.
What worries me about this of course, is that even with nominally 36 infantry battalions, we still have to take Tankers out of turrets, and train RA gunners to be “infanteers” – but the last figures TD published from a Parliamentary Answers does not show most units as being massively understrength, so were does this age old problem of not having enough infantry lay ?
Perhaps all units need to be over manned by 10 % over their full war fighting establishment as a matter of standard ?
@Paul, will be looking at armour including the medium weight argument in a future post
@ACC, will be covering some of your comments in future
@Jed, on commitment levels and in line with my thoughts on strategy these are less than SDSR but don’t forget I will be looking at the capability plus and presence stuff in a separate post. Same with ceremonial and the garrison/training stuff like Kenya, Canada, FI and Cyprus etc. Reducing head count allows us to harden what’s left and spend on other capabilities. On the TA and reserves, want to keep my powder dry for now!
@Repulse, I wanted to remove the jungle and cold weather specialism’s from the high readiness team for reasons which I will explain later but that’s not to say that maintaining these specialist pairs at a higher readiness, taking turns like 16AAB and 3CDO do, would not be impossible
@Callum, I don’t think I actually mentioned anything about officer recruitment, are you attributing someone elses comments to me, of course if they are sensible of course I agree, if not, who was it! It might be an interesting post though, the difference between LE and DE, the jobs they might be best suited to and alternative engagement models. Cyprus is a conundrum, I agree on its strategic value but does it really need a fully trained infantry battalion to provide security, FI makes do with a company and isn’t most Cyprus currently resourced by TA?
@Bertrum, I know its fashionable to discount parachute delivery but I think it’s more useful than many think and as you say, it’s a capability plus. My idea of for capability plus has always been to create islands of expert and high level capability from existing expert and high level capabilities, building from what we are already good at makes more sense than starting from scratch and theatre entry is one of these areas. Interesting point on morale and hacking into regimental HQ’s, I don’t have any glib answer to that issue.
@Gabriele, harmony guidelines are going to have to be closely examined, I would not like to see the US model of 12 month deployments but I think 9 is a realistic increase. However, this only works if we are flexible, a high threat C-IEDD operator might realistically need 3 month deployments and longer intervals for example. Remember, these are only guidelines, they are also built around the prediction that we will be constantly deployed, in my strategic vision, this becomes much less and much shorter in duration. On the tank comment, no it is not at odds with the TD strategy at all, as I said, you keep a hard core, surrounded by capability plus and forward presence to reduce the need to deploy. But when you do deploy, you don’t hold back and provide capabilities that are meaningful. I think I made the point in a previous post about spreading the armour over the MRB’s means they are safer from cutting but that is still not a good reason to do so.
Didn’t I get in trouble with TD for pointing out we could fuel 3 battalions for a year of tanks for the same money it costs to run one Eurofighter? (That is being run to empty from full twice a month.)
I know there is a lot of wear and tear on running gear. But I ask again by what measure are tanks expensive?
x
They are and remain stupidly unrealiable, and are very maintenence heavy.
You simply cannot power 65 tons at 30mph over rough ground, often in gringing sandy or muddy conditions for long without something breaking.
Engines, transmisions, tracks and suspension take a pounding quite unlike anything in civilian life.
Then you have to come up with some equally big and expensive kit to get them out of the impossibly difficult terrain they can get stuck in when they do break. Teams of Reme to take out whats knackerd and replace with shiney new bits. (In some casses being aware they will have to repeat the process 48 hours later). Logistical train of supplies (Including the afforsaid fuel)to allow all that to happen.
I read in a Ian V Hogg book 20 years ago that the French Army was happy after every Bastille day parade if their tanks got down the ‘Champes’ without at least one packing it in, and the AMX 30 was not THAT comparativly unreliable.
@ X, RAF Regiment’s only formed unit deployment is Camp Bastion. There will be a few in the FI and Cyprus. Those in Cyprus would be on a three year standard overseas tour. Those to the Falklandsit is 6 months. I believe there are moves to reduce the size now they only have one deployment on the go at the moment.
@TD. Mea Culpa! I am confusing you with Alan; I think it must be the avatar…
Cyprus: The UN ‘Green Line’ commitment is resourced by TA or CSS units. The battalion commitment to IS only makes sense if you realise that in the two years they are posted there the two battalions rotate through IS, TRB and training commitments. The IS commitment could be met by another unit or capability, but that would render the TRB commitment unsustainable at their current readiness states.
Hi Mike W,
We are doing a bit of equipment detail, but I think it will benefit the later streams:
1.If you factor in: “Need three tanks for one at the ready” that would mean 90 tanks for each brigade (or 114, if going for the Type 38 formation). That means 450 (or 570 if Type 38) for all 5 Multi-Role Brigades. That is far in excess of the number of tanks the Army is intending to keep, so therefore not possible
- Is that what you meant?
- No, hence the two [??]
- It has consistently been maintained over this site that one in three is available at any given time. This is supported by a “memoaire” statement that “I shipped every tank available from BAOR to the Gulf” and the shipment numbered exactly 1 to 3 of the total strength
- IXION gives good reasons why this is the case, but if you only drive and exercise with a dozen per MRB, then the rest will be available at a better percentage (not breaking when you drive them out of the “garage”)
2.You are right when you say, “the Warrior upgrade has also been speculated at a number that could fit with your vision.” I think the latest indication is that the Army intends to upgrade (40mm cannon etc.) 300 Warriors, so 5 x 60 seems feasible.
- over the last year or so the figure most often quoted has been well over 400? There are no hard facts, though (wheeling & dealing & negotiation, more likely)… the good news is that with the 7 FRES prototypes soon(?) to be delivered, you can establish the value-add viz a viz an Improved Warrior in different roles, and apportion the budget accordingly
3.You have also made an intelligent estimate of the number of MPAVs/ MRAPs which will be left in a useable condition after Afghanistan.
- guess work! But factoring in the well-established vintage model
4.All the more important therefore not to scrap all of the Bulldogs. They will be needed for some Mechanized regiments until FRES UV comes in (2018?).
- absolutely, I think we are somewhere between 800 and a thousand; take into account condition & improvements installed and surely 500 can be made to last? Ref: of course roles that they are needed in to be taken into, but mainly to keep the Mech. Infantry strength going
5. You’re right. AA does need some thinking about. I am of the opinion that one regiment of HVM needs to be attached to the fully deployable “Ready” Division (1st (UK) Division) and its component batteries (3) should be attached to the individual multi-role brigades (3 of them in that division). – The brigades would need their own integral air cover; That is the integral air cover?
- Bn’s would have further HVM’s in man-portable configs (this is not really for “on the move” but for the battle field?)
- Rapiers are not so mobile, so they are called “area defence” because it sounds better than “static defence” – Having said that (about tactics), the current missile system seems to be very performant (Supply nodes; HQs; any massing of formations at the start of a major Op… airfields, of course)
@TD the comments about officer selection should be addressed to me, I feel quite strongly that someones background and comparative eductional level should not be an obstacle to advancement.
I’m an advocate for having the right body in the right suit, so;
this means more commissioning from the ranks,
NCO pilots in the RAF and RN
(shock, horror) Army flying Chinook and (EEEK!) RAF flying Apache…the list could go on for ever.
(Dons body armour and helmet) OK chaps, go for it I’m in hard cover!
Why the push for NCO pilots in the RN or RAF? The right body is in the right suit (mainly). You’re right in the sense that they don’t need to be officers to fly, but they need to be paid relative to what they do, and there is the issue about airlines which effect retention.
Other nations seem to get on alright with non commissioned pilots (as does the British Army.)
I don’t see why the RN (for example) would not allow an NCO to fly when a ships helmsman is usually an NCO.
Would you advocate a change in the AAC to an all commissioned pilot cadre?
“[...] that would mean 90 tanks for each brigade (or 114, if going for the Type 38 formation). That means 450 (or 570 if Type 38) for all 5 Multi-Role Brigades. That is far in excess of the number of tanks the Army is intending to keep, so therefore not possible”
Indeed! There never were 450 Challies to start with, as they only were 386 + a number of driver training tanks (maybe 23, can’t remember now…), with only a Chally lost, to the infamous blue-on-blue incident.
I believe there were 345 tanks listed in holding in total at the SDSR time, so 40% cut (should) mean that in service will (possibly) remain barely 207 tanks, of which:
Up to 12 for the 1 Royal Tank Regiment for training and demonstration and the rest for five regiments, which could have a maximum (paper) warlike strength of 38, probably no more than 30 each in peacetime.
But these were calculations i made on my own. I believe the army did not disclose the post-cuts holdings of AS90 and Chally yet, has it…?
I tried making two counts about the AS90 too, and the maximum strength per regiment after cuts will be 18 guns in 3 x 6 batteries.
As PZH2000 regiments in Italy and Germany… but with the difference that AS90 is older and with shorter range and lower rate of fire.
Some more clarity about these aspects is stuff that i anxiously wait for.
Also, what will be done with all those good challies that are retired…? I suspect cannibalization to sustain their brothers will be their first sad fate…
@Alan. Officer selection. A quote from the current commandant of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst:
“Commissioning soldiers from the ranks can bring great dividends – though, if taken to excess, it could weaken Warrant Officers’ and Sergeant’s Mess’. For now Sandhurst could do with more…” “…Ex-rankers give wise and current experience into the OCdt platoons here and they generally thrive.”
The army seeks talent and seeks to develop talent. Background and comparative education level is not seen as an obstacle. Maj Gen McDowell who was a recent General Officer Commanding 2nd Division started off as Private McDowall, David, service no 24288322. He left Braidview Avenue, in Stranraer, and joined the Army, aged 18, with two Highers, in English and technical drawing, from the local comprehensive.
@ Alan
They probably do manage, but is that you are after? Not sure the same examples work all over the world.
Not sure how a navy bridge works but I would think the helmsman steers, he’s not in charge of the whole ship, unlike a pilot.
No I wouldn’t.
topman, this brings us around to my point about rank being the only means we have of paying people the going rate for their transferable skills, its a blunt instrument
What would you suggest TD? We pay them the going rate and give them rank commensurate with job they do. Pay is complex enough as it is in the military, it’s hard to see how making it more complicated would be better with no adv that I can see.
@Topman: well answered, I’ll think about this some more before jumping back on the horse.
@Callum Lane: I stand (or rather sit) corrected.
Chaps thanks for your input on this. I’ll stop high-jacking the thread now.
Topman, I am whinging from the sidelines, surely you don’t expect and answer as well
Having read JSP574 I am not sure I would suggest even more allowances but I think sometime we use rank as a means of awarding personnel for their skills, rather than their ability to command or lead. The disparity between aircrew between the services is particularly noteworthy but I am sure there are others and it is a problem that afflicts all the public sector, a complete lack of flexibility in paying people what they are actually worth, hence the mushrooming allowance system which is enough to make your eyes bleed
Not sure I even have an inkling of an answer though!
We pay them for each scalp……….
TD – interesting thoughts, but if we don’t bump up rank as a reward for mastering skills, which quite right should include leadership and command skills, we end up with the bloody yanks mess e.g.
“Private First Class, grade II type B”…….
Their system of specialisms and the ranks that go with them are truly mind boggling !
Alan – just for info the helmsman is never an NCO; OK I will caveat that, you might find a Leading Hand (Corporal equivalent) on the wheel at times, but generally its an “Able rate” type of job. Normal steaming will see an Officer of the Watch (Lt.) in “control” of the ship (as in “I have the conn” with maybe a Sub.Lt or Midshipman as ’2nd Officer of the Watch’, 1 x Able Rate and 1 x Leading Rate (of the Operator Maintainer branch i.e. Seamen) and maybe a Communicator. The ‘Commanding Officer’ whatever his rank is always “in command” of his vessel, unless he formally hands over command to the XO or perhaps the Ops Officer for a short period (for example appearing down on one the mess decks with a crate of beer, to boost morale…..).
Thanks for that Jed, I have recently watched Warship Series 2 on Youtube and the chap at the helm of HMS Bulwark was a PO.
Is this an abnormality?
Anyway, I promised to stop thread jacking.
I’ll get back drawing my plan for the Army’s armoured troops.
@ IXION
I know tanks are difficult contrary beasts; I didn’t say the weren’t.
Two Typhoons flying 250 hours a year at £90,000 per hour cost £45,000,000.
Being generous two old full tank regiments (plus some AVREs) shall we say 120 hulls; using TD square brigade structure. I will be generous and say 500ltr to fill each tank. And let say our campaign lasts 90 days (approx 3 months) which lets face it is a lot, lot, longer than GW1 and GW2! Using all these figures each hull has a budget per day of £4167. Even if fuel cost £2 per ltr, which it doesn’t, leaves £2167 for spares each day. I suppose I should remove personnel costs from that £2167. If I remove £1000 that still leaves £1167 for spares.
I know I am being a bit slack here with figures. But I ask how are tanks expensive? Or should that be how are tanks are more expensive than anything else?
x
Your assuming typhoon costs 90k per hour to operate. Don’t forget that number is an mod number which includes many weird and wonderful thing such as asset depreiation costs. Don’t know much about tanks but they seem to have a large supply train with them which we seem unable to support over any big distance. We should only consider a deployed strength and work back for what we can actually support without breaking the log system or were just keeping paper tigers
come on x, you know Typhoon, like GR9, Apache and GR4 costs about 4-6k per flying hour, the higher cost includes all sorts of other stuff including the capital cost
Alan – have to admit I don’t know, but it sounds a bit odd. Maybe because she is big, and maybe they were at special sea duty men (which on a frigate or destroyer often sees the Leading Regulator on the wheel).