It really is difficult to avoid cynicism when observing the flow of news stories.
Right on cue, after Robert Gates delivered his stinging rebuke to us European pacifists comes a warning about naval resources and with a certain inevitability, the Falkland Islands are raised.
Of course, it’s an opportunity too good to miss isn’t it, the defense secretary of your largest ally warns that you are not spending enough on defence so what better time to get your claim in, who can blame him?
On the Harriers and carriers subject
Rather than deploying from Gioia del Colle, we would deploy within 20 minutes as opposed to an hour and a half, so obviously there are some advantages. It’s cheaper to fly an aircraft from an aircraft carrier than from the shore
Admiral Mark Stanhope GCB OBE
10 minutes and the cost comes out of the Treasury reserve, not the MoD’s budget, just sayin!
Beyond the next ninety days, which is how long the NATO mission has been authorised for, the RN committment to Operational Ellamy will result in a re-prioritisation exercise that will see other committments reduced which demonstrates how bad things have become.
To anyone but a complete bufoon scrapping the harrier force was a ridiculous act of strategic and operational vandalism and it is hard not to pull your hair out when the head of DFiD talks about the UK becoming a development aid superpower or we can still find the money for yet more Euro bailouts or even the Red Arrows, but faced with a real budgetary car crash and within the bounds of political acceptability it was probably the right decision.
Of course they would have enhanced the operatioon in Libya but would they have made a massive difference, probably not.
Then we have the Falkland Islands mentioned in perfect synchronicity, Admiral Sir John “Sandy” Woodward making the claim that we would be unable to retake the Islands should Argentina suddenly change political course, find an effective expeditionary armed force whilst searching for a few peso’s down the back of the sofa and invade the islands.
All this because US support would not be forthcoming now that the US doesn’t need, want or like us any more.
I looked at the Falkland Islands and its defence a while ago, click here, the comments are very illuminating and well worth a read.
In an increasingly globalised and interconnected world it is simply not in Argentina’s interest to do anything more than sabre rattle but if beligerance/capability did increase and the UK failed to notice and decided not to bother to enact its graduated response reinforcement plan, attacking forces would face a very different threat from what they found in 1982.
Of course the Falkland Islands are important enough to defend properly, are in a strategically important area and whilst we should nevr be complacent, I wince when they are constantly used to highlight cuts to UK force levels, especially to the Royal Navy.
The best way to keep the Falkland Islands as they are is to negotiate with Argenetina on improving trade relationships, thus binding the two in mutual ties of mutual interest, whilst having a credible defensive capability, not threatening subsequent violence should we be remiss enough to lose them the second time.
If they are not interested in having sensible economic relations with the islands then fair enough but that is the first and best means of preventing conflict.
Defence means just that, effective air, ground and naval forces on, above and around the islands, not steaming over the horizon with Harriers blazing
Of course, it’s an opportunity too good to miss isn’t it, the defense secretary of your largest ally warns that you are not spending enough on defence so what better time to get your claim in.
On the Harriers and carriers subject
Rather than deploying from Gioia del Colle, we would deploy within 20 minutes as opposed to an hour and a half, so obviously there are some advantages. It’s cheaper to fly an aircraft from an aircraft carrier than from the shore
Admiral Mark Stanhope GCB OBE
10 minutes and the cost comes out of the Treasury reserve, not the MoD’s budget, just sayin!
Beyond the next ninety days, which is how long the NATO mission has been authorised for, the RN commitment to Operational Ellamy will result in a re-prioritisation exercise that will see other commitments reduced.
To anyone but a complete buffoon scrapping the harrier force was a ridiculous act of strategic and operational vandalism and it is hard not to pull your hair out when the head of DFiD talks about the UK becoming a development aid superpower or we can still find the money for yet more Euro bailouts or even the Red Arrows, but faced with a real budgetary car crash and within the bounds of political acceptability it was probably the right decision.
Of course they would have enhanced the operation in Libya but would they have made a massive difference, probably not.
Then we have the Falkland Islands mentioned in perfect synchronicity, Admiral Sir John “Sandy” Woodward making the claim that we would be unable to retake the Islands should Argentina suddenly change political course, find an effective expeditionary armed force whilst searching for a few peso’s down the back of the sofa and invade the islands.
All this because US support would not be forthcoming now that the US doesn’t need Europe any more.
I looked at the Falkland Islands and its defence a while ago, click here, the comments are very illuminating and well worth a read.
In an increasingly globalised and interconnected world it is simply not in Argentina’s interest to do anything more than sabre rattle but if belligerence/capability did increase and the UK decided not to bother to enact its graduated response reinforcement plan, attacking forces would face a very different threat from what they found in 1982.
Of course the Falkland Islands are important enough to defend properly but I also wince when they are constantly used to highlight cuts to UK force levels, especially to the Royal Navy.
The best way to keep the Falkland Islands as they are is to negotiate with Argentina on improving trade relationships whilst having a credible defensive capability, not threatening subsequent violence should we be silly enough to lose them the second time. If they are not interested in having sensible economic relations with the islands then fair enough but that is the first and best means of preventing conflict.
Defence means just that, effective air, ground and naval forces on and around the islands, not steaming over the horizon with Harriers blazing
The admiral is right in saying that, if the Falklands were to be invaded now and the on-site garrison forced to surrender, the UK’s only option would be to ask for the prisoners to be freed and brought back home.
And much as here there is enthusiasm about an invasion having “no chances of success” or even “no chances of happening”, i do not believe it is that sure.
A few thought-provoking notes:
In early June 2010 two Typhoons and a VC-10 baed on the Falklands had to divert to Punta Arenas in Chile after poor weather closed Mount Pleasant. This required the aircraft to fly over Tierra del Fuego; authorization for this was given by the Argentinian Air Force.
Of the 4 airplanes in the Falklands, 3 are operational and one is an on-site spare. Most of the defences, as such, were gone in one stroke.
Second Note, on deploying Typhoons (and Tornado, for that matter) to the Falklands.
To deploy 5 Typhoons to Mount Pleasant (the fifth returned, 4 staid) it took ten support aircraft from four squadrons flying 280 hours supported by 95 personnel in addition to the fighters and their aircrews.
The transfer is a two-stage operation: the aircraft are trailed by tankers to Ascension Island, using the Canary Islands as a staging post. From Ascension, they are trailed again to the Falkland Islands without any outside assistance. The Typhoons were accompanied by a TriStar aircraft throughout, whereas the other air-to-air assets provided fuel at various stages before returning to Ascension; in all, each Typhoon was required to refuel seven times. The Falkland Islands-based VC10 was on hand to provide a final top-up of fuel if required and to enable the Typhoons to divert to the South American mainland had the weather deteriorated unexpectedly during the nine-and-a-half hour transit.
In addition, Hercules and Nimrod aircraft provided Search and Rescue cover for the long sea transits, and were equipped with survival equipment and spare life rafts that could be dropped to any survivors in the water in the event of an incident that necessitated an ejection.
The extent of the back-up required to ensure the transfer included:
Two Tristar aircraft from 216 Squadron, RAF Brize Norton, which flew a total of 89 hrs and involved 26 personnel;
Four VC.10 aircraft from 101 Squadron, which flew some 87 hours and involved 28 personnel.
Three C.1/C.3 Hercules aircraft from 70 Squadron, which flew 90 hours and involved 21 personnel.
One Nimrod MR.2 from 120 Squadron, RAF Kinloss, which flew 14 hours and involved 20 personnel.
These two notes are useful to explain WHY if the on-site defences prove not enough, it is very, very complex to even think about bringing in reinforcements timely.
It takes good part of the RAF to bring an handful of planes down there, and the Voyager tankers, once in service, will improve the situation only that much.
As to the carrier air, i will leave someone else speak for me:
“It would have been nice to have had a few more Harriers, but I’d have preferred it if we’d had the Ark Royal, but then again, if we’d had the old Ark Royal and all her aircraft i don’t think the Argentines would have invaded in the first place.”
Corporal Stuart Russel, 2nd Battalion The Parachute Regiment, speaking at the end of the Falklands War.
CVF is the new Ark Royal (literally if Prince of Wales gets renamed as it has been suggested), meaning a real carrier capable to project enough power to deter, and when necessary destroy.
As to the irony about “claims”, you might have noticed that the sea lord did not beg to have the current Ark Royal back.
However, he’s trying to ensure the future of its service, not differently from what the RAF and Army do all the time. And the carrier strike, RUSI docet, among others, is not a RN, but a national asset vital to have. http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4A4DEB373BC51/
Last, on the point of “good decision” about scrapping Ark and Harriers, i might point out that it is good only apparently.
It left in service a more powerful plane, the Tornado. But delivered short of a billion in terms of savings, which means that new cuts have to be found, while Tornado would have balanced the books.
Militarily, in terms of performances, Harrier GR9 loses against Tornado GR4.
Strategically, Harrier GR9 and carrier win against Tornado GR4.
Economically, retaining the Harrier was endlessly less expensive, and using them for Libya would have cost a fraction of current Ellamy figures.
So, no. It wasn’t exactly that good a choice. Although far from optimal, the only real way to go was cutting Tornado. A horribly painful cut, but at least PR11 and 12 wouldn’t have had to scramble for yet more cuts. It will be the shape and extent of the new cuts that will ultimately tell how bad or good it was to retain Tornado, because the Armed Forces are paying a massive bill to keep em’ flying, and depending on how much larger the bill grows, it might prove to have been the most disastrous decision ever.
Right on cue….
It is a fundamental fallacy to assume that the strength or disposition of the RN had any bearing whatsoever on the Argentine decision to invade, it would have been a very different campaign if Ark Royal were available but that is a different debate
Please not the Harrier v Tornado debate again, I thought we had done this
Does anyone know the sortie rate from the french and US carriers, there is a nato link floating around somewhere….
“It is a fundamental fallacy to assume that the strength or disposition of the RN had any bearing whatsoever on the Argentine decision to invade”
TD, this is ridiculous.
They invaded because they believed the UK would be unable/not willing to respond.
With the point you make, then we have to assume that the local forces and the Typhoons in the Islands are also not influencing argentine decisions.
It makes absolutely no sense to think this unless we accept that the argies are nothing other that suicide fools. And if they are suicide fools, we have to accept that they could well attack now as we talk.
Sorry, but it is an assumption that falls in pieces like a castle of cards at the first breath.
No, it is not ridiculous at all
Argentina decided to invade because it wrongly assumed the UK would not respond, in fact, if they had waited a few months more there would have been a significantly lower strength RN and the outcome might have been different. It made a political error of judgement not a calculation of whether it would get away with it based on one carrier or another. They also realised that with a small military force on the island they would be able to take the islands without bloodshed, which, more or less they did.
If you read any of the histories of 1982 you will find the type of carrier had very little bearing on the decision making process.
Real deterrence comes not from the threats of subsequent violence wrought by a carrier task force but by making it politically and militarily too costly to even try in the first place. Basng the defence of the south atlantic on whether we have a carrier or not is rather silly, a credible force ON AND AROUND THE ISLANDS makes much more political. military and economic sense.
I think it would be very wrong to under estimate the will of the Argentinians to possess the Falkland Islands. When it comes to the Islas Malvinas, intelligent, normally good natured people become quite irrational to this slight on their national creation myth.
That being said, I feel that it is extremely unlikely that the Falklands will face an invasion threat anytime soon. The military is now regarded with mistrust by much of the middle class, and has been run down to an extent where they would struggle to mount a sustained operation against the islands. Fortunately, the Govt is even more dysfunctional than our own. But despite this they have been successfully using diplomacy to push their claims to the islands.
I agree with TD in that the British Govt must use some clever diplomacy of it’s own (no mean feat for Dave & Co). Brazil and Chile should be courted, or if need be firmly reminded that access to EU markets may suddenly become a whole lot more difficult.
In the meantime, not only should we ensure that the Argentine Govt is mindful, that if it did give way to a moment of madness, then any invasion would be a very bloody business. But, whilst not under estimating the difficulty, we should also offer a fig leaf in the form of joint oil exploration rights. At the end of the day some form of compromise will be in the long term economic interests of the Falkland Islanders themselves.
“a credible force ON AND AROUND THE ISLANDS makes much more political. military and economic sense.”
And that is three Typhoons + 1 and HMS Clyde?
Or perhaps the concept is that while these held the ground, the RN Standing Task destroyer and the South Atlantic SSN, and, was it available, a carrier strike, would come down and seriously, seriously ruin your day?
I suspect it is the second, TD. As to the carrier factor being not important in decisions, we could very well go and believe to flying elephants then.
“it wrongly assumed the UK would not respond” exactly because of the cutbacks at home, carriers included.
You don’t attack someone far stronger than you knowing all too well that he’ll beat you into pulp.
You attack when he is weak, and when he’s looking the other side.
I would say that it is more than credible, given it has deterred a repeat performance since 1982, nearly 30 years
Plus, you are missing the other components that make up the FI defence plan, the actual threat state, timelines for reinforcement, logistics and a whole host of other very practical factors to make a point for carriers carrier carriers
Who says the UK and particulalrly the capability on FI is weak, if I was a generalisimo I would be thinking rather differently
“Brazil and Chile should be courted, or if need be firmly reminded that access to EU markets may suddenly become a whole lot more difficult.”
Is it a credible threat, we should ask ourselves? The UK desperately needs to export and to make money from trade with a growing economy such as Brazil, and all other european nations need and crave exactly the same.
If the UK refuses to do business with them, they have a long row of others eager to step up.
It is more like Brazil can threat the UK these days, not the other way around.
And anyway, as even the US show, they will be UK friends, but their main interest is a stable argentina. It is true for Brazil, for the US, all the way.
“a fig leaf in the form of joint oil exploration rights”
There was and formally is an agreement for that, from which Argentina unilaterally pulled out claiming sovereignty.
To negotiate and make agreements, it takes two parties, not only one. It is like asking the Libyan rebels and Gaddafi to reach an agreement: Gaddafi absolutely want to stay, the people absolutely want him out.
Argies want sovereignty, UK and Falklands will never give that, and rightly so.
Negotiating is beautiful, but at times it simply can’t work. Not to such extent, at least.
“Plus, you are missing the other components that make up the FI defence plan, the actual threat state, timelines for reinforcement, logistics and a whole host of other very practical factors to make a point for carriers carrier carriers”
Or maybe you are overestimating the capability to airlift troops and stuff to the islands, and transfer planes down south.
As to the other components of the FI defence plan, one is Nimrod, and we all know where that is now.
“deterred a repeat performance since 1982, nearly 30 years”
The count should start from 1983, when the airport was built and the RN carriers could finally return home, but anyway, let’s accept the figure. But i bet you would not accept that the Royal Navy deterred any attempt of invasion for far longer, arguably from the very start of the british presence on the islands. So that would be at least from 1834 when the islands were, casually, a Naval Station. That’s 148 years, of which 64 with carrier air available, from 1918 onwards.
And that was done with ships that were not tasked specifically with defence of the islands, like a garrison.
The troops you put in a garrison are there, full stop. The ships go wherever they are needed, and they are more cost effective.
You try to make it look like the aircraft carrier is justified only by the Falklands, but that is the way you want to read it, not the way things are. The Falklands are just one of one thousands scenarios you can use a carrier to fix.
I like me a bit of Carrier aviation, but I have to say:
- Tornado offers us capabilities (SEAD) that Harrier didn’t,
- I think people are grossly over estimating the impact of a small fleet of Harriers flying of one of our previous carriers,
- I thought it was a generally accepted fact that the Argies had a go because;
a) They needed the distraction,
b) They didn’t think/realise we really gave a toss about the islands,
- Those Typhoons plus the threat of an SSN make it unlikely Argentina will take another shot,
- People keep talking about the man hours/cost of flying Typhoons down there. How much does it cost to operate a carrier for a day? How many men? Gabrielle can you please stop making the pro-carrier crowd look like knobheads. How will TD ever be swayed in the face of such lunacy?
- Given the advances in ships that we now have, plus our better tactical knowledge, I’m fairly certain a naval task force without Carriers could pull off a liberation.
I’ve never understood why assets like Challenger 2 and AS90 have not been moved to the Falklands in reasonable numbers and added to the training that can be done on the islands (to partly cover the costs involved), wonder how much of the training done in Wales and Scotland could be done in the South Atlantic.
Mounting an attack against an infantry force is one thing, trying to land forces against heavy armour would be much more daunting and it’s easier to disperse and conceal.
If we go over to Canada for exercise, is it that much more expensive to go to the Falklands? And what level of marine training would be possible on such a long coastline. I expect that with MRTT it will be much easier to rotate forces, for an A330 the distances from Ascension to the islands are easily within standard ETOPS range (if not ETOPS regulations). In fact at 3800miles from Ascension the MRTT (range approx 7200 miles) could make a round trip with just an early top up (if we had taken the in-flight refuelling option for MRTT).
Agree completely with Gabriele.The Argies could blockade the islands and all the Hague-induced UN resolutions in the world couldn’t stop them. letting the tyres down/cracking the windscreens on a couple of Typhoons would scupper their involvement in any invasion. As for diplomacy, that hasn’t changed Spains’s view of Gibraltar, has it – and we are in an unholy “union” with them? However, expect a mass vaccination programme for Gauchos paid for by money borrowed by us to be announced shortly. That should do the trick!
“Please not the Harrier v Tornado debate again, I thought we had done this”. Didn’t realise there was a TD injunction out on this subject. I’d keep both but accelerate the withdrawal of the latter and replace with Typhoon and, eventually, F-35, if we have no intention of looking for a strike aircraft elsewhere. Oh – and an MOD spokesperson said that Harrier couldn’t carry the precision weapons being used in Libya. More lies – and Typhoon is carrying them all I suppose? Rafale is starting to look better every day.
“People keep talking about the man hours/cost of flying Typhoons down there. How much does it cost to operate a carrier for a day? How many men? Gabrielle can you please stop making the pro-carrier crowd look like knobheads. How will TD ever be swayed in the face of such lunacy?”
450 millions a year is the approximate cost figure i’ve heard for the Falklands garrison.
Cost PER YEAR of CVF in 2000 figures is 44 millions, planes excluded, refits INCLUDED.
Chris B., i know you hate me, but if you could PLEASE call me with my name and READ what i write before bashing me, i would appreciate it. I did SAY that Tornado GR4 is more powerful and that Military it makes more sense to sacrifice the Harrier than it.
However, in terms of STRATEGY and BUDGET, the two things that matter the most, it does not make sense.
Harrier + Ark Royal savings = 1 billion or less.
Tornado projected savings = 7.5 billions
Current MOD budget situation:
1 billion shortage in funding in 2011, covered (for now) by the Treasury thanks to Libya effort and in exchange for a moratory on ALL MOD orders.
Projected shortages of as much as 3 billions in each of PR12 and PR13. Ongoing “study” in Budget and programmes ongoing, to report in July, which is considering what to do. More cuts on the way.
THIS is the problem. That 7 billions black hole would not be there had Tornado been sacrificed. I don’t like it, mind you, but THIS is realism.
What will have to go in the next two years to keep the Armed Forces alive and within their budget? How much is it going to cost to keep Tornado?
And oh, by the way, the SEAD capacity of Tornado will end in 2013 if ALARM is retired for real. So SEAD is the very last thing to argue when listing the Tornado’s good points.
Here there is always prayers to realism. Here it is. Now find a solution if you can.
No wonder that Tornado retirement date was 2025 pre-SDSR, then 2021, and then in the latest rumors 2017 and dropping closer. For who did not notice, the RAF head did talk of a 2020 RAF with 5 squadrons of Typhoons and 1 of F35C. No mention of Tornado.
Want to see CVA01 and TSR2 happening all over again? Because that is what seems to be happening.
Ark Royal and Harriers gone already, and soon after that Tornado gone as well.
Oh, that would be a real triumph!
29 Squadron Phantoms assumed air defence duties for the Falkland Islands with Phantoms from October 1982, flying out of RAF Stanley, using a repaired and modified runway
You assume that I am somehow against carrier aviation, that I don’t value its flexibility and unique capabilities
I do, but I put it in a practical context
I bash you Gabrielle because an RAF PR man would have a field day in front of a select committee with some of the claims you make.
The Falkland Islands are an allegory for naval expeditionary warfare in general.
While the very mention of the Falklands (see, I did it again) sends an ice-cream-burn-like pain stabbing through the brain of TD, it has a different secondary meaning too.
It represents our future ability to project force and policy beyond the fringes of Europe, and our future ability to kill distant foreigners in many countries – not just Argentina.
@Gabriele
I think you have to be careful with the cost of the garrison, it seems high to me and either reflects some element of write down for the airport and port, or is biased by the costs of getting old short range aircraft and tankers down there, with MRTT I would expect massive reduction in air transport costs its just another leg for that type of current long haul aircraft. Imagine trying to stay in commercial operation with VC10s !.
Plus, if there is more focus on sea based logistics costs should also drop dramatically, if we can import cheap tat from china (at little cost) by sea why not send lots by container to the south Atlantic?
Why would Argentina want to invade some islands off Scotland?
One would suggest TD if you didn’t want to go over this ground again you shouldn’t have posted on what 1SL said………
“The best way to keep the Falkland Islands as they are is to negotiate with Argenetina on improving trade relationships, thus binding the two in mutual ties of mutual interest, whilst having a credible defensive capability, not threatening subsequent violence should we be remiss enough to lose them the second time.”
I think thats a bit unfair.
You want all three. You want the other side to not want a war, you want the other side uncertain it can win the opening phase, and damned sure it cant survive an extended war.
“This required the aircraft to fly over Tierra del Fuego; authorization for this was given by the Argentinian Air Force.”
And what would they do if they said no and flew through anyway?
Shoot them down? With what?
“It is a fundamental fallacy to assume that the strength or disposition of the RN had any bearing whatsoever on the Argentine decision to invade, it would have been a very different campaign if Ark Royal were available but that is a different debate”
Remember, the Argies invaded when the Royal Marines security detachment was in changeover, IE at double strength.
Not quite a carrier, but our disposition wasnt foremost in their minds. The point remains, they genuinely didnt believe we would fight. That doesnt mean they expected a surrender of course.
“Real deterrence comes not from the threats of subsequent violence wrought by a carrier task force but by making it politically and militarily too costly to even try in the first place.”
MAD disagrees…
The decision was not military in any event, it was political. Argentina did not believe the UK would fight. Military capability wasnt relevent, we could have built a super carrier and retaken the islands if we wanted to. Argentina guessed we WOULD not, not that we COULD not.
““a credible force ON AND AROUND THE ISLANDS makes much more political. military and economic sense.”
And that is three Typhoons + 1 and HMS Clyde?
Or perhaps the concept is that while these held the ground, the RN Standing Task destroyer and the South Atlantic SSN, and, was it available, a carrier strike, would come down and seriously, seriously ruin your day?”
Today, yes, three Tiffies and a patrol boat is sufficient.
If Argentina buys 36 Block 52 F16s and a dozen tankers, then we will increase the deterant force.
“Or maybe you are overestimating the capability to airlift troops and stuff to the islands, and transfer planes down south.”
Reinforcement doesnt follow invasion.
It preceedes it.
RW
I’ve made that point several times, even if it were just 4 Challies and 16 CVR(T)s, kept fully maintained, ie sat in the hanger.
“The Argies could blockade the islands and all the Hague-induced UN resolutions in the world couldn’t stop them.”
Astute could though.
Argentina seizes a ship, Astute sink Argentinas Navy.
“450 millions a year is the approximate cost figure i’ve heard for the Falklands garrison.
Cost PER YEAR of CVF in 2000 figures is 44 millions, planes excluded, refits INCLUDED.”
The 08/09 MoD accounts show £444,000,000 as the cost of the aircraft carriers, we dont have 10.
After the 2010 SDSR it is clear the United Kingdom cannot, and will not, take part in large scale war for the next 10 years. With commitments in Afghanistan, standing deployments, and now Libya there is no way we could mount a Gulf War III: Gulf Harder, or anything along those lines.
Our strategic decisions should have been based on small scale intervention, and preserving core expeditionary capabilities until they regenerated post 2020. For me both strategically and financially the Harrier GR9 was the better option. It may not have been wizz-bang enough, but its a simple bomb truck, it could have handled Libya cheaper, and easier, with the flexibility to go elsewhere. Instead we continued fallacies such as the idea that the UK will do SEAD on it’s own, or in any measure comparable to the US. We launched 18 cruise missiles… hardly shock and awe. Simple fact is Tornado GR4 is not a world beating aircraft, nor is proportionate to what we do. Once again we are paying 750% for 150% what we need.
The MoD now faces more cuts, and a loss of a key capability required in FF2020, all for a shinier aircraft. The FI won’t fall (touch wood), but are a prime example of power projection, and how being sea blind (or air fascinated) can lead to a national disgrace. The CVS and Harrier would have cost less and done what we need to do.
The cost in 2004/05 for the Falklands Defence as a whole was put at 365 millions total, of which some 130 due to the Army garrison and its infrastructure.
The 450 figure probably was for the year when the Typhoons had to be moved in and other non-recurrent expenses had to be made, or possibly was press exaggeration, i won’t deny it, it is perfectly possible. Newspapers have that bad habit.
The trick is due to what is calculated in and what is not.
Normally the cost reported is that of the British Army Garrison alone, which can vary from around 60 to over 100 millions a year depending on the presence of a Battalion deployed down there to train and by many other factors.
Adding in the RAF, the cost of infrastructure and ships for the RN standing tasks, and all, we are always north of 300 millions a year.
And building Mount Pleasant and the base and everything cost from 2.2 to 3 billions in the post war, according to the different sources.
The Voyager MRTT can self-deploy on 5000 km with four Typhoons in tow. But the distance is still 8000 naval miles.
While less planes will be in future required and the cost for transfers will be somewhat smaller, it remains a huge feat.
I would ask this question of the general public. Would you like the armed forces to be configured to conduct falklands style operations or to conduct afghan/Iraq style operations. Or if you want to do both we need more money. What ever the answer Then that is our capability plus high end force.
It’s like playing whack a mole, one argument is knocked back and something very similar pops up again
A sensible strategy would have seen the Harrier force retained until JCA came in together with Tornado. Both fleets winding down as JCA stood up. This would have provided a flexible force mix that made a lot of sense, especially if those carrier fantasists dreams of two CVF with 36 JCA permanently embarked were tempered with reality, both CVF’s acting as something more akin to a large and flexible multi role aviation vessel with say 6 or 12 JCA, a mix of helicopters and an embarked force.
Fiscal reality hove into view which made the sensible simply untenable and a very tough decision had to be made.
Tornado being retained was he sensible decision in a word of less than sensible options, forget all your conspiracy theories and arguing about how much money could woulda shoulda been saved or whether Brimstone or Storm Shadow would fit because the issues crystalised on sustainability and utility until 2020 onwards. Tornado was a larger fleet with greater versatility across a range of missions, therefore easier to sustain and likely more use. Harrier has some very useful capabilities and in some regards more capable than Tornado but practical, boring, fleet management issues made it a bit of a no brainer.
JCA has yet to reach main gate so the reality is we simply do not know how many or how much.
Comparing costs is also a bit silly because of where the argument leads.
Lets assume the garrison costs a pound and a carrier costs 50p it would be obvious that a carrier would be the best option, wouldn’t it?
Except only a fool would think that 1,2 or 50 carriers have anywhere near the political or military effect of deterring an invasion. As I said, you deter first by diplomacy and trade, there are limits to that of course but this is by far the cheapest option in blood and treasure. After that you deter by making it difficult or impossible militarily and politically to actually successfully invade the place without consequence. The existing arrangements do that fine and have been for several decades. OK, after that, a credible force to retake the islands in a bloody and glorious repeat of 1982 is the final option but to be honest, I think I would rather pay for the garrison and avoid bloodshed than base our whole defence posture on the threat of subsequent violence. A garrison sends a political message that you are going to have to spill blood, a distant carrier is a distant threat.
The comparison between the cost of a garrison and one CVF is to be frank, verging on the comical. So CVF doesn’t have an IPT, port infrastructure, RFA’s, escorts etc etc. It is ludicrous to compare the two. The garrison costs include all sorts of stuff, EOD for example. It like comparing apples and ford fiestas and saying one is a better television
I might take a break from the Army series and try to justify maritime aviation, I think I have done it over a few posts but will have another go
@x, am a bloody fool to myself aren’t I
@Brian, good point, you are dead right but it get really grouchy when I see this opportunism, make no mistake the other services are just the same and I suppose you can’t argue with the need to do it.
@Gabriele, you get pulled up because you do not half gild the lilly sometimes, for example, herumphing about me saying land based air was there from 1982 by dismissing it with your jaunty statement on when the carriers could finally return home in 1983. Go and have a look at the homecoming and tell me how many carriers were there. Of course they were needed post surrender until land based air could take over but that was in 1982 not 1983 as you say. The tone in which you said it was dismissive, like the RAF were slacking somehow and the RN had to do the heavy lifting again. This is why people like Chris jump in.
Do you believe CVF is going to cost £44 million per year when a Bay costs £10million, not forgetting the additional crew requirements to accommodate CTOL?
@ChrisW, fair enough, if you want to discuss Tornado v Harrier we can, didn’t want to close debate down, sorry. I agree with you on the broad position
@Dominic, fair point about the RM but are you seriously saying my argument is not valid based on overwhelming 20 or 40 booties with armoured personnel carriers etc. Come on, keep it realistic.
The problem is that you continue to justify the Harrier retirement on budget reasons, while cheerfully ignoring the fact that retaining the seven times as expensive Tornado fleet is blowing holes in the MOD budget for at least the next three years and that Tornado now is almost certain not to make it to 2020, no matter what we say.
Everyone keeps dribbling the issue, and go on and on about Brimstone, and Storm Shadow, and Raptor. It is not the point.
TD
“@Dominic, fair point about the RM but are you seriously saying my argument is not valid based on overwhelming 20 or 40 booties with armoured personnel carriers etc. Come on, keep it realistic.”
I was agreeing with you….
Argentina did not expect us to fight.
Having 10 nuclear supercarriers in Portsmouth and 4 BattleStars in orbit wouldnt have detered the aggression, they simply didnt believe we would fight back, so what capabilities we had werent relevent.
A sticks no use if you arent prepared to hit someone with it.
If Argentina cared about our forces, they would have at the very least waited until the garrison wasnt at double strength, or even until the carriers were scrapped/sold.
They didnt, they expected to invade, mount a symbolic occupation, and a diplomatic solution to be forthcoming.
TD I am not an advocate of CVF or JCA, but simply don’t accept that retained tornado was a sensible decision. What does Tornado give us, that we need, above and beyond CVS and JFH? Apart from making HM Treasury £6.5 billion lighter, which now has to be found in other areas. Let’s face it, that money could have kept CVS and JFH, Nimrod MRA4, Sentinel ASTOR, Nimrod R1, Largs Bay, Albion, and perhaps even the T22s.
To dismiss off the cuff matters of savings is ridiculous. What is the point in writing the “Future of” series if we discount “arguing about how much money could wouda shoulda been saved”? The same argument against CVF and 36 JCA can be applied to the RAF and 96 GR4s, or the Army and 1,300 FRES SV. Fiscal reality seems to apply to one argument but not the others? Will it descend into fantasy fleets, armoured corps, and Bomber Command?
The Queen Elizabeth Class exists, and will be brought into service, if the UK ignores that fact for both the present configuration of the armed forces and the future, it will waste a flexible (if unwanted) asset. It is not sensible to retire carrier aviation before stepping up a rung, particularly at the cost of £6.5 billion.
“Defence means just that, effective air, ground and naval forces on, above and around the islands, not steaming over the horizon with Harriers blazing”
Absolutely, but it is nevertheless true that all this pre-planning for graduated response is backed up by the ultimate insurance policy; we can always take it back off of them.
This capability to take back the Falklands is also highly complimentary with Britain’s desire to maintain rapid/limited intervention forces, so it is dual-use and not therefore as ‘expensive’ as might be imagined.
Gabriele – £44m/year? Dream on – that was a figure mooted back in 2000, when the carriers were going to cost £2bn or something.
The day they were officially announced in 2003, Lord Bach apparently said “The cost of the ships, not including the aircraft, is estimated at £2.8 billion, with an additional £6.4 billion in through life costs.” I’m guessing that was in an MoD press release, I can’t find the original source other than Beedall. The Indy reckons he said £7bn. Spread £6.4bn over 40 years and you’re looking at £160m/year for the two ships alone – it would be interesting to know what the current estimate looks like, given that was in the good old days of the capital cost being £2.8bn for two carriers. And of course that doesn’t include the same again (??) for the rest of the battlegroup, and then ??£40m/year per squadron of aircraft.
One of the more rigorous analyses came from RAND in 2005. (well worth a read just for their thoughts on things like the cost of different ranks in the RN) They reckoned a discounted cost of £4.5bn but allow for maintenance periods etc for a cost of £200m per active-ship-year, or £570k per active-ship-day. Again, that’s just for the ship itself, in 2003 money.
As was pointed out above by TD and someone else; it’s not just whether you can win the war or not that matters, it’s whether you can win the war at an acceptable cost – in terms of casualties, cash and political fallout at home and abroad.
The fact that Argentina put so many troops into the islands would suggest that they did believe that the UK still retained the ability to send a mission to the islands, but that they thought that they could raise the British cost of doing so beyond what would be accepted.
This thinking follows through with our own defence of the islands, in that we just need the forces required to raise the cost of atting them beyond that which the Argentine government of the day would be willing to pay.
(I wonder too, whether an Argentine success in ’82 would still have seen the end of the regime there given the numbers of casualties. Despite popular support for retaking the islands, would the loss of 650 of their boys have been considered an acceptable price at home?)
Mark raises the question of whether the general public want the armed forces configured for a Falklands style op, or an Afghan/Iraq style op.
We live in a democracy, so a big consideration for any government is how will military operations of choice affect their chances of future election/re-election.
There is no political capital in fighting an Iraq/Afghanistan style conflict in the near future; and if anything it would be politically damaging. We see this reflected in the widespread reluctance to have to commit ground forces in Libya; even countries not deeply involved in Iraq or Afghanistan don’t want to encourage or take part in something that looks like Iraq or afghanistan.
If we accept the premis that politicians won’t want to do something in the future that looks to the general public like Afghan or Iraq, then we just need to figure out how long the general public are going to hold these conflicts in their bitter collective memories; and that length of time will correspond to the length of time that we don’t need to prepare for those type of wars.
On the other hand, a Falklands style war is exactly the kind of war that the general public will love. Despite being a bloody little war, there were clear baddies, we were clearly the goodies, and there were clear objectives. That is the kind of war that wins elections.
So a Falklands force it is, mark.
How long do British governments have to avoid Afghan/Iraq style ops. Not sure; ten years after withdrawal from Afghanistan perhaps? After the 2025 general elections?
———
we should also be aware that nuclear weapons are out, in terms of what is the fashionable measure of a country’s strategic military capacity.
Carriers are the new ‘in thing’. It’s what every best dressed country will be wearing next season. are we really going to buck the trend? We’ll follow the crowd, like every one else.
Cor, can’t change Channel without seeing all sorts of naval bods.
Woodward, Parry and West in the last 10 minutes alone.
The word for today is;
a·nal·o·gy
/əˈnælədʒi/ Show Spelled[uh-nal-uh-jee]
–noun, plural -gies.
1. a similarity between like features of two things, on which a comparison may be based: the analogy between the heart and a pump.
2. similarity or comparability: I see no analogy between your problem and mine.
“Gabriele – £44m/year? Dream on – that was a figure mooted back in 2000, when the carriers were going to cost £2bn or something.”
You don’t know any better than me what the annual running cost will be.
Even if we assume 7 billions through-life costs, on 50 (not 40, the carriers are specifically planned to last AT LEAST 50 years) that is 140 millions a year for both ships, or 70 for each.
Calculated on the assumption that both would work as full fledged strike carriers, something that won’t be, as only one will carry an airgroup at any one time.
“include the same again (??) for the rest of the battlegroup”
This is the most demented point often made about carriers.
Are we building escort ships only for CVF? No.
Do the other ships of the RN stay idle in port now without a CVF to escort? No.
If they will be used to escort a carrier will it cost more than using them to keep a blockade around Libya, or more than use them in the gulf or in the Caribbean? No.
Unless you want to build a fleet specifically to escort the CVF and do nothing else, the point about “battlegroup” costs are an absurd claim. The fleet is not going to build new escorts for CVF. The same ships there are now, one day will sail, when necessary, accompanying CVF. They could accompany the Queen Mary liner across the Atlantic and it would be the exact same thing.
“then ??£40m/year per squadron of aircraft.”
The planes are going to be there anyway for the RAF, just like the navy ships will be there either way.
Arguably, a squadron that can work on land and sea alike is twice as cost effective as a land-only squadron. This is another point that makes 0 relevance. And we don’t know the cost of a squadron either.
To make you understand the way the “battlegroup” argument is stupid, i will make you notice that, reasoning in the same way, i could say that the Falklands islands cost 14 billions only for the Voyager air tanker that will (?) be based there to replace the VC10 now used.
It does not make sense to say this.
But it is the same of the “battlegroup” argument.
If i take a Type 45 from the fleet and use it to escort the CVF, it is like i’m taking a Voyager to base it in the Falklands.
With the difference that i have to pay to deploy a Voyager and its crew abroad, while the Type 45 is meant to go to sea, and doing it with or without a carrier alongside changes nothing in the cost of the mission.
You are saying that, without CVF, the Navy does not need its ships. Kind of extreme, if you reason well on it.
“On the other hand, a Falklands style war is exactly the kind of war that the general public will love. Despite being a bloody little war, there were clear baddies, we were clearly the goodies, and there were clear objectives. That is the kind of war that wins elections”
I say this all the time, but no one ever listens, most of all “Dave”.
Gabriele
“You don’t know any better than me what the annual running cost will be.”
The 08/09 cost £440mn
Even if thats for three, so £145mn each.
The QE class has basicaly the same crewing requirements, and is 3x the size, theres simply no way QE’s are going to be a third of the cost of Vincies.
Perhaps it might keep things in perspective if we quantify the help we actually got from the USA in 1982. We got some help on the intelligence front; some air launched weapons and they very kindly let us use the airfield on Ascension. And that was it.
If we took back the airfield on Ascension and obliged the DfiD to finance a nice diversion airfield on St Helena, we could very rapidly reinforce the Falklands. No doubt Sierra Leone would be happy to provide a staging post if we built them a nice new airport (out of the DfID budge).
“hey very kindly let us use the airfield on Ascension.”
Isn’t RAF Ascension british owned, subject to UK South Atlantic command, and run by a 17-men RAF team and by a similar number of americans under RAF command?
I don’t think the UK has to ask permission at all, to anyone. (luckily) The base is kept going with a vessel of supplies sailing to the island every six weeks.
/me puts his little carrier model in the bath and attempts to fly some typhoons off its deck, all while nude and filming it with his phone camera.
Carriers are being built and will be used in some way.
We were right to keep Tornadoes because they can do more, we’ve got more of them and therefore can do a lot more. However, Harrier shouldn’t have been axed because it can get on straight away to do your bombing quickly as possible when you need it.
But really the problem here isn’t just the government ramshackles of an review (It seems they’re taking longer to work out what to do with HMS endurance then they spent for the whole of the forces!)
Its the current government looking at money and every successive government fuck ups running defence!
I’d have chopped a few tornadoes, kept a the harriers and accelerated the typhoon program for air to ground (perhaps even built a few more!)
You’d know what I’d do next?
I’d chop the harriers and tornadoes, replace them all with Typhoons and Sea Tiffies!
As for the spare carrier, well HMS ocean will go at one point, why bother building a replacement when you can just bodge a job together with the left over carrier? Hell you could even send it for evacuations, aid supplies, troop carrier, navy supplies. We’ve paid for it, might as well bloody use it because there no point trying to squeeze every single last penny out of not operating it. The main carrier, deploy a few aircraft, but at least build enough to deploy! (Since the RN wants carrier F35, how easy would it be to dice a normal F35 to carrier version? or is it a case of buying a used one from the US?)
So then what back to the Falklands. Who wants to do the maths and specs of flying sorties down to the Falklands? (such as fuel, armaments on the aircraft)
But one of the things we’ve not really talked about is protecting ships and to some extent the air space via ships. Can the Royal Navy with the Type 45 just sit there offering coverage? After all air defence did seem a bit of a problem the last time when unloading ships were being attacked. I think we really need to head down this route of protection of the assault and supplies (In a conventional battle like this in a remote area can you afford to win the air first then go ground, I think you’d have to go ground pretty quickly)
@DominicJ
The allocation of funding for carrier operations for the year 2009/10 was a net 349,202,000 pounds. Of these, 138 millions were the operating costs of Illustrious and Ark Royal, so roughly 69 millions each, covering fuel, crew, ports fees, and stuff, included capital cost.
The rest of the figure probably comes from the air operations made on board during the year and other undisclosed cost voices, as the figure isn’t further broken down in detail. The figure comprises also cost related to the 12 millions refit Ark Royal underwent, finishing in september 2009 when she entered service again.
Sizes aren’t an automatic indicator of cost, otherwise the big container ships should cost billions and this obviously is not true.
While 44 millions are not 44 millions anymore (it was a 2000 figure, you must factor in inflation, there is no escape), the calculations were specifically made to ensure a ship operating cost inferior to that of the old Invincibles. Crew is 682, against 685 for Ark Royal in its latest, most modern form.
Once Invincible took over 700 men to man her.
Ship operating cost and Carrier Operations costs are a different thing.
440 millions is what the MOD spent in 2008/09 to use its carriers (all of them) in the way it did.
As I have said many many times before, trying to work out exact costs from open source information can only ever result in an educated but very very rough guess.
Invincible was decommissioned in 2005 so would not appear in those figures
There are all sorts of variables, were the air crew on board for much of that year, were they at sea much and don’t forget the deck crew for STOVL is much less than CTOL. So many variables in fact it is difficult to say much except on a ship only basis, accounting for the extra fuel and consumables use because CVF is over twice the size of a CVS, crew costs will be pretty similar. There has had to been quite a bit of infrastructure work for CVF but over the life of the ships pretty small.
The real kicker is going to be the air component because CTOL demands a larger pool of very expensive aircrew and groundcrew that have to maintain their very perishable skills at a very high level to be safe. This pushes your people bill up significantly, plus of course the additional fuel for training, airframe hours, trainers, courses, pensions, housing, allowances etc etc etc etc etc
The true costs of CVF/JCA are going to make the bar bill of the garrison on FI look like small change
Going CTOL was quite possibly the dumbest decision ever made, unless of course you see it as a political decision to enable a joint UK/French/EU carrier force, in which case bugger the cost, it makes perfect sense.
So whilst the CTOL fans are having wet dreams about the extra few miles range they are going to be rather unhappy when we have to share a carrier with the bloody french, Nelson blah blah
Right, what have I missed?
@ Gabrielle
“The cost in 2004/05 for the Falklands Defence as a whole was put at 365 millions total, of which some 130 due to the Army garrison and its infrastructure”
According to Hansard (http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo060131/text/60131w08.htm) the cash cost of maintaining the Garrison for one year in 2004/2005 was £65.3 million, of which over half is personnel apparently. Depreciation is not included in operating costs, but stands at about £38.4 million.
That’s a hell of a lot less that £440 million.
“Isn’t RAF Ascension british owned, subject to UK South Atlantic command, and run by a 17-men RAF team and by a similar number of americans under RAF command?”
It’s a Joint Facility and is run by the RAF the same way that Mildenhall is. That is, it isn’t.
I think I’m a bit late to the party.
When I saw the Navy piece today, I thought it was only a matter before the FI was mentioned. It seems it’s thought by some the defences are deeply inadequate and we really need the current carriers. The defences in the FI are well thought out using man made and natural defences. Any invading forces would have a real challenge to take the FI and the airbase.
I think some overestimate the forces Argentina have, they have little combat experience, they have almost no knowledge of planning such a large and complicated operation. The budget is streched to the maximum. They would have problems even getting enough troops ashore at all, their navy has a almost no capabilty in that area. Their only specifically built ship is unseaworthy and hasn’t left port in years.
Plus there’s a lot more issues that they have, and strengths that we have. Not to say it is impossible, we should guard against being complicant. The threat is described as Low level but persistent. I’d say the forces were enough to deal with it for the medium term of upto 10 years.
That’s ignoring the political change and turmoil that would have to come about to ok an attack on the FI.
The real issue is that even after spending billions that there is no capability for 10 years to take over from the Harrier. I’ve got over the loss of the aircraft and in isolation it does make sense that since the redrawl of the SHAR the capability was limited at best.
What does wind me up is the lack of strategic direction and the belief that it is quick and easy to get a large amount of troops / kit by air, it’s not.
I suppose it depends on how large and what kit, the devil would be in the detail.
But by sea is easier, I think for example 90% of kit for gw1 came by sea.
I’m not sure why the admiralty suddenly decide to grow a pair and say something now? Seems bit childish.
If they felt strongly, shouldn’t they have said something while MoD was ransacking the pantry?
I’m all for the CVF, but you know protecting the white elephant got you in this mess, so tall cup of STFU is in order for RN.
The falklands in its self does not justify CVF. What justifies cvf is the type of operations this country will be able/allowed to conduct in the future. And in my view it will be almost impossible for any UK government to commit a ground force to a foreign country for a very long time to come Iraq and how it was handled has seen to that. A move to more air and naval policing such as the Iraq and balkans no fly(with all its limitations) is the most likely position
TD
I dont believe the cost difference will be as much as is made out with modern sims and onboard systems remember there will be no 2 seat trainer on f35. I would also caution F35B would have operating a rolling ship landing which would have involved more training than harrier operations anyway.
Chris. B
If that’s just it, in 2009 i think it cost just 39-40 millions because less personnel was kept there in an effort to keep costs down, too. Training exercises and Rapier launches have also been shaved.
The cost hit an all times low in 2009, but normally is around 60 millions on a good year, and gets over 100/110 when a second battalion is deployed down there for training or other stuff happens.
But that is the Garrison. NOT the defence of the Falklands.
The British Army Garrison is just a part of the Falklands defence. It is the Army force, and probably includes the Rapiers, but doesn’t include:
the airport
The Typhoons
The radar stations
The RAF personnel
The two SAR helos
The C130 and the VC10
Mare Harbor, the RN port on the islands
HMS Clyde
The SSN committed to South Atlantic
The 2/3 destroyes or frigates that in a year are committed to ensure continuous South Atlantic coverage with overlapping deployments
RFA tanker(s) also committed.
HMS Endurance/now HMS Protector
The service of flights chartered to bring people in and out
Other voices, such as fuel for airplanes and ships etcetera.
All these things are obviously NOT part of the Garrison cost in that answer.
Indicatively, the Falklands defece costs well over 300 millions a year when all things are factored in. The figure is never exactly equal, each year there are differences.
Lately for example it should have cost more than usual since the runway of Mount Pleasant had to be completely repaved, and works lasted six months from last september to early this year. http://www.the-islander.org.ac/art_7836_31_0_1.html
If all that stuff was paid for by 60 million pounds, the Armed Forces would not struggle fitting in their budget, if you think about it. They’d be as happy as Santa if 60 millions covered all that stuff.
Why include the guard ship or the subs or the VC10. They’d be there anyway, we didn’t buy them just to protect the falklands, they would be doing other things.
See where I’m going with this?
“Why include the guard ship or the subs or the VC10. They’d be there anyway, we didn’t buy them just to protect the falklands, they would be doing other things.
See where I’m going with this?”
I see. But you make little sense at all with your irony.
We could accept it for the ships, and SSN, that once go to the Falklands and once go somewhere else entirely, but we cannot accept it for the resident units, included HMS Endurance/Protector, the four Typhoons detachment and all the rest, as those are resident in the islands and only serve for its defence. Along with the resident battalion. When it is deployed on Falklands duties, that is the end of it.
The frigate that one day escorts CVF, instead, the day after can be sent around doing something else.
Try harder.