I have looked at the issue of energy, food and water security a few times and as a companion to the previous piece on strategy I thought a follow up would be useful.
This isn’t an exhaustive list but concentrates on resources, energy, food and trade.
The Conservative party, to their credit, highlighted the issue a number of times pre-election, even though they indulged in a spot of scaremongering. In October 2009 the Shadow Energy Minister, Greg Clark MP, delivered a speech on the issue titled Keeping Britain’s Lights on. For maximum showbiz effect, it started with the lights off and raised the spectre of rolling blackouts. There was also a strong inference that we were at the mercy of the Kremlin, all they had to do was turn off the taps and old ladies in bobble hats would be dropping like flies.
In 2009, in the grip of an extremely cold winter, several large industrial users faced restrictions in supply as domestic users were prioritised. These large users had signed up for interruptible tariffs in return for discount pricing so could not really complain, you pays your money and you take your chances. This however, did not stop the bandwagon jumpers (i.e. press and opposition politicians) seizing upon the issue, evoking the famous phrase ‘keeping the lights on’ yet again.
The Conservative Party’s pre election strategy paper, A Resilient Nation, devoted a paragraph to the issue of energy security, stating;
The danger that the country now faces of a real risk of the lights going out – inadequate power to keep the economy going – was entirely predictable even before Tony Blair spoke and yet his government did virtually nothing. Taken together, the lack of resilience in the UK’s stretched power generation, strained energy transmission, insecurity of energy supply and lack of emergency storage is nothing short of alarming. Forming a coherent energy policy, joining domestic with overseas factors, security with long term climate change goals and private sector investment with government policies on resilience of systems will be an urgent Conservative priority on entering office and is an example of an approach that can be applied to other essential sectors
In a supporting Annexe, the paper makes it clear that the armed forces will play a part in addressing the issue of energy security
Reflect energy security concerns in the tasking of the Armed Forces. The MoD should have regard to energy security in the tasking of our Armed Forces, for example the Royal Navy in the security of the sea lanes and the safety of maritime traffic
Beyond this rather bland statement about keeping the sea lanes open how realistically can we shape the armed forces to meet our very real energy and material security issues?
What would their role be, what configuration and equipment would be needed, is it actually the job of the military to contribute to energy security?
Starting with the issues…
Energy
The UK demand for energy is only ever going to go one way, up. Even if a collection of overly restrictive ‘green’ policies succeeds in driving heavy industry offshore, which it seems is increasingly the case, population growth will drive demand for gas and electricity up.
Energy resilience is perhaps one of the most pressing and important issues the UK faces, certainly more important than the threat from Islamic terrorism.
Whatever your feelings on nuclear, global warming, the oil industry or renewable energy, the fact is, today, the UK is a net energy importer and baring some surprise technological development is likely to remain so. With the future of nuclear being made more uncertain in the aftermath of Fukushima this will create a double impact for the UK.
First, it is likely that demand from Japan for Middle East LNG will increase placing our divertable supply contracts under competitive economic pressure.
Secondly, the issue in Japan (and now Germany)will inevitably delay any build out of UK nucelar generation capacity,
Combined with faster than expected reduction in UK oil and gas extraction, wasted investments in renewables such as wind that have hoovered up all the energy investment funds and other factors point to a pressing energy problem for the UK.
Currently, gas for power generation contributes to both base load and peak loads. Gas is currently sourced from dwindling North Sea fields, pipeline delivered gas from continental Europe (Norway and Russia) and ship delivered Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from the USA and Middle East (mostly Qatar)
In 2006 Qatar overtook Indonesia as the world’s largest exporter of LNG and its North Field reserve is the largest in the world with an equivalent capacity of 150 years UK peak demand. The Qatargas II supply chain is a quite staggering project, the South Hook LNG terminal in Milford Haven, 14 new LNG tankers, 30 wells, 2 onshore processing facilities and the supporting infrastructure. It is the largest LNG terminal in Europe and can satisfy 20% of the UK’s demand alone.
The agreement with Qatargas is for a 20 year, non divertable supply. Within the terms of the agreement, supply cannot be diverted elsewhere if they pay more.
Nearby is the Dragon LNG terminal, similar to South Hook although smaller, there are other large terminals on Teesside and the Isle of Grain.
In addition to Qatar, the UK imports LNG from, Kuwait, Algeria and Trinidad.
Major gas pipelines include the Langeled and Vesterled routes from Norway, the IUK pipeline to Belgium and BBL pipeline to the Netherlands. These pipelines link the UK to the wider European gas infrastructure and at the height of the Russian supply crisis even allowed the UK to export gas into Europe.
Unless new and extractable UK reserves are found it is likely that by 2030 the UK will be a total gas importer
Shale gas, underground coal gasification and thorium nuclear generators remain intriguing prospects and may yet reduce our dependence on imported energy but it would seem prudent to base our future medium term plans around imported LNG and pipelines from Europe i.e. Russian/Norwegian gas. In May this year the UK imported more gas in the form og ship delivered LNG than it did via the pipeline(s) from Norway and the extensive investment in terminal capacity means the UK is now a route to Europe.
LNG requires timely distribution because of evaporation, the natural gas is compressed to form a liquid and although modern LNG carriers have onboard boil off regasification plants, a significant volume is still lost (although some of this is used to power the ship, a neat trick)
Transmission, generation and storage capabilities have seen variance in investment but many projects are in the pipeline so to speak and the realisation that renewables are going to have to take a back seat to gas and nuclear generation means that even a government in denial must at some point snap out of their ‘green’ trance and start generating more than hot air and wishful thinking.
The recent outspoken criticism of the Renewable Obligation Certificate and carbon reduction targets from the chairman of Aggreko, the temporary power group, must serve as yet another wakeup call to this delinquent government. Robert Soames went on to say;
“The idea that CCS [carbon capture and storage] is going to be able to contribute significantly to power generation inside of 15 or 20 years is bonkers. People who are not engineers seem to have an unrealistic view of what’s going to be possible”
He also accused politicians of “holding hands and singing Kumbaya to the great green God” but warned the reality is it will be many decades before renewable energy can plug the gap left by traditional sources of power.
Whatever happens with the domestic market it is likely that we will increasingly rely on gas imports, delivered to the UK in LNG tankers or via pipelines from Europe, the security of those supplies must be a high priority for the whole of government.
With three major pipelines and at least 4 large scale LNG terminals in operation it would seem the reception infrastructure is in place. Storage is currently carried out by using mainly natural underground geological features or exhausted gas fields but additional investment in this area should be an obvious means of increasing resilience to supply fluctuation.
Short, medium and long term storage facilities are characterised by the speed of filling and the speed of supply into the grid, a careful blend of all three is needed.
So the UK, with some caveats on storage, has a reasonable gas infrastructure which is actually a testament to those involved, working on despite the attention renewables have obtained recently.
However, just because we have the infrastructure, does not secure supply.
A similar set of complex issues also surrounds oil and refined products, with UK production falling off more rapidly than predicted and the demand for imported products rising.
So it should be clear that the UK faces an uncertain energy future, if current government policies do not address the wishful thinking on renewable energy and start acting in the interests of this country there exists, despite the scaremongering, a real threat to continuity of supply, especially if storage is not addressed and the supplies from the Middle East are disrupted.
Maritime Trade
The UK is most definitely island, a large coastline in excess of 10,000 miles and over 600 ports but despite this, the vast majority of maritime port traffic is concentrated in a very small number, about 50.
The increasing tonnage of UK registered merchant shipping has happened despite a decreasing tonnage of Royal Navy ships and it is because of the Tonnage Tax and Seafarers Earnings Deduction make it tax efficient to register in the UK.
The global shipping insurance industry is largely based in London, Lloyds and many other P&I Clubs contribute a significant amount to the UK economy. Shipping agents and brokers also form a large sector.
We should also not ignore the maritime leisure sector; it is huge and supports many jobs.
Food
The UK was at its highest food self sufficiency since the 19th century in 1980, at the height of industrial food production.
This has steadily declined from 80% to about 60% now.
This increases to nearly 75% for food that can be grown in the UK but this can be misleading because these self sufficiency percentages are calculated as the farm gate value of raw food for production divided by the value of raw food for consumption, it is therefore an economic indicator, not a measure of food security.
The story of our food security is a complex one, whilst we might import over £30 billion per year, in the same period we export just under half that. In terms of diversity, after the UK, the largest suppliers are the Netherlands (6.2%), Spain (5.1%), France (3.5%), Germany (2.7%) and Ireland (2.5%)
The source for individual produce is intriguing; Saudi Arabia supplies a significant quantity of the UK’s tomatoes for example. Africa provides about 14% of the UK’s fruit and vegetables imports, with 47% of that coming from South Africa.
These ratios also fail to take into account the nature of goods imported to actually process the food we grow ourselves, fertiliser, fuel, pesticides, animal feed, food processing equipment and farm machinery for example.
The figures underling all these statistics are also sometimes called into question because they rely on farm surveys and collection techniques that might not always be wholly accurate.
What is obvious though is that as a nation we rely on the global food market, like almost all other industrial countries.
Lots of stats at DEFRA, for those interested and they also publish an excellent summary called the Food Statistics Pocket Book, download here
Threats
The first important thing to recognise is that the world trading system is hugely resilient; it has to be to be commercially viable.
Importers and exporters have a vested interest in making sure they can trade, it is this point that is often completely misunderstood by those seeking to scaremonger and generate a reason for continuing investment in security or military solutions.
Commercial organisations invest in resilience, supply diversity and recovery capabilities because it makes economic sense to do so, in many ways, corporates have a more mature view of strategy issues than governments, which are largely based on the political horizon. The non divertable 20 year contracts with Qatar are a great example, the private sector investing $13billion (including £1billion for South Hook at Milford Haven)
However, there are limits to what business can do and these limits are often exceeded at points of concentration; a port, a distribution point or choke point. The physical movement of gas, oil or food relies on port facilities, ships, airports, aircraft and pipelines.
Looking at the nature of UK trade it is clear that the scaremongering about maritime security if often overstated.
Although the vast majority (95%) of imports and exports by volume travel by ship this is much less by value, also, 65-70% of both imports and exports by volume are between the UK and Europe where it might be argued the greatest threat is accident, bad weather and the odd WWII sea mine.
The security threats to shipping in the North Sea are self evidently different than those in the Gulf of Aden.
If we consider the amount of shipping movements between the UK and North America those percentages rise even higher, again, minimal security threats exist against this traffic.
Food imports are also overwhelmingly from Europe, excepting certain types of produce although as noted above, food production relies on imported products including oil and gas powered electricity production.
The threat to the UK therefore, is to a small percentage of shipping that originates outside Europe and North America, about 20% by volume.
The naval lobby, a group that is obviously seeking funding for the Royal Navy is preference to the other services, often exaggerate both the percentages and threats, seeking to confuse the lame minded politicians who take on face value a load of convincing statistics without any understanding of what lies behind them.
It is a fallacy to think that all the UK’s import of gas comes through the Suez Canal and Straits of Hormuz, this is simply not the case, despite that argument or inference constantly popping up. It is equally untrue to suggest that the UK is any more vulnerable to disruption to the global trading system than France, Germany, Norway or Spain. We are linked to the rest of Europe by a network of sea routes, diverse shipping providers and of course the Channel Tunnel which carried about 15 million tonnes of freight cargo last year, in an emergency, all routes could be significantly increased.
However, LNG supplies from Qatar are a particular concern. LNG ships have to transit the Straits of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandab, and the Suez Canal, all potentially hazardous locations. Because of the volatile nature of LNG extended transits via the Cape will result in higher losses and increased cost so these should concern us all.
Straits of Hormuz; About 15 million barrels of oil per day flow through the Straits of Hormuz, and its 2 mile wide shipping channel, between Iran and Oman. Volume through the Straits has declined in recent years as pipeline build outs continue but it is still the world’s most vital chokepoint. On average 13 tankers per day pass through the straits on their Eastbound route, with a corresponding empty traffic going the other way. It should be noted that more than 75% of export traffic through the Straits is destined for Asian markets. If the Straits were closed the existing pipeline routes would have to cope but these already carry a significant volume. The East West Pipeline pair from the East of Saudi Arabia to Yanbu on the Red Sea is rated at just under 5 million barrels of oil per day and 0.3 million barrels per day of liquid gas. The Habshan-Fujairah pipeline is about to commission and this will transport oil from Abu Dhabi to another of the seven emirates of the UAE, Fujairah, on the East shores of the Strait. At about 1.5 million barrels per day capacity this will provide a greater level of security for the oil trading nations on the South coast of the Persian Gulf. With Iraq returning to some semblance of normality it is quite possible that existing and new pipelines would see greater utilisation, especially through Turkey. As can be seen from the map below a network of gas pipelines also exist in the area although there would need to be significant investment in compression and storage facilities if Qatar LNG were to be transported in this manner.
Bab el-Mandab; The Bab el-Mandab is a chokepoint between the horn of Africa and the Middle East, and a strategic link between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. It is located between Yemen, Djibouti, and Eritrea, and connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Most exports from the Persian Gulf that transit the Suez Canal and SUMED pipeline also pass through the Bab el-Mandab. About 1.8 million barrels per day of oil is moved through the area on its way to Suez and the SUMED pipeline, most destined for the USA and Europe. If it were effectively closed it would place greater pressure on the Saudi East West pipeline. As piracy in the area continues to rise, security is an increasing concern. Because there are currently no effective diversion routes for LNG products close of the Bab el-Mandab would result in LNG tankers having to go around Africa.
Suez Canal; The Suez Canal is accompanied by the SUMED pipeline which runs parallel to it. It connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez in the Eastern Mediterranean with a length of nearly 120 miles. LNG represents about 11% of tonnage and 5% of ships but this is growing especially for Belgian, Italian and UK bound traffic. Because the canal cannot handle the very largest tankers they unload their liquid cargo which is then transited by the 2.3 million barrel per day SUMED pipeline and loaded again at the other end. Closure of the Suez canal and/or SUMED pipeline would require a 6,000 mile, 15 day diversion. This extra journey time would reduce throughput by tying up a finite number of tankers and ultimately drive up costs.
When looking at realistic threats to these three vital chokepoints it is important to consider that the UK is not alone in having a strategic interest.
Traffic is two way and concerns not only the consumer countries but also those producing the oil, gas or other products.
If there were a disruption to any one or all three, the UK would not stand alone in efforts to resolve the situation.
There is also a difference between vulnerability to disruption and likelihood of it happening.
If Suez were closed, commercial shipping would simply go around the long way, yes this would add time and cost but in what circumstances would this happen anyway.
Who is going to block the canal and who is going to keep it blocked?
About 1,500 vessels per month pass through the Suez and provide Egypt with in excess of $5 billion foreign currency revenue per year. Along with energy and tourism it is the largest source of income for the country so any political party that decides to deny itself the two largest revenue sources, for tourism would surely follow any any disruption to the Suez, plus the likely suspension of foreign inward development investment is not likely to last long as it finds itself unable to pay its own people.
A more credible scenario is that of terrorism, either attacking the fabric of the canal or ships in transit.
As mentioned above, it is not in Egypt’s interests to allow canal traffic to be reduced and if shipping owners thought there a realistic threats they would carry the additional risk until it became more economic to re-route, at which point Egypt would have to do something. A scuttled or sunk ship at certain points would be a serious impediment to traffic but due to the vast size of the canal it is actually not that vulnerable to sustained denial with such pin prick attacks. Unless multiple attacks succeeded it is not likely that any damage would be enduring. That said, the threat of maritime terrorism remains credible and an attack would cause oil price fluctuations if not the closure of the canal.
The Bab el-Mandab is a different prospect, Yemen remains a fragile state and unlike Egypt, has no skin in the game when it comes to revenues from the area. Although it is a much larger geographic area and therefore harder to deny it would be feasible to create the conditions where commercial shipping owners decide the long way around is the preferred option, although I am sure Egypt, having just lost all its SUMED and Suez Canal revenue might have something to say about the matter. Disruption would not be allowed to continue indefinitely.
The Straits of Hormuz is an intriguing prospect because the most likely suspect, Iran that is, getting up to mischief bymaking threats or actually carrying out real interdiction of shipping would be playing a dangerous game of brinkmanship.
Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia would all be drawn into any conflict, as would the Western nations in support, China might even get its sleeves rolled up because 75% of traffic through the straits is Eastbound and given that much of Iran’s foreign income generation activity also relies on the Straits any action would necessarily have to be short term.
Because of their economic mismanagement Iran has to import food and even petroleum products, they rely on a small number of refineries and in reality, if they attempted to shut the Straits they would suffer a very serious reprisal and any disruption would be over in 2 weeks, move along here, nothing to see, oh, except the Iranian economy in tatters.
It would not be sensible for Iran to carry out its sabre rattling threats because in reality the sabre rattling occurs in front of a mirror.
Logic does not always come into it though so we should never discount the actions of Iran, they remain a threat (hence pipeline building)
A much more likely threat is that to individual Gulf nations and facilities but again, this risks a wider conflagration and ignores the continuing efforts of everyone in the region to negate the strategic importance of the Straits by busily building pipelines. In fact, with sufficient investment in pipelines it is possible that the most vulnerable nation to blocking the Straits of Hormuz would be Iran itself.
Perhaps we should threaten them with closing the Straits!
Non Military Solutions
The sooner the UK government realises that the ‘power projection’ is not necessarily always the best solution for UK security the better.
The problem is that despite the best intentions and fine words of this government, when it comes to budgets its business as usual.
It might come as a surprise to read this on a defence blog and military capabilities are about much more than securing energy supplies and fresh strawberries, but we should also consider the wide angle.
With oil prices so high, oil fields in UK waters that were once considered uneconomic to exploit will now become viable. It is certainly in the national interest to use public funding to increase exploration and technology development because oil should be considered a strategic concern. Perhaps the recent Scottish political climate is clouding the investment issue, if devolution leads to independence then which nation would reap the benefits of ‘British’ investment.
Why are we not investing public money in exploration around the Falkland Islands?
There is little doubt that the UK has not used its North Sea windfall wisely, with what is left and the prospects of more fields, the nation needs to take a longer term view and realise the market is not always the answer.
Greater cooperative investment in infrastructure in the Gulf region should also not be ruled out, especially in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE and Oman, our traditional and historic allies in the region.
Security around our ports and pipelines should be increased but this is a civil matter, apart from specialist capabilities like mine countermeasures. Our police are now armed and high competent, is there any reason why an armed coastal security force, scaled and equipped for the most likely threats of terrorism and smuggling, is not possible?
The South Hook LNG terminal cost just under a billion pounds, or about the same cost as money wasted on FRES and associated projects (with nothing to show for it) so far, less than half the cost of delaying CVF the first time or one twentieth of the cost of our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq so far.
Puts things into perspective doesn’t it.
Military Solutions
Despite my belief that non military spending should be prioritised over military spending or at least food and energy security not used as all encompassing arguments for yet more military expenditure, there is an absolute need for military capabilities to integrate into the resilience and security matrix.
It is in the national interest to do so.
If we accept that sometimes military solutions are the answer to an unpleasant question we need to indulge in a spot of critical thinking, how best to apply our military and diplomatic levers to ensure continuity of supply into the medium and long term of these most essential of resources.
It is at this point that thoughts of matter maritime comes into the picture, it is hard not to think that a naval solution is the answer because, well, we are talking about ships after all but all three services must be considered equally.
Being dispassionate, given a finite budget and some radical joined up thinking/doing, investing in expeditionary military forces does not provide a good return on investment when considering energy and food security.
Investing in these things does not protect shipping against the most likely threats because their high cost means few numbers and only limited effectiveness but we cannot ignore the security aspects of maritime trade and it is here where the all three services have to properly justify themselves.
Personally, I think our greatest contribution to the collective security in the area and thus by definition, a significant contribution to energy security at home, should be in developing local capacity and capabilities, training and working in local security partnerships for example.
This goes against the ‘strong navy’ mindset, where a strong navy is defined by expeditionary strike and amphibious capabilities. An alternative vision of a strong navy might see a different structure, better suited to preventing conflict than applying force after intelligence and diplomacy failures.
Currently we have the forward basing of a number of Royal Navy mines countermeasures vessels, as I have mentioned before, this is a capability area in which the UK excels.
This is exactly what I am talking about, we are already doing it albeit at a small scale, I want a greater priority given to this kind of activity
Given the interests of the producer nations is to make sure that they can continue to make money out of the oil, gas and shipping traffic it is hard to envisage a scenario where host nation support would be anything but forthcoming with open arms.
The justification for an expeditionary force, usually maritime and centred on CVF is more often than not preceded with a collection statistics about imported goods, history, the maritime industry, energy, and food security. These are usually impressive; 95% of our imported good comes by sea, without food imports we would be starving within 90 days, thousands of jobs relaying on the maritime industry and other equally convincing statements that immediately make you think, isn’t it obvious, we need a strong navy.
The deep and fundamental flaw with this argument though is that it fails to make a link between the ‘we are a maritime nation’ position on the left and the strong navy on the right.
There is a void in the middle; advocates just assume that everyone ‘gets it’
There is no doubt in my mind that the UK is a maritime nation, there is no doubt in my mind that an effective and relevant Royal Navy can make a key contribution to UK security and interests but I start from a sceptical position when it comes to making a causal link between this protective role and the expeditionary strike role as personified by CVF.
The other fundamental problem is, no one ever questions the underlying statistics and as we know, statistics can tell you anything.
I know I get a hammering for being anti Navy, as if they are some sort of religion but this could not be further from the truth, just because I don’t agree with the prevailing priorities and aspirations of CVF advocates does not all of a sudden make me anti navy.
The first and obvious source of information for how a Royal Navy can protect the British way of life is of course the Royal Navy website. Some time ago they published a very well written report on the important of maritime trade (click here to read in full)
The campaigning group Save the Royal Navy also looks at this subject in its 2009 article, 10 Reasons Why…
The Phoenix Think Tank looks at the issues here
This is where things get interesting because a strong Royal Navy can be defined in many ways.
On the one hand, we have the Royal Navy’s vision of a force centred on 2 strike carriers, surrounded by a surface combatant force, a number of submarines and associated logistic and secondary capabilities.
But I fail to see how this force as constituted in the real world, not the fantasy world, actually contributes to real world modern security threats.
The Royal Navy suffers particularly from what I call ‘tradition drag’ because of its historic pre-eminence in the world naval rankings but this is 2011 and the UK no longer dominates world trade. This constant reference to the Royal Navy’s position in the world is incredibly damaging and snuffs out any constructive debate of what it should look like.
If we are too concerned with ‘measuring up’ to other powers as some abstract concept we take our eyes off what is actually needed.
There is a lot of talk about being a first rank naval power but frankly, being rank 1 or 7 is irrelevant and shows the level of debate.
What is important is that the Royal Navy and other services are relevant to the needs of UK defence and security, rank has nothing whatsoever to do with it.
We shouldn’t care whether the Royal Navy is ranked 1st or 71st as long as it is relevant to the national need and the same goes equally for the other two services.
Yes, we are an island
Yes, the UK maritime industry is huge
Yes, the vast majority of trade sails rather than fly’s
Yes, the UK must not become ‘sea blind’
Yes, we are an island!
But all three services have to make credible and convincing cases for every last pound note, because if we are talking about real security and resilience, there are many more cost effective means of spending the public’s hard earned cash.
If there were a large scale security threat around those three choke points mentioned above it would be a global issue and the obvious argument is that the UK would have to contribute its fair share to any coalition force involved but by investing a greater relative share of our national budget into developing local security, diplomacy, obtaining timely intelligence and influence in the area we might not get to that point.
There is also a strong argument for investing funds that might have been earmarked for military capabilities in energy and food resilience, given that energy and food are fundamentally important to the prosperity and survival of the United Kingdom.
Do we invest in continual maintenance or foot the repair bill?
I have never ever been convinced of CVF as a strike asset for me its value is as a sea control asset. But I don’t think Their Lordships see it that way. I have said several times here I don’t think the UK will spend the next 50 years chasing Third World tribes around remote mountain ranges. We will be facing crises about resources and we will need first rates assets to match the first rates assets of our “competitors.”
Rather quaintly I think the navy’s job is sinking ships (with a bit of nuclear strategic warfare as a side line.) The UK is one of the few nations with ownership of a competent SSN force. We don’t need them now (just as really we don’t need 3 QRA squadrons now) but it is a capability we need to maintain (as are the 3 QRA squadrons.) We need Astute 8 – 12 as one for one replacements for the S & T boats. And I would go further and say I would rather have 8 long range AIP SSKs than T26.
I think if CVF had been cancelled we would still have had only 6 Darings and 7 Astutes.
TD
That was a rather interesting and thought provoking piece. I am however not sure why you lumped CVF in with it. In my mind CVF is there for a very different conflict than that of protecting trade and shipping lanes. CVF is to allow secure independent oversea expeditionary warfare an almost unique asset in Europe.
What were looking at here is the C3, frigate requirement and I believe the small patrol boats that operate around the UK. Both programs are funded so I fail to see why its an either or. I would through in MPA if we had any!
Its like saying we need to have a garrison in cyprus falklands and uk for security requirements but to pay for it well scrap all the challenger tanks..
My concern with energy security is that of the countries we buy from. Most of our natural allies in the mid east are not the most stable in the world (there people do not like the west as were seen as propping up there dictators) what if something in one of those countries develops that stops that country from producing and refining oil or gas eg regime overthrown or its invaded by a neighbour.
I agree with x; CVF’s most important function is sea control, starting with air defence. It’s considerably cheaper in this than the usual RAF solution of fleets of fighters and tankers based in improbable locations
The cheap escort is a myth and probably isn’t needed anyway. During WW2 what saved shipping was the convoy system because it denuded the ocean of targets. 9 out of 10 convoys never ever saw a U-boat; though that is not belittle the panic or fear felt by sailors because of false contacts. ASW only became effective when a good number of high end frigates/corvettes became available (working in groups) and air cover was increased.
Does this mean that just about everyone is agreed that Type 26 is a waste of cash?
Ah, thought it had been a while before we have another anti CVF rant on Think Defence!
Energy security is a good reason for a strong navy but not CVF, indeed as Mark says ‘CVF is to allow secure independent overseas expeditionary warfare’.
It’s a bit like the argument we shouldn’t have a deterrent because it doesn’t deter terrorists.
I’d add that CVF is also useful in allowing the UK to have a capability that is attractive to potential allies which ties in nicely with a piece you wrote recently.
TD says
‘investing in a so called strong Royal Navy with aircraft carriers, frigates, submarines and destroyers does not provide a good return on investment.’
If you want your Navy to exercise sea control wherever you want it does. What you are in effect doing is wanting to make the Navy a one trick pony when most other nations with large trading economies are looking at ways of enhancing sea control.
Paying BAE £126million to redesign the wheel is a waste. We should just buy the FREMM design and build them here (eek!!) Or my current favourite idea build a variant of Iver Huitfeldt/Absalon hybrid (engines from the former, weapons from the latter) which is simpler and cheaper design (though I doubt that would translate into numbers.) Yes 1 Daring (with SONAR) to 3 A/IH Hybrids seems a good idea. That is if we can have 6 more Darings..
Andy said “If you want your Navy to exercise sea control wherever you want it does. What you are in effect doing is wanting to make the Navy a one trick pony when most other nations with large trading economies are looking at ways of enhancing sea control.”
Say again station. Message garbled. Over.
Sorry x, airwaves are a bit dodgy.
TD was making the point a Navy with CVF, Destroyers, Frigates & Subs was not a good return on taxpayers money.
I was trying to make (badly) the point that if all you wanted was for your navy to protect trade then it wasn’t but if you want it to exercise sea control it most certainly was!
And that is the thinking of all emerging economic powers as well.
@ Andy
Thanks matey.
I’m sticking to my Type 45 guns (fitted for, but not with, firing pins).
Scrap Type 25. Enhance the Type 45 design. Save some money on production efficiency. Magaritas all round.
chris its too late to make production saving on type 45. Its production is effectively over all ships now launched and fitting out people who initially manufactured it are now on other things. Type 26 has the benefit of needing less crew and a long production run with several countries coming on board and promises to be cheaper (i know i know).
X
Fremm costs nearly as much as type 45 its a nice ship but somewhat out of our price range.
@ Mark
It is only out of our price range because “we”,well HMG, choose it to be… (Only jokin’!)
Um. Debatable though whether it would be cheaper to build FREMM or re-engineer T45.
And I said I am rather taken with Danish CODADs at the moment…..
@x
‘I think if CVF had been cancelled we would still have had only 6 Darings and 7 Astutes.’
I think this is the real reason why the Navy is fighting so hard for the carriers. In their minds they have ‘given up’ lots of subs and surface combatants in the hope of jam tomorrow in the form of ‘real carriers’. In reality they would have lost them anyway due to defence kit inflation and budget squezing. The carriers were just a more effective dummy to complaints about cuts because of their size!
In reality all three services are the same – they fight for the ‘sexy’ kit because it is a great recruiting tool. In the RAF it’s fast jets and in the Army fast armour. Recruiting is what perpetuates the organisation and all bureaucracies exist to self-perpetuate in the end. I’m sure similar stuff goes on in other areas of public service – surgery getting more money and attention than cleaning or food in hospitals for example.
I think carriers certainly have their uses, the main one being the ability to manoeuvre an air group in very flexible ways, but it is clear we can’t afford an air group which in anyway justifies the size of carrier we have bought. They don’t do much for energy security, TD is right there and even in areas where we can’t effectively work at building local capability, we need quantity not quality. OPVs and MCMVs will do just as well with the terrorists and pirates as full blown AAW Destroyers. The flexible FPV TD posited in the Navy series would be adaptable to both roles and therefore could be available in enough numbers to regularly patrol trouble spots keeping the situation suppressed rather than responding when everything has already kicked off. I agree with x that we were wrong to completely abandon SSKs particularly given the export opportunities. The Darings are too few and too one dimensional though to give up on T26 altogether, they were an epic cock up IMO as anything that large and expensive should be armed to the teeth not ‘fitted for but not with’.
Um. In all my years involved in sea cadets I never ever knew one to go on to join the navy for the sexy kit. To learn a trade. Yes. Perhaps because they didn’t like the idea of camping with a rifle and digging holes as a job. And perhaps some of them did swallow too many of the tall tales told by ex-matelots. But sexy kit? No.
@x, yes, their Lordships see CVF as a strike asset, they have said so often enough in various select committee evidence sessions, it has nothing whatsoever to do with sea control or protecting trade routes and it is this very plank on which a lot of the justification for it sits, say one thing and do another.
@Mark, I included CVF but then I think I also included the whole expeditionary thing as well, FRES, Typhoon and others, this piece was not against CVF particularly. I am advocating a fundamental shift in the way we see the role of the armed forces, away from striking and towards a greater cooperative role. I know its goes against the grain and challenges a lot of vested interests but there you go
@Andy, did you actually read the post, I do believe it is bigger than CVF but if it suits you to think I am having an anti CVF rant then fair enough. The reason I singled CVF out is because it is the poster child for the stronger Navy, we are an island crowd that use things like overseas trade and energy security, distorting the facts at every step, to scaremonger in a desperate attempt to provide justification for something that will put the RN back in the big league. If you look at the £20bn for Iraq and Afghanistan, what could we have had instead, proper energy security, I look at CVF/JCA/FRES etc etc in the same way.
@ Mark
At least BAE has a very good idea of how to build and put together Type 45′s. The 26 is a drawing on a computer at this stage and like all such projects a lot of money will be spent on the first 2 or 3 ships figuring out what the best way is to put them together. That is money that could be saved, along with a hefty chunk of R&D work that will be needed to bring the 26 into service.
I can see multiple avenues to go with Type 45;
- The current version,
- A version with gun removed to make extra space for a large land attack cruise missile bay,
- A version with same as above,but also with extra luanch tubes in place of the hangar,
- A version minus the missile bay (Huh!!) to make room for maybe a surgery or extra cargo forward. A ship that is essentially tailored for more low intensity work,
- An ASW specific version,
In other words, a Type 45 derived fleet of surface vessels. I hear Type 26 might be offered with a diesel engine choice, so that would probably be worth the investment still, but I fail to see the need to spend billions developing a new class to do jobs that could just as easily be done by Type 45.
Now specialist very low intensity craft I can live with, but not another all new “destroyer/frigate”
TD – excellent piece diving into what are, or should be important constituent elements of the nations “grand strategy” not just military strategy.
It’s a shame you managed to spoil it by coming off as anti-Navy even when your trying to be pro-Maritime ! Although I heartily agree, CVF does not have much to do with sea control, or SLOC protection (or interdiction) that is more to do with the HMG focus on the CVF as a power projection tool. A carrier as simple ship is a highly versatile platform, as to whether it has a role in protecting trade all depends on what we fly off of it.
However we digress, how is it you make “strong Navy” sound like the worst kind of curse you could ever use in front of your mother ?
If we have an extremely expensive long term Army garrison and RAF presence in Oman (not that they want it) how is that a more cost effective solution to securing the Straits of Hormuz than having an RN with effective vessels ?
Don’t forget the RN is at an all time low. 8 x Darings instead of 6, 8 SW focused “C1″ type ships and 8 x General Purpose frigates for a total of 24 ‘ships of the line” would be a “strong Navy” at this moment in time, although when I joined the RN in 83 I would have laughed my tits off at such numbers !
By the way, having spent my entire 10 year RN career in the gulf, we have had excellent relationships with the UAE, Oman, and Kuwait since the early 80′s – so as to partnerships and forward basing, well I hardly think we do it on a small scale. I have spent more time in Dubai on a Pompey based MCMV than I did in Pompey. Likewise I know the Omani naval dockyard of Mina Rahsut as well as I know Rosyth……
So, as you know I am a proponent of carrier air power, but I am not wed to CVF, and would happily seem them go to return to a 28 to 30 major surface vessel fleet, but actually when it comes down to energy security, just invest the entire defence budget for the next five years in developing a mass-manufacturable Liquid Fuel Thorium Reactor (LFTR), patented up the jacksie, and then flog our expertise to the whole world ! We would be doing every one a favor never mind securing our own energy sources
x, Chris B. et al
We seem to discuss fleet structure ad naseum, on every thread possible – not complaining mind you.
However, I know x was around when we published these, but not sure if Chris B or others ever found them and read them:
Sea Power 101:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2011/01/sea-power-101-the-sdsr-2020-force-structure-and-the-future-of-the-rn/
An Absalon derivative ‘C2′ or “Global Cruiser’ for the RN:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/01/fdr-maritime-futures-part-2-another-view-on-c2/
TD – a bit of help – I could have sworn that you also published a paper I did on a T45 derivative as the ‘C1′ or ASW focused surface combatant, but searching I can’t find it !
Chris B:
Ref:
“I can see multiple avenues to go with Type 45;”
May I address each of your ideas in turn ……
- A version with gun removed to make extra space for a large land attack cruise missile bay,
No need for this. The design has space (and weight margin) for additional VLS cells (specifically the longer ‘land attack’ version of the Sylver) between the rear most row of the current system, and the front of the superstructure.
- A version with same as above,but also with extra luanch tubes in place of the hangar,
Bah, modern warship with no hanger is hardly a flexible asset. With extra tubes up front, and probably weight and space margin to bung some Harpoon type canisters or CAMM cells elsewere, is this really necessary ? We can’t afford an “arsenal ship” all our vessels must be as flexible as possible.
- A version minus the missile bay (Huh!!) to make room for maybe a surgery or extra cargo forward. A ship that is essentially tailored for more low intensity work,
No need for this either. The T45 is very large inside, with a considerable space margin. There is more accommodation than needed. It may require a ‘redesign’ of that internal space to get your required large sick, operating theatre etc, but is this kind of work not better performed by a different class of vessel ?
- An ASW specific version,
Absolutely with you on this one. Lever the sunk costs and build expertise. Change the fan tail and area under the aft flight deck to fit the 2087 towed array. Widen the after superstructure for a double hanger (for 2 x Merlin) removing the large 3D air surveillance radar. Fit STWS tubes if necessary. Expand boat bays for 2 x additional 11m RHIB based USV with dipping sonar for persistent littoral ASW ops. I am not sure you need to change the front end at all, but to keep the costs down you can go with Artisan as the radar, and CAMM as the SAM.
Ah ha – found it – TD roled my T45 as C1 type ideas into his own post, so I am not showing as the author
However, our joint ideas and my design drawing are in this article:
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/11/the-future-of-the-royal-navy-05-%E2%80%93-the-type-23-replacement/
I’ll get reading and get back to you in a bit. But first one request.
Can we please stop calling it the littoral. You mean “Coastal”.
Chris- the “litoral” includes inland waterways, estuary’s, deltas, it is “bigger” than coastal !
However, I will stop using it, if you and x agree that the days of the Battle of the Atlantic are behind us and stop calling RN surface ships “escorts”
A: Energy self sufficiency should be the goal of every country, as such the UK should be looking at moving to a majority nuclear based baseline generation capacity supplemented by all manner of renewables, including, though not limited to, landfill gas/waste to energy/biomass plants, wind, wave/tide (which could be installed within existing offshore windfarms) and hydro-electric (including additional pumped storage for the wind farms). To continue to rely on imported fuels is folly, and leaves us open not only to the whims of the supplier nations, but also the volatile international markets.
B: Food production within the mainland UK should be encouraged to be sufficient to supply all needs. While their will always be food which will need to be imported, these should be considered a luxury. Projects such as Thanet earth should be encouraged. A unilateral ban on dumping dead fish should be introduced (if the EU fail to come up with the goods) and methods should be pursued to reduce the amount of food waste, both at the point of harvest, the point of sale and in the home.
C: The Military should not be needed to keep up fed and warm, protecting imports is spending money to watch money flow out of the country, the Royal Navy should only be required to protect our exports and other maritime trade which occurs under the UK flag, i.e. spending money to make money. To this end the RN will be required to have a role policing the sea lanes, and while the CVF is not the ideal vessel for this (a 2 helicopter escort, deployed in pairs would be better) it does afford us a big stick which can be waved in the direction of a possible threat to our interests should the need arise.
D: Submarines have no role in high seas merchant security, SSNs and SSKs byt their very nature are a purely offensive tool, used to deter or destroy the vessels of other navies or to enforce blockades against maritime shipping, they cannot be used to prevent attacks on UK flagged shipping, except those being conducted by large surface vessels or other submarines, to attempt to utilise an SSN to deter say pirates in a RHIB of small converted fishing boats is not an effective use of military equipment.
Right, all done.
@ Jed (sort of)
– Gunless LAM platform. The Type-45 does indeed have room built in for these, but only 16 or so. I’m thinking of a version without the gun that can then double or maybe triple that number.
Also, I was led to believe (have to stop saying that) that the extra VLS cells for any LAM would go between the current lot and the gun. This was mentioned somewhere, buggered if I can find it now, in a report about the 155mm gun.
– The Arsenal ship. As you said, this kind of ship wouldn’t be particularly flexible, but then it isn’t supposed to be. I would only imagine two, maybe 3 of these being built. They would come in bloody handy for a situation like Libya. Imagine that first day strike capability?
But I might trade away the arsenal ship if you’ll let me have plenty of the gunless LAM vessels.
– The ASW vessel. Yep, towed array, with you. Not sure about the double hangar. Any change to the super structure costs cash and the hangar-bridge is all one section so I’m led to believe (bugger it).
– The one with the Surgery. No, not an episode of “Friends”. I’m just thinking that at some point we have to roll up our sleeves and build a more numerous vessel for less strenuous/high intensity tasks. I’m thinking it could be Type 45 based.
So axe the Sampson and the VLS, find some other cost savings, keep the gun, and then deck the thing out for a mixture of low level security/mercy/disaster response style missions.
All of the above fitted with CIWIS, and all but the last cheap one fitted with 2x quad Harpoons they should already have.
@ Jed.
They escort Carriers, thus escorts!
“the “litoral” includes inland waterways, estuary’s, deltas,” – rivers in other words. So coastal ships and river boats/brown water navy
@ Grey
Feeling Blue?
Anyway, “protecting imports is spending money to watch money flow out of the country”. Not necessarily. Those imports can be anything from steel and wood used to make things, to consumer electronics that help fuel our economy (TV’s in pubs for example)
Also, exports and imports are often linked, the whole “we’ll give you this, you give us that” type thing.
Imports are more than just money going out. If we didn’t need those things, we wouldn’t be importing them.
Like, the LNG that TD was talking about. Oh, and oil.
Imagine what would happen if all that was cut off.
Another gross misunderstanding of Seapower and maritime security alongside the flexibility of a firm use of defence assets on food ad energy
Head over to the Phoenix thinktank readers!
With recent events in North Africa, I wondering if the straights of Gibraltar and the straights around Malta could become new choke points…
Completely on board with the ‘high end core’ argument for RN. Scrap the T26 and build a second batch of ASW T45, and upgrade the whole lot to have the bells and whistles you would expect from GP vessels. T26 will be built in too few numbers to make any impact on what we are discussing here. We need a larger number of light (cheap) patrol frigates and JSS ships.
A pertinent and well constructed analysis.
What has history to say about this? The Roman Empire in its latest years invested a lot in hiring “allied” tribes and training them to fight to defend the empire’s borders and strategic areas. The Roman army was filled up with generals and officers from German tribes and other populations. The Empire’s legions were expensive, and they were scaled down. Allies and “federatus” tribes had to make up for the shortfall.
The result was that thousands of men, once trained by the romans, fled back to their countries and taught their populations in the roman way of fighting war, that for centuries had made Rome invincible. And then they turned against Rome.
Arminio, officer of Rome but german of birth, is most known for betraying Rome (after years of sterling service that made him trusted and appreciated)and defeating the empire’s army in Teutoburgo, slaughtering 55.000 roman soldiers.
Adrianopoli saw the destruction of 8 legions. Whole. And the death of the Emperor himself, i believe it was Valeriano, but the name might be wrong.
The romans had long been outnumbered. Now they had lost their edge in tactics, strategy and kit.
In the end, the Empire fell.
Today we train the afghans (not that we could do otherwise at this point, but…) and lots of them defect (most certainly to the talibans) and some others fire on their trainers. Some britons did made it back in body bags for this kind of event, and at least an italian soldier, my compatriot, also met that end.
We talk about the Gulf. I believe that, if we take a look at the countries of the Middle East, we’ll see that they are actually growing stronger and stronger, economically and militarily, both more trained and more equipped with every year that passes. They buy fighters, stealth missile boats, submarines, even C17 cargo planes, Patriot missile batteries, etc. With western help and supplies.
Does this REALLY improve OUR security? Or is it the building phase of tomorrow’s really nasty crisis? Are we training the tribes that tomorrow will give us trouble, like Rome once did?
If the US tomorrow morning were to listen to some and retreat their “not needed” aircraft carriers from the Gulf, we’d live in a very different world in no time.
The UK is the next country after the US in the security job. The impact of a reduction in presence would be very significant.
I’m sorry, but i continue to fail seeing the benefits and great successes of help, training, aid money and everything. It sure isn’t working with Pakistan. Bahrain is also an embarrassing case, with the repression of the civilians protesting in the streets and everything.
Somalia is the top example. If we could “build” Somalia into a nation and “help it so they do not need to go pirates anymore”, wouldn’t it be nice…?
Unfortunately, that is the red-glowing example of soft power failure that no one admits.
Does the World Food Programme and all the other UN initiatives change anything in Somalia?
Is there any chance to send them liasoning teams to train “government forces” (if they exist at all) into controlling their own damn country, without having the “trainers” captured, kidnapped or killed? Doubt it.
When i’ll see Aid money and a small force of trainers and support personnel enter Somalia and fix it and put an end to piracy, i’ll believe into the possibilities of this.
Because let’s be crystal clear: forward basing the Army in places such as Kenya has only ended up in incidents with the locals and legal calls on Britain to pay money to them, like the 4.5 millions the UK had to pay in 2002 for the issue of unexploded training ordnance and related incidents.
For now i only see Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and Bahrain, and it shrieks of FAILURE so loud to make me deaf.
As to the Air Force, good luck building stability in the world with a training exercise of two weeks in India.
We can close our eyes all we want, but it is the navy that lives its life, in peace and war, forward deployed.
Can Britain survive a Gulf crisis without carriers? Yes, so long as the US fix that themselves.
Can Britain be the nation it used and wishes to be without carrier? No.
Should Britain invest in it?
At 7 billions for the ships and 10 billions for 150 F35s? YES. Hell, yes. It still is at least 3 billions short of the ridiculous amount of money that went into Typhoon, that much as i love it, is simply and inexorably strategically 10000 times harder to justify that the aircraft carriers, with all what a proper flat top makes possible.
I’m cynical, i know. But certain strategies just kind of remind me of Homer Simpson’s slogan “Can’t someone else do it for me?”, and i fear they’d work just as well as that slogan did for him.
RE: “the “litoral” includes inland waterways, estuary’s, deltas, it is “bigger” than coastal !”
- it also includes the immediate coastal land area, up to 100 km (depending on the topography)
- so take the 127 mm OTO with Volcano rounds and you can reach out and touch all of it (from a stand-off distance re: normal land artillery or ATGWs)
- rivers and large estuaries need special solutions (USN is expanding their Riverine Command)
@PTT fan, bore off!!
Paul, that should be PTT fan(s) because there are multiple of them, the funny thing is I publish all their comments without editing or moderation but when they publish stuff on their website that makes multiple accusations about this place they don’t allow commenting at all.
Of course, as PTT fan has said, they don’t comment on other web sites which is patently nonsense, much like the vast majority of their dribbling.
Its good for a laugh though isn’t it
PS, PTT fan, where have I used any PTT content, apart from links and quotes, can you please point it out to me
@ Jed
I use the term “escort” as a catch all term for frigates, destroyers, large corvettes, and sloops.
Naval classifications have changed over the years. And change today from navy to navy.
Take the term cruiser. Today that means a very large conventional (one with guns, missiles) ship. In the days of the old sailing navy any ship detached from the fleet, irrespective of size, was called a cruiser.
We have to use terms every body recognises.
TD
For what it’s worth we clearly see the defence environment the same way by and large.
Without picking on Nelly and Dumbo, AGAIN.
(But it’s such an easy target… I can give it up any time I like…. No it’s allright I’m clean now doc.. Oh alright I did have a bit of rant yesterday. but only for 5 minutes, in the privacy of my own room.)
More seriously I am a big believer in a ‘Strong navy’.
I think the problem is the definition of ‘strength’.
As this is about strategy, we should be asking what is it we want the navy to do?
In this day and age my answer; (and I am not so egotisticle as to believe it is the only valid one), Is that it exists to promote and protect the UK’s economic interrests and where possible it’s citizens accros the world, and play it’s part in protecting the borders and soveriengty of the uk from likely threats.
There really is on this site;(and this is going to stirr up a storm) a huge thick seam of post colonial imperialistic almost subconciously racist, bullshit about Uk’s status and the rest of the world!
If I may expand on TD’s point (and if it’s not his point then it should be)!
If real trouble kicks off in the streights of Hormuz or the Horn of africa or even in south east Asia. Modern Global economic reality means Vital supplies will be rerouted, the worlds navies,(including the real big boys)which are a lot closer than us, US India, China, Japan, South Korea etc will step In because the boot will be on their necks as much as ours. They have ships, capable crews, and kit to do the job, as good as ours in many cases. And I suspect would be a lot less bothered about rules of engagement.
What won’t under any realistic circmstance happen, will be the cry of “Save us oh great Royal Navy with your mighty ships of the great white queen accross the seas” Whereapon we will despatch our Mighty carrier (with it’s 12 aircraft, (oh god don’t get me started), to ‘sort out Johny Foreigner’ Like it was 1900 all over again.
I know I exagerate for the sake of making the point (can’t spell hyperbolie), but many of the comments on this site and the arguments about maritime power seem stuck in a time warp. And are obsessed about restoring the RN staus to some point in the past without ever asking if that is necessary for the UK defence, or even if it were, is it possible.
That is without dealing with the potential fighting power of our potential enemies.
The old
‘Whatever happens
we have got
the Maxim Gun
and they have not’
Apogie of Imperial power is long gone. Some of the people we might be trying to strong arm can now shoot back.
A recognition we are a trading powere and that we shoudl concentrate on that and have a Navy that does the same, would go along way to help defend this country.
Tin hat on climbing into fox hole “INCOMING”!!
@ Jed re fantasy fleets
One apologises for this too. My personality type means I find it difficult to come settled judgements. In extremis this even means at times I ignore new information because I can’t cope.
Comment
Perhaps the money spent on Nellie and Dumbo could have been better spent on Nuclear reactors to give us a measure of imported Fossil fuel free energy independance?
It is interesting to drill into what the circumstances of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf infer for military operations.
If your concern is terrorism then really there isn’t a military solution. If a terrorist intends sinking a ship or crashing an air craft in a sensitive place, then once such an operation is underway there isn’t really anything that would prevent it. Fighting terrorism is better done at the conceptual stage by the intelligence services.
Obviously there is extensive piracy out of Somalia already, but I haven’t noticed Britain or anywhere else being deprived of essential imports or trade because of it. Therefore, on the evidence it would seem that foreign piracy, while unwelcome, is not a strategic concern and wouldn’t rate too high on the list of the MoDs priorities.
That is not to say you wouldn’t want to do something about it if you could, but the pirates success so far isn’t because they have better resources. Rather it is because the western navies involved (RN included) are not designed for that sort of task. Having a highend warship with a highend ASW helicopter chasing up and down the coast of Somalia on the off chance of seeing a pirate raid in action is just consuming the expensive operating hours on the ship and helicopter without a great deal to show for it. If the MoD wants to get into playing beat cop it should look at smaller/faster but more numerous boats for the navy and use land based aircraft for ISTAR and air support.
However, if Iran or any other nation decides to exert control of the region then it is an act of war that would prove the Admirals right – the carrier with the shiny aircraft and T45s would become very useful until land based alternatives could be put in place.
@ IXION
The Germans have just pulled the plug on their nuclear programme…..
X
And many commentators believe that represents an opportunity for UK PLC
A lot of heavy industry uses huge ammounts of power. If we can offer lots of RELITIVLY cheap nuclear power we might find industry investent flowing our way. German Nuclear technologists may flow to UK in serch of gainfull employment
The politics in Germany are so anti nuclear, it is purely a political move.
IXION, you say
‘I know I exagerate for the sake of making the point (can’t spell hyperbolie), but many of the comments on this site and the arguments about maritime power seem stuck in a time warp. And are obsessed about restoring the RN staus to some point in the past without ever asking if that is necessary for the UK defence, or even if it were, is it possible.’
Rather condescending. Also suggests the majority of world powers with interests in sea control are out of touch too.
TD,
‘If we listen to the usual suspects, unless we have 12 carriers and 200 frigates the nation, when three Iranians fart, will starve within 2 days and freeze to death within 3′
More condescending rubbish TD. If we can’t debate CVF or more pertinently some form of air power at sea without labelling every one in favour of it as some kind of bathtub admiral playing with his toy boats then I give up.
“a significant contribution to energy security at home, should be in developing local capacity and capabilities, training and working in local security partnerships for example. This goes against the ‘strong navy’ mindset, based around CVF”
No logical connection between the two statements.
You can do all of the wonderful things described to boost resource security by the non-military means suggested………….. but doing so is by no means going against maritime/raiding expeditionary setup.
All it argues against is ANY kind of military response to resource security, which is to say land sea or air rather than any at all.
Naval-raiding is damned marvellous because it is an excellent method for projecting expeditionary military force, not because it has a sideline in protecting the import of sun-ripened tomatoes from the ME.
If you want to argue that resource-security would be better served by a placing a greater emphasis on non-military measures then fine, but please explain to me how this justifies axing carriers/phibs rather than brigades, because the parallel sounds faintly absurd from here!
It is accepted that Britain will remain an interventionist power, regardless of method.
It is accepted that we must maintain resource-security, and that non-military means rock.
The two are largely divorced except where there might be some complementarity.
However, the fact that there might be less complementarity than some lunatics claim between naval assets and resource-security does not negate that some does indeed exist, nor that naval-raiding is a very useful expeditionary posture.
This of course requires acceptance that limited funds mean we can no longer be a broad-spectrum Great Power, and thus a choice is necessary, but that is not something the capability-plus ‘doctrine’ has really accepted……..
IMO it is all about the submarines.
The carriers will be very vulnerable against the best opponents, worried about against medium opponents, and most people will know roughly where they are.
Our subs are about as good as it gets, and very hard to find. Would Argentina risk an invasion fleet against our subs, would they risk their mainland infrastructure against TLAM?
Serious research cash should be put into sub launched remote vehicles- a disposable recce TLAM could be a useful emergency asset (and show of potential force), how about mission bays for remote small subs/RIBs that could take on patrol boats (and launch SAMs against MPA aircraft looking for the subs)??
@ Chris M
Yes submarines are one of our strengths. We need to preserve the capability.
@ All
I don’t mind high end ESCORTS chasing pirates or drug runners; it is on the job training. Try to think of T23 or T45 in the India Ocean chasing pirates as being forward deployed. Ships have a utility factor lets use that to our advantage. Better than sat in Pompey or Guzz. We can’t afford two navies.
Why is it whenever I make the odd joke in a largely serious article I get picked up for being hysterical, for fcuks sake fellas, the bit about Iranians farting was just a joke
I am not anti Navy and for the umpteenth time, I want a strong navy it’s just that my vision of what a strong navy is different from others, doesn’t make me right or wrong, just different. What really gets on my tits though is the lengths by which those in favour of a strong navy as defined by carriers and frigates etc i.e. a particular force composition, use the most ridiculous arguments on, for example, energy and food resilience, to justify their position. Look at the link I provided to the Save the Royal Navy site on their 10 reasons why the state of the RN should matter article, NUMBER 1 was energy, food and trade but whilst they quote freely the hoary old 95% of trade and 50% of energy stats they fail to mention that over 75% of that trade is with Europe and if we include the US it is even higher. No that would make a justification for a better Coastguard buts that’s a bit inconvenient isn’t it so instead they justify CVF, Type 26 etc etc on the premise that without them, our very existence and way of life is in danger, which is complete and utter cock.
It is this that I rail against and it is this that I will continue to expose.
At what point did I advocate cutting CVF and NOT army brigades, at what point did I advocate garrisoning Oman, at what point did I say that a 2 week aviation exercise in India was going to have major effect, not once that’s when, please read the articles and not what what you think I wrote. You lot have yet to see my take on land forces but I can tell you it will have the same threads running through it as my views on air and maritime. That is, a reduction in the top end, less expeditionary and more sustained forward presence to assist others to help themselves. Not because of any ideological zeal or phobia of anything dark blue, but because I think it is the best use of a finite resource.
We all bemoan a lack of strategy but a logical strategy dictates there are better returns on investment for true security, energy, food, trade etc that the armed forces. It’s a sad fact but a reality nonetheless.
The reason I pick on CVF and JCA is because despite the sunk costs, it is still within our reach to snap out of and change direction, the same for FRES. If you actually read the post I make several references to Typhoon and FRES, decidely non dark blue stuff
@Repulse, I was going to look at Gibraltar and the Straits of Malacca but I wanted to publish it and ran out of time but you make a good point, there are a number of other chokepoints worthy of attention.
@Gabrielle, if you want to look at history, have a look at the greatest empire the world has ever seen, the British Empire, then look up thinks like air policing and political officers, these are interesting parallels. Your comment about training the ANA and body bags is fair enough but miniscule in the grand order. You are right that the Gulf states are getting stronger militarily but what’s wrong with that, they are taking responsibility for their own security and we are helping them, if we didn’t sell them the kit the Russians or the Chinese would. Given it is in their economic interest to keep those oil tankers moving it only seems fair that they do it for themselves.
@Ixion, spot on
@Richard W, if Iran gets a bit punchy in the Straits of Hormuz they will be the worse off because structurally, their economy depends on that 2 mile stretch of waterway more than the other Gulf states so it would be completely illogical for them to do so. Of course logic doesn’t always prevail and this is why for the last couple of decades all the countries in the region have been building a huge network of pipelines that will lessen, in the long term, the important of the Straits. If we are really serious about limiting the influence of Iran we should be realistic about their economy, the state of their military capabilities and stop shitting ourselves every time they stage a demonstration with a speedboat and RPG. If things did kick off in the area trust me, there would be airfields galore, we would be spoiled for choice.
@Jedi, no, they are linked inexorably because there is a finite amount of public money available but as I have said before, we may be closer in thinking than you realise
Finally, PTT fan, you will note that despite your multiple IP’s addresses and emails I continue to publish your comments unmoderated but instead of just sniping and telling us all how much better PTT is why don’t you actually engage in the debate like Andy, X, Jed or Gabrielle do, these people have a differing view to mine and that’s great because as I said above, mine is just one view amongst many. You say that the PTT does not comment on other web sites but I note the article
http://www.phoenixthinktank.org/?p=875
Attacks this site, accuses it of having vested interests behind it and complains that the article on naval aviation misses the point. I have no means of commenting on that or Sharkey’s World, in fact that’s not actually true, I did comment on Sharkey’s World but it was deleted.
The whole point of what I am doing here is to energise the debate, get people talking and raise the profile of defence but it seems the PTT just want to shout to an empty room about how much better they are than anyone with a different view of things
The door is always open for debate
TD – here here ! Well said sir – we dont agree on everything (anything ?) but we engage in debate.
Sharky’s “article” was copied from his personal blog to the PTT site – the PTT site does not allow commenting and Sharky (or his minions) have deleted my comments on the posting, not once, but twice !!
So bottom line, PTT I accuse you of being a troll, feck off !
TD – you did indeed not suggest garrisoning Oman – I was extrapolating from your comments about “forward presence” or “forward basing” to make a point; obviously I did not do it very well.
So I will try again: for my entire full time RN career I was “forward based” mostly in Dubai, sometimes in Oman, occasionally in Fujairah (UAE)- it’s not new.
x – because you SHOUTED the word ESCORTS I will take the bait ……
A modern warship, and the RN has evolved the classifications to the point were Destroyer = AAW focused and Frigate = ASW focused, and you flippin’ well know this, can act independently, can provide protection to a high value unit as part of a task group (which might fit a very loose definition of ‘escorting it’ ) or can provide a ‘close escort’ as a Sea Wolf armed ship acting as “goal keeper” for a CVS for example. The term ‘escort’ as applied to surface vessels was originated in WWII by the USN to describe small, cheap, and not very fast vessels which could escort convoys (the British Destroyer Escort or BFE of lend lease, which became the DDE in USN use).
I have escorted tankers through the Straits of Hormuz on a Leander and a T42 – it does not make the use the of the term ‘escort’ a suitable one to classify modern warships – so Yah boo sucks to you matey
Perhaps we should come up with a new word that we can all agree on!
I’ve been wondering… what if we take the idea of the leviathan and sysadmin and divide them amongst us and the US? Should we configure our forces for the protection and enforcement of International law, rules, freedom of movement etc., while the US gets to unleash a can of whoop ass when needed? For example the Royal Navy focuses on sea-control, asw escort, forward security presence, etc., leaving the large scale power projection to the USN/USMC? We may retain a mini-leviathan force to give our admin some teeth but essentially we and the US adopt mutually supportive strategies?