We are about to embark on the ‘Future of the British Army’ series of posts, for convenience, this will include all land oriented forces including the Royal Marines and RAF Regiment.
As usual, the floor is open for guest authors on more or less any relevant subject they fancy writing about.
These are a few subject areas I am going to look at, its not an exhaustive list and not all subjects will form a separate post, in no particular order;
- Tasks and roles
- Force structures
- operating environments
- Training and development
- Command and culture issues
- ISTAR
- COIN v Combined Arms or this war v a war
- Indirect fire and offensive support
- Combat engineering
- Support and individual weapons
- Communications
- Vehicles (likely to be over several posts)
- Forward presence, building security capabilities and mentoring
- Integrating civilian aid and development
- Ceremonial and bands
- Specialist operations
- Logistics and support
- Non regular forces
- Air defence
Any other subject areas you fancy reading about, please say so in comments…
i’m slightly irritated by the notion that because a service has Army or Air Force as part of its name that it should somehow control all function to do with it.
i really believe that this push at integration will serve the UK badly. very badly.
This thread on ARRSE was very enlightening. All about kit (predominantly the weight issue), the pros and cons of body armour (a lot of supporters for the removal of armour!!), weapons, the difference between Operations in Herrick and training in the UK (difficult to locate targets versus white background boards) and the difficulty in getting people onto the ranges to shoot in the first place.
Excellent thread, but brace yourself for 60-odd pages. Worth reading all the way through if you have the patience and time.
In the interim you could appease the masses by publishing that article sent to you by a dashingly handsome and modest chap from Essex….
Helps if you post the URL: http://www.arrse.co.uk/weapons-equipment-rations/133200-reality-herrick-you-personal-kit-uk-training.html
I read it a few weeks back. Well worth a read.
My central theme is that we’re in a situation comparable to about 1911: Huge technological change, decades of peace in Europe, most military experiences resting on small war adventures and on few and very specific major wars far away.
Generally no clue about modern warfare or about how to handle the new conditions in a high en land campaign.
1914-1917 was horrible as a result.
Now look at the topics list and you won’t find the search for an understanding of the changed general picture, no new doctrine.
In fact, I rate only the two first as important – the others make no sense unless they’re on a robust basis of a new model for high-end land war.
Hints: Small forces = low force density. Inability to absorb large losses. OPFOR possibly not restricted the same way as UK Army and allies are (cluster ammo ban, land mine ban, GLCM ban, SRBM ban, love for gold plating, cheap small UAVs, radio comm dependency and EW).
@ x
How much total coffee did you consume during reading periods?
@TD
From the link that Chris.B. posted, this stands out in a logistics sense.
POSTED BY STONKER.
Re: The reality of Herrick. You personal kit and UK training.
I’m reminded of a snippet from “The Sharp End Of War” by John Ellis
He quoted figures that showed the US Army QM system issued something like 3 times more personal kit to Yanks fighting in Europe in 1944/45, than there were actual soldiers in that part of their Army.
Troops advancing from defensive positions simply dumped everything that wasn’t going to keep them alive, and tolerated the discomfort of being low on “luxury” until their resupply system caught up and re-equipped them.
Not sure that it is an option for 21st Century Brits, though.
The question i or thought i have is, do we actually budget for what really happens in a major attack, or is it just another UOR later on?
@Chris.B
Man, i’m only upto page 3
Can i suggest, to anyone who is interested in the thread on ARRSE that Chris.B. found, that they read the post by MrBane, it’s No.76.
Would the point he’s making also hold true for built up or urban areas?
@ Michael
The kettle will become your friend. The Sugar will become your mistress. By the time you’ve finished reading that thread you and the coffee mug will be one.
But you will probably learn more about the real British Army in that one thread than you will watching a hundred official Army DVDs or reading a hundred official Army recruitment books.
Trust me, the rewards are great if you manage to press on through it. Will you accept the challenge of ARRSE?
What a lyrical turn of phrase you have
I ran out of coffee and tea, am onto the budwiser and lemonade (disgusting i know).
Only problem i have with the tread (as i’m an ignorant civilian), are all the abbreviations. But i do get a sense of what they mean.
Especially the bionic dog type thing (£1 million each maybe?) v a mule with cut vocal cords.
I’ve never watched one of those DVD’s cause it’s all corporate type crap and the only army book i ever read was about Normandy.
Seriously, the sense i’m getting from this is that the people in command are wedded to their ways of doing things and that the very idea of asking the people who do the fighting to recommend how to do what they do is anathema to them.
Isn’t the definition of insanity to continue doing the same thing while expecting a different result?
Got to ask but doesn’t the army brass ever read ARRSE?
Well if they do then they don’t pay any attention or simply dismiss it as bitter soldiers ranting.
But there’s a lot of common sense stuff in there and some stuff that should frankly shame the generals.
Chris.B.
Very much agreed. I really hate it when someone come out with that tired phrase “lessons have been learned!”, well after the fact!
Btw, did u check the link (again a post by STONKER), of the U.S.Marines after action report?
It’s post No. 104.
Well, for anyone interested here’s the link.
http://www.powershow.com/view/1c025-MzFmN/ENEMY_TTP_AND_AFTER_ACTION_REVIEW_flash_ppt_presentation
Four to 7 hour ambushes.
What stands out the most for me is the number of times that CAS is neccessary, either fast jet or attack chopper.
Ambushes that last that long are not ambushes. They are a movement to contact that did not yield a satisfactory result once contact was made.
Well it’s the U.S. Marines who call them ambushes.
To me, it looks like the Taliban (whateva u want to call them), decided in many of these fights, to initiate major to the death fights which can last for hours and hours and they start it with a carefully prepared ambush, or series of ambushes.
Only sometimes, according to that link, did they try to get away.
Also my mistake, it’s from 2 to 40 hour ambushes.
Main thing that i can see, is that we need lots more CAS with many more munitions and better, faster medical evacuation.
OKay…
I’m looking forward to the Future of the British Army posts…but…as with the Future of RN/RAF…TD we/us/you/whatever should have started with Future of UK Strategy…whether or not that is grand strategy or the strategy that the MoD has to adopt to best accommodate the fickle vagaries of whatever party is in power.Everything stems from strategy,otherwise its just fantasy fleets.I’m sure everyone on this site has their favorite bit of kit/pet project whatever but without strategy its all pie in the sky…everything on your list I could rant on about for hours in the pub…but…clearly the British armed forces are more about just defending UK,dependencies and our treaty obligations…but what is that more, clearly its expeditionary but does that mean invasions/occupations if so our defence budget is way to small.Sorry I’ve slightly lost my train of thought but I think the point I’m making is since we have no immediate external threats we as a country haven’t got a clue what we want our military to do…
Yes I did Michael, I’ve kept the link to that and another link that was brought up about the command structure during Telic.
Must sleep now. Been up since 6am.
But before I do, my understanding of an ambush is simply a surprise initiation of contact; where the start time and location of the contact are chosen exclusively by the attacker and come largely unexpectedly to the defender.
Granted the more textbook method of an ambush would be to kill as many enemy as you can in a rapid engagement and then scuttle off, but don’t forget we’re often talking about small towns/villages being the ambush sites. The only place to run would be across large swathes of open ground, which isn’t ideal when the enemy has vehicles.
mmm…until there is a consensus on our place in the world the Mod can only hope that whatever fudge they settle on is good enough…SDSR vs Libya for example…going back further SDR vs Iraq/Afghanistan sadly you can keep going back delivering bollocks in a bollocks world/frontline first/options for change/Nott/Sandys…Strategy first…fricking force structures/regimental cap badges/assault rifle calibre and 24 rat pack contents later
I think i’m gonna follow chris.b i’ve been up too long getting a bit incoherent…sorry guys might of had a couple…where are our cheques from the RAF?
My two pence worth at this stage:
- I agree with WD; without specifying the overall UK defence strategy / objectives we are in danger of creating a position with incoherent priorities and capabilities. Sounds very familiar with the current SDSR…
- It would be easy to assume that we need to shape the army to fight the wars of the last 10 – 20 years, but do we? The defence of the UK (and dependencies) is the number 1 priority, defence of our allies next and lastly large scale foreign interventions.
- We do not need a relatively large standing force. We should be aiming for a core elete force and a scalable backup. To do this we should have a much better mix of permanent to part time reserves.
- We should think about restructuring the current infantry / mechanised / armoured units in more generic battle groups. Though we should keep the regiment identities it is the foundation of the army.
I’ve taken my own look at the army’s future post-SDSR on my blog, for whoever’s interested to expand the knowledge about the matter as TD prepares his mega review.
http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/p/future-force-2020.html
@ Chris B
I drink tea (NATO + 1) in half-pints every two hours.
Saddly I don’t read as much as I used.
- Just over to your blog to read it Gabriele.
@TD
My first question would be can we draw any lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, and if so how do they relate to future shape of the Army. I think only once we have explored the distortion in the use of the Army though the lenses of Afghanistan in particular can we have a sensible discussion on the future. Obviously as its a hard subject its unlikely to get as many posts as say why FRES is a pile of steaming dog excrement, or why the AAC has been screwed over getting the Wildcat Lynx.
@ repulse:
I agree entirely. There is no point in talking about structures, let alone equipment, divorced from the basic question of what we want the army to be able to do. The list of priorities you provide seems clear and logical.
If we look only at recent experience then we would probably abandon some of the high-end roles (like high-intensity armoured warfare) as it’s hard to foresee any call for it: but on the other hand, we didn’t foresee any of the conflicts we’ve actually got into for the last few decades.
I think that we should keep a small core of all current (or any emergent) capabilities fully up to date, because it’s easier to expand an existing capability should circumstances change than it is to start again from scratch. As the RN will doubtless discover with carrier ops…
@ Tony W
I think you’ll find most things started from scratch………
Well i know i’m a Naval proponent/addict but when i look at the wars we have been fighting, which are either wars of princible or choice (depending on your own point of view), then i think we first better decide what’s in our long term national interest.
To me, that does not just mean actual defence of the UK itself.
Due to all of the major agreements and treaties (NATO, UN) etc, bilateral agreements with nations all over the place, trade and economic necessities etc, i think a real independent look at what we need could come to a very different conclusion about the size of the army.
I would not be suprised if we ended up with a bigger, more mobile army than we currently have.
@ TD – One area I think you should study is the suitability of current training. It was mentioned on the epic ARSSE thread that the training (and the combat loads used) the Squaddies recieve does not prepare them for combat operations. On the other hand we have had a lot of media reports about “Afhgan villages” in the middle of the English countryside.
Another issue is the use of laser tagging for training. I have heard reports that this gives a false sense of the battlefield; light cover stopping the laser when it wouldn’t even slow a bullet down and not demonstrating the physical effects of High Explosive from such things as mortars and RPG’s (One solution suggested was uber-paintball!).
How do we make sure we “train like we mean to fight”?
Is the Army Air Corps missing from the list?
Had a thought that some future SAR helicopters should be RMP/AAC so they could serve dual SAR/anti terrorist roles.
Lets not forget rules of engagement. Does the UK need a version of the recent Russian law that allows Putin/Medvedev to deploy Russian forces worldwide?
Michael (Civ.), when you say “…a bigger more mobile army…” do you mean strategically or tactically mobile?
If it’s strategic mobility you mean, then that surely ties in with the heavy lift assetts in the RN and RAF.
TD, will you be doing a “Future of the Armed Forces” summary/ mini series to tie all the previous ones together?
@ x
You’ll need to break out the coffee for that thread. You must have an emergency stash somewhere, surely?
As for the general argument of stratgey definition, I felt TD did a good job of explaining that as he went along in the previous posts, so I think we should wait and see.
I think the army needs to be able to get much better deploy-ability after this review. Also the regulars should be used for the high end theatre entry eg heavy armour, air assault amphip assault only along with increase SF and intelligence gathering and logistics. The scale of the army in general has to match the scale of what we can effectively deploy and sustain on operations. This means a much smaller regular army
No point doing a helmand on our own if we cant resource it we loose to many of the finest that way. A proper forces welfare structure is need though I believe this is getting much better.
I think we need to retain the ability to fight in the winter the sand and the jungle you never can tell were well be needed next as we have dependant territories all over the world.
Equipment for vehicles need huge rationalisation. Families of vehicles are needed a la ocelot is the future a medium and heavy armour equivalent is needed. I for one do not like the way were are making the light formations heavier we are losing more than we gain thru not investing appropriately in other areas.
Finally COIN or occupation is not for us we aren’t brilliant nor better than any one else at it and you always have a time limit with the affected population before you become the problem not the solution perhaps a more police paramilitary force type structure is need here for the much more rare occasion this happens. TA expanded to include deploying full formed brigades for stabilization/police role and home emergency missions using a medium weight vehicle family maybe better.
Hi Alan,
This is a very good point:”more mobile army…” do you mean strategically or tactically mobile?”
I hate it when terms like intervention forces and theater entry formations are used interchangeably;
- RM are strategically mobile
- so are the PARA BN’S
- the rest of 16 AAB is not (so) strategically mobile… this does not mean that I am being critical about the make the make up of that Bde (quite the contrary, just that each intervention will be uniques and needs a tailored force)
On the other hand, the need for strategic mobility is for more than the RM, or the intervention forces taken together. Hence, if we strive too hard for commonality in kit, we will have nothing (hardly anything) that can quickly follow through with the initial intervention (by us, or someone else. who was in a better position to take the immediate steps).
What I am trying to come to, is not what size of army should we pay for, but rather: an army to be able to do what (strategy is defined as having a grasp on the means to the desired “what”)
I would suggest an artical on dependancy defence forces such as the gibraltar regiment and the falklands defence force. They are uk tax payer funded.
Don’t know where it will fit in but address the huge historical ‘tail’ the army has. Not just in force structure.
The regimental system etc.
ACC, this sounds like the old chestnut of shiny sexy kit over boring necessary stuff.
How uk forces operate is an important legal black hole. They have to operate within british civl law as well as military law. Makes the hole thing a nightmare.
Evidence with a berden of prof against pirets for eg
So the ones they catch have to be relised.
very anoying for the royal navy.
same goes for taliban in afgan
very anoying for the army
Need some new laws?
Hi Alan.
I mean both strategically and tactically, that they can get there quickly in enough numbers and that when they are in the field, wherever that might be, then they have either enough organic lift or mechanised equipment to be able to suprise any opposition.
For me (and i may well be wrong), if we have to rush in loads of tanks/mechanised forces etc then we have a massive failure of strategic warning. As we have had many of these failures, then to me, it makes sense to build as robust an Army as possible for when the next suprise happens.
What we have seen with Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, maybe with Libya and in the near future probably Syria is that UN Agreements/Human rights laws are more important to our politicians and diplomats than simply having an Army structured for the defence of the UK and intervention if our serious national interests are at stake.
The way i read it, that’s a really big change.
The main problem i see is this, we seem to be committed to a kind of Global Guardian role in an increasingly unstable world, while not giving the Army the equipment it really needs, (unless by UOR) and not giving the RAF/Navy the assets they need to be able to support the Army properly after they are sent in.
Therefore, i can only look at it as though nothing has changed since the late 80′s. We are tasking our forces to do more than we are willing to pay for. “Punching above our weight” etc, and the rest of that rubbish.
Michael
The point is there is no appetite for boots on the ground none. The only way they got the resolution thru the un on lybia was to state no boots on the ground. I can’t see this changing for any operation of choice anytime soon especially in a middle east or Muslim country. The only way we deploy conventional ground forcesis if our direct nation security is threatened.
I believe there should be a feature and a mature debate on the fitness levels of both regular and TA forces. For every section of racing snakes there’s a chubby knacker hidden away somewhere who couldn’t pass a PFT without the aid of a rocket pack. I thought all these guys had been pensioned off?
If we’re going to have to suffer cuts in troop levels ad infinitum, should we not be raising the fitness levels accordingly so we just get to keep the best and fittest?
Hi Mark.
I hate to say it but i think some of that is dead wrong.
I think there is a subtext to all of what’s going on, that our various western governments are saying to really vicious governments all over the place that if they go about killing on a such and such a scale then we’ll intervene in whatever way that we can do or that we see fit.
I don’t really think that our governments are thinking about the public’s appetite or lack of it at all. For some it’s about whats desirable or what’s needed at the time.
In a week or two the situation could get so bad in Libya that they could very easily send in ground troops, justifing it by saying it was absolutely necessary as the conflict had taken a turn for the worse.
Also, we have deployed ground forces when we have not been threatened directly, i think this will most definitely continue, due to UN agreements/Human Rights Laws…..or if you prefer Lawfare.
I am slowly coming to think that everything changed very quietly in the aftermath of what happened in Rwanda. I am not saying i totally agree with it but i think it has happened. That it is now a reality and that our governments believe they have a duty to prevent such things if they can.
If, that is the case, only saying if, then we may well need a bigger, more robust Army. Looking at what we have and at the various reasons given for what we are doing, then i think that things have changed and we need a force structure that acknowledges the facts.
No government within the next 25 years will send British ground troops to far away dusty places to fight prolonged land wars with any significant numbers.
One it’ll be an election loser, and two we’ve not been especially good at it (however brave and professional our soldiers are) because government constantly fight with tight RoE and fight wars with one eye on the fatality count and we simply don’t have the numbers for it in the first place.
Any ‘future of the British Army’ review that envisages Afghanistan & Iraq as the future is merely kidding itself.
Michael
There is a difference to setting up a safe haven for humanitarian reason a la RM after 1st gulf war. As opposed to invasion of a country and deposing a government and taking over its running. You only need a big army for the second option.
Rwanada didnt make the west get involved in the situation in Zimbabwe or ivory coast.
I would say everything has changed since Iraq. Even the suggestion of ground troops in Lybia a couple of weeks ago almost caused the whole thing to come to a stop. Sort of a country invading another I cannot see a reason for the UK deploying a ground force of any real size.
Supporting either a governments forces (sierra leone) or supports local ground forces (afghan northern alliance/Lybia) with SF, air and sea forces will be a more sensible approach for operations of choice.
ACC said “so are the PARA BN’S”
Really? Um. If we acquired two 747s, filled them with a parachute battalion, flew them to OZ, and then pushed them out the door t’other end all it means you have demonstrated strategic reach. But without ability to support the formation at those distances you donot have a strategic formation. It is all about endurance. Paratroops are for use within a theatre at the operational sub-strategic level. Why do people constantly confuse what marines and paratroops are for? Yes both formations are light infantry. But they are employed for entirely different reasons with entirely different modes of operation. Me thinks me the smells the unmistakable stench of “air power is the equal of sea power.”
I look forward to the series of blog posts/articles on the possible future of the British Army especially as it’s the subject area I know least about when it comes to organisation. Who knows maybe we could have a discussion on what we all think the British Armed forces should be doing i don’t think it’s ever too late to pop that into the discussion . Adam the Falklands Islands Defence force is fully funded by the Falkland Islands Government including the wages of the Royal Marine warrant officer that is a permanent trainer. Of course the UK Government via the MoD still pays for Mount Pleasant and the RN presence around the Islands alongside the Army units stationed there. #
For those talking about staying awake while reading that thread may I suggest Jolt Shots as they worked well enough to keep me awake at times for 50 hour LAN parties
Although I’m probably a fair bit younger than you lot so can stay up for quite a while with no artificial stimulants.
What in the hell is a “LAN party” and why does it take 50 hours?
Overseas deployments of our troops are not an issue with the public, as long as you can keep the numbers deployed to a sufficiently low level that the media doesn’t notice or doesn’t care.
I agree with Nick.
Sorry, I agree with x. Parachute infantry are about using surprise to seize and hold an objective until other forces can relieve them. They fight light because they’re only expected to hold the objective for a short period of time before the cavalry arrive. That’s not really a strategic deployment.
Marines are about grabbing and clearing beachheads/inland airheads (for helicopters) until reinforced by stronger forces. To be honest that’s not entirely strategic either.
Both forces are shock troops. They are theatre entry tools designed to crack open the nut; then let someone else come in an scoff it.
@ Chris B
No ground force can be “strategic” on its own. It only moves (and so unto action) because the other two “services” (or powers perhaps?) allow it to. I suppose the only way a ground force can be strategic is as a force in being. I suppose there is a matter of mass too. And that would be relative too I suppose to the mass of the enemy. Um. Marines (or to be more general a ground force delivered by sea) are only strategic because they are delivered by sea as only ships have the range, endurance, and capacity.
Oh LAN Party! Its a Local Area Network Party.
Gamers playing multi-user games together at a venue.
I remember when computing was a nice solitary occupation.
Chris Google is your friend, but anyhow a LAN party is a Local Area Network party where gamers get together and physically network their computers over a local network. The staying up thing is basically because sleeping is a waste of time when you only have the venue for a weekend etc and because you get engrossed in it. Also most people tend to also get hammered while they are there with like minded folk and generally have loads of fun with no parents around but I’m not one of those folk. Ah thanks X bit faster at getting a comment in before me
I would like to read about the RMCs and what kind of role, will they be used, in post herrick. At the moment, they are being used in a more conventional infantry role. They are designed as commandos, will the future see them converted back to a force that is capable of undertaking low level raids or raids which have a medium of importance.