Future Force 2020 set out a list of objectives, tasks and force levels that post Afghanistan, in the land of budgetary milk and honey, the services would evolve into.
Personally, I think the perennial strategy of hoping for jam tomorrow is hugely naive, it isn’t going to happen yet FF20 makes the assumption that the 2015 SDSR will see a sustained and meaningful increase in funding.
It is highly unlikely this will happen.
Politicians roundly condemn the MoD for its pervasive atmosphere of wishful thinking, especially in equipment projects, but here they are promising the future will be rosy and asking the armed forces to take them at face value, if only we can take a little bit of bitter medicine now.
Ho Ho Ho
A few weeks ago someone made the comment that they would rather the armed forces be a ‘hard as coffin nails David’ rather than a limp wristed Goliath, I thought this was brilliant and it neatly encapsulates much of what is wrong with our thinking. We tell the world we are a Goliath, we provide him with big spears and a flashy helmet but when push comes to shove, are found wanting because the resultant package is unbalanced, Goliath has the big spear but he hasn’t had a decent meal in weeks and his spear is fitted for but not with tip!
The only way to achieve balance is to be realistic about scale.
Future Force 2020 attempts to move towards this realism about scale but I am not sure it has actually fooled anyone.
In a speech delivered at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington in November 2010, General Sir Nick Houghton said;
But first, I would like to make some general points about where the SDSR leaves our relationship with the US. As the SDSR makes explicit our relationship is ‘deeply-rooted, broadly-based, strategically important and mutually supportive’. The UK intention is to remain America’s most capable and reliable ally. We recognise that we benefit a great deal from the relationship. In return we will retain the ability to operate independently or in support of the US across the full spectrum of domains and capabilities.
The full spectrum of domains and capabilities, this is clearly at odds with reality and in recent evidence to the defence select committee all three service chiefs agreed that the SDSR left the UK somewhat short of being a full spectrum military power, despite David Cameron disagreeing with them!
Jekyll, meet Hyde
We either are, or we are not.
That is of course assuming that being a full spectrum military power is actually important in itself, I don’t think it is, what is important is, does the military meet the strategic needs of the nation.
This is where I tend to disagree with most (apart from Sven perhaps!) in that the UK needs a defence capability and the ability to mount operations at length, alone and at a small scale but only for self defence or operations such as evacuations.
Anything else is purely discretionary, slaved to strategic and political goals.
Traditionally, we have conducted this self defence at arms length, the concept of fighting in someone elses back yard rather than your own front door is actually pretty sensible but it is looking increasingly anachronistic in a globalised and interconnected world economy.
This constant ‘reassuring the US’ stance that we are somehow special, their bestest friend in the whole wide world and will always be available, on tap, to provide a political fig leaf for their dubious over reactions must stop. As the US focuses on the east our interests will increasingly diverge and unless we want to base our whole strategy on being subservient to the US by moving our strategic focus to the Pacific and Indian oceans we must accept a partial parting of the ways.
The reputation of the British armed forces, over £20billion, hundreds of lives and countless injuries have been spent in pursuit of playing a supporting role to the USA and we must ask critically, what has this provided.
The UK’s future strategic interests lie in Africa and the Middle East, sometimes these will be coincidental with the interests of the USA, that’s fair enough, we can be a useful and reliable ally that share many common values, nothing at all wrong with that.
What operations with the US have shown is that in reality, they are not actually interested in our definition of ‘full spectrum’ but selected capability areas that compliment and reinforce theirs. Other alliances and coalitions should be of equal importance and viewed in the same manner, anglo French/Dutch, the Commonwealth, the Five Powers, Baltic States, Middle East and numerous others should have a renewed interest. The Commonwealth in particular is likely to be increasingly important and NATO, whilst having an uncertain future, should also be seen as a key element of our self defence strategy. The increasing global interconnectedness of nations means that a problem that affects one, with affect many others and coalition operations, as recognised by the last several defence reviews, will be the norm.
If we offer these coalitions a little bit of everything, because a lot of everything is simply not financially viable, we will not achieve any sort of influence within it. If we specialise then the UK becomes the ‘go to’ nation for those specialisms.
This should inform how we approach land forces reform, structure, scale and capabilities.
In the same speech, Sir Nick Houghton looked at a set of tasks that Future Force 2020 was measured against and although not all of them are wholly Army specific it is worth repeating them.
Firstly we looked at our ability to restore freedom of navigation in contested waters. In a globalised world dependent upon trade, disruption to shipping lanes has wide-ranging affects to a large number of countries. Our thinking assumes that the UK would want to be capable of contributing to coalition operations of this sort.
The second scenario was a stabilisation and counter insurgency operation of the sort we have become familiar with. There were two main issues which we tested here. The first was scale, where we concluded that we needed to remain capable of deploying and sustaining indefinitely a brigade sized force. The second was self-sufficiency. Although we expect to conduct this sort of operation mainly in a coalition we took the view that we needed to remain self-deploying and self-sustaining. So the Future Force delivers the enablers to avoid being a burden on others.
We also considered a similar scenario in which the UK leads a coalition which intervenes in a civil war and conducts a follow-on counter insurgency operation. With the UK in the lead, this scenario tested our logistics and command and control capabilities. The results can be seen in the Force Structure we have come out with and justified over retention of a Theatre Command Capability.
Another scenario put Weapons of Mass Effect in the hands of a non-state group, and required the rapid and precise deployment of high readiness forces, supported by strategic intelligence and rapid decision making. Here we judged that we needed to be capable of operating on a national basis as well as part of a coalition.
Fifth, we tested our ability to carry out a complex non-combatant evacuation. The UK military has performed this function most recently in Lebanon in 2006, rescuing British nationals and citizens from other allied nations as tensions increased and led to war. This scenario tests our ability to deploy rapidly to disparate parts of the world, with reach and sustainability as key issues.
The most challenging scenario was an operation to liberate an ally from an occupying state. Here we judged that we need to be capable of putting a divisional sized force in the field with substantial maritime and air support. Our multi-role brigade concept allows us to configure this sort of force for the threat it is likely to be faced with at the time. This represents the best effort of the Future Force 2020 and could operate alone or with allies.
Finally, we considered the ongoing requirement to deter the use of force against the UK. Here presence is key. So our decisions to develop a new carrier strike capability, continue with hunter-killer submarines equipped with Tomahawk missiles support this. And in the final analysis our ultimate guarantor of security is the Trident-armed submarines providing continuous at sea deterrence.
Restoring freedom of navigation in the global water maritime is something we should definitely be able to do and in this mission set is also interdiction of maritime terrorism and counter smuggling, all most likely threats. It also uses the word contribute, recognising the global nature and interconnectedness of maritime trade.
I admit being troubled by some of the others because they start with the assumption that these tasks are in our strategic interest, not sure countering an insurgency in a foreign country is actually in our interest or that having cruise missile armed submarines and a strike carrier is a deterrent, presumably this is talking about the South Atlantic where the best deterrent is diplomacy, commercial interdependence and a credible self defence capability. In fact the more I think that deterring Argentine by threatening them with subsequent violence after we have allowed them to take islands a second time seems fundamentally ridiculous. I know the concept of deterrence is a sound one but I think the deterrence of value of defence is actually greater than attack. Are we really basing CVF and SSN on providing a deterrent to those wishing to attack the UK when in the SDSR and NSC we explicitly recognise these are very low likelihood threats, again, somewhat confusing?
Does anyone else think that these tasks are predicated on preserving capabilities rather than aligning with strategic objectives, self serving, self preserving, wishful thinking at its best?
The Multi Role Brigade is an interesting concept because it is designed to provide a sustainable enduring presence in a counter insurgency campaign at medium level (Brigade) whilst still able to scale up to a divisional size force for the occasional ‘kick Iraq out of Kuwait’ type operation.
By dispersing the combat elements like artillery and heavy armour amongst the force it protects them from predation by the ravenous Treasury, regardless of the fact that in most enduring operations you have very little use for them.
My first thought on the MRB was that it was designed to hoodwink gullible politicians whilst retaining as many command slots and capabilities as possible. The whole point is that it provides a stable rotational scheme with a stable force composition but the reality is that it pitches the force capability at a mid level, assuming that all operations will need this level.
If not, the concept of stable rotation goes out of the window as Peter will be robbed to pay Paul, business as usual. It also sticks with the notion of uniform deployment periods for all force elements, the high threat C-IED operator will still do the same 6 month tour as an IT specialist in a HQ. Again, if we are to accept the notion of flexible tour lengths depending on role then the stable rotation MRB concept becomes frayed around the edges.
It has the thin veneer of radical innovation but really, it is just spreading what we already have into an even layer to make enduring operations more manageable and protect key force elements.
This is fair enough and a pretty neat idea if the future is participating in enduring counter insurgency operations but I don’t.
It seems a common thread throughout the SDSR, let’s all decide which bits of kit and capability we want to keep and write the strategy around them, tail wagging dog.
Whoa, hold on, rewind a minute.
Did he just say the future is not enduring COIN operations?
Yes, I did.
Although we are actually pretty good at it we can no longer afford the force density to make it work in the traditional sense (if there is anything traditional about it), Malaya and Northern Ireland are shining examples of the operational art, but look at the force levels used to make it happen. At the highest point in Northern Ireland we had the equivalent of 3 Divisions in an area of about 5.5 thousand square miles, Helmand is 22.5 thousand square miles and how many personnel do we have deployed?
And, lets not forget the Ulster Defence Regiment, Royal Ulster Constabulary, MI5 and huge civil service and a fully functioning ‘civil society’
I accept that we are not covering the whole of Helmand and never were, COIN being as much about people as space etc but it is an interesting comparison to make when considering the size of land mass we are planning to conduct COIN operations in.
If we want to conduct a successful COIN campaign on our own in a suburb of a small town in Yemen, then yes, we can go it alone but this is hardly worth subverting the Army and other armed forces to do so.
This is where a lot of readers may be surprised because what I think is the most appropriate future is actually a blend of strategic raiding, contributory and global guardian, to shamelessly steal the RUSI definitions.
To underpin this, let’s go back to my prevailing strategy, cum hair brained scheme, as described in previous posts.
It goes something like this, cue the music…
A full spectrum core (or David) that is scaled to provide enough capabilities for self defence of UK territories only, plus evacuation operations, which realistically means small scale. This also provides a hedge against strategic shocks by retaining skills and capabilities at a seed corn level.
Surrounding this are what I call ‘capability plus’, selected functions that we expand to such a level that we become actually useful as opposed to a liability, in a coalition operation, we might not be able to do everything at a medium or large scale but what we can, is done very well.
One of these selected and expanded functions is forward presence, mentoring, training and building regional security. This will see a greater integration of military, diplomacy and overseas aid functions, all aligned to a common set of resource, trade and security strategic objectives.
Where do land forces fit into this?
First of course is the need for self defence of UK territories and the ability to act alone for non combatant evacuation.
In addition to the forward presence/regional security capability plus, others would be electronic/cyber warfare, combat engineering, ISTAR, psychological operations, intelligence, theatre entry from the sea/air and command and control.
Many of these are what might be called enablers or backbone capabilities and the theatre entry aspect is of course, what some might call strategic raiding, but they all leverage our technology and expertise yet de-emphasise mass, or fewer boots.
This reduction in overall force size but concentration on certain key elements and their enablers plays to our strengths but still makes provision for effective contributions to multi national coalitions and satisfies the need (at least in my eyes) for a range of capabilities that we can use to develop other nations security, provide meaningful and timely intelligence and increase influence in other areas beyond the purely military, all in support of the over arching strategy which concentrates on collaboration rather than confrontation.
There is a clear danger in reducing the force size, it diminishes the critical mass that drives career progression and retention, it places land forces in greater peril from unrealistic politicians and without combat experience our ability to actually provide credible training for others that is relevant (because the trainers have loads of bling) might be reduced.
It is not without risk and I recognise this.
I will look at scale and endurance as I cycle through the next set of posts but in general, the ability to mount divisional one off operations and self sufficient brigades for enduring operations would be off the menu. Our deployments, especially those of the forward presence elements, would be enduring in nature and the capability plus areas would also be capable of sustained deployments when acting as coalition enablers but the general rule of thumb is an end to sustained deployments of full spectrum forces and a more selective approach.
The Future of the British Army Series…
The Future of the British Army 01 – Scene Setting
The Future of the British Army 02 – Tasks and Capabilities
The Future of the British Army 03 – Rank and Size
The Future of the British Army 04 – Structures
The Future of the British Army 05 – Heavy Metal
The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)
The Future of the British Army 07 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (02) A Sensible Future
Supporting Articles
Medium Armour – what is it, and what does it mean for the post 2020 force structure?
@ Admin – “As the US focuses on the east our interests will increasingly diverge and unless we want to base our whole strategy on being subservient to the US by moving our strategic focus to the Pacific and Indian oceans we must accept a partial parting of the ways.”
Very much agreed, but:
“the UK needs a defence capability and the ability to mount operations at length, alone and at a small scale but only for self defence or operations such as evacuations.”
I would peg the the ability to conduct solo operations at a medium scale.
“I think is the most appropriate future is actually a blend of strategic raiding, contributory and global guardian, to shamelessly steal the RUSI definitions.”
Very much agreed once again, but:
“Does anyone else think that these tasks are predicated on preserving capabilities rather than aligning with strategic objectives, self serving, self preserving, wishful thinking at its best?”
I do think it is useful, because i do value the forces as [a] tool with which to further British geopolitical objectives, and I see medium-scale as the minimum credible tool of coercion/intervention.
“I will look at scale and endurance as I cycle through the next set of posts but in general, the ability to mount divisional one off operations and self sufficient brigades for enduring operations would be off the menu.”
I am all for an ability to sustain a brigade, but as per the “future character of conflict” document I would look to ensure that enduring commitments do not tie-down all of our capability, thus leaving us at the mercy of “events dear boy, events.”
As the FCoC states:
““We may wish to consider a significant investment in preventative action, recognising that we may be required to fulfil this role concurrently in a number of widely dispersed areas. The spectrum of preventative activity, and the resources devoted to it, may require a refocusing of priorities within Defence. This should reduce the possibility of conflicts escalating into larger wars that would consume significant resources, and it could also provide a wider range of options to the Government.”
So I would argue for running the capabilities for limited (scale) stabilisation operations and limited (endurance) punitive operations as separate functions, which could in dire need be aggregated for greater effect.
We struggled in GW1 to a put a division into the field. That was when BAOR was still intact.
And that the future isn’t COIN isn’t exactly news to me.
Submarines are the weapon of the weaker nation. We are fortunate that “we” possess good SSNs and competent crews. If you look at the world through a liberal/global lens war with any other nation state seems unlikely. As a realist I am not that easily persuaded. China is the (potential) threat and we need to contribute to the defence, if it doesn’t sound to grandiose, of our “civilisation.”
I struggle to see where a 120,000 man organisation costing £15billion that can only move by permission and with the support of other fit in.
China is the (potential) threat and we need to contribute to the defence, if it doesn’t sound to grandiose, of our “civilisation.”
Define “our civilisation” there. Because I don’t see the PLA rolling over the Oder any time soon, nor yet into Canada or Australia. And if you’re saying that it’s our job to defend anyone in the entire world against the largest army ever raised in peacetime, well, that’s not really what any of us signed up for.
Mass has a quality of its own.
Two points:
1) The MRB concept is fundamentally flawed because it is too small to have any significant effect, whether that is in COIN or high intensity combat. Currently in Afghanistan the UK has a division (-) deployed. In Iraq the UK deployed a brigade plus – both were too small for what was required and we had to be bailed out. A brigade cannot conduct independent tactical action. A brigade can only secure a sparsely populated province or a small town.
2) Perception counts. If we want to have an effective forward presence we must accept that that presence will only be effective if it is perceived that we are a capable military power. To most militaries that implies:
- The ability to conduct combined arms operations.
- The ability to conduct combined arms manoeuvre operations at divisional level.
- To deploy and sustain a formation of at least brigade size and preferably at divisional size.
- The ability to deploy Tier 1 SF (capable of ‘black’ and ‘green’ ops and with pertinent ISTAR capabilities).
- The ability to deploy and use highly effective integrated ISTAR capabilities.
- The ability to coduct joint operations at formation level.
The significance of the above capabilities is that they are beyond the scope of most militaries.
Small bands of highly capable men forward deployed are unlikely to gain us the same leverage as small bands of determined men forward deployed with a very large stick behind them. Currently the UK armed forces have the kudos of being rated second only to those of the US. We will imperil that reputation (and our influence) if we downsize significantly.
Callum, I see your point about size, but the fact is that with the current defence budget it would need a significant increase to keep the army manning levels where they are without seriously damaging the rest of the armed forces.
In my view, what we need is a much better balance of full time to reserve forces across all 3 services. For the army this means that all battalions (outside of rapid reaction forces) should have atleast one company from the TA. This means that the army will be less agile, but does have the ability to size up when required.
@x
Personally I think that China will be the threat in the long term, in the mid-term as the US turns towards the Pacific, we are much more likely to end up with issues with Russia that might turn hot (like them re-taking the Baltic states) which we will have to deal with without much in the way of US support, ditto with the long-term fallout of the Arab Spring destabilising North Africa and Middle East, while Europe is sensitive to problems leading to mass emigration from these areas the US is not.
““the UK needs a defence capability and the ability to mount operations at length, alone and at a small scale but only for self defence or operations such as evacuations.”
I would peg the the ability to conduct solo operations at a medium scale.”
As would I, but it depends on what TD means by small scale.
I think a more armoured Falklands force is a decent guestimation. Deploy/Supply/Support 5000ish strong ground force for a 30 day hot war.
Callum
“1) The MRB concept is fundamentally flawed because it is too small to have any significant effect……both were too small for what was required and we had to be bailed out”
The MRB is not a garrison force, but I dont think anyone on here suggests using the British Army to Garrison Asia makes even the tinest bit of sense.
Quickly deployed and dug in around Surt, theres bugger all Gadaffi could do to shift them.
A French one at Waddan and a German one at Sabha and you’ve partitioned the country.
I’m gonna say that the UK needs, in terms of land forces:
One Deployable Divisional HQ, which inglobes the Allied Rapid Reaction Corp, which is a big contribution to NATO and has to stay, but which as the SDSR states is becoming a fixed kind of HQ and not a deployable one. As it stays back in the UK, it must cover as many tasks as possible at home, so to enable cutting of other HQs.
5 (full-time, regular) Multi-Role brigades (you can’t have any less than 5 if you want to deploy a whole brigade on a continuous base, unless the 24 months break between 6 months tours of duty is shortened, and this is not a nice option) as part of the deployable division.
A second division HQ, non deployable, with 5 TA brigades, each “twinned” to a regular brigade.
A single MLRS regiment with 5 batteries (39 RA) and 2 TA reserve batteries. (already there)
A single STA (5 RA) regiment plus 2 TA reserve batteries. (no change from current structure)
A single, 5 batteries SHORAD air defence regiment with 2 TA reserve batteries, armed with Starstreak.
A single 5 batteries Local Area Air Defence regiment with 2 TA reserve batteries, with CAMM.
A single UAV regiment (32 RA) with 3 Watchkeeper batteries (10 drones and 4 GCS each)[current plan, no changes] plus 2 batteries of personnel, and perhaps another one manned by TA.
A single Fire Shadow regiment of artillery with 5 batteries plus TA.
With this force structure each brigade would be able to deploy:
1 Type 38 Tank Regiment (38 Challenger II)
1 Brigade Reconnaissance Regiment (FRES Scout and family)
1 Armoured Infantry battalion (warrior)
1 Mechanized Infantry Battalion (for now Mastiff, Ridgback and Warthogs, later FRES UV)
2 Light Infantry battalions
1 AS90 155 mm artillery regiment (3 x 6 batteries after SDSR cuts)
1 Field Support Regiment with 18 L118 (3 x 6)
With, attached as required:
1 Depth Fire Battery GMLRS – 9 M270B1 launchers, one M270 MARV, 15 trucks with reloads.
1 Battery of SHORAD
1 Battery of Local Area Air Defence
1 STA/Base ISTAR battery – note that in Afghanistan a battery from 5 Regiment RA is ALWAYS present, delivering artillery control, Surveillance Target Acquisition and running Cortez, the system of sensors that survey and protect the bases and FOBs against enemies sneaking up for an attack. This capability will pretty much always be called for. The 5 Regiment had four batteries (HQ battery included) but in 2010 a fifth was created to sustain the effort, and the HQ battery works both as HQ and STA formation.
1 Watchkeeper battery for 24 hours surveillance.
1 Talisman/road clearance troop
Engineers, EOD and Logistics sized to the need
Ideally each brigade should have a squadron of Utility helicopters, but this means there has to be money to buy them, so i’ll keep it as a desire.
There would then be 16 Air Assault as High Readiness, highly-deployable formation, and the 3rd Commando Brigade.
With the 5 TA brigades being made more Us National-Guard like, and thus made of deployable formations, the Army would be able to deploy, ideally, two brigades at a time, or more realistically a beefed-up one, with full artillery and drone and ISTAR support, and when required a protection in terms of SAMs.
The RAF Regiment would expand its role of Force Protection, and field 8 Field Squadrons, each deployable to protect operating bases and FOBs, with or without airplanes and helicopters inside them.
And as indicated by the SDSR, i’d want two batteries of C-RAM artillery, with personnel in the RAF Regiment’s squadrons trained to man them, so to give that level of protection too to FOBs.
Result: Army down to around 80.000, but built squarely around the concept of Multi-Role deployable brigade, and thus better structured to deliver troops where they are needed.
Massive cut in non-deployable force, yet net increase to around 40% of the army’s force made up by TA reserve, on the fashion of the US Army with its National Guard.
Total brigades: 12 (with PARA and RM), theorical deployability 2.4 brigades at a time.
Maximum deployment: 1 Division with 5 brigades. Since this will happen only in very particular situations, the inexorable breach of harmony guidelines (particularly for specialists of the Artillery but also tank crews, as creating 5 reserve tank regiments is impossible/unthinkable) will be somewhat acceptable.
Oh, and as part of the cuts, only 1 PARA will stay parachute capable, mostly because it is part of the Special Forces Support Group.
There’s not enough planes to parachute the whole brigade, nor is it any likely that it would be done at all. And parachute training and pay COST. This will save at least 4 millions a year just for the pays.
A RAF Regiment Field Squadron, the 2nd, would also be Parachute capable (it should already be), and be made available to the Special Forces Support Group as well, among other tasks. The 2nd is specialized in capturing enemy airfields, as intact as possible, and i want this to be part of the special forces toolbox, as it might be useful both for an evacuation of civilians from an hostile area (ask the Israelians about Entebbe) and from more war-like tasks.
@DominicJ:
“Quickly deployed and dug in around Surt, theres bugger all Gadaffi could do to shift them.
A French one at Waddan and a German one at Sabha and you’ve partitioned the country”
My point precisely. An MRB, or any bde configuration is too small to operate independently except in the most benign of environments. In Libya one bde is not a game changer, it merely reinforces the status quo. A division minus (two brigades with div troops)starts to give you an offensive manoeuvre capability.
Bde = reactive
Div = proactive
If we accept this then the next step is do we want to retain a div capability ourselves? I would answer that we do, partly because the div level is highly effective and partly because we want to retain our standing (military and political). The div level need not be probitively expensive, Gabrielle’s post on use of Reserve elements is one way in which it could be retained.
sounds pretty sensible, and i do hope the reserves get expanded to meet the reductions in the regular army, but is 5x TA brigades in any way likely or achievable?
in reference to the discussion on reserves:
would their be mileage in forming the TA around three brigades, with the other focus being the divisional support elements which I am presuming are the following quoted from Gabriele:
“1 Depth Fire Battery GMLRS – 9 M270B1 launchers, one M270 MARV, 15 trucks with reloads.
1 Battery of SHORAD
1 Battery of Local Area Air Defence
1 STA/Base ISTAR battery
1 Watchkeeper battery for 24 hours surveillance.
1 Talisman/road clearance troop
Engineers, EOD and Logistics sized to the need”
Therefore regular ground formations are built at medium-scale, but with TA support capable of operating at divisional level………
Does this make any sense?
There are now 10, down by one or two with SDSR cuts.
Currently there are exactly 10 TA Brigades in three Regional Divisions + London District that apparently has divisional rank as well.
SDSR mandates the Regional Divisions closure, with a single “UK Support Command” to take their place, with the closure of “at least two” brigade HQs.
Regular forces number 2 divisions (1st and 3rd) of which only 1st will remain deployable after the SDSR cuts are implemented.
I go further forwards:
All five regular brigades under 1st Division HQ, and just 5 TA regional brigades (say: 51 Scottish, 160 Wales, 38 Irish, 43 Wessex and another for England, so everyone is generally happy), down from 8, under 3rd Division HQ, with closure of the “Uk support group”.
3rd Division non deployable HQ.
But the 5 TA brigades in it will be able to supply, say, batteries of STA or Artillery or even battalions of infantry and replacement crews for armor to the regular brigades.
Make a TA brigade a deployable brigade is a step too long, i fear, but we could have a Regular brigade deploying with 4 battalions of infantry (example) of which 2 TA.
The MLRS regiment and the other “specialized” regiments i mention would be regular formations, but each would have one or two extra batteries from the TA, to support enduring deployments abroad.
The structuring of the regiment on 5 batteries plus reserve is meant to “twin” each battery with a brigade, and ensure that there is always a battery ready to deploy in support of the twinned brigade (or of another, but the more the formations know each other, the better they work).
Currently 39 Regiment RA artillery has 5 batteries. Only two have the MLRS launchers for real, i believe, as most of the launchers are mothballed to save money.
Two batteries of 9 launchers each, in practice, but five sets of crews, so that a battery is always deployed in Stan.
The 101 TA Royal Artillery supplies further two MLRS batteries, and two STA batteries to reinforce the 5 (Regular) Royal Artillery Regiment.
Dunno if i’m being clear enough in my explanation.
Basically, since we can’t fund a whole MLRS regiment for each brigade, we make sure each brigade can get at least a whole battery.
And so for STA, drone support and the rest of the services.
starting to make sense. i ain’t military so the structure that makes perfect sense to you guys seems labyrinthine to me!
@ Jedibeeftrix
To help you around all this stuff I recommend the “Pen and Sword” Pocket Guides. They produce two. One covers just the army. While the other covers all three services, but with a bit less detail for the army. They cover everything from orbats to fun information like the cost of an individual round of .223 (and other stuff.)
a said “Define “our civilisation” there. Because I don’t see the PLA rolling over the Oder any time soon, nor yet into Canada or Australia. And if you’re saying that it’s our job to defend anyone in the entire world against the largest army ever raised in peacetime, well, that’s not really what any of us signed up for.”
Oh dear. I feel a bit insulted by that. I
cheers X.
this article/report may well be very useful when planning the Future Army series:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/8548637/British-Army-not-ready-for-urban-warfare.html
Should we turn the already large MRB concept into a pocket division?
We have to make our choices from what’s available. The US may be shamelessly self serving but at least they have the means and the will. Can we imagine any of “anglo French/Dutch, the Commonwealth, the Five Powers, Baltic States, Middle East and numerous others” fronting up in a shooting war without the US to do the heavy lifting? I can’t.
Naturally enough the inclination to seek alliances arrives when you think that a given level of operation is too big to do by yourself – an alliance is not an end in itself, it is a substitute for your own lack of ability. The real issue in front of the Army is why on a not insignificant annual defence budget of £35 billion plus extra for operations, do we struggle to maintain a modest operation of 10,000 personnel (of which only a third do actal fighting) in A’stan?
An interesting news item reported here: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/release/125906/british-army-ill_prepared-for-urban-warfare%3A-report.html
“Leaked Internal Report Says Army Ill-Prepared for Urban Warfare
(Source: British Forces Broadcasting Service; posted June 01, 2011)
An internal study has reportedly revealed the British Army is not prepared to fight in built-up areas and lacks the ability to anticipate threats from future enemies.
The Army’s shortcomings are highlighted in a planning report called Agile Warrior – which the Daily Telegraph says it has seen.
The assessment was carried out by the Force Development and Training Command which tries to prepare the army for likely future operations.
Some believe future conflicts are more likely to be in urban areas than the countryside of Afghanistan.
The report says the role of tanks, armoured vehicles and helicopters will need to change in order to better support infantry troops.
It also claims the army lacks the precision weapons needed to target enemies without endangering civilians.
An Army spokesman said while the focus remains on Afghanistan, commanders were prudently planning for the future.”
Because out of 5 divisional HQs (+Allied Rapid Reaction Corp) and a divisional-rank command (London District), ruling over a combined force of some 16 brigades plus 16 Air Assault, the deployable brigades are only 6 plus 16 Air Assault, i’m guessing.
And for some reason at one point 11 Brigade was formed to sustain the Afghan effort, too, and disbanded as soon as it returned.
The structure of the army is currently a demented mess, honestly.
10 brigades out of 17 are not deployable at all, and there is a monstrous overabundance of division-level HQs which, thanks god, will be fixed at least in part thanks to the SDSR.
One of the very few things gotten right in that damn document-thing.
Because out of 5 divisional HQs (+Allied Rapid Reaction Corp) and a divisional-rank command (London District), ruling over a combined force of some 16 brigades plus 16 Air Assault, the deployable brigades are only 6 plus 16 Air Assault, i’m guessing.
And for some reason at one point 11 Brigade was formed to sustain the Afghan effort, too, and disbanded as soon as it returned.
The structure of the army is currently a demented mess, honestly.
10 brigades out of 17 are not deployable at all, and there is a monstrous overabundance of division-level HQs which, thanks god, will be fixed at least in part thanks to the SDSR.
One of the very few things gotten right in that damn document-thing.
@jedibeeftrix
With my Multi-Role Brigade concept i tried creating a “pocket-division” (or at least a full-fledged deployable force which is not exactly a brigade nor exactly a division) and i believe i’ve already aimed for the most that funding would allow.
Then again, in terms of infantry, my concept means deploying up to 6 infantry battalions at once (one armored, one mechanized and 4 Light) of which four are regular and used to work together as they come from the same brigade, while the other two are supplied potentially by the supporting TA brigade.
More could come via Commando and PARA, even if that would mean sacrificing part of the capability of reacting to trouble popping up elsewhere.
It is already quite ambitious: currently there are indeed 6 Battalions in Afghanistan:
42 Commando, Royal Marines
45 Commando, Royal Marines
1st Battalion, The Rifles
The Highlanders, 4th Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland
3rd Battalion, The Mercian Regiment (Staffords)
2nd Battalion, The Royal Gurkha Rifles
And my concept brigade would come with a Formation Recce, a tank, an AS90 regiment and a field regiment on L118 light guns, plus eventually air defence batteries, drone battery and STA/ISTAR and logistics/EOD/Engineers. Plus a RAF Regiment field squadron tasked with Force Protection and base defence, so to leave the rest of the infantry as free as possible to act.
I think there is plenty, overall. Trying to do more inexorably requires more formations, more money, more kit.
could it be said that with this pocket-division as envisaged above we have a structure big enough to conduct manoeuvre warfare (said to be the province of division level structures)?
@ Gabriele
“The structure of the army is currently a demented mess, honestly.”
I sometimes think that this might be a good thing, if even we can’t work out how it’s supposed to work then maybe an enemy will have much more trouble and get it wrong!
Some serious question though, what about Logistics, REME and medical support? Should all of that be integrated or should it be as and when needed?
With the budget cuts, how are we going to sustain such forces in the long term?
My opinion is that to be truly deployable, a brigade should have its own Logistic Regiment (as already happens with 3rd Commando Brigade), medical regiment, MP company, engineers and REME.
At divisional level there must be excess Logistic capability to support the division as a whole and distribute stuff to the brigades part of the formation.
And then, ideally, there must be some “Theater Troops” kept ready, providing some more Engineers, Signal and Logistics formations, since these are always in massive demand, also in peacetime (floods, disaster-relief in general).
So, i’d suggest quite a great deal of integration. After all, with a single deployable division (and a focus on deploying “large brigades”) it makes no sense anymore to keep separated formations of logistics to distribute as needed: now there is only one user that requires them!
@jedibeeftrix
Hard to say. It largely depends on what enemy you are facing, to start with. Against an enemy on our same technological level, even an enlarged brigade, alone, would mean a front of maybe 7/8 kilometers, at best. A current brigade as little as 5 (words of the ex Army Chief, at least).
Against low-tech enemy, since i give you a contingent almost as big as the current Helmand force, basically i believe the scale of a nation-building/COIN op would remain as large as the current one.
I’m preparing graphics already, and i guess i’ll have to write something of a review to fully explain what i have in my mind.
I think Gabrielle is on the button in that we must make better use of our TA and Reservist elements.
The TA brigades she refers to are Regional Force brigades and should be thought of more as administrative and home defence (resilience) HQs. They are very diffeerent in terms of function and structure from regular HQs.
My opinion is that SDSR is flawed in its approach to reforming of HQs. The regional force divisional HQ structures (4 HQs; 2, 4 and 5 Divs plus HQ LONDIST) needed reforming and slimming (quite possibly down to 2 HQs), but I think one HQ for the whole of the UK is unlikely to work. The span of command will be huge if nothing else. What should have been focused in on is the duplication and overlap between Army and MOD 3 and 4 star HQs; I suspect there are big savings to be had there.
Finally in thinking of unit and formation structures remember the span of command, especially if envisaging manoeuvre operations. A unit or formation can easily handle 3-5 but struggles exponentially thereafter to exercise effective command as the number of subordinates rises. More then 7 (manoeuvre) elements and severe difficulties are encountered. Gabrielle’s MRB composition with 6 subordinate units is a good size, increasing the number and gearing more towards a ‘pocket division’ would be difficult to manage.
By the way, the SDSR, i realized, talks of “dropping by one the number of deployable brigades, and go to 5″.
But… currently the deployable brigades are technically 7, if i’m not mistaken:
1 Mechanized
4 Mechanized
12 Mechanized
7 Armored
20 Armored
19 Light
52 Infantry
So going down to 5 means TWO, not ONE brigade…
Not clear how that is supposed to work.
52 Bde disbanded on return from AFghanistan. The SDSR plan is 5 x MRB and 16 AA Bde – ’6 in the mix’. One more bde will go.
5 x MRB will allow a Medium Scale Enduring commitment to be maintained, while 3 Cdo and 16 AA Bde will alternate on high readiness for initial entry and contingency operations.
I had missed the disbandment of 52 brigade. XD And of course the british army website is not of any help either, outdated as it always is. Now it is clearer.
i have always found this page pretty helful:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Structure_of_the_British_Army
@ Tony Williams re report “Leaked Internal Report Says Army Ill-Prepared for Urban Warfare.”
Recently the Guards have been across to play with our French friends at their massive FIBUA range. The “Guards” said it was different because all they normally did was run around the countryside.
The French also exercise through real urban areas. I don’t know what the good citizen of Salisbury would say if they found exercises off the Plain spilling onto their streets….
Gabby said “I had missed the disbandment of 52 brigade. XD And of course the british army website is not of any help either, outdated as it always is. Now it is clearer.”
Not to worry matey. You still have a greater grasp of the UK’s defence capabilities than every MP including the Secretary of State for Defence and the First Lord of the Treasury!!!!!!!!!
Thanks, X, but i’m honestly embarrassed. And surprised. It must have been said somewhere, and since i daily check military news, i can’t believe i missed noise of a brigade disbandment XD
52 is a bit of a strange one, its role changes quite a bit, I wouldn’t worry too much about trying to keep up with each unit because they are constantly changing, merging, re rolling, forming new, which in many ways is actually a strength of the British Army, unless you count the time spent quibbling over of which bits of funny headgear are important, who gets what from the mess silver and how battle honours are divvied up!
Think its back to being a regional brigade now, not disbanded as such, just re rolled
52 bde started off as a regional bde, got upscaled for AFG and quietly disbanded on return. No big fuss was made as all the troops were simply reallocated elsewhere and it’s regional force responsibilities had been taken over by HQ 51 Bde. Much the same for HQ 6 Div. Stood up for AFG and stood down on return.
Not being an army buff, can I ask why TA soldiers need to be in separate units? What would be the downside to replacing a company of regular soldiers with one (or more) TA? The up side for me is that you have an overall tightly bound / scalable structure used to fighting together. Creating TA only units adds an admin burden and will make them less familar with fighting alongside regulars.
The TA struggle to deploy a company as a unit into an inf bat. Training reasons as the obvs do less training, trying to get an entire TA in company all to deploy would be very difficult. All the members would have to be ready to deploy at the same time, it wouldn’t really happen. The fact that they are often spread across a whole region as well doesn’t help. The structure of the TA more lends itself to individual replacements rather than TA batt/comp deployments.
Its jumping to a future post but I think the TA has become the great white hope of defence reformers but I am not sure it will ever be able to fulfill on the dream, although some specialist units have deployed formed, the majority of the TA provide individual augmentees out of a very large and relatively expensive pool
Repulse, it’s been some time since I left but the TA unit I was in would have deployed as a complete battalion and not just supplied bodies to 1,2and 3 para as they do now!
I guess it depends on how you see the TA working. These days the deploy operationally
Mire often but not as a standalone unit. At the moment the TA plugs the shortage in regular force numbers, not a part time force to reinforce the regulars when mire troops are reqd
Following Gabriele’s earlier post you see me agreeing with the removal if para pay or the reduction of deployable para units!!!
If the TA could deploy whole units it would leave it open to the sort of “abuse” suffered by the US National Guard. Part time soldiers being used to gap a standing army reduced too far by the government. The National Guard soldiers tend to suffer more from combat stress than US regulars; they just aren’t trained to the same levels.
I think the only TA units that deploy anything close to a FU and often are the Field Hospitals.
Insert WON’T in the last para (see what I did there) in my last post.
@ Jedi
Thanks for that link man, thanks a lot.
Did i piss in your pint or something at some point?
I now have a splitting headache and am very confused. I had no idea that (for instance) we only had 2 x Field Hospitals or that there were 2 additional SAS Regiments. The very idea that a private Army existed, never, ever, entered my pointy little head.
That is the most confusing page i have yet seen at Wiki.
Please don’t do that again.
Thanks for the reasoning. I’ll await TD’s bit on the TA…
@ TD
Ok, that little picture to the left of my name replicates very closely the expression on my face after looking at Jedi’s Link.
Mike (Civ) said “The very idea that a private Army existed, never, ever, entered my pointy little head.”
What do you mean here young sir? I don’t quite get your drift.
Even in today’s rationalised MoD there are surprising number of odd little organisations that never see the light of the day. Many of them, like RFCAs, need getting rid of.
I don’t know whether any of you have read the recent statement by the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Peter Wall. It can be found on the “Defense News” website.
In it he asserts that the British Army will have to change itself from its “Afghan-centric campaign” to “something that gives us a more broad-based military capability with a regrowth of contingency.” The article makes for interesting reading, especially as he adds that such re-structuring “will certainly require real-term growth over the latter part of the decade if we are to resource [our plans] for Future Force 2020.”
Comes from the top!
as much as it pains me to disagree with a gentleman of the Corps, isn’t that just hoping for jam tomorrow and/or more expensive kit
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6686256&c=EUR&s=LAN
It also seems at odds with the MRB which is designed to cope with low to medium intensity enduring deployments
Thanks Mike W,
The same place knew what is “in” and what is “out” in the use of reserves study now running:
“pe. The Study has a broad scope which, whilst concentrating upon the Reserve,
will necessarily consider military manpower more broadly within the context of the Whole
Force. The Royal Naval Reserve (RNR), Territorial Army (TA) and Royal Auxiliary Air
Force (RAuxAF) are the key components of the Study. However, the Study will also
consider other Reserve elements such as the Regular Reserve. Special Forces Reserves
are in scope. The University Units are out of scope, less for their part in producing
Reservist officers. Cadets are also out of scope, as they are the subject of the MOD’s
Youth Engagement Review (YER)”
@ ACC
The role of URNUs isn’t recruitment but to introduce graduates to the importance of the maritime sector to the UK (or something like that as I don’t speak modern business speak.)
As somebody who was involved with sea cadets for over 10 years I am really looking forward to YER.