Having built up a bit of momentum with the RN and RAF series it has been pretty difficult to get into the Land domain and by taking a service centric structure it has exposed the weakness of thinking along these strictly service lines. If we look at almost any operation it is obvious that no one service is dominant to the exclusion of others, there are of course exceptions but in general the vast majority of operations are conducted by all three, plus elements of the civil service. We often ignore the civil service element of operations, even land dominated ones, but without them, the armed forces would simply be unable to function. Both Afghanistan and Libya are current examples of the truly joint approach that now exists across defence planning and execution, all three services plus the civilian element contributing to the main effort, as it should be.
Whilst recognising the inherent weakness of a single service centric structure to these debates I am going to carry on anyway and as it concludes I will probably summarise across service boundaries.
In the normal manner, I will publish a series of posts and other contributors will pitch in as we go, the door is always open for more if anyone fancies a go and writing something.
Remember, these are just suggestions, thought pieces designed to stimulate debate
I don’t want to get too much into recent history but to start this series off I am going to take stock of where the Army is today.
Recent Operations
The British Army is no different from the other services or any Army in the history of warfare, it evolves and constantly changes, operations inevitably dictate equipment, structures, doctrine and training and the pace of moving between peace time to war time inevitably creates tensions. The Army is institutionally conservative for a reason, good reasons usually, but sometimes they conflict with the need for change and throughout its history there has been a series of evolutionary and revolutionary changes.
The British Army is unusual in many respects because for several hundred years it has been engaged on constant operations of varying intensities, it is arguably the most experienced amred body in the world. Even the experienced personnel of today must recognise that whilst the BAOR years are characterised by some as a ‘drinking and whoring Olympics’ the period was interspersed with a series of short but brutal conflicts overseas and a 37 year long enduring operation in Northern Ireland during which much was learned.
The British Army entered Iraq with its reputation at an all time high, hugely respected by enemies and allies alike but if it was guilty of anything it was hubris, as we know, pride always comes before a fall.
At the end of operations in Iraq that reputation had been tarnished.
The reasons for our problems in Iraq were numerous, no one person or group was singularly to blame but as a corporate body, the Army came out of Iraq with a much diminished reputation, especially for counter insurgency operations. It is often described how this arrogance was characterised by the wearing of berets in Basrah whilst lording it over the US forces about ‘how we did it in Belfast’ but I think this is sometimes misunderstood.
The Northern Ireland peace process had started in 1998 after the Good Friday agreement, some 5 years before so how many section commanders or unit commanding officers actually had any deep and meaningful experience of operations in Northern Ireland?
All military forces seem to be very poor at retaining their institutional memory, look at the US Army experience in Vietnam, huge lessons learned that were then discarded and painfully relearned in Iraq, the same for the British Army. A favourite example of mine is gunshields on armoured vehicles, before Vietnam, no gunshields, during Vietnam, gunshields, before Iraq, no gunshields, during Iraq, well you know the drill.
We entered Iraq thinking that we could apply the same lessons in Basrah that we did in Belfast but not only did we fundamentally misunderstand the differences between the two we also took those hard learned lessons, cherry picked the easy ones and ignored the hard ones. Softly softly, berets and soft skin Land Rovers were a part of Operation Banner but it was not the only part. Under political pressure the Army chiefs simply agreed that we could do in Iraq what we had done in Northern Ireland yet with a fraction of the force density and many of the political and military elements that made Operation Banner such a success, sadly absent.
At a tactical level, there would seem very little to fault operations in Iraq, the Army fought with its customary courage, determination and effectiveness but on a political and strategic level it was badly let down by the government and senior military staff.
It did the best with the cards it was dealt and paid the price of others writing cheques it was unable to cash.
Afghanistan has been another story of confused political goals, dysfunctional strategies, resource starvation and poor coordination contrasted with quite incredible bravery and tactical skill.
The British Army fights best when it believes in the operation but I am not sure many actually believe in its objectives. It would be difficult to characterise the situation in Afghanistan now as being anything less than one of wanting to get out with as much reputation intact as possible with the minimum casualties, after 5 years of continual operations there are signs of hope but for every two steps forward we take one back.
There are endless books available on the subject and I don’t want to dwell on it here but Iraq and Afghanistan, both fairly and unfairly, have diminished the reputation of the Army and the need for reform at an organisational and strategic level is obvious.
The Need for Reform
If we look back in history, the Army, when it actually recognised, or was forced to recognise, its failings has enormous potential for reform.
Haldane, Childers and Cardwell all set about the task of asking difficult questions, coming up with uncomfortable answers and going about the business of reform with gusto. The first step is to recognise the need to change but unless this need is recognised, there can be no meaningful next steps.
We also have to be very careful about throwing the baby out with the bath water; the Army now is better equipped than it ever has been, has a deep well experience at all levels to draw from and despite the doom mongers is still a hugely effective force, able to adapt and deliver.
We can only hope that the young officers and other ranks, those with hard won experience of Iraq and Afghanistan are nurtured, pushing the older generation out of the way. We must not allow institutional conservatism to stymie radical thinking because these younger personnel are the future (I know that sounds a bit syrupy but it is true) although the voice of experience of different operations is also important to retain, a difficult task indeed.
The recently announced reforms that seem to indicate a thinning out of the top ranks are promising but only if they allow the younger and fresher thinking personnel to flourish. If any reforms are to be successful, it is the modern generation that must lead and crucially, be allowed to lead.
Reform or evolutionary change, it is a difficult question to answer because inevitably the reform you implement is out of date by the time it is finished and constant reforming is equally destructive.
It also hinges on the prevailing view of the future, whilst we can make a reasonable assumption that the Red Army is no longer gearing up for a day trip to Calais in dispensing with some of those Cod War capabilities we could be in danger of falling for the latest in military fashion, spending huge amounts of intellectual and financial capital on a future that never comes to pass.
Informing much of the debate around the SDSR and Future Force 2020 is a brilliant document called the Future Character of Conflict.
The Future Character of Conflict is a study initiated by the Vice Chief of Defence Staff on the Character of Conflict out to 2029 and the broad implications that flow from it. The Future Character of Conflict found that the global trends indicate increasing instability and growing opportunity for confrontation and conflict. State failure, extremists, increased competition for resources and the changing global balance of power will dictate why, where and how we engage in conflict.
The study concludes that the character of conflict will continue to evolve. Though it is impossible to accurately predict the exact character of the future conflict, in many of our future operations we are likely to face a range of simultaneous threats and adversaries in an anarchic and extended operating area.
I would urge everyone to put aside a bit of time and have a read, download from here
This should inform much of our thinking but where it treads lightly, is the issue of funding and any notion of grand strategy (its not a criticism, its just out of scope of the document)
The armed forces must face the reality that baring some major strategic shock, funding is unlikely to increase in a sustained manner.
This is the first reality that the armed forces must face, given that the Army is traditionally manpower rather than equipment intensive, its greatest cost is manpower and this is on an upward trajectory. Maximising the return on investment in personnel should be a high priority, the days of poorly trained, poorly equipped conscripts going over the top are well and truly over and we must challenge some of the assumptions about career length, ceremonial duties, the rank system, traditional engagement models and yes, even the regimental system, if we are to make every last penny count.
The underlying themes to my thinking are a relentless elimination of duplication, the military is not always the best answer, prevention rather than cure, strategic realism and ruthless commonality.
Expect to see them in the following posts but to reiterate, these are simply ideas and witterings designed to spark debate, god help us if anyone is listening!
The Future of the British Army Series…
The Future of the British Army 01 – Scene Setting
The Future of the British Army 02 – Tasks and Capabilities
The Future of the British Army 03 – Rank and Size
The Future of the British Army 04 – Structures
The Future of the British Army 05 – Heavy Metal
The Future of the British Army 06 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (01)
The Future of the British Army 07 – ISTAR and Formation Reconnaissance (02) A Sensible Future
Supporting Articles
Medium Armour – what is it, and what does it mean for the post 2020 force structure?
we must challenge some of the assumptions about career length, ceremonial duties, the rank system, traditional engagement models and yes, even the regimental system, if we are to make every last penny count.
Hear hear. I think Kings Troop RHA might be a good model to follow; if you want to have men in furry hats outside Buckingham Palace, that’s great, but it might be more economical not to have them expensively trained in modern infantry warfare first. Just recruit a full-time Ceremonial Company instead (maybe from the ranks of London’s unemployed actors?) and let them do it, and let the Toms get on with real soldiering.
2 Troop, 1st Thespians…
Like it
I’m dreading this series of posts, as part of me will whince with the suggestions, I know change is required to bring the green out of the 20th century.
Two things on above points, Iraq got messy when labours tofu munching, natural fibre fairtrade wearing twats got involved and soldiers were going on patrol,worried about been sued/charged/jailed for actions taken. Morale was low not just because of equipment but troops believed they would be hung out to dry if it went tits up.
with ref to the guards (who would be reduced in my orbat) why not recruit from people leaving, look at other trades do pilots fly after they leave, do mechanics still work on engines? So as it takes a squaddie mentalility to troop the colour, (no way a luvvie will stand out there for x hours) make it a NRPS type posting which obviously removes the 13% x factor link it into the pension,include accom and make it a job to 55-60 and bingo
Plus why are they spread all over london particularly kings troop who are based in st johns wood that well known cheap area of london to live! How often do the troop go into london, bin their present base and sell the land (remember treasury has said monies raised from selling land can go straight into MOD coffers). co hab with another regt outside or near to the M25, even pirbright must be feasible for kings troop. Don’t get me wrong i admire the gravel technicians, but they have been untouched throughout all the cuts and at a minimum i would repeat the life guards blues and royals merger with the coldstream and grens into the household foot regiment.
I’ll leave TD to hit armour and arty but i’ll ask this before signing off,joint NBC regt what’s the point of a specialised regiment being based other side of the country from the centre of excellence for NBC ie porton down. NBC as well if we need them we are at all out war and in a world of pain, so that would become a dedicated TA unit based either at porton down or as near to as possible, freeing honington camp for returning BAOR troops (or even moving the 16 AABn regiment from canterbury as that’s a hell of a lot closer, and doesn’t involve the dartford crossings to get to them!)
I’m rambling time to do one!!
“This is the first reality that the armed forces must face, given that the Army is traditionally manpower rather than equipment intensive, its greatest cost is manpower and this is on an upward trajectory.”
I did actualy have something of a revelation over the weekend.
Its frequently stated (by me) that over the last 50 or 60 years, the armed forces budget has decreased to a quarter of the proportion of GDP it held, whereas the NHS budget has increased to 4x the budget it held.
But whereas the armed forces have maintained their CapEx budget, the NHS have lost theirs. Prompted by a local radio station trying to raise £80k for a mobile CT scanner, theres currently only one in entire country.
£80k, and that needed a private charity appeal.
Out of a budget of £120bn
Mandess…
Paul, have you been peeking at my notes!
Ist Thespians – love it anyone remember Monty pyhtons square bashing
RSM
SQAAAAD CAAAMP IT UP!
On a more serious note.
A lot of police are ex forces.
How about the royal reg guards (With coldstream. Life Grenadier battalions) Being just that recruit form ex forces – all those 7 year wonders into Ceriminial and Security untit trained swat style and intigrated into royal protection squad to actually guards Her maj?
“We can only hope that the young officers and other ranks, those with hard won experience of Iraq and Afghanistan are nurtured, pushing the older Cold War generation out of the way. We must not allow institutional conservatism to stymie radical thinking because these younger personnel are the future (I know that sounds a bit syrupy but it is true)”
My knowledge is a little sketchy, but hasnt the majority of the actual fighting been done by Marines/Paras/Rifles?
And dont senior officers generaly come from Guards/Artilery/Engineers?
Jackson was a Para (eventualy) but since then….
Obviously Marines have no chance of shaping the army.
My understanding of the mechanics is virtualy nil, but it was certainly my understanding that combat posting slowed your career progression, they didnt accelerate it. Your career basicaly freezes if you go special forces?
Good start admin, i look forward to more.
I did have a look at the Future Character of Conflict document some time back:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/09/09/britain%E2%80%99s-future-strategic-direction-13-%E2%80%93-threats-to-meet-alone-and-those-that-require-partners/
Oh bugg*r, Ixion almost exactly nicked my idea
, I was going to suggest that at the end their tours, as they are getting ready to head to civvy street they could undertake a training slot with the police and then the Royal Protection force could then all be manned by ex-services police officers who can switch between the ceremonial duties and close protection. Does anyone know if the US have had good track record re-training troops skilled in close-quarters combat/house clearing as SWAT forces, or do they tend to be to hair triggered for police work after a couple of tours in Afghanistan?
@TD and @ paul g: Basing. Basing is largely (but not completely) outside the gift of the army as it is decided by a complex arrangement of: Army requirements and aspirations, Defence Infrastrucuture Organisation real estate and budgets, Treasury requirements and political considerations. So in the current example of the ongoing re-basing from Germany the Army will have a clear idea of where it wants to end up, the DIO will have a clear view as to what is available and affordable, the Treasury may or may not allow the MOD to spend (now) to save (later) and every politician will be campaigning hard to keep the camps (and jobs) in his/her constituency.
@Dominic J. Most fighting in Afghanistan is done by the infantry. The PARAs and Marines have done no more and no less then everyone else. The RIFLES have 5 (regular) battalions and a very good PR machine which is why they figure a lot. The SCOTS also have 5 (Regular) battalions and have had the same operational commitment as the RIFLES but much less PR. Currently 3 Cdo Brigade is the nucleus of Task Force Helmand and most of the troops are army and not from 3 Cdo Bde (they are from 7 Armd Bde).
All of the current crop of type A brigade commanders commanded at the unit level in AFG or Iraq. At two star general and above there are none that I can think of who have not got Iraq or AFG experience either in command or senior staff (some 40 plus generals have served in Iraq in various capacities) appointments.
How about the royal reg guards (With coldstream. Life Grenadier battalions) Being just that recruit form ex forces – all those 7 year wonders into Cerimonial and Security unit trained swat style and intigrated into royal protection squad to actually guards Her maj?
There are sort of two different ideas here: one is to recruit more ex-soldiers as royal protection officers, which may or may not be a good idea. The other is to get the royal protection officers to spend a lot of their time standing around outside Buckingham Palace with furry hats on, which I think is a bad idea, just as getting the Toms to do it is a bad idea – these guys are (I would think) as expensive to train than squaddies, and would earn a lot more (being older and civilians), and all that training would be wasted on the standing-around duty.
no way a luvvie will stand out there for x hours
Ballet dancers would. Some of those girls are nails; they go out on stage with blood actually soaking through their shoes, when your average SUT would be sticking his hand up and going “staff, staff, I need to see the medic, me feet hurt…”
Tubby
Oddly enough, in the event of us getting elected sherrifs, and me being elected as such, I’d want a two tier police force, with the first tier being “bobbies on the beat”, recruited pretty much at army pay, from the army.
Callum
I’m afraid I didnt quite get much of the technical language there.
I may be wrong, but its my understanding that an officer who serves 10 6 month terms in 10 different areas will be much more likely to move on to major and higher than the officer who does 4 in Sangin, 4 recovering from Sangin, and 2 in something else.
Yes, most Generals will have gone to Afghanistan, some might even have spent a few days outside Bastion.
I dont believe they will be grooming the Sangin Captain who has these funny ideas about mobility not being the answer to every question.
I could be wrong, but everything I’ve read tells me I’m not.
Dominic J,
‘A Little sketchy’? A little insulting more like. Every infantry, cavalry and household unit has done their fair (some will disagree!) share of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Don’t forget how many batallions of Paras/Rifles there are when compared with a single battalion regt or small cavalry regiment, so the media coverage is always going to reflect that. Also, many of the army’s high fliers and young COs have an SF background, so i’m afraid you are wrong there too.
TD, Old Father Time will guarantee that the new generation take over from the Cold War mob, and I don’t like this concept that we are being held back by them. Just as the Imperial Policemen were out of date for The Great War, they are out of date for now, and our generation’s experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan will perhaps have little relevance for future conflicts; be they state vs state or something else entirely. We need to get away from this culture of blaming the ‘Cold War Dinosaurs’ for the problems of today. They are victims of circumstance, as we shall be too.
A Like I said A LOT of Bobbies are ex Squadies.
They should be recruited on Police PCSO Pay and conditons (not all that different incash terms to Constables), Trained to act as back up to royal protection, Equiping and training for armed opperations is expensive in police terms, but very cheap in millitary terms.
No, I have not though it all through
but just thinking out laud.
@ed zepp (i do like that name) you’re right when the media screech their latest headline quite a few of the bods coming out of the MOD building have upside down wings.
@callum I see what your saying, but hence my choice of units, the point of bringing the air assault inf batt closer to the actual brigade and nearer to a training area (thetford) surely if this was presented to a basing committee would be shouting common sense, common sense from every page of the report. Moreover canterbury barracks is isolated, I know that when my section were responsible for repair of the electronic equipment (radios,TI sights etc) as we were the bde wksp it was unfeasible as it was a 6 hour round trip and had to be farmed out to 3rd line civvy wksp.
With the kings troop, i’m sure they are not in london doing ceremonials every day like the gravel techs do every day ie changing the guard, hence co locate them at an existing camp (bingo savings in admin hq’s, qm’s and cookhouses, sorry regimental restaurants) this also will do away with london allowance, a pittance i hear you say? so is para pay and look what’s happening there. Basing of troops is going to a very big issue in the next 5 years.
By the way if the army can have super garrisons (tidworth, catterick) why can’t the RAF? The arguement of spreading assets to keep flying has well gone, anyone who is capable of a strike of the UK will wipeout any straight piece of tarmac of 800m or more in the UK by naafi break day one. just a thought!!
ED ZEP
Good points, I am les concerned with personalities more with structure which are WW2 Cold war whatever by and large, which does affect thinking, which affect doctrine, which does affect equipment etc etc. But I suspect that’s where TD is going with his posts.
We are stupidly over generalled admiralled etc.
Paul g
(Don’t suggest cutting the Raf! The light blue inquisition led by T(Torquamada)D Will catch you and burn you at the stake surrounded by burning bundles of ‘Royal airforce today and Tomorrow’, Greased with Brylcream).
“Also, many of the army’s high fliers and young COs have an SF background, so i’m afraid you are wrong there too.”
Well, we can only go on what we read, and a couple of years back, the SBS was “in crisis” because it couldnt fill its ranks, because people felt it was a career ender, or, that was what I read.
I could of course be wrong, the army could over the next decade recognise every mistakle its spent the last decade denying, learn from those mistakes and never repeat them again.
I fear I am not, Afghanistan will be forgotten, those with real experience from it will be sidelined over those who spent the time preparing for the “proper” war the army wants to fight and cheerleading FRES.
Walls first combat appears to be as a Major General in Iraq, the second time round.
Richards did NI three times and his own private war in Sierra Leon.
Did Ireland a couple of times
Mike Jackson
Actualy seems to have gone somewhere quite dangerous and been at the sharp end for some it.
Michael Walker
Again, a bit in Ireland
Roger_Wheeler
Not really clear but looks like Ireland
Charles_Guthrie
Finaly someone from special forces
Peter_Inge
Another Green Howard….
John_Chapple
Again, not completely clear, but sounds like he could have been at the sharp end of Malaya
Nigel_Bagnall
Quite a bit of sharp end, and another green howard….
Now, I have neither the time, inclination or resources to track the career paths of soldiers who actualy did quite a lot of fighting, but they dont appear to swim straight to the top.
It could just be that it isnt mentioned that they all did serve in ebvery firefight, rather than waiting around fulda for one.
Perhaps Guthrie was a better candidate than Waters
Perhaps if H Jones had survived, he’d have been top rank material, but Pike didnt quite make it
And neither did Rose
And these are just the commanding officers with wiki pages, which I’ve sicne deleted
Most lack them.
The majors and captains under than dont even get a mention.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_ground_forces_in_the_Falklands_War
I could be wrong, and am happy to be proved such, but would like a little more than an accusation of insult and statement that I am wrong.
I repeat, it is my fear that the armed forces, like any other quago, has an inbuilt prejudice in favour of the men that imitate what the man at the top says, thinks and does.
Those who insist on real operational knowledge will be rebuffed in favour of those who repeat the orthadoxy.
I hope to god I’m wrong, but doubt I am.
COs are Lieutenant-Colonels, not the Chiefs of Staff. For high fliers try looking at blokes like Gus Fair, Tim Radford, Mark Carleton-Smith. Of course the previous generation haven’t fought in Afghanistan/Iraq. The nature of the army is such that if you are an officer, the bulk of your fighting days are over by the time you hit captain. Most of the recent chiefs of staff would have been colonels or above at 9/11, let alone the start of the helmand campaign. Of course their only fighting was northern ireland!
And there is nothing wrong with championing FRES. Would you want to go to war in an IED drenched country in a CVR(T)? I think not.
“dispensing with some of those Cod War capabilities”
My father faught in the Cod War, according to him, weapon of choice was the snow ball. Occasionally, after a few drinks, he gets that steely look in his eye and and tells war stories…
Regarding people’s comments on amalgamating the guards regiments- by some accounts they practically have been. The Welsh Guards Battlegroup on Herrick X was reinforced by a company of Scots Guards, incl. a platoon of Coldstream, with a fair few grenadiers coming along for a nosy towards the end of the tour. Basically, the Household Division becomes the RHQ of all 5 regular battalions and the London Regiment. This would allow each regiment to remain distinct and to be a “regiment”, but operationally it benefits from the large regiment structure. I would use this as an opportunity to get rid of No. 7 Company etc., and just use a battalion, along with reductions in real estate. Oh, and a huge cull of hangers on that seem to clutter the guards.
Regarding the series- I can’t wait. If it remains at the standard set by the previous two, should be a good read.
In the past I thought the ceremonial element could be put on the same footing as the bands. I don’t think recruiting would be a problem. Look at the RAF Regiment they make a career out of staggin’ on.
(Sorry TD.
)
@Dominic J. Sorry about the technical terminology.
An officer who has a broad brush of experience will generally do better in his/her career then one who has not. However, high fliers will generally spend 18-24 months in a post as oppossed to 24-30 months, 6 month flits will harm a career.
Currently any officer who has not successfully completed a demanding operational tour in a command earning slot (whether as a major in charge of a company, lieutenant colonel in charge of a battalion or brigadier in charge of a brigade) is highly unlikely to promote to command at the next level. Again staff appointments on operations are highly sought after as promotion is slower without credible operational experience.
The long and short of it is that in the current army if you have not commanded troops in combat your career is at best on the slow track up and you will be lucky to promote much further and highly unlikely to command at a higher rank.
Interestingly General Jackson as CGS had far less operational experience then most of the current crop of 4 star generals, and the operational experience he had was far more limited. That is a reflection of the times he was living in and the opportunities available.
What one has to remember with senior generals is that they are selected for promotion in part by politicians. The following was told to me by a senior politician with well over a decade under his belt of dealing with the defence establishment. “There are three types of generals; killers, politicians and politicians with a proven propensity for violence. The first are rare and frighten politicians, they are rarely selected for the very top. The second are common and embraced by politicians, they are most often found at the top. The last is so rare as to be exceptional, but they make the best generals, combining flattery with fear”. Of the generals mentioned only Guthrie fits this latter description.
@paul g. Basing: My understanding is that the army is very keen to rationalise its estate and that would mean closing down isolated garrisons. However in order to close down a garrison you have to have the money to build a replacement and therein lies the nub of the problem…
I believe that the RAF is going to a version of super-garrisons in that the fleet will be rationalised to bases: all rotary at one base, multi-engine at another etc.
Hi all, thanks for commenting and welcome to Ed Zep (are you showing your age there!)
@PaulG, I think Claire Shorts dysfunctional DFiD has a lot to answer for as well but its water under the bridge to some extent, I just wanted to set the scene, explain a little why I think there needs to be meaningful change. The RAF is going to major hubs, ISTAR at one, transport at another etc (oh, Callum has beat me to that one)
@Callum, thanks for that
@Ed, like any organisation the young will replace the old but as I said, natural and understandable conservatism must sometimes be discarded with a spot of revolution. Babies may well be thrown out with the bath water and your point is well made. Not sure if you have followed the blog for long but if you have you will know I hold very little sympathy for demonization of so called Cold War Relics, many of which have utility in all spectrums of conflict but it is as much about thinking as equipment. We need to be much more agile because the world around us no longer has the same certainties as it once did.
@Callum, do you think the competition for combat command slots has a distorting effect on operations, short tour syndrome, wanting to get something ‘kinetic’ on the report and ultimately producing identikit homogonous senior officers?
@Bertrum, thanks for your kinds words, I hope this series will be decent enough but remember, its only an opinion, I don’t have the monopoly on ideas, good or bad
@all, don’t forget, the door is always open for anyone to chip in with articles
@TD. Most of our senior officers are homogenous. That is because in a conservative (small ‘c’) organisation like selects like for promotion. Arguably our most successful general of recent times (Lieutenant General Sir Graeme Lamb) made it to 3 star because he was so talented, but no further because he broke too many molds.
The emphasis on getting the operational ‘tick in the box’ certainly skewed our early years in AFG and IRQ with a lack of continuity and a desire to ‘have an impact’. I think this latter emphasis in our (reporting and grading) system on ‘having an impact’ in one’s current appointment, regardless of whether it is on operations or not is having a serious detrimental impact across the board. It is encouraging short termism. In senior officers I think it is also resulting in pandering to politicians (instead of giving them unvarnished military advice) and the results can be seen in the number of poor strategic decisions we have made both internally (to the MOD) and externally (as a nation).
Do you think we will ever see another Bill Slim or Percy Hobart?
If TD you are wanting to “advocating a fundamental shift in the way we see the role of the armed forces, away from striking and towards a greater cooperative role” then the 1st question has to be do we need a regualar army at all.
You could have training corps and some engineers but all other roles could be preformed by TA forces called up when ever required. You only really need the the higher end capability if you intend to take and hold ground against a enemy force.
I think the entire Regimental system needs overhauling but no matter how sensible the proposals the public outcry and subsequent campaigns to save their local regiments (witness the Scottish Regiments a while back) may scare the powers that be into compromises or even U-turns.
(Change of name for this post only in honour of Mr. Pantyshield)
TD
Yes.
And another Wingate, Do not under estimate the much maligned and (undouptedly flawed, but whose perfect) Monty. He did much to make the army fit for purpose in WW2. The Crap he had to put up with from obstructionist officers should not be underestiamted.
@TD. Slim and Monty’s I think the Army probably has already; Superb trainers, tacticians, organisers and leaders. The problem is that despite what they say the MOD and the armed forces are not yet fully on a war footing. If we were the impetus for reform would be much greate; we would clear out the dead wood and bring in the new. One of the problems of our current system is the lack of impetus to take risk or think and act long term – both appear inimical at times to one’s prospects for advancement. Our system is also very bad at allowing ‘bad calls’ to catch up with people, so making a good short term call that turns out to be a massive blunder in the longer term never impacts on the people who made the initial decision.
Wingate – well a certain recently retired SAS CO who regularly appears in the Press springs to mind!!
I hope that we will have someone like US Generals William DePuy and Donn Starry who helped rebuild the US Army post Vietnam (although I believe the Army and Defence needs reforming not transforming, unlike the US Army then). I think we have the individuals in the posts (General Newton as the Army’s Commander Field Doctrine and Training for one) but the organisational inertia to be overcome is immense.
Someone who finally understands the name! Hallelujah! Much obliged Mr. Crapspray. I Actually went back and read it again, and it seems I spelt the… er… my name wrong. Cry shame.
Think Defence, I’m well aware that someone with the initials BP clearly has a monopoly on the best ideas.
Hint:- They have nothing to do with petroleum.
Callum
“Currently any officer who has not successfully completed a demanding operational tour in a command earning slot (whether as a major in charge of a company, lieutenant colonel in charge of a battalion or brigadier in charge of a brigade) is highly unlikely to promote to command at the next level.”
But thats kind of my point, you need one deployment to Afghanistan, but you need ONE deployment.
A fourth, third or even second and you’re, “narrow” and overlooked in favour of someone who did one stint in Afghanistan, and then went off to command the defence of Fulda.
Dont get me wrong, we dont want everyone to have dsone nothing but Afghanistan, its a stupid war with little long term benefit, but frankly BAFG is even worse, and it *seems* that officers who actualy serve in the oddball wars we actualy fight never rise any further.
Ed
“And there is nothing wrong with championing FRES. Would you want to go to war in an IED drenched country in a CVR(T)? I think not.”
Since “going to war” in FRES at the moment entails wandering around with a powerpoint presentation acting as a caller for bullshit bingo, I’d go with the vehicle that we actualy own.
If we are mad enough to go to war in an IED laced country again, I’d want an IED proof vehicle, like a Cougar, rather than a death trap like an up armoured tankette.
“… acting as a caller for bullshit bingo”
Probably the single greatest line of text I have ever read on a website.
P.S. I was once a bingo caller for Gala for a couple of years.
But thats kind of my point, you need one deployment to Afghanistan, but you need ONE deployment.
A fourth, third or even second and you’re, “narrow” and overlooked in favour of someone who did one stint in Afghanistan, and then went off to command the defence of Fulda.
Not to call you a liar, but: what’s this based on?
ChrisB
It was originaly shout RMA, Information dominance, but it was a bit unwieldy.
a
Simply what I’ve read
Dominic J,
Without wishing to pre-empt the inevitable FRES debate that will come later, I don’t think you will find many people who think Cougar is a suitable platform for conducting Brigade reconnaissance. All AFVs are measured by mobility, firepower and protection, and whilst FRES may not be the ideal solution, it is a hell of a lot better than what we have: a 40 year old, knackered fleet of CVR(T) that have pop guns and can’t stop 7.62.
@ Dominic J.
“But thats kind of my point, you need one deployment to Afghanistan, but you need ONE deployment.
A fourth, third or even second and you’re, “narrow” and overlooked in favour of someone who did one stint in Afghanistan, and then went off to command the defence of Fulda.”
Not quite correct. Without a strong performance on operations in charge of a company a major is highly unlikely to get command of a battalion. Then, without a strong performance on operations in charge of a battalion said lieutenant colonel is unlikely to promote to brigadier and get command of a brigade. So mulitple operational tours are an unwritten pre-requisite for command.
On the staff (desk jobs) operational staff jobs will strengthen a CV and enhance promotion prospects. The only jobs that compare in terms of cachet and worth are the policy jobs that go to the top 10%. These might not be operational, but it does make sense to expose ‘fliers’ to the politics and esoteric ways of the MOD early…
I know of some very capable officers who have lost out in the promotion and command stakes not because they are lacking in talent, but because they are lacking in recent relevant operational experience.
Ed Zeppelin,
The second paragraph of your first comment (how quickly specific kinds of experience get to be less relevant) is spot on. It’s much more a matter of what useful qualities get cultivated by active service, and how flexible the owners of those qualities are about dealing with different sorts of conflict. (OGH brought up Slim; what he learned about himself and fighting a command in the dog’s p*sshole of Great War Iraq and Europe served him very well in Burma because he *was* flexible.) And if your name’s showing age, flaunt it — if not, good taste young man!
IXION,
The squad camping it up was the very best shot by a group of blokes old enough to have a meaningful memory of National Service. Even better than how to deal with a man coming at you with a banana.
Mark,
Fair comment (though I suspect you’d still need some small emergency-response elements as regulars, even the Swiss have those.) “Greater cooperation” of the kind the boss sometimes toys with raelly ends you up in a place I’m not sure he intends — a US Marine Corps model, because in the end we all do answer to geography, it would be an army with a coastguard in for the krauts and along the Med it’s harder to tell, especially if you have mountain borders like the Spanish and Italy. A purple bodge like Canada’s ends up mostly in name only (Canadian MPs with shipbuilding constituencies are talking about the Canadian Navy again, and the rest is mostly a matter of time and inertia. After a longer Korean War than Korea out in the Stan I think the “Land Forces Component” is ready to be an Army again.) In Belgium it’s an excuse by the Eurobankers to do as in the UK, ball it all together to hack away at the budget. With just one “efficient” service and more pressure to minimize/economise/rationalise/all the other bollocks that has helped British industry devour its capital for the sake of shareholders would hit in force that makes the SDSR look like the teddy bears’ picnic. Likewise inter-specialty (instead of inter-service) rivalry for even fewer crumbs.
Callum,
Thank you for sharing thoughtful assessments about where the talent may be. Rather than whinging it’s good to think on what can be done with the resources to hand. DePuy and Starry are good comparisons; my American uncle (ex-their Army) was in school (primary school) with a junior member of the gang, Huba Wass de Czege, and both knew Starry when they were officers in Germany. Gets back to the discussion a couple of threads back — conception of strategy first, then think on form following the operational functions.
Plus why are they spread all over london particularly kings troop who are based in st johns wood that well known cheap area of london to live! How often do the troop go into london, bin their present base and sell the land
Kings Troop are, I learned today, moving to Woolwich at the end of the year.