As interesting and fun as our various discussions and hair brain schemes about the future shape of UK defence (capabilities and equipment) are, we all acknowledge that without an underlying concept of what the armed forces ‘are for’ we are indulging in nothing but fantasy fleets, however dour and grounded in fiscal reality they may be.
The Future Of series of posts makes a key assumption; defence budgets are unlikely to see a significant and sustained increase short of some major strategic shock.
Is this a sound bedrock for any future planning, probably not, but it serves its purpose and stops any thoughts of laser beam wearing sharks.
However, it is probably worth looking again at the underlying strategy that shapes foreign policy and in turn shapes the armed forces, so here are my ramblings on the subject of strategy, as usual, one view amongst many, not right or wrong.
There is much criticism of the lack of a grand strategy that guides the decisions of successive British governments and various interesting proposals to install some sort of council of wise elders to guide the inexperienced politicians, hedge against short term crisis management and provide breathing space for ‘thinking’ but as alluring as this might be it fails completely because if you have been elected by the people then you are not going to want, nor is it desirable, to be told, however gently, what you should be doing by some old farts who used to be important (unfair but probably realistic)
Politicians are elected to govern and there is quite enough power vested in the unelected ‘great and good’ as it is.
The role of a sovereign Parliament is to hold the government to account and it to this institution, however flawed, that we should look.
The people, through their Parliament, need to reassert their power.
Simply putting yet more unelected layers of influence into an already over complex government mechanism is counter productive. Even the much vaunted National Security Council and new Anglo US arrangements simply complicate matters.
Its composition and appointment process would inevitably be politicised and there is a real danger of groupthink setting in. Where Grand Strategy did work, the Victorian or Cold War eras, there were very clear enemies and/or objectives.
The world is a much more complex and nuanced place but strategy should still be very simple.
That is not to say there is no room for discussion, debate and free thinking on matters of grand strategy, far from it. This is why we have the House of Lords, RUSI, Chatham House, select committees galore, the Defence Academy, think tanks (various), the media and of course, the new media!
If there is to be some sort of higher level guiding, revising of proposal and tempering of rash decisions, surely this is role of the upper chamber and MP’s.
Contents
We Are All Doomed
No we fu##^&g well are not, there is a depressing and pervasive view that Great Britain isn’t that great anymore (I am guilty of this sometimes)
But this could not be further from the truth, look at our history, look at our contribution to world affairs and look at our potential, still, you will see plenty to puff your chest out about and think positive thoughts about.
This country needs to rediscover a bit of flair, a bit of self confidence and stop thinking of a million reasons not to do something.
Great Britain bought the world football, Darwin, railways and the X Factor, let’s not forget for a small island off the coast of Europe we have a lot going for us.
Where Values and Interests Clash, or Me Me Me
A grand strategy is where our liberal values of peace, love and functional democracies tend to hit the buffers because whilst it is obvious that Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Zimbabwe can do just about what they please no matter what we say, the same is not so true of others.
We all get a nice warm feeling about promoting democracy and gender equivalence but don’t care enough if it gets difficult or clashes with our national interest, we should stop hiding behind an ethical foreign policy (stop laughing at the back) and just be open and honest.
Instead of trying and failing to be a force for good in the world we should stop, realise that the world doesn’t give a toss what we think and knuckle down to putting the interests of the UK first, second and seventieth.
Grandstanding and posing is for amateurs and whilst we basking in the saintly glow from, for example, Sir Bob and Bono, the Chinese are busy pulling the rug from under our feet.
The ‘ends’ are therefore pretty simple, security and prosperity for the UK.
The Special Relationship
Like some clingy girlfriend (heard that on the radio this morning) the UK is constantly trying to show how important we are to the US and however we might reposition it as an essential relationship there are still elements of a complete lack of reality around the discussions. It is trendy to berate the UK/US relationship and anti Americanism is often simply jealousy dressed up as analysis the bare facts of the matter is that the US always acts in her best interests,
And why bloody well not, let’s not be deluding ourselves that we would be any different, good luck to them I say.
However, the UK does gain a lot from our relationship with the US in trade, military and intelligence matters, of that there can be no doubt but going forward we have to recognise that hanging on to the US coat tails and hoping for crumbs from the table, all whilst the US looks East, is a game of diminishing returns.
Our interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been of questionable strategic value and unless we somehow try and ingratiate ourselves with the US by assisting them in Asia then the relationship will become increasingly one sided. Libya has laid bare the military power of Europe and from a US perspective, being world policeman and getting bugger all thanks whilst European nations vow to fight the last American must be wearing rather thin and you cannot blame the US for going cool on us.
All nations have special relationships and we are no different, our relationship with the Commonwealth might be called special, we sign agreements with Brazil and France, have cross border intuitions with Ireland, integrate Dutch amphibious forces with the Royal Marines and of course there is our relationship with the EU. The US has many so called special relationships with Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia and even Mexico.
We need a more realistic appraisal of where our interests lie and if that means we get closer with nation A or B then fair enough but this constant pandering to the US has to end.
The Lure of the Sea
Many people think the most sensible proposition for the UK is the so called strategic raiding or maritime centric approach. This is where I think the wisdom of the crowd is wrong but it is an appealing and in some aspects, logical choice.
Predictably, these arguments seem to have crystalised on a service centric basis;
If you wear light blue and sip Pimms, isn’t it obvious, without air power, sailors and soldiers lives are at risk, airpower can deliver strategic affect and we should have all the money.
Dark blue and the odd tot of grog; strategic raiding is the answer; after all, we are an island you know and would starve if the sea lanes were not kept clear, the future character of conflict document is wrong and we should have all the money.
Green, don’t raise the port decanter off the table; Afghanistan is the only game in town, COIN is the future and the future character of conflict document is good but not quite right, carriers are no good in a desert and we should have all the money.
None of these arguments hold up to critical analysis but it is Strategic Raiding that seems to have gained a lot of traction.
Gunboat diplomacy on steroids, which is what it is, is strategic thinking devoid of any real thought for the aftermath.
Supporters simply swish the consequences of our actions away with bold statement that after we have knocked the doors down and stirred up a hornets nest, other people (there is a whiff in some quarters of other people being brown), will pick up the pieces and provide the mass for ongoing stabilisation operations where it gets messy and difficult.
The bold assumption, that having a big raiding stick, usually centred on big flat boats with things that fly, provides a credible deterrent and can coerce or influence the actions of those ashore.
Sorry, yet more delusion, did Sadam decide not to bother invading Kuwait because of the USN in the Gulf, did Slobodan change course once the carriers were in the Adriatic, did the West Side Boys give up their hostages in Sierra Leone because we had Sea Harrier, did Mohamed Aidid give up when faced with overwhelming force sitting offshore, did the Taleban decide to give up Osama because of the F18?
No is the simple answer, it took the application of significant and sustained combined arms forces to achieve anything, if at all, in these situations and every one of them was as a result of failures in diplomacy or intelligence.
Extended strategic raiding, if I can call it that, defines almost anything but Afghanistan and the years after the initial invasion of Iraq as strategic raiding so with most of these theories, its all in the eye of the beholder.
The whole ‘we are an island’ argument is anachronistic and assumes that the UK is any more vulnerable to disruptions in the free flow of goods and raw materials than any other European nation. Is Holland more vulnerable to disruptions to the Suez Canal than we are, is France any more dependent on Middle East oil than we are?
Barring a few details, of course they aren’t.
If we are really serious about maritime security and isolation from food and fuel supplies then we should invest in port infrastructure, multiple pipelines, supplier diversity, gas storage, shale gas exploration, offshore renewable energy, sensible agriculture/fishing policies and cross channel security arrangements.
I am not sure why strategic raiding seems such a popular proposition and maybe it is me that is barking bad but not only does it seem like warmed over ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ fantasy where, after using our high technology sensors and rapid reaction capabilities, we launch from afar, kill the bad guys in a hail of effects based trickery, who will have conveniently decided to pit their weakness against our strengths, build a couple of schools in compensation for explosively destroying their country and be home in time for tea and medals. The aftermath, thats for others, we can crack on with shining our carriers and let others do the hard yards of building security.
Not sure the real world bad guys will be so obliging or predictable.
It also has the added bonus of requiring lots of expensive toys, industry and the chiefs will be over the moon because they can measure up to the French and USA instead of actually doing their jobs of securing the UK’s interests.
Strategic Raiding is the latest in a long list of military fashions and allows the service chiefs to keep their big ticket items; the answer is Typhoon, FRES and CVF, now, about that question.
Whilst I do not think a maritime centric strategy is right for the UK I don’t think we should be maintaining large ground forces to engage in extended COIN operations either.
We do not have the manpower and cannot afford it anyway.
The answer therefore (at least in my muddled thinking) is forward engagement and multi dimensional partnerships that build security, provide intelligence and opportunities for early intervention that might not always be military in character.
It isn’t very glamorous or exciting, its hard work, not cheap and the results might be ambiguous at best but I can’t see any other option that is realistic.
Trends and Mystic Meg
Looking into the future is a thankless task, no one ever remembers when you were right but if events turn out to be even slightly different to your predictions then everyone thinks you are an idiot.
In all our thinking we must recognise the nature of uncertainty but equally recognise that to hedge against every eventuality is the same as paying for asteroid insurance for your kitchen.
There are trends and patterns we can make reasonable and educated guesses about, an invasion through the Fulda Gap by the Russians is pretty unlikely for example. Glib maybe, but the point is a serious one.
The National Security Strategy actually made that point quite forcefully and elevated the risk cyber attacks and terrorism but the attacks on so called Cold War Relics TM masks a basic ignorance of the utility of Cold War Relics TM in all spectrum’s of military operations. Challenger 2 might no longer face the Red Army but they are still damned useful today, maybe not as many of them should be supported, but that is the point.
Where the SDSR went off the rails is that it consistently failed to actually take on notice of the National Security Strategy and descended into a lastminute.com orgy of cost cutting where horse trading, back scratching and back stabbing seemed to take precedence over anything else.
In its haste, politicians failed to control the uniformed grown ups and the end result was a series of incoherent salami slices, something that the government vehemently claimed would not happen.
As an aside, whilst everyone is looking East I think we also need to shift our gaze to Africa.
A Practical Notion
Having impressive big sticks is fine but using them generally means something has gone wrong somewhere else, usually an intelligence or diplomatic failure.
Instead of concentrating on creating capabilities for increasingly unlikely scenarios we should be shifting resources to a greater engagement with regional partners. Because of the increasing disparity between personnel numbers and personnel affordability it is obvious that we can no longer provide the bulk of land forces for extended expeditionary campaigns and do so is wasteful of such a precious resource anyway.
The proposed Multi Role Brigade is designed to provide such an enduring force package but a Brigade scale is really too small to be operational useful in this type of operation and I suspect the structure is designed to preserve as many senior officer posts and regiments as possible, regardless of the utility.
Resources should be concentrated on intelligence, diplomacy, building regional stability, partnering, civil affairs and languages for example, in order to making best use of our strengths.
That is not to say we disarm and turn into a nation of knife wielding social workers, far from it, but it does mean a greater emphasis on certain capabilities than others.
Instead of desperately trying to have both width and depth in a full range of military capabilities a re-appraisal is desperately overdue.
The woeful SDSR which over promised and under delivered needs to be neatly placed in the round filing cabinet, with all the other rubbish.
The TD approach sits on a number of principles
Principle 1 – Stomach in tits out
The UK needs to reassert its sovereignty and rediscover its self confidence whilst recognising practical limitations.
Although I am verging onto political ground here, this would mean a full repatriation of powers from Brussels and a reaffirmation of the primacy in law making of Parliament.
Principle 2 – We love you Simon Cowell
The UK has an enormous well spring of both perceived and actual capability in the military, diplomatic, academic, cultural, overseas development, sporting and industrial domains from which to draw, all of which can contribute to security.
We need to stand back, look at what we have and start to pull them together into a coherent approach. How popular is cricket in the UK and South East Asia but do we see the security value in exploiting this common passion, no, but we should be.
When was the last time Simon Cowell was invited to National Security Council, a flippant example perhaps but UK popular culture is hugely influential and should be viewed as a key thread in our security tapestry. I am not advocating sending Simon Cowell to Libya or Afghanistan but culture is important, hold on, that might not be a bad idea. Helmand’s Got Talent, the Taleban would give up in an instant!
People look at our hubris in Iraq and say we don’t really know about COIN, the US student has become the master. But look at Northern Ireland and then look at Basrah and Helmand, we have simply not applied the lessons we so painfully learned in Belfast and Londonderry to warmer and less rainy climes. Before the trendy words like comprehensive approach were even being talked about that is exactly what we did, combining military force with all the levers of state.
We suffer from stovepiped budgets and a lack of properly joined up thinking, let alone joined up doing, as the recent issue of funding for the BBC World Service or flogging off RFA Largs Bay amply demonstrate.
This principle therefore seeks to coordinate these disparate strands.
Merging the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development and elements of the security services into a single entity would be a significant organisational challenge but it would demonstrate intent, show that they are many facets of a single gem and by making them answerable to parliament, including their budget, deliver clear and unambiguous objectives to which they could all align.
Of course there will be much rustling of the Guardian and the Daily Telegraph but I simply don’t care for the has beens, wannabes and vested interests who would challenge such a merge.
The goal is to unify those three squabbling children into an effective force for the UK’s security and prosperity, generally speaking; that means other nations security and prosperity as well but we have to start being selfish.
Principle 3 – Break glass in case of fire
Regenerating capabilities from a small core is much easier than starting from scratch so as a hedge against uncertainty it would seem prudent to retain the full spectrum of capabilities, even at a relatively modest scale. This approach might not be wholly efficient in that it maintains forces and equipment for less likely contingencies but much like an insurance policy, it provides some measure of assurance.
We should therefore retain a hard central core of capabilities, in all domains but with graduating levels of readiness. There is a role for reserve forces in this approach, closely integrated with regular forces as a guardian of skills and capabilities. Reserve forces simply do not have the capacity to do this on their own and it is fallacy to think otherwise but they can play a large part in capability retention and continued development.
This principle also means the retention of a nuclear deterrent, form and function to be defined. It might have little relevance to the vast majority of operations but it serves a few of purposes, first, it is an insurance against the asteroid mentioned above, second, it infers a certain influence, third, it stops anyone indulging in a spot of nuclear blackmail and finally, it contributes to technology independence.
There are many arguments for and against nuclear weapons but the one that matters isn’t logical, it’s an emotional one.
Emotion trumps logic every day of the week and twice on Sunday.
The deterrent should stay.
Principle 4 – No man is an Island, not even an island
This means alliances, special relationships and partnerships.
NATO, the Commonwealth, Five Powers, European partnerships, the United Nations and numerous bilateral arrangements must all play their part, the more the merrier, there is nothing wrong with having lots of mates.
Our security capabilities must not only serve the UK’s interests but the collective interests of our international and regional partners, we must become a better neighbour but also recognise that our contribution to collective security must still be effective and worthwhile.
In capability terms, this would mean developing out from the central core a number of ‘capability plus’ functions that deliver a powerful contribution to multinational coalitions in response to collective security threats. This does not mean fooling ourselves that we can do everything or be a mini me USA and some of our existing capabilities would be scaled back into the core, but it would make sense to build on areas that we are already strong in.
Instead of the current situation, where we have the illusion of being a full spectrum military power but scratch the surface and you see a different story, the fur coat and no knickers illusion, we would clearly state that we are no longer such a power but in these certain areas, we are better than most. In other words, for capability x or y, the UK becomes the go to partner, in yet more words, useful, or in other other words, not a burden that the USA have along so as not to upset us.
When we talk about regional engagement and developing regional security we must actually mean it, put the resources behind it and keep on going. It will be difficult and there will be setbacks but it is the only approach that is feasible in the long term.
The classic inkspot theory is sound, but all the spots do not need to be wholly filled with British ink. This is where engagement with regional partners is important, instead of the ‘kick the doors down and engage reverse gear’ notion of strategic raiding, leaving others to shoulder 100% of the aftermath of our explosive entry, engaging with partners on an enduring basis means our limited resources are used to maximum effect.
Instead of providing the bulk of the manpower for stabilisation operations we can still provide elements of the theatre entry force (if that is needed) and stay engaged for the medium to long term, sharing the burden with others rather than abandoning them which will result in zero long term security benefit.
Principle 4 – Change you can believe in!
There is a fundamental disconnect between the illusion of ‘no strategic shrinkage’ and the impact of the SDSR, or David Cameron maintaining that we are a full spectrum military power right after the service chiefs have unanimously said we aren’t.
We need a strategic review of defence and security that has some credibility, one that actually takes those much heralded tough decisions instead of the weak kneed approach taken by every single review of recent times.
If we cast our minds back to the Haldane, Childers or Cardwell and Esher reforms these had credibility, whatever the outcome. They recognised there was a problem, had no truck with the happy clappy self delusion of the service chiefs or politicians and set about making effective changes with gusto. Crucially, these reports and reforms were not headed by insiders.
This is what we need, desperately.
Turkey’s don’t vote for Christmas the very last group of people we should be inviting to the reform campfire is those on the inside already.
Defence reviews have an unhappy past and certain familiar ring;
1981 (The Nott Review)
We have a choice. Either we can continue to pretend that there is no problem, that we can wish away the threat or imagine that the United Kingdom can somehow sustain, replace and enhance its operational effectiveness without a fresh look at how we perform our tasks. I see my task as a simple one, and no amount of special pleading from one part of our defence establishment or another will divert me from it. It is to form a defence view—not a single Service view—of how we can conduct our tasks within the Alliance in the defence of freedom and democracy.
1998 (George Robertson)
The Review is radical, reflecting a changing world, in which the confrontation of the Cold War has been replaced by a complex mixture of uncertainty and instability. These problems pose a real threat to our security, whether in the Balkans, the Middle East or in some troubles pot yet to ignite.
2010 (Dr Liam Fox)
It will be a chance to have a clean break from the legacy and mindset of the Cold War and should be viewed as an opportunity for fresh thinking and change. Make no mistake; we need a step change not tinkering.
The grudging, finger nail scraping road to Future Force 2020 has been a slow but steady one, each time this decline is covered by a smokescreen of strategic thinking but it doesn’t fool anyone. The service chiefs refuse to give up on their parochial interests and vanity projects, vested industrial interests continue their vice like grip on budgets and successive governments have laboured under champagne tastes for foreign interventions and international grandstanding on a brown ale budget.
Nothing significant or radical ever actually happens; gold plated equipment cock ups and over stretched and under resourced forces being asked to do ever more.
Adaptable Britain is a piss poor joke, dreamt up by people who should really know better but don’t.
It maintains the fur coat, but throws the knickers out of the window, as soon as we have to do a spot of flashing; our exposed and unimpressive fanny is there for all to see.
There is a delusional fallacy that strategy should only be shaped by threats/objectives and not resources; this is usually mentioned by politicians on the eve of yet another review that reduces defence spending.
Here is what Dr Fox said on the eve of SDSR
Now, we could start with the money. And lots of Defence Reviews, since the war, have started with the size of the pot, then you see what you can buy from it. The trouble with that is that you end up with unintended consequences in foreign policy
Strategy should always be about resources, as the good doctor now knows only too well.
This is the point where I introduce, yet again, my favourite act of my favourite film.
The service chiefs are the fat kid and the treasury is Santa.
Even now, the MoD is banking on jam tomorrow, wishing for more in the 2015 review, if I were a betting man I would wager the MoD’s hand is going to be full of brown stuff and not folding stuff.
The MoD has to achieve some measure of financial credibility but equally, the politicians have to allow it to do so, so that means a credible, joined up review that faces up to reality.
A new review must look at the wider picture, clearly define roles and requirements and if sacred cows need to be culled, burned and buried, then let’s get at it.
For once in modern history, the forces need a credible defence review that has an equally credible financial underpinning.
Did I say it needs to be credible?
Summary
Start with a hard-nosed and realistic assessment of resources, threats and opportunities, realise the only thing important is the national interest and that advancing it is difficult.
Be pragmatic about partnerships but understand they are essential.
Wise up about being a full spectrum military power at scale.
Harness our considerable soft power resource; actually join up the dots rather than just talking about it.
Merge the MoD, FCO and DFiD
Maintain a core set of full spectrum military capabilities at varying readiness levels as a strategic hedge and to enable the UK to mount a small scale expeditionary operation with limited goals without assistance.
Surround the core with two sets of additional ‘capability plus’ areas.
The first would be an extensive mentoring, defence diplomacy, training and assistance force that can work with regional partners to help them to build their own security, provide intelligence and opportunities for early intervention. This would integrate with a wider national capability set that includes and integrates diplomatic, developmental assistance, disaster relief, academia, culture, sport and industry that is focussed on national interests.
The second would be a selected number of enhanced contributory capabilities that allow us to function as an effective and influential partner in coalition operations. The composition and nature of these would be open for debate but the goal is to become the ‘go to guy’ for capability x or y
Have a credible and radical review, reorganise and implement it without mercy or influence from vested interests.
Put the kettle on.
I’m all for concentrating on a few core areas that we should excel at, and be attractive to partners because of it.
How about Britain reverts to being a world naval power bringing capabilities to the table that only the US could? We don’t have the manpower to do extended land warfare, and we certainly don’t do it better than everyone else.
We protect our sea lanes and our territory in the process. Might sound a bit naval centric! Scratch that then.
But why not a naval centric future? You say ‘big ticket’ weaponry doesn’t deter, then i’d have to ask what does the British army bring to the table that would which would justify concentrating our resources on it?
Very thoughtful piece btw.
If we plan for a desert war, we will end up fighting in the mountains. Nott wanted to slash the fleet , but ended up sending pretty much the whole RN to the Falklands.
I think we should keep a bare minimum “Falklands” capability, as it allows us to fight & prevail anywhere within 8000 miles.
We do not need to leave the EU. Just be like France, at the heart, but ignore any EU rules you do not like. While Thatcher, Major, Blair, Brown , Cameron all talked tough, but then caved in to the EU. In all that time, the French have not budged a millimetre on the common agricultural policy.
We need politicians with real world experience, who put Britain first & take a long term view.
Can I just say that “Bad Santa” is a great film.
That said, Simon Cowell? Seriously?
Despite by heart felt defence of the RAF I am actually quite a pro-navy person. I think the ability to lob Tomahawks from on and under the sea may not be a great deterrent, but it is a handy tool to have.
I’m just not confident at all in the principle of “We’ll be working with the Americans” etc. Listen to Obama this week. He’s turning the US to the East (their west) and looking to China, India and the Pacific rim. If Britain was to get caught up in some small war over Zimbabwe for example, then you can forget any notion that the US is going to help. Even France probably wouldn’t.
I do like the general concept of forward deployed units and using every resource we have, at every level, to influence the world around us. I wonder how much it would have otherwise cost us to buy the influence that we’ve gained over the years through SAS units training bodyguards abroad?
Now if we could just fit out a pair of “Disaster Relief” 747′s, with surgery and all that for a bit of rapid aid delivery, and I’d be happy.
Till I find something to moan about of course.
If a politician said that – I’d vote for them. I don’t entirely agree with you about Strategic Raiding but you are sticking to a coherent strategy and not writing any cheques you can’t cash which is an improvement on most strategic proposal which just get carried away looking for roles for the armed forces rather than recognising they have too many.
Ref. Principles 2 & 3 have potential sync with Thomas Barnett’s concept of both a Leviathan force (aka dept of war, destroyers) and a Sys Admin (aka dept of everything else, builders) force.
I don’t subscribe to the idea of two actual forces (too American like the -old- US army of infantry only doing combat, leaving MPs/Civil Affairs/SF do the nation building stuff) but it’s a useful view of the different problems/skills and the importance of inter-agency personnel in the latter.
Excellent (detailed and funny) briefing at TED 2008
“Gunboat diplomacy on steroids, which is what it is, is strategic thinking devoid of any analysis of the aftermath.”
I don’t think you intend to this, but the problem with a maritime startegy is that it is seen as an absolute.
5 multirole brigades + 2 rapid reaction brigades with thatre entry/support assrets pretty much IS strategic raiding.
the ability to engage in limited/punitive intervention does not negate the requirement for persistant effect.
HMMMM..
Bit of curates egg this one.
All for: -
1)Merging FO MOD DIS etc
2)Forward presence squadrons
3)Stop trying to be moral policeman concentrate on british interrests.
4)Deploying Simon Cowell (the further away the better)
5)Stop sucking up to US
6)Got to cut coat according to cloth.
However
Not convinced by: -
1)Dropping strategic raiding idea. I suppose this depends on your definition of a ‘Raid’ A full on visit by RM and paras and our proposed mobile square brigade, would be enough to knock the stuffing out most countries we would ever go to war against on our own. I made joking ref to us stomping Libya on another thread. We could do that. (If the spirit was willing).
That’s without getting into targeted raids by ‘Them’
2) We get nowhere (literally and actually) in strategic terms without maritime mobility and reach.
I am not dark blue by design or history; (in fact there are dead proto Ixions buried all over the world who died wearing red and later green, in attempts to keep it properly run, (By the british)! But unless we want to stick to be able to invading Belgium (why), and France (oh yes please) We need a navy and a big one with big long range ships, able travel 10,000 miles and fight at the end of it. AND TO CARRY AN ARMY WITH THEM.
3) The big bugbear’ is the idea of having a ‘pocket full range capability’ kept inefficiently in penny packets, to be expanded by necessary (you talk of the MOD still playing the old ‘If we hang on long enough we will get the money for our toys’ game). Are we not being guilty of this..? Will our penny packets really keep us in the game, or by the time we need to expand them will they be out of date technically and tactically?
That I believe is a strategic mistake. As it reduces the forces we will have that are deployable usable, and recognised by such by the world (real hard power).
Cant wait for full on posts re Army
So much I agree with, and yet so much weirdness that I do not; stemming mostly I think from your Glass Half Full view of UK PLC compared to my Glass Half Empty, but then I guess that is why I live in Canada, and you still live in the UK
Perhaps strategic raiding is so popular because raiding as a word suggests the use of military force, and not nation building ?
Unfortunately I believe all you suggest, indeed the re-orientation of UK foreign, policy and any UK ‘grand strategy’ would require a rather more complex re-orientation of the whole of UK politics and because I am the pessimist to your eternal optimism, I just don’t see any UK politicians currently cable of thinking past their next birthday
That is one of the most impressive, organised and furious response’s that i’ve ever read.
I can see people sititng there thinking, Simon Cowell, you havin a laugh?
In terms of Soft Power(tm), if people get to know us better get to like us then they are less likely to want to war on us or view us with suspicion/anger/hatred, no matter what their Government/Despot tries to tells them.
What are the chances of Britain going to war v The Netherlands, Sweden or America?
However just for the people we have a serious problem with, you keep a real hard core that’s mean and nasty.
I was at this point going to do a 180 on some things i have a tendency to get vocal about, however….i have a request/suggestion instead if people don’t mind….
List what you think we are really good at and only those things. Not things that we could get good at with some practice or shiney new equipment…..please?
I am busy scribbling my own list. Which will be short as i don’t know much
TD, really exceptional.
Just had a thought
Now i realise why you are so keen on the F-35B, if need it could go far inland to rough strips and then do very targeted strikes with minimal weapons?
F-35C will make such a thing very difficult.
@ Wstr
I’ve seen that talk before, excellent stuff.
I’m of the view that our strategy should revolve around;
1) Influence,
2) Power projection,
3) Clean up, which transitions into 1 again.
So the ability to exert political and other means abroad, to prevent trouble in the first place.
Then the ability to kick down doors afterwards.
Then the ability to swarm troops and (hopefully) allies in after that to secure the enemy territory.
My Good At List.
1. Peacekeeping.
2. Short interventions with complex ROE’s.
3. Small scale invasions.
4. Destroying armoured/mechanised forces.
5. Mine hunting.
6. ASW.
7. Anti-Air surface warfare.
8. Small scale long term CAS.
9. ISTAR.
10. Airbourne logistics/support.
11. Long range, space based, secure communications.
12. Seabourne replenishment/movement.
I can’t think of anything else that we do really well. The reason that i asked this question is cause i’m having traitorous thoughts re: The Navy.
I think we should start by looking at what we absolutely have to first and then what of that can be offered to a coalition. Protection and security of the uk and our dependant
territories comes first and what is required to do that.
We do have to continue to support our treaty obligations I mean many countries around the world answered the call from the UK in our darkest hours in WW2 when they didnt have to or were really threatened (im thinking mainly of commonwealth countries) should we now not contribute the other way because we financially find it a bit tough. Our energy security is a big concern and the possibility for conflict in the artic is slowly increasing which could impact the UK.
NI is not all that comparable to iraq or helmand we were not invading another country and the majority supported what the military were doing within NI. You can however draw several parallels.
In areas of hostility the army where initially accepted but only for a short time before they became the problem (rightly or wrongly) so yes long term coin is pointless. Second it showed the need for helicopters light medium and big. There was also IEDs in NI and we didnt start driving round in tanks better intelligence and air movements in and out of FOBs were the routine.
Its often said the price of peace is eternal vigilance and this is were I like TD fwd presence squadrons and indeed RAF long range ISTAR assets. We do need to take a look at what we and europe want to do when the US isn’t interested and at what scale that should be at. why should the american tax payer pay for UK security?. The initial high end assets are important and maybe france and uk needs to hold them more than most and that does cost. I do like I think it was gareths humanitarian and disaster relief force Idea and should be a area of interest. I think the FCO and MOD should be kept seperate its hard for the same organisation to play gd cop bad cop in tense situations but I just dont really know what dfid does that ambassadors or military logistics lift cant.
Our strategic priorities should also determine what forces are held in the regulars and the reserves there is no reason why the reserves should not be better utilised than they are now.
With all respect, the forwards presence is a nice concept but… does not really get that far away in real life.
Other than basing a OPV in the Caribbean, along with 2 or three marittime patrol aircrafts for anti-drug smuggling and enduring presence,
Deploying another long-range OPV in Bahrain along with the 4 minesweepers the RN keeps there regularly, and some marittime patrol aircrafts there, too, in order to help with Gulf control and counter-piracy,
I cannot think of anywhere else where the UK could obtain any effect by forward basing.
Unless “forward basing” means entering Somalia, suffocate the fighting there, clean the coastline and destroy all pirate boats and safe havens and build FOBs all along the coast to put an end to piracy, and guarding the country with force as the UN and international community as a whole re-try, once more, to build something in that sad angle of world.
But this is a lot more ambitious a kind of operation.
Also, a little less pointless carrier-bashing i think wouldn’t hurt.
Recognizing that the Navy is the only force that forward bases each and every day with its Standing Tasks would also be a good start. As it would be recognizing that, to go anywhere, it’ll take ships to bring the stuff and people in.
Good luck doing it by air!
Great article, and a cracking read. The vast majority of which I agree with.
However, I have concerns with the forward basing of units (naval or otherwise). Mainly that it could see Britain slip back to a 1930′s styled military, where it exists primarily for standing tasks and overseas garrisons, and has very little slack for anything else. Essentially over-egging our influence puddings, while having a negative effect on the basic war-fighting capability of services.
Sadly, most of the innovative thinking taking place on the blog and various others across the internet will fall foul of personal empires and service-centric thinking. Part of me hopes for Stalinistic purge; perhaps not executions, just sacking and taking away the pension (they’ll earn enough working for Wastelands anyway).
@ Gabby
It could be argued that the army, RAF, and RN can only deploy because the USN allows them.
For what it is worth I think there are 4 basic questions you have to be able to answer before you get anywhere near deciding what capabilties you might need.
1. What MUST I do. These are the inescapable commitments that any Government must meet through its armed forces – Homeland Defence perhaps? Defence of our overseas territories maybe?
2. What do I WISH to do on my own? These are the discretionary tasks that we will probably have to complete, but are unlikely to gain external support for. Again defence of our overseas territories might fall here? NEO? National security or law enforcement at range? These tasks might be driven by need, pride or vanity.
3. How do I gain influence in an alliance? What are the things I have or can do that will gain sufficient influence to get other countries to do the things I want to do, but cannot manage on my own. Is it skilled diplomats (soft power), the quality of my 2 star deployable HQ, or the fact I have sufficiently well equiped armed forces to stand on the day 1 start line?
4. Do I want to lead in an alliance? A slightly different tack, but command of an alliance operation brings with it a bill for a particular capability set, heavy on C2, strat comms and ISTAR, not to mention an associated officer star count.
These questions are broad, but they do present a framework to force an examination of what it is the armed forces are expected to achieve. That is only the start because the implications of those answers will drive the demand for military capabilities and therefore the size shape and type of the future forces.
welcome to TD Bob, don’t you like my Simon Cowell idea then
@TD
Why Africa?
I’m asking cause i’ve re-read it and you haven’t actually said why?
Are you thinking about trade?
Or are you thinking about that big DiFD future report?
Oh and when i said “That is one of the most impressive, organised and furious response’s that i’ve ever read.”, i mean’t as a reaction to the lack of strategy in the SDSR!
@Jan Guest.
I agree very much with what you said, i just wish i could put it that way too
@BertrumPantyshield
Hi, aren’t we having a “negative effect on the basic war-fighting capability of services” anyway, with all the salami slicing and promises of money that never appear while increasing the commitments?
@ TD. Sorry SC and the grim genre he represents makes my skin crawl! Though I agree with Ixion (9.10), the further the better.
I am afraid that I cannot ignore the fact that we are an island when considering the UK’s interests and strategy. 90% of our trade by volume is transported by sea and that flow might be disrupted by regional instability, crime, terrorism or whatever. Are we really certain that in this instance we will wring our hands, shrug our shoulders and just let whoever it might be sort it out? Are you certain that you want no part in the solution and therefore no right to influence or determine what it might be? I’m sorry, its probably a personal bias, but I don’t buy that.
In some shape or form the UK will still want to be able to act in its perceived interests overseas. That means you need military capability that can meet that need, in 2 forms. Firstly on an enduring basis as a standing commitment to demonstrate our continued regional interest; a smaller unit or formation but with a persistent forward presence. Secondly a larger more robust capability able to deal with contingencies either alone, for small problems or in partnership for bigger ones.
So the small stuff; a ship? A British Military Training Team? A flight detatchment? Deployments targeted for influence and understanding.
Your bigger stuff; An Amphibious Task Group? 70-100km reach inland, sustainable and protected. Or perhaps with more warning time a multi role brigade? Heavier, greater resiliance and more robust capabilities. But slower to deploy, recover and much more cost. (I am assuming appropriate embedded Air).
Is this strategic raiding? No I just think it is strategic reality, but the size and scale of the solution space (and £) will drive the degree of capability we need (or can afford), whether basic (escort, lt infantry or ‘simple’ aircraft, or more exquisite; Carrier Strike, MRBs, Typhoon, F35.
@Chris B
Three good major strategy phases there, accepting that they need not always be undertaken in sequence:
3 only – Major disaster relief with need to rebuild host country institutions. If successful feeding back into 1 as you rightly suggest.
1,3 (skipping 2) – Rarer ops of the type in East Timor as I’m putting countering criminal gangs under 3
In terms or organising the expanding or rounding out of people, process & equipment to meet the non-warfighting aspects of that strategy or TD principles; four immediate approaches spring to mind:
[1] Military Makes Do Alone – gets by each time, using their extant people to rapidly learn new skills/equip as required by the current situation and campaign phase, with or without supplemental funding (e.g. early days in Iraq post-conflict)
[2] Org Status Quo – Skills remain stove-piped in separate teams from other govt depts & private coys, but within a joint liaison structure (e.g. Military and DFID boundaries as per now, but hopefully better coordinated!)
[3] Temporary Hybrid – Military temporally absorbs new people, with accompanying skills/equip/remit into their overall structure (e.g. wider scope variant of non-reservist civilians manning US Human Terrain Teams)
[4] Permanent Hybrid – Military absorbs new remit in law with matching budget (e.g. wider scope variant of US Coastguard’s parallel defence & law enforcement responsibilities)
Resources, resources, resources! Until these meet our aspirations we are going to keep going around in circles at best or in a downward spiral at worst.
2015 needs to start with a clean sheet of paper. The NSS needs to provide a clear picture of what threat are reasonable and likely and what the UK’s position and policy should be towards them. This is where the Treasury should have input as it is here our aspirations are laid out. The SDSR should be based on the need to meet these aspirations and resources should be available to meet this need, be it soft, hard or fetish.
@ Wstr
I think I would include controlling criminal gangs as 1 & 3. Now here’s a slightly more detailed plan, but still certainly not exhaustive
1) Influence;
– The continuous at sea deterrent
– Helping counter-narcotic, counter-pircay ops,
– Training foreign bodyguards,
– Training foreign counter terrorism units,
– Training foreign special forces,
– Training foreign police and specialist units (with our own plods)
– Training foreign medical personnel here,
– The use of hospital ships and flying hospitals http://mercyairlift.org/flyinghospital/mission_op.html to conduct “Medical diplomacy” perhaps with RAF/RN/Army medics manning the crews.
– Making use of military engineers to help practically and with teaching on small projects in other countries,
– DfID abolished, funds cover the two suggestions above,
– Use of the foreign office to introduce British companies to high level foreign officials,
2) Power projection;
– A larger Astute-submarine force, who routinely carry cruise missiles as 50-75% of their warload,
– Scrap T26 and go with a Type 45 MK 2, which keeps the hangar but does away with the main gun in favour of an extended missile bay for cruise missiles,
– The full run of projected T26 would not be fully replaced, leaving a bit of cash for a few small extra LPH,
– Carriers!!!
– Our forces would be designed to work together to provide a serious Day 1 door kicking ability. Paras, Marines, lots of missiles and bombs, a full on attack designed to crush the oppositions military. Target selection would be quite liberal.
– Army goes in, finishes off what is left. The whole force is built for Early days door kicking (tanks, artillery, warrior etc)
3)
– War ends, door kickers hang around for six months.
– Importantly, we have a large number of TA guys, as many as we can get our grubby hands on, who join the door kickers for the six month clean up,
– We also try to bring in international partners. The deal is “We take the risk/expense to kick the door in and shoot anything hostile, then you help us guard the police tape afterwards for six months”.
– Immediately we secure anything that might be remotely dangerous. We get inbetween hostile religious factions etc and we take zero shit from day one of clean up.
– We swiftly move to build a legit interim government. It might be a puppet job but fuck it. We make sure every faction has a seat at the table, even if we make sure the best seats are given to the people we like.
– We bring the full weight of our medical and engineering prowess to bear with the locals, concentrating on certain regional centres,
– We also bring in police training experts into these areas and start training a local force,
– The regional centre’s don’t have to be cities per say, just places where we have absolute control over in goings and out goings, safe havens,
– Eventually door kickers leave. TA takes over for a bit.
– Eventually TA will leave, but engineering, medical, policing and other training aspects will stay, along with a a fresh battalion or so of door kickers rotated in to be the muscle,
– Eventually we try to transition from Clean up back into satge one, influence.
How’s about that then gents?
TD old chap, can you please explain the crack smoking lunacy that would be the uber ministry born of a un-holy union between MoD, FCO and DfID ? Surely it would be a beauracratic nightmare of NHS proportions, and even more massively inefficient because of it?
It has nothing to do with the topic(s); but the 3 Nimrod sqns at RAF Kinloss disband today it seems. 42, 120 & 201, and I did a tour on each of them. Nine years in total! And they didn’t invite me……….
A very interesting and thought-provoking article, TD. I agree with much of it and, as a whole, it shows vastly more logical thinking than anything which any government seems able to come up with.
Needless to say it has sparked some responses in my mind!
To start with, I posted this on another thread a month or so ago but I think it bears repeating here:
“Regarding the cut-back in numbers affecting all of the services, it’s interesting to consider the long-term implications.
This down-sizing could be regarded as a belated recognition of the post-Cold War changes which mean that we have, for the present at least, no real threat to our nation.
In fact, the biggest real threat comes from the international money markets which can bankrupt a country if they feel like it.
Even if we find ourselves in conflict with another country, the most likely form of attack is via cyber warfare, which can bring down a lot of our infrastructure and cause all sorts of chaos. (Similar to what we would suffer from a giant-sized Coronal Mass Ejection strike like the 19th-century Carrington Event – also a real possibility which could and should be protected against.)
In the longer term, climate change is another serious threat – not just directly, but indirectly in the possible displacement of huge populations from newly uninhabitable areas to more favoured places (which may include the UK).
Conflict with extremist terrorist groups is of course ongoing and likely to remain so, but conventional defence forces are pretty useless in dealing with that. In fact, using them to try to solve the problem may even have a negative effect – our lamented involvement in Iraq and now Afghanistan almost certainly increased the risk of home-grown terrorism and IMO has basically been counter-productive. I fear that Libya may turn out the same way, if we can’t get rid of Ghaddafi.
So what do we really need armed forces for? Arguably, nothing very much at the moment. Some defences are needed for the Falklands to stop the Argentinians getting ideas, but where else is there a direct threat which requires military power to counter it?
The problem, of course, is that this relatively benign situation may change. In fact, it almost certainly will change, the key unknowns being when – and in what way. Assumptions (i.e. wild guesses) about these two unknowns are all we have to go on in determining what kind of defences (in the broadest sense) we need, and what part the armed forces can play in this.”
I agree entirely that we should be focusing on maintaining and enhancing our influence for good in the world. In this context, the cutting back of the BBC World Service is crazy – we should be expanding it, to become the “go to” service for anyone anywhere wanting to know the truth about what is going on – in their own language.
I agree entirely with merging our foreign policy and international development activities, but while certain aspects of defence policy should also be closely linked to these, there are others which are rather less so.
I also agree (as I posted on other thread recently) that we should keep a small core of high-end capabilities up to date in various military fields, in case we have a need for them later, even if we don’t need them now.
One important aspect of enhancing our influence, IMO, is to be more independent of the USA in terms of the actions we take (Iraq and Afghanistan have badly damaged us throughout the Muslim world) and to be less inclined to send the armed forces into foreign countries at the smallest pretext.
We should be able to defend our genuine national interests – which implies flexibility in policy, military structures and equipment as these interests evolve in a rapidly-changing world.
One more detailed point which I think is important is being able to help poorer countries in trouble from natural disasters or other catastrophes, which means that some of our capabilities and equipment need to be dual-role, being useful in disaster relief, evacuations etc. That means flat-tops with helos, patrol ships with lots of spare accommodation and feeding/medical facilities, even ships able to use their power plants to provide an emergency electricity supply in a port.
Basically, people in other countries should be pleased to see us when we turn up, and respect our capabilities without being afraid of what we might do next!
@ Michael (Civ.) 25/05/2011 23:53
Indeed we have cut capabilities over the years, but yet our strategies still maintain that we need large numbers of units for standing tasks and garrisons, and now forward presence.
While there needs to be a proper balance between £1100 million destroyers and £100 million frigates, I fear we will end up with a two-tier fudge, likely unable to carry out either task. Why we couldn’t have gone for £500 million destroyers and frigates is beyond me; someone in Whitehall probably wanted a nice model on his desk.
——————————
One thing that goes unmentioned in the article is how we can use defence exports. The current marketing of the Type 26/GCS is a good example of how we can curry influence. Indeed, if Britain became a European alternative to the US as an arms dealer (if the British public can stomach it) it could give us a valuable place on the world stage. More importantly, to HM Treasury, it would mean extra money in the coffers.
“Sorry, yet more delusion, did Sadam decide not to bother invading Kuwait because of the USN in the Gulf, did Slobodan change course once the carriers were in the Adriatic, did the West Side Boys give up their hostages in Sierra Leone because we had Sea Harrier, did Mohamed Aidid give up when faced with overwhelming force sitting offshore, did the Taleban decide to give up Osama because of the F18?”
I’m sure we’ve been here before, but here goes.
Sadam simply didnt believe the US had the will to fight him, I doubt even he was deluded enough to believe he could actualy win, he simply didnt believe he would have to fight.
Slobodans people were being wiped out in a genocide. There was a large scale organ harvesting operation going on FFS.
Stand there quietly whilst I cut your child open and taken his heart, liver and kidneys, or I’ll bomb you….
Nar, that wouldnt have worked on me either.
Aided wasnt faced with overwhelming power off shore.
Oh sure, there were lots of big ticket items, but there were also rules of engagement that said he could wave to the americans as he flayed children alive.
An AC130 flying overhead could have wiped out the top tier of the various clans in an afternoon, and done it every day until some more pliable heads came to power.
Much the same goes for the Taliban, they simply didnt believe the US would invade and occupy the country.
“The whole ‘we are an island’ argument is anachronistic and assumes that the UK is any more vulnerable to disruptions in the free flow of goods and raw materials than any other European nation. Is Holland more vulnerable to disruptions to the Suez Canal than we are, is France any more dependent on Middle East oil than we are?”
We are no more vulnerable than France, and considerably less vulnerable than China. Chinas military spending is geared to driving the US East of Hawaii and West of Africa. The US plan for dealing with China is to blockade it.
We are deeply vulnerable to a blockade, to believe otherwise is madness. Even if most others are equaly vulnerable.
“we launch from afar, kill the bad guys in a hail of effects based trickery, who will have conveniently decided to pit their weakness against our strengths, build a couple of schools in compensation for explosively destroying their country and be home in time for tea and medals. The aftermath, thats for others, we can crack on with shining our carriers and let others do the hard yards of building security.”
Pretty much, but not quite.
In my view, the enemy force isnt relevent. I dont want your dirt.
I know its an unlikely example, but lets say Argentina reinvades the Falklands.
Cameron goes on TV, says he knows this is not the actions of the Argentine People, it is the actions of a tyranical dictator.
We then kill said Tyranical Dictator and anyone stupid enough to stand in the way. David goes back on TV, announces the formation of the Argentine Provisional government and accepts its surrender, with a modest settlement in our favour.
If then Argentine Provisional Government refuses this honourable surrender, then obviously, the war had the support of the populace, they are responsible for the war, and we slaughter them, sell the survivors into slavery and salt the earth as we leave. Again, I dont want your dirt, fell free to hide in caves planting IEDs for generations to come, British Squaddies wont be there.
“Not sure the real world bad guys will be so obliging or predictable.”
Not sure they have a choice in the matter…
“Strategic Raiding is the latest in a long list of military fashions and allows the service chiefs to keep their big ticket items; the answer is Typhoon, FRES and CVF, now, about that question.”
See, I’m not so sure about that, since I’d scrap one, probably scrap another, and would scrap the third if we hadnt already brought it into service.
“Instead of concentrating on creating capabilities for increasingly unlikely scenarios we should be shifting resources to a greater engagement with regional partners.”
Which I see as a very important part of Strategic Raiding.
We need to build a network of local, reliable, allies, scattered around the world. They look after our interests in the area on a day to day basis, and if our interests our attacked, support our raider fleet when it turns up to ruin someones day. In return, they get unrestricted access to the armoury, at Cost + Profit (IE, without Tax) and if anyone attacks them, our raider fleet turns up to ruin someones day.
But, it requires hard nosed reality.
We have to say, “if you start a fight with us, we will kill you personaly, we will kill your wife(s?), your children, your parents, your brothers, your sisters, your fish. We will destroy your homes, your cars, your yachts, your swimming pools ect ect ect.
We have to mean it
We have to be believed when we say it
And, if pushed, we actualy have to carry it out.
Now, I cant speak as a soldier, I’m not one, but I sure as **** can speak as a politician, and even if the night before, I was the firebrand pushing for war, you can bet your bottom dollar if my boss was blown apart by cruise missile overnight, and I was next in the target, I’d be denouncing his warmongering, thanking the British for their generous terms and surrendering.
@ Mike (Civ) re Africa
Mineral resources and land, lots and lots of land for food and commodity crops.
I agree in principle that a balance of air/sea/land power is required based around a core of high end capability. Our armed forces should be in a position to regenerate quickly; in my view however as long as there is a core capability training new troops for example is much quicker than building a new aircraft carrier. Also it is quicker to build a tank than a destroyer. Therefore, our peacetime armed forces will and should look out of balance with what we would expect fighting WW3.
What are the UK strategic objectives? These I think cam be summed up in three points (in priority order)
- defence of the UK, our dependencies and our economic / natural resources.
- conflict prevention outside of, but would have an impact of the above.
- in partnership with others, promote world security and quality of life.
The fact that the UK is an island and our dependencies are either islands or next to water is inescapable. Also, most of our natural resources are under the sea. Also, the ability to move without restriction and provide worldwide sustainable presence without occupation or comprise through land basing can only be achieved by the sea.
This is why I believe a strong Navy has to be the UK’s #1 priority, however this does not mean scrapping the army and RAF. I am not bought into the Strategic Raiding doctrine, but can see it’s place when required. Our aim should be to have a light touch global presence without the feel of old colonial days. It should be as much about humanitarian relief as destroying Iranian nuclear weapon plants. We should have multiple sizes of sticks to meet the requirement.
For me this means for the RN we should scrap the T26 and buy a second batch of T45s. We should have both carriers and SSNs. We should also have a large number of light frigates which have just enough to defend themselves for reasonable threats but can be upgraded if need be. It also means we should look at the JSS as a replacement for the now defunct MARS programme.
For the RAF this means we need a maritime patrol aircraft urgently. Enough typhoons to patrol our airspace and enough F35s to support limited offensive operations. Also, transport aircraft to allow for resupply and the movement of a brigade sized battle group.
For the army / RM this means fewer heavy weapons and increased agility. The core should be the RM commandos, the 16 airbourne brigade and another new medium weight rapid reaction force which can be deployed by air or sea. The rest should be a much tighter mixture of full time and reserve forces (ratio of 2:1) focused on homeland defence and UN/NATO commitments.
For me, a cross between Libya and Sierra Leone is the most probable future type of conflict not COIN ops or Iraq style invasions.
Finally, yes Britain is great and we are our own biggest critics, may both continue!
‘Why Africa?’ – Its going to be an engine of economic growth in the next century if it goes right and a costly mess otherwise, damaging trade through piracy and other land-based interruptions. The US does not really care as it is focused on the middle-east and Asia, particularly the China, India, Pakistan triumvirate and quite rightly so. We don’t have the scale to achieve much with nations or forces that large but in Africa we could be a genuine help particularly to smaller countries. Whilst various rulers will talk about it being neo-colonialism in fact European intervention in Africa is much more popular on the ground than it is in the Middle-East and faced with very real Chinese economic colonialism, we might look more of a genuinely friendly face. We have strong relationships through the commonwealth and much of Africa is English speaking. It also stops off a huge source of immigration at source if Africa is more stable and experiencing fast economic growth.
Couldn’t have said it better Jan
Jan and TD – you forgot we already have a heavy vested interest in Sierra Leone on the west coast, Nigeria on the east and South Africa, so we have all the corners covered !
DomJ – blimey, your living, breathing proof of the efficacy of Psyops and propaganda !
On the subject of Africa;
1) Oil – not huge, but ok.
2) Mineral resources – Huge. Some very important ones as well.
3) Farmland – The country has barely been touched by modern, advanced agriculture. Food and bio fuels await in large quantities.
4) The consumer goods boom over the next 50 years in Africa could practically fuel a manufacturing nation’s economy.
Jed
So does that mean I’m an over excited Express reader or good example of a Tyrant willing to fight to the last not me
@ Jan Guest
I like your reasoning.
TD missed that bit in the article, if he’s arguing for a major change then i think he should have included the reasons for making that change.
TD, you might want to think about adding Jan’s answer into your article.
@ Chris.B.
I like your thinking and your list, i’d add just one more thing
- A bit more independent space based ISTAR.
Add to the skynet system.
(Chris.B. have not been able to comment all afternoon)
Just one point i’d like to ask about, water!
According to the DiFD future report water will soon be more of a problem for larger parts of Africa.
@ X
Man, i’m hurt.
We talked awhile back and you said some people might call it neo-colonialism….
I had touched on focusing on Africa in the Navy series, forward presence bits and pieces, and wanted to include it in this one but didn’t want to make it too long
Its worthy of a separate post, will get cracking
tried to post earlier, whether it’s still relevant i dunno,
with regard to the last 3 posts, the 3 main countries involved in putting rwanada back on its feet in 1994 were australia,canada and the UK. Although many have said it was a token effort it has to be noted that last year Rwanada applied to join the commonwealth, they were successful and even sent athletes to last c’wealth games! So we must have some standing/friends over there
Evening All, long time lurker, first time poster. And this is the latest in a long line of thought-provoking posts which have me hooked.
I agree that the latest strategy is pretty much motherhood and apple-pie – defend the homeland, support allies, no existential threat etc etc. But I think it is fair to say that articulating a convincing alternative is very difficult. Ruthless prioritisation is pretty difficult in the real world because of the law of unintended consequences. Things which may look woolly or silly or a waste of time may turn out to be crucial later on.
If we take the broadest view of strategy as our position in the world, we have a choice – give up all pretensions of greatness, make a clean break with our history and downsize accordingly. So concentrate on territorial defence and our NATO obligations. Give up the UNSC seat and Trident, let everyone know that from now on we’ll be keeping our opinions and power to ourselves and they should just carry on regardless. We’ll still be a leading voice within the EU although we won’t expect that to amount to much internationally. So we’ll become Germany with humour.
Or, we do what we do now. We say “hang on, we’re still one of the richest countries in the world, with a massive global trade network which we are desperate to expand, and a huge expatriate population scattered to each corner. Our cultural influence is still pretty impressive thanks to our language, heritage, media industries and the BBC WS. If we’re not going to stand up for peace, security and prosperity across the world, who is? The BRICS? No thanks. Not until they start believing in the same (secular) values like rule of law that we do”.
Apologies – this is already a bit of a ramble. My conservative view is that the current strategy (i.e same as the last but with less money) may be messy, but that’s because some things defy an elegant solution. We generally try to influence the world for good, because all we really want to do is trade with the world and be free to travel and live in it without too many fears. Unfortunately, we are one of a handful of countries which want the world to be a better place and are in a position to do something about it.
That doesn’t mean we can’t do it better. I’d rather increase MOD’s budget than DFID’s (although I wouldn’t cut aid either). Being more choosy about fighting wars is a good idea. Better procurement of course. But let’s try to remain a world power for a little bit longer.
Welcome to Think Defence Nick,what do you think of my Simon Cowell as a member of the National Security Council idea then
Its great when lurkers de-cloak
Nick C
Why should we ‘try to remain a world power for a litle bit longer’?
In real terms I frankly doubt we are.
We like to think we are and it sometimes sutes others to go along with that,when looking for coalitions, or support in the UN etc It sutes us if we want to be part of coalitions like the one trying to sink Col Gadaffi.
But are we realY?
How do you define a world power, if you are talking about real weight in world affairs able to in effect unilaterally ‘pursuade’ reluctant reagonal powers to courses of action they don’t realy want to do, or disuade them from doing things we don’t like: then I have to say surely that has gone.
Brazil, Isreal Saudi Arabia south Korea etc etc would frankly tell us to ‘stick it in our ear’ if we tried to shove them about
The ability to millitarily beat up on countries with the Gross national Product of Basildon, Does not make us a world power.
I do not want to take TD’s name in vain but surely we would serve our interrests better if we concetrated on that, and actually did formally give up on trying to be ‘Team UK’ world Police Community Support officer?
We are starting to make ourselves look a bit silly.
The reluctance or inability to match the ends (£) and means is down to a growing schism between what we think we can do against that which we can afford to do. By we, I don’t just mean that our political masters don’t understand, but all of us.
The great British public still have a notion of the Armed Forces as an emergency service that is always there, ready to act when their interest is stirred and ‘something must be done’. But when it doesn’t go to plan (or we just get it wrong) then there will be hell to pay. Meanwhile, confronted with a choice between health, education, welfare or defence, you can guess where the public priority lies. Now, as strategically aware commentators we may wring our hands, but I am afraid that this is just reality as it has been, and is being played out every day. So, when they equivocate over defence spending, all our politicians are doing is reflecting public opinion . In fact you might view our current situation as a political success story – we are still delivering our main effort, nearly all of the other existing tasks and a new major operation, with less kit, fewer people and for less cost.
But where does this leave strategy? Well if the grand straegy is to restore a robust economy, then the military lever of national power can only support that end. It drives a focus for operations that will either protect or enhace our economic prosperity. Anything else is discretionary and therefore not a priority. So where do our economic interests lie? What military capabilities are needed to protect them? At the risk of repetition, do you recall the 4 questions?
1. What must I do? – Defend my homeland. UK + 200nm.
2. What do I want to do on my own? – Defend my overseas territories. (HMT would drop this like a stone, but they just can’t get away with it – yet). They are all islands – that suggests at least a degree of Amphibiosity, but could equally justify CVF
3. How do I gain influence in an alliance? – Now we are moving into intersting ground. Which alliance? NATO? – where is the economic gain? Arms, stability, shared security? EU? – better/good for the economy? Limited defence? Alienates the Commonwealth and many others too? The Commonwealth? – Too poordiversespread? Not enough economic clout? MMmmm… Maybe I just need to hedge my bets? I’ll just have to be good at everything as that’s what they would expect anyway. At present, most of what we do in Afhg sustains our straegic alliance with the USA. How do we map to other alliances?
4. Do I want to lead in an alliance? Hell yes? Don’t you know who I am? I have the inbred superiority of a Colonial superpower – I just seem to have mislaid some of those little countries!
So, if you can close down an answer to 2 & 3 in particular, you really start to define what it is the UK armed forces must be able to do, beyond Homeland Defence. In doing so we can decide, set against strategic priorities, what capabilities are needed to meet that demand.
Sorry, its a ramble – still finding my feet…
Part of the problem with the whole making the world a better place is the lack of effort from our European colleagues. The EU’s GDP is far larger than that of the US but it’s combined defence budget is pitiful and ill-spent. Europe needs to get serious about military capability as a whole or back out of world power status as individuals. There is a limit to how much good can be done on 35 billion quid a year – certainly some but not open ended commitments like Iraq and Afghanistan without seriously harming vital capabilities. These have damaged our reputation rather than made the world a better place and cost us a lot of blood and treasure while we were at it. We can do good but it needs to be in a strategic and limited way – we do not have to get involved every time another western power does, particularly if that power is the US and they frankly don’t really ‘need’ our help anyway. European defence consists of us and the French co-operating in a half-arsed manner and everyone else sitting on their hands. We need a viable and achievable set of objectives rather vague assertions of making the world better. At the moment we are very much community support officer to the US’s world police. At best a helping hand in a coalition and at worst a liability unprepared for the task at hand. The capability + strategy is excellent as it means we can help where we actually have something to offer but accept this cannot be all tasks at all times. With the whole European project very shaky, this is a far more realistic strategy than anything in the SDSR.
IXION, when people mention ‘world power’ I’m pretty sure they mean more than just militarily.
(Are there any world military powers other than the US btw?)
I love Nick C’s point here…
‘Or, we do what we do now. We say “hang on, we’re still one of the richest countries in the world, with a massive global trade network which we are desperate to expand, and a huge expatriate population scattered to each corner. Our cultural influence is still pretty impressive thanks to our language, heritage, media industries and the BBC WS. If we’re not going to stand up for peace, security and prosperity across the world, who is? The BRICS? No thanks. Not until they start believing in the same (secular) values like rule of law that we do”. ‘
In other words, of course their are limits you do the absolute maximum you can to influence world events to your liking because if you don’t someone else will take your place. Be that through hard or soft power, culture or aid.
The UK is far too hard on itself. Taken as a whole, very few countries have the ability to influence anything on a global scale.
For me Global power means more than just military. We have the sixth largest economy in the world. We dominate certain financial markets. We have the power to manipulate the economies of other countries in ways that people would not even know it was us doing it.
We have the ability to truck up and do some country serious harm with our military as well.
I think people grossly under estimate just how much clout we can bring to the table, the question is about using it.
Andy
I suppose its in the defininiton of ‘Power’.
I am happy to accept (and in deed just happy), that we have influence, and are held in some regard by many parts of the world. Nick C’s point you quote is well made.
BUT I am not sure that clinging to the remnants of Imperial glory for a few more years is in any way a strategic choice. Standing up for world peace security prosperity etc is all well and good, but how do we do that?
Do we move to a UN/ reagional organisation based multi lateral combined effects, diplomatic / economic,sanctions form of influence, which I accept we can still play a part in?
OR
Do we maintain the pretence of ‘stop killing your civilians or we will come in and shoot you’ power we once had?
The former has SOME future (aided by Td’s forwrd presence deployment ideas), the later is seen increasingly by the world as UK as US Poodle at best, and at worst as windbag has-been trying to tell everyone what to do.
What is needed is a real cultural shift in UK thinking.
Recognise that shit happens that civilians will get massacred by evil governments, , they always have been and always will be, and, (and this is the difficult part) that we cannot stop them; that the world is no longer the UK’s personal plaything etc etc And just get on promoting UK PLC.
Contries like Denmark, Norway, sweden etc get on quite well without trying to sort out Zimbawie, Palestine or Barhain- so should we.
@ IXION
“Recognise that shit happens that civilians will get massacred by evil governments, , they always have been and always will be”
At the risk of sounding like a bleeding heart liberal, I very much hope you don’t mean this. We can do things, but it takes political will.
It means not getting tied down in long term jaunts like Afghan.
It means drawing together as many aircraft, ships and soldiers as you possibly can, and going in hard and fast.
We committed a very soft response in the early stages to Libya and it very nearly cost the Rebels and the people of Misrata. If our leaders had any backbone they would have rounded up every spare plane available and lead the charge properly.
I’m not an idealist. I understand that you cant change the world and you cant change human nature. But we can do some things, and we bloody well should be doing them.
It is a matter of will, and sadly our country lacks it at times.
@Jan Guest:
“At the moment we are very much community support officer to the US’s world police. At best a helping hand in a coalition and at worst a liability unprepared for the task at hand.”
Some painful truths in your post, Jan. Iraq wasn’t just a disaster from the international relations standpoint, it also appears to have been a disaster for the reputation of the British military.
Immediately after the conquest, we were so sure that we knew far better than the Americans how to handle these difficult peacekeeping operations that we were very smug about how well we were doing in Basra. Yet we finished up sitting in our defended camp outside the city while the Americans and Iraqis cleaned up the city between them.
In large part,this was due to the politicians’ failure to assign enough resources to do the job. But, judging from objective reports, it was also a failure of strategy and tactics. Put bluntly, the Americans started badly but learned their lessons and ended up being highly effective. The Brits failed to adapt and went steadily downhill, losing control of the situation.
Afghanistan doesn’t seem to be quite such an embarrassing failure, but it’s not good either. I hear that the US Army doesn’t want us involved in its operations, and has a low opinion of our capabilities.
Our Army chiefs, politicians and jingoistic press are reluctant to admit it, but have been taking on tasks that we are not capable of finishing. We do NOT want to get caught in a such situations again, which means that we have to take a cold and realistic appraisal of what we really can do, and be very careful indeed about committing forces in the future.
We have a lot to be proud of as a nation, but should look at our strengths and be focusing on using what remains of our international prestige to have a beneficial influence in the world. That means far more cultural and support activities (training foreign troops, police, politicians etc) and far less of kicking down doors.
this would mean a full repatriation of powers from Brussels and a reaffirmation of the primacy in law making of Parliament.
Wow, that came out of nowhere. Not sure what if anything that has to do with defence policy…
Merging the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Department for International Development and elements of the security services into a single entity would be a significant organisational challenge
Ah ha, I recognise my concept of the Department of Doing Stuff to Foreigners… glad to see it’s getting traction.