Some interesting comments on other blogs and in posts on Think Defence about being able to defend and/or retake the Falkland Islands from an Argentine attack and invasion.
The Falkland Islands and surrounding smaller ones are sovereign territory, we have a clear obligation and mandate to protect them from aggression. Any operation there would not be a war of choice and we must not forget that Argentina has not relinquished her claim to the Islands.
The Argentine authorities have declared that any shipping that wishes to travel between Argentina and the Falkland Islands (including South Sandwich and South Georgia) must seek permission. This is a gradual upping of the general tempo around an issue which has never been fully resolved, i.e. Argentina continues to refuse accept that the Falklands are the Falklands and not the Malvinas.
What of the claims and counter claims?
The first thing we must be very clear on is that the defence of the Falkland Islands is based on a strategy of graduated readiness and scalable response, when the threat level increases ‘things happen’
The UK maintains a very close eye on the political and security situation within South America in general and Argentina specifically so military readiness on the islands is matched to observation and analysis. It is judged that currently, there exists a relatively low but tangible threat from Argentina and maintaining an appropriate defence and deterrent force is the right strategy.
Should this change and a more belligerent government come into power that matches sabre rattling with the buying of real sabres, then calculations would change and so would force levels and capabilities.
If we look at the actual capabilities of the Argentine forces to mount a combined arms amphibious operation to retake the islands, sustain an occupation against experienced and well armed dispersed defence forces and resist an operation to retake them then again, it is quite clear that fantasy does not meet reality.
They can huff and puff all they like but the piggies are quite safe, sitting in hardened aircraft shelters and 100m below sea level thank you very much.
So lets assume that MI6, GCHQ and the combined intelligence capability of the UK, plus of course Jane’s and Shepard Defence, have completely missed a change in Argentine intentions and military capability to such a degree that the alert state on the islands remains low, no reinforcement having taken place and jogging is continuing to be carried out normally. We might also assume that intelligence and security relationships with our NATO and EU allies have also completely broken down and no product has been forthcoming from them either.
To lend credibility lets make some more Captain Fantastic assumptions, the internet has been disivented and and the thousands of expats living in Argentina, defence contractors and Argentine press are doing their very best hear no, see no, see no and type no evil.
In short, all the vast array instruments of intelligence at our disposal in a globalised and interconnected defence economy have completely failed.
For Argentina to have built up a capable force and prevented it’s discovery would be a deception on a par with that perpetrated by the allies before D Day but again, lets suspend reality for the sake of the argument and assume that they have the intention and means to do something about it, poised ready to attack, crouching tiger style.
Lots of assumptions here.
How might an attack proceed?
That of course depends on what they want to achieve, if it is a limited operation designed to make a statement, force the issue onto the worlds agenda and gain some recognition then a limited special forces attack might be chosen.
This limited special forces attack might also be a precursor to a more substantial attack designed to occupy the islands and force a negotiated settlement.
For the government of Argentina to attack the territory of another nation, however it might see things differently, would be incredibly foolhardy. They have done it once before and the prospect of the UK handing them their arses a second time around would weigh heavily on the minds of the military, national embarrassment is difficult for any nation, let alone one in South America with all that latin machismo.
The objectives would have to be very clear and capabilities well matched to those objectives.
Of course it is feasible to land a small scale special forces team on the islands, there is a long coastline, the islands are sparsely populated. If Argentina manages to bring into service a credible submarine force then yes, it would be possible, if Argentina manages to approach the islands under some sort of false flag type cover then yes, a small force is eminently possible. Who knows, perhaps there is one there now.
But, there is a world of difference between getting sand between your toes and doing anything militarily useful.
Attacking Mount Pleasant Airfield and disabling the air defence radar installations would be the obvious first task if such an operation was a precursor to a full scale invasion but how likely is it that a small team of swarthy underwater knife fighters will be able to completely destroy a large military airfield, , disable multiple radar locations, deny the widely dispersed hardened aircraft shelters, disable the 4 (ish) Typhoons that might be there or might not be (they could of course be in the air), destroy the 10,000 foot long reinforced concrete airfield at key points, get the fuel facilities to go up in smoke, navigate the worlds longest corridor and generally create all sorts of mayhem while the garrison stationed in and around MPA were enjoying a quite night in by the fire, avoiding stagging on, watching the TV or out on a penguin safari.
Once the attack starts they would also have to move about what is actually a very large place dodging the personnel who would of course not be standing to, executing pre-arranged drills and getting on top of the situation but instead be running about, Captain Mainwaring style, telling everyone not to panic.
Executing a neat shimy, Strictly Come Dancing style, our scenario also forgets that the roulement infantry company, detachment of Short Range Desert Group (Shemagh and Shades optional), Falkland Islands Defence Force, RN presence and various other capabilities basically sit on the sideline with a note from mum, excusing them anything strenuous.
The RIC will of course all have various shades of sun tan from their extensive world tour and therefore likely have ten times more actual combat experience than the forces ranged against them.
But none of this matters does it.
Filed in the ‘not relevant’ section of the scenario is the inconvenient fact that UK forces have been doing nothing for the last 30 odd years except planning for and rehearsing such an attack on MPA by Special Forces, I mean, whoever would have thought of that!
Credible so far?
If any of the Typhoons are in the air or launched within this initial attack , remembering there are more HAS than aircraft, each one could carry up to 8 air to air missiles and it is acknowledged to be one of the most potent air defence aircraft in the world.
It just does not add up to any sort of credible threat but lets assume there is another means of attack.
The Argentine Air Force wakes up one day and finds Santa Clause has delivered a fleet of fighter bombers, the support infrastructure and training necessary for an attack against one of the worlds premier air dominance fighters and slip on shoes champions 70 odd years running and decides to go for an attack. Against 4 Typhoon it could be a numbers game, probing and feints might sap the endurance but this scenario assumes that yet again, the UK has decided not to bother swinging into action with the very well planned reinforcement plan that would see multiple Typhoons tanked south along with an E3 Sentry or two.
Yet again, the whole deception by distraction idea has never once been thought of, the RAF are complete chumps (stand fast at the back) and these scenarios have never been tested, ever, once, not ever.
Meanwhile various naval vessels and an amphibious force would be on their way, UK C17 and C130 fleet would be flying South full to the brim with every high readiness unit at the UK’s disposal, all of course taking the time to plan, receive intelligence whilst inbound, slap on a fetching shade of cam cream and get busy combing their luxuriant facial hair accouterments.
In very short order we could reinforce the Falkland Islands with a serious force, on top the very serious force that already exists.
Any operation to invade the islands would therefore be an issue of timing, Argentine forces would need to destroy the ability of Mount Pleasant before the UK could reinforce it.
If Argentine forces want to use MPA for themselves then a small team of special forces would have to overwhelm the entire station and assume complete control, if they want to deny it to us, this would be a suicide mission and require a force of such capability and numbers that it would need significant means of transport, where is this coming from.
Stepping forward into our fantasy scenario, MPA has been denied to both sides so this only leaves a follow on approach by sea.
Acting on a tip off, we now know that Tom Clancy has been sacked and a dose of realism injected into the plan, the attacking force would now require amphibious assets to mount an attack either over the beach or using one of the few port facilities, Mare Harbour or Port Stanley for example. Yet again, this assumes that they have completely neutralised the Falkland Islands Defence Force and other UK forces on the island because to mount an amphibious assault (with equipment they don’t actually have) against a force armed with Javelin missiles, and organic ISTAR capabilities that leaves very few places to hide for example, would be rather risky, or suicidal depending on how you see these things.
So far so good, the Argentine forces have been able to change the political process in their country, build a credible force under the noses of the worlds intelligence and defence economy community, launch an attack against a hardened and well defended island, subdue vastly more experienced and better equipped forces and consolidate their gains with a handful of personnel, what next?
Forgetting the political and diplomatic angle, the occupying forces would have to reinforce and establish logistic support to sustain an occupation. If they have denied MPA they would have to effect repairs and/or use somewhere else and these somewhere else’s are in rather short supply.
The UK would immediately declare an exclusion zone that would extend to the Argentine coast and anything that was moving towards the Falkland Islands, naval or transport would likely find themselves bailing water in short order as the on station SSN was joined by several of her sisters, each desperate to fly the Jolly Roger when they get home. These would likely launch Tomahawk strikes against key locations such as airfields. Special forces would be flown down to join the submarines and would start infiltrating the islands or even mainland, things would really kick off then.
Assuming that sea movements became a non starter the only means of reinforcement and logistic sustainment would be by air.
I wonder how many transports would be downed by MANPADS armed Special Forces or key facilities at MPA and other locations denied by those .50cal Accuracy International Anti Material Rifles we seem to have a few of?
Things would become very difficult, very quickly, for any occupying force and that is before a task force could be assembled and sailed South. Admittedly we are in reduced circumstances at the moment but we are not that shabby either and using our newly signed Lisbon Treaty we might even expect those very nice chaps over the English Channel to wade in and go windmilling down south.
This is why our pants will never be around our ankles again, a sensible force structure against credible threats with a realistic reinforcement and deterrent plan
Much better to win the fight by not fighting than having to fight twice to regain the islands.
We should not be over confident though because over confidence and hubris leads to complacency, however, the notion that Argentina poses an imminent and credible threat might make a good novel, but is not realistic so lets not pretend otherwise.
“Much better to win the fight by not fighting than having to fight to regain the islands.”
Absolutely, but it is nevertheless true that all this pre-planning for graduated response is backed up by the ultimate insurance policy; we can always take it back off of them.
This capability to take back the Falklands is also highly complimentary with Britain’s desire to maintain rapid/limited intervention forces, so it is dual-use and not therefore as ‘expensive’ as might be imagined.
They key thing here is the poor quality of the Argentinian military and its equipment. They would need such an overwhelming force in order to succeed that we would notice there build up in advance and would be able to react.
Great post TD, this reminds me of the well reasoned line taken over on ARRSE where one poster continued to battle the ever increasingly silly ideas of how Argentina would invade – such as false flag attacks, with Argentina using cargo ships flying false flags and mounting missiles in the deck mounted cargo containers to launch a surprise attack and pilots bailing out of an old cargo plane aimed at MPA, with plane full of explosives to cripple the runway.
I think its safe to say that in order for Argentina to invade it needs to increase its defence spending from 0.65% of GDP, it needs to recapitalise its air force, buy several amphibious ships, significantly improve their ASW and spend at least one to two years training with all these forces to stand a chance of taking the islands in a way that does not result in political failure.
What interesting is the limited options they have to recapitalise their forces given their budget constraints, their aversion to Russian or Chinese equipment and their desire to have new or newly new equipment. If they were willing to buy Chinese I would imagine they could easily change the dynamics with the UK, would we be quite so relaxed if they purchased say 24 J-10B’s, plus 36 JH-17’s plus a good number of PL-9 short-range missiles and PL-12 BVR missile, along with LT-2 LGB’s plus the JH-17 is apparently also cleared for Exocet missiles (apologies for not using the export designations for the J-10 or the missiles, I could not be bothered to look them up, and I cannot find any evidence that China has incorporated the KH-29/59 on either the J-10 or the JH-17 and they seem limited to LGB/Satellite guided bombs for the most part). They have already made steps to re-capitalise their transport fleet, and they will be able to use the transports in the tanker role as well. They might need to look at expanding their maritime helicopter and SH forces, but again buying Chinese or Russian might be the answer given their budget constraints
They could then look at improving their naval capabilities – this is their greatest weakness, they need more ASW frigates, possible a couple of new submarines, and they would also need new amphibious forces. I guessing all told they would need to persuade the Chinese to sell them three to four new build Type 54A frigates, a new build Type 71 LHD, get hold of a couple of the older Type 73 medium landing ships before they could be reasonably sure of getting (as the older Chinese frigates that they are likely to sell would be no better and possibly worse than current Argentine Naval frigates). Alternative are of course older frigates being retired from the US or European navies, but again I am not sure they are any better than the what they currently have. Also the older amphibious ships being retired (excepting the Bay sold to Australia) are rubbish and have already been rejected. Of course they could go to South Korea or Singapore, the Endurances for example are full of French systems and are pretty good medium sized amphibious ships.
I’m sure we have done due diligence re MPA, but fundamentally, nothing is defended unless we can take it back if necessary. That means carriers…which we no longer have. It’s that simple.
The reason why the Falklands gets constantly raked over on sites like this is as a scenario it has nearly all the elements of an all arms war. What happens is that readers sometime mistake the hypothetical scenario for “real” propositions. Once the rat hole is entered it is hard to escape!
Argentina is no threat to the Falklands. Most Falklanders I know still dislike the nearest neighbour. And of the small number of Argentines I know they either don’t care about the issue or are blissfully ignorant of life islands, still see it as a passing romantic notion, but don’t really see how if ever the islands will be returned to them.
I think the RAF should have kept Tornado ADV down there instead of Eurofighter. 4 aircrew with 12 airframes mean there will always be a ‘plane available in theory. Tornado is bought and paid for. It would have eased the Typhoon situation a little perhaps too. Perhaps the ideal situation would have been for a Bristow like entrepreneur to step forward with PFI the support contract with Tornado maintainers about to leave the service. Experience would be kept, but leaving the RAF’s newer bods to concentrate on Typhoon.
“fundamentally, nothing is defended unless we can take it back if necessary. That means carriers…which we no longer have. It’s that simple.”
for now.
but that has more to do with keeping 10,000 troops in a faraway dusty places for the last decade (and the next five), than it has to do with carriers.
come 2020 things will be different.
Ralph said “nothing is defended”
If SeaViper works as advertised and given the parlous state of the Argentine military I don’t think carriers would be needed to secure the air space of the island.
Not forgetting that it was a single SSN that forestalled an invasion in ’77 and the stupid announcement that one was on the way (playing off an inaccurate news report & forgetting a deterrent has to be actually in place to be effective), that gave the window of opportunity in ’82.
Even if the Argies had a fictional force of the type described & actually succeeded against the odds, the biggest danger to their goals & long-term retention of the islands, would be the number of British casualties that would necessarily have to be inflicted in able to defeat the current 1000 strong garrison.
With only a single death in the initial ’82 invasion the world could stay out and treat it as a regrettable colonial issue between the two countries. With a modern surprise invasion inflicting say 100+ dead & wounded (to defeat on land alone: inf coy; FIDF; HQ & base installtion staff; armed RAF ground crew & naval pers ashore) I suspect the majority of the international community would take a pro-UK stance (even an Obama-led US!).
@Wstr
Totally agree on the casualties issue, especially if civilians are injured or killed. Not to mention that we are talking about sinking the guard ship and likely a frigate or destroyer in the area, shooting down four Typhoons, destroying the rapier batteries by either by bombing or firing an anti-radar missile at them, and bringing up artillery to suppress the garrison before attacking dug in defenders who have planned for 20 odd years on how to defend the garrison and have experience in combat, in situation where you have to absolutely take the island in a few days or you face the prospect of the UK being able to bring additional forces to bear. Then once you have captured the islands your only logical recourse given that the islanders do not want to be ruled by Argentina would be to “ethnically cleanse” the island by deporting all the islanders back the UK.
I won’t enter fantasy war scenarios which i love far too much for my own good, but…
The Typhoons are four, but one is an on-site spare airframe named “Desperation”. Only 3 Typhoons are actually flying as a norm, and carry the names of Faith, Hope and Charity as the Malta’s famous Gladiators.
(1435 Flight was the unit which defended Malta in world war II, even if it later had Squadron size during the war)
Anyway it would make a lot more sense for the argies to create some kind of “incident” at sea, serious enough to lure the Typhoons away from the airport…
And then strike the runway to rip holes into it, denying the Typhoons a place where to land. The jets would then have to crash-land or enter Argentina and surrender just because of the lack of fuel. And there goes the air cover.
Upgraded Skyhawks can do the work, so the Argies have what they need as it is without any shopping.
There’s plenty of places where the Skyhawks could hide, flying low over the sea not to appear on Mount Pleasant’s radar until it is too late. There’s no AWACS in the islands.
Prior to the bomb-run, after pop-up they would have to climb above 5000 meters, which is their better defence from Rapier (http://www.army-technology.com/projects/jernas/specs.html)
Coordinate the time, and disabling the runway is actually feasible.
Also, we do not know if, what and how many weapons the Typhoons have available in the islands. Have they got AMRAAMs and ASRAAMs in decent numbers? Do they regularly fly well armed?
Almost certainly they have no AG weaponry available in Mount Pleasant, and currently most definitely no Air-Ground capable pilots, even if the Typhoons in there are (hopefully) compatible with AG stores.
In which state is the Rapier battery? Fully operational, partially operational…?
Certain satellite photos show plenty of missile launch pads, but little in terms of launchers.
And there is always the problem of just how limited Rapier is.
Is a SSN REALLY close to the Falklands? In theory, yes, in practice possibly no.
With Astute not yet operative and anyway in Faslane at the moment, there are only 6 SSNs in the RN. Not all of these SSNs will be available, and we know that HMS Talent just got back in port after Libya, Turbulent is outside Libya and another might be in the Gulf.
There’s actually a serious risk that there are gaps in SSN coverage, more often than not, and it does not take the CIA to realize it.
HMS York was sent towards Libya and left the islands without allocated destroyer for some time, too. HMS Edinburgh is now preparing to go south and relieve York in the near future.
Yes, the Falklands are well defended. Yet, as you see, ten minutes are enough to list several very real dangers.
Assaulting the island, even with current Argentine kit, is not impossible conceptually. Politically, the situation is also a lot more complex than the article admits, with even Brazil voicing open support to Argentina on the issue, and south american countries backing argie claims at the UN.
Argies probably fear the Tomahawks, that is the point i truly do agree with. That’s something they can’t really counter, and i suspect it is what really scares them, because the RN subs could hit the argie’s airbases with the TLAMs, and make the campaign really, really complex.
There is no requirement to ‘take’ Mount Pleasant Airfield (MPA). All that is required is that its use to us is denied for so long as it takes for an opposing force to land a bn plus grouping and secure another airhead. Port Stanley airfield would make a suitable airhead and there are numerous other grass strips on East and West Falklands that would make possible airheads.
Denial of MPA can be done with MANPADs or indirrect fire, personally I would use a combination of MANPADS and mortars.
A battalion dug in on an airhead will require a brigade to remove it. Two battalions gives the enemy commander the ability to retain an airhead and manoeuvre aggressively against the UK in place forces.
Two battalions is relatively easy to sustain, but difficult for the UK to counter against for so long as it does not have an airhead.
The RN I believe retains a South Atlantic Frigate although that may now have morphed into an ‘Atlantic Frigate’. The Atlantic is a large place and if not on station at the Falklands it would possibly take time to get there. It would be foolhardy to commit a frigate or destroyer by itself to a hostile situation, it would be better staying out of the way until a task group can be formed.
The big deterrent is the SSN. However if the Argentinians are not using naval assets but focusing on air then its use is more limited.
All hypothetical, but enjoyable hypothesising!
Its always an interesting discussion but how would Argentina actually get a battalion onto the islands to deny MPA and Gabriele, how would Argentina manage to lure away the Typhoons so they could sneak an attack in, an attack by the way that would be detected long before they arrived because there are multiple means to do so.
Do you really think we are that thick as to fall for amateur hour deceptions like that.
All that is required is that its use to us is denied for so long as it takes for an opposing force to land a bn plus grouping and secure another airhead.
This would have to be done by C-130. Argentina has seven, of which realistically you can expect five to be available. With this fleet it would take, at a very rough estimate, three or four days of perfect jump weather and no aircraft losses to shift the Argentine Rapid Deployment Force (based on the 4th Parachute Bde) in to the Falklands – one wave would carry half a battalion of infantry. Daylight drops at low level are highly risky for the transport aircraft if there is any sort of AAA/MANPAD threat at all, which there would be; even if MPA is denied to both sides (and the C-130s are therefore operating without a fighter threat) it’s more realistic to assume that the entire C-130 fleet would be destroyed over the course of this operation, leaving roughly half the RDF on the ground in the Falklands and the rest either dead or stuck back on the mainland. Night drops would not really be practical if you wanted to assemble the RDF as a coherent fighting force quickly.
Then, without C-130s, they’d be truly stuck. Doesn’t matter if they’d managed to seize a grass strip – they haven’t got anything to fly into it any more, so no reinforcements or supplies. As for marching the RDF to take MPA from their drop zone, that’s going to take time – see 1982! – and you’d be doing it without vehicles, helicopters, or artillery, and with limited logistics and supplies.
And, as I mentioned elsewhere, don’t forget that the other side has paratroops too. And seven C-17s (not C-130s) to jump from. One wave of those is going to carry a battalion and a half of infantry (albeit the waves will be further apart if they’re flying from Ascension).
A yacht or fishing boat can be used to infiltrate SF. There are a surprising number of yachts in South Atlantic waters now. Once the QRA cannot take off then there is a window of opportunity to fly in sufficient assets to pose a more enduring problem to the UK garrison and bolster the denial capability.
I do not know what air assets the Argentinians have but I imagine a couple of C130s (literally) would be sufficient to provide a force to overmatch UK forces in the sense that they would not be able to take significant offensive action against the enemy.
Naturally this all assumes an intelligence lapse the size of that in France 1940, Singapore 1942 or Israel in the Yom Kippur War…
And of course that scenario assumes that you can keep MPA continuously unusable for three or four days with nothing but a few SF with mortars and MANPADs while you bring your RDF in. This is also a bit unlikely.
“Its always an interesting discussion but how would Argentina actually get a battalion onto the islands to deny MPA and Gabriele, how would Argentina manage to lure away the Typhoons so they could sneak an attack in, an attack by the way that would be detected long before they arrived because there are multiple means to do so.”
Their last Type 42 has been modified into a Commando carrier and alone can deploy 238 soldiers and two helicopters.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARA_Hercules
More can be carried by their last amphibious ship, the ARA Bahía San Blas (B-4), which would also deploy the AAV7 vehicles they have left.
The rest could come aboard trawlers, merchant ships and other vessels. If they have one advantage, it is being much, much closer to the target.
And with the Typhoons not in condition to strike their surface transports, whatever works.
They’ve also 3 small SSKs, 4 frigates and 9 corvettes too.
In 2010 the construction start of four 1.800 ton offshore patrol ships was announced.
In May 2010, Defense Minister Nilda Garre announced that the Navy would continue working on a system that would enable the launch of Exocet missiles from the Navy’s P3 Orion aircraft (they have 6 even if not all of them were airworthy for lack of spares. Something that can be fixed.). In addition, the financing of the local development and construction of a coastal Naval defense system that may also be based on the use of Exocet missiles was announced.
Orion with Exocet. An interesting thing that gives them a reach they did not have in 1982. A reach that the UK has not, either, especially after losing the Nimrod.
They have still a number of C130s, 29 Mirages of various types and 34 A4 Fightinghawks upgraded and generously sold to them by the US.
As to luring the Typhoons out… causing Scrambles, last time i checked, wasn’t really complex.
I do not say they are going to invade, TD, don’t get me always wrong.
However, i have a bit more worries on the situation than you, that is for sure.
As I said Gabriele, its about scalable response but lets look at the commando carrier for a moment, with its compliment of 2 Sea Kings
To launch its helicopters it would need to sit offshore somewhere (making the assumption that it hasnt been tracked all the way from port, which, lets face it, is not unlikely) it then has to embark the marines at maybe 20 at a time, thats 10 round trips in pairs.
Do you reckon they could achieve this without the defence forces having something to say about the matter, especially as those Sea Kings would not have the benefit of modern DAS.
Suicide mission
As for trawlers, merchant vessels and the like. Very Tom Clancy but not practical given that they would have to come aboard in small boats, with whatever they could carry.
Thats not a suicide mission at all, its a live range exercise for the FIDF and garrison
The Typhoons would have the ability to strike surface targets with their 27mm which I know is cack but still, by the time there was a realistic threat Typhoon will be cleared for PWIV and Brimstone, SS etc.
I don’t want to sound complacent because nothing could be further from the truth but seriously, the threat is not credible when matched against a graduated response based on what is already there
Doesn’t Mount Pleasant have the world’s longest corridor at something just over half of a mile?
Aren’t Argentine Sea Kings wired for Exocet too?
@X
They are. Argies have got this funny love for Exocets, they want it everywhere.
@TD
I did not say it is easy or tidy an exercise for the Argies to get troops ashore. But they can, to a degree, getting them there.
As to the Falklands defence force, it is around 200 men armed with Steyr AUGs, and their effective capability to do much to contrast a landing, in particular if the Argies use their ship-guns for bombing them, is questionable.
The big obstacle are the stationed battalion from the british army and the TLAM missiles which would, at some point, start to hit Argie airbases.
The rest, it is not impossible to work around 3 Typhoons and a OPV.
Where the Falklands war II will be really won or lost will be in politics. If at the trial of the facts Brazil and others continued to endorse Argentina’s claims, then the problem might be really bad, and even if pretty much incapable (currently) to win the operation militarily, the Argies would win politically. And the risk is that at that point the UK would not have enough military mass to ignore the political factor and secure the islands by force.
@ Gabby
As opposed to the British apparent disdain for ASMs….
The point here that I think Gabriele is missing is that the clock starts ticking as soon as the first action is taken to deny MPA. After that you’ve got to keep that airfield shut all the time; which involves your SF teams staying in their positions within range of MPA with their mortars and SAMs, despite the sweeps by infantry, FIDF and helicopters (there’s a couple of Sea Kings down there) trying to locate them.
The buildup’s the killer. The commando carrier and its two companies of marines, the tiny C130 fleet and the risks of dropping paras that I’ve noted above, the trawler fleet and how long it would last landing its troops in tiny boats in an opposed landing (because you wouldn’t be able to hold a beach head _and_ a DZ _and_ keep MPA suppressed at the same time)… it would be a bloody business and more importantly a slow one. Because you haven’t got long before the response arrives; first the SSN will sink the commando carrier, then TLAMs, Paras, and (if you take your eye off MPA for twelve hours) airlanded troops.
@a You do not have to deny MPA for days, just a couple of hours while you fly something bigger in. With a coy based in the Falkands a battalion minus with mortars and mandpads is sufficient to deny MPA to UK use indefinitely against the combat power of the FI Garrison. The requirement is simply to buy enough time to get your first wave in. Your first wave only has to be big enough to ensure that the FI Garrison (a light role infantry company) can not overmatch it.
Infiltration by yachts and fishing boats etc might sound Tom Clancey but criminals, drug smugglers and terrorists (Mumbai) do it frequently. Interestingly:
http://www.falklandnews.com/public/story.cfm?get=509&source=7
While I certainly dont think the argies have the capability in the next 5 year to do anything about the Falklands their growing co-operation with china and that countries interest in resources may start to increase Argentina’s capability.
Indeed TD the intelligence failures that proceeded the last conflict is on a par with what you described at the start of your piece. Also lets not forget how well the western intelligence agencies forecast the current uprisings in the middle east and we were already involved in that part of the world.
Haven’t a clue how you’d take mount pleasant but from what ive read its a pretty difficult place to get to. But havent our sf made the art of the impossible possible purely because everyone thought it to be impossible. Through out time this has come back to bite people even the japanese attack on pearl harbour was considered impossible.
I would have thought if you’d crashed a plane on the runway you could knock it out for a while maybe long enough to get some people ashore to cause confusion.
There are in excess of 2,000 UK service personnel in the Falklans islands not counting RN shipborne personnel. Every single one of them has completed OM 525 (2 week 5.56MM l85A2) course and there are rifles and ammo for all of them. Then you have the Resident infantry company and the FIDF, a highly motivated company sized organisation trained by the Royal marines and well equipped, Steyr Assualt rifles and GPMGs, mobile utilising quad bikes and know the terrain like the bacl of their hand. 72 hours warning is all that would be required to move the spearhead battalion via a couple of 747-400s requisitioned from BA and that is game over. Also ref gabrielle the Falklands doe not have AWACS but does have radar sites spread across the Islands on the high ground. Plus the 1022 radar of the resident type 42 and the extremely capable air search radar on HMS CLYDE. Any invasion other than somewhere remote on West Falkland would be an opposed bloodbath.
Several problems I can see. All these plans sound complicated, I cannot see how we would fail to see the build up as they would need to train in order to stop the complicated plans from falling apart. Plus the political fallout means that Argentina needs to prep the political ground carefully or it might find its so called allies in the region deciding that actually they do not want all the trouble that will be heading their way if they stand by Argentina, which is also likely to be spotted.
Then there’s the idea that you could land a SF unit large enough to deny MPA even for a few hours and simultaneously suppress the Garrison’s ability to deny MPA to Argentine Air force. I presume that in addition to rapier batteries which you will have to disable, the Garrison has man portable Starstreak, which I imagine would be more than enough to shoot down a C-130 on final approach, plus mortars, Javlin and LASM all of which could be used to attack disembarking forces as they form up. I think it would be a bloody plan and one which gave at best 50:50 chance for victory.
Of course you could get the SF in by foot, and get them to laser the air field for an all out attack by the Fightinghawks, assuming that they can all make it with in-flight refuelling (the need to in-flight refuel would limit sortie rates), and I cannot find any evidence that they have integrated a targeting pod or that the Fightinghawks have the ability laser designate, meaning they will be using dumb bombs and I am not sure how successful they would be, and they certainly would need to pull off a lot of training to do it, which we would spot.
So while I can imagine with the resources available they could take the island, they would need to be lucky and it would also require us to be stretched. If we are still in Libya in six months time then they might have a good chance of pulling it off, as I suspect we will be stretched to buggery – and there is a rapidly diminishing window, once FTSA starts to deliver are tanking capacity increases, and once we start UOR upgrades to the Typhoons and improving the training the more dangerous the Typhoons on the Falklands will be. Give it a few more years and we will be replacing our Rapier batteries with CAMM which would be a much greater threat to the Fightinghawks, and as I discussed earlier given Argentina’s budget, wish for nearly new or new fighters and reluctance to go Chinese or Russia they have few options to replace their Mirages, and should they fail to put MPA out of action they the Typhoons will be the deciding factor.
Realise there is an inherent contradiction in my last post about the Fightinghawks. If the SF are designating for the Fightinghawks the can of course use LGB’s and do not have self-designate.
Very interesting stuff! I follow defence sites and yours is one of the better ones, but come on, time to put your Airfix soldiers and plastic aeroplanes away and get a …..beer!
You won’t though, mind my posting the link to my Argentine colonel friend who of course will be in fits of laughter! He’s got lots of exocets to use up!
Regards,
Lizzie
An interesting debate – I’ve served in the FI (and Iraq & Afghan) and would say that its a seriously tough nut to crack. I posted at length on this on ARRSE (I post there as Jim30), but essentially to suceed, the Argentines need to massively increase their budgets, massively raise their training tempo, and come up with a plan which denies the UK an asset built and designed to resist such an attack.
The terrain round MPA favours the defender, its built to be defended and it is some distance from the coast. To take it requires a major amphibious assault, while the Argentines have got to be certain of denying it in one go, without tripping the early warning radars, and without letting the UK garrison dig in. If the airfield isn’t denied, then the FI Reinforcement plan begins and its game over.
I have considered this at length and am genuinely struggling to think of a credible scenario, within current and predicted force structures in which the Argentines could take MPA without major use of artillery or WMD.
TD
Don’t want to feed carrier junkies fantasy but do not undersetimate your enemy.
Isrealis did not see 73 comming, who’d have thought the Arabs would invent the pressure washer!
UK keeps an eye on south america does it.. Just like it did on Libya and Egypt 3 months ago so no possibilty of surprises there then..
I’d land first waive by c130 rest by chartered civil transport.
Really TD very complacent Just because the Argies could not take it by conventional means; does not mean Argies would not try by unconventional means.
Rumbles in the South Atlantic? bung Chile a couple of Billion from DFID or somewhere and a couple of squadrons worth of unwanted Typhoon and maybe old Tonka Toys. Then suggest to them how nice a map of South America would look with Patagonia or chunks of Argentina as Chilean territory. Aye ok that is dreaming a little too much but arming Chile would certainly make Argentina watch it’s back rather nervously if the Chileans had billions of nearly new British military equipment and training teams to show them how to use it.
The politics of it all especially with Brazil would in my opinion be affected by the French as they have been getting all friendly with the Brazilians and France also has the problem of overseas territories and the need to protect them. The Yanks and most others would maybe mutter something at the UN but stay out of it unless there are casualties then they might step in to halt military operations until we all finish arguing in the UN.
Personally in lala land if I had my own vision of the UK Armed Forces realised I would be doing RIMPAC biannually rolled into a big round the world cruise to show the flag to folk in support of the FPDA in Australasia etc. The South Atlantic would maybe get a visit by a combined task force on the way home for some tea and biscuits with the Chileans and some penguin chasing for those unfamiliar with the sport.
Why is everybody assuming the Argentines need to win a war to win what they want?
The Third World has become ever more vocal in the UN since the end of the Cold War. A few hundred dead teenage conscripts may just be enough to get the UN to ask the UK to be “reasonable” about the Falklands. And knowing how committed our governments are to giving the people, sorry foreigners, what they want well……
@Gaby
There are daily patrols of the area around the Falklands, there are radars, rapier and more than 3 Typhoon. It will took a level of planning beyond the Argies to get through. As already stated they could not do a surprised attack like they did last time as the intelligence services would notice the build up.
If you have ever been to the Falklands and MPA you would see how easy it would be to hold off anything but a large scale attack. The ground is a nightmare to walk across let alone attack hardened positions.
Additionally, they have regular exercise to prepare for this sort of thing and there are other measures in place that are not for discussion here.
I think Gabby is to be applauded for caring so much about our defences.
I bet there isn’t a Brit on any of the Italian defence sites displaying such a wide knowledge of Italian military history and procedure.
jim30 is right ( i’ve read your stuff on arrse) plus i’ve done a 6 monther there and agree with his asessment of the defence in depth.
Although i have to say with a huge sigh and a heavy heart x has probably spoken the future.
oh yeah 10,000ft runway really enjoyed FOD plodding that in 40mph winds! (chief tech never deviated from the rules even when common sense should’ve kicked in, either that or he hated pongos)!!
To be fair to the Foreign office and the intelligence services re: Libya, there is a hell of a difference between monitoring the build up of a military force over a period of time, and monitoring a bunch of protesters spontaneously agreeing to meet up and go march on Facebook. It started as a protest and got out of hand very quickly. You can’t blame that on a lack of intelligence.
The fact is wars are rarely as clear cut as is commonly described when people discuss a falklands 2. In the short term a full invasion of the FIs is pure fantasy and would be counter productive. Slow tightening on the restrictions on sea freight and RN refueling, plus political pressure from other south american nations make alot more sense. In the end they will hope that the high cost of keeping the islands will be too much for the UK tax payer and we will want to negotiate
… also, if the wanted to crank up the political pressure what in my mind is more likely is to try and land a couple of hundred troops on South Georgia without firing a shot. Assuming they had the supplies it would be a pain in the arsenal to get them off without unacceptable casualties from either side.
To me the falklands should serve as a reminder of the dangers and consequences when people at the top try to pretend that we can neatly package defence for political / financial / inter service reasons and that the world is a simple / predictable place. It is not; falklands was not the first time this has happened and will not be the last. I am pro carrier as without them our options to respond to events are severely restricted.
@Wibble. “There are daily patrols of the area around the Falklands”. And this is conducted by? The Falklands has a land mass of 4,700 square miles and a coastline estimated at 800miles. The Islands have territorial waters extending 12 nautical miles and and Exclusive Economic Zone extending 200 nautical miles from the islands.
That is a lot of real estate to patrol with 1 x infantry company, the Falklands Island Patrol Vessel
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/river_class/
and a south atlantic frigate. There are no Maritime Patrol Aircraft based in the Falklands although the FI government in conjunction with the South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands Government does maintain some Fishery Patrol Vessels (although the latter are normaly focused on the SGSSI fisheries). It just seems not a lot to patrol an awful lot.
The two key weaknesses appear to be the lack of maritime patrol assets (especially aircraft) and the lack of ground based assets (or air to supplant the ground).
As has been pointed out repeatedly on this thread, one would hope that the UK’s strategic intelligence capability in South America is good enough to detect any threat of a magnitude likely to cause the FI Garrison cause for concern, with the FI Garrison demonstrating UK strategic intent and a deterrent capability.
@Chris B. There was plenty of evidence that the status quo in the Middle East was unsustainable in terms of social dynamics. A very young population, high unemployment, rampant corruption and nepotism linked to the increasingly free flow of ideas. This is a society where to get married costs money and if you are without a job or patronage you are unlikely to be able to get married (and where sex outside of marriage is not just frowned upon by society, but difficult to achieve in practice; all powerful drivers for social change.
The intelligence services could have and should have seen the potential for rapid change (plenty of others did) allowing the government the ability to make strategic decisions early.
Perhaps they did, perhaps they didn’t. Governments are rarely noted for their ability to make bold decisions, with most politicians being risk averse and consensus drive, so having the advice and acting on it are two different matters.
@ Callum Lane
“plenty of others did” – who?
There was plenty of evidence that the status quo in the Middle East was unsustainable in terms of social dynamics. A very young population, high unemployment, rampant corruption and nepotism linked to the increasingly free flow of ideas. This is a society where to get married costs money and if you are without a job or patronage you are unlikely to be able to get married (and where sex outside of marriage is not just frowned upon by society, but difficult to achieve in practice; all powerful drivers for social change.
Yes, but that was also all true in (for example) 2006, when capitals across the Middle East were conspicuously not overrun by a wave of anti-government protests. SIS and FCO were no doubt aware of these things – they’ve been discussed in the public domain ad nauseam since the 1980s! – but you can’t go from listing those causes to predicting that it was all specifically going to kick off in Tunis in January.
@Chris B.
The terrorists infiltrated into Mumbai by fishing vessel.
The PIRA successfully ran weapons into Ireland by a variety of vessels in the 1980.
The arms embargo on Libya is being breached successfully by a variety of means.
The IDF regularly intercept seaborne consignments to the Gaza Strip – undoubtedly there are others that get through.
Criminal smugglers routinely evade border control, worldwide and on a daily basis.
And:
http://www.falklandnews.com/public/story.cfm?get=509&source=7
someone came ashore from something to do what?
@a. I am not saying that they should have, mnerely that at the strategic level intelligence analysis and subsequent strategic planning is as much about trends as specifics. The middle east turmoil should have come as a strategic surprise and not as a strategic shock. Strategic planners should have had the chance to consider options based on the ‘what if’ basis instead of the ‘so what’ basis.
Again I am not saying that this did not happen, merely that it should have happened.
Callum.
The difference between the Falkland Islands and other cases of Maritime Insertion is traffic density. the traffics density in the Eastern Med and off coast of India is a thousands of times busier than the Falklands. The embargo into Libya is being breached across the land border and by hiding weapons on large containerships that NATO(lacking a diversion port) cannot fully search. Saying that if they did get onto land what next? They have to walk to MPA and do enough damage to the runway to put it out of action for some time. The minute the runway gets hit the entire garrison stands to. 2000 personel at MPA with rifles and the FIDF plus 1 or 2 Ships and possibly an SSN. Any attempted landing in the face of that is going to be extremely costly. The Uk begins to deploy troops to Ascension whilst runway repairs take place cutting the flying time for reinforcements down to about 8 hours. For the Argentinians to have any hope they have to figure a way of disabling the runway and almost simultaenously getting enough troops on the ground to defeat the FIDF and Resident Infantry Company before the rest of the Garrison can stand to. It takes approximately 8 hours to issue everyone else with rifle and ammo. This is exercised evry 6-10 weeks as part of the full scale Cape Petrel Ex.
A sideline to this thread, but RE “Also lets not forget how well the western intelligence agencies forecast the current uprisings in the middle east ”
- it has been well known for a decade plus that a “boiling over” would happen, at least in the S of Med part of the wider M. East (i.e. Maghreb included)
- “Madrid process” was formulated to make “it” manageable, but EU did not stick to it, because it took less effort & money to cosy up to dictators
- here we are, even though Algeria and Morocco don’t look too bad, and Tunisia and Egypt are not lost cases
RE “suggest to them how nice a map of South America would look with Patagonia or chunks of Argentina as Chilean territory” I think Chile is quite busy (and budget burdened) with their mini-arms race with Peru, exactly for that sort of reasons?
@ All Politcos
Good points. All situations are different. My point with regards to border and maritime security is that it is not foolproof and is breached regularly.
I am not an airpower expert, but there are different ways to deny an airfield, not just by denying the use of the runway although that is the most obvious.
Of the 2000 pax at MPA some will be required to run the air operations and so will not be available for defence tasks. The remainder will not be in formed tactical units and sub-units and will not be trained in offensive Dismounted Close Combat operations, therefore relegating them to static point defence tasks. One can use them in extremis for offensive dismounted close combat tasks but the risks are high and the effectiveness low. That leaves the infantry and the FIDF, both of which will take time to muster and deploy. All this would suggest that the defence is credible with warning, but there are gaps in the ability to respond to a surprise assault. The point being made that in theory all the Argentinians have to do is to deny the airfield to our ARA aircraft for sufficiently long for them to get more assets onto the Falklands to overmatch the garrison’s ability to clear them. This level of forces is a company plus.
That said this defensive posture is entirely realistic because threat is a combination of capability and intent and while the Argentinians may have the capability to infiltrate a small team onto the Falklands they currently lack the intent. I also suspect that they lack the capability and intent to deploy larger force elements onto the Falklands and they definitely lack capability to garrison and defend the Falklands from any UK response.
I agree a full frontal invasion by Argentina is unlikely to: (a) occur, and (b) succeed, if success is assessed as the complete military domination of the islands.
But I think it’s a mistake to reduce the analysis of who wins and losses to a simple count up of our equipment and say we are better than them. Strange and unwelcome setbacks happen in war. In ’82 HMS Sheffield was lost to a SkyHawk it could easily have shot down simply because at the moment of attack its radar was shut down so a radio message could be sent, two Harriers collided in cloud, and a boat load of Guardsmen was wiped out because it was left sitting in the open without any orders.
The four Typhoon might be a formidable force if they were armed and airborne in the hour they were needed. But the RAF’s usual ratio of aircraft availability is apparently one out of five, so with four they have to do better than normal just to have one aircraft available. I’d wonder how many aircraft are kept at QRA status and does QRA in the FI mean the aircraft is ready to go or is the pilot having Sunday dinner in Stanley at the time?
X has a good point with the question “Why is everybody assuming the Argentines need to win a war to win what they want?”
Argentina simply wants to win a claim to the FI, not to actually live there. The ’82 war started with some Argentine scrap metal merchants landing at an old whaling station to pinch the metal scrap. Suppose they orchestrated the same thing again. They could be fairly sure that the landing party would be arrested. Argentina would then protest to the UN about the unreasonable treatment of Argentineans on ‘Argentine soil’ by British colonisers. (You can imagine what would happen if we actually shot them.) The rest of South America would join in the chorus; we’d tell them all to back-off and the UN sensing conflict would be passing motions telling the UK not to over react and require a UN mandated discussion about the sovereignty of the islands. And there it is – Argentina would have had people on the islands and the UN saying they had the right to be there.
It’s fun to play Tom Clancy or Patrick Robinson (see his novel Ghost Force) and to create all kinds of Falkland Islands war scenarios.
Some things are for sure:
(1) the SSN is the ace of the game and the UK has them all
(2) the best option for the UK is to make sure they do not loose the islands in the first place.
(3) time favours the Argentinian team.
Ten years or so from now, Brasil will be one of the leading economies in the world. It most probably will have a GDP at least similar to that of the major European economies (Germany, UK, France). In its wake, other South-American economies will also grow. Argentina today is the 27th world and the 2nd SA economy with a nominal GDP of about 16% of the UK’s GDP. As per IMF chrystal ball estimates, Argentina will rank 22nd in the world in 2016 with a nominal GDP of 22% of the UK’s. Argentina will catch up on the UK year after year. I think it is fair to state that defense capabilities will be growing on a par with GDP. So it is not totally unconcievable that Argentina somewhere in the next decade theoretically will possess military capabilities similar to those of e.g. Sweden or the Netherlands. If investments are pointed in the right direction and are being concentrated on offensive capabilities (read: ability to conquer the FI by force), the cost of countering this capability by increased and better defense arrangements for the FI will become difficult to bear for the UK.
This evolution leads to the conclusion that the solution for the future of the FI is not military but political and the driving forces will be economical and financial. The solution for FI self determination and prosperity (with or without oil – but even more so with) does not reside in the UK, but in South-America.
The main Argentinian arguments to claim the FI as the Malvinas are “history through South-American glasses”, “continental shelve” and “leftover from colonialism”. The main UK arguments to keep the situation as is today are “history through European glasses”, “no indogenious population” and “right of the FI inhabitants to self-determination”. Combine all of these and you have the FI inhabitants peacefully requesting/obtaining their independence from the UK and joining the “league of independent, democratic and peacefull South-American nations”. This approach would kind of defuse the current situation, and if carefully prepared on the diplomatic level, I do not see why major world and local players would oppose the idea. Of course, it will take several years for Argentina to make a 180degree turn, but the more they find themselves alone opposing the idea of an independent FI state without support from e.g. Brasil and Chile in South-America, from the US and from sympathetic countries in Europe such as Italy and Spain, the more they will see that it is also in their best interest to swallow their pride and to accept it.
This is a difficult process that the Falklanders themselves must start by stating their intentions. I don’t think it is wise for them to stick to the “we are part of the UK”. Some day the UK will no longer be able to guarantee that “independence” and they themselves will not be able to provide the same guarantee (note that current FI defense arrangements are said to cost 1% of MoD budget – say 300M – compared to a FI GDP of about 100M). The “hostile” attitude of Argentina is also costing them in terms of growth potential, be it in oil exploration or in tourism. The guarantee for a future independent FI state must come from the US and Brasil. They must also enforce for other countries to behave and establish normal political and economical relations with the independent FI state. And of course, there can be and there will be a special and preferred relationship with the UK. Falkland Islanders can continue to speak English, send their youths to UK universities, drive left side of the road and sip tea in the afternoon.
The FI themselves, the UK, Argentina, all three of them will benefit greatly from such an arrangement. How to start? FI government should hire an internationally renowed diplomat to explore the way. In the meantime, the UK must continue to provide a credible defense force for th FI to make sure they do not loose the FI to the Argentinians as retaking them will be difficult and costly (though not impossible).
Is this wishfull thinking? Maybe, but I think in the long term it’s the only realistic option. Argentina is never going to accept today’s situation, the other South-American nations will support Argentina’s claim, the threat of the use of military force will continue to exist and with Argentina’s improving military capabilities, the UK will find it increasingly and financially difficult to provide a credible defense/deterrent. In the UN of today, the “leftover from colonialism” argument has more weight than the “right to self-determination” argument, so don’t count on the UN for support and don’t wait until there is a resolution that supports Argentina’s claim, because then it will be too late. Defuse the “leftover from colonialism” argument and go for independence with strong backing from US, Brasil and most other South-American and European countries.
RE “8 hours to issue everyone else with rifle and ammo”!
- for a garrison of regular forces?
- the Swiss sleep with the rifle under the bed, and a cupboard stuffed with energy biscuits
- in 8 hrs the whole country would be up and armed