The armed forces are increasingly moving to joint or tri service organisations, helicopters, EOD and a great deal of training all come under the sphere of joint organisations and this has been driven into the services by financial necessity. The degree of enthusiasm by which the services actually entered into these arrangements is open for debate, I get the impression that jointery is a reaction, rather than something that happened as a result of truly joined up thinking.
I get the impression that there is a line with jointery and that line is service centric capabilities, beyond that, seems a step too far.
If we look at the services we see duplication, each has its own infantry, each has its own fixed and rotary wing aviation, EOD, intelligence, logistics, engineering, police.
The Army operates mexeflotes from Royal Fleet Auxiliary crewed vessels, the RAF operate Support Helicopters in direct support of ground forces yet the Army operate Attack Helicopter in exactly the same air space and the Royal Navy have infantry currently in command of operations in Afghanistan.
Is any of this logical, would it be the desired end state if one decided to start from scratch or is inertia, tradition and the fact that it just seems too hard to change standing in the way of real organisational transformation that would make every penny count.
Can we take jointery a step further and raise the spectre of a truly combined, or single service, armed forces?
When this is mentioned people point to Canada, their smashing together of the three was not seen as a wholly successful exercise yet if one looks at the Israeli Defence Force it is clear that such a single service approach can work. Yes, I know the IDF is different in many ways but they are a flexible and efficient force without some of the historical baggage that the UK wears with a weary gait.
The need for operational and economic efficiency dictated that the IDF remain as a single service, even accepting there are different branches within it. All is not rosy however, their recent poor showing in Lebanon was blamed on an over reliance on air power and an atrophying in combined arms manoeuvre training because they had an aviator in charge.
So the question remains, is there a logical and desirable end state beyond the current situation or is the current status quo about as good as it can get?
A complete merge of all three services, ruthless elimination of duplication across services or even a fourth ‘materiel command’ that would consolidate all the logistics, policing, bands, engineering etc functions held within all three?
I don’t know the answers but as the forces shrink, joint working becomes an even greater reality, duplication simply must be driven out because to do otherwise means precious money that might be used to generate or maintain capabilities is lost to the maintenance of service ‘capability islands’
With our rich military history the UK has probably more ‘tradition’ than any other; the regimental system, cap badges, corps marches, regimental mascots, colours, ,mess silver and even drinking songs, it is an incredibly rich subject area and not something we should discard lightly but does anyone else wonder that this can sometimes be an impediment to innovation and efficiency.
If we are to do what is genuinely best for the UK and her Armed Forces we have to think the unthinkable, and this just might include sweeping aside some of those traditions or moving away from the notion that this is how it has always been done.
you’d still be left with the problem of the “British Defense Force” having internal fights between different elements, branches, specialties…whatever you call it. the air power element will want more jets…the ground element will want more vehicles.
oh and if you think that elimination of duplicate efforts will occur then i think you’re being overly optimistic. what you’ll face is more of everything. the best thing you might achieve is rationalization of vehicle fleets but i believe the savings overall will be small
We would have to first get over which colour berets, cap badges, mess silver and marching pace!
Before we look at streamlining into one service, the three services need to take a hard inward look and make their own cuts, from there we can truly look at what can be married up. The navy and RAF appear to be taking a more pragmatic approach while the army seems to be being missed out, and this isn’t only at home, operationally the army is fat and unwieldy which occurs to the detriment of operational capability, I’m not for one minute saying the other services are guiltless but a quick look around bastion is all it takes to see that the army has a long way to cut before it is remotely efficient.
Melding all three services into one sounds like the sort of thing that would inevitably cost more than it saved if the MoD actually tried it. Deciding what each service is going to ‘do’ and what equipment and units they will have to do it and eliminating unnecessary duplication would make savings though. I have a feeling that much of the opposition to more efficiency comes from nostalgic ex-personnel and high-ups protecting turf and is actually more do-able than people think.
good thoughts TD but the dirty little secret is that for the West, its not the gear(or the duplication) that drives costs but personnel. having a professional military is all well and good but if the UK and US were to have draftees instead of professionals then you’d have a much cheaper military. not quite as effective (or so we’re told)…much more difficult to use in wars of choice but much cheaper.
My apologizes for the bad English in this comment, I’m not native speaking as you surely understand.
@ TD: what you are discussing might look good in theory, especially presented on a power-point slide by an organisation consultant. It doesn’t look good in real life. If you put all three services into one bowl you will get a mess without structure. Instead of many subordinates having the same boss, every subordinate commander would have several bosses in different areas, i.e. education, training, operations, logistics, personnel etc. The result is an organization unable to make decisions, as no senior officer has the overview that is necessary.
The differences between the three services have their reasons, centuries of development have formed the organisation and methods used in the different areas. To merge that and make it into an effective unity is simply not possible.
If you, on top of that organize a fourth ‘materiel command’ you will truly have a mess. Think of it, when along the line from factory to target does ammunition go from being logistics to become an operational matter and who is in charge of the process of delivery?
@ Solomon: Many countries have tried this and are currently changing towards a professional force in order to make it effective and useable. Yes, a professional force is smaller and more expensive, but it is something you can use. With draftees you get the costs without producing any units ready for anything but a WWII defence against invasion. Is that what you want and need?
/ Commander
Welcome to TD Commander and Grolly
@TD
“We would have to first get over which colour berets, cap badges, mess silver and marching pace!”
Would it really save money? Would that money be used to give the joined single service better equipment and service conditions and end decades of savage cuts? I fear it would not. In the best case, the joint service would be given a firm 2% of GDP as obliged by NATO agreements, and all the savings and all the rest would be prey of the treasury.
And call me a traditionalist and everything, but “colour berrets” and metal badges and everything… they are the identity of the most history-filled armed forces in the world. A national treasure, i find.
Killing all that tradition, the identity of everything that the british services have been not just in the UK’s history but in world’s history… Is it really worth it?
I doubt it.
Soloman
I’m not sure how draftees would be cheaper, unless they were slaves.
Soldiers arent really highly paid, the highest paid squaddie earns as much as the lowest paid policeman.
The problem is of course, the lowest paid squaddie is paid ten times the lowest paid Chinese Squaddie.
RE “If you, on top of that organize a fourth ‘materiel command’ you will truly have a mess”
- don’t we already have that, if we look at manning (civilians included) and budget share?
- what we don’t have ( I know there are Capability Directors)is a clear separation of requirements management/ review at portfolio level and acquisition management (where the focus will have to be at project level)
Surely the point of having seperate services is that each is best placed to deliver the capabilities that it is meant to specialize in. Those areas of capability that cross over between the services, such as the placement of helicopters, damage the argument for retaining seperate services.
There is also an argument that the seperate services may have been needed at times of high manning, such as WWII, to avoid having a single massive and unweildy force structure; but today, with ever decreasing force levels, it’s not so important.
I personally think that we should retain seperate services, but that we shouldn’t be afraid to make dramatic cuts or changes to an individual service if that is necessary.
Too many reforms are either delayed or perhaps never take place due to worries about upsetting traditionalists. The Labour Party’s reform of the army’s regimental structure caused something of an uproar -particularly the formation of The Royal Regiment of Scotland- but it was necessary and it was long overdue, and the result has been increased efficiency within the army.
I also remember the fuss about the Paras losing Pegasus when 16AAB was formed -all over a badge; imagine the shit-storm that would be created by the government that finished off the entire army, or RAF.
I think there are too many people within the government, the press, the public, and the ranks of old servicemen that view the armed forces as lead soldiers arrayed on a table top. In reallity the forces are a machine for f’king with peoples’ day; their efficiency and ability to carry out that task should always come first, tradition second.
So keep the services but let’s not be to prissy about them; and let’s resolve the arguments concerning the placement of capabilities such as helicopters and naval jets.
———
One of the more superficial problems that the Canadians encountered was of what to call the branches of their single service. Folks stubbornly kept calling the bit with ships the ‘Navy’ for example. So a bit of practical consideration is needed if we ever decide to go down that route.
I’ve also noticed the confusion in our own press over who owns which bits of kit. Reports of ‘Army Chinooks’ or ‘RAF Apaches’ are relatively common.
When we get spaceships who’s gonna operate them RAF or RN and if they need a ground force element is it gonna be RAF Regt/RM or Army?
I saw this excellent documentary on our Skynet satellites developing robots for timetravel fascinating stuff but what happens if the robots want a separate fourth service?
Hi WD,
Space Command = USAF,
we seem to ape everything (when we can afford it); the two Cyber Commands were stood up within months of each other.
The only area where the “studying” seems to happen the other way is USMC/ 3 CDO, as the former tries to come up with more nimble, but still self-contained units
Why is everyone discussing “jointery” as a sudden “big-bang” implementation? Surely the best and most efficient solution for getting a single Service would be to identify capability areas, migrate duplicates to joint-service structures and then gradually evolve the Three-Service structure in a single Service over time. This prevents culture-shock, develops a generation of Service personnel that have expectations of working “cross-service”, migrates personnel contracts to have an expectation of “cross-service” working, and allows the introduction of unified equipemnt fleets as old equipment is replaced (via multi-Service purchasing projects).
Of course a big driver for this would be to squeeze the budget progressively so that Service heads are forced to reconsider jointedness to retain capabilities at least partly within their own Service.
Ah. I see that’s already happening.
The Canadian Implementation of a single service seems flawed because it imposes a joint command above three branches. In effect it isn’t a single Serive, but a Combined-Arms approach.
Maybe a better way of doing it would be to combine at a lower level. Keep individual Regiments/Divisions, Suadrons, Ships/Flotilla’s but everything above them becomes a signle Service command. This approach would have the advantage of allowing most of the traditions to be kept (since they reside mostly in the individual fighting unit, be it Squadron, Regiment or Ship), satisfying the reactionaries.
Then these Fighting Units would be combined per Operation into tailored task-forces, and a single command structure stood-up to oversee the Operation. Much like today, but without the rivalry over who-controls-what.
Any comments?
@ WD:
Surely the RAF would expect to become the Space Service of choice if only because of it’s motto:
“Per Ardua ad Astra” – Through Struggle, to the Stars.
Hi DD,
Yes, much like today: “Then these Fighting Units would be combined per Operation into tailored task-forces, and a single command structure stood-up to oversee the Operation. Much like today”
- what are your next candidates for jointnes, under a more permanent basis?
@AC:
Interesting point. I suppose my proposal actually compartmentalises the Armed Forces more, into building blocks.
I suppose areas of duplication I would examine are:
Various Engineering Commands. Common equipment across the Service will help. Any complaints about an RN radar on a Type 45 being fundamentally different to the AD radar used by the Army in the field are resolved because technical grades will be trained specifically for different pieces of equipment.
Military Policing/Shore Patrol: Having a single constabulary with a consistent set of guidelines and capabilities would be good. Bringing the MoD Police into the organization may help.
Rotary-Wing Aviation: Training is already joint, but with more tightly integrated combined-arms operations there is more of a need for helo’s to operate in all environments. Of course having helo’s that actually *can* operate in all environments would be a help. Moving all of the specialized light infantry (RM, Para, RAF Regt.) under one command and deploying as needed (instead of one block) as per 79th Armoured in WWII could give advantages?
Other than that? I admit I haven’t bitten too deeply into the subject. For that I’d have to thank you AC as your making me think about it more. I guess I’ll have to scour the ‘net for org charts and tables and see where joint organisations could be useful. . .
I am mostly in agreement with Brian Black @10:52
TD – we (the British Armed Forces) have been doing joint operations for hundreds of years; probably best to point to the Napoleonic period as the time when formal arrangements were first set up.
OK, so you do realize that the IDF is NOT a single force structure yes ? Just a single name. They don’t cross post individuals between an F16 unit and an infantry unit, and then on to a patrol boat. However they do have the same ranks and command structure across all 3 branches, land, air and sea. They also have a single command structure linking to the General Staff; and of course a single set of staff colleges. However the IDF absolutely IS a very special case with little in common with the UK armed forces, starting from the ‘social contract’ with the rest of Israeli society and building out from there.
Canada is often weird – for example “Air Force” Fire Fighters are part of a ships flight on a Frigate. Great, no duplication of effort there then, except of course in the RN, you don’t have separate fire fighters at all !
Instead of the IDF perhaps you should hold up the USMC as the shinning golden example of jointness ? Everyone is a “Marine first” – all Marines, officers or enlisted, male or female do a basic bootcamp that gives them basic infantry skills before they specialize. However this based on history, tradition and their expeditionary role – I am not sure that the UK needs to incur the cost of having a Typhoon pilot who is fully qualified to act as a Platoon commander in an infantry battalion.
There is plenty of room for reform, plenty of room for more purple goodness, but there is really no such thing as a “single service” and all my theoretical learning (MBA) and on the job experience as a senior manager in civvy life suggests the ‘change management’ task would be extremely difficult in the face of the existing ‘organizational culture’.
Just a quick one for Gabriele – I completely understand your points, but is the modern Italian Armed forces based on the Roman Legion ?
Yet surely yours is the modern nations with the single longest and brightest military history ? The only reason the British Empire was bigger than the Roman Empire was the technological progression in sea faring.
When it comes down to it, it is easy to setup museums; lets face it, more people dress up as Roman soldiers every weekend in the UK than do in Italy !
http://www.erminestreetguard.co.uk/
Hi Jed, I agree about the jointiness goodness but I have a sneaky feeling that it has been forced onto the services. I am sure you will agree that all the services, but especially the Army, is a collection of tribes. I just wonder if we have got to the point where that is an unaffordable uxury.
Good shout on the USMC, agree with you 100%, plus if you look at what and how we have been doing things for the last several decades you might argue that we are more like the USMC than we like.
Would it be such a stretch if members of the three services did a common basic military syllabus at a single location for both OR and Officers?
Would it destroy the fabric of society if there was an MoD/Service police/legal function (not provost stuff which of course is different)
How much could we save if there was a single engineering function where personnel could seamlessly move between services, a turbine is more or less a turbine is it not
I don’t really have a strong feeling one way or the other on this but my gut feeling is that we need to be ruthless and ditch all the traditional baggage
TD
As you know I have been in two services, RN as full time, Army as a part-time reservist. However the ‘Army’ unit was very army in that it was part of the Int Corps and yet very very “joint” in that the OC rotates between all three services, and the regular forces staff are from all 3 services, and even the reserve component was multi-service (no RNR, but the RNR is very small). I had more trouble with my ‘Corps’ not understanding my unit and my role then we did internally with jointness. So I guess I am saying I have good, positive experience of what can be done when people just get on with the job disregarding cap badge.
The down side that was promotion and advancement was screwed up not by jointness, but by the odd nature of the unit. I can see this being magnified heavily by your approach to “a turbine is just a turbine”.
There is considerable difference in working life, conditions etc between maintaining a ships powerplant, a Typhoons powerplant and a tanks powerplant (I know we don’t have gas turbine powered tanks but stay with me). I am not talking about culture, cap badges and history. I just don’t think it is entirely feasible to have a career structure where you can be expected to master living in the field (soldier first, turbine maintainer second ?), then master all the damage control, sea survival and fire fighting that is expected of people who maintain turbines on ships, and then master the easy living that comes with looking after the Typhoon (sorry, could not resist the dig !).
Your other example is better. Surely the RAF could loose their separate police force (and infantry)and have a Provost type function like the RN’s ‘Regulators’ branch (there is no such thing as RN police or ‘Shore Patrol’). MOD Plod are what they are, and I have been under their jurisdiction in naval dockyards and at a large RAF base (where they were actually replaced by RAF Police !!). Could you create one big force by merging MOD Plod and RMP – not sure, there maybe legal barriers to doing that (MOD Plod essentially being civvy police force ?).
It’s the need for mastery of a whole gammut of secondary skills which comes with a particular “service” orientation that seems to be the sticking point to me. Stick 1 or 2 Intelligence Corps guys on a ship and they are not going to be a problem with manning fire fighting and DC. Stick a couple of Crabs in the field with the AAC and they are not going to be a drain on force protection. But try to cross train your turbine maintainer in all these different ancillary skills? I just dont think it works.
You would still have a separate career stream with specialisms I think, so to use the turbine thing. A single CSS type force would have the mythical role of turbine spanner monkey (N) and turbine spanner monkey (G). I can see the unique operating environment aboard a grey war canoe but see less of a difference between those maintaining a turbine on an RAF base and the same trade but in Bastion. So this would maintain a degree of commonality, a larger overall sized ‘unit’ for promotion and basic training but with a couple of specialist secondary training streams depending on the environment they were predominantly operating in. You still achieve some economy of scale whilst maintaining flexibility and specialism where its needed.
I think with this one, the devils in the detail
Ref the devils in the detail – for sure! However I am not seeing any great benefits of single service TSM(N) and TSM(G) over having Naval, Army and Airforce TSM’s doing specialist trade training courses at a single joint service technical training center – for example.
@Jed
No way. Modern italian air forces at the most contain references to 1800-age units, such as Bersaglieri and Carabinieri, but that’s it. However, we still have the Ariete armoured division (the one which got destroyed entirely at El Alamein, sticking to the “no retreat order), the Folgore also of El Alamein glory, and other historical formations mostly from the two world wars. And we were on the bad side in one of the two, besides.
But Italy was unified only 150 years ago. The last pieces of Italy, actually, were obtained from the Austro-Ungaric empire only at the end of the IWW.
So, no. There are firm limits in the effective history of our unified armed forces, and definitely there’s nothing at all which builds on the ancient legions of Rome, which mostly were identified by a number anyway. It would have no sense to try and reference roman legions, but we certainly do have in the Armed Forces the badges and names of the major units from the national unification onwards.
And this is valid all over the world to a degree or another.
Fact is that there is far more history in the armed forces of the UK, which date well back into the 1700 in many cases to say the very least, and have worldwide experience in countless conflicts in the most various places, than in most, if not all, the other countries.
As to duplication, Italy’s police is made up by the Polizia (civilian-born police) and the Carabinieri, that are half-military and half-civilian.
Polizia and Carabinieri “hate” each other (rivalry between services is alive and well everywhere in the universe).
The good of Carabinieri is that they have full-military formations, cover Military Police role, but the arm of Carabinieri also is the police you find in most towns, even the small ones such as the one i live in.
Also, as of duplication: Italian Navy has an amphibious regiment of infantry (San Marco) and the Army another (Lagunari).
At least, however, the Army’s aviation here (AVES) is in charge of all chinooks, Mangusta attack helicopters, NH90 and everything else. And there’s actually an air mobile formation in the army which has its own helicopters for mobility.
Then there’s the Navy aviation with Merlins, a bunch of other helos, marittime patrol aircrafts and 20 AV8B Harriers for the carriers Garibaldi and Cavour.
Again, i believe the UK has no need at all to delve into “extreme” jointery. What can be unified effectively, ok, welcome.
But throw away identity and story of the armed forces…?
Guys, you say the Uk is broke. If Italy can maintain its own history in the armed forces, believe me, the UK most certainly can do it too.
The UK is nowhere near as broke as us… even if you do panic a lot more than we do.
Gabriele your being a spoil sport, I always wanted to salute officers by yelling ‘Hail Caesar”
I feel the need to write an “alternative history” sci-fi novel, where a Romano-British Empire rules the new world……
Jed and Gabriele
@Jed
Well, there’s the wonderful book series of Jack Whyte “The Camulod Chronicles” which creates a fantastic – and credible – story of the fusion between the people of Britannia and the ancient Romans to create the King Arthur’s bloodline.
Concept is almost the one you point out!
Good news of the day anyway is that Typhoon got its cherry popped.
http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot.com/
And i also got the JCA/F35C article up.
Gabriele – never heard of those books – grazie mille!
In terms of service fat (looking at Grolly’s point) the RAF carries most fat. The Army civilianised most of its 3rd line (base support) elements, no longer maintains mess stewards in uniform and runs its bases on a leaner tooth to tail ratio then the RAF – to name but three aspects.
Where efficiencies are to be made are in force generation. The Navy is very good at force generation, the RAF seems to be struggling at the moment (I do not know enough to know why) and the army is very inefficient at force generation.
The debate about army force generation will have to wait for another day – it is a whole essay in itself.
@Callum
Do you really think the Army is that poor at Force Generation? I for one would be very interested in seeing an article at TD that covers FG especially as we get a different message.
Tank
The Germans have the Streitkräftebasis and the Zentraler Sanitätsdienst. But as they tend to be on the loosing side should we follow them?
Don’t look for duplication where there is none. The RM may have a basic infantry function and yes the army calls on this to plug their gaps. But the RM are a weapon wielded by the RN just as guns, torpedoes, or aircraft to support maritime operations. Though many new marines have spent more time playing on the beach than in the water it is to the latter element they belong. Saying the RM is just infantry displays a lack of understanding of what the marines. You see similar arguments when every defence review some idiot suggests merging the RM with the Parachute Regiment. Yes they may be elite infantry but both have over arching specialists. The Para’ are shock troops. The RAF Reg is a different matter; they are just a light infantry regiment.They are product of the WW2 that failed to fade away; the RN let go all of its infantry divisions after WW1 because they weren’t needed. I think the RAF Regiment survives today because it is an efficient organisation for producing infantry that fulfils a function that saves the army a job. But you can’t really compare the RAF Reg, RM, and infantry elements of the RN.
The RFA doesn’t exist just to support the RN. The army always operated ships through various agencies and departments with the MoD and its forebears. These functions were brought into the RFA. Take the Round Table Class LSL; when these were originally “purchased” they weren’t operated by the RFA. They were taken into the RFA and were tasked by the army because the army doesn’t operate large ships beyond its various classes of lighter, large landing craft, and range craft. And why does/did the army operate these vessels because they directly supported army tasks and operations. The Bays took over from the RTs but in war time they will spend more time supporting than amphibious manoeuvre warfare. The Bays are about transporting the thousands of tons the army (and the RAF) depend on when deployed. So it also logic that organisation 17PM is an army formation. Nothing at all to do with RM or the RN; the latter two are sea services not land services. In times past there was a reason why before the helicopter the RAF had a maritime branch because of the need for it to rescue its downded crews. This wasn’t a duplication of RN MGB and MTB ops because the latter two were about fighting a sea war. But that doesn’t mean they wouldn’t pull down crews out of the oggin.
So be careful where you see duplication and demarcation.
The USMC? A lot of lads I know over the pond belive the USMC has the most fat to be cut… lol and point to our RM’s of how ‘its supposed to be’ for them just as we point to the USMC for our ‘how it should be’ rants XD
As a commenter has already said, the branches have always worked together in one way or another – grudgingly or willingly – since there was an organised british military.
@ Mike
I don’t think the USMC is as elite as it believes. And I think there is considerable gap between how it is portrayed on US television and reality.
The USMC is very officer light and so dependent on SNCOs to get the job done. The Chinese identify the SNCO as one of the elements that make (some) Western armed services so successful. And so is doing is best to replicate the structure within its own armed services away. Thinking for yourself isn’t the Chinese way, yet.
Mike – I referenced the USMC as a ‘single service’ with a particularly “single service ethos” e.g. they all consider themselves to be Marines first, and then Harrier pilot or cook second.
Whether they have “fat to cut” is a different conversation and you absolutely CANNOT compare USMC to RM, for goodness sake USMC has more manpower than whole of British Armed forces !
The clue with UK RM is in the ‘commando’ role – USMC are expeditionary corps and within it they have units / sub-units which are much closer to RM in role and training – ‘Force Recon’ springs to mind.
Some in the US say they should cut muscle never mind fat – get rid of M1 tank battalions, let the Navy fly jets, etc and concentrate on ‘shedding weight’ and stop being a second army.
X
I am one of the idiots who see merging RM, para,16 AAB; into one Light/ raiding forces division Lets call it say the 90th Light division.
Whatever their ethos etc they have in reality for the last 30 years been almost interchaingably used in the light assult shock troop role. Often replacing each other as in Afghan.
After all Jointness allows for lots more well paid command jobs effectivly duplicating other services jobs etc.
Rather think th answer to the above articles title is a simple: – YES.
@ IXION
Most of the time the RM and Para have been rotating through deployments with line infantry not specifically each other.
There is a difference between shock and light.
I think the paras and the marines should be removed from the regular deployment roulement as soon as and used only in there theatre entry and rapid reaction roles. They should not be merged after all when was the last time the paras where on a amphib ship.
on the whole RM/Para/RAFReg worms, can, for the use of…
Afghanistan has shown the RM and Paras to be more or less the same as other light infantry formations, have The Rifles, for example, got up to the green/maroon beret wearers or are they operating at a level beneath their expertise?
Does this raise question about their continuing existence?
With the loss of the their NATO role, are the RM oversized for their raiding role, could the cold weather thang be distributed across other units?
If the RAF Reg force protection role is so easy, why do they exist and indeed undergoing an enlargement, is it a specialist role?
Where does the term shock infantry come from by the way, its not something I have ever heard in the context of the RM or Paras?
@ Mark
I am now searching to see if Para’s have been on amphibious ship. Too easy to just say ’82!
The reason why 3Cdo is used as line infantry is because the army is short of infantry. It is the reason why the RAF Reg is still with us too.
Um. Contrarily I do think that 3Cdo 4th manoeuvre unit should be airborne. But only for rapid re-enforcement or take important objectives or as a division; then extracted back to the sea. But that is using parachute troops as intended. Quick attack and hold out while a superior force comes to the rescue.
It would be wonderful to have two mini-args (1xLPH, 1xLPD, 2xBAYs)…………
x, you say ‘used’ by the Army as if to imply that the RM and Paras are being dragged kicking and screaming to Afghanistan. Do you honestly think the UK could engage in high intensity operations like AFg and not have them chomping at the bit to get involved?
@TD,
”
Does this raise question about their continuing existence?”
- I don’t think using a specialist unit to substitute for line infantry in any way raises that question
- If you can claim that their specialism will never be needed, then, that would raise the question
Now, now TD I think you are being slightly naughty to provoke a reaction. You know full well what I mean.
Would you prefer me to say MoD or HMG and not army?
As for the Rifles well as much as would like to see the Light Infantry/Royal Green Jackets as were used as light infantry in their historical rule the fact is the The Rifles is just another infantry regiment that happens to recruit from the South West, the English side of the Welsh Marches a few enclaves oop north.
And I am not going to be drawn on why the RAF Regiment continue to exists as my answer may be interpreted as anti-RAF……….
TD you are indeed being naughty, Afghanistan indeed skews everything and is not in itself a reason to get rid of Bootnecks, Paras or Rock Apes.
When was the last time RM was used in Amphib assault role: GW2 Al Faw peninsular.
When was the last time Paras carried out an air drop into action at over battalion strength ? I am not being sarcy’ I really don’t know.
Similarly when was the last time the RAF Regiment ‘force protection experts” saved an RAF base from attack by Spetsnaz, ooops sorry, I mean insurgents ?
Ixion – No point at all discussing roles of individual units and potential mergers into generic “elite, light raiding troops” without big picture grand strategy, full stop.
JED
I was rather working with what we’ve got.
We have these super fit super motivated light infantry types all trained to think in terms of ‘raiding’ etc.
Seems to me the That we should be (under the concentrated force being better principle) Keep them in 1 command.
I remain to be convinced that you cannot teach someone to jump out of an aircraft and a landing craft.
I know I am supposed to be anti RAF but can’t really see why RN are running an infantry brigade.
After all up until general wolf marines were for fighting at sea and nothing to do with the land.
RE “up until general wolf ”
- wasn’t he spectacularly effective with a relatively small force?
@tank Force Generation: It takes an Army of 100K plus to maintain 10k in the field on a medium scale enduring commitment. That does not seem efficient to me.
@Mark 16 AA Bde have just completed their final Afghanistan tour and will return to contingency. 3 Cdo Bde are on their final Afghanistan tour before returning to contingency. Interestingly the majority of 3 Cdo Bde force elements deployed in Afghanistan are army force elements.
@X The reason why 3Cdo Bde are used as ‘line infantry’ is multifaceted:
Defence Planning Assumptions were for one medium scale enduring commitment, the UK ended up with two…
3 Cdo Bde have always had force elements committed to enduring operations (Op Banner in N Ireland for instance), it is how they get experience and justify their existence (under the ‘if you don’t use it you lose it’ rationale).
The British Army was unwilling to change force generation matrices and ‘harmony guidelines’ in ther same way as the US did in order to meet operational requirements. There were good and not so good reasons behind this.
Callum, I am going to be looking at force generation when I start the Army series but whilst on the surface the 10k out of 100k looks poor, there are many very good, and some not so good, reasons.
@ Ixion, its a difficult question isn’t it. There are good reasons why the RM and Paras are different and you might say that the differences in approach, training, doctrine etc deliver more than the inevitable cost overhead of maintaining them seperately but my point all along with this train of thought has been, are these desirable differences worth the premium in a world of decreasing defence funding?
As a personal opinion, I think the RM need to get back to their roots; soldiers aboard ships, commando raiding plus operating in/ securing the littoral/shoreline/riverine area.
The whole ‘we need a specialised force’ argument to get off one big boat onto a smaller boat and onto the beach is stretched a bit too far sometimes, the same with airborne and force protection around airfields. Yes they are specialist tasks, yes they need additional training but not sure they justify a whole separate force to do so
@Jed, amphib assault role, Al Faw. Yes, but in this assault phase were they helicoptered in from Kuwait as well?
The whole lose it or use argument is a bit circular really isn’t it, when was the last time the RAF used an AA missile, the RN a torpedo, the Army an AA missile, quite a long time but that doesn’t mean we should be binning Rapier, Spearfish or ASRAAM does it
It would be gd if it was 10k it’s only 6k in afghan from the regular army. That is positive new on 16 aa and 3 commado. I do dislike this merging of any service unit idea. To me it headline grabbing politics to pretend were doing something when in reality it’s deck chair suffling on the titanic. The are much more underlying difficult and long term changes require in mods organisation and procurement to be down first before we need to resort to the merger option
The use it or lose it arguement is somewhat specious. But a large thrust of the MOD’s current force adjustment is that we cannot afford to keep those capabilities we rarely use, hence the focus within the land element on the focus on elements useful for the fight we are in, and not the fight that we might be in; AD becoming UAV, heavy armour becoming protected mobility et al. We just cannot afford it all. The same argument is used for Trident; it is hard to put a monetary value on deterrence…