Oh how things have changed from the last days of the previous government and the first days of this one.
We were promised a strategic review, an end to boom and bust (oh, sorry, wrong politician), an end to salami slicing defence reviews, a solid strategic bedrock for ‘our brave boys’ and above all else, no more conspiracy of optimism, where jam tomorrow was the default position when the MoD was balancing it’s books.
As we come up to the first year anniversary of this government it is telling that the latest defence news is of a hasty retreat from a politically damaging second round of cuts.
We all knew that Planning Round 11 was going to be bad, rumours started to surface at the end of January and early February about extra cuts as the expected jam tomorrow of Typhoon sales to Oman failed to get out of the jar.
Jim Murphy, the Shadow Defence Secretary, sniffed an opportunity and started windmilling;
The defence review has been rushed and botched. More rushed cuts to capability at this time of great global unrest would be wrong. Ministers must stop and think again
The reality was however, that the MoD had very little room for manoeuvre, with an increasing and high percentage of the budget already committed. The ‘Pay Now and Pay More Later as Well’ PFI bow wave is starting to reach the shores of the MoD and this, along with many other factors, meant that that it was going to have to resort to it’s usual voodoo economics to reach any sort of settlement.
Later in March it was revealed that Liam Fox was in talks with the Treasury about a reported £1 billion gap between fantasy and reality, this being made up of the Oman Typhoon sales mentioned above and fluctuation in fuel costs and currency rates. The indications were that George Osborne was standing firm and that the MoD would have to live within it’s means, however painful that might be.
And that would have been that, the MoD would have had to make those extra cuts.
But over the hill then rode Libya, with David Cameron writing cheques his SDSR ‘adaptable posture’ stance could not cash, some of the capabilities being used were destined for the chop (Type 22′s, Sentinel etc)
What is a politician to do therefore, there is a war on you know!
Of course, it will broker a deal in which the politically damaging headlines of further cuts whilst fighting in two wars can be staved off for another day.
The Government has also shown a huge amount of political cowardice, it is making redundant several tens of thousand of military and civilian posts but instead of allowing these posts to be reduced from the most sensible places it has lurched from one set of media image driven exclusions to another. The main ones being no one deployed on operations, pre deployment training or post operational tour leave (all two weeks of it) when the decision is announced. Given the high utilisation of existing personnel this of course makes things extremely complex and difficult to resolve, I know this might seem harsh and I do not want to seem cruel or oblivious to the operational impact but just because someone is deployed, should not mean they are immune for consideration for redundancy because what is important, is that the forces come out of this exercise stronger than before (remember that one) so making the artificial restrictions simply ties the hands of manning planners.
All because the Government is scared of the headlines of people getting their brown envelopes whilst sitting in a FOB.
This is not protecting the front line, this is not putting the interests of the forces to the fore, it is simply PR spin and a lack of moral fibre that will lead to poor decisions.
Remember those tough decisions, what a joke.
Instead of sticking to the SDSR and matching commitments to it, it would seem like Governments before it, this one has eviscerated capabilities and quantities but carried on grandstanding, talking the big one but only being able to deliver by taking advantage of the inbuilt ‘can do’ attitude of the forces.
Still, I am sure the six hundred odd million Pounds for Pakistani schools, a skills transfer of our painfully won expertise on counter IED and an admission that most of the world’s problems are our fault will make everyone more secure.
This is a good quote from EU Ref which I think sums up the situation quite well
So much for the strategic defence review – which has failed at the first hurdle. This is a policy the Boy and 13th Century Fox had years to think about, years to plan. They forced the pace – they were not interested in debate or discussion. They knew exactly where they were going … straight up a cul de sac.
Back to this non review of the SDSR then, what does it mean.
The SDSR decisions will stand but the extra cuts that were being planned as a result of PR11 will be staved off.
The reported £800m package allows the MoD to avert EXTRA cuts, not do anything about the ones already announced and it will still have to find an additional £200m from somewhere so stand by for more programme delays, those mythical Chinook’s for example.
It is early days yet and there might be a genuine rethinking on the strategic assumptions found in SDSR but in allowing individual equipment and capability issues to take precedence over the wider strategy we are simply following up one rushed botch job with another.
Despite lambasting the previous government about short term expedients that just pile up grief for the future this one is doing exactly the same, all this government is doing is putting off decisions until after the possibility of damaging headlines has passed.
So the nature of this agreement is, well, its a sandwich all right, but its not jam is it?
Its brown, and its not Nutella.
UPDATE 1:
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg says that it is inevitable that changes will be made to the Strategic Defence Review, while Lord West argues that any additional money should be used to reinstate the Harrier Jump Jet.
UPDATE 2:
Defense News are reporting the gap filling deal comprises the following
- 12 month spending moratorium called the Comprehensive Commitment Control regime (3CR)
- This will cover all but essential expenditure
- An MoD spokesman confirmed ”Spending will be focused on operational requirements and issues like health and safety. 3CR will apply to the equipment program”
- Rumours of the Chinook and Warrior CSP being deferred but 14 Chinooks – 12 additional helicopters plus the replacement of two machines written off in Afghanistan – start in 2012 and be completed in 2014
- Training, spare parts and other spending requirements are also expected to be curtailed
- MoD research and technology may also be in the firing line for cuts
Ref: “I know this might seem harsh but just because someone is deployed, should not mean they are immune for consideration for redundancy”
Seriously ? Of course they should be – in this round. For sure tell them they are under consideration once they are back, but for the Army especially discipline, morale and safety on operations are paramount: “right you three I just called out, one step forward, march! Right lads when we get back your redundant, now fall in. OK, gents it’s time to patrol our favorite piece of IED and sniper infested green zone again…. What’s that Smith, yes of course that includes you, your not redundant yet !”
Actually an even better visual would be some redundant Harrier pilot in flying gear poking the PM in the chest while yelling that Top Gun line in his face “son, your ego is writing cheques your body can’t cash !”
The exclusion from involuntary redundancy of those warned off for ops, deployed on ops or recently returned from ops does make it difficult to implement. However the staggering of the redundancies between now and 2015 means that everyone is eligible at some point of time to be made (involuntary) redundant.
In terms of political cowardice I would like to see more political courage in reforming the MOD behemoth encompassing procurement, DCMO, DIO and the rest. Genuine reform would make considerable savings, as well as position the Armed Forces well for the future. Every defence review over the last 20 years has made us ‘leaner and more agile’ except in HQ structures and processes which have become bloated and ossified.
Jed, don’t get me wrong, there shouldnt be any at all and I don’t want to sound unnecessarily cruel and oblivious to the impact on morale and effectiveness but if the forces are to reduce personnel, lets not tie their hands because the PM hasn’t got a backbone
The more things change the more they stay the same.
Already some are talking about a reprieve for the Harrier’s, more money for the Tornado fleet, so they don’t fall out of the sky (HIS WORDS NOT MINE!) and keeping the Type 22′s but not saying where the extra money will come from or how it will all be paid for.
This government seems as scared of the 24 hour news cycle as the last one was.
The quote from EU REF is bang on.
The Libyian intervention is looking more stupid by the day.
Just wanted to point this out.
When the SDSR came out a lot of people pointed out that it contained an assumption that there would not be any major strategic shocks in the next 10 years.
The government implied that we wouldn’t be getting involved anywhere else anytime soon & if we had to, then a short term operation would be doable within without a re-think of the whole SDSR.
In less than 6 months on from that we have ex-service chiefs talking about a re-think.
I just read a service centric article in the Guardian, where the ex-Navy bod estimates the cost of the Libyian thing at near £1 Billion.
Almost exactly the amount that they are now scrambling about to “find”.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/08/naval-air-power-cheaper-than-raf
Fox and friends need to go, it’s clear they don’t know what they’re doing, if their oh so careful plans are shown to have failed in less than 6 months.
The Armed forces recruit 25,000 men every year.
Instead of sacking 17,000, 25,000 will leave and only 8,000 replacement will be hired.
Simple really…
Micheal Civ
Sounds like someones been listening to Sharkey again…
DominicJ
Yes, or is it that the service’s are doing just what the Gov. & Treasury want them to do, i.e. fight & argue amoungst themselves?
I think there is a bit of that but also that the plans & assumptions in the SDSR are dead wrong and what we are seeing is the start of the realisation of that fact.
If we haven’t got the money for robust planning then what are we doing in Libya?
@Jed
You may recall we came deliciously close to that scenario with the Harrier pilot who asked the pointed question when the PM was doing his sales-job at PJHQ.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1321819/Cameron-confronted-hero-Harrier-pilots-serving-son-plans-scrap-jets.html
Dom, if only it were that simple, your suggestion would mean the forces would be bottom heavy!
Hi Michael (Civ),
So this is not a quote from my post on Herc wing fatigue, then: “so they don’t fall out of the sky (HIS WORDS NOT MINE!”?
RE ” also that the plans & assumptions in the SDSR are dead wrong “,
- I would not say quite that, rather
- assumptions a motley collection and too high level to be a reasoned argument, hence
- the plans are haphazard (as for capabilities, scaling them and – first and foremost – how will they fit together for the most likely mission profiles)
TD
I’m not naieve enough to believe there will be no CR’s, but only madness, incompetance or vindictiveness will see PBI in Afghanistan made redundant, unless the regiment wants them gone.
They are all so depressingly predictable. I think West’s opportunism with the Harriers is fairly absurd. Bringing back the Harriers now will do nothing but ‘add to the problem’ as he says of the ‘bow-wave of future costs’ through moving back to 3 types of fast jets. And as he points out the Ark Royal is virtually all the way down the plug-hole so they add no increased utility in terms of carrier operations. He seems to contradict his own reading of the situation.
@ACC
Speak of the devil! I was quoting the good Lord West himself.
While doing the washing up i was thinking about the political effect of finding more money for the MoD. I might be wrong about this and if i’ve missed something i hope someone will tell me what or why.
I think the knock on political effect of this could be really big, i’m not sure what sort of effect exactly but here’s my reasoning.
The coalition government said we have a serious deficit problem and this is our plan to fix it.
Then they go back on the plan cause the situation has changed or they didn’t allocate enough money in the first place. This shows that the plans were/are flawed as they do not stack up to reality.
In many peoples minds there will be a linkage between Libya and the amount of money needed by the MoD, even though that may not be the case, yet.
Think of all the people out there who are already angry about the cuts that are coming.
If they then see the MoD successfully arguing for more money then there will be huge push-back from almost everyone in all of the Gov. departments to re-visit all of the plans.
What will the political fallout be if the Gov. only gets, say, 2 thirds or a half of the cuts through that they came into government saying were absolutely essention or else the sky would fall?
What will the effect be on the markets (who we know we must all bow down to), if the deficit reduction program doesn’t begin to show the results they expected to see?
Anyone for another general election in 1 or 2 years time, when the pressure starts to mount due to the contant back tracking?
What is particularly worrying is not only that they are carrying out this political fudge at all but that the decision in that fudge appear to make no operational sense. So two of the four elements of the fudge are to put back the purchase of 12 Chinooks and to fund the £300m for the Puma upgrade from the Treasury Reserve rather than the MOD budget…. The rationale being touted for this was that the Pumas were needed in Afghanistan (obviously wrong since they are useless in that and most other environments) and that the Chinooks already weren’t going to be delivered in time to be deployed to Afganistan….
One suspects that the real reason is that the Puma upgrade is deemed to be a “must happen” because to cut them would call into question the point of 2 more RAF squadrons and the government’s commitment to provide vital helicopters for the boys…. Whereas the Chinook is a new capability and can hence be safely dropped….
Even if you choose to make a fudge, a better one might have been…. –
1. Scrap the Puma upgrade and the aircraft
2. Form both of the squadrons as a new Chinook operators (increasing the squadrons numbers to 5)
3. Spend the £300m on 16 new chinooks immediately
4. Buy a second batch of new chinooks/merlins when the additional promised money appears (if ever!)
New update
“gap filling deal”
lol there has always been those, it should be the main mantra of the MoD.
Interesting stuff.
At this point, would it be worth reminding that the man Fox has trusted to drive reform is the man who designed the system of procurement that delivers a £22 lightbulb….?
Look for the usual suspects.
Whilst agreeing that the current defence cuts went too deep I cant help but wonder what if any airframe hours are left in the tornado gr4 and harrier aircraft after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The airframes must be getting quite old and costly to maintain. Would it not make sense to lease/buy a newer aircraft from the US such as the F18E/F.
TD said “I know this might seem harsh but just because someone is deployed, should not mean they are immune for consideration for redundancy”
http://www.sparkcaster.com/demotivational/images/tactical%20facepalm.jpg
Not at all X, it is about having the moral fibre to back up your decisions.
With almost constant deployments since the end of the war any redundancies are always going to impact people who are deployed, about to deploy, supporting those who deploy or about to deploy.
I am not saying someone in a FOB should be getting their brown envelope along with his bluey and I think it should be obvious that I do not mean this but if we are to reduce personnel in a rational manner, a manner that meets the needs of the forces and allows them to generate the right skills at the right time then closing off a significant proportion of the personnel base because you are too cowardly to actually face up to the impact of your decision makes me sick.
As I said, being considered for redundancy is not being made redundant
“Still, I am sure … an admission that most of the world’s problems are our fault will make everyone more secure.”
Or the fault of the weasel-faced toffs like Cameron and Blair who’ve run everything since the year dot. My ancestors from our Imperial period didn’t decide to capture Sindh or start the First Anglo-Afghan War. Poor sods didn’t even have the vote.
Maybe Cameron can just apologise for people like himself and leave us out of it? Mind you, nice of him to use our aid money to apologise with, and all.
His conscience, my income tax.
We now have the situation where over 13,900 civil servants from 85,000 have applied for voluntary redundancy during the worst recession since the 1930s. What exactly does that say about morale and the state of management/leadership within MOD? The problem is that those wanting to go will all too often have key skills the MOD needs to retain. They know they can get jobs with defence companies, many of whom will then sell their services back to the MOD at an inflated profit, further reducing value for money. Getting rid of people does not mean that the jobs they do will no longer be required. Someone will have to do the work and this will mean buying in expensive contract services.
It is all too easy to take the popular view ‘good riddance to lazy civil servants’, but many of these leavers will be engineers, research scientists, cost and management accountants, project managers and the like. Their departure will have a direct impact on the ability of the MOD to be an intelligent customer and to manage future equipment projects. We are going to end up like a third world country, buying kit of the shelf without the ability to sustain or modify it, and probably at grossly inflated prices as we lose commercial skills.
This government’s arbitrary decision to get rid of 25,000 civil servants (many of them doing jobs that 20 years ago were done by uniformed personnel, don’t forget) is crassly ideologically motivated (‘they are all public sector wasters’) and downright stupid. Most organisations would at least carry out a full job analysis and target the losses to minimise the damage, but MOD has simply thrown open the doors to departure and we will suddenly find that entire teams and departments have left.
This promises to do just as much or even more long term damage as cutting the Services themselves. And now we have Mr Cameron, a PR man by experience, deciding that he is an expert in grand strategy and wishing to play a leading world role on a defence budget only 45% of that of the late 1980s (by % of GDP). Is there something in the water at Downing Street? At some point we are going to be faced with a major national humiliation and I for one will enjoy the discomfiture of a hopelessly naive political class.
£800 million is a start, but UK armed forces need an extra £ 3 billion a year for the next ten years. The cry will be we cannot afford it. Yet they can find an extra £ 4 billion a year for foreign aid. An extra £450 million pa for the EU. £4 billion for Portugals Euro bail out. £ 650 million for Pakistans Mercedes/IED fund , sorry education scheme.
This feels like the 1930s. !929 stock market crash, the west cut defences, result WW2 in 1939. 2007 Credit crunch, west cuts defences, 2017?
FatMan, you won’t find any mindless CS bashing here
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/11/the-civil-service-bonus-story/
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2009/10/shiny-arse-civil-servants/
The problem is that the West can’t define what defence means. Why is India building up her armed services? Is it as some security studies experts say an example of the phenomena of a rising power aping the practices of established powers? Or does India fear a potential war with Pakistan or China?
Europe has abrogated responsibility for her own security since the end of WW2. Happy for America to do the heavy lifting and yet quick to criticise America for mistakes.
J30,
CS queuing up to leave is merely indicative of constant change in the wings that MB’s mood music plays.
The Department is entirely sclerotic. On the one hand it has just failed to transfer to the private sector the training of P2/3 training through the DTR programme, which ran – with bids on the table – for 5 years. Doubtless, the Department will reflect on this cluster and determine that the outsourcing of its core activity was insanely ambitious.
On the other hand we are expecting the DRU to propose a mass of (guess what)outsourcing.
But really, a taxpayer would be entirely reasonable to ask: if the Government can not privatise a FE Tech college,and takes years and years and years to decide it can’t, wtf hope is there for it to successfully outsource whatever the DRU commends is passed over?
It is too depressing for words. TD really should pen a piece on the cluster of DTR – what it cost and what Defence has to show for it.
Jennings, would love to look at the DTR and various other bits of outsourcing but am somewhat removed and there are only so many hours in the day, do you fancy the job?
The point of the reference to the DRU commending outsourcing is that it will be presented as a panacea and the Department will take a saving in its settlement – which will never materialise… again
@x
Didn’t India say a while back that China was it’s main long term security threat or concern?
I don’t really know what bought that on, maybe to do with Kashmir or Tibet?
Also considering that India has land borders with both China & Pakistan, as well as a few others, i’m a bit suprised at the naval assets that they are building. I know that India sometimes gets very prickly about the water around it but what are they going to do with entire carrier battle groups, that could not be done with land based aircraft? Thinking about their situation, that is.
About America, from their point of view, since we in Europe like to kill each other en mass…..the idea of replacing our ability to do that with a military that is under their control is a good idea. Though i pity the American tax payer.
Although looking at defence expenditure all round right now, it looks to me as though a lot of people are getting jittery. I wish i knew what that was really down to.
@ Mike (Civ)
Both India and China are dependent on resources that move through the Indian Ocean.
The “global” part of the India economy is service based. But as we are finding out in the West to make money first you have to make something!!
China and India have a nationalistic drive. Nationalism is a dirty word amongst the European political elites who put their faith in supranational structures that are far removed for the general populous leading to a sense of discontent between voters and their representatives. Ask a British teen about Europe or even about being British and you will receive an incoherent and ill-defined response. If you ask an India or Chinese teen you will receive if not a reasoned articulate answer the passionate “party” line about how great is their country. And it is from that mind set that C17s are purchased, aircraft carriers are built, and space programs begun.
@Jennings
The point about DTR was that the contractors could not provide the training package they promised (even after MOD watered down the requirements to make them achievable, despite undermining their own key needs). St Athan was a disastrous political choice for the DTR base to keep the Labour-run Welsh Assembly happy after the failure of the Red Dragon project (see the scathing NAO report on this).
The DTR failure was principally one by the Metrix consortium, not the MOD Civil Service, and this is a good case study to illustrate the point that the private sector cannot always deliver what the public sector can. For example, Metrix made the naive assumption that experienced civilian technical instructors from areas like Berkshire, Hampshire and Wiltshire would all happily move their families to a remote part of Wales far from any major town. Simple issues, such as the fact the local schools teach in Welsh, were enough to cause these highly employable staff to make clear they would not be going. Metrix was faced with running critical courses without any instructional staff. Moreover their cost estimates were initially low (to get the contract) and then started to climb remorselessly. Their major concern was the profit, not the needs of national defence. One just has to think of the massive travel costs every year in moving vast numbers of trainees between St Athan and the main UK bases in southern and eastern England to see how badly thought out the economics were.
This project was driven by Gordon Brown’s obsession that PFI was the answer to every problem and would have been a lot more expensive than the heavily criticised £9.5 bn FSTA tanker contract (I heard one DTR projection was for £14.5 bn). This was simply unaffordable in a major recession and would have been a major national scandal. There is still a scheme to rationalise some technical training at St Athan, but the main DTR project was an abortion that has conveniently died.
J30,
It would be interesting to see what the contractors could have done – but to be honest the idea of combining so many in a one and passing the lot over might perhaps have been a madness, not unlike say errrr the DBSO or whatever they are calling it this week.
Do not forget in the many years it took to deliver a preferred bidder, the preferred bidder could not be declared until the “commercial core” of a deal had been agreed. I have no reason to speculate that the problems on DTR (of which there are many) will not be replicated on whatever over ambitious outsourcing initiatives the prats that deliver a £22 lightbulb recommend in the summer….
It is the MoD’s biggest attempt at a PFI – the combined costs of the two packages put it right at the heart of what Defence delivers. And it screwed up – royally. So bad that they tried to hide it when the Defence review was announced…
Its failure should serve as a weather vane to the DRU, but will it?
NFC
@x with ref to movements through the indian ocean, wasn’t there some huge hullabaloo about china building a railway through to pakistan? In fact whilst typing found a link.
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2010-07-07/china/28277199_1_karokoram-highway-indian-border-islamic-militants.
Hi x,
RE your “@ Mike (Civ)
Both India and China are dependent on resources that move through the Indian Ocean”
- very true, and India has the paranoia of being encircled. There is more truth to this than what is in the public domain. Someone on the blog just stated that Sri Lanka is a de facto China colony. Ditto Burma. There is a rumour of 4 blue water PLA(N) bases being constructed in the Indian Ocean arena. There’s your first two… add: Pakistan (a long-standing ally since the 1962 Sino-Indian war, to counterbalance India on land (and in the air)? One in Africa; where?
- Other nations have the same dependency: Five Nation Pact is directed at that; in addition, there have now been 13(!) years of Malabar exercises between USN-India-Japan; some of them in the Indian Ocean, some in the South China Sea.
Hi Paul g,
That railway is only the tip of the iceberg. They have proven their capability in Tibet. But the real network is to pull in Kazakhstan (energy) and in the end Iran (guess what: energy). The Russians are busy countering with a link all the way to St. Petersburg, and the beloved containers will start to flow to a land-locked country. And Iran is of course acutely aware of being potentially cut off from the rest of the world by closing that very narrow Strait (works both ways!).
Slightly across the water from this sites core focus. But if you think it’s bad here, see how far the dutch have just emasculated themselves:
http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/dutch-armed-forces-turning-point
Thanks Wstr,
so similar: the proposed strategy and [future Dutch]force structure “fails because he is trying to please everyone. He wants to keep the Dutch military operating as it has been, at the forefront of the world’s armed forces with broad capabilities. At the same time, he [DefSec] wants to dramatically cut the budget to meet the needs of a government trying to fix the country’s finances. He may achieve the latter goal, while inadvertently squelching the former.”
@ ACC
Exacto-mundo!!
@ PaulG
As you know I am unabashedly pro-navy. Some of that support comes out of my interest in history which has in turn become a sentimental attachment to an “eccentric” culture that can both isolated from the UK mainstream yet represent all that is best of our country.
But the majority of my support comes from what I see is as if not logic perhaps common sense. In the next decades our forces will probably engaged in conflicts at “Falkland” like distances. In the Arctic, in the Antarctic, off the coast of sub-Saharan Africa, off the northern coasts of Australasia. And though TD won’t be happy with me saying this 9 air tankers to support what somewhere in the region of 24 aircraft won’t be off much use; the friendly bases ideal is dangerously flawed. (How much are the Italians charging us for the privileged of dealing with their naughty neighbour?) London to Tripoli is what 1500miles; yet it took a healthy chunk of air support assets just to fly a few elderly jets across friendly skies to launch a handful of standoff missiles. On this website an airgroup of 12 F35s on CVF is seen as something of white elephant; yet in reality can the RAF deploy much more? Can it really project power beyond the confines of Europe from the home islands? No. But as I have said the distances “we” will have to fight will be greater than 1500miles. Even if CVF isn’t packed to the gunwales with aircraft being seen to be participate with coalition partners and contribute well trained (so, so important) balance forces will be of vast importance. No military tool allows us a state exercise power in such a flexible manner than a navy using the sea, a global common, to go where ever its government so chooses.
(I will add as a disclaimer my current defence hobby horse is FSTA!! Can it now Dave! Buy some A400m tankers, give the RAF one big airframe (C17 excepted) to get its jobs done.)
@ WSTR
I have a very good book on the relationship between the Dutch and their armed services. In many ways they are more of a people of the sea than ourselves. So looking down that table all I see is a nation that know the threats it will face in the next 50 years will be outside Europe. Are the frigates being cut? No. Are the submarine being cut? No. (Thank God for that because the Dutch submarines have been an asset FOST have depended on for a good while now.) Will the Russians be marching across the German plains soon? No. The Chinese? No. Still it is a worry.
The only thing wrong with Dutch navy is that a lot of them need haircuts…….
X,
Did they cut the OPVs, though? Still being built, if I am uptodate
And half of one of the most modern AAD systems in Europe?
At least we don’t cut brand new kit ( a lot of existing kit, though, just to pay for new).
The Chinese base strategy is called (or is part of) the “String of Pearls”:
http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/String_of_Pearls_(China)
As with most things, it represents different things to different people; the Chinese are trying to avoid their energy supplies being blocked but the Indians (and to even larger degree the US) see it as encirclement/expansion.
Some info about the “string of pearls” concept, via Information Dissemination. The first article is interesting, seeing it as maritime cooperative security.
http://www.informationdissemination.net/search?q=String+of+Pearls
@ armchaircivvy ‘At least we don’t cut brand new kit’
*cough* Nimrod MRA.4 *cough*
@ X (Dutch maritime focus)
Good point and we’ve had more occasions to thank them for that, rather than curse it, over the centuries. They are still equipped to secure blue-water SLoCs but expeditionary ops (RNLMC still there) will be harder with no medium-lift helos bar the single sqn of chinooks (which eat up flight-deck spots) and giving up all hvy armour when the Danes & Canadians have shown their Leos still add value, even in an Afghan-type op.
@ Andy (giving up new kit)
I’ll add to that – Largs Bay!
I would be mad at the Aussies for getting such a super deal, but at least once the Canberra LPHs are up-n-running, she’ll go on and serve with a proper ARG; rather than run the risk of being increasingly neglected here.
Hi Wstr & Andy,
RE “@ Andy (giving up new kit)
I’ll add to that – Largs Bay!” yes, half new!
Lost for words whether the Nimrods were quarter new, or what? Now, where is the shed that has all the mission systems (they were a major part of the write off)? Or is it an MOD strategic reserve,hidden away, that is meant to work together with Treasury Central/Contingency fund?
@ ACC
Yes I believe two of the Hollands have gone. But if the UK can cope with just 3 Rivers I suspect the Dutch can cope with just 2 Hollands. The frigates can do what the Hollands can; but can the Hollands (as super as they are) do what the frigate can do?
@ WSTR
Yes I hear what you are saying. But you can see the priorities can’t you? For example the MBTs. Is there an immediate land threat to the Netherlands? No. So what about using the MBTs in places like Afghanistan? Well though the Danes and Canucks have had success the MBTs are still wouldn’t you say niche tools. The Dutch seem to have a better appreciation of what kit they needed in A-stan than we did/do. So I don’t think really A-stan is a good case for keeping the MBTs. And don’t you think the West is loosing is appetite for boots on the ground? Keeping all the frigates and submarines mean the Dutch can as you say help keep the SLoCs open with their other Western allies. In extremis this is about keeping fuel and food supplies flowing. On a more day to day less extreme basis it means ships keep flowing in Rotterdam.
Um. Not condoning the Dutch cuts. I can just see some sort of logic to them.
Hi x,
Any more would have been overkill:
- they are good for patrolling a long time, with a v small crew
- they only have one gun, and would have to persecute pirate/ narco/ smuggler chases either with RIBS (why level the playing field??), the helo (will have to shoot to get any effect), or both
- where would you put them then? Probably rotate in and around the Dutch West Indies
@ ACC
Sorry you have lost me. I am not saying the Hollands are poor vessels; on the contrary I think they are rather super. But if the Dutch need to make savings and the choice they face is loosing a De Zeven Provinciën class frigate or Holland class OPV I think they have made the right choice. Yes both ships carry helicopters, RIBS, and gun. But I think the OPV is lacking a AAW missile system and several other fun toys.
Hi x,
We agree
- DZP about the most potent warships for their size
- N-class frigates real warships, not “pretend ones” like Holland-class; the only thing that cast the dice in the right way here was:
1. NL has ambitions to be a supplier in some categories of defence equipment
2. M-class frigates had been sold to Belgium and Portugal (small scale navies) with the promise of a shared “logistics tail”, i.e. lower over-the-life cost
3. Had that promise been broken by decommissioning the Dutch part of the fleet, well: no credibility in any further deals of that kind!
… Wwhooo, how lucky (this time around)
BTW: Now that the(ir) medium utility helos are gone, how do the Chinooks factor in for the lifting the 3 army commando bn’s? One at a time (and none of the three marines bn’s at that time)?
- 3+3 is almost the same as our 16 AAB + 3 CDO, but with under a half of the Apache numbers in support