In the Telegraph today was a call from fifty senior commanders, experts, campaigners and politicians to reconsider the SDSR and PR11 cuts in the light of ‘events in Libya’
The problem with this is that many of these people were part of the problem and might even be the reason the MoD is so badly financially overstretched.
Let’s not forget, we have a significant defence budget, it is just the defence industry, MoD politicians and military form an alliance of fuckwittery unrivaled in the field of spending other peoples money.
After recklessly pissing it up the wall for decades, the existing defence establishment have a certain lack of credibility.
Of course more money would be better, but not without reform.
These people would be better devoting their energies to highlighting meaningful and radical methods of improving the return on the nations significant investment in defence; from the comfort of their pensions and directorships.
Anyone see a problem?
Is that a flashlight advertisement in the middle of a blog post ?!?
I think I recall from my management studies days at university that in order to achieve transformation of an organisation you need to turn over at least 40% of senior management.
The armed forces will not reform themselves willingly, historically the impetus for reform has always been external, whether political imperatives of political. The armed forces are an inherently conservative (small ‘c’) and hierarchical organisation. People progress by working within the system and not against it. In order to reform defence I think we need an issue (we have one, we are broke) and a political will to do so. This should result in a root and branch culling of senior ranks in the Ministry of Defence (civil service as well as military) in order to enable the reform agenda.
Correcting annoying typo (TD – can we have an edit post facility on this?)
I think I recall from my management studies days at university that in order to achieve transformation of an organisation you need to turn over at least 40% of senior management.
The armed forces will not reform themselves willingly, historically the impetus for reform has always been external, whether political imperatives or military and normally it is the latter – military defeat resulting in top down reform. The armed forces are an inherently conservative (small ‘c’) and hierarchical organisation. People progress by working within the system and not against it. In order to reform defence I think we need an issue (we have one, we are broke) and a political will to do so. This should result in a root and branch culling of senior ranks in the Ministry of Defence (civil service as well as military) in order to enable the reform agenda.
“I think I recall from my management studies days at university that in order to achieve transformation of an organisation you need to turn over at least 40% of senior management.”
At the absolute least, 40%.
Even people who want to change, including the people who wrote the new order, often struggle.
“This should result in a root and branch culling of senior ranks in the Ministry of Defence (civil service as well as military) in order to enable the reform agenda.”
The entire edifice is rotten.
OTTAWA — The Conservative government is slamming the door shut on a British proposal that wants the two countries to work together in building new warships.
Correcting annoying typo (TD – can we have an edit post facility on this?)
I think I recall from my management studies days at university that in order to achieve transformation of an organisation you need to turn over at least 40% of senior management.
The armed forces will not reform themselves willingly, historically the impetus for reform has always been external, whether political imperatives or military and normally it is the latter – military defeat resulting in top down reform. The armed forces are an inherently conservative (small ‘c’) and hierarchical organisation. People progress by working within the system and not against it. In order to reform defence I think we need an issue (we have one, we are broke) and a political will to do so. This should result in a root and branch culling of senior ranks in the Ministry of Defence (civil service as well as military) in order to enable the reform agenda.
“Canada will not be pursuing collaboration with the United Kingdom on our new surface combatant fleet,” Jay Paxton, a spokesman for Defence Minister Peter MacKay, said Sunday.
Hi Callum, have installed an edit feature but it didnt seem to work when I tested it, can you do another comment and see if you can edit it
I think we would need more context to have a proper discussion; DRU – its brief, composition and anything (nothing?) heard since.
How do the Defence Board and DRU inter-relate? Are any items cross-referred as a rule? Or is it all left down to person(alitie)s sitting on both?
In my very personal opinion, nominating an ex-intelligence chief to Def.Sec. in the US has added more of the political dimension than having a politician in the seat. Would that equate to a cross-bencher here? Nothing against Dr. Fox, he inherited a mess, but by May some order should emerge (see how generous, Presidents are only given 100 days).
Most of the stuff can be found through the MOD and Cabinet Office websites.
From the Defence Reform Review Terms of Reference:
The Review is to be a fundamental examination of how the Ministry of Defence is structured and managed. Its purpose is to develop a new model for Departmental management, which is simpler and more cost-effective, with clear allocation of responsibility, authority and accountability.
The Review should take account of:
• the Secretary of State’s vision of a leaner and less centralised Department that is built around policy and strategy, the Armed Forces, and procurement and estates;
• the need for a more effective and efficient approach to force generation;
• the need to deliver integrated Defence outputs, including in current operations, and the importance of joint Service activity and effective military/civilian cooperation for that purpose;
• the need to reduce MOD running costs significantly;
• any decisions of the Strategic Defence and Security Review which significantly impact on Defence organisation and management; and
• the Permanent Secretary’s role as principal Accounting Officer for the Defence budget.
The Review will be overseen by a steering group (the Defence Reform Unit) chaired by Lord Levene, the other members of which will be:
Baroness Noakes
Dr David Allen
Raymond McKeeve
Björn Conway
George Iacobescu
Gerry Grimstone
General Sir Nick Houghton (VCDS)
Ursula Brennan (MOD Civil Service)
Detailed work in support of the Review will be undertaken by a small team within the Ministry of Defence.
The Review should aim to provide final recommendations by the end of July 2011.
Some of the workstrands being looked at are:
– Defence Infrastructure
– Force Generation
– Acquisition and Support
– Corporate Services
– Review of top level management of Defence and Operations
Thanks Callum, I had seen those, hence the emphasis on “since.
But we are here (?) laying the foundations for a good thread (or redirecting this one from being a rant?); will cherry pick from your quote:
- Just what I would prescribe: ” less centralised Department that is built around policy and strategy, the Armed Forces, and procurement”, BUT
– policy & strategy… where is it? Can’t build around it without articulating it
- My favourite pair of words there “more effective and efficient approach to force generation”
– sounds like better use of reserve components (all for it)
– efficient vs. effective = sticking to the old routine, then you make more mistakes, but being effective goes back to policy & strategy (and threat scenarios; YES – have read read the output of the “futures unit”. I was with the Club of Rome in the 60′s and 70′s and they were right – we can see it now – but a lot has happened in the “middle”)
- and last, but not least for this forum: any decisions of the Strategic Defence and Security Review which significantly impact on Defence organisation and management… which might those be(?); why is there a deafening silence around PRxyz and how might that relate to the March meeting (decisions by the Defence Board, hence my x-reference from the DRU)
As per usual its all little bits of this and little bits of that, what exactly do we expect the DRU to do that will be so radical ?
As per usual the lack of “grand strategy” hampers all efforts.
1. This is our grand strategy for the next 40 years
2. This is our strategy for the next 20 years
2. This is our short term plan for the next 3 to 5 years and our medium term plan for the next 5 after that…….
This level of forward looking planning, would include a decision and a thoroughly worked out and communicated decision on the political aspects of defence procurement:
1. Defence is too big an issue for petty party politics, so to minimize the local constituency issues we will…..
2. UK defence industry is important, so we will buy x amount of kit from UK suppliers without competition, in a declared strategy to support our industrial base……
3. UK armed forces are now too small to warrant an defence industrial strategy, we will buy all kit “off the shelf”……
Pick your preferred approach. I have no faith in the DRU, as I have no faith in the current administration being able to do anything radical or exciting on any issue – how can they, they are a middle of the road coalition, they reek of mediocrity (by the way I am not saying their predecessors were any better).
Ah – the chief Druid, who in his last sojourn in the Department implemented the system that gave you the £22 light bulb of tomorrow’s chip wrappings.
What hope for his radical reforms?
Hi Jed,
RE ” I have no faith in the DRU, as I have no faith in the current administration being able to do anything radical …they reek of mediocrity (by the way I am not saying their predecessors were any better)”
- exactly the reason, why I thought why putting DRU up for discussion now, rather than after they have delivered/ disbanded might be a good idea (only because it might be important, ie. what they do, not our “hot air”)
Okay….
The Defence Reform Steering Group reports directly to the Secretary of State for Defence. Below them sits the Defence Review Programme Board which consists of the three service Assistant Chiefs (ACNS, ACGS, ACAS) and a plethora of MOD civil service and joint appointments. Below this is the Defnce Reform Unit proper. The Defence Board is regularly briefed on the work of the Defence Review.
I would be amazed if this set up will work as I doubt that any of the three services or indeed the MOD will vote for Christmas and implement root and branch structural reform, rather they will want to tinker with the status quo. Therefore trying to get the Services to facilitate the work of the DRU is unlikely to accomplish anything meaningful. Reform has to be imposed with the Services and the MOD justifying why it cannot happen, not why it should not or could not happen and as ever – a clear strategy for what we want Defence to achieve and some financial planning assumptions would be ever so slightly useful.