Before starting this discussion we should all fully understand that project CVF is not a strategic priority for the current Government, if they could, they would have cancelled them in an instant. It is a combination of industrial and political factors that will result in the MoD paying for two, but planning on only bringing one into service, and whether the unwanted sibling will be sold or simply placed straight into extended readiness is not yet clear, as is the likelihood of this second vessel being fitted with catapults.
So for one carrier and a half completed one that might be sold off or not the UK taxpayer will likely be paying in excess of £6 billion and if I were a betting man I would definitely have a punt on the final cost going beyond lucky number seven.
And this is without a single aircraft.
Clearly, it is not a good example of acquisition best practice and is a stark reminder of how we should never again let equipment dictate strategy rather than strategy dictating equipment, or, commonly known as the SDSR approach.
Despite this, in many ways the project has been steaming along very nicely indeed, the blocks continue to be built, contracts are being placed and progress is self evident. When all said and done, CVF is actually a relatively simple, relatively low risk design.
We should draw a distinction between factors internal and external to the project, fiscal and political issues are largely beyond the control of the project and yet responsible for the overwhelming majority of cost inflation and delays.
The root causes of the problems on Project CVF have been politics and financial ‘short termism’, can we really blame the MoD and Royal Navy for all these, I don’t think so, but, they must shoulder some.
Squabbling between service chiefs and yes, cock waving, have also joined the supporting cast.
After the 1998 SDR in which CVF was announced, it took several years to place the order and this order was conditional on bringing former competitors together into an uneasy industrial alliance. As the MoD equipment budget experienced more and more pressure, as other projects ballooned in cost and budgets remained static, the need to balance the yearly budget overspend led to a whole raft of short term decisions, delaying projects and de scoping them allowed a short term budgetary crisis to be averted but inevitably pushed additional costs out the following years.
The impact of this was well known so it should have come as no surprise to anyone when another billion and a half was added to the bill for project CVF. The NAO has made several stinging criticisms of the MoD for this practice, paying more by paying later and the practice, commonly known as whistling and hoping the problem will go away, seems to be very common, arguably one of the more widespread causes of project cost inflation.
It might be seen as unfair to blame the service chiefs for these problems but they were willing accomplices in the jam tomorrow strategy, instead of changing projects they settled on a strategy of wishful thinking and all three were guilty in this respect.
It is the current government that has ‘called time’ and for this, despite the uncomfortable results, they should be roundly congratulated.
Because of this cost inflation and at a time when the Army was experiencing serious equipment shortages in Iraq and Afghanistan is it any wonder that carriers were starting to come under severe pressure, the debate/argument/slanging match between the services about the relative slice of the defence budget intensifying as costs rose.
This reflected both poorly and somewhat unfairly on the project team but amplified the distortion to the Royal Navy equipment plan caused by CVF. And distort the plan it has, self evidently, the Admiralty have traded off ship after ship and capability after capability in order to retain CVF in its original form. As costs have risen the need to make ever deeper cuts has been the painful result, making cut after cut in return for jam tomorrow put the RN in a very poor negotiating position with the Treasury and other services, others knew full well they could ask the First Sea Lord to wave his tackle at the cameras in Downing Street in return for CVF and he would more or less have to do it.
By continually failing to budge on CVF, the Royal Navy paid an ever more expensive price to do so and in what some might see as irony, the very fact that the RN has no carriers and carrier aircraft to offer Operation Ellamy is precisely because of the desire to have CVF shaped carriers and FAA insignia bearing carrier aircraft.
One might reasonably argue that the inability of the Royal Navy to see any future at all without CVF and a reluctance to consider alternatives has led them to mortgage off the rest of the fleet in order to get the carriers and rebuild from there.
The strategy it would seem; is the get CVF at any cost and rebuild around there in the long term, again, equipment tail wagging strategy dog.
Personally, I think it was a poor strategy and has resulted in a much reduced surface and sub surface fleet, a fleet that is arguably more relevant to UK security and more useful in the majority of operations the UK and Royal Navy will be involved.
There is also a less visible effect of rising cost, as night follows day, the subsequent reaction to a politically or fiscally induced cost over-run is to get out the red pen and start deleting line items from the design shopping list.
In practice, what this means is a gradual de-specification of the design and unfortunately it is a well trodden path. At the end of that path lies an expensive white elephant that flatters to deceive. It may well give the impression of being world beating but scratch the surface and the reality becomes only too apparent. These deficiencies may be rectified at a later stage but it will be several times the cost of doing the job right in the first place.
There have been numerous design compromises, deleting credible self defence systems, having a smaller than desirable hangar and a lower than optimal speed are just three examples that are paving the way to the end of that elephant width path.
But to repeat an oft repeated phrase, we are where we are and CVF in one form or another is a reality.
Conversations now should be all about how we maximise value on our not inconsiderable investment.
To do this we have to remove any trace of sentimentality or desire for prestige and look across the whole of the defence landscape, paying particular attention to the joint capabilities on offer.
CVF is not a Royal Navy vessel in isolation, it is part of a complex tri service defence capability set and it is in this context which it must be viewed.
Far too many people view it as an isolated maritime capability or as a way of preserving independence, being in the top league, punching above its weight and assorted other sentimental nonsense.
This attitude has no place in modern defence planning and to those that think this way, I would simply say, please, get with the reality of modern joint capability planning.
I am not going to suggest another defence review where the RAF is raped and pillaged and the Royal Navy gets all the toys, throwing a few consolation prizes like support helicopters to the Army Air Corps, I don’t suppose any of you will be expecting this from me but I thought I would set the scene.
I also still think we should have cancelled CVF a long time ago and instead had three or four smaller vessels to replace CVS, Ocean and the LPD’s but the opportunity for that has long since passed.
In the next paragraphs I am going to explore how I think we can derive maximum benefit for an acceptable cost, not rehearse the reasons for or against maritime aviation, a maritime strategy or why we should have binned Tornado and kept Harrier.
Contents
- The Strategic Landscape
- Usage
- Rotary
- Fast Jets and the Joint Combat Aircraft
- Option 1 – Carry on Normal Jogging with the F35C
- Option 2 – Cancel F35C and develop a carrier capable Typhoon
- Option 3 – Cancel F35C and buy another carrier capable aircraft
- Option 4 – Switch back to F35B
- Option 5 – Unmanned
- A Proposal
- Summary
The Strategic Landscape
Most arguments for and against CVF tend to gloss over the strategic landscape and more importantly, completely ignore fiscal and political reality. Instead of some vague notions of sea lanes, punching above our weight, being in the top division and we are an island; CVF must be firmly rooted in reality.
The first reality is a fiscal one, after Nimrod, FRES, T45, Astute, A400, Typhoon and numerous others the government would seem to be in no mood for special pleading from the MoD. The fact is, the MoD needs to regain and retain some measure of fiscal credibility. The scope therefore, for significant extra money for new projects, is limited, however much we promise that this time it will be different.
The second major reality is a strategic planning one, it was quite clearly stated as far back as the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and reiterated in the SDSR that the direct military threat to the UK is very low and that the future nature of operations would be expeditionary and largely collaborative.
Working in partnerships and coalitions will be the norm.
The UK should be still able to undertake a small scale focussed intervention without external assistance but anything above that scale or for a longer duration will be in conjunction with others.
This applies equally to air and land forces as well, just in case anyone was wondering, so we must carefully select capabilities and maintain them at a scale that delivers influence in such operations without impacting our obligations and requirements in other areas of defence.
Some might view maritime fast jet aviation as one of those capability areas that delivers this influence in a coalition but I am sceptical and would not prioritise it above other areas, at least not disproportionately.
Looking into the medium term, carriers do provide some hedge against uncertainty because of their inherent flexibility but a reasonable assumption would be that CVF is more likely than not to be engaged in operations against non peer or proxy nations and in a coalition with others. The location of these most likely future scenarios will be in the Middle East and Africa although as a system, it has to be able to operate anywhere because it might be argued that equally as likely is conflict in the polar regions.
So, setting the strategic landscape we must then consider how it could be used and for what purpose because it all informs equipment and design choices.
Usage
When considering the what’s and how’s of carrier missions the first thing we must ask ourselves is what do we want to achieve. Only then should we determine if a carrier is the optimal method of achieving that objective and if the answer is yes then equipment and others questions would need answering.
We should not be afraid of lateral thinking, if the requirement is first day strike then are aircraft necessarily the best means of delivery. Perhaps a containerised Storm Shadow that could be carried by any number of surface vessels might be a more cost effective means of fulfilling that requirement, I am not arguing for or against but saying that alternatives can sometimes be attractive and worthy of consideration.
CVF was originally a pure strike platform, optimised for attacks against land targets.
Our thinking around how we could use CVF should be centred on building up a capability that we already have and the obvious strength in this context is littoral manoeuvre from the sea or amphibious operations. We already have a strong capability in this area and CVF offers the possibility of improving this to an even greater degree if we put to one side notions of it being used a single minded strike platform with 36 fast jets. It also fits in with my thinking about the UK’s future approach to defence, this being the maintenance of as many capabilities as sensible at a small enough scale to satisfy the unassisted small scale focussed intervention as per SDSR, supplemented with a number of ‘capability plus’ areas that deliver influence in coalition operations and provide for a greater security by virtue of regional engagement and intelligence gathering.
In the recent ‘future of the Royal Navy’ series of posts I suggested that the Royal Navy retain a small but effective striking force or Single Task Group but supplemented it with a greater forward presence to build regional security and provide better intelligence.
The proposal to repurpose CVF is entirely in keeping with this approach.
Recent operations in Libya, particularly the joint USN/USMC TRAP operation to recover the downed F15 aircrew have demonstrated the value of being close and having responsive forces. It also demonstrated the complementary nature of land and naval aviation. In UK parlance, the Joint Personnel Recovery mission is one which we are relatively poorly resourced for. I would like to see this change; the value of downed aircrew, special-forces, conventional forces, journalists and NGO personnel etc to a terrorist group or opposing regime is significant. Capture, torture and manipulation of them to change the strategic direction of an operation is a very effective tactic and one to which the UK has very little in the cupboard to counter. This is not an area that I think we should or could rely on others to fulfil.
Unpredictability, choosing an entry point that suits you not the enemy and speed are can provide significant results in a range of operational scenarios. It should come as no surprise that in the forthcoming series on Land forces I will place a great emphasis on rapid reaction forces.
[Don’t let that lull you into a false sense of security though, I am not going soft on Strategic Raiding!]
This also allows the UK to exploit the size of CVF, space provides flexibility (a good argument for size if ever there was one) and the ability to embark a capable force from a large deck in a single hop i.e. speed.
Some missions will be aviation centric but these are likely to be less frequent and as would be the norm (operating in a coalition) other nations can carry out these roles, France and the US being the most likely partners.
A reduced emphasis on fast jet aviation, strike, interdiction, close air support and defensive/offensive counter air changes the requirement for JCA, reducing numbers and reducing cost. JCA would still be needed at the scale and capability for the small scale focussed intervention but that would be the baseline, anything above that becomes discretionary.
What does this mean for CVF?
First, it recognises that CVF has value, a lot of value.
Second, it means that to maximise that value the role of CVF should be changed.
Rather than prioritising fast jet aviation and using it as a strike optimised platform it will become more multi-purpose in nature. Operating with a mix of aviation and embarked forces. Many will say it can do this anyway and in some ways they would be right, CVF is designed to offer a secondary LPH capability, but this would mean CVF becomes more akin to the USMC America Class, aviation optimised amphibious vessels.
Strike and high intensity counter air become secondary roles, modifications and the fast jet air wing would reflect this.
Rotary
Whether it be Apache Attack Helicopters, Merlin/Chinook Support Helicopters or whatever comes after there are many options for a blend of rotary wing aircraft.
MASC/ASaC/AEW or whatever we are calling it this week is an area where people assume that just because we might use catapults it is an automatic shoe in for an E2 Hawkeye but again, we must smack those sweet shop bound fingers with a bit of fiscal and strategic reality. It is unclear if there even exists any funding for a Merlin based solution, post the withdrawal of Sea King in the 2016 time frame. To start with, the baseline must always be a small scale focussed intervention. For this, a helicopter based solution would seem to be perfectly adequate. There have been a number of proposals to palletise and transfer the equipment from the existing Sea Kings and lift and shift into a small number of Merlin airframes. This is a low risk and relatively low cost solution that still provides an adequate level of capability, in fact the existing Sea Kings are seriously underestimated.
Although flexibility is the watchword, a typical aircraft load would be 6 to 12 JCA and 24 to 30 helicopters (mix of Apache, Merlin SH/Chinook, Wildcat, Merlin ASW and Merlin ASaC)
We all know the UK is light on vertical lift capability but there is never enough money to pay for, the respective services have never given enough priority to helicopters. So how we do get the money for more, simply have less fast jets.
Fast Jets and the Joint Combat Aircraft
Some missions might require no fixed wing aviation at all and there is no shame in operating CVF without a compliment of JCA, put your teeth back in now!
Once you get beyond the aircraft carrier sometimes with no aircraft theme it is logical, but a normal (if there is such a thing) compliment of JCA would be in the region of 6 to 12. The America Class has 10 as its standard compliment for example, the Juan Carlos 1 and Cavour a similar number. Of course CVF is larger than these vessels but that is not the point and being larger than these alternatives provides excess space for stores (meaning greater un-replenished endurance), accommodation and the ability to surge up should needs dictate.
In defensive counter air and in conjunction with Type 45, Merlin ASaC and with support from land based aircraft in some instances should still be able to provide adequate protection against the scale and capability of likely opposition in the SSFI scenario. If there is a greater threat we would still have the option to surge or simply rely on others in the more likely coalition instance. Offensive counter air might also involve land attack, much better to destroy the ability of opposing forces on the ground than in the air and this opens up a number of options, particularly with cruise missiles.
Interdiction, recce and close air support would still be at a high enough level for SSFI, even with 8 to 12 embarked aircraft and again, the ability to blend air delivered munitions with those delivered by long range land based UAV’s, ship/submarine launched loitering munitions and cruise missiles allows a reduction in overall aircraft numbers for a given delivered effect.
Thinking in a joint context and with multiple means of mission delivery logically reduces the aircraft count.
The current preferred option to fulfil the Joint Combat Aircraft is the F35C but it has yet to reach Main Gate so that means almost anything is possible!
When looking at JCA it is important to understand the word joint is there for a reason, both the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Air Force will be operating a common aircraft type for joint missions, the services and MoD grasping the ruthless commonality nettle.
I think this is the reason for so much vitriol, the grown-ups at the MoD imposed an aircraft choice based on sound operational and financial factors, sweeping away service centric concerns and I wonder if either service really wanted the B model. The Fleet Air Arm wanted the C model and RAF the A model, why, because looking at the issue in a service centric stovepiped manner logically leads to a two type fleet.
The B model is a compromise, it is neither perfect for the RN or RAF but that is exactly the point, it was supposed to be the perfect solution for the UK.
The STOVL F35B was therefore the outcome of studies about how the JCA would most likely be deployed, initial operations on board followed by a transition to land bases for the sustainment phase. Not only that, it would allow CVF to dispense with catapults and barriers, thus significantly reducing capital and through life costs of the vessel. It would also neatly dispense with the training overhead of maintaining carrier operation currency for flight crew. To safely operate from conventional carriers requires a high level of skill and that skill is perishable. This means regular training and having to use a greater proportion of the aircraft fleet for this training, adding yet more cost.
By using STOVL, this continual and regular training requirement would be dramatically reduced, as regularly demonstrated with the Harrier achieving proficiency for carrier operations could be achieved in days by RAF aircrew. Of course it would be better to maintain and enhance these skills for all pilots but the ability to quickly surge or reinforce the carrier capable aircrew for the most likely operations was seen as a compromise worth taking because of the cost savings.
What this decision did was impose some order on the squabbling children at the heads of the RAF and RN, no more stovepipes, no more empire building and no more needless duplication. By sharing, the overall fleet size could be reduced and money saved.
This much sanity was doomed to failure.
This was the stated position for a long time until a couple of things happened.
The F35 and especially the STOVL B model started to have ‘problems’ and the keys to Number 10 changed.
Announced in the SDSR was a switch to the F35C or conventional carrier variant, an obvious design change to the carriers (even though they really wanted to cancel them) and a bit of wishy washy uncertainty about what would happen to the second carrier on order.
Explaining the switch, Liam Fox and David Cameron stated that it would provide better interoperability with allies, cost less to buy and offer better performance.
So F35C it is then.
In subsequent parliamentary questions the MoD has made it absolutely crystal clear that it does not yet know the full cost implication of the switch and given the widely acknowledged fact that SDSR was rushed I suspect when pennies start to drop and spreadsheets start to have more detail the MoD is going to be in for a rude awakening.
For the purposes of discussion, I am going to have a look at alternatives to the existing position.
Option 1 – Carry on Normal Jogging with the F35C
Why, I have to admit I was perplexed by the switch to F35C, it annoyed our principal expeditionary operations partner, the USMC and resulted in yet more delays and costs but I can see the logic in a service centric and more importantly politically expedient fashion.
Cost, the reality of F35 is that no one really knows how much they will cost despite the millions of words and countless spreadsheets but it is a reasonable assumption that the C model will have a lower price tag than the B model. The real costs, those inconvenient through life costs, have yet to be fully realised. The other truth about the F35C is that the MoD does not know how much extra the non aircraft costs will be. It may well be within their cost model boundaries but when did the MoD ever make a cost estimate that was worth the paper it was written on?
Additional costs include delay costs, which we know run into the billions and the modifications to the design of CVF, principally for catapults and barriers. The electromagnetic catapult design has not yet been selected, whether it will be the US or UK designs is not certain but one this is certain, they will not be cheap.
Putting the capital and delay costs into the shade will be increased through life costs.
Again, this is a complex set of equations, the B model is more complex than C and will logically cost more to maintain but in looking at the operating costs as published in Parliament of a Harrier and Tornado, there isn’t that much difference. Twin engine v single engine or conventional v STOVL makes an interesting cost comparison exercise for spares and maintenance but the F35 will be single engine in all variants. The B model lift fan will require extra maintenance but the C model also has additional systems and the airframe gets a maintenance intensive battering every time it takes off and lands, however gentle the electromagnetic system will be.
There is also the not insignificant maintenance requirement for the catapults and barriers themselves.
So whilst the differences between the C and B model in terms of maintenance may yet turn out to be fewer than expected the real cost differences lie in pink things.
To manage the catapult and barrier system will require additional staff in the DE&S Integrated Project Team, another set of contracts to manage and additional maintenance personnel to pay for. These are recurring costs whether we fly a single mission or not. The deck crew will need expanding also and training courses changed/added.
Each extra crew slot requires pay, housing, welfare, healthcare and pension payments that will need to be maintained for longer as people grow older.
Behind those extra crew are the logistical and management tail, even an extra course for catapult operations and maintenance will require staffing.
It is personnel costs that are growing in proportion to their number, in short, personnel are getting more and more expensive which is exactly why western nations do not carry out labour intensive manufacturing and are automating as many tasks as possible.
Military forces are no different and yet we have made a decision to increase personnel.
Risk, the C model has a lower risk than the B, some think that the B model may be cancelled and it is on probation in the eyes of the US Department of Defence. Risk might have been a significant factor in the decision
Capability, no doubt, the C model beats the B model in terms of performance so in this regard it is a sound decision
Industrial, no change really, yes we have the development programme B models but that is not entirely wasted and too much is made of this by the press. Whichever model is chosen the defence industrial benefits to the UK are significant.
Politics, this is I think the principal reason for the switch to the C model because it allows the Royal Navy to resource share with the French. There has been a strong move to greater military cooperation with the French and short of buying Rafale, a switch to conventional carrier operations means that a CVF could form part of an interchangeable and shared carrier force. The fact that there was a CTOL F35 variant is a happy convenience that means we don’t have to upset the US by switching to Rafale and yet can still also keep the Anglo/French alliance satisfied by sharing CVF. I think it is likely that the second, unloved and unwanted CVF, will be sold to France at cost and the UK and France will maintain a joint carrier strike group, one nation sitting in the hot seat on a rotational basis and covering each other’s refit periods. The Charles de Gaulle will be withdrawn as soon as this becomes a practicality.
So with this politically driven, resource sharing background, switching to CV makes perfect sense.
Option 2 – Cancel F35C and develop a carrier capable Typhoon
Why, isn’t it obvious, cost and commonality but it would be a significant development effort for a small number of airframes with little export potential.
Cost, the great conundrum when anyone suggests navalising Typhoon, perhaps the Tranche 3 aircraft and that is the cost. Whether the chosen option is to turn Typhoon into a conventional carrier version for use with cats and traps or a STOBAR design with a ski jump and barrier assisted landing system the cost of either option is uncertain. If it is feasible within an acceptable technical risk boundary then the cost benefits of having a single type with as much commonality as possible, should be obvious to all. It is an attractive proposition from a cost perspective, no doubt.
Risk, the detractors of Sea Typhoon tend to deride the very notion and dismiss it out of hand but I do wonder if those doing the laughing are the ones with most to lose, the RN and RAF, because they would no longer be getting the keys to the shiny new F35. As we have seen, both services are keen to get their hands on the F35 and the perception is that a Sea Typhoon would be a retrograde step. Hard facts are very difficult to obtain about the feasibility and therefore technical risk, some say combining advances in modern avionics, thrust vectoring, the QinetiQ work on F35 SRVL, older work on the Rockwell MBB X31 and the inherently strong Typhoon airframe would allow a STOBAR derivative to be developed within a sensible risk fraction. Others say the idea is barking mad and would result in a complete waste of money.
Capability, we know Typhoon is a sophisticated aircraft and when combined with the full range of UK weapons would be a formidable capability.
Industrial, swings and roundabouts, we may (possibly) lose some of the F35 work, although the F35 development MOU splits the numbers bought from industrial participation, it would be difficult to envisage a situation where the UK purchased no F35’s but carried on with the industrial participation, stranger things have happened though. On the other hand there would be considerable work accrued from developing a STOBAR Typhoon.
Politics, it would be difficult to manage the impact with the US of withdrawing from the F35 programme but would leave the Anglo-French CVF ‘sharing’ deal in place.
Option 3 – Cancel F35C and buy another carrier capable aircraft
Why, if we make the assumption than an F35C alternative is worth pursuing because of cost issues and a Sea Typhoon is not feasible then a number of alternative options open up.
F18, Rafale, Hal Tejas, Harrier III and Sea Gripen all sit on a three way capability/cost/risk matrix, each with different advantages and disadvantages.
Cost, whatever the cost of any of these alternatives, they would have to be significantly cheaper than the F35 to make it worthwhile, especially given the relatively small numbers in this proposal. Cost is the only reason for even looking at these non Typhoon alternatives and when the ‘small print’ costs like weapon integration are added I am sceptical that the cost savings would be significant.
Risk, some, like the F18 and Rafale M are very low risk, existing aircraft with only weapons integration to complete. Others like the Sea Gripen or Harrier III represent an unknown quantity and might not be available within the required timescale.
Capability, compared to the F35B one might argue that the F18 or Rafale do not fall far short in capability terms and bring different qualities to the mix. The others would offer a greater shortfall in capability but it would all come down to cost. Suffice it to say, most of these alternatives would be good enough for the majority of the mission requirements for the majority of time, whether they would meet the JCA requirements is another matter.
Industrial, a difficult one to answer but likely less than either the F35 or Sea Typhoon
Politics, interestingly, most of the alternatives would offer something positive in political terms
Option 4 – Switch back to F35B
Why, it was originally selected as the preferred option for the Joint Combat Aircraft requirement for very good reasons and I think we have allowed ourselves to get spooked at the technical issues and rising costs whilst succumbing to inter service machinations.
Cost, by switching back to the F35B we would still of course be liable for the additional capital costs. These costs are rising and they is no point trying to hide that fact but I also think that some of the hype surrounding the F35B costs are over played. A switch back would also instantly eliminate the additional capital and significant through life costs of going for the catapult options.
Risk, a slightly risky option because there is a chance that the F35B will be cancelled but I do think this is a slight risk. The USMC aviation strategy is built upon the F35B and even though they have bought into the C model I can’t see this changing.
Capability, in some aspects, the F35B has the lowest performance of the options but two things must be remembered. The F35B originally met the JCA specification and it will still be a step change in capability from the Harrier and Tornado. Reduced signature design and the sensor fusion on offer will mean it will remain relevant for a long time and despite a number of issues with what might constitute and austere location it has the greatest flexibility.
Industrial, the existing industrial participation arrangements will be retained and although the share may come under some pressure as the overall order is reduced the agreement more or less states that order volume has no relationship to the industrial share of the programme, it is the development cash we stumped up (£2b) that counts.
Other, it would be embarrassing flip flopping
Politics, instead of being interoperable with the French and US Navy we will be interoperable with the USMC and all the former Harrier operators that will eventually buy the F35B.
Option 5 – Unmanned
There are various unmanned options such as the X47 development and even the Anglo French programme that might eventually come out of Taranis but it is unlikely they will be practical options for several years and the cost seems to be rather open ended.
An unmanned system might also require significant satellite bandwidth, even with the advances in autonomous operation and onboard processing, satellite bandwidth that we don’t have.
It is also unlikely that an unmanned system would be able to fulfil the counter air role for several decades.
Unmanned systems are usually characterised by very long range which kind of negates many of the advantages of carrier launch.
In the introduction to this post I wondered if we could actually carry out some of the penetrating strike role with cruise missiles, maybe we can.
Finally, unmanned systems sound far too much like expensive jam tomorrow and the RAF is already trying to ditch yesterday’s news, the Typhoon, in favour of the shiny new model.
A Proposal
I actually think CVF does has a lot of potential, I know you lot might be surprised by this but my objections have always been on cost grounds. This proposal is one possible method of squeezing maximum value for the investment in the most likely missions it will be required to fulfil.
- Switch back to the F35B for JCA
- Obtain enough to maintain a minimum of 6 on board permanently so that we can maintain a littoral manoeuvre capability and more importantly, the skills to do so, on an enduring, always available basis
- In addition, obtain enough to maintain a minimum of 6 on an enduring land based operation (rotating with Typhoon as necessary) to support the deployed multi role brigade. the Typhoon would be more numerous and therefore find itself deployed for longer
- This allows for continuous cover for an enduring land operation of Multi Role Brigade strength whilst still maintaining enough capacity for the rapid reaction force to be available at short notice without impacting the enduring operation
- Total aircraft and crew numbers would be determined once maintenance and force generation factors become known
- For a one off, short duration operation the non deployed force could be used, STVOL supporting greater basing flexibility (land or sea)
- The RAF should stop dreaming about hordes of F35’s and get on with the job of deriving maximum benefit from the eye watering and defence budget distorting entity that is Typhoon. We need to start sweating our assets, not always looking over the fence
- Equally, the Fleet Air Arm and Royal Navy should stop dreaming about having a mini me CVN and concentrate on creating a credible entry from the sea capability with a much greater vertical lift capability, reductions in F35 purchase would provide the funding for this change in emphasis
- The FAA would cease operating fast jets and the aboard aircraft would be RAF operated. We can’t afford two air forces and the largest one, the one that can achieve some economy of scale and is focussed on managing fast jets, should have primacy
- Invest in greater platform diversity for Storm Shadow and TLAM
- Complete both CVF with one maintained as an in service spare to cover refit periods
- Investigate role of reserve forces to maintain second CVF at a level of readiness sufficient to provide some measure of resilience and refit cover
- Do not replace Ocean, the role to be covered by CVF
- If funds allow, the in service spare could be bought into full service
- Redesign CVF to have an enlarged hangar, at least big enough for Chinook, CH53K and V22 across the FULL width and length of an enlarged space. Also, improve command and control and embarked force accommodation facilities
- Invest in a Merlin based ASaC which is sufficient for the role
Some might say the JCA number is too small but I would ask too small for what?
If we accept the result of the SDSR then it becomes the baseline, a similar number of aircraft support (6-12) currently support operations in Afghanistan for a much larger force than envisaged in SDSR. 6-12, with a minimum of 6 would still deliver a credible capability and remember, the F35 will be incredibly effective and versatile.
Even if we stuck with the F35C then the numbers aboard would remain but the numbers behind would increase as training and currency issues would demand a larger fleet and the overall cost would rise because of it, it would not be the end of the world though and the additional performance of the C model would be very welcome. This option would need both CVF fitted with cats and traps so the B model saves again and retains the ability to maintain a continual CVF presence.
By keeping the numbers to a realistic level (6) then we afford an opportunity to maintain that fleet on continuous joint training with the RM and other services, something that is currently lacking. If we find a few quid down the back of the sofa then yes, lets have more, but it is a balancing act and we have to be realistic.
In effect, we have 2 small squadrons or large flights of 6 aircraft each. One more or less permanently on board CVF and one more or less permanently in a rotation pool with Typhoon for enduring deployments. If there is no enduring deployment then the training pool becomes larger, hours are preserved or more is available for one off operations. Of course the aircraft and crews rotate in and out of those slots on a normal deployment schedule, the details of which and total fleet numbers would be dictated by aircraft availability etc. I have pegged these numbers for convenience, reality means that the numbers will flex up and down anyway but it gives us some measure of scaling.
The inherent deployment and operational flexibility of the F35B means this scalability can be maintained much easier than with the C model, whatever its other virtues.
I am agnostic on the FAA operating fast jets, its not an idealogical issue, purely cost. Logically, the larger force, a force dedicated to the art of operating aircraft, should be more efficient and therefore lower cost. Whilst the US can afford four air forces the UK cannot, now, if the FAA can prove they can operate F35 cheaper for the same effect than the RAF then fair enough, but duplication and resource waste should be our enemy.
Summary
There are many options for maximising investment and getting the most out of what we are about to have. For what it is worth, I think the route to that end state is to turn CVF into as multi-purpose a capability as possible, building from a position of strength (amphibious) and not building from a weakness (fast jet maritime aviation)
This means littoral manoeuvre from the sea in the theatre entry phase of any operation i.e. an oversized LPH with the ability to operate a modest fast air wing with the ability to flex up should the occasional need arise.
Switching back to the F35B is my preferred option for the reasons outlined above; it allows both CVF to enter service, reduces through life costs, still keeps a fifth generation aircraft in the inventory, still keeps us in the largest combat aviation programme of modern times and provides interoperability with a number of important allies.
CVF becomes an air optimised amphibious assault ship pair, combined with the LPD pair in service and the LSD(A)’s.
Whoa boss!
You’re opening a can of worms on a hornet’s nest with this thread!
can of worms? this guy’s been sniffing turpentine! you have got to be smoking something illegal…drinking fortified alcohol…something!
why are you against having the Royal Navy operating high speed aircraft? cost savings will be lost with the expertise that will be sacrificed…besides the RAF will have to designate certain Squadrons as Naval so you’d have the same issue…it might look good on an accountants ledger but thats about it.
Ok my thoughts:
Commission both, but alternate one at extended readiness/refit.
Use them like small Tarawas rather than small Nimitzs, a combined Invincible and Ocean on single hull if you like.
Air wing
12 JSF B
6 UAV?
6 Merlin ASW
3 Merlin ASaC
12 Merlin/Chinook
6 Lynx/Apache
I disagree with you on the RAF operating JSF, I would much prefer it to be the FAA and ofcourse CHF
Enduring land based missions should be RAF Typhoon FGRs
Sorry this is a bit brief and I haven’t giving much reasoning but i better fill out this census form….
Incredible length of Bull written into this blog format which I have always preferred – quick to read; easy to respond to.
Looks like everything that has been said, is there, in one way or the other.
However, I think you got to the right destination, as in :
“For what it is worth, I think the route to that end state is to turn CVF into as multi-purpose a capability as possible, building from a position of strength (amphibious) and not building from a weakness (fast jet maritime aviation)
This means littoral manoeuvre from the sea in the theatre entry phase of any operation i.e. an oversized LPH with the ability to operate a modest fast air wing with the ability to flex up should the occasional need arise.”
- with all the other assets ( I think what will be at hand was seen, a bit, through “rosy spectacles” or was it just the wording, or… undisclosed future plans?
Hi WD,
RE “Use them like small Tarawas rather than small Nimitzs”
- that’s an America, then?
- with the uncertainty about the “B” USMC don’t like the concept that much, anymore, and they will be tending towards the “Tarawa” type of design, next… not exactly QE/ PoW?
The more I think about it, the more I think we should just sell the damn things and be done with it.
The only issue I would have with the analysis is that you seem to be building ~60,000 ton carrier with only about 12 aircraft per ship. That would be about 25% of the originally planned load.
Here are the problems I see:
1. 6 – 12 airplanes are wholly insufficient for any military operation beyond the most basic. The aircraft carrier would turn into a glorified helicopter carrier, with minimal offensive ability.
2. In that case, why buy the carriers? And, why have two? There isn’t any reason to have that large of a carrier for only 12 airplanes and there is no reason to have to for only 12 airplanes.
The Royal Navy will need to have a sufficiently large number of fighters to return on the investment for the two carriers. What they should do, in the short term, is to purchase the catapult version and hold off on which airplane they’ll buy to man it. The ships won’t enter the fleet for another 10 years so they can delay that decision until the prices for the F-35 B / C stabilize.
Having a 60,000 ton carrier with 6 airplanes will be a joke, it would in essence turn those ships into amphibious assault transports and yet they couldn’t launch an amphibious assault because they don’t have sufficient air support.
wrong answer gentlemen. the USMC is full involved and committed to the F-35B. as much as i don’t like having an aviator for a Commandant instead of an Infantryman, in this case its definitely helpful. he’s already formulated a plan to get the B off probation this year. so the B is a given.
as far as us trending back to a smaller Tarawa sized LHD, don’t believe it. in addition to the B’s we are also equipping with CH-53K’s, MV-22′s and even the AH-1Z’s and UH-1Ys are larger so America class it is.
quite honestly that would have been the ideal solution for the UK…a purchase of the America class LHD would have assumed the roles of two of your ship types and codified your expeditionary capabilities on fewer ships, yet allowed you to maintain a sea control ship type function as you (the UK) so admirably demonstrated during the Falklands War.
i do understand the fact that local industrial base at times trumps military issues.
Hi ACC
Sorry I meant a large Tarawa/America rather than small Nimitz…
By that I’m agreeing with TD in using them as commando carriers with extra sea control and limited strike capabilities.The Albions and Bays give us plenty of vehicle deck/dock capacity.
The USMC JSF C order is hard to read into, they seem to be saying they always wanted some Cs to replace their Hornets but it does look like they’re hedging their bets.It has to be said future of JSF B is the biggest stickler to TDs proposal…
RE “as far as us trending back to a smaller Tarawa sized LHD, don’t believe it. in addition to the B’s we are also equipping with CH-53K’s, MV-22′s and even the AH-1Z’s and UH-1Ys are larger so America class it is.”
- no mention about smaller size, just the method of landing the bulk of the force; air vs sea, or just skimming it?
- CH-53s and MV-22s – we don’t have American cousins/ godfathers for that kind of money!
- heyy, Zulus and Yankees, that is the ruthless commonality (the often cited, but unsubstantiated, 80%)
Look in an ideal world i’d love two CVNs with 3 Sqns of fast jets, the assault capacity to land a brigade and hey i’ll have some SSGNs aswell but needs must so i’m kinda in agreement with TD lets work out the best way to use what we’re stuck with…
I guess if you’re going to spend all that money and put them in service, you might as well have both and give them a full complement of fast jets. Owned and operated by Fleet Air Arm. I know if I joined the Air force and was told I was being deployed to a carrier at sea I’d be mighty miffed. If we’re going to have them then we do it properly or not at all.
And that is?? ( I mean, the rosy view that I referred to, in the leading in article, was Albions, in the plural)?
- let’s start with the “things” we’ve already paid for, then dream on…
- put one of these things together, as described, and two Albions and three Bays again… what have you got?
- three commandos, plus (sometimes) heavier supporting arms;
In my books, a brigade ( a very powerful one, and more self-contained than most)
That was @ WD,
sorry, Chris got in between
I used to be a bouncer, so I’m used to getting in the middle of fights.
but what are you going to do for aviation? the Albions are great but getting long in the tooth.
lets be honest here guys. you were never going to put 20 plus airplanes on these carriers and your Navy knows it. perhaps in a war time surge operation but never in a regular deployment type scenario.
the America class would be ideal. you could still retire the current LPD’s retain your amphibious capabilities…put your Merlins and Chinooks to good use giving your Marines a robust Helo Assault capability off a modern platform (along with being able to transport your vehicles such as the Ocelot and Bronco and BVS-10(?) and still have room to surge an airborne company aboard)
the real miscalculation was in aligning with not the US Navy…but with the carrier side of our Navy. your aim should have been to align with our Gator fleet.
The hangar of CVF is already sized for pretty much anything, including Chinook, Ch53 and even UNFOLDED MV-22 Osprey in the “hard-hat” area of the hangar where the ceiling height is over 9 meters.
HMS Ocean looks already condemned to have no direct replacement without us suggesting it, actually. My feeling is that either one of the CVF gets mothballed for a few years and pulled out when HMS Ocean bows out (either in 2018 or 2022 which is the latest planned date i’m aware of) or there is no mothballing but HMS Ocean is retired earlier in exchange. Either way, it is CVF and nothing else.
Just the F35 engine costs 15 millions. The B variant engine comes with a baseline cost of 32.
Start to see why the F35B, even assuming it works, is not what the UK needs? It does not reduce through-life costs AT ALL. Just each engine needed during the life of the plane could fund TWICE the number of engines for the C variant.
Also, remember that the F35 cost figures from LM do NOT include the engines, which are calculated separately.
The RAF achieves economy of scale??? Operations by the RAF compared to operations by AAC and FAA are reported to cost 38% more as average because of higher personnel retributions and shorter operating periods.
No way.
So 400 millions for a relatively weak Merlin-based platform is a good investment when the UK could lease 4 far more capable Hawkeyes for little more than that?
Small-scale operation or not, the Hawkeye offers greater endurance, range, coverage and performances in both AA and AG roles. To do what a CVF could do with 3 Hawkwkeye on boards it would take a good lot of Merlins.
Not cost effective i say.
6 attack planes…? That’s just ridiculous. Even 12 is little stuff, but 6, honestly… You couldn’t have more than 2 in the air all the time, and that, in presence of a shadow-threat from evenmy air forces would need to be in the air protecting the task force.
With the spare/operational airframe ratio used by the US Navy, the RAF/FAA with 40 F35C can form two 12-planes squadrons.
The practice of having two spare airframes for each flying plane must end. Buying a bit more spares will always be less expensive and mean more airplanes actually fit for service than buy 100 million dollars planes to keep them in hangars and cannibalize them.
If the USN plans to have a spare F35C every nearly 3 active F35 (calculations done on the recently released USN/USMC document detailing F35 plans), with how much they use them, there’s no frigging way the RAF can be justified in buying 40 planes to fly 12. No way. Is the RAF planning to crash-land an F35 every two weeks? I hope not.
12 must be 800° NAS.
12 + training airframes can form a RAF squadron.
The rest spares.
Anyway, officially, long term target remains “operate around 100 F35″. I do not believe that.
But i think 80 would already be an awesome fleet, and the UK can certainly afford it.
If defence is a priority.
If everything comes first, included aid to India, then it is useless to even talk about it, but this is another, purely politic matter.
My hope is that Libya taught Cameron that, once things get serious, if you miss the tools of the job, you can talk all you want, but you are out.
Surely the situation TD describes (with 12 as the minimum fast jet compliment rather than 6 F-35B’s) was the intent of the CVF when it was a STOL carrier, that basically during most mission’s it would emphasise it’s helicopter capabilities, but by going with a STOL carrier we could easily operate additional F-35B’s off the CVF turning it into a strike carrier if needed. The original CVF plan was bloody clever if you ask me, and made lots of sense.
The switch to cat and traps changed that. While I think the French were a factor, I have argued elsewhere once you pushed back the ISD to 2020 you needed to add an angled deck and cat and traps so that you could be operating UAV’s for ISTAR, as carriers are going to be the premier choice for operating HALE and MALE’s off, and by the mid 2020′s I reckon we will tentatively start purchase of our first UCAV.
So the problem appears to be that having accepted the reality of needing Cat and Trap’s for the UAV’s, some of which are eventually going to need full length catapults, we are stuck with F-35C, Rafale-M or F/A-18 International, which screws the way we intended to use the CVF, and forces us to have one squadron embarked at all times as it takes a lot more training to launch and land on a CATOBAR carrier. Of course we could decide to sacrifice precious under deck space for hydraulic rams, and add a ski jump which can be lowered to horizontal to allow catapult launches, then we can also go back to a STOL option like the F-35B or Harrier III (need a large buy to justify), or STOBAR options like the LCA (N).
Tubby, I think you’ve got it (in the good old days we would have been Kremlinologists, now we just have to read the tea leaves coming out of our own MOD), as in
“The switch to cat and traps changed that. While I think the French were a factor, I have argued elsewhere once you pushed back the ISD to 2020 you needed to add an angled deck and cat and traps so that you could be operating UAV’s for ISTAR, as carriers are going to be the premier choice for operating HALE and MALE’s off, and by the mid 2020′s I reckon we will tentatively start purchase of our first UCAV.”
TD – “Before starting this discussion we should all fully understand that project CVF is not a strategic priority for the current Government, if they could, they would have cancelled them in an instant.”
Simply don’t agree. As long as the government has ambitions to use the Armed Forces to achieve significant Foreign Policy effect then Carriers, in one form or another, are the best way to so. This is what “punching above our weight” actually means; to supply sufficient military effect that you in return receive policy/command input.
I accept that the phrase has been grossly abused and now bears closer relation to metaphor for politicans under-funding and over-committing the Armed Forces, but be in no doubt that they intend to continue supplying sufficient military effect that we in return receive policy/command input.
TD – “Switch back to the F35B. Complete both CVF with one maintained as an in service spare to cover refit periods. Do not replace Ocean, the role to be covered by CVF”
This is what we should have done in the first place, and I think I said more or less the same:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/10/10/1374/
————————————————-
“When we consider that we are buying the QE class anyway, and that Ocean is approaching the end of her life, the obvious answer to this ‘conundrum’ is to realise that CVF has the hotel facilities to support a battalion in addition to the crew itself, and that the limited buy of JCA will leave plenty of deck and hangar space from which to operate helicopters.”
“Buying both CVF and operating them in a swing role means that we technically keep the same capability to deploy, insert, command, and sustain a reinforced brigade in theatre, only now it will have access to CAP and CAS from an organic fighter-bomber squadron deployed with the task-force. We also retain a permanent ability to generate a carrier group, not unimportant given that deterrence relies on the perception of commitment, after all, we didn’t keep armoured divisions in Germany only six months of the year throughout the forty years of the cold war.”
“The current rumours suggest a JCA buy of 72 aircraft, which would indicate three active squadrons of twelve aircraft, twelve in an OCU/ECU, twelve in squadron maintenance, and twelve in deep maintenance or attrition reserves. The likely result is one squadron aboard the active carrier at all times, with a second squadron frequently joining for exercises, or deploying from the second carrier when there is operational overlap. This on a vessel designed to operate 36 JCA, of spare capacity there will be plenty!”
“CVF does not have a vehicle deck, embarked landing craft, or a rear ramp, but then neither does the Invincible Class when its pulling duty as the fleet LPH, and it’s not as if the Royal Navy is short of these attributes in the six other amphibious vessels; the Albion’s and the Bay’s.”
“If it proves suboptimal so be it, these are suboptimal times, and they can always revert back to operating as pure carriers in the 2020′s when there is money to buy one more squadron of JCA (24 in total) and a brace of dedicated LPH’s.”
————————————————-
TD – “Obtain enough to maintain 6 on board plus 6 on an enduring land based operation (rotating with Typhoon) to support the deployed multi role brigade.”
Don’t agree here, because the carriers are their to provide limited intervention alongside the rapid-reaction brigades 16AAB and 3Cdo, they cannot provide persistent support for an ongoing operation rotating the 5x multirole brigades in and out of theatre. Air support would best be generated by RAF capability based in theatre.
In conclusion:
While I’m not sure it will be possible to reverse the momentum behind the switch to F35c, the proposal is as close as Admin and I have come to squaring the circle over carriers, and I wish his proposal had been the status-quo-ante that emerged from the SDSR.
I might as well put in my two pence worth and be unpopular to go with it. I cannot see both carriers being fitted out with cats and traps. QE will be basically an large helicopter platform whilst PoW will have the ability to operate FJs. Instead of the F-35 I would like to see the UK and France form a joint airwing bringing on stream the 2nd and 3rd frontline Rafale squadrons, increasing the E-2 compliment to 5-6 for starters. The joint airwing will be manned by RN and Aeronavale personnel, and operate from either CdG or PoW, which ever is operational at any one time. This would mean chipping in for the 3rd Rafale Squadron and extra E-2s and running costs but it would give the UK and France and fully functioning CVA espaecially if the escort group is also joint with T-45s and FREMM.
This has to be the cheapest way for the RN to get back into the fixed wing game. Most ordonnance will already be cleared with only the Brimstone, ASRAMM and Paveway IV needing clearance. However ASRAMM can be left out as the combination of MICA and Meteor will certainly ge the job done. The French are looking for a nwer generation LD/EO pod for the Rafale so the RAFs Litening would fit the bill and the Frence already use a 500lb Paveway so integration of the IV should be too hard. It shuoldn’t be too hard to convince the French to adopt the Brimstone as the DM variant has proved itself both in Afghanistan and not Libya and the Frence do not really have an equivilent.
QE is a bit more of a problem but it will bring alot of rotary assets to a given operation and be able to carry out large lift ops due to the number of spots available.
I know this idea will be very unpopular with many but I am thinking outside the box and cannot see the UK being able to afford to run a Carrier(s) on its own effectively and that is the key word. At present everything is invested in the CVF whist little has been confirmed with contracts for its airwing. A lot of spin has been produced but in reality they are starting to look like “White Elephants” with little or no practical value until a firm decision on the platforms to operate it are taken backed up bt contracts.
Um…………………………..
I think Lord Jim has some jnteresting ideas and whilst I might not go as far, I do think Rafale Ms and greater co operation with the French are the way forward. As I said in another post, the french can run the OCU
TD
I think you have a basically sound proposition but fail to allow for the cancellation of F35B being actually most likely, it has two years not just to fix the technical problems but also the cost ones and they will be harder.
THe EFV was cancelled but the USMC capability need survives and will be met in other ways – ditto F35B. It is not the only way to arm their amphibs and Gates will be ruthless about its deletion if costs are not rock solid.
Tubby
I think it is possible to have both cats aligned on the port side and a ski jump remaining in the middle of the forward structure. I suspect that lifting a jump into place would mean it had to have a very strong structure which would lead to more weight and round in circles
Gabriele
Leasing sounds like an interesting option – what about leasing one of the CVFs to the US to help them meet their mandated 12 carrier fleet (which they are not meeting)
Hi RW,
RE “F35B. It is not the only way to arm their amphibs and Gates will be ruthless about its deletion if costs are not rock solid.”
- Gates is talking tough as he will be gone by then
- talk about White Elephants – without the B’s America”s” will be a huge waste of money
But back to our own… when I joined this site, I had a bet with a friend that it will Rafale’s flying off the carrier(s)
- still looking to collect
- rotating the 3 carriers (not ChdG, the next one) makes it two with aircraft and one populating (our) assault ships with helos (French amphibs carry theirs, regardless how far and in what kind of seas they have to travel)
- the Rafale production is running at peak as there are 51 Super Etendards to replace (not to mention that in the rush to get Rafale into service they, too, got their T1 that cannot be upgraded at a reasonable cost; only 10, though).But then, no orders! So all those billions and billions forked out (by the French tax payer); all we need to do is to place the order
- 3 carrier-borne AEWs; just buy one more – that will do (only $200m a piece; MACS will still be needed as the carriers can’t be everywhere
- and, after 2 or 3 bn gone, cancel the joint-UCAV and buy what USN has by then put in service; that will keep Rafales useful for a long, long time
To launch unmanned vehicles, you need no CVF. A dedicated mothership like BAEs UXV-proposal or better something COTS makes just the most sense. Also, I don’t expect HALE-UAVs to join an air wing anytime soon. Reaper or Avenger may be another question.
It is also no primary requirement to accomodate French or Spanish or Italian or US aircraft. If we go STOBAR, we will retain such a capability nonetheless. It certainly requires the French to qualify Rafale for STO, so it would makes THEM pay for THEIR additional capability.
I also see no valid requirement to cross-deck FAA or RAF squadrons with allied carriers. Seriously.
The CVF as I see it should provide “just another, but to-go-where-no-airfield-can-go airfield” to the RAF and the hub of a flexible and relatively cheap to operate RN + RM helicopter force.
If the RAF operates Sea Typhoon, F-35B or C is a detail which can be decided in 2012-14. Until then, the Indian MRCA deal has inked and we will see, if Sea Typhoon materializes. A STOBAR-carrier should be able to operate each of those types, it’s only not an ideal solution for hosting F-35B and C.
Irrespective of the carrier question, the F-35 will survive IMHO. In the early 2020ies, we need a Tornado-replacement. Until then, the development cost are written off and I expect the aircrafts price to drop.
So the general plan is:
- go STOBAR
- wait, if SeaTiffy materializes; if yes, convert half or better all the T3-orders to the navalized version; if not, proceed with the F-35C
- the RAF can concentrate to press capability out of the at least partially interoperable fast jet fleet and gets just one more basing option.
- the RN can concentrate on helicopters and fulfil the everday tasks with them
- the MoD can save money by filling the carrier-aircraft-requirement with T3-slots and delaying the F-35
- even BAE wouldn’t be to afraid of this scenario
Stick, hornets Nest, Poking for the use of…
@Sol, I am not against the Fleet air Arm and Royal Navy having control of naval aviation, far from it. What I am against is the duplication and cost burden that it delivers. As i said, we have to be unsentimental, hard in fact, when looking at this. I know there are operational benefits of keeping the FAA in the fast jets business, not disputing that all, but I am less certain that these benefits outweigh the cost of duplication. The US can afford 4 air forces, we can’t. I agree that the likelihood of B being cancelled is very small now. An America class would have been ideal, i agree, but that is not the point, we have CVF whether anyone likes it or not, this post is about making the best of that fact
@Willy, yes, mu suggestion is to commission both at an identical equipment fit but have one as the refit spare. It will cost more than normal extended readiness and I could see a role for retained reserves to maintain the second ship at enough readiness to cover planned refits.
@Chris B, who would buy both and at what price, what would we do with the receipts
@Arkady, what was planned and what was the reality were always very different. I think the actual, as in really actual, plan was, was for about 12-18 JSF. The fantasy land of 36 JSF plus was just that. You say 6-12 aircraft is wholly insufficient for all but the smallest operation, exactly, that is the whole point. CVF becomes a joint asset for small to medium scale interventions alone or as part of a larger coalition force, where the number of aircraft becomes less important than the overall contribution. Lets take off those single service blinkers
@ACC, you are right we don’t have the cash for CH53K and V22 but that is because we have plans for loads of F35′s, this is the crux of the argument and I think vertical lift is more important and more useful than more fast jets
@Chris B, not sure what you mean by you might as well have both and give them a full compliment of fast jets, how would we pay. The post is about pragmatism and achieving realistic capabilities
@Gabrielle, be careful of putting too much store in the figures on JSF, as I said the reality is no one actually knows yet and also I said, the personnel costs dwarf any equipment costs. The RAF does achieve economy of scale, yes they might have more people and more generous terms and conditions of service but with Chinook, for example, they achieve availability rates unmatched even by the US. i think the new engagement model will start evening out these discrepancies in service conditions as well.
@Tubby, not sure on your predictions for UAV’s. Their massive range and endurance will tend to trump the advantages of being nearer with a carrier. Am unconvinced by the UCAV/Carrier combination
@jedi, the government would have cancelled CVF in a heartbeat and you know it, that makes it not a strategic priority in my eyes. I think we tend to agree on the broad front but with two less well decks to call on the situation is far from ideal and with CVF not having a vehicle deck, optimised accommodation, a ramp and landing craft it will be no Ocean, but, this could be compensated by greater vertical lift and it is here that its size really comes into play because you can do a single lift in one go of good size. All we need is additional vertical lift and the F35 piggy bank is what i would raid to do so, less JCA, more helicopters makes CVF actually worth doing.
On your last point i think you have misread. I suggested an F35 force that could do 2 things, maintain 6 on board at all times (this would need rotating crews and airframes) AND maintain 6 in a land theatre, not OR. The 6 in a land theatre would provide CAS/ISTAR for an enduring mission, supporting the MRB.In fact, a bit like what Joint Force Harrier did in Afghanistan for 5 years. These 6 could be supplemented by Typhoon and UAV’s as well.
On a surge basis, thats at least 12 JCA, probably up to 20 odd being available for contingent operations either afloat or on land, the F35 delivers this flexibility
@RW, I don’t think the F35B will be cancelled but accept its a riskier proposition than the C or Rafale/F18 etc
TD – “On your last point i think you have misread. I suggested an F35 force that could do 2 things, maintain 6 on board at all times (this would need rotating crews and airframes) AND maintain 6 in a land theatre, not OR. The 6 in a land theatre would provide CAS/ISTAR for an enduring mission, supporting the MRB.In fact, a bit like what Joint Force Harrier did in Afghanistan for 5 years.”
I did indeed, my thanks.
Will update the post to make it clearer
TD
You really do like poking the hornets nest don’t you.
Do you hang arround seedy container opperater bars, nudging lorry drivers and saying ‘see him in the corner, he’s looking at your bird’?
Given we are stuck with the Things your proposals make a lot of sense. However the F35b will either fly or it won’t The technical difficulties will do all the argueing. They will either be dealt with or they won’t. Sorry to sound so trite but, Boy oh boy will we look silly if we build the carrier to take B version only, and it does not fly.
They would be left as rotary only carriers.
PS
Can the FAA run the Raf instead? After all if we havent got that many aircraft why can’t they be in Dark blue?
Hi TD,
Agreed “@ACC, you are right we don’t have the cash for CH53K and V22 but that is because we have plans for loads of F35′s, this is the crux of the argument and I think vertical lift is more important and more useful than more fast jets”, broadly.
But then paying attention to the fast jet split between carrier-capable, and not so?
OK, starting at the end and working backwards:
1. CVF as Uber LPH – don’t have a problem with this concept – EXCEPT I would make it a pure LPH and not bother with any F35 at all.
2. We should have cancelled it when we had the chance – yep, but we did not, hence we arrive at 1. above.
3. Time to start a fight: TD said” “By continually failing to budge on CVF, the Royal Navy paid an ever more expensive price to do so and in what some might see as irony, the very fact that the RN has no carriers and carrier aircraft to offer Operation Ellamy is precisely because of the desire to have CVF shaped carriers and FAA insignia bearing carrier aircraft.”
What total and utter cods wallop ! Let’s get one thing straight I applaud TD for his “pragmatic” attitude, and more especially for making the service chiefs take their slice of responsibility for current woes, but come on seriously ? At what point did you see a line of successive Admirals knocking on the PM’s door asking for the carriers to be delayed, again… or taking petitions demanding the surface fleet be cut ?
Grand strategy is the purview of HMG, particularly the Cabinet and other committee’s not the MoD, we are not a military dictatorship. If the 98 SDR said ‘expeditionary’ and laid out great plans for carriers, and Gordon Brown as Treasurer said “jog on matey, your not having the cash” – how exactly is the fault of the Admiral of the Fleet ? If said HMG, and its successors continue to pay for pointless adventures in the sandpit, while cutting real terms defence spending, but NOT drawing back on the strategic rhetoric, and continuing the “punch above our weight” crap, how is that the fault of the Admiralty ?
We could quite easily have a carrier and Harriers available, in fact if Libya had kicked off mere months ago, they would have been available. I am not re-opening the Harrier versus UK based Tornado argument, as it’s completely bogus; they are complimentary assets with complimentary capabilities, and lets face it, look at the way the Jaguar fleet was upgraded in record time when needed for the Iraqi no-fly zones; yes if we wanted Brimstone on GR9 we could have done it. That is just more treasury led divide and conquer bull shit, and too many people are just happily falling for it.
IF HMG wants to withdraw from it’s weirdly grand notions of being a world power, lets have 160 Typhoons and nothing else. Lets stay away from wars of choice and depend on providing niche capabilities to NATO formations.
IF HMG wants to be a world power, it has to fund it properly. If it want’s a major post Afghanistan, post 2020 expeditionary capability it needs to order a 3rd carrier and 100 aircraft of the readers choice (F35, F18E, Rafale M, whatever…..).
Of course it wont do either, and without a proper strategic context, our foreign policy, or response to world events and our armed forces will just bumble along, fixing stuff with gaffer tape, because that has become the norm.
Admirals, Generals and Air Marshals may have been unimpressive over the last 10 to 15 years, but not any where near as unimpressive as our elected officials.
Jed
2 big cheers for that post but:-
‘At what point did you see a line of successive Admirals knocking on the PM’s door asking for the carriers to be delayed, again… or taking petitions demanding the surface fleet be cut ?’
During the last SDR when it was clear from leaked reports that when the RAF and Army had nearly won the day on cancelling carriers; the Lords of the admiralty were widely reported, (and never denied it when it was reported) to have offered up everything in the surface fleet for the carriers. Where did the 19 unit surface fleet idea come from? The RN that where.
I am sure they did not want to be in that position and would Have done anything not to be, but when they were, instead of saying ‘Ok stuff it you can shove the carriers up the RAF’s tailpipes and on your own head be it’, or whatever, they got down on their knees and begged for them’.
So like I say Jed with you all the way but RN are far from blaimless.
@TD
The way I see it with regard to UAV’s and carriers, especially carriers mostly operated along side your amphibious forces, you want your UAV’s to spend as much time on station as possible scoping out enemy movements and least amount of time transiting to and from enemy territory, so it makes sense to have your UAV’s on your carrier. Plus I would imagine its now considered a minimum requirement that you provide the Royal Marines with real time video feed of their LZ and their alternate LZ, and I suspect that if you offered a RM Major about to put boot’s ashore a choice of QE with 12 F-35C’s, plus 6 MALES and 12 Apaches or a QE with 30 F-35C’s he will take the former over the latter, unless we have gone crazy and been talked into taking on Russia or China, then the 30 F-35C’s will be busy keeping the task group alive long enough to launch helicopters.
Here, here Jed!
Seconded! Nicely put Jed
fight fight fight
Jed, glad you see it as simple as that but I don’t
The leadership at the Admiralty have had numerous occasions on which they could have changed the design altered the specification, adjusted the requirement. All these would have dramatically reduced both the political and cost profile of project CVF, they chose not to
Now I am not absolving Cyclops of any blame, far far far far from it but the reality is, the RN is equally as culpable
If I made an error, it was not including the Government and one eye but lets all stop pretending the RN’s collective decision to have CVF at all costs has had no impact, choices were made, choices have consequences
anyway, my Dad’s bigger than yours!
So for one carrier and a half completed one that might be sold off the UK taxpayer will likely be paying in excess of £6 billion and if I were a betting man I would definitely have a punt on the final cost going beyond lucky number seven.
..contradicts this…
Despite this, in many ways the project has been steaming along very nicely indeed, the blocks continue to be built, contracts are being placed and progress is self evident. When all said and done, CVF is actually a relatively simple, relatively low risk design.
I’ve noticed a sort of negative euphoria around here recently…
Alex, how is that contradictory
The nuts and bolts have been moving along nicely but the project as a whole, as explained, is a complete cock up. The reason for the vast cost and time inflation has been short termism and spec changing which are driven by political and fiscal constraints outside the project
Alex
Going to go away and think about negative wotsit.
TD: “my dad is bigger than your” – erm, well mine is 6 foot 4, if only I had taken after him and not my mum…..
OK, lets agree to disagree, there are degrees of culpability, and as the ultimate deciders of national strategy, HMG is ‘more’ to blame….
Now then, onto this 6 x F35 onboard, and 6 on ‘long term’ deployed ops with the RAF. How on earth does this work on a cost benefit analysis ? 6 a/c on the carrier, honestly you may as well not have them, as your not going to keep enough pilots current to pay for all the bother. I presume for some op like Libya you would embark and RAF squadron, or the OCU or something ? I just really don’t see the point on a pure cost versus capability standpoint.
As for 6 x F35 deployed on an ‘enduring’ operation alongside Typhoons, this is even more bizarre. You want to use a very, very expensive aircraft, one which has a design that has been highly compromised by the so called “first day of the war” low observability requirement for ‘enduring’ combat ISTAR ? WTF ?? what a waste of money. F35 is in U.S. parlance “a door kicker”. The USMC may describe how it will replace all their other ISTAR assets due to it’s Cylon based avionics, but we don’t have the USMC’s budgets (if only……).
So we are either skint or we aren’t – lets drop the pretensions and make them giant LPH. Maybe, just maybe we could introduce Avenger / Predator C and later a proper UCAV-N type, but if we truly are skint, the F35 in any form has to go.
You should see my mum!
There is an argument that says why bother if we can’t do it properly and I do see it but I hate to be the only one in the blogosphere that seems to get the financial issues at play, it might make me a bit of an outsider because I am not making up fantasy fleets where the result is the RAF gets raped and the FAA gets everything with a few crumbs left over for the AAC but I think it is a realistic position to take. Its not like the grown ups at the MoD have much credibility when it comes to generating future force structures from a finite pot of cash is it, in fact, the ore I think of it, the MoD is the ultimate hotbed of fantasy fleets.
keeping 6 on board permanently provides a realistic force capability on a permanent basis which will mean vastly more training opportunities for amphibious operations and littoral manoeuvre than the GR9′s ever had. Because they are STOVL, keeping then current is not a problem, like it would be with CATOBAR.
Keeping 6 on enduring operations is in conjunction with Typhoon, not as well. On an enduring operation you are rotating your 5 MRB’s every 6 months, there is an argument that the air component should have longer tours but it would still mean that F35 takes it place in the rotation system with Typhoon. typhoon being the more numerous would naturally take up more slots.
In a surge (assuming you are not already in an enduring operation, and this is the SDSR assumption) you can either take the ones on board and send them to a land base or take the ones at home and send them to CVF. The surge would use the F35 in the first day of war stuff only if that is what was required, equally, you might find typhoon more suited and as I mentioned, greater platform diversity for SS and TLAM would contribute to the short fall
If the shit really hit the fan then yes, strip out your OCU etc and this is where the B model shines, just like the GR3 before it. If the shit hits the fan in such a manner that carrier ops are the preferred option then every f35 pilot, whether normally sea based or not, can be qualified for ops on CVF within days
Creating a small fleet of F35′s allows us to build when times are better and the streets are paved with gold but that would be much cheaper than generating from scratch again
There is logic to this suggestion you know!
Indeed, I do see your logic ref buy a few now, and maybe we can buy some more later. However its just another salami sliced response to no cash; or as we say in the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yorkshire: “it’s neither nowt, nor summat lad!”
I even understand your logic ref Dave-B, even though part of me thinks if will never even see service with the USMC.
I have to counter your ‘tactical’ pragmatism with what I feel is a longer ranged, more strategic pragmatism; if you cant afford to deploy a certain number to achieve the desired operational effects, the ‘critical mass’ that makes the capability worth while if you like, then don’t waste money, time and doctrinal development bandwidth on it in the first place.
Oh and if were not wasting money on F35′s I will have two more T45 and a whole bunch of Absalon Global sloops or whatever please….
“The leadership at the Admiralty have had numerous occasions on which they could have changed the design altered the specification, adjusted the requirement. All these would have dramatically reduced both the political and cost profile of project CVF, they chose not to”
The problem was that CVF is probably the most comprehensively assessed military project HMG has ever embarked upon,.
Every size was looked at from Vinces, to CdD style 40,000 tonner, up to 55,000 tonnes for the BAE design, and they still settled on 2x 65,000 tonne carriers.
It was and is the right design.
I am not arguing with the size necessarily, but going large puts you in the political firing line and it might have been the most comprehensively assessed project in the world but things change.
The RN and MoD (and other services as well) stand accused of not moving with the times, putting their fingers in their ears and muttering, hoping things would change
GUILTY
Jed, I would also add, 6 F35B unable to deliver operational and strategic effect, come on, course they would.
In conjunction with the amphibious force or surged up for wider contributory operations 6 to 20 depending on the mix is still a pretty decent capability
“The FAA would cease operating fast jets and the aboard aircraft would be RAF operated.”
You know as soon as I heard that Dave-B had been dropped in favour of Dave-C, I thought “that will be the Navy ensuring that only their aircraft and pilots are carrier capable”.
Personally, I’d dump the entire RAF, but I’ve said that often enough for it to even bore me . . .
“Conversations now should be all about how we maximise value on our not inconsiderable investment.”
amen
“a reluctance to consider alternatives has led them to mortgage off the rest of the fleet”
AMEN
Seriously, to get these carriers when there were other options, the RN betrayed itself.
What a turd storm this is, both this thread and the real thing. I am going to sit back and watch, and laugh…and cry.
But to those frothing like their rabid at the RAF/FAA debate…lol its just a uniform, seriously… Joint Fore Harrier prooved it can work with Harriers, why the hell cant it work with JCA!? (or whatever we’ll get… I am thinking kites…) The training and logistics demands? Maybe, but we’ll get over it.
And oh, I am light blue who has served with dark blue, on land and in a tub, I wasn’t ‘niffed’ at all.
I have some question’s & a suggestion.
Question one is this:
How much is it going to cost in £Billions to upgrade the Typhoon with Thrust-Vectoring & an AESA Radar, conformal tanks & all the other stuff that they seem to want for it?
Suggestion is this:
Freeze the design of the Typhoon after it gets all the equipment that turns it into a bomb truck but before it gets all the other extra’s. Take the money that would have been spent on all the exotic extra’s that the RAF seem to want for it & TOGETHER with the saving from cutting the 5 NON 2087 Type23′s buy more F35-C’s & the little ships needed to impliment your LOG idea.
The RAF would then be in much better shape (i think), it would have 100 odd Typhoons at say FGR5 configuration for bombing & it would get perhaps as many as 90 F35-C’s for QRA, AD (either on land or at sea on the CVF), & for kicking the door down if it comes to an operation or war.
The Army & Navy would be better off as the RAF would then be able to better support any operation, anywhere, that might be required. With more aircraft available it would then make sense to keep & convert the second carrier for full carrier ops, thereby making the most of the investment’s in the carriers. What is the point of building them if you’re not going to make the most of them? Along with the Littoral Operations Group, which won’t cost that much will it, what’s not to like?
I have been wondering about this one a lot…….in the SDSR it says we should be prepared to be able to do a small scale independent operation.
Since when has an enemy cooperated in it’s own destruction by doing exactly what our plan’s have allowed for?
The thinking behind this assumption is mind blowingly stupid, the UK Gov. & MoD are only thinking of short term measures, they are not really thinking 10 years down the line at all.
If they were, they would not come up with a laughable prediction for the future, a prediction that, of course, is then used to justify their position & the reasons for that position.
One other question
Which will be faster off the ground for QRA, which will be better at Air to Air…..Typhoon or F35-C?
If i had any money i’d be willing to bet it on the Typhoon not having a hope in hell against the F35-C, especially if it’s in a slicked down anti-air configuration.
In fact i’d like to see 6 Typhoons v 2 F35-C’s, i bet that would be a real eye opener for all concerned!
Thinking about it, we could run a similar test right now.
Six Typhoons v Two F22 Raptors.
Who do you think would win?
If you think or admit it’ll be the Raptors, then why on earth are we going to bother with all the very expensive upgrades to the Typhoon? Is it really due to need, or merely due to inertia within the MoD & BAe?
@TD
You could do the same sort of thing with the F35-B, although i think the C model will be much better in performance & for me, performance is what it should all be about.
oooo i hate coming into boat/ship debates, mainly because in 22 years of green my time on a boat was 6 times round the IOW and then driving me truck up brown beach!!
However, someone said you don’t join the RAF to go to sea, not quite the same but when i was the maroon deliverers of death, many of the para trained reme had been in the brigade for donkeys years, in fact pulling out the stops to stay within the brigade. Why? because they really wanted to be tradesmen, but they really wanted to be a para, if someone really wants to fly fast jets, if it means going to sea i believe they will go to sea.
Really going out of my depth here but a couple of facts pointed on here one being we are commited to buying 3 dave b’s development aircraft so instead of paying for that huge, expensive refit for ocean in 2014. bin/sell it and get a carlos like the aussies, then there is amphib and accom facilities and if the poo hits up top there’s your 3rd “mini” carrier with some dave b on flown by RAF who because they are VTOL don’t need loads of carrier training. IT’s only a thought don’t hit me (or my mum or dad)
@ Paul G (at fist then another of my mad ramblings.)
I think I know what you are saying but a soldier is a soldier. Um. You wouldn’t apply that argument to REME attached to tank regiment would you? He wants to do his trade, but he wants to play with tanks. He is a soldier, then REME, and then para’.
But the pilot aspect of the FAA v RAF annoys me. The argument that FAA couldn’t field squadrons without RAF pilots to make up numbers. True, but only because FAA fast air community was eviscerated after the last conventional carrier went. How many graduates would know about FAA fast air in the 1980s? Not many. Naval aviation is a complex task for CATOBAR ops. It isn’t something pilots can opt into then opt out of. The costs of training mean that carrier pilots would have to (with the rarest, rarest of exceptions) stay in the carrier community. As I have said before there is a difference between being doing an exchange tour and spending your whole career do a job. Why can’t the FAA recruit more fast jet pilots? There was a time when there were no pilots at all, that has to a be a start to everything, why can’t the FAA start again? Are we that bereft of imagination? Are we that occupied with own time that we can see there was something before the RAF and there is no written rule that says we have to keep the RAF? As Paul G said if young (wo)men want to fly they won’t mind going to sea to fly? Why can’t it be Fly Navy why do we have to perpetuate the RAF?
Again as I have said before it seems here anybody who argues for the navy to look after its own equipment is being illogical or sentimental. That ‘planes are something special; yet aren’t many RN ships driven by gas turbines and filled with electronics just as modern ‘planes are? It seems hard data about sortie rate, force projection, deployment numbers for the RAF are ignored or swept under the carpet. If the RAF and RN were commercial operations would you as a shareholder of the latter want to see any part of operations merged with the former? How many RAF personnel are still “deployed” to the UK? The RAF is bigger than the RN yet it fields less than 10 airframes to A-stan. Its latest aircraft can’t even be deployed to the war we are fighting. How many planes approximately will it have ready in the air above Libya and A-stan at any time? About 4 or so. So it takes nearly 40,000 personnel to keep 4 elderly jets in the sky. The RN as a proportion of its establishment contributes the same number of personnel to A-stan as the army. Yet still has at least three submarines on ops, 4 OPVs, more than 6 frigates on ops, hyrdographic units, etc.
If you want to talk about pragmatism TD perhaps you should take a long hard look at the RAF’s record. The organisation apart from a few months in 1940 hasn’t got the best record.
Move the helicopters over to the AAC. Give the F35s to the FAA. Leave the RAF to fly its Typhoons and large fixed wing stuff.