Tactical transport typically involves moving stores, personnel, equipment and vehicles from an established airhead to a forward operating location and is usually characterised by a combination of short ranges, outsize payloads, defensive aids, low level flight profiles and the use of unprepared or austere landing locations.
They might also be used for air drop delivery of the same payloads.
Modern tactical transport aircraft blur the distinction between tactical and strategic by virtue of long range for example.
Airdrop logistics has seen resurgence in the last few years as its low cost, low risk and increasing accuracy has combined to make it a very attractive proposition although of course it is only one way.
The main staple of tactical transport in the Western world has been the C130 Hercules, in service for over 50 years it truly is an incredible aircraft and it is supplemented in US and UK service with the C17, another remarkable, but expensive aircraft.
Without going into the tortuous history of the Airbus Military A400 it will replace in UK service the various versions of the Hercules.
The existing C130 fleet (both J and K) will ultimately be replaced by 22 A400’s, down from the original requirement of 25. The seventh C17 has only recently been delivered and will allow the first 4 aircraft to be upgraded in the USA to the same standard as the others, reducing the cost of maintaining two ‘fleets’ of C17’s
The move to a single type, the A400, for all tactical transport and air delivery will dramatically reduce operating costs when compared to the multiple types of K and J models currently in service but there is no doubt the numbers of A400 will be much lower than the Hercules.
C17
I have included the C17 in the tactical lift section because it can do the job but might also be considered a mostly strategic aircraft; indeed it is more often than not called a strategic airlifter.
The C17 fleet is working hard and allows large volume and weight payloads to be transported directly into Afghanistan from the UK for example, supports many humanitarian missions and can also deliver payloads into austere locations. The ability of the C17 to land and take off from unprepared locations is not in question but the maintenance penalty is significant so is rarely done even by the USAF and I am not sure it has ever been done by the RAF.
Operation in these austere conditions is dependent on a number of factors such as load, altitude, runway length, surface load bearing factors (California Bearing Ratio), operating restrictions and whether one wishes to use the surface again. A USAF operation into Camp Rhino was only able to support a small number of landings before heavy engineering plant (bought in by C17) was required to repair the surface for example.
It is a neat trick but it might be compared to taking a Range Rover off road, yes it can be done and done well, but is it something you would do by choice?
When the RAF were operating the C17 as part of a lease, all operations into such locations were prohibited by the terms and conditions.
11. However, under the terms of the lease the full capabilities of the C-17 will not be available and the aircraft can only be used as a strategic long-range transport, albeit with the ability to land on short runways. The C-17s will be restricted in operational use and their capability for para-drop, airdrop, rough field, low-level operations and air to air refuelling will not be used.
The real party piece of the C17 is its ability to carry heavy and outsize loads so it is perfect for armoured vehicles, helicopters and engineering plant.
This is a video of a USAF C17 transporting an M1 main battle tank to Afghanistan, check out the securing chains!
Apart from the C5 and Antonovs the C17 has no equal in this regard but in many situations it is simply too much aircraft and given its high cost of purchase and operating this means it is often an inefficient method of transporting pallets. If you look at many pictures of C17’s on operations they are not overly full and transporting fresh air costs a lot of money.
In particular, the cost of transporting personnel from the Middle East to Afghanistan in the hub and spoke arrangement is extremely high, given the maximum personnel capacity is 103 this represents a particularly low density cargo for the aircraft although fuel burn will of course be reduced.
The runway at Bastion has been continually improved, quoting from my favourite magazine, concrete monthly;
A small team of British Army Royal Engineers is getting close to the end of an ambitious 10-month project to build a second runway at the Task Force Helmand Task Force’s logistics hub, Camp Bastion, in Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan.
The new 7,710-foot-long runway, due to be completed in December, will enable the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) C-17A Globemaster aircraft to fly direct to Camp Bastion from the United Kingdom, greatly increasing the speed of the onward distribution of freight and supplies throughout the province. The C-17A Globemaster is the latest addition to the RAF’s fleet of transport aircraft and is capable of rapid, strategic delivery of troops and all types of cargo to main or forward operating bases anywhere in the world.
The new runway will replace the temporary gravel landing zone constructed by the 39th Engineer Regiment in March this year. Currently C-17A aircraft can only land at Kandahar Airfield because of the gravel runway at Camp Bastion, so Hercules C-130 aircraft are used to ferry freight between Kandahar to Camp Bastion. The Hercules C-130 aircraft will also benefit from the new runway as they will be able to carry more weight on landing – be it troops or supplies.
October 2007 Issue
So we can deduce from this that the RAF likes concrete for its C17’s and this allowed a second Air Line of Communication (ALoC) to be established. From 2008 Operation MERGE was initiated to improve the facilities again, in order to support the USMC deployment to Helmand, notably the Camp Leatherneck 1, 2 and 3 phases. As part of this operation and in order to operate the largest of aircraft like the AN-124 , C5 Galaxy and commercial aircraft like 747’s the runway at Bastion has been supplemented with a new build. This new 11,500ft runway will run parallel to the one mentioned above, which will now operate as a taxiway. When completed the new runway may also enable direct flights usingTristar’s rather than them flying into Kandahar, 25 odd times per month.
The ability of Bastion take the C17 has been crucial to aeromedical evacuations, direct back to the UK, in one go, from hospital to hospital with minimal disruption. The C17’s speed, range and large hold which can accommodate the various palletised high dependency systems and their attendant medical personnel make it almost a perfect aircraft for this role.
This is a 50 minute documentary and well worth the time and sitting through the odd advert, a real testament to the work of the Critical Care Air Support Team and RAF
Some interesting background on AE and CCAT can be read in the RAMC Journal here
The C17 is without a doubt a brilliant aircraft but it is very expensive to operate and because of various factors we have often been left with no alternative, consequently one has to wonder if we are, through necessity, over using them, incurring excess fuel and maintenance cost and using up valuable airframe life.
It sounds rather callous to question the operating costs of the C17 when used for the aeromedical evacuation role but when viewed holistically and without emotion, if we can reduce the cost of a given task we can maintain or enhance capabilities in other areas.
Despite the obvious utility of using a large aircraft that allows various palletised intensive care facilities and medical personnel to be carried it is arguably not the best option, it is the best option (range, speed and space) we have at the minute but this is where the FSTA should be used in the future if at all possible. Because the version we will be getting is the passenger not cargo version, the same palletised systems on display in the video above will not be able to be reused on the main deck.
The expansion of the C17 fleet will eventually allow the first 4 aircraft to be upgraded to the latest Block 17 configuration which provides enhanced radar and on board inert gas generator to improve survivability. It is hoped that this work will commence in 2011.
What about cost?
As we all know, pinning down the cost of individual items of military equipment if fraught with difficulties but piecing together various snippets;
The cost of leasing the 4 C17’s under the Short Term Strategic Airlift programme we had to cover delays in the A400 and obvious need was in excess of £700m. Reflecting the nature of the lease, that it was a gap-filler until A400 arrived, the requirements only listed a payload of 32tonnes for example. Competing bids were received from Air Foyle and IBP with the Antonov AN124 and Airbus with a mix of A300 freighters and the distinctive Beluga.
As an aside, the Beluga is a very interesting aircraft, its European design and manufacture would not come with the ‘spares’ issues of the AN124 and its ridiculously large cargo box dimensions (7.1×7.1×31.7m) would allow it to transport a Chinook without the very time consuming transmission strip down needed when they go C-17 Class. One was chartered to transport 2 NH-90 and a Tiger helicopter to Australia but a maximum payload of 47 tonnes and complete lack of austere location capability means the C17 is ultimately a better all rounder.
Anyway, back to reality.
The recuperated costs of the 3 out of the 4 recent Hercules losses have been used to part fund 2 C17’s, beyond the 4 we purchased at the end of their lease period. Some indication of comparative capacities and costs can be obtained from the arrangements in place between European nations as administered by the Movements Control Centre Europe which trades 1 C17 flying hour for 7 Hercules hours.
Boeing supports the RAF’s C-17s through the C-17 Globemaster III Sustainment Partnership, a performance-based logistics programme, at RAF Brize Norton, the RAF’s main operating base for strategic air transport and air-to-air refueling. The arrangement provides the RAF with the benefits of complete “virtual fleet” access and an extensive support network. The virtual fleet concept enables C-17 customers, especially those with smaller numbers of aircraft, to benefit from worldwide parts availability and economies of scale when purchasing materials.
In 2008 the estimated UK cost of participation in the GSP was $225 million for six aircraft and in 2010 the seven aircraft resulted in an estimated cost of $390 million. It is not indicated how long the GSP runs for.
Purchase cost depends very much on the optional extras and how many you are buying. The ‘all option included’ price for 10 to India was reported at $.5.8 billion, Australia’s 4 at $2 billion and Kuwait’s 1 at $690 million.
It should therefore be clear that the oft mooted $200m or £125m price for a C17 is way off the mark. A closer figure would be around $580 million or £360 million for an aircraft in a usable condition, fully supported.
The A400
Because of the obvious political aspect of the A400 programme it seems to polarise opinion.
There is no doubt it has had a troubled past with specification that has been compromised to get it into service, a bad case of over promising/under delivering on costs and timescales from Airbus Military, the usual suspects (mainly Germany) prevaricating leading to delays and trying not only to develop a cutting edge aircraft but the most powerful turboprop engine in the world all at the same time.
There is equally no doubt the A400 has politics wrapped all around it, the desire to strengthen a European defence identity and maintain European sovereign capabilities in large military aircraft production.
With all these problems is it any wonder the launch nations have had to compromise on specifications and numbers to get the project to completion?
Despite all the numerous problems we have to try and look at the aircraft and its specification in isolation, forget the political and industrial baggage and ask ourselves if it is worth having.
The requirement for the A400 is officially defined as;
A400M is planned to provide tactical and strategic mobility to all three Services. The required capabilities include: operations from airfields and semi-prepared rough landing areas in extreme climates and all weather conditions by day and night; carrying a variety of equipment including vehicles and troops over extended ranges; air dropping paratroops and equipment; and being unloaded with the minimum of ground handling equipment. The 1998 Strategic Defence Review confirmed a requirement for an airlift capability to move large single items such as attack helicopters and some Royal Engineers’ equipment and concluded that this would be met, in the latter part of the first decade of the 21st Century, by Future Transport Aircraft. The A400M was selected to meet this requirement.
After much uncertainty, the revised contract is expected to be finalised towards the end of 2011.
From the latest National Audit Office Major Projects Report the A400 will cost the MoD £3.231 billion for 22 aircraft and associated items, some £487million more than expected and over 5 years later than expected when it comes into service in 2015.
The programme cost is therefore, a very rough £148 million each.
The NAO also assesses each project against the 8 Defence Lines of Development and it has assessed the A400 to be at risk in Equipment, Logistics and Infrastructure. However, all 8 of the key Performance Measures are forecast to be met.
The A400 is often compared to the C17 when in fact it is a replacement for the Transall and Hercules, the reason it is compared to the C17 is because its cost is more than double the Hercules and approaching the C17. The oft presented argument is because the A400 is approaching the cost of the C17 why not just buy more C17’s and even more Hercules, the sum of these would be greater than the sum of the C17 and A400. This is a powerful argument and worthy of serious consideration but it misses a crucial point, the Hercules has been overtaken by the reality of larger vehicles and engineering plant so no matter how cheap it is or how many you can combine for a large total payload if your single (realistically) tactical airlifter cannot lift the majority of your kit the rest doesn’t matter a jot.
To that, many people counter with an argument that tactical aircraft is not about moving vehicles or plant but more to do with pallets and people. Again, a fair point but by going down this road we condemn the forces to relying on a very small number of C17’s to move vehicles by air and I do not think this is a desirable state for any number of reasons.
This is a couple of rather optimistic videos but good anyway.
The inconvenient fact that supporters of more Hercules cannot discount is the trend in vehicle and engineering plant size and weight, especially size, in increasing.
- WMIK becomes Jackal
- 4 tonner becomes SV
- Foden Recovery becomes SV Recovery
- CET becomes Terrier
- Scimitar becomes FRES Scout
- Saxon becomes FRES UV
- CVR(T) becomes FRES SV
- Viking becomes Bronco
The IED has arrived on the scene and the physical design mitigation measures have resulted in higher and wider vehicles. The IED is not going away either, in any spectrum of conflict it will always be a threat and vehicle designers and armed forces the world over realise this. The fundamental core role of strategic air transport is to deliver and sustain land forces, if by concentrating our resources on legacy aircraft like the C130 we deny ourselves the ability to discharge that fundamental role in any meaningful way.
Even if you look at shifting some Land Rovers, a single A400 can move 6 plus trailers, 3 times a C130J. Getting back to pallets and people, the A400 can carry 9 and 54 personnel at the same time; the C130J can do 5 pallets with no room at the side for personnel. The A400 can go faster and higher and this really comes into its own on a prolonged supply movement as turnaround time becomes a factor. Its speed and altitude will allow the A400 to share airspace with civilian airline traffic. It is plumbed for air refuelling, has much better sustained soft field performance than a C130, has innovative cargo handling and maintenance capabilities and go can much further.
Is it too big compared to the C130 making it useless for some tactical air strips, you can’t get all those improvements above without getting bigger, but look at the dimensions. If we take the standard C130J (not stretch) as a base, the A400 is about 10 ft wider wingspan and 45 foot longer but if you compare it to the stretch J it goes down to 30 foot. So although physically bigger it is designed to have a much smaller ground pressure than a C130.
The fundamental truth is this, plant and vehicles are getter bigger and the C130 cargo box isn’t
By keeping the C130 and not moving on, we are tacitly accepting that more and more of the types of equipment that used to go in the back of a Hercules now need’s to go via C17.
This would be fair enough if we had loads of C17’s which were cheap to operate, low maintenance and able to repeatedly operate from austere locations, but it cannot.
If you really want a dull read, pop over to this link and look at the requirements for austere site operation of the C17. The issue is not about one off landings but repeated landing on anything other than tarmac or compacted gravel without destroying the aircraft in the process or rendering the surface unfit. From the document, the C17 can do about 15 cycles into a location with a CBR of 6 with a payload of 20tonnes and enough fuel for a short return flight, before the runway needs serious repair. The A400 on the other hand, is designed to do roughly 40 cycles at the same weight, do the math as they say over the pond.
LM and Boeing talking about the C130XL and C17B respectively i.e. meeting the spec of the A400 and the US is also running a number of programmes (Advanced Theatre Transport, Advanced Mobility Concept and Advanced Joint Air Cargo System) to address the growing gap in their tactical lift fleet. The US has plenty of C17’s so the gap is not in desperately urgent need of closing but there is a gap nevertheless. The USAF recently asked industry to start thinking about a C130 replacement, even if they don’t actually know what they are looking for.
The A400 has been designed with a cargo box width the same as the C17 and other aspects of its design have been very carefully thought through, they were not picked out of a hat.
The reality
Let’s make no mistake; the A400 is not out of the woods yet and the amount of specification creep has yet to be confirmed, that said, there is growth potential in the airframe, engines and flight control software and there are very few military equipments that spring forth from the manufacturer as the finished article so I am relatively sanguine about these issues.
We might also whisper the fact that European air forces will collectively have a very effective airlift capability, sshh.
The plan is therefore to withdraw the C130K’s, operate the C130J’s and A400’s as the A400 comes into service and then withdraw the C130J’s in 2022 so the RAF will have a 3 type Air Transport fleet, the A330, C17 and A400.
The RAF currently operates both the C130K and the all digital cockpit C130J, for which the RAF was the launch customer. Within these two basic types are a number of variants and capability increments.
The 22 A400’s will replace the 35 C130’s currently in service. It must be said that out of that number only 26 are in the forward fleet and 18 fit for purpose but even deploying the ‘Hoon defence’ of if something is better you don’t need as many, that is a serious reduction and makes little provision for attrition.
By way of explanation the forward fleet comprises aircraft which are serviceable or short-term unserviceable. Fit for purpose aircraft include only serviceable aircraft available to the front-line commands for operational and training purposes
It’s simply not enough if we are to maintain an enduring expeditionary presence, UK/FI commitments, contingent capability for tactical airlift/air dropping and training.
More information from the A400 site here
Something Smaller than an A400
A problem with the A400 is the very simple fact we will only be getting 22 and a shared with the French support/training system. This last aspect hasn’t been formally announced but that is the direction of travel.
The second issue is very similar to the one that often besets the C17; it is too much aircraft for many situations. The large cargo compartment will mean that for a lot of the time the A400 will be transporting people, pallets and lots of fresh air.
Now this may seem like a contradictory argument to the one for the A400 but bear with me.
Whilst the A400 makes a lot of sense when shifting heavy and voluminous loads in the build-up phase but a pallet or two, a couple of dozen personnel, a piece of engineering plant or a vital spare part it is clearly too large.
These are typical intra theatre loads where even the C130 is often too large.
In the build-up phase the majority of flights will be carrying vehicles, plant and equipment. As an operation progresses into sustainment, personnel transfers and pallets will be the norm.
The third issue of concern with the A330/C17/A400 mix is the quantities. The A400 is a tactical airlifter, it is designed to slum it in the rough stuff; the RAF has lost 4 C130 in operations in the last few years. An equivalent number of losses would represent nearly 15% of the A400 fleet and this calculation assumes all 22 are actually available and fit for deployment, which we know will not be the case. This will lead to a tendency towards risk reduction and operations should not be overly constrained by such concerns.
Against all my ruthless commonality and standardisation instincts I think there is a need for a utilitarian, cheap to operate, very short take off/landing and modestly sized tactical airlifter, a transit van of an aircraft for time/mission sensitive loads. In some circumstances this aircraft might also supplement the Chinook and Merlin force which whilst obviously useful are very expensive to operate.
The ideal payload bracket would be as that of the Chinook, about 10 tonnes but with higher volume for low density cargo.
There are a few options in this bracket, the EADS C235 and Alenia C27J Spartan being the obvious ones. Although the C235 would be a good choice the C27J is a ‘proper’ tactical airlifter with a long heritage and superior performance. The US Air National Guard will be operating 38 Spartans, the Joint Cargo Aircraft.
The C27J Spartan is an updated version of the G222 and has some commonality with the C130J. Of course the RAF C130J’s will be going out of service but one wonders if some aspects of the C130J logistics and training capability might be reused in some way.
At its most basic, the C27J is a cut down C130J, its performance is impressive, 600kph, 3000km range (8 tonnes), take off distance at max weight 580m, landing distance at max weight 340m and a maximum payload of 11.1 tonnes in the logistic mission (less in the assault role)
The cargo hold can carry up to 60 personnel, 46 paratroopers, 3 463L pallets, 36 stretchers or 6 airdrop bundles. Its cargo box width allows light vehicles to be carried like the Land Rover, Ocelot, Jackal and Viking for example, although these would be the exception, pallets and personnel being the rule.
Payload options
Other missions for the C27J would be maintenance of parachute drop capabilities, which has proven difficult in recent times due to a lack of airframes and special-forces support.
Although now put on hold the US had intended to use the C27J as a basis for the AC-27J Stinger II gunship variant, an interesting proposition that would deliver a serious capability upgrade for UK forces.
Dropping down into the bargain basement there is a wide variety of aircraft choices but their loading flexibility and payload are arguably too limiting although their ultra low operating costs are certainly attractive.
Is there room for a fourth airlift aircraft, normally I would say no way, but given operating cost of the Chinook and the scarcity of the A400 I am more and more convinced.
As above, it is very difficult to gauge an in service price but the US sale would indicate about £30million each including logistics, simulators, training etc, comparing favourably with the Hercules, A400 and C17
Options
Although I have split the tactical and strategic transport posts in many regards they are closely linked and the dividing lines a grey shade of grey. Although the C17 and A400 have utility in both strategic and tactical roles the need to use them thus will be heavily impacted by the strategic capability on offer from the FSTA aircraft. Delivering mixed loads of pallets, containers and personnel into a non austere location will generally be cheaper and when combined with the airborne refuelling capability will make the FSTA a particularly low cost means of delivery direct to an airhead.
The first option to consider is therefore a repeat of the suggestion in the previous post, namely a change of aircraft from the passenger to the much more flexible cargo version of the A330 MRTT for the FSTA programme. This will reduce the need to use C17’s and A400’s in the strategic role, moving personnel, pallets and lots of fresh air over long distances, thus preserving the precious commodity that is A400 and C17 airframe hours. Utilisation rates and therefore operating costs for all aircraft, should improve as a result of having this flexibility.
The second option is to consider is the maintenance and logistics system that supports the main tactical transport aircraft. For far too long we have accepted/swept under the carpet the low availability rates of aircraft that is a result of insufficient spares and maintenance personnel being provided. These are usually predicated on a demand that is not based on enduring and demanding operations and this has to change. Although it is a few years old this link will show just how often aircraft are cannibalised for spares.
Thirdly, we don’t/won’t have enough C17’s and A400’s
As funding, hopefully, improves towards Future Force 2020 then we should consider increasing the orders for both. Boeing seems to be forever closing the C17 production line ‘very soon’ but there is no doubt it will happen at some point. Increasing orders for the A400 might be seen by some as rewarding failure, it is late and we are only getting 22 for the inflated price of 25 after all but I think the A400 will mature into a very effective aircraft and in a decade or so we will saying;
‘Hercules who’
How many is ‘some more’?
We have to base this on a baseline of an enduring operation at Brigade strength plus the extra commitments for training, contingent operations and special-forces support. The RAPID aspect of the Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) is often ridiculed because no matter what our insistence on air portability we do not have the ability to lift a brigade rapidly.
This ridicule is unwarranted, there is absolutely nothing wrong with the aspiration to airlift a medium weight brigade, in fact it is a sound concept. Early deployment of a rapid intervention force may often negate the need for larger forces later and as long as we do not base our entire force planning on the premise that rapid intervention will achieve results in every circumstance then it is still something we should pursue.
The whole point of having rapidly deployable forces is to react to circumstances; if we cannot lift 16 Air Assault Brigade into any theatre within a reasonable time frame then there becomes little point in having them as a distinct formation. The same could also be said of the Royal Marines, if we do not have the ability to land them from the sea in a reasonable time frame then they become much less valuable. On a side note, the recent rumours of the RAF wanting to take operational command of the Parachute Regiment are an interesting thought. The Royal Navy has the Royal Marines and fought tooth and nail to keep them, arguing that theatre entry from the sea needs specialist command, could the same be said of forces whose raison d’être is to effect theatre entry from the air? I will leave this argument for a later post but it is food for thought, argue for the RN and RM, then flip the coin and see it from an air perspective and tell me what is different.
As a minimum therefore, we should have the ability to airlift a Brigade force in a reasonable time frame, even if it is not a ‘medium weight’ force.
How many extra, 50 of course but back in the real world!
Without detailed planning assumptions at hand I think an extra 2 or 3 would provide a useful enhancement, if we could find the funding before those nice gentlemen from Seattle make good on their ever present threat to cease production.
When carrying vehicles, the constraining factor is often weight and volume; this is where the cavernous dimensions of the cargo area and basic lift capacity come into play. For really large and super heavy loads there is always a chartered Antonov or a ‘borrow’ of a USAF C5 Galaxy but these are definitely the exception.
Fourth, the argument for a small tactical airlifter like the C27J is strong and a small force of 10-12 would be sufficient for special-forces support and intra theatre transport for a deployed brigade on an enduring operation.
Fifth, air despatch, or the chucking of kit out of the door, is enjoying a renaissance as the combination of threats, risks, economics and the availability of accurate air drop systems have converged. We should continue to invest in systems and training to enhance this capability.
Finally, the ability to rapidly create and maintain a suitable airhead is vital to expeditionary operations. The specialist airfield construction capability within UK forces is currently relatively low capacity and this needs to change.
In an ideal post 2022 world, the RAF’s tactical airlift fleet would comprise 8 or 9 C17’s (all at the same Block), 25 A400’s and 10 or 12 C27J’s, all backed up with the FSTA cargo variant aircraft.
To summarise then;
- The move to a 3 type transport fleet of A330, C17 and A400 is sensible with some caveats, the commonality benefits are obvious, especially when looking at the Hercules fleets within a fleet problem we have now
- The FSTA A330’s needs to be the cargo variant, no question, this will reduce dependence on the C17 and A400
- A couple of extra C17’s and possibly the original number of A400’s would contribute to the goal of being able to lift 16AAB into theatre in a reasonable time frame, we have to be sensible, we will never be able to do it in one go unless the tooth fairy delivers but more airlift is never a poor option
- We should continue to invest in training infrastructure, support and logistics to maximise the availability rates of our diminishing number of aircraft
- The argument for a small airlifter is worth serious investigation to provide a sensible tiered capability and allow the aircraft to be used in their most appropriate roles, minimising poor utilisation and supplementing the rotary fleet
## Other posts in this series ##
The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction
The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends
The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets
The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement
The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01
The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)
The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)
The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)
The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)
The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)
The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)
The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling
The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport
The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)
The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)
The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)
The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)
The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security
The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary
Instead of the C27J would the C-295 not be a better choice? We could then also buy the maritime patrol version and fill the gap we have created with the scrapping of Nimrod.
Very interesting and informative.
Tubby, the problem with the C235 and C295 is they are commercially derived and dont have very good short field performance and their cargo box width is far too small
Tubby I would agree with EADS Airbus works in metric and Boeing/North America works in imperial so operating c-295 with a400 and a330 would at least allow common stores holding for those 3 aircraft. As C17 is already covered by the global spares service it makes financial sense to allow it to be the only exception to procurement from a single company procurement strategy as well.
It’s a pity that the C-130 wasn’t modified into an updated version of the XC-120 Packplane. Wide cargos could be slung underneath and streamlined with an inflatable fairing.
The airlift review wanted an 8th C-17. I hope the RAF gets it, but the coalition is oblivious to the threats in the world.
Th RAF is right not to use its few precious C-17s “off road”, but should experiment just in case a vital “Entebbe” style, one off special op needs it.
I too think that the A400M will be ok eventually. I think it should have been designed to lift 45 tons rather than the 37 it can now. Perhaps a streched turbofan “mini C-17″ version in the future?
I can see your point about a few small transports, but funding an extra C-17 + 22/25 A400M will limit extra purchase.
I would give the short RAF C-130J to the RN. Once refurbished, they should be given search radar & an EO turret similar to the US Coastguard C-130J. The USCG C-130J can do deep ocean patrol/SAR & keep their transport capability.
Hi all,
Have to agree with tubby, i think the C-295/C-295 mpa might be a better buy especially if we buy say 20, enough for 2 squadrons of 8 (1x lifter, 1x mpa). Also could the C-295 be fitted with the engines from an A400m reducing logistics and parts or would it cost too much?
An A400 engine has nearly 4 times the power of those used on the C295/C235
It would blow the bloody wings off at idle
If course, it would also snap the wings off before it was ever started
Have a look at the TP400 on a Hercules to see just how big it is
http://lh6.ggpht.com/_erq5Z9l-0CA/SUsSrDCmM5I/AAAAAAAAXeI/uJrL07rlV4M/100748_1.jpg
I would go a little further, obtain 212′s for FOB replenishment, short field landing/take off or just use as air drop possibily using the copterbox as can hold 60lbs 3 or 4 would do an ammo/water replen. This aircraft currently used by the US ironically as they are normally known for “big is better”.
I might even go a step further and suggest these are flown by the AAC, they use islanders now so not a big step.
@ tubby when the 295 went up against the 27j the spacing issue raised it head as they couldn’t fit a kiowa helicopter in plus aircrew wouldn’t be able to walk past vehicles, the parting shot was it couldn’t pass an operational test (engines weren’t powerful enough, airbus bluffed about extra power). Somewhere i have a disc diagram showing cabin width.
I remember reading somewhere marshalls of cambridge had done a study putting 2×1.5m extensions in the 27j so it would be the same length as 295 and therefore able to take 5 pallets in fact same as 130!!
just my ramblings
Thanks for the info TD, just a crazy idea thats all. Could we make a C-27 mpa derivative? would it be a seller abroad?
MM
Jed may know the answer to this, but did not canada look at MPA c27?
page 38 of the c27 document has the comparisons, phew, nights just fly by in my house!!!!
ahh brings back memories of then I was at Lyneham,seeing the J come online… a nightmare at times!
I agree with TD’s propseal of a third small lighter tacticle transport aircraft. The special forces demand sometimes damn near chokes the C-130 airframe availability… but wouldnt it be wiser to use the C-130J for this role once A-400 comes? Rather than go through the long drawn process of choosing another airframe and introducing it, training, OEU etc etc…Like the K, we could get a few more years out of the J…have them dedicated to the SF role. Then again the J’s appear to not be as sturdy as the Klassics.
Or as suggested, convert them to MPA standard…though lol keep them RAF…no need for the change of uniform.
Good post! Gald to see a balanced and clear view of the A400… which has just passed its cold weather tests in Sweden.
I think the J’s have been battered and bruised so will start costing big time beyond 2020, I can see the logic in having a clean sweep and getting rid of the 3 or 4 versions and 8 or 9 capability increments of C130
I thought we might be able to raid some of the existing Hercules ‘back office’ for the C27J, engines etc
The C27J annoys me because its just too small to fit an ISO container in it otherwise it would be ideal. However if all you want to do is carry some people and pallets around maybe even the C27/C295/C235 are too big, whats needed is a modern day C23 Sherpa, Dash 8 or BN Islander. Although in an ideal world I’d take a cargo carrying autogyro over all these options.
I’ll end with a bit of trivia. There was a proposed tactical transport concept of the beluga. Check out the following link:
http://www.allaboutguppys.com/beluga/cargo/cargo.htm
I understand the problems with the C17 and Austere Airfields, but I dont understand why its considered a problem.
Land the C17, BUILD A PROPER RUNWAY.
For the costs of sustained austere runway performance, surely we just train the Royal Engineers to build an 11,500ft runway double quick?
Hard land 6 C17′s, build a runway, land the remaining C17 fleet with the rest of the gear, job done.
The A400 is shaping up to be quite a good aircraft, for everyone who’s military doesnt need access to anything outside EUrope.
France gets a big chunk of production, the UK gets? Well, an aircraft thats great for supporting The British Army of the Rhine, that wont exist come 2020.
That said, I prefer the Turbo Prop to the jet for this sort of role.
We need something with the range and payload of the C17 or C5.
Without wishing to “fight the last war” The A400m cant reach ascension without am inflight fuel, unless it runs cargoless.
It simply cant reach the Falklands.
“Too much space” doesnt really hold water either.
For example, the C17 in passenger mode could double up on passengers with the addition of another “deck”.
Theres more than enough room above the soldiers for, another soldier. If you dont like that example, put some seats on top of a pallet.
The same goes for “urgent” cargo.
I get this odd impression that the soldiers arent routinely complaining,
“Bloody Quatermasters, what do they think we need all this gear for? I’ve just got no where to put it. Perkins has had to bunk with this nice bloke called Terry TalicoughSmith because I needed his bed for more storage room”
Shouldnt be too hard to hold a stock of gear ready to fill up a flight thats on its way for an emergency resupply.
Seems like a C-27J MPA might be possible, their web-site does not sell it very much but they do say:
“With mission modules for maritime and electronic surveillance, search and rescue, firefighting and VIP transport, the C-27J is a truly versatile and capable intra-theater airlifter.”
http://www.c-27j.com/flexibility
However I have been reading on PPRUNE Military and it sounds like fixed wing SAR is actually the responsibility of the Department for Transport not MoD, and it was one of those tasks which Nimrod MR2 covered because it could, rather than being a core responsibility of the MoD. If that is the case then I hope someone gives DfT a good kicking until they get their cheque book out are replace our long range SAR capabilities ASAP.
@Tubby, yes, I don’t suppose there is any reason why the C27 could do basic SAR; decent radar and comms fit, some palletised emergency stores and bobs your uncle. If we want it to do more, maritime patrol type activity then a FITS pallet might just do the job, it has a very high G airframe so going low should not be a problem. Range would be pretty good as well because it would more or less be empty.
The issue for me, as with SAR rotary, is why should the MoD carry the cost for very little operational benefit?
@Dom, building a proper runway is a very time consuming task, stalls your momentum and makes you vulnerable to counter.
With a payload of 20t the C130J does roughly 4000km, at the same weight the A400 does roughly 6,000km. Consider this, using the A400 to reinforce the FI it could do 20 tonnes by going to Gib, Gib to Ascension and then to MPA, each leg without refuelling. The C130J with the same load would need a refuelling sortie for the last TWO legs of that journey.
If you’re looking for short filed performance and pallets and passengers I still think the BAe 146M is discounted without proper consideration, especially as part of a hub and spoke configuration taking pressure off both C-17 and C130 and bringing speed and commercial rates of ” hop”.
You just have to look at the configuration to know it can be of use, and BAE are keen to get rid of them as they are the last vestiges of a commercial business they got out of ages ago.
It has up to 10 tonnes payload and 100 pax with range of up to 1500 nm
It has an amazing short field configuration… City of London and Cranfield (5000 ft and 6000ft) amongst others, and is designed for austere airfields carrying its own spares
It has very quiet operation which is useful as a defensive aid
It is already flown by the RAF!! , AND ITS BONKERS CHEAP.. £2 million for a pax configuration and £5 million for a cargo conversion (its currently used by commercial cargo lifters).
At those prices one could have a small fleet including dedicated forms for medical evacuation etc, this is not even to start on how it might be used for tactical ISTAR or even for air drops.
Yes it has no ramp, but nor does the A330 MRTT and it does come with great potential to just lift stuff, but all the MOD teams are obsessed with the outsize loads that are infrequent and ignore the reality of the day to day grind.
As TD says, C-17s for passenger lift makes no sense… especially if a BAE 146 (linking to the A330) could do the job better and at much less cost.
I think the reason we use C17 is because of deficiencies elsewhere.
If we go Tristar into Kandahar (when the tristar is actually available) we then have to use scarce C130 to Bastion
Until the new runway is built at Bastion, Tristar has to go to Kandahar and again, C130 to Bastion
Going C17 from the middle east with personnel is our best option, not because it is ideal, but because we don’t have a choice
The 146 option is very interesting and has a number of advantages but is it as versatile as a C27, I agree though, you can’t argue with the cost
addendum.. should read 10 tonnes or 100 pax
sorry
TD
I’m not a fan of the C130 either, for the same reason, its great for flying around the continent (US or EU) but they arent really tasks we need to do.
I’m not against the A400m per se, and I dont believe the C17 is perfect.
Its simply that the A400m lacks the range we need.
That the C17 cant land on all the airfields we’d like is little weakness if the A400 cant reach them.
Idealy, we’d want an enlarged A400M, but if no one else in Europe is after any, we cant afford it.
Mike you took the words right out of my mouth. Why are we ditching the C130Js? As I understand it that was NEVER the plan. The replacement for the 50ish C130s was 25 C130Js and 25 A400Ms.
As was stated the C17 was leased to fill the delay in the A400M. They then realised how bloody useful it was and we now have 7. Great, we need more, the RAF alwaus ecpected to get about 12.
We know we are short of transport capability, so getting rid of the C130J makes no sense. We have the infrastructure, the crews so lets use them. I would convert some for MPA and use the rest for special operations and Intra-theatre transport.
If you need anything smaller I would go for the C27J, simply due to the commonality with the Us and the C130J. I am a fan of the 146, I just don’t think it would be a flexible as the C27J.
Finally YES lets change the FSTA to thew Cargo version FFS!!!!
I think the reason the J’s are going is because they have been battered
@DominicJ
Don’t quite get your point, why would a 400M want to go to the Falklands? (Save as a ferry move to forward deploy).They (Falklands) have Mount Pleasant Airfield so don’t need short field performance.
I can’t imagine any situation where one would use both strategic range and real short /rough field capability. If you go a strategic distance you have to know that you can make a safe landing and refuel. The risk of damaging a C-17 is too great for it to be worth using its theoretical capability.
Losing C130s to mines is bad enough but putting a C-17 into a pot hole would be insane and then having to destroy it would be even worse.
If you just need a tactical hop to a short field you will have a large runway at one end and a short one at the other so the hub and spoke idea develops.
It’s mastering where you have a concrete runway (but its light aircraft in scale) that is the challenge and where the C-17 has its troubles. Yes it has range but with a payload it has to have a long runway, that’s where the 400M contributes, it can get into forward logistic bases for the considerable time it takes to develop their infrastructure.
Re building a runway in short order- I don’t think that this is a sensible suggestion, think how many tons of material is needed for the thickness and strength that can take a fully loaded C-17.
The time taken to build new runways at Camp Bastion is a good example of the functioning (land) supply lines that are needed for such an effort. Just building Route Trident has shown the engineering problem of finding enough aggregate (even in a mountainous country like Afghanistan), no idea where they would find the materials nearby for a “quick” runway build for a place such as Bastion.
If you want to do strategic (really well) with big runways at either end…. such as for the Falkland’s.. use a 777-200ER freighter- 100 tonnes over 10,000 miles… miss out Ascension altogether.. don’t waste the C-17 on such jobs….. save its outsize capacity for when its needed.
The C-17 is a short field version of the C-5 while the 400m is (as TD states) an up to date version of the C130.
We can use both but should reserve them for their own special capabilities and use more commercial aircraft whenever possible to control costs.
You can build runways in a reasonable time but just not with concrete and aggregates
Something like AM2 aluminium matting or the newer ones that use plastics, most of our AM2 matting went down the on the Atlantic Conveyor (that is what the Conveyor was basically carrying, a forward deployed airfield for Harriers and rotary)
I have a post in the pipeline about expeditionary airfield operations
@ Brian – Have you seen this up-dated concept of the “Packplane”?
http://mikesnead.net/resources-cat.htm
@ TD – Another great post! I agree with your article particly the need for a smaller transport. On that subject, I have two ideas that may interest. First off are two articles by Carlton Meyer from the G2mil site. Now I KNOW some of his ideas are crazy but so are some(all?) of mine…
http://www.g2mil.com/Greyhounds.htm
http://www.g2mil.com/Hawkeye.htm
If we are going to have a CATOBAR carrier and the idea is to use it as a floating airfield rather than a strike carrier then why not have a small tactical aircraft with variants that can be used for cargo, AEW, Elint, ISTAR, even patrol/ASW? If we are going to get the most out of both the Carrier and the small Transport aircraft could this be the way?
The second idea is if you want to have a aircraft with the same capabilities as the Chinook but cheaper and easier to operate with better range etc then what about (Retro-Tech warning!) the Fairey Rotodyne?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairey_Rotodyne
The Groen Brothers claim that any high-wing transport aircraft can be converted in to a Gyroplane using similar technology;
http://www.aviastar.org/helicopters_eng/groen_gyroliner.php
Aircraft with a “H” tail are easier than a “T” tail to convert…
Gareth, can I direct your good self to this post
http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/09/vertical-heavy-lift/
RW
“Don’t quite get your point, why would a 400M want to go to the Falklands?”
The Argies want a second round?
“The risk of damaging a C-17 is too great for it to be worth using its theoretical capability.
Losing C130s to mines is bad enough but putting a C-17 into a pot hole would be insane and then having to destroy it would be even worse.”
You can only really say that in a risk/reward scenario.
We were prepared to send Harriers beyond recovery range in the Falklands, have the pilot eject and be picked up by helicopter.
I’d rather not write off £3bn of C17, but I’m sure I could come up with a reason to.
“If you just need a tactical hop to a short field you will have a large runway at one end and a short one at the other so the hub and spoke idea develops.”
I dont get the advantage.
I just dont see this war in which we will be doing such a thing.
Perhaps thats the better question.
What do people see A400M doing?
TD
but we haven’t got the Harriers anymore, and DJ was proposing building a runway out of the back of a C-17, my point is you need some functioning supply line (land or sea) that can deal with the weight and volume before you can develop a runway
The idea of matting or your other idea of block paving are very good for airfield hard standings or rotor craft but I doubt they could cope with runway duties for large aircraft.
I suspect that you can deliver a runway to site with precast concrete support sections and use block infill’s with a concrete screed on top (current flooring techniques) but while fast it is still huge amounts of weight and best done either near the coast or near a railway.
As to a runway (from humble beginnings) in a remote area with poor roads its always going to take time. However if you were serious about that capability you would look to hybrid airships with 500 tonne plus payloads, possibly combined with either large ground effect transports or super size hovercraft.
In any event this is a lot of technology and effort to put a fixed asset in harms way, if you are going to spend that sort of money (which no one will) then I think you are better off thinking of developing a floating airfield. Hybrid airships with loads in the region of 5000 tonnes might do the trick and not be quite as daft as they sound.
The Northrop/ Hybrid Air Vehicle effort may yet surprise us both in terms of speed to theatre and eventual utility.
@RW, Wouldn’t disagree in the round but you can build functioning runways out of AM2, it is what it is for but your point about ‘what next’ is well made, of course you need a functioning road network from there.
This is reminiscent of an earlier thread so I’m glad that someone else thinks that the C-27 is a useful potential purchase (had that thought when we seemed to be flogging Hercs. to death carrying not much around Irag, I seem to remember).
Also glad to see that others also believe that the Js are knackered. As lead customer, we didn’t get best value from these. The short ones are already thought of as useless.
Does the A400 have self-sealing tanks, by the way?
Call me sceptic, but how do the operational cost of the A400M compare with the C-17 compare? And, due to the scarce nature of its procurement, will the A400M be ever operated from austere locations? Is the C-17-practice of not using autere airfields being done because of incapability or common sense, with the latter also applying to then scarce A400Ms?
The same things about operational cost where selled with the Typhoon. Designed to be easier to maintain, cheaper to run etc. The last I read was the German AF spending €73k per flight-hour. Or: three times the Tornados number.
So, how realistic is the whole picture being drawn here?
Then, first you crush the Herc, then you revive her in form of a C-27. The price of £30m is also very questionable, as the bill will be paid for in Euros.
If it costs so much, why not opting for the brazilian KC-390 for an estimated £36m, getting an additional tanker-capability as well?
And when we are at it: the Japanese C-2 will have a 6,500 km (4,039 mi; 3,510 nmi) range at 30-tonne payload, with a ferry range of 10,000km+. According to WP, $80m are envisioned per plane. And the C-2 has an ASW-cousin, the P-1.
DJ
If the Argies want a rematch, resupply will be to Mount Pleasant by air or its nearby port by sea, the 400m would be little or no use except to put (Falkland based)special forces into strange places.
I think we already have wars where the risks taken in the retaking of the Falkland’s are avoided (lessons learnt) and commercial logistic models are considered more relevant. Hub and spoke is the model being used to deliver material and troops from bases in the UK via transhipments points into Afghanistan. I don’t know where i.e. Cyprus or Pakistan these swap over’s occur but they allow the tristars etc… to be part of the operation.
The advantage of not going direct (point to point)is that you can optimise the different legs, commercially derived aircraft are better for the long hauls, military aircraft are better for the outsize load and the final leg. In commercial terms the A380 is the heavy lifter going into hub airports (Heathrow) and is supported by traffic from the spoke airports(Bristol or East Midlands).
Another analogy.. Main battle tanks only do the last leg under their own power, for most of the journey they travel by ship or rail, then road and only at the last possible moment on their own power (tracks).
As to 400M what they see it doing is delivering as close to the front line as possible and delivering a more realistic payload than the C130s (which will anyway be worn out before the 400M arrives), what I see it doing is also extending the length of the “spokes” in a hub and spoke logistics model. This would allow the hub to become either a port or railway yard and allow greater throughput to the front line.
I know that logistics take a back seat to flash and bang but even in the immediate and short term they are the telling factor, if there is any way you can tell at an instant that the US is “THE” superpower it is in its logistic capabilities. If they get it wrong first time they can get it right next, by the time you get to dropping Harriers in the Ocean you are just relying on dumb luck and an enemy having such a limited capability that increasingly they only exist in the past.
Heroic as it was, in many ways, the Falklands was about what not to do and many of our forces are now configured with that in mind. Better to move on and make the Argies absolutely 100% certain that a second attempt would be a costly failure because our logistics would dominate theirs.
@Chris, I cannot conceive of any circumstance in which the RAF would be operating tactical aircraft without countermeasures and inerting but I suppose you never know
@McZ, good point about running costs, I guess only time will tell but you also have to look at it across the whole fleet, we have a very diverse Hercules fleet which costs a fortune to maintain. The C17 can drop into the rough stuff but as per the post, its not repeatable without surface remediation and the maintenance penalty is severe so its not something to be done lightly, will the A400 be so precious as to only be used on concrete?
Yes and no i think, we can’t afford not to have it capable of the rough stuff but even the Hercules was primarily used on runways before operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. That’s why I made a case for the C27J because it can do tactical stuff all day long at a low cost. The Japanese C2 needs a massive runway and their constitution prevents export so its a bit of a non starter
I know that logistics take a back seat to flash and bang
Not on this blog RW
Check out some past posts on the very subject, its a pet obsession of mine
Re the photo of the C17 in PAX Mode.
I myself and probably many other readers will remember flying down to the Falklands in a C130 as soon as Stanley was able to accept them.
The space the troops in the photo have is twice that which we had. We were given our packed food and drink on leaving ascencion and told to make it last as it was too difficult to get any more to us.Facing each other as in the photo but so close we had to slot our legs in between the guys legs opposite.
Want to take a leak,one porta loo at the end of the aircraft so you had to somehow climb over the rest of the lads to get there.
No doubt in the next emergency the same will happen and the number of pax will be doubled,we all know and accept that in such a situation all the regs fly out of the window.
I have no doubt that A400 will be no different and that once it is up and running will perform sterling service for us.
DOMJ
The a440m will do what we currently do with the c130 but it will carry the same load further and we as has been said we have now out grown c130 as we did dakota before that.
Chris W
Outside of the structural design requirements its up to individual customers what level of protection is provided on the a400m.
The KC-390 is an interesting proposal my only concern is like the c17 its turbofan power and these can have issues with FOD on rough strip. I think whats really needed for theatre transport is a modern skyvan. Being unpressurised would allow a nice boxy hold and dramatically reduce the effects of landing/takeoff pressure cycles and the associated fatigue problems. Crew may not agree mind you if they had to fly thru bad weather.
C130J are being flogged to death due to the serviceability issues of the c130K from 2020 they will most likely need to be re-winged and we know how straight forward that is. To replace c130J I would consider buying the 10 a440ms off the germans cheap as compensation for the large a400m workshare they got by agreeing to buy 60a/c in the first place. As the a400m will be procured in similar numbers to the c17 maybe all the partners should buy into a similar sort of support system as c17 only run by airbus in the 400m’s case.
“On a side note, the recent rumours of the RAF wanting to take operational command of the Parachute Regiment are an interesting thought. The Royal Navy has the Royal Marines and fought tooth and nail to keep them, arguing that theatre entry from the sea needs specialist command, could the same be said of forces whose raison d’être is to effect theatre entry from the air? I will leave this argument for a later post but it is food for thought, argue for the RN and RM, then flip the coin and see it from an air perspective and tell me what is different.”
I think, the main difference is the basic idea of the air as an operational base. On the seas, there is a landing ship. What is in the air?
The RM are air-deliverable through their own commando helicopters. The Paras have conducted amphibious ops throughout the second half of the 20th century. The Apaches of 16 AAB are capable of flying of from vessels. Outmerging RM and 16 AAB into a real SOC may have merit.
I would retain the SBS in the RN, and would give the SAS to the RAF.
I wish to register a complaint about the paucity of ISO containers in this article. Call this a TD article on logistics? You need to pull your socks up mate!
RW – be careful with your analogies. There was a lot of debate in the commercial world about hub-and-spoke versus direct models of aviation, exemplified by the Airbus approach (A380 + the little ones) and Boeing with the 787 (which gives you the fleet commonality that works so well for Ryanair for instance). Consensus seems to have emerged that no one model works for everyone, and that it’s probably a close enough call that the two approaches will have big enough markets for Boeing to do a son-of-747 and Airbus to do a Dreamliner equivalent.
As an aside, I had an A380 fly over me on finals the other day – blimey. Although I don’t think it was _quite_ as impressive as seeing a B-52 taking off, which must be my all-time memorable aircraft moment.
The other interesting thing I noticed was that all the Islamic airlines have their names painted in really large letters on the bellies of their planes, presumably in the hope that the MANPAD-wielding jihadis of Hounslow would rather go for an infidel target.
I’m with Gareth Jones, in the longer term it might be interesting to talk to the USN (and Marines? and French/Brazilians/Indians?) about their replacement for the C-2, since we’re now going to have a requirement for COD. Even if it was just a C-2 with engine (and wing?) upgrades. Plus at some point they’re going to have to refresh the Hawkeye airframes, it could be a less ambitious version of the CSA, but with ambitions to be a baby Herc as well.
@ TD – I knew there was a reason I liked this site ;p
Another crazy idea – could you have a flying crane rotodyne? It may not be able to fly without a module in place but it would be even more flexible.
As for transferring the Paras to the RAF, the Fallschirmjäger
in WW2 were part of the Luftwaffe. You could combine with the RAF Regiment and have both a defensive and offensive unit, capable of both defending airfields and raiding/seizing them, amongst other things.
If we are going to have a CATOBAR carrier and the idea is to use it as a floating airfield rather than a strike carrier then why not have a small tactical aircraft with variants that can be used for cargo, AEW, Elint, ISTAR, even patrol/ASW? If we are going to get the most out of both the Carrier and the small Transport aircraft could this be the way?
If you’ve got a proper-sized carrier, like what we will when the Queen Liz hits the water, you can land proper-size aircraft on it.
Like Hercs.
Really.
http://www.theaviationzone.com/factsheets/c130_forrestal.asp
No cat launch, no arrestor wire, no problem!
At max takeoff weight, they got a C-130 off the deck in just 745 feet of takeoff roll. With a lighter load of 85,000lb, it would take about half that.
CVF has 932 feet of runway.
I think this idea really has potential. Obviously, you can’t then get the Herc below decks because the lifts won’t be big enough (they could manage the weight – they’re rated to 70 tonnes – but I doubt they could manage the wingspan).
@TD
Yes, the C-2 needs a massive runway. But there will be a commercial version available, so I don’t think the export ban applies here.
I agree on the C27s flexibility, i just don’t buy the price stated.
It goes without saying that a Herc would be great for AEW and MPA – versions of both already exist (EC-130V is used by the US Coast Guard for AEW; the HC-130 for patrol and SAR.)
If you need a bit more margin for error on the takeoff roll, there have been experiments with Hercs that could take off in a football field’s length thanks to large numbers of JATO rockets… might melt your flight deck and/or wings though.
@El Sid
Airbus have answered 787 with 350 XWB but it is not a direct response 350 XWB has overlap with both 787 and 777
re son of 747 there is a 747 -8 which is using 787 technology to give life to a Boeing jumbo
But to the general point that both models have value – Yes but despite the product evolutions the vast majority of the travel growth is going to a new global hub in the UAE (Emirates) which uses both point to point and hub aircraft to dominate the future of airline growth- witness their purchase of approximately half the 380 fleet
that is also my point re miltary logistics C17 and 400m do point to point but they need to be supported by a hub and spoke product such as MRTT or C5..what isnot in doubt is the need for hub and spoke as volumes increase.
380 is designed for “slot controlled airports” i.e too busy for any more landings and this is what we are seeing at Bastion and Knadahar
re paras to the RAF – paras have already integrated with SAS through SSG as I’ve understood so makes no sense to me to try and develop special forces with the RAF. They have no history of such a competence.
McZ,
The difference in a word is ‘historical’
I claim no great knowledge of the RAF but I understand it was formed during the 1914-1918 war as the ‘Royal Flying Corps’.
The Royal Marines on the other hand have a history as a seafaring body as long ago as 1664 when it was described as a Maritime Regiment.
It was an obvious success as in 1775 in was incorporated into the Royal Navy as an independent Royal Marine Regiment,one of its duties was to enforce discipline onboard ship.
Since then it has grown into the formidable fighting force it now is,so you see the RAF’s claim to the Parachute Regiment would be extremely weak in comparison.
Like the Royal Marines can you see an elite force like the Para’s accepting being under the auspices of the RAF,I don’t think so.
Gentlemen – back to basics if you please.
What are the roles these aircraft are to fulfill after 2020 ?
Hub and spoke regular logistics operations to where exactly ? Our crystal balls do not show where the next conflageration will be, nor do they confirm it will be another 10 year long COIN effort (can’t see HMG or public buying into anyway).
What do we think we need to move, and to where ?
5th Airborne is long gone, we no longer have a requirement to do reinforced brigade level parachute operations, with 3 x Para regiments, enginers, signals and artillery etc.
16 AAB – most of its combat power and utility is in the helo’s – so they either self deploy within Europe (to counter what threat ?) or use the QE class as very large LPH. Or take them to bits to some extent and ship them in C17, or on merchant shipping.
Truly light armoured vehicles seem to have a very constrained role in modern warfare, and will we ever have enough transport aircraft to move even a single regiment / battalion of Warrior or FRES SV anywhere in a hurry ?
SDSR tells us we are to continue to carry out expeditionary warfare, and to do at least limited operations on our own. Does that mean enough airlift to get a reinforced battalion of the Paras (in a SOF / Ranger role), a squadron of SAS and supporting troops IN to an area, and lots of scared (and injured?) civvies out ?
Only when we have answered the strategic questions, and have a clear set of requirements can we develop force structure.
I agree with TD and all commenters thus far the the tanker PFI is a cluster-frak. The tanker really should have multi-role transport capability and a boom, thus ensuring a level of flexibility for future response and operations.
After that I would not like to comment on numbers of C17, A400M or “small” transports like the C27J.
Parting shot, idea of a Super Greyhound as a modern replacement for the old CSA project is probably a good idea. Fighter jet mafia and 10 years of constant ‘close air support’ tasking for USN / USMC squadrons has seen them neglect ASW, ISTAR, tanking etc etc etc…… Would a probe equipped shore based ASW Greyhound be the best in the world, no, but it might be a 75% solution that could also fly from your carriers if required.
Can anyone comment on the Medicine Man exercises in Canada. Are we still doing them? They used to take up almost all the VC10 capability transporting troops there and back every month.
Very informative post.
“The A400 is shaping up to be quite a good aircraft, for everyone who’s military doesnt need access to anything outside EUrope.
France gets a big chunk of production, the UK gets? Well, an aircraft thats great for supporting The British Army of the Rhine, that wont exist come 2020.”
DJ, Maybe you don’t know but A400M’s workashe is related to how many aircraft each contry is ordering.
france’s one is 50 and wasn’t reduced like the UK or Germany did(doesn’t mean it ‘ll not be later).