Just when you thought the MoD could not be any more ham fisted they manage to completely screw something up so spectacularly it restores your faith in their rank incompetence. Widely covered in the press this week is the decision to abandon the £6 billion SAR-H PFI in the light of allegations of skulduggery and dodgy dealing.
The MoD police are now investigating the preferred bidder, Soteria, after allegations that a former member of the joint Ministry of Defence/Department for Transport integrated project team (IPT) assisted the consortium in its bid preparation by providing access to commercially sensitive information. The individual then apparently went to work for Soteria.
The Secretary of State for Transport (Phillip Hammond) said;
“On 16 December I and my Rt Hon Friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced that information had come to light regarding the preferred bid in the Search and Rescue Helicopter competition which required clarification.
“In mid-December, the preferred bidder in the SAR-H competition, Soteria, voluntarily came forward to inform the Government of irregularities regarding the conduct of their bid team which had only then recently come to light. The irregularities included access by one of the consortium members, CHC Helicopter, to commercially sensitive information regarding the joint MOD/DfT project team’s evaluations of industry bids and evidence that a former member of that project team had assisted the consortium in its bid preparation, contrary to explicit assurances given to the project team at the time.
“Since December, our two Departments have been working with Soteria to better understand the situation and its implications for the procurement process. In addition, the Ministry of Defence Police are investigating how the commercially sensitive information came to be in the possession of the bidder. It would be inappropriate to comment further on the details of the investigation until it has finished.
“However, even without the outcome of that investigation, the Government has sufficient information to enable it to conclude that the irregularities that have been identified were such that it would not be appropriate to proceed with either the preferred bid or with the current procurement process.
“The Department for Transport and the Ministry of Defence will now consider the potential procurement options to meet future requirements for search and rescue helicopters in the United Kingdom, including options to maintain continuity of search and rescue helicopter cover until new longer term arrangements can be put in place.
“We will make a further announcement once a way forward has been agreed.”
Soteria is a consortium comprising the Canadian operator CHC, Sikorsky, Thales and the Royal Bank of Scotland (yes, the one the taxpayer owns) although RBS bailed out just before Christmas when the allegations emerged. In all fairness to Soteria, it was they who fessed up with their concerns,it wasn’t of course the MoD, lets face it, they would be lucky to find water if they fell out of a boat.
Currently, SAR helicopter operations are carried out by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force flying the Westland Sea King, and by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) using a mix of S-92s and AW139s provided by CHC under an interim contract. Under the Soteria SAR-H bid, this mixed fleet would have been replaced with a single fleet of Sikorsky S-92As based at 12 stations around the country. The service was due to be in place by 2016, when the Sea King is planned to exit service. The losers, AirKnight (Lockheed Martin UK, VT Group and British International Helicopters) will no doubt feel rather agrieved. British International Helicopters currently service military contracts in the Falkland Islands and for Royal Navy Operational Sea Training.
It was reported that the MoD would pay two thirds of the costs and the Department of Transport, the balance. The contract was reportedly was designed and the service would have been a boost to capabilities, much better aircraft for example, S92′s instead of Sea Kings and AW139′s. However, some doubts were raised such as the the differences between the words capability and effectiveness when used to describe the level of service comparison between the existing and new.
Scheduled to start operation in 2012 the requirements included launch within 15 minutes during the day, within 45 minutes at night and be able to reach all ‘Very High Risk Areas’ and 75% of ‘Medium Risk Areas’ within 60 minutes, the service also had to have the ability to surge aircraft when required.
The Soteria bid was widely recognised as being excellent, the requirements had been refined over a number of years and the bid process open and detailed, I am sure it would have been a highly professional, if PFI style expensive, service.
Always ready with an interesting quote, Bob Crowe, the general secretary of the Rail, Maritime and Transport union said;
‘This whole sordid and botched episode shows that the raw greed of the private sector should never be allowed anywhere near life or death rescue services on the high seas. Millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money has been wasted and the whole plan should now be scrapped, not shelved.’
More Than Meets the Eye
I wonder if the ‘bad apple’ narrative is a cover for something else and whilst I started this post with a cheap shot at the MoD the more I think about it, the more I think there is more than meets the eye.
Despite the technical requirements being very detailed, the desire to retain military aircrew and a politically motivated desire to retain 12 operating locations (possible more than needed with the modern helicopters being proposed) meant the contract vehicle ended up being a bit of a hybrid, restraining the ability of the operator to drive down costs and make a profit. Soteria are not a charity, they have a duty to their shareholders, lets not forget that.
In the period between naming Soteria as preferred bidder and contract award that never happened, two crucial events took place.
First, it was announced in December that military aircrews would not be part of the deal in a bid to cut costs.
Second, RBS withdrew from the consortium, again in December, without stating why.
The current narrative is that Soteria became aware of irregularities, reported it to the MoD and upon hearing of these issues, RBS wanted to put some distance between them and the deal. The news about the member of the IPT was released and everyone assumes that the skullduggery is the open and shut reason why we are where we are.
How about a few of idle conspiracy theories;
Removing the military aircrew makes the contract extremely difficult to deliver against and signals a lack of commitment from the PFI hating government, RBS realise they are never going to make a return and pull the plug. Soteria decide their best route out is to suddenly own up.
or
The government know that the deal is hugely expensive, have been scathing about PFI’s in opposition (some quotes from Phil Hammond and Liam Fox here) and after Nimrod and other MoD failures decide enough is enough. How could they collapse the deal without looking even worse than they do now, have a quiet word with RBS and suggest it might be in everyone’s interest if they withdraw from the consortium and did they know about a member of the IPT who went to work for Soteria?
or
Facing the prospect of ‘signing on’ Prince William was subsequently reported to be lobbying David Cameron to reverse the decision. David Cameron decides not to go forward with a contract that would see the heir to the throne issued with a P45 and concocts some means of cancelling the contract, see above!
Now some of these may well be the product of a fevered mind and I don’t have the first clue what actually happened (I would point out I am not making an accusation) but some of the timing does appear somewhat convenient. The individual has been named but I am not inclined to repeat it here because the man’s reputation has been ruined before the facts come to light.
Is there more to this than meets the eye or is it simply a case of a bad apple, I suspect we will never know.
What Next
Whatever the conspiracy theory, whatever the actual reality, the fact is we need to decide what comes next.
Before what happens next is decided the Sea Kings will have to soldier on, although some of them are not as old as you might think. Merlins were discounted early on because of their massive costs and significant rotor downwash so punting the RAF’s Merlins on to the SAR force seems a non starter.
I have mixed feelings about SAR remaining as a military task, retaining it within the MoD allows a larger pool of aircrew to be maintained, reduces ‘brain drain’ to the private sector and improves the image of the armed forces within the country but how much ‘actual’ movement between SH and SAR communities occurs and is it really a military task?
The more combat oriented search and rescue, or joint personnel recovery on operations, is carried out by the Support Helicopter function or more likely by the USA and in the context of a decreasing defence vote I think it becomes less and less important to retain it as a military task.
The search and rescue task, fixed and rotary, is an extremely complex task and the current mixed provision does not on face value seem to be an efficient means of delivering that task.
Whilst I do not think it is necessarily a military task it certainly is a public sector task, the actual responsibility still rests with the Department of Transport, not the MoD.
Is it about time we had a coastguard that was equipped for all aspects of maritime patrol and search and rescue?
Or even a Government Aviation Service that provides all non military aircraft, fixed and rotary?
I think it would be an excellent idea to have a US style Coastguard, which included proper OPV’s, medium and long range SAR assets, their own UAV’s and SAR helicopters, and which could be tasked with assisting the US coast guard in anti-drug responsibilities in the Caribbean Sea instead of the RN as well as patrol UK waters. However I doubt the DfT can afford a pot to p*ss in at the moment let alone a proper coast guard.
My personal theory is that when the MoD pulled their pilot’s out of SAR, they took the budget and likely pointed out that the have no requirement to do SAR in the SDSR, and DfT with their larger cuts to their budget can barely afford 1/3 of the PFI contract let alone all of it, along with a requirement for fixed wing SAR the whole thing has been put on hold while the argue about how to move forward in the background.
I keep on plugging for the RN to get 18 CSAR Merlins for the tough jobs. Some(half?) should be based in the UK to defend our shores.
More mundane SAR could be done by HM Coastguard or whatever it is called now. A civilian SAR Wildcat might be an option. With Britains trade deficit being £100 billion a year, we need to make more here.
@ John
In terms of tasking I have cut this from Roger D’Erassoff’s post on PPRUNE Military. Hopefully Roger will not mind me quoting him wholesale:
“From the SEARCH AND RESCUE FRAMEWORK FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND document (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.g…4mca/uksar.pdf), in the UK:
4.1 Responsibility for civil aeronautical and maritime SAR policy rests with the Department for Transport, (DfT). As such, the DfT is responsible, through the UK SAR Strategic Committee, for assessing the adequacy of UK civil aeronautical and maritime SAR resources, response and co-ordination.
5.2.1 The MoD has responsibility for providing SAR facilities for military operations, exercises and training within the UK and, by agreement, exercises responsibility for the co-ordination of civil aeronautical SAR on behalf of the DfT. Where the coverage provided by military SAR assets meets the civil SAR coverage requirements, they will be made available for civil maritime and land-based SAR operations.
Ie Aside from covering military trails, long-range SAR is not the MOD’s responsibility, but the DfT’s.”
So while the MoD needs to get SAR platform such as new Merlin’s that is the extent of it’s current responsibilities. Just hope the DfT can afford actually undertake it role rather than keep getting it done on the cheap by the MoD.
mail on sunday has more on this subject, it seems that uk air rescue a rival bidder warned about the RAF SAR pilot joining CHC Helicopter, part of the consortium Soteria. seems he was actually on the project team before leaving the services to join CHC, ‘kin hell how did no-ons spot that!!
In fact the article goes on to state UK air rescue pulled out of the race convinced they were hampered. The article names the pilot, but i don’t know (or can afford) a decent lawyer so i’ll just link the article.
By the way john AW149 would be an ideal SAR less downwash and after you’ve put a winchman and and a wicn controller in the back of a wildcat you’re limited to rescuing solo yachtsmen!!
http://www.mailonsunday.co.uk/news/article-1356439/Millions-wasted-bidding-costs-cancelled-RAF-seardch-rescue-project.html
The other interesting aspect to this is the fact that the person alleged to have passed commercially confidential information about the bidding was apparently a serving RAF officer. The claim is that he was subsequently recruited by Soteria. His departure from the IPT to Soteria must have been well known to all his colleagues, as must the details of the winning bid, so why did it take so long for any suspicions to surface? Did no-one at MOD Abbey Wood have any concerns? The Financial Times has suggested that in fact several Service officers from this project team have joined Soteria, but this should only have been allowed if MOD had actually agreed they could do so – normally a waiting period would be enforced if a contract was in the midst of negotiation. So did their uniformed superiors turn a blind eye?
There is of course a long tradition of Service officers subsequently joining defence companies and there have been allegations in the past (for example of people who recommended acquiring the rather dubious Warthog vehicle in preference to Viking 2 then being recruited by the manufacturer: see the Defence Management website). I actually overheard an attempt to persuade two serving colonels to back the procurement of a certain vehicle during an expensive lunch organised by the manufacturer. Their pitch was ‘You are coming to the end of your careers. If we get this contract of course we will be looking for people like yourselves to help run things for us’. No-one actually offered them a job, it was all just implication to get the officers to think about their own future prospects.
It is very tempting for military officers to go down this route. Unlike civil servants who have employment until retirement (SDSR cuts allowing), most officers will need a second career once they reach the 45-55 age bracket and you can see why they would wish to take advantage of inside knowledge to get themselves a well paid job. They can also be very commercially naive about the way the business world works – the Service thrive on people taking short cuts and breaking regulations to get things done (in a way the Civil Service does not) and therefore passing data might well not strike them as either illegal or immoral. Many officers find themselves being pushed into procurement in later stages of their careers and ending up working for Defence Equipment and Support, so the events surrounding Soteria are perhaps not so surprising and I have a suspicion they may happen a lot more often than most observers appreciate.
why is the warthog dubious? seems people are walking away from it after an IED.
What the hell has any of it got to do with Bob Crowe?
I’d go firther with my opinion of the man, but it could be deemed libelous.
SAR Helicopters are not my strong point so I post a thread discussing the ideal SAR Helicopter for your information;
http://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/403939-my-ideal-sar-helicopter-would.html
The leading contenders appear to be S-60 (RescueHawk?), AW139, and new EC175.
Going to check now what the CoastGuard use currently and re read TD’s Helicopter Strategy.
I think it would be a shame if all the military aircrews leave SAR. The military will fade away from the peoples thought post the withdrawal of afghan and the continued draw down of forces. This is one tangible area many people see military forces regularly. Also it gives serving pilots and ground crew a chance to apply for a posting that guarantees them a sustained period at home which they may require for what ever reason at a certain time in there career which may stop them leaving the service. Maybe theirs a chance to use RN or RAF reserve crew here also.
As for the aircraft type maybe the aw149 is the way to go but whatever it is it should be the same helicopter type that is used to replace puma. I remember TD did an piece on a helicopter strategy where he mention the varied types used by police and ambulance services maybe a government directive to concentrate on one type say the aw149 would help everyone maybe elements of the home office and health budgets could support this area.
If its not possible to retain the status quo then I like johns idea of using rn merlins in the long range csar/sar role as the military element of future sar we would need a AAR capable of refuelling helis a400m anyone. It was quite embarrassing for the 4th largest economy in the world to ask the USAF at mildenhall to preform a long range rescue using their Pave Lows a few years ago.
The problem with all these schemes to civilianise jobs normally done by the military – is what happens when the s**t hits the fan? Will they be there when you need them?
If you were a pilot named William serving on a RAF SAR Sqn and the big finger pointed and said go to Ascension Island – you would go. If you worked for a Canadian pension scheme you might not.
http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/waf/uk/cg/ukaf-cg-home.htm
The CoastGuard (or CHC) operate two types of Helicopters – S-92 and AW-139. Is this due to different requirements?
They also operate (via a different contractor) some fixed-wing aircraft including a civvie version of the P-3, mainly for pollution spraying.
But is not convenient to keep it with the MoD regardless, since what other government body has that amount of choppers. It makes little sense to move that function to the DoT because that in itself will be hugely expensive and they will probably be even more incompetent than the MoD (I know that is hard to imagine…).
Paul G
‘why is the warthog dubious? seems people are walking away from it after an IED’
Have you been in one? Sure, it will offer some IED protection (though nowhere near an MRAP since the armour remains thin). The concept of Viking and Warthog was to produce amphibious vehicles for littoral operations, but adding bar armour, etc has produced a vehicle that is too clunky for its original role and still inadequately armoured. I certainly would not wish to hit a mine in one given the large thin flat bottom. All this comes at the price of delays, an under-estimation of the complexity of upgrading the system to meet UK requirements (= cost overruns) and the logistical impact of deploying two similar but different vehicles (Viking and Warthog). The question is one of why the enhanced Viking 2 with its logistic similarity and similar performance was rejected.
If the RN got 18 CSAR Merlins, then 8 would be needed in the UK. A pair in NE Scotland to protect the oil rigs, a pair on the Clyde to protect the nuclear deterrent, a pair in SE England to protect London from Mumbai style attack & a pair in Cornwall to keep an eye on ships approaching the Channel.
The others could be deployed on ships/Afghanistan.
A shame the Wildcat was not given the long cabin of the Lynx 3 prototype. It would give the Lynx/Wildcat the internal room it needs.
I like the idea of a idea of a ‘proper’ coastguard service, but I also like the idea of a pilots from across the services doing a stint at SAR because of the training benefits of operating in a difficult environment that keeps valuable skills honed especially during peacetime.
John Hartley, I have to disagree with the idea of SAR Merlins and Wildcats on the grounds of operating costs, using a civilian helo would be a lot more effective, especially with access to spares on the global market rather than restricting ourselves to a single source supplier. Also, Paul G is right, one thing the Wildcat lacks is cabin volume, any more than a couple of survivors, especially if one’s a stretcher case and someone will have to sit on the co-pilots lap!
As for what aircraft to use, AW139’s seem to be the flavour of the month, along with the S-92, So I‘d be happy to go along with those. Despite this we shouldn’t forget about the current S-61, I’m sure there’s enough airframes and spares available to keep them in service for a few more years.
I think Warthog was bought with an eye to after A-stan. Buy something a bit heavier than Viking and hopefully once the “war” is over “we” will be able to use them for proper RM/amphibious work.
John Hartley, re: the Wildcat, it could’ve been given the cabin size akin to the WG30, which essentially used the same transmission components of the Lynx AH.1. Bigger cabin, a chunk of naval heritage thrown in, I believe it had a lot of potential, although not the cheapest chopper to operate and maintain. Something of a missed opportunity there.
Richard S
Civilian helicopters are fine for civilian rescues, but what about a nuclear submarine in trouble. Would civilians be allowed to fly to it?
What about a Mumbai style attack? Civilian helicopters answering the panic calls, could be shot to bits.
Also UK troops in warzones should have a few dedicated CSAR helicopters to back them up.
Part of the military covenant.
I have found a most excellent site while looking into UK Civil “para-military” helo use: “UK Emergency Aviation”
http://www.ukemergencyaviation.co.uk/index.php
The site provides details on police, EMS and coast guard helos. Apparently there are already moves afoot to create a National Police Aviation Service, quoting this site:
“Today [26th October (2010)] ACPO have gone public with their plans for an eventual National Police Air Service [NPAS], which is expected to be operational from April 2012. The idea behind it is to create a ‘more efficient’ service with less aircraft [An odd conclusion if ever I've seen one]. The savings are quoted as between £12-18m per annum.”
http://www.ukemergencyaviation.co.uk/National-Air-Support.htm
Back to SAR helos in particular. I am against a “jack of all trades” / one-size fits all solution. The current interim use of AW139 for ‘coastal’ and non-mountainous inland use, with the S92 for longer range, and more demanding mountain rescue scenarios appears to be a good mix.
IF saving life trumped operating costs, I would simply replace the contract S92 with Merlins with IFR probes and a suitable (C130?)fixed wing SAR search – tanker plance.
This would be a truly long range and very flexible SAR system……..
two SAR links for people to look over, well the 149 is sort of!
http://www.agustawestland.com/system/files/brochures_new_product/AW149%20Brochure%20Final.pdf
http://www.agustawestland.com/system/files/brochures_new_product/AW101%20SAR%20CSAR.pdf
ps fat man yes i have been in a warthog and was impressed and surviving a 50kg ied says it all really. and viking is being replaced so won’t be operating side by side (did a bigger comment earlier but apparantly my cookies had been eaten)
paul g
Sorry, a 50 kg IED is small, less powerful (given the crudity of much local explosive) than a 155 mm shell. It should be able to survive that with ease. I would like to see the results of a barmine strike. I have seen these flip over a 432, as well as ripping out the ventral plating, and a Warthog is little better protected in this area. The bottom line though is that Viking 2 had the same capabilities and logistic commonality, so why exactly the desire to change horses? The real issue is not Warthog per se, but the nature of a procurement process that appears to allow a considerable amount of uniformed leeway in making a decision. Contrary to popular opinion on blogs such as this, military men are not always the best placed to make hard commercial decisions. While there is a perception that the military are being let down by civil servants when it comes to kit acquisition I can only say from past first hand experience that many Service personnel have a very limited horizon, are poor at predictive threat analysis, and are preoccupied with replacing what they have with something a bit better and a lot more expensive. Lateral thinking and imagination are notably absent and the can be slow to take aboard what should be obvious lessons. Too often civil servants are left to procure questionable systems that have been poorly specified by military officers.
The reason why Merlin is not going to be selected for SAR duties is that it is too expensive to run (3 engines) and the desire to minimise logistic support means that only one type of helicopter will be procured. No UK product meets these requirements, so the real options are S-92 or one of the Eurocopter offerings. S-60 is too small, as is NH90 (very expensive too), so S-92 seems logical. A shame then that UK production was not made one of the conditions. I suspect S-92 will win a re-run competition too, perhaps with a different contractor. No-one is blaming Sikorsky for this mess.
Hi John, good point about the nuclear subs, it adds to my list of reasons why military pilots should maintain a presence in the SAR world.
As for a Mumbai style attack, to counter that I think we’re moving out of that realm of SAR and into a policy of a permanent heliborne QRF’s within reach of the major connurbations. In this sense the Merlin would be the preferred option, along with armoured seats, flare dispensers and miniguns. Sending one of these out to pick up a hillwalker with heatstroke is OTT when a AW139 will do.
I agree with you on the dedicated CSAR for combat zones, a squadron of the forthcoming CH-53K (MH-53K?) would be ideal for this, it’s a shame they’re cost prohibitive in the current climate!
so why exactly the desire to change horses? exactly, do we know what BAE were saying, doing or even threatening! maybe STK were more accomodating, we don’t know. However, we have seen the tricks pulled during FRES SV to the point that when BAE suddenly realised they weren’t the automatic choice changed tack on how much would be built in the UK.
Warthog is probably not the best choice to debate this, however as stated it is overall a better vehicle than the one it is replacing.
when it comes to kit acquisition I can only say from past first hand experience that many Service personnel have a very limited horizon, are poor at predictive threat analysis, and are preoccupied with replacing what they have with something a bit better and a lot more expensive.
To make a broad sweeping statement like that just annoys me, not saying you haven’t seen it however generalisation afterwards is just insulting, i spent most of my life in green and have seen good and bad decisions. limited horizons; must be tough sitting on that throne. don’t bother to retort, i’m not interested
As portrayed in the TV programme the day to day life of SAR is more air ambulance than ‘search’ and ‘rescue’. I guess the ‘search’ bit is in the bit of the repertoire that isn’t needed very often.
The test would be whether having provided the assets, the MoD is free to take any or all of them to Afghanistan or anywhere else where it may have need of then. The British public tends not to like giving up something once it’s given to them, so if the answer is ‘no’ these will never be deployed on military operations, then its plainly a civilian thing and the MoD should get out of it.
A lot of Service driven procurement programmes are initially driven by first hand experience of exisiting kit or a lack of appropriate kit suggested by Service Personnel. However when a requirement enters the mainstream procurement process thing can and do go awry. Whatever epople say, affordability/Value for money is nearly always the main driver with non UOR procurement. There is also a need (in law) to tender every contract and you have to have a very good reason no to take the one that offers the lowest cost whist meeting the conditions of the tender. On large programmes however it is now accepted practice to tender a capability requiremetn forst and not for a type of equipment. So whilst one group of people may say we need a tracked vehicle with the same performance as vehicle ‘A’ but better armour, another group will issue a tender for a platform able to transport X number of personnel over land and protect them from such and such a threat. Often tender to meet such a capability requiremetn will come with an “Options” list to tempt the possible customer or the capability requested may be greaqter than the original requirement. These are just some of the ways things get messed up.
Wouldn’t an amphibious helicopter be ideal for maritime SAR? The Sea King has a boat like hull but I don’t think it was designed to be used regularly.
I don’t see the flying boat making a return (although C-130 version would be pretty damn cool!) But what about a rescue pod/boat that could be air dropped from the back of a cargo/MPA that contains medical equipment/personnel that can be piloted back to land or within range of SAR/Ambulance helicopters?
Some people on here have forgotten; we do have CSAR… the RAF Merlin force was rather good at it, so were the CHC Seakings…both to a point where the USAF rather envied the speed of the Merlin…(also remember, CSAR is a particulary air force job) however Afghanistan and their role in the aeromedical evacuation – although immensely inportant – has led to a drain on skills… because obviously we dont have enough crews and airframes to maintain that whilst being dedicated to Astan… our lack of pressence has been noticed at several CSAR exercises in eruope… the only force to have a dedicated CSAR force is the USAF and USN.
Theres a large gulf between SAR our seakings provide and the CSAR the RAF’s Merlins and CHC Seakings provide… the SAR of course keeps the skills and aircrew pools open and healthy, which is inportant, but the way they fly and the threat and challenges between to two are huge.
The main role of the UK RN and RAF SAR force was first and foremost to pluck pilots out of the sea during the cold war ‘gone hot’ senario… the reason RAF Lakenheath/Mildenhall has a CSAR unit. Who here remembers the RAF operated motor launch boats? The RN hated the fact the RAF had a leftover from the ‘seaplanes’ era…lol and I agree…was strange.
In the end I agree; we sould give over and hand it over to the Coastguard…with military crews rotating along with dedicated SAR CG pilots (who’s most likely be ex-forces anyway) And amend the arm’s policy and principles… not entirely like a USCG, but in a way that their contracts wont get in the way of them going into the danger zone… rigs on fire, ships about to go over/down and big floods (which will get worse in time). And also the ability to arrest and – if nessessary – use force. Let them actually be more like the name implies.
Although MPA and the real ‘shooting and snooping stuff’ should be left to the pure HM forces.
Mike, you are bang on. What the RAF provides is an ad-hoc form of PR (personnel recovery) rather than full blown CSAR! The Merlin is considered to be the ideal CSAR aircraft. We just can’t afford to have a dedicated CSAR fleet.
I am beginning to change my thoughts on SAR,
Maybe the civvy and military are best kept separate. Then they are free ti select the best aircraft for their particular needs. I still think a US style coastguard is the way to go. I cannot see the funding being available. So perhaps keeping things as they are and just refurbishing the Seakings makes more sense.
Mike
France has dedicated CSAR helicopters. Some of Portugals Merlins are dedicated CSAR.
I see two roles for UK SAR helicopters.
A dedicated military CSAR helicopter force for the tough dangerous missions.
Plus a civilian lower spec helicopter force for the mundane calls.
Hello John.
Regarding your comments about the need for dedicated CSAR helicopters, – E Flight of 28 Squadron RAF has a dedicated CSAR role with Merlins, in conjunction with an RAF Regiment Ground Extraction Force.
Regards.
Peter
No disrespect to E flight, but do their Merlins have the sensors , weapons, inflight refuelling, extra fuel tanks, armours, comms of a proper, dedicated CSAR helicopter?
The AW149 has also been proposed as a dedicated CSAR helicopter. To Turkey, if I remember rightly.
John
This is the RAF Merlin specification:
The Merlin is the first of a new generation of advanced, medium support helicopters for the RAF. It is an all weather, day and night, multi-role helicopter used in both tactical and strategic operational roles. The aircraft carries an impressive defensive-aids suite, which includes a Radar and Laser Warning Receiver, Missile Approach Warners and Directional Infrared Countermeasures equipment, all integrated with an automatic chaff and flare dispensing system. This is one of the most comprehensive defensive aids suites fitted to any helicopter in the world.
To ensure accurate navigation anywhere on the globe, the aircraft’s management computers take data from its laser-gyro, inertial-navigation platform and its doppler system and from air data sources, and combine the information with precise position data received from Global Positioning System satellites.
Navigation at night is enhanced by the crew’s use of display night-vision goggles and by the aircraft’s multi-function turret, which can be fitted with forward- looking infrared radar. To increase the aircraft’s range, the Merlin can be equipped with extended range fuel tanks and is capable of air-to-air refuelling, although this option is not currently used by the RAF. It is also fitted with an active vibration-damping system, which reduces the level of noise and vibration inside the cabin to a level no greater than that of a turboprop aircraft. As a result, crew fatigue is much reduced during long transits and airframe life is increased.
The Merlin is able to carry a diverse range of bulky cargo, either internally or under-slung. Cargo can include artillery, Land Rovers or light-strike vehicles and over five tonnes of freight. The spacious cabin can also accommodate up to 24 fully equipped combat troops and, when required, will convert to carry 16 stretchers for casualty evacuation or during humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Designed to operate away from base workshops and in difficult terrain, the Merlin has state-of-the-art support technology and incorporates aircraft health-and-usage diagnostics and a self-test capability for ease of maintenance.
The Merlin is armed with two general purpose machine guns converted for the air role, although there is provision for additional weaponry to be fitted at a later date.
My point was that, regardless of whether they are provided with the best equipment by the government, There does exista aq dedicated UK CSAR unit. – I’m sure it could be improved.
Aren’t the USAAF para-jumper CSAR bods reservists as well if I recall.
It is odd that the RAF don’t do proper CSAR. In their past the RAF has done nearly everything else.
Is it doctrinal? Or just something the RAF doesn’t do? O
money, joint personnel recovery which is the RAF’s term for CSAR is not a dedicated task because we dont have enough kit to make it so, its therefore tacked on to other things, or, we simply rely on the US to do it for us
Peter
E Flight seems nearly there, but a custom ordered full CSAR Merlin, would still be my choice.
@ TD
Re-assuring to know if you are air crew………
I notice that the Soteria website is ‘Temporarily unavailable’. http://www.soteriasar.com/
Just come across this Farnborough snippet (or Google AgustaWestland on Keeping UK Rotors Turning)
“There may be those among us who view the formal handover of the AgustaWestland AW159 Lynx Wildcat to the UK Ministry of Defence at last week’s Farnborough airshow as the beginning of the end for Britain’s helicopter industry….
But AgustaWestland doesn’t see it that way. The Anglo-Italian company has established “a fully integrated UK/Italian/Polish design team for the AW189 in the UK,” says CEO Bruno Spagnolini. “We are bringing back a design capability in the UK.”
The Yeovil, UK-based team is designing the search-and-rescue (SAR) configuration for the AW189 – the commercial version of the AW149 tactical transport – which is being proposed for the UK’s restaged SAR helicopter service (SAR-H) competition. “There will be full final assembly in the UK, if the AW189 is picked,” says Spagnolini….
The transfer of Royal Air Force Merlins to the Navy to replace Westland Sea King HC.4s is in the assessment phase, says Spagnolini, with a contract for their modification and marinization expected in 2014. A program to develop a “helicopter early warning” (HEW) version of the AW101 to replace the Navy’s Sea King ASaC.7s is expected to begin around 2016″