This is a regular round up of Parliamentary questions and answers from ministers relevant to defence issues
In addition to oral questions, MPs and Peers can ask government ministers questions for written answer. These are often used to obtain detailed information about policies and statistics on the activities of government departments.
In the House of Commons ‘ordinary’ questions do not have to be answered on a specific date. An MP will date a written question for two days after they have tabled it (ie, submitted it for answer via the Table Office).
The convention is that the MP can expect it to be answered within seven days of the question being tabled.
Contents
Question
Menzies Campbell (North East Fife, Liberal Democrat)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence on how many occasions aircraft have been launched from both quick reaction alert bases in response to a single incident in each year since 2006.
Answer
Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)
None.
Question
Philip Davies (Shipley, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how much his Department spent on carbon offsetting in each of the last three years; and to which companies payments for carbon offsetting were made in each such year.
Answer
Andrew Robathan (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Personnel, Welfare and Veterans), Defence; South Leicestershire, Conservative)
Costs to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) for offsetting its carbon emissions from air travel in 2007-08 and 2008-09 were £167,214 and £240,880 respectively (both excluding VAT). Payment was made through the Government Carbon Offsetting Fund administered by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. The MOD will purchase offsets for 2009-10 using the facility now administered by ‘Government Buying Solutions’.
Question
Jon Trickett (Hemsworth, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence pursuant to the answer of 31 January 2011, Official Report, column 516W, on departmental procurement, for what reasons his Department let each contract non-competitively.
Answer
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
Many factors are taken into account in reaching these decisions and they vary from contract to contract. The detailed information requested is not held centrally and could be provided only at disproportionate cost.
Question
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence whether steel for the substantial construction of the hull structure of the first boat of the Trident replacement programme will be made as a long-lead purchase prior to main gate.
Answer
Liam Fox (Secretary of State, Defence; North Somerset, Conservative)
Yes. The specialist high strength steel needed for the hull structure for the first boat is included as a long-lead item in the Initial Gate Business Case for the programme. This is due to the length of time needed for the mill run, that means that the order must be placed prior to Main Gate in order not to put at risk the in-service date.
Question
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence from which work streams the £750 million of savings to the public purse arising from the Trident replacement programme identified in the Strategic Defence and Security Review will be made.
Answer
Liam Fox (Secretary of State, Defence; North Somerset, Conservative)
The Strategic Defence and Security Review identified a total of £1.2 billion of savings and £2 billion of deferrals over the next 10 years. These savings are attributable to submarine production, the nuclear warhead, supporting infrastructure and improved efficiency at the Atomic Weapons Establishment.
Question
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North, Labour)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence
(1) whether he had discussions with his US counterpart prior to the sharing of information with theRussian Federation on UK-designated Trident D5 missiles;
(2) whether he has made an assessment of the potential effects of the sharing of information between the US and Russia on UK-designated Trident D5 missiles on the operational status of the UK’s Trident nuclear weapon system.
Answer
Liam Fox (Secretary of State, Defence; North Somerset, Conservative)
Officials from the Ministry of Defence have regular discussions with US authorities on a range of Defenceissues. Where discussions relate to the D5 Trident missiles they take place mainly under the auspices of the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement (as amended for Trident).
The US holds a stockpile of Trident D5 missiles from which the UK has purchased title to a number but these are unspecified in the stockpile. There are therefore no UK-designated missiles.
Under the terms of the bilateral new strategic arms reduction treaty (New START) limited information is shared between the US and Russia. Procedures for transferring information have been in place since the 1991 START treaty and have been carried forward and updated for New START. Such information exchange between the US and Russia will have no detrimental effect on the operational status of the independent UK deterrent.
Question
Julian Lewis (New Forest East, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence for what reason the physical destruction of the MRA4 airframes was initiated; and by whom the decision was taken to release images of this process to the media.
Answer
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
Having taken the decision not to bring the Nimrod MR4A into service, I considered a range of options and concluded that the most cost-effective one was for the nine aircraft to be disposed of following recovery of equipment and systems that can be used elsewhere.
Photographs of the dismantling process were not released by the Ministry of Defence to the media.
Question
Julian Lewis (New Forest East, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many specialist RAF personnel formally employed on theMRA4 project will be (a) retained and (b) made redundant.
Answer
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
At the time of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) announcement there were approximately 242 RAF personnel directly involved in the MRA4 project. The number of Nimrod-related personnel to be made redundant under the Regular Armed Forces Redundancy Programme will not be known until the process has concluded. In line with normal practice, where a role comes to an end, the RAF will seek to reassign Nimrod-related personnel elsewhere within the service. However, in order to sustain the long-term balance and structure of the RAF, while implementing personnel reductions planned as part of SDSR, some personnel may be made redundant. We will seek to achieve this through voluntary applications, but it may be necessary to make some reductions through compulsory redundancies.
Question
Julian Lewis (New Forest East, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what airborne (a) electronic intelligence and (b) intelligence, surveillance, target co-operation and reconnaissance capability will remain to HM Armed Forces after the withdrawal of the Nimrod R1; when the Nimrod R1 will be withdrawn; and if he will make a statement.
Answer
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
After the withdrawal of the Nimrod R1 on 31 March 2011 the following airborne intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities will remain available to assist our armed forces: Sentry, Sentinel, Tornado GR 4 when fitted with a RAPTOR or Litening III pod, Typhoon when fitted with a Litening III pod, Sea King Mk7, Reaper Remotely Piloted Air System and Hermes 450 UAS.
Question
Douglas Carswell (Clacton, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what estimates his Department has made on potential cost savings in the procurement of loitering munitions equipment.
Answer
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
The United Kingdom’s loitering munition capability is currently being procured as part of the Department’s wider portfolio approach towards acquiring complex weapons. This approach was launched in April 2010 and will secure significant efficiencies of some £1.2 billion across the breadth of the complex weapons portfolio over the next 10 years and is designed to meet the United Kingdom’s military requirement and safeguard our operational sovereignty.
Question
Douglas Carswell (Clacton, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence
(1) how much his Department expects to spend on loitering munitions in 2010-11;
(2) whether he is reviewing his Department’s contracts for loitering munitions;
(3) what discussions his Department is having with defence contractors responsible for loitering munitions;
(4) if he will make it his policy to announce any changes to contracts for procurement of loitering munitions between his Department and defence contractors.
Answer
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
The Ministry of Defence expects to spend some £50 million on loitering munitions during the financial year 2010-11.
As part of normal business, we conduct regular and ongoing engagements with prime contractors, including MBDA for the supply of loitering munitions.
There are currently no plans to review contracts for loitering munitions. However, as part of our wider contract renegotiating strategy, all major equipment procurements will be reviewed for possible savings measures.
The Department’s approach to announcing any contractual changes relating to loitering munitions will continue to be subject to the usual processes and conditions governing the procurement of war-like stores.
Question
Andrew Rosindell (Romford, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what serviceable (a) aircraft, (b) vessels and (c) weapons systems his Department has sold since 1997; and how much it received from each such sale.
Answer
Gerald Howarth (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (International Security Strategy), Defence; Aldershot, Conservative)
I will write to the hon. Member shortly.
Substantive answer from Gerald Howarth to Andrew Rosindell:
Further to the holding response I provided to your question about serviceable aircraft, vessels and weapons systems that have been sold since 1997 (Official Report dated 19 January 2011; column 826W), I am writing to provide a substantive response.
Serviceable equipment is characterised as that which has been sold to other governments for continued use as defence assets rather than those sold to commercial enterprises, either for use in another capacity or for recycling. Sales to other governments have the potential to strengthen international relationships; generate income that can be re-invested in defence; allows other governments to contribute to international security; and can also provide UK industry with opportunities to undertake some of the equipment regeneration work to meet the customer’s requirements.
Details of aircraft, vessels (surface warships and submarines) and stand alone weapons systems that have been sold to other governments since 1997 are enclosed at Annex A.
I hope this is helpful.
Annex A-Dated January 2011
| Sales of defence equipment to other governments since 1997 | |||
| Equipment | Purchaser | Revenue (£ million) | |
| Aircraft | |||
| 1997 | 6 x Wessex helicopters | Uruguay | Information no longer held |
| 1999 | 2 x Hercules | Sri Lanka | 64.0 (combined) |
| 2003 | 3 x Hercules | Austria | 34.0 (combined) |
| 2005 | 1 x Hercules | Netherlands | Information no longer held |
| Vessels (surface warships and submarines) | |||
| 1997 | HMS Plover (Patrol vessel) | Philippines | 7.5 (combined) |
| HMS Peacock (Patrol Vessel) | |||
| HMS Starling (Patrol Vessel) | |||
| 1998 | HMS Upholder (Submarine) | Canada | 227.4 (combined) |
| HMS Unicorn (Submarine) | |||
| HMS Ursula (Submarine) | |||
| HMS Unseen (Submarine) | |||
| 2000 | HMS Bicester (Mine Countermeasure) | Greece | 10.0 (combined) |
| HMS Berkely (Mine Countermeasure) | |||
| HMS Orkney (Patrol Vessel) | Trinidad and Tobago | 1.5 | |
| 2001 | HMS Orwell (Patrol Vessel) | Guyana | 1.5 |
| 2002 | HMS London (Type 22 Frigate) | Romania | 116.0 (combined) |
| HMS Coventry (Type 22 Frigate) | |||
| 2003 | HMS Shetland (Patrol Vessel) | Bangladesh | 8.0 (combined) |
| HMS Alderney (Patrol Vessel) | |||
| HMS Anglesey (Patrol Vessel) | |||
| HMS Lindisfarne (Patrol Vessel) | |||
| HMS Guernsey (Patrol Vessel) | |||
| 2003 | HMS Sheffield (Type 22 Frigate) | Chile | 27.0 |
| 2005 | HMS Marlborough (Type 23 Frigate) | Chile | 134.0 (combined) |
| HMS Norfolk (Type 23 Frigate) | |||
| HMS Grafton (Type 23 Frigate) | |||
| 2007 | HMS Sandown (Minehunter) | Estonia | 32.0 (combined) |
| HMS Bridport (Minehunter) | |||
| HMS Inverness (Minehunter) | |||
| RFA Sir Galahad (Landing Ship Logistics) | Brazil | 5.2 | |
| 2008 | RFA Sir Bedivere ((Landing Ship Logistics) | Brazil | 10.0 |
| HMS Cottesmore (Mine Countermeasure) | Lithuania | €155.0 (this sale was concluded in euros rather than sterling) | |
| HMS Dulverton (Mine Countermeasure) | |||
| 2010 | HMS Dumbarton Castle (Patrol Vessel) | Bangladesh | 2.4 (combined) |
| HMS Leeds Castle (Patrol Vessel) | |||
| Weapons s ystems | |||
| 2001 | 20 x Rapier Cascade Missile System | Australia | 0.68 |
| Notes: 1. Sales agreements are negotiated on an individual basis and they are never “like-for-like”. For example, some sales may include onboard systems, training and spare equipment support while others will exclude these elements. Comparisons between the sales of similar equipment should not, therefore, be made. 2. The costs provided represent the total combined revenue for the MODand its industrial partners who, for example, carry out the work to regenerate the equipment. | |||
Question
Patrick Mercer (Newark, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many ISAF-trained Afghan National Army personnel worked in partnership with UK forces between (a) 18 May 2009 and 4 October 2009, (b) 5 October 2009 and 21 February 2010, (c) 22 February 2010 and 11 July 2010 and (d) 12 July 2010 and 28 November 2010.
Answer
Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)
The information is not held in the format requested. However, the number of ISAF-trained Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel “present for duty”, or available to conduct tasks in the Task Force Helmand (TFH) area of operations, is shown in the following table:
| Period | Total number of ANA in Task Force Helmand area of operations | Reductions in Task Force Helmand area of operations |
| 18 May 2009 to 4 October 2009 | 2,351 | - |
| 5 October 2009 to 21 February 2010 | 2,312 | - |
| 22 February 2010 to 11 July 2010 | 2,260 | March 2010: Musa Qaleh transferred to US area of operations. |
| June 2010: Kajaki transferred to US area of operations. | ||
| 12 July 2010 to 28 November 2010 | 2,102 | October 2010: Sangin transferred to US area of operations |
During the periods of time requested, the TFH area of operations was decreasing in size. Consequently, while the number of ANA personnel in the table appears to be decreasing overall, in fact there has been an improvement in the number of ANA in the TFH area of operations and in Helmand as a whole.
These figures are based on monthly averages and we are unable to ascertain daily figures. These data are based on information derived from a number of sources and can only be an estimate, not least because of the difficulties in ensuring a consistent interpretation of the basis for collating statistics in a complex fast-moving multinational operational environment. The data are subject to change as more information becomes available.
Question
Angus Robertson (Moray, Scottish National Party)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence how many contacts between UK forces and the Taliban there have been in Helmand province in each month since April 2009
Answer
Nick Harvey (Minister of State (Armed Forces), Defence; North Devon, Liberal Democrat)
holding answer 24 January 2011
The numbers of troops in contact events involving the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and insurgents in the Task Force Helmand area of operations in Helmand Province for each complete month from April 2009 for which verified data are available are shown in the following table:
| Month | Number of contacts( 1) |
| 2009 | |
| April | 160 |
| May | 230 |
| June | 460 |
| July | 450 |
| August | 430 |
| September | 450 |
| October | 360 |
| November | 430 |
| December | 490 |
| 2010 | |
| January | 560 |
| February | 470 |
| March | 520 |
| April | 220 |
| May | 540 |
| June | 740 |
| July | 910 |
| August | 990 |
| September | 800 |
| October | 790 |
| November | 160 |
| December | 370 |
| (1) Rounded to the nearest 10 | |
ISAF forces operating in Task Force Helmand’s area of operations come from a number of different nations, which often operate closely alongside each other and alongside Afghan Army and police units. Without undertaking a detailed assessment of each engagement, it is not possible to define precisely in every case whether a contact involvedUK forces, our ISAF partners, or Afghan units. Data are therefore collected on the number of incidents involving ISAF forces in Task Force Helmand’s area of operations without attempting to identify the nationality of the forces involved in the contact.
These data are based on information derived from a number of sources and can only be an estimate, not least because of the difficulties in ensuring a consistent interpretation of the basis for collating statistics in a complex fast-moving multinational operational environment. The data are subject to change as more information becomes available.
990 fire contacts in August 2010! 990!!!
It is a monstrous number, far higher than i expected.
Still, the request for a small troop of Challenger II tanks has been turned down four times in a row.
Evidently Whitehall knows better than those in the area of operations.
…
And we used to blame the Stavka (russia’s high command) for slowing down all decisions in the URSS times since even the highest officers on the field had to ask permission to do much of anything.
The politically-correct concept and the penny-pincing are destroying Britain.
Don’t blame the navy if pirates roam out in the sea as they want: the RN’s got its hands tied behind its back by political unwillingness to do anything real serious for fear of looking bad and evil…
We’ll see what happens with Libya, now… and how the UK eventually contributes to a NATO air policing operation in the area.
It might very well be unable to provide more than a lone AWACS or something similar, by now.
@ Gabriele – That indeed is a large number but I think that is due to the US Marines going on the offensive. As for the lack of independent thinking, I recently watched some episodes of Royal Navy Caribbean patrol; they had to shadow suspect vessels for hours until permission to board from higher up arrived. What happened to giving a captain orders and letting him get on with it?