Kindly being invited to do a guest post, I thought I would outline how back in 1940 Britain was totally unprepared for Invasion due to defence and the armed forces largely being neglected during the 1920’s and 30’s. I will outline the national defence strategy based around a continuous anti-tank barrier and the defence of the beaches, with Suffolk as an example.
This is only the briefest of outlines but if it proves to be of interest then maybe future posts with more details?
At the end of the First war, Britain probably had the best equipped and trained army in the world. As further war was considered unlikely, for the following 20 years spending on the army was neglected. When it was obvious that Chamberlain’s appeasement of Hitler had failed, the politicians woke up the threat to Britain and set in progress a rearmament programme. In 1939 the government doubled the size of the Territorial Army to 340,000. However it took time to gear up the production facilities for new armaments and the additional TA forces had to be trained and equipped.
The threat of aerial bombing in any future war had been recognized and measures put in place to deal with it (ARP Act 1937, Civil Defence Act 1939) but the actual threat of invasion seems just not to have been taken seriously at all. During the Phony War, it was considered an invasion by sea could not take place without parachute troops first being dropped to cause disruption and seize vital communication routes/ports etc. Destroy the paratroop forces and invasion would be impossible.
Territorial Troops deployed to Suffolk in Nov 1939. Defence strategy seems to have been based upon defending key communication routes by strong points, and destroying any airborne forces that attempted to seize them. Nothing in the way of defences was developed except the odd weapons-pit. The beaches were to be defended by light machine guns and anti-tank rifles only! One counter-attack force based in the Melton area had virtually no transport (an ambulance would have been used to carry one of its platoon weapons into action).
The events in France in May 1940 changed things – Britain was now the front line and invasion a very real possibility. Britain found itself with no defences, hardly any weapons (most having being destroyed or abandoned in France) and still a poor state of training in the TA. With this state of affairs, CIC Home Forces General Ironside considered that he could not hold the coast line in any strength and hence decided to concentrate his main defence on protecting the capital, London, and the industrial Midlands by constructing a continuous linear anti-tank barrier – the GHQ anti-tank stop line. Of course the enemy was not to have an unopposed approach to the GHQ line. The coast was to be held strong enough to repel raids and to disrupt as much as possible a full scale invasion (referred to as the ‘Coastal Crust). Further stop lines were planned between the coast and the GHQ line to further disrupt and canalize the enemy’s advance; once the direction and intent of the enemies attack were known, counter attacks were to be made using mobile reserves. The GHQ and other stop lines were to form a continuous anti-tank obstacle, utilizing natural features (e.g. rivers), man made features (e.g. railway cuttings/embankments) and where no obstacle existed, by digging anti-tank ditches. These obstacles were to be covered by infantry and anti-tank weapons, many housed in pillboxes.
The Coastal Crust – Suffolk: Suffolk was within the area of command of 11 Corps, Eastern Command. The 55th Division, a first line Territorial Division was now the front line Division in Suffolk in May 1940. Defence strategy was based around the following:
Infantry Posts: The defences were only developed to a linear strip along the length of the coast. Defences consisted of section posts sited to cover the main exits from the beaches. Section posts could either be just trenches or a combination of a pillbox and supporting trench. Sections of beach not covered by posts were to be included in the arcs of fire of the artillery.
Infantry Pillbox and supporting trenches, near Aldeburgh
Coast Artillery: On the outbreak of the war, the only coastal artillery covering the Suffolk coast was the guns in Harwich. In May 1940 a number of Emergency batteries were planned. These consisted of vintage First War Naval 6” guns, at first mounted in sandbagged posts although later brick gun houses with concrete roofs were constructed to protect the batteries from dive bombing. The primary role of the guns was to engage invasion barges and protect the ports/harbours of Felixstowe, Southwold and Lowestoft.
Gun House for a 6” Naval Gun, Grand Hotel Emergency Battery
Field Artillery: There was an acute shortage of modern field guns and as with the Coast Artillery a number of First war guns were bought out of storage. These included 4” guns mounted on Lorries to form mobile anti-tank guns. The role of the artillery was to cover the beaches and the exits from them.
Mobile 4” gun mounted on a lorry
Beach Obstacles: A series of obstacles were constructed. Concrete tank blocks were placed to prevent tanks from exiting the beach, anti-tank and personnel minefields laid and iron spikes (‘dragon’s teeth’) set in concrete laid below the high tide line to rip out the bottoms of barges. Between May and November 1940, 558 Field Company, RE constructed 7153 anti-tank blocks, 175 pillboxes, 6,313 dragon’s teeth and laid 7,200 mines mostly between Benacre Ness and Aldeburgh.
Anti-tank blocks, Minsmere
Stop Lines: A number of stop lines were sited in Suffolk although only the Corps Line (or Eastern Command Line) was to provide a continuous anti-tank obstacle. As for the GHQ line, natural features were utilized were possible and where none were available, ditches were dug. Again the obstacles were covered by many pillboxes. The Home Guard was to form the garrison of the stop lines until reserves moved up either to hold the Corps Line or use the stop lines for forward bounds in counter attack (although in reality in 1940 no reserves of note existed in Eastern Command). Inland towns/villages where main road networks passed through or converged on (known as nodal points) were also to be defended by the Home Guard to deny the road network to the enemy.
Modified Type 28 pillbox, with a holdfast for a six pounder anti-tank gun, Sudbury on the Corps Line
six pounder gun mounted in a Type 28 pillbox
Many Field Commanders were unhappy with the static linear nature of defences planned by Ironside. On 19th July Ironside was replaced by General Alan Brooke. The defence strategy changed in emphasis to a mobile offensive role of counter attack troops. German invasion forces were to be slowed and delayed by a series of ‘anti-tank localities’. Work on the GHQ line was halted. But the very nature of beach defence meant that linear defence was unavoidable. The development of defences in Suffolk from 1941 could be the subject of another post.
For more information, go over to Daves blog below
I think Ironside gets a bit of a bad deal.
The resources he was provided with were Concrete, Labourers, Half Trained TA and field guns from the last war.
He didnt have the equipment or the soldiers to fight a mobile war. Trying to do so would have been criminaly negligent.
Interesting pics though, I shall have a look.
Ironside has always been an interesting person in my books; his memoairs were the first written document, before the opening of archives, to be open about the true goals of the Narvik expedition.
But realities have to factored in; Dominic is absolutely right with “He didnt have the equipment or the soldiers to fight a mobile war. Trying to do so would have been criminaly negligent.”
Imperial forces were practically the only ones with both equipment and trained in manoeuvre , and only arriving then:
- Canadian Div, 2nd arrived in September
- Oz, a Bde in June
- nominally 2 Bde’s from NZ, June
These are from Operation Sea Lion (by Peter Fleming)
Hello both
I agree with both of your posts – but not being sure quite how much space to dedicate to a guest post kept things brief. Not only did Ironside lack the resources, he was also tasked by Churchill to defend the Capital and the industrial heartland of Britain. Given the resources he had in June 1940 its hard to see what else he could have done. We will of course never know how he would have developed defence strategy and tactics if he had not been removed from his command.
it wasnt a criticism of your work, it was just me rambling.
Hi Dave,
The pill boxes in your photos actually look quite substantial. I live on the Kent/ East Sussex coast and the ones built here (of ordinary red bricks and with totally vertical walls) could have been knocked down with a sledge hammer (, or pulverized by the then standard issue German 37 mm’s hit).
ACC
I can’t speak for the actual pill boxes you have seen.
However the construction of many of these things according to WD manuals was done by local labour, sometimes even home guard. they were built using two shuttering walls of red brick the middle being filled with reinforced (often not very reinforced there was a war on), concrete. When compleated the red brick shutter was still just left as not worth the effort to take down, as in the process many of the bricks were rendered unusable, and it was time consuming and jerry was over the channell.
A farmer of my aquaintence who had too of these quite large structures on his land in the fens, was stuck with them.
(I seem to recall they were supposed to be able to withstand 4 inch shells, for how long, and where the resoluetly metric Germans were going to get 4 inch shells I know not).
I have never met as happy a farmer when one day the council decided to demolish a bridge next to his land and one day out of the blue, trucked in a bick excavator thingy (technical terminology at my fingertipps as ever), with a big jackhammer on the end of its arm to do the job.
Words were had, contracts drawn up, (the pub was involved), cash changed hands, and when the bridge was down, the big excavator thingy was trundled about 5 yards and started on theses nominally brick built structures. Even though the site engineer had reckognised the natue of the structure, they proved much harder to destroy that even the experts thought- two days.
Just a comment about this topic…
I think this is a really interesting area, and I would be really keen to see more posts on this, so please post more info.
The wartime defence against invasion is almost a ‘hidden history’, and just the technicalities of it are a fascinating topic. I’ve often been intrigued by the pillboxes and defences that can still be seen in certain parts of the country. I live in London, and I’m sure there’s a pillbox at platform level at a tube station I often travel through (Putney Bridge on the District Line, I think…).
One suggestion, more maps please!
Hi Simon D,
A good idea this one “One suggestion, more maps please” as the source I quoted earlier covers the invasion plans, but defences only as for the strength available at points in time (incl. harware) and tactics considered.
Dave, Excellent post. What did happen at Shingle Street? Was it an exercise that went wrong or the wiping out of a small scale reconnaissance by German forces? I wonder if “Went The Day Well” was based on actual events?
Hello Brian
As far as I can make out, the Shingle Street story was comprised of two elements: a few German bodies were washed up (some naval and airmen but also some army – these almost certainly drowned while training for ‘Sealion’ or perhaps manning ‘flak’ trawlers moored in the Channel) and the authorities at the time were happy to let a moral boosting good story of a foiled invasion run (at that time there was not much good news around!!). The other is down to the good old British media – having got hold of the story they were happy to let the story run (right up to the 1990′s)as it sells newspapers!!
There is even the suspicion that some authors made up ‘facts’ in order to sell their books. That’s my understanding, but if anyone has any other details I would be fascinated to learn of them.
Dave
I cannot veryfy any of what follows, but I swear the bit about how the story was told to me and what was told to me is true: -
In early 90′s went to wedding in germany, got sat at table with a very impressive looking elderly gent all very proper and ‘High German’. In his 80′s but still ‘spry’.
We were chatting away in English when I asked him were he learned it. Bit of a facer when he said ‘oh in the SS before the war I was in the RSHA’! (In the byzantine structure of the third Reich one way of describing it, would be, a sort of competator/element of /cooperative organisisation to the Gestapo, within the SS).
At this point realising I was almost certainly talking to a war criminal, my conversation flagged a bit. But finding in this relativly youthful Brit someone whose knowledge of the war went beyond ’2 world wars and one world cup do da doda’ the usual
‘ Oh our biggest mistake was to make war on Britan, we are brothers under the skin’ etc line came out, (talk to any German over a certain age they all say it).
He then went on to state that although he took no direct part,
‘It was well known at the time we tried raiding / intelligence gathering opperations on the UK coast in 1940 and achieved little except failure’.
My wife intervened seeing this might go on all night and steered me towards other guests. Whether he really knew or was just repeating Rumour I know not.
All I can add is more rumour but from the other side.
It wouldnt be that difficult to land half a dozen blokes on a deserted beach, you could row across the channel with little difficulty or chance of interception virtualy anywhere.
Thats very different from landing and sustaining an army though.
It took us two years of planning and industry to make the trip (TD has a few write ups on the logistics part, all hail ISO boxes), had Germany tried to cross they could have landed an army, but it would have lacked the supplies to acconmplish much.
Even if they did seize a port, the RN would have simply thrown itself into the channel en masse, suffering horribly but blocking the supply convoys until the port could be retaken.
Hi Dave, IXION, DominicJ,
Many thanks for your comments. I recall reading something in the online Daily Mail this summer – seventieth anniversary etc, about an elite German unit (Brandenburgers?)that trained for reconnaissance missions along the south and east coast. One of my favourite books is Riddle of The Sands (published 1903)which suggests a German plan for invasion of the east coast using similar barges to those massed in 1940. It would appear that Operation Sealion wasn’t so much a plan for invasion as a reply to an expected invitation.
Everyone
Long before we got round to actually doing the invasion propper, lots of allied servicemen(and some women), risked/ lost their lives, on missions to finds out questions like: -
What was in that copse of trees just behind than bank on that beach?
Could that beach support tanks?
Etc etc.
The Germans were profesional, it would be a little odd if they had not been sniffing arround, at least, or even tried a Mini Deippe style raid at best; after all we tried in 42, long before we were ready to actually invade.
Hi all
The Germans had certainly been collecting information pre war and also Hansa Luftbild probably took many aerial photos (Hansa Luftbild was taken over by Luftwwaffe on the outbreak of the war). However much German intelligence does seem to have relied on information readily available (e.g the Gestapo’s handbook of Britain Informationsheft GB was largely compiled using readily available information). Although Hitler was serious about invading Britain I just don’t think the preparations were in hand in 1940 to undertake such an operation and it must be remembered the speed of victory in France surprised the Germans just as much as us. Although invasion barges were assembled and training undertaken the planning was just not in place at the time for Sealion to have any chance of success. Brian as you correctly state we began planning for D Day long before the landings (actually from 1942 onwards) and by 1941 plans for an invasion of Britain had been more or less dropped.
The other thing to note is that at the time of the Shingle Street incident no mention is made in any of the War Diaries of units in Suffolk of ‘Action Stations’ – surely all troops would have ‘stood to’ even for a raid. The ‘Cromwell’ warning issued to Southern and Eastern Command on Sept 7th 1940 which many took to mean invasion imminent or in progress was actually a misunderstanding – it was only meant to signal an increased alertness. As with Shingle Street, another myth of of failed invasion grew although this one was finally quashed at the end of the war by a statement by Attlee to the House of Commons in Nov 1946.
I have to say that there are many good reasons why the Wartime govt would want to keep a ‘shingle beach’ type incident quiet.
However I doubt it could have kept it quite for long after the war. So on the whole, I am prepared to quite accept a few Germans soliders creaping about having a shufti, and then having boating accident possibly without any outside interfearence form UK troops.
Any kind of failed, even medium scaled raiding opperations involving shooting was very unlikely to have happened.
Hi all, just read with interest the above article and comments below. I’m doing some background research on the Shingle Street Incident around late August/early September 1940. My interest stems from something said to me by someone who was a leading mechanic on MTBs during the war and based in Ipswich or Felixstowe around that time.
He told me that whilst on patrol one day, off the coast of Suffolk and stretching out across the North Sea towards Holland, they came across a whole “mass” of German bodies floating in the water, a great many of whom were badly burned. His words to me were “they’d tried an invasion attempt and had been burned as they tried to land”. Now many people poo-poo this, but take a look at a map of the Suffolk area behind Shingle Street and you will notice a number of airfields which were operational during the war.
Surely it’s not so far fetched that they may have tried a seaborne invasion to secure one of the airfields behind Shingle Street where they could have landed more troops (and vehicles?) before launching an attack towards London? It was after all a thinly defended coastline!
Hi Robert
Germany was just not ready to contemplate an invasion in Aug/Sept – the victory in France had taken Germany by surprise just as much as us! There was no ready invasion fleet assembled, no German commanders with any experience of such a large scale amphibious operation, the list just goes on… The incident related by your contact may well relate to the ‘Texel Disaster’ during Sept 1940 when 20th Flotilla ran into an uncharted minefield – two destroyers sunk and one seriously damaged. ‘Esk’ sank immediately with the loss of 150 crew, ‘Express’ had her bows blown off with the loss of 90 crew and ‘Ivanhoe’ was mined with the loss of 53 dead. With near 300 dead and another 100 wounded this incident was hushed up in order to maintain morale and entered into the legend of a failed invasion attempt.
James Hayward’s book, “The Bodies on the Beach – Sealion, Shingle Street and the Burning Sea Myth of 1940″ is a must for anyone with an interest in this subject.