Has transport and airborne refuelling been neglected in recent times and resources funnelled to Typhoon, Tornado, Harrier and other more offensive systems?
If you believe the ‘Fast Jet Mafia’ theories then yes and the dire state of the RAF’s transport and AAR capability would seem to confirm this. The RAF’s lack of capacity has been exposed by enduring operations in the Middle East, perhaps the most damaging PR problems have come from this area, soldiers leave being delayed and other stories paint a picture, however unjustified, of RAF indifference to the needs of the Army whilst they continue to devote most of their funding to the whizzy shooty stuff.
It is not a fair accusation for any number of reasons but whatever reasons for the real or perceived lack of priority the fact is, the RAF needs to concentrate more resources to this area. The general thrust of the Think Defence proposal for the RAF is retention of minimal UK air defence and reduction in expeditionary fast jet capacity. A steady state for UK air defence with the ability to surge to 2-3 squadrons for a short term contingent operation dropping down to 1 squadron of fast jets for enduring operations. This shrinkage will free up funding for the ‘capability plus’ areas of ISTAR, transport and building regional security/special forces support; those that deliver effect for the most likely types of operation we will be involved in and afford influence in coalitions; again, the most likely operating condition for UK forces.
I also think this is an area where the UK should be bold, invest to save and not be afraid of taking a clean sheet of paper approach.
In this post I am going to look at the strategic transport and air refuelling capability area.
Strategic Transport
With the advent of the civilian passenger jet most air forces have used derivatives of them for the strategic transport role, apart from operating in higher risk airspace there is very little to distinguish the flight profiles of commercial and military aircraft transporting pallets of stores or personnel, going on holiday or summering on a two range is largely the same in terms of air transportation.
Civilian wide body jets are optimised for efficient movement and low operating cost, exactly what is needed for the strategic transport role. These have been developed to also provide airborne refuelling, often only with minimal modification.
Typically, strategic transport moves personnel, 463L and LD3 pallets into and out of main operating bases from the UK.
Aeromedical evacuation is also a typical mission, along with various other transport requirements for training locations like Canada for example.
Airborne Refuelling
What might be considered as proper airborne refuelling was invented by the British company founded by Sir John Cobham in the 1940’s as a direct result of the insatiable thirst of the early jet engines and need for extended range. Before then, various expedient solutions were used, like catching the trailing hose with a walking stick, in the 20’s and 30’s for breaking endurance records.
In 1934 Sir John formed Air Refuelling Limited to exploit the early systems for military use. Although used by the RAF’s Tiger Force in the Far East the true potential of airborne refuelling was not realised until after the war when Boeing used the same Air Refuelling Limited equipment to equip 4 KB-29M aircraft which allowed the record breaking B-50A Lucky Lady II to circumnavigate the world in a continuous flight.
Developments rapidly followed and the Cobham probe and drogue system is used to this day.
There is a great source of information on the history of airborne refuelling at the Cobham 75 website, here, well worth a read, as usual with most stories of military logistics they are under recognised.
Being able to refuel whilst in flight has the obvious advantages of extending mission range and endurance, the iconic Black Buck raids by RAF Vulcan bombers and Victor tankers during the Falklands conflict in 1982 were an extreme and record setting example but it is now a routine, almost mundane occurrence, in modern operations.
Not only are there operational advantages to extending the persistence of tactical combat and logistics aircraft but a number of cost benefits also accrue, instead of expensively transferring fuel over long distances, an airborne refuelling facility allows bulk fuel to be obtained at cheaper locations. Tactical strike fighters delivering close air support and ISTAR can take off with heavier loads than might normally be possible, take on fuel in one or multiple ‘pit stops’ and extend mission times, less aircraft are needed for a given coverage, less crew, less maintainers etc.
However, all in the garden is not rosy; the cost of maintaining this capability is not insignificant but they are the very definition of force multipliers.
Today
Because the RAF basically cannot meet the requirements of the deployment in Afghanistan the MoD are using civilian charter aircraft, the expected cost for this year is estimated to be £215m as given in a recent parliamentary answer.
Operating ageing aircraft like the Tristar and VC10 has resulted in an over reliance on charter transport and morale sapping delays in personnel movement. That the joint logistics team have managed so far to maintain the air bridge to the Middle East is a testament to their skill and hard work, again, they do not get anywhere near the credit they deserve.
But skill and hard work do not make up for a lack of airframes, fire fighting and overcoming daily obstacles do not make for an efficient system.
Some might say that this is OK, the Treasury is paying the cost of operations in Afghanistan, Afghanistan is a particularly air intensive operation, the service is adequate and the RAF is not having to fund aircraft that in times of less intense or no operations would stand idle. There is some logic to this but the notion relies on the availability of the civilian charter market, if the world economy improves availability will decrease and costs will rise. This is a similar situation that prompted the letting of the Points class RORO ships contract and we are taking risks, hoping that the civilian charter market tap will always be available to turn.
These civilian aircraft are not fitted with defensive aids, as a matter of policy the UK does not use them for personnel transport so has to resort to a time consuming, inefficient and expensive ‘hub and spoke’ arrangements that involve civilian charters to the Middle East and transfer to RAF C17/C130 for the flight to Afghanistan. Flying directly into theatre from the UK will reduce the total number of air movements and deliver a much more efficient, lower cost capability.
The majority of flights in an enduring operation will be personnel and pallets, vehicles and helicopters may well form the bulk of requirements in the early stages of an operation but this will change once they are delivered. As forces are built up prior to a higher intensity operation then the mix and intensity might change as well.
The sheer volume of cargo requirements can be staggering, recent information from the MoD detailed the flight and cargo requirements for operations in Afghanistan. During the early years there were about 750 flights, 7,000 pallets and about 12,000 tonnes flown per year in a rough 50:50 split between the RAF and civilian charter. Last year this jumped to just under a thousand flights, a similar number of pallets but a weight of 16,000 tonnes, again on a rough 50:50 split.
This averages out to about 4 flights, 20 odd pallets and 40 odd tonnes per day based on Afghanistan, which might be described as the worst case scenario for resupply on an enduring basis by air, assumption in SDSR are 1 brigade of about 6,500 personnel on an enduring basis, we currently have about 10,000 personnel deployed. We might assume that Afghanistan is the worst case scenario for enduring operations but even though Afghanistan is relatively air intensive there are conceivable locations where a similar situation might prevail.
Afghanistan might establish a reasonable baseline onto which we load contingent operations, build ups for larger scale one off operations and other commitments such as the Falkland Islands, training and airborne refuelling.
Whilst the existing fleet has been getting used and abused the RAF and MoD have been moving along with the delayed and very expensive FSTA agreement that will solve all the strategic transport problems.
Tomorrow
Replacing the RAF’s clapped out Tristars and VC10’s will be the Future Strategic Transport Aircraft or FSTA programme. Delivered as a 27 year £13 billion Private Finance Initiative from Air Tanker, it will provide a step change in capability, availability and reliability. Based on the Airbus A330 Multi Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) ordered by Australia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates it must be understood that it is not simply having the aircraft on Hire Purchase, it’s a complete availability and service contract.
Despite the problems we should note that Air Tanker have competently and diligently met all their performance targets and programme objectives.
FSTA progress so far
Despite recent progress the FSTA programme has a long and none too stellar history, it’s an MoD procurement after all, surely you weren’t expecting anything other than a woeful story of delays and incompetence were you?
The National Audit Office report in March last year painted a damning picture and the Defence Select Committee waded in with another, neatly timed to coincide with the first flight of the aircraft.
It is worth quoting the reports summary;
In March 2008, the Ministry of Defence (the Department) signed a private finance initiative (PFI) contract with AirTanker Ltd, for the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) to provide air-to-air refuelling and passenger transport services. FSTA is based around 14 modified Airbus A330-200 MRTT and will replace the 24 Tristars and VC10s that form the RAF’s current fleet.
Under the contract, AirTanker owns the aircraft and will provide them to the Department when required. AirTanker will also provide the associated aircraft support, maintenance and infrastructure, making the scope of the deal broader than any other defence PFI contract to date. The value of the contract, worth £10.5 billion over 27 years, also makes it the largest signed.
PFI works best where activities and demand are predictable. This is clearly not the case for FSTA. For instance, it is simply astonishing that the Department did not decide until 2006 that FSTA should be able to fly into high threat environments such as Afghanistan. Yet the Department is inhibited from changing the specification because of the implications to the cost of the PFI. Just two years after the deal was signed, the forthcoming Strategic Defence and Security Review is likely to change the demand for the services AirTanker has been contracted to deliver. As the Committee’s previous work shows, dealing with changes on PFI deals is expensive and the Review may question whether this PFI deal is sensible or affordable. The fact that no other country has chosen to procure air-to-air refuelling and passenger transport using PFI type arrangements is further indication that PFI is not a suitable procurement route for such important military capabilities.
There are significant shortcomings in the Department’s procurement of FSTA and we do not believe the procurement was value for money. The shortcomings include:
Assuming that PFI would be the right solution from the outset without a sound evaluation of alternative options;
Running only a limited competition;
Never developing a realistic fallback if the PFI solution proved unworkable;
Failing to have a clear understanding of the full costs of running its current aircraft fleets and failing to secure visibility of sub-contractor cost data, meaning the Department was unable either to compare costs with the price being offered by AirTanker or determine whether the PFI option was good value for money;
Not fixing the requirements until late into the process so that the negotiations themselves took over nine years to complete, more than double the expected four years. This delay in turn led to a considerable cost increase against initial estimates;
Not having the right skills and experience in place and failing to provide firm leadership until the later stages of the procurement to effectively manage the procurement, and
Not making timely decisions on fitting the necessary protection equipment to enable the aircraft to fly into high threat environments like Afghanistan, a task that the Tristar may have to continue doing until 2016.
In order to obtain best value going forward, the Department must retain contract expertise and ensure that staff make decisions regarding FSTA in the full knowledge of the financial implications. Without this action, the risk is that extra demands will be placed on AirTanker which result in additional, and unnecessary, payments being made by the Department.
In the measured tones of official publications this is pretty damning stuff.
Quite clearly it is yet another MoD/Military weapons grade cock up.
But we say this with the benefit of hindsight, if we had purchased them outright something else would have had to be delayed or omitted from the equipment plan. The PFI arrangement means that pretty much everything is included for about £400 million per year, more details here.
The delays have resulted in a woefully inadequate air transport capability, highlighted above, which has had serious impact on the Iraq and Afghanistan air bridge and as usual, we have had to rely on the herculean efforts of the existing aircraft maintainers and capabilities of the air movements teams to keep even a basic level of service in support of operations. We spend millions on training personnel so they can do a good job but then saddle them with antique equipment that is fundamentally unfit for service.
PFI’s are a fundamentally poor way of procuring capabilities that are unpredictable and involve risk because the cost of that risk is always transferred back to the customer and interestingly, one of the funding partners for Air Tanker is the Royal Bank of Scotland. We will therefore be borrowing money off ourselves because we can’t afford it!
A few of comments from members of the current government are interesting.
Vince Cable MP said of PFI’s
“The whole thing has become terribly opaque and dishonest and it’s a way of hiding obligations. PFI has now largely broken down and we are in the ludicrous situation where the government is having to provide the funds for the private finance initiative”
Philip Hammond, Conservative Treasury spokesman, said
“If you take the private finance out of PFI, you haven’t got much left . . . if you transfer the financial risk back to the public sector, then that has to be reflected in the structure of the contracts. The public sector cannot simply step in and lend the money to itself, taking more risk so that the PFI structure can be maintained while leaving the private sector with the high returns these projects can bring. That seems to us fairly ridiculous.”
Liam Fox MP, Secretary of State for Defence, commenting on the NAO report said;
“This NAO report exposes one of the most absurd procurement decisions taken by this Labour Government.
“First, they failed to examine alternative ways of funding the requirement for air-to-air tankers / transport aircraft. The extraordinarily convoluted PFI process means the programme is five years late, leaving the RAF dependent on 40 year old Tri-Stars and VC-10s which have provided our troops with an unreliable service.
“Secondly, because the contract was shrouded in secrecy, it is only now that we learn that the planes will not even be fitted with defensive aids to enable them to fly into war zones.
“As troop carriers they will be of no more use than hiring British Airways or Easyjet planes, but twice as expensive. Meanwhile, the NAO confirms it will be years – and millions more pounds of taxpayers’ money – to bring the planes up to the standard necessary to replace the Tri-Stars on routes to war zones like Afghanistan.
“This FSTA programme sums up the utter incompetence of Labour’s management of defence procurement”
Politicians must be used a diet of their own words!
So it being obvious what the Conservative Secretary of State for Defence and the Liberal Democrat Business Minister think of PFI’s have they had the CEO of AirTanker into Whitehall for an interview without coffee, what do you think?
Business as usual it would seem, so let’s not have any more lectures from our current crop of ‘grown ups’ about PFI’s or lecturing the previous incumbents about the financial good sense shall we.
Because of the need to ‘get the small print right’ in the agreement every minor change in requirement needed yet more costly and time consuming legal/commercial reviews and the time to get the funding consortium sorted have all added to the considerable delays and costs. The delay means we have had to spend a lot of money on the VC10’s and Tristars, additional maintenance and equipment. Money that we can ill afford to spend and is essentially, wasted. The older aircraft are much less fuel efficient as well.
It is conceivable that the delay costs, additional spend on fuel, charters and maintenance could have paid for new aircraft outright.
We tend to fixate on the aircraft number, divide that number by the contract value and proceed to the spitting coffee/ruining keyboard stage but it is not a lease deal for a number of aircraft, it’s a service delivery contract, the number of aircraft is dictated by the requirements.
The whole PFI concept is based on stable demand, where this is impossible, this variability has to be expensively written into a hideously complex contract during which both parties will have agreed to break points, usage levels and risk. Costs are therefore predicated on looking into a crystal ball and taking what at best are educated guesses. Will the RAF be able to sell on some of its AAR capacity to other nations, will the passenger charter market allow Air Tanker to make maximum use of the aircraft, will we need more than can be provided by the aircraft, who knows.
If we cannot predict the next 27 years, how about looking back?
What has happened to the RAF aircraft fleet, air combat, technology and the geo political landscape since the conflict in the Falklands, it is roughly the same time period. Coming back from the Falklands could we have predicted the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, the reduction in aircraft, technology or the collapse of the Soviet Union, yet we are being asked to predict what demand for AAR and AT for the next couple and a half decades?
Simply ridiculous.
Now all these issues might be worth swallowing if the services were getting a tangible improvement and a decent set of capabilities.
You hopeless optimistics you, you didn’t really think that would be the case did you?
Come on, Really!
Because of the nature of the PFI contract, where AirTanker can use some of the aircraft for non MoD charters there had to be compromises which means minimal modification to the base platform, or they had to be made as civilian as possible to both facilitate this reuse and of course keep costs down to a minimum.
What are these compromises?
NUMBER 1
There will be no airborne refuelling receptacles fitted, which means the aircraft will not be able to take on fuel themselves whist airborne. One might think that this would not be needed because of the aircrafts extreme range and fuel capacity but this is not the case. Many missions have demonstrated the value of being able to take on fuel. Every other sensible operator of airborne refuelling aircraft ensure they can take on fuel themselves. The Royal Australian Air Force use the same A330 as the FSTA aircraft will but they have of course decided on this capability.
Here is a video of what we will not be getting
These receptacles are standard fit on the A330 MRTT and it is called the Universal Aerial Refuelling Receptacle Slipway Installation (UARRSI), the MoD have ensured it will be removed from the design.
NUMBER 2
Although the VC10’s and Tristar’s don’t have a boom the other A330 refuelling aircraft do, it’s a system that allows the aircraft to refuel those fitted with a receptacle rather than probe. In UK service there is only 2 such aircraft, the C17 and E3, although when the RC-135 Rivet Joint purchase is finished that will be another. It also limits our usefulness in coalition operations, especially with the US, and combined with Number 1 will reduce flexibility and utility in the AAR role.
Here is a video of something else we won’t be getting
Boom refuelling is much easier for a large aircraft in the receiving mode although it is not impossible for them to use a drogue.
The boom system is called Airbus Military Aerial Refuelling Boom System (ARBS) and despite the recent problems will no doubt be fully proven and matured in due course.
NUMBER 3
Not all of the aircraft will be fitted for the high capacity AAR role, only 5 will be fitted with a Cobham 805E Fuselage Refuelling Unit (FRU) to provide flexibility and high rate offload for large aircraft. This system also allows different fuel types to be carried and the variation in equipment fit across the small fleet will result in a loss of flexibility as having aircraft in the right place with the right equipment becomes that much more difficult with a non-homogeneous equipment fit. The sensible thing, funnily enough that other operators do, is to have a single interchangeable fleet.
NUMBER 4
No self defence system or flight deck armour was originally specified, in the early 90’s when the programme was initiated these might have been a reasonable things to leave off but for operations today, it is simply unthinkable for an aircraft to fly in hazardous airspace without a full suite of protection systems. It has been stated that all aircraft will be fitted with suitable defence systems but the impact of this on the contract and the aircraft’s desirability to the lease market is unknown. DAS are some of the most restricted systems in existence, closely guarded and seldom discussed. Quite how they might be removed so the aircraft could be used for the civilian lease market and refitted without complex engineering and recertification processes is again, unknown. If only the core aircraft are fitted with DAS then not only does it make a mockery of that statement but the ones used for surge operations would need to fitted at short notice. Not having sufficient DAS equipped aircraft might result in inefficient hub and spoke arrangements where the FSTA aircraft fly into a benign location with personnel transferring to tactical transport for the flight forward.
In some ways it is perhaps a good thing because had they been specified in the original contract they would have been fitted and probably immediately removed due to obsolescence when the aircraft entered service. At least this way the RAF will get the latest DAS but how this is being funded is uncertain.
It is easy to be seduced by the bungling MoD line on this issue but I suspect that it was not omitted at all, but deleted due to commercial and cost issues. It is an interesting excuse; ‘how could we predict we would be flying into high threat environments’ is often heard but whilst hiding behind the convenience of not being able to predict the future we are quite happy to enter into a 27 year contract.
NUMBER 5
The RAF FSTA aircraft will not have a large freight door on the main deck, nor a cargo floor. The KC-45 that EADS proposed for the recent US tanker competition had a boom, in flight refuelling receptacle and a full cargo door/floor, for about £120m each. Not having suitable cargo handling capabilities on the main deck will limit it to light stores on small pallets and personnel, the lower deck will be able to handle LD3 containers and 463L’s but because upper deck access is limited by a small door the overall cargo capacity will be extremely limited even if the seats could be removed.
Here is yet another video of something we will not be getting
This lack of cargo carrying flexibility is arguably the most significant omission from the FSTA contract, have a look here for an image of a Tristar cargo setup. If we can have this type of common sense flexibility on a 30 year old aircraft why is it why cannot have the same on our shiny new toys?
The A330 MRTT comes in two basic flavours, the passenger + fuel version or the cargo + passenger + fuel version.
The first is the cheapest and inevitably the option we have selected because of the need to both keep costs down and make them attractive to the civilian charter market (depending on which of the aircraft we are talking about)
To understand how this is a ludicrous decision we need to understand the difference between the two versions
The A330 MRTT has the traditional wide body 2 deck layout of the A330. The lower deck on both versions is the same; it can carry a combination of military 463L pallets and civilian LD3 and LD6 containers, typically 8x 463L, 1x LD6 and 1x LD3 or 25x LD3 as the diagrams below.
The difference between the two versions is the upper deck.
In the passenger version there is no cargo door and the seats are semi permanently installed, capacity depending on the seat size/pitch is between 270 and 291. A crew rest compartment may also be fitted for extended mission times but given that we decided not to bother with the ability to take on fuel from another aircraft this has not been taken. An aeromedical evacuation setup can also be fitted but it is not known if this will be the simple stretcher configuration or the high dependency palletised systems as used on the C17.
This is the version the RAF will be getting, absolutely minimal modification from a civilian A330 passenger jet.
In the cargo configuration, the upper deck is configured for pallets and containers rather than personnel, as per the image below, no windows and cargo rollers.
This is not to say personnel cannot be accommodated in the cargo version because palletised seats are freely available in a range of colours!
Using palletised seats (as the image below) a total of 252 personnel can be accommodated, less than the dedicated version but not by much.
Instead of seats, the upper deck could also carry a whopping 26x 463L pallets.
As we all know by now, palletised systems might deliver slightly less capacity but infinitely increased flexibility, a mixed configuration could be 136 palletised seats and 5x 463L pallets on the upper deck plus 25 LD3 on the lower deck for example.
It is not certain if the RAF aircraft will be able to accommodate the palletised intensive care facilities used so successfully by the C17 and in service with the UK. If it is the case that these systems will not be able to be used on FSTA then we will have to keep using the C17 for high dependency aeromedical evacuation instead of the more suitable FSTA, injecting yet more inefficiency into the system as a whole.
The cargo door opening is 2.56m high and 3.58m wide so some smaller vehicles like Land Rovers or Ocelot could be accommodated on the upper deck if they could be angled in.
Compare the number of pallets routinely going into Afghanistan (about 40 per day) with a solution that can carry 8 (the RAF A330 ) or 32 (the cargo A330) and it should be obvious which one will be the more useful. Before anyone shouts up I know I have not included the LD3 capacity in the RAF versions figures but when flying cargo and personnel the RAF’s FSTA aircraft will be hauling a paltry 8 463L pallets and significant quantities of fresh air and empty seats, seats that will be burning fuel.
The cargo version can be easily modified to suit the mission at hand and it is this flexibility, carrying the exact mix of passengers, 463L and LD3′s required, means that utilisation rates would be significantly increased, less flights being made with sub optimal loading, less flights overall and dramatically improved efficiency.
At this point it is worth noting that the FSTA is designated as an air to air refuelling and passenger transport capability with air transport of cargo being a secondary role, somewhat unfairly criticising it for something it was not designed for, but whilst this statement might have been fine at the project outset it certainly is not now. Expeditionary operations, even at a Brigade level will require significant air transportation of cargo, even if the preferable option of sea transport is available. Deploying, building up more concentrated forces and withdraw will equally require capacity that may not be available in the civilian market.
It is ludicrous to not have selected the cargo version.
With the changes in force levels as per the SDSR and suggestion in the Think Defence series, the RAF would arguably need less refuelling capacity and more air transport.
FSTA delivers the inverse of this.
NUMBER 6
Without seeing the exact nature of the agreement for the second batch of aircraft, how much they cost when being used or not being used for example, it is difficult to speculate on whether the number of provided aircraft is too high or too low. We should also remember that we are contracting for a service, not necessarily a number of aircraft but this exposes the fundamental inflexibility of long term PFI’s, a difficulty in coping with variation in demand IF that demand is lower than the contracted baseline.
The baseline requirement is for 9 aircraft, an option for the 10th in permanent RAF service and the rest will be available on a surge basis to the RAF or used for revenue generation.
With a conventional purchase, if demand drops, the aircraft can be placed in extended readiness at low cost or used to even out airframe hours. This might not suit the MoD’s accounting systems but the operational and long term financial benefits are clear.
NUMBER 7
It has been reported that the terms of the agreement prevent the RAF from using any other aircraft or service provider for the air refuelling role which sounds eminently reasonable in a commercial context but of course flies in the face of operational necessity and basic old fashioned common sense.
Because the A400 has been designed from the outset to offer airborne refuelling, using it in a mixed cargo/AAR role would be a relatively simple affair, all the plumbing is there, expensive modification not needed. Beyond training and the relatively low cost refuelling assemblies we could extract maximum value out of the A400 in three scenarios;
The first is for the Falkland Islands, to provide refuelling cover for the Typhoon flight, supporting long flights from Ascension Island or diverts in the case of bad weather, the RAF maintain a single VC10 at Mount Pleasant. Joining the VC10 is a C130 used for tactical transport and some maritime patrol tasks. When the A400 comes into service it would be able to cover both these roles with a single aircraft, a significant cost reduction and capability improvement. As it stands now, the Falklands will require both an FSTA A330 AND an A400. Multiply that additional cost by a decade or so and it should become clear just how expensive and restrictive this contract condition is.
The second scenario is helicopter refuelling, special forces missions often require long range helicopter flights, instead of using multiple helicopters whose effective mission load would have been dramatically reduced because of a high fuel load, an A400 could fly a similar low level tactical flight profile, refuelling the helicopter/s whilst also providing airdrop facilities for vehicles and heavier stores. It is not likely that the A330 will be able to fly low and slow enough to refuel helicopters and low enough to be survivable or maintain surprise. This is a capability we currently have to rely on allies for but given our global reach, should be able to do this on sovereign missions and it would be available at minimal cost.
Finally, blending a tactical transport and AAR mission would be extremely cost effective in a number of situations and the flexibility to refuel fast jets should it be needed is also an added bonus.
Having an A400 AAR capability would allow the RAF to maximise the investment in these aircraft, improve capabilities and significantly enhance operational cost efficiency.
Options
The MoD has traded affordability for value for money, penny wise pound foolish as it seems so often to be.
Whatever the merits of FSTA, I suspect it is very poor value for money and will fail to deliver the capability that we actually need, with too much air refuelling for a fast jet fleet we longer have and not enough air transport of sufficient flexibility for future sustained expeditionary operations.
Given the budget issues I suspect that Liam Fox has decided to do what all SoS Def have done and that is push out the pain to the next administration. No more invective about PFI’s, not a single one has been cancelled yet despite the hyperbole its all gone quiet on that front.
The first option is simply to carry on and forget all the problems, this is of course the most likely option to be taken but it is not the correct option as we all know.
Every time anyone suggests that a PFI is unsuitable, delivering the wrong capabilities, inflexible, too expensive and generally not fit for purpose, the first response is always the dreaded penalty clause.
The government seems institutionally scared of them.
The problem with being scared of the contract and its penalty clauses is it fails to take into account the reality of the defence marketplace. All the Air Tanker consortium members need a sound long term relationship with the MoD and as BAe has found out, sitting back on contract clauses has resulted in the ‘anyone but BAe’ policy for future projects. What is needed but never happened with CVF; is a good dose of level headed pragmatism.
The current consultation on the future defence industrial strategy and likely direction of travel of more off the shelf, less government funded development programmes and generally an end to the good times should focus the minds of defence suppliers. They should balance the assured revenue of FSTA against an unsatisfied customer and poor PR for the next 20 odd years.
Quite clearly what needs to happen is a cancellation of the PFI and renegotiation to address the serious operational, capacity, configuration and financial shortcomings.
Much is made of cancellation costs, exclusivity clauses and penalties should we ever use any other operators and this document makes interesting reading about risk financing.
The A330MRTT with Rolls Royce engines is absolutely the right aircraft but in trying to scrimp and save we have knobbled the fleet, they will be inflexible, inappropriate and expensive.
A cool headed renegotiation would still provide the Air tanker partners with significant and assured revenue, the customer would be much happier and world peace would become reality!
This new agreement could include the types of integrated and innovative support contracts that have been pioneered in the UK and there is no reason why some airframe sharing leasing scheme could not be delivered.
## Other posts in this series ##
The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction
The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends
The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets
The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement
The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01
The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)
The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)
The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)
The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)
The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)
The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)
The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling
The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport
The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)
The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)
The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)
The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)
The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security
The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary
Hello,
much of your analysis is very sound,but some points are worth expanding on.
Just as the Strategic Defence and Security Review was a direct reflection of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy which the United Kingdom is subject to post Lisbon Treaty,so the new Defence Industrial Strategy will reflect the European Union’s procurement policy.
That can be summed up as follows:
“National or non European procurement is bad.
Pan European procurement is good.”
With the scrapping of Nimrod,Airbus is now the only manufacturer of large military aircraft in Europe and consequently has a monopoly position.
The Ministry of Defence will be in no position to dictate terms to Europe’s only supplier.
Airbus and the rest of the Airtanker consortium also have legal contracts on their side.
However,it has previously been stated that there are get out clauses in that contract.
If that is the case,it raises the question of why they are not being used.
Anyone who has read the European literature will know the answer.
The creation of joint European capabilities has been a European Union priority for some time.
Herve Morin referred to tanker aircraft late last year:
http://grandlogistics.blogspot.com/2010/10/herve-morin-on-anglo-french-joint.html
Quote:
“We are also thinking about other areas such as that of tanker aircraft.
We could take advantage of British overcapacity once a way of fairly sharing costs has been found.”
Regarding capacity,the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft’s requirements were drawn up long before the contract was signed,let alone the recent force reductions.
The figures you gave in an earlier post suggested that we maintain a force equivalent to two brigades in Afghanistan with the equivalent of less than 3 A330 sorties a day (and some of that may have been by aircraft other than VC10s and Tristars such as C17s,the figures did not specify)only half of which were Royal Air Force flights.
As we will be sustaining a single brigade in future our transport needs will be significantly less than even the current small number of daily flights.
Demand for tanker capacity during our last major war fighting operation was roughly equivalent to 4 daily A330 sorties:
http://grandlogistics.blogspot.com/2011/01/aerial-refuelling-demandby-numbers.html
Again,future demand will be much lower.
It is difficult to see a need for anything like 14 aircraft to
supply the likely level of demand,even if you add in the small numbers of flights to places like the Falklands and Canada.
The capacity demanded by the contract appears to be far greater than what is required.
GrandLogistics.
Interesting article – there is nothing I would disagree with. It is also interesting to consider a couple of additional points -
1. On the point around compromises which means minimal modification to the base platform so that they had to be made as civilian as possible to both facilitate reuse for non-MOD charters, I find it interesting that Airtanker themselves would not have wanted the aircraft to be as useful as possible to other military forces – they are the most likely customers of surplus RAF aircraft, followed by air cargo compaanies (where I suspect a cargo door would been mandetory). I would still question whether Thomas Cook are that likely a user…. This would lead you to believe that the equipment ommissions were driven very largely by cost – indeed it would surprise me if Airtanker didn’t charge the MOD for NOT including a cargo door….
2. An additional point here is the industrial aspect of all of this…. The UK was the lead customer for the A330 Tanker, and is still by far the largest buyer, and yet the final conversion line has been sighted in Spain. This was an opportunity for the UK to take a lead in an Airbus project and reap some indistrial benefits… Instead, due to the interminable delays to reaching agreement and the half-cocked version of the aircraft choosen, we managed to not leverage a position of commercial strength, while still paying over the odds…. Truely a classic MOD affair
GL, without knowing the exact figures and shape of the agreement it is difficult to gauge exactly if t is too much but I suspect it will be, and in the wrong capability area as well.
I want transport to be a ‘Capability Plus’ area which means I would in some areas like more capability than we need for sovereign operations, this gives us influence and leverage in coalition operations.
This is the problem with PFI’s, by the time you have finalised the negotiation, the world around you has changed
Does this contract rule out any tanker aircraft flying off the CVF which is a must if for no other reason than aircraft safety.
I have seen it it claimed that it does rule out tanker’s flying off the CVF and buddy refuelling, but presumably if the MoD are negotiating with AirTankers to allow France to buy into the contract then there is an opportunity to renegotiate the contract (not to mention the usefulness of a carrier is limited if you still need friendly air base and over flight for your tankers).
PFI is a terrible way to pay for anything; it’s nothing more than a creative accountancy tool, used to obscure costs for political purposes.
Even with schools and hospitals funded through PFI there have been additional costs dumped on the taxpayer due to changing requirements of the service provided, and also some horribly scary forecasts of future costs.
It should be a whole lot easier to estimate the requirement for future service delivery -based on past trends- in areas of health and education than it would be to estimate military requirements over the next 27 years. Despite that, health and education PFIs have not been a great success (it was reported last year that the most expensive PFI contract will see the NHS paying back 16 times the original capital value of one hospital).
In defence procurement, PFI contracts would seem to be solely the choice of madmen, contract lawyers and accountants. As pointed out above, the last 27 years have seen many changes and a great deal of uncertainty and surprises; being tied into a PFI is not an effective way of meeting the unpredictable future challenges faced by the armed forces.
The UK could well have an expensive tanker over-capacity for some years, and will not have the flexibility of the multi-role A330 either.
——————————————–
In response to Nigel’s first additional point:
I suspect that it’s not in the interest of Airtanker to operate the multi-role A330, as when their already existing PFI fails to meet the RAF’s future cargo requirements the MOD will have to look for another option… and the companies that form Airtanker will be on hand (perhaps setting up a new consortium called something like ‘Aircargo’) to offer another juicy PFI deal to operate another fleet of aircraft.
Or maybe that’s just my suspicious mind working over time.
I agree with you that the a330 is the aircraft of choice for this capability. The US airforce would have signed the contract already had it not been for the American way of only buying US. I am somewhat surprised at the PFI decision in the way it was handled if these jets needed to be bought in this way why didnt the mod just go straight to airbus and finance the sale in the same way as airlines finance aircraft of them. Also we could have financed the maintenance out to ba engineering in Cardiff who do hold approvals for this aircraft even though ba dont operate it themselves.
The final thing with this is I dont believe there was ever much chance of these aircraft getting any civil passenger company to lease them. The reason is these aircraft had had a number of mods to them not just the install of DAS, refuelling and radios but also as a result of them having to operate in a military operating environment. It would to me have made a lot more sense for any over capacity being sold to the much more lucrative cargo customers maybe even hazardous cargo carrying(in the civil world paint is considered hazardous cargo) which further begs the question as to why the cargo heavy variant described by TD was not taken up. This reminds me of the Laurel and Hardy catchphrase “Well, here’s another fine mess you’ve gotten me into!”
TD
A number of thoughts
There is no steer in the NAO report of whether they are using current pounds ( value) or just cash figures, if they are using cash, then including fuel etc, the cost of the deal is £7.8n billion at current prices.. so not so bad.
The use of extra cargo capacity in MRRT reduces the business case for A400M and even more so for further purchases of C-17s so that may have affected configuration
Relating to the above is there any indication about the routes taken for the pallets into Afghanistan (pallets east post), if some pallets are moved directly into theatre with C17s these are not available as capacity for a hub and spoke MRRT business case.
Finally the pallet data leaves out the issue of moving personnel into and out of theatre, given that this occurs periodically rather than in an even distribution does anyone know what personnel capacity the MRRT “people configuration” needs to deliver before calculating cargo capacity?
In the Harrier (its value relative to other platforms) debate prominent ex-Navy people put forward these inflation-adjusted figures. In the debate itself they may have had a bias, but surely knew the sources better than most of us. These are platform costs that include initial programme costs plus in-service modifications, but no service delivery component:
Tornado F £134 billion
Tornado GR £86 billion
JP 233 £42 billion (to add to the GR capability)
Nimrod AWACS £12 billion
Nimrod MRA £19 billion
Typhoon £73.9 billion (partial story, so far)
Total £366 billion
The numbers as units are vastly different across the line items, even though the inflation adjustment has been made. It would require a Parliamentary Question to get the yearly averages of units actually available for service of each type to make any comparison, but
- £ 13bn divided by (14 times 27)might actually not come out that badly?
What I do take a dislike to is mortgaging a fixed amount from an unknown (shrinking!) budget for just one (and a half, as so well highlighted by the leading-in piece by TD) capabilities.
Hi RW,
I can see that we were penning roughly similar thoughts at the same time. Just a small question for
” use of extra cargo capacity in MRRT reduces the business case for A400M and even more so for further purchases of C-17s so that may have affected configuration”
- agreed for the A400M
- but is it really so for C-17? If you mean this last one to come in, it is needed from day one. If you mean further purchases stretching over years, then I agree that the mix of heavy lift and other longer-ranged transport should not be in need of any further adding to on the “heavy” side
- rather, the money should go into making some essential kit to be of the weight/ dimensions to allow the use of other, not just C-17 part of the fleet… not meaning that all brigades should have this kind of kit, just those earmarked for “early intervention”
ACC
I dont believe it does affect the business case of either. C17 hauls oversized loads and enabling equipment over long distances that’s its business case. A400m will be used for moving kit into rough strips and will be more effect than this than c17 is i know this is what c130 does but vehicles and equipment have got bigger and we have out grown the c130 the europeans IMO have got it right for once and why lockheed have been looking at a new herc for a while now. FSTA should be about troops and pallet movements to theatre and then other assets move it on to fwd bases.
Brian – nice as it would be to ascribe this to “private company taking advantage of hard working civil servants”, having worked for the last 6 years as part of a private company working for the UK government, I can say with some confidence that this has all the halmarks of the a project run by the UK civil service – ill thoughtout ideas and specifications, glacial decision making, profound distrust of the private sector and a total unwillingness to listen or change course….
As I say, it wouldn’t surprise if me at all if Airtanker took one look at the basic ideas, including that of providing excess aircraft to passanger charters, and told the MOD it was bonkers. The MOD would have told them that that was the plan and it had to be stuck to. They would have further accused Airtanker of trying to add-on non-essential items (such as a boom, or a cargo door) as an attempt to make extra money. Finally Airtaker will have turned around and said “ok mate, its your choice and your money, we’ll deliver what you ask for, no more questions asked, but be clear, our charge to you will include an amount to cover us in the event that we can’t actually lease the aircraft out to anyone else…..”
@ TD
Super article. You will all be glad to here I have nothing say about this topic. Except I don’t understand this……
“What has happened to the RAF aircraft fleet, air combat, technology and the geo political landscape since the conflict in the Falklands, it is roughly the same timeframe, but this time looking into the future that the contract is based on.”
Why you use the Falklands War as milestone I don’t know. Fall of Communism I could understand. Since WW2 the UK has fought to high end wars to serve her own national interests, Suez and Falklands War. In both it was the Navy and the Army that took much of the burden with the RAF playing very much a supporting role. The RAF primary role (and the reason for its growth) was the Central European Front. As costs of maintaining BOAR and the RAF Germany the UK’s expeditionary capability shrank. Since the end of the Cold War there is now a greater need for this expeditionary capability has defence funding shifting from European land based forces to an expeditionary capability? No. It has been 20 years since the Cold War ended. In the same amount of time after WW2 the UK decided to get out of the carrier business; a major capability was dumped when there was a clear and present danger to the UK. Now with no clear threat on the near continent we are spending major money to maintain a capability (or should that be service?) that is no longer of that much importance. No need to reply. I am just comparing now with 1963/65.
There is nothing wrong with PFI in theory, but the way it was carried out by the previous government was a huge mistake (being polite & clean).
There is no reason why government should not buy kit on a ten or fifteen year loan. That would bring yearly cost to about £400m the same as the PFI, but after 10 or 15 years we would own the planes & modify them as we choose.
We should have bolstered the Tristar fleet by buying the 4 ex BWIA Tristar 500. That would have cost peanuts & saved a fortune in trying to keep the VC10s flying.
That FSTA is expensive is one thing, but they are nearer to airliner than military jet.
Other websites talking about PFI hospital scandals have mentioned getting the 1977 unfair contracts act to cover PFI as well.
We should have bought (with financing) 10 A330 to the same standard as the RAAF.
We should then have 9-10 second hand surge planes to a lower standard, flown by reservists when needed.(tristar/B767/A330, ex airline)
If we only have 3 or 4 A330, then I pity the poor squaddies trapped in theatre for months unable to get home on leave.
X, I used the Falklands as a marker, about 25 odd years ago. Look at what has happened in those 25 years, we have entered into a contract that predicts demand based on what we know now, can we really be sure about the next 25 years if we look at the changes of the last 25 years?
TD an excellent article. You have covered all the points, perfectly!
This is a very very bad deal for the RAF. We should have bought the Australian spec, cargo doors and floor, boom and ability to be refuel itself. It also needs armour and DAS’
The fcukwits that signed up for this needs sacking!
The fact that it precludes any other AAR capability is beyond belief!!!
This needs to be renegotiated asap… PERIOD!!!
There’s nothing wrong with PFI in theory…but just point to one that wasn’t a hideously expensive dog in practice.
Apparently, back in 1996, Airbus offered 21 airframes in the same production run as the Germans’ A310MRTTs. Not as great as an A330 airframe, but pretty nifty, and the proposal was a straight sale. Unfortunately that was the era of Sir Steve Robson (PFI’s inventor) in his pomp.
Also, I think there is a broader issue here. Specifically, there is a culture of what I would call “procurementism” in government. This is founded on the doctrine that the public sector must get it wrong, and therefore a whole pseudo-private machinery is needed to stop this. Part of this is that the machinery should cost as much as private sector financiers do. As a result we’ve got to the point where the procurement process is costing as much as the aircraft.
Excellent post TD! As a potential system I may be working on, I am very interested about the MRTT…and now quite dissheartened to hear how low-spec they are!
Btw; 2 of ‘our’ MRTT’s have flown.
The DAS issue was a stone shockingly bad move, even the old VC-10′s and Tristars ‘borrow’ part of the C-17′s advanced DAS, so this choice was reversed? I do hope so!
One thing however, TD, in your post, concerning UK aircraft with boom recepticles;
“In UK service there is only 1 such aircraft, the C17, ”
lol it was my first post, but need I remind you the E3 Sentry also has the boom recepticle, and quite frequently uses it! Especially since the aircraft is commonly used in joint multi-national operations… this makes more sense then for our MRTT’s to also be thusly equipped.
Ah well, the Tristar has ‘coped’ so I guess these will.
X,
To add to TD’s reply, remember it was this conflict which really did wake up twithall/MoD/Government/the forces (everyone) on how bad our air tanking capability was, and was really our first conflict with tankers playing a major (and often forgotten) role in.
Anyway, good post of bad news, I agree; this should be renegociated!
It would have been better to have a mix of aircraft under the PFI with 10-12 proper Cargo/Transport/Tankers in RAF Service but also 6-8 Cargo/Passenger Airframes that the PFI company can use for its own ends unless needed by the MoD, all based on the same airframe. The RAF platforms fitted with a full DAS and the others fitted for but not with. The same would go for IFR Surely it woul dhave been possible to design a removable probe.
Anyhow all of the above would have meant buying a less austere version. I have a feeling this is going to come back and bite the MoD in the Ass as by neccessity they are forces to renegociate the PFI to allow additional systems and usage to be included, but given the financial situation maybe the PFI Contractor will see the light and realise it would to their benefit to co-operate in these issues. Is it too late to have at least some of the remaining airframes fitted with cargo doors? Surely the MoD can see the advantages of being able to use these capable platforms to their full extent.
It’s the fcuking “Bean Counters” again! String em up I say….
LJ
I agree with your fleet break down would have been much better. Also would it not have been easier to to have had the airforce take all the aircraft and lease any spare capacity to our european allies ourselves and made money that way. I was under the impression that the FSTA will be delivered with the same level of defensive system protection as the current raf transport fleet is that not the case.
As for the cargo door it depend which deliver slots the aircraft are in. Its much easier if this is fitted in build as opposed to retrofitted and the raf order only equates to about 2-3 months production if they all came together. Though the military like keeping serials close together total monthly production to the raf prob wont happen, but I would still have thought theyre to far done the pulse line to make that change without considerable cost or deferral of orders to a later slot
On the RAF E3D it has both probe and receptacle, which is quite sensible. Giving that the vast majority RAF aircraft use a probe if one had to chose one then probe makes sense and none is plain stupid (just look at the Black Bucks for why). Tanker to tanker fueling is very useful even if it is only for efficency purposes rather than range, as in one coming on station tops up with whatever is left from the one leaving station.
Thanks Mike and DM for the correction
It’s so bloody depressing how we consistently get these big decisions wrong. If the contributors of this forum can see what is so obviously wrong with this, why the fcuk can’t the MoD?
As I said earlier it must be the bean-counters at the treasury. The operational performance must be the governing factor, NOT, can AirTanker easily use them in the civilian Market!!!
The purpose is to provide a military capability not setup a lease fleet got DHL or UPS!
PD
It’s the old responsibility game.
If you create a mare’s nest of programes, comittees, and then byzantine contracts, it is impossible to trace who is actually to blame for anything.
If a simple committee of say 2 or 3 civil servants, and 2 or 3 uniforms, chaired by jnr minister spent a few months asking questions, a few months anyliszing responses and formulating a proposal and them 6 months puting out tendering for it, then anything that went wrong would be their fault.
So they create committees with overlaping responsibilites, sub commitees, and spend years formulating the requirement, making sure it all leaks so that the MP for marginal east with defence contractor in it gets a good shout. So that BAE get the job whatever.
Then issue a contract spec that would choke a great white shark, hopelessly trying to predict all requirements for the next 30 years or so. Then drag it out so that the membership of the commitees chages 3 times before anying is actually signed.
The Public accounts committee can go ape, the teligraph can scream, but (and this is the important bit), No one can point at single individula or small group of individuals and say this time the diamond encrusted chocolate tea pot was your idea. And no one gets fired.
You don’t get to wear gold braid, or snt civilservicedom, not to ministerial rank in polotics, withou learning how to avoid responsibility.
Simples
Just thought this might interest everyone.
In Dec 2007 the Columbian AF ordered a MMTT from IAI. The A/C seleected was a 2nd hand B767-200ER.
The A/C was aquired in early 2009. Trials and testing were completed between July and October 2010 with delivery 1 month later. Not sure of the full spec but wing pods are visible in photos.
OK its just 1 A/C but if the Columbian’s can decide what they want and get it in 1 month less than 3 years then what the hell is the MOD about !
@ Mike
I didn’t know TD replied, I didn’t want a reply, but I am sure it was OK. Perhaps even better than OK……
Anyway I have thought of something to say. A couple or three Spartans for parachute training wouldn’t go amiss. None of this “we can’t qualify your baby paratroopers” business. Then again I suppose using a PFI the Army could handle that on its own.
KP
Obviously a very inferior way of going about it, buying 2nd hand kit, quikley and efficiently that would never do.
@ TD & Mike
Does it help that the Victor is my favourite V bomber?
I don’t know how many tankers the RAF need; they will get as many as “we” can afford. I do know the PFI is a cock-up which will stop us “affording” as many as we could have.
As we’re discussing Tankers with cargo capability and knowing TD’s foundness of modules I thought this might be of interest.
http://mikesnead.net/resources/cat/configurable_air_transport_cat_presentation_2006_airlift_tanker_assoc_conference.pdf
http://mikesnead.net/resources-cat.htm
Now I confess NOT to be a fan of PFI. I think it makes no sense at all. There again I am not a bean-counter as they live in some virtual cyber-space where anything can be justified on a spreadsheet or mathematcal model.
However, my veru crude understanding of a PFI, is that a PRIVATE company puts up the funding (Hence Private Finance Initiative) and provides a service, ehich the customer pays for over a number of years, which pays the supplier the cost for supplier the service and a nice ROI/Profit…..
Now as I understand it, AirTanker could not raise the capital to fund the setup costs of the service. So the Government lent them (Public Tax Payers Money) to buy the service. They (AirTanker) then charge the Tax payer a premium for lending them our own money?
You can’t make the shit up can you. Yet will still end up with 14 aircraft that are more use to Virgin and Easy jet than they are to the RAF!!
Is there no end to the incompetance of the MoD and those involved in UK Military procurement. This is not a PFI and as such the contract should be torn up as it is clear that AirTanker could not provide the capability as a PFI. So lets buy the planes (built to the right spec.. as per the Australian A330 MRTTs), service them ourselves and use any spare capacity to stop leasing civvy aircraft and possible sell to our European allies who are sadly lacking in this capability.
I dont think the first paragraph is unjustified, more just flat out wrong.
The RAF wanted and needs a C17 Fleet for Strategic Transport.
It got an A400m tactical transport fleet because we felt like subsidising EUairbus.
Blaming the RAF for that is madness.
Clean sheet of paper approach, I’d say we need a super heavy Turbo Prop.
“So it being obvious what the Conservative Secretary of State for Defence and the Liberal Democrat Business Minister think of PFI’s have they had the CEO of AirTanker into Whitehall for an interview without coffee, what do you think?”
Unfortunatly you cant.
The contracts have been signed, you can put up with them, buy yourself out, or you can tear them up and watch your next gilt sale fail and the LNG ships turn around and sail elsewhere.
“The problem with being scared of the contract and its penalty clauses is it fails to take into account the reality of the defence marketplace. All the Air Tanker consortium members need a sound long term relationship with the MoD and as BAe has found out, sitting back on contract clauses has resulted in the ‘anyone but BAe’ policy for future projects.”
As above, this is equaly dangerous. The last thing the UK can possibly afford right now is to be seen as an untrustworthy partner.
Even IF the contracts are unfair and exploitative, the world frankly doesnt care, if you make noises about not paying debts, people get shifty about lending you money.
All you can really expect from the current crop is not to repeat mistakes, fixing them is pretty damn unlikely.
Ixion
You missed the most important bit of the sub committee.
Jobs For The Boys.
Not only is no one responsible, you create a small army of people who are entirely reliant on your patronage for their daily bread, or A8, Wine Cellar and Villa in Tuscony.
Phil Darley
I am a bean counter, and I hate PFI with a passion.
The Theory goeth thus.
Townia Civic Council collects the black bin every week and the Brown/Green/Blue on an alternating 3 week cycle, and spends £100,000,000 a year doing so.
Townia Civic Council contracts out the bin collection Bins’R'Us for the same service for £95,000,000 a year.
Bins’R'Us, not being retarded, stop wasting money and collect the bins at a cost of £90,000,000 a year, and pockets a £5 million profit.
Everybody wins.
It was never designed for long term variable services like hospitals or nuclear missiles.
Its been pursued in fields its not capable of delivering for, simply because it deliveries “something” now, like a shiney new hospital, at no declared cost, so no change to the national debt.
Unfortunatly, rather than harnessing the efficiency drive of the private sector, its harnessed the profit taking side instead. So, we get hospitals that will cost 16x what the build cost was, a 6% interest loan costs about 4x capital over 25 years.
DominicJ who on earth do we get in to such a mess with PFI’s? It seems Politician just wanted to pass costs on to the next parliament or next generation, even idd in the end it costs more… much more. This is just madness and it is due to too much power and influence being in the hands of bean-counters (no offence). However, that does not explain how we ended up buying totally the wrong version of the A330. Capability-wise it should have been the Transport (upper Cargo)version as TD decribed, plus should have the Boom refueling probe (ARBS) and the (UARRS) so it too can be refueld,not to mention flight deck armour and DAS. What we are getting is so short of what is required it needs to be stopped and the contract amended.
To cost a fortune and not provide what is required is taking the piss. £13billion for 14 aircraft that are so close to what a civilan airline would buy is madness
mr loophole? he seems to knacker up sure fire convictions for the celebs by ripping apart the small print
PD
Nar, its nothing to do with bean counters, and everything to do with pollies who want to pass the cheque.
I’m cutrrently trying to fight off a Labour Campaign along the lines of “Labour build schools, Tories close them”, unfortunatly, “Yeah Labour built a new school, but your kids will be dead before its been paid for” doesnt work as a headline on a leaflet.
Any sensible bean counter should have said, “this idea is ****ing stupid”, unfortunatly, any that did, would find themselves side lined for promotion.
PG
The problem is the civil service negociating Teams star player was a 24 year old with a third in Multicultural Feminist Poetry from a polytechnic promoted because she was polishing a junior ministers knob and had impressed a senior civil servent with her dedication to solving climate change and racism with cup a soups and a new fairness comittee.
AirTanker were represented by lawyers on commission.
We dont have loopholes, they do.
DJ and others
Can we leave the party politics out of this, British defence policy (particulary procurement), has been a cluster f*ck of Cluster f*cks since the war with the occasional got it right or shining example.
Regardless of the party in power.
Labour might not have understood the military, but that implies that the Tories do and are still shafting it.
,
Is the 24 year old female described, any more qualified than 35 year old product of Eaton Cambridge nice job in city, to undersatand procurement contracts.
I have met some very stupid ‘Highly intelligent and educated’ people in my time, and there is no fool like and old fool who thinks that life has taught him everything.
The Mod should have equiped the lady described with the right team andd that is a political system, but not party political question.
There are peopel in all 3 major parties who could be shot for what they have done, or would like to do to defence.
IXION
The Mod should have equiped the lady described with the right team andd that is a political system, but not party political question
They do its called the civil service, no matter what party is in power the bean counters etc are the same people. Maybe they have grown to large in the terms of numbers employed and basking in the idea they had a job for life. Now they are being called to account. The whole MoD it too top heavy in both civil servants and brass.
Ixion
I’m afraid you’ve wildly misunderstood my last comment.
The first part, could be described as party political, its also true.
The second part, was not in any way political, the only party that officialy subscribes to that view are the Libertarians, and I’m not a member.
That too, also has the advantage, of being true.
I want the civil service abolished, I dont want it replaced with “the right sort” of civil servants.
If this Tory Government survives another 15 years, the civil servants might have changed party allegiance, most of them did that a few days after the last election.
They’ll still be promoted based on who’s knobbing who and come out with the most convincing “right on” twaddle, ragardless of what flavour of right on twaddle is currently in vogue.
“The Mod should have equiped the lady described with the right team andd that is a political system, but not party political question.”
Damn right it should.
But anyone jumping off a 50 story building should grow wings.
They cant, neither can the MoD.
I meant to make the point that civil service corruption, and incompetance is not a party political issue,
I think it was Philip Green who told a commons committee after a drafting a report, the private sector could do the civil services job with half the people better for half the price.
I want the civil service abolished, I don’t want it replaced with “the right sort” of civil servants.
No civil service, no nation, DominicJ. Sorry, but there it is. If you want to abolish Britain then you may be on the wrong blog.
I’m afraid the Timeline of Britain is quite a bit longer than the Timeline of the Civil Service.
The simple fact is the civil service is a political organisation.
BAE is a business.
Theres only ever going to be one winner when those two square office.
Sir Humphrey cant beat Gordon Gecko, because if he could, Gordon Gecko would hire him, pay him 50x what the civil service does and unleash him upon the civil service.
Unfortunately most Civil Service Bean Counters are not employed to vet whether a programme is good or bad but just to run the books. From experience one of the main problems is the revolving door regarding Project Managers and other staff especially the Military.
One good move would be to reduce the influence the Treasury now seems to have on all policy decisions which is usualoly based on short term demands.
The “Through Life Management Plan”, idea needs to be revisited for all major programmes with each section of the CADMID cycle having its funding locked in place once green lighted and the powers that be should have the power and spine to halt/can projects as soon as there are either no longer needed or unaffordable.
What form the forecomming DIS takes is going to have a major impact on future contracts and hopefully influence exisiting ones as well. The PFI gravy train should be well and truely derailed as Companies realise that if they want the deminishing number of Defence Contracts they had better play ball or lose out. PFIs probably would have worked in the stable days of the Cold War but nowadays flexibility and rapid turnaround are required from all parties involved in programmes.
Don’t forget that an arm of the Civil Service, the Office of Government Commerce has come up with world renowned systems such as PRINCE 2 for project management, and ‘Managing Successful Programmes’ (MSP) for portfolio’s of projects, and yet we cannot seem to actually apply the stringent methodologies our selves ?
Bureaucrat is not actually a four letter word, bureaucracies such HM Civil Service are a response to the complexity of large “messy” problems, such as running a nation. Like any large organisation they are unfortunately rife with their own internal politics. However this is made far worse when the Civil Service becomes “politicised” by the elected government of the day, and thus party politics do become involved.
Ideally the bureaucracy should tread the finely balanced line that would allow it to counter balance the party politics of currently elected administration, without being antagonistic.
We seem to be in a post-Yes Minister world, where party spin doctors and “advisors” have whittled away at the independent power base of the career civil servant to the point that they feel they must toady up to / brown nose with, the government of the day, to the detriment of all concerned.
It would have been in Sir Humphrey Appleby’s direct interest to have a well run Tanker project, and if that meant de-railing the Rt Hon Jim Hackers stupid suggestions about PFI’s, then de-railed they would have been……
I’m afraid the Timeline of Britain is quite a bit longer than the Timeline of the Civil Service.
No, it really isn’t.
It hasn’t always been called the Civil Service, but for as long as Britain has been a nation – in fact, for centuries before that – it had a civil service. No tax gatherers, no tax revenues. No tax revenues, no government spending. No government spending, no government. No government, no state.
The best way to view the Civil Service is a collection of tribes or clans. Their primary aim is to protect the tribe and if possible, expand its power and influence. It doesn’t really matter what the purpose of the ministry is – the civil servants can be in agriculture or defence, it makes no difference to them.
jed
unfortunatly jed, sir humphrey tends to derail projects he doesnt like as well as projects that are stupid.
I like to rag on the last governent for the shortage of mraps, but in the end, it had to hold a gun on the mod and screamed use the ****ing things!!!
Elected officials make decisions.
Electors replace them for making bad decision.
Now unelected officials are great, until they **** up royaly and carry on regardless.
Think soviet agriculture or maos sparrow purge.
@DomJ – ref: “but in the end, it had to hold a gun on the mod and screamed use the ****ing things!!!”
Ahh, but as TD likes to point out, and as Defence of The Realm goes into a great length, was that a failure, not of the MoD per se, but of the most senior echelon’s of the Army itself (along with the “yes, we have enough helo’s, thanks….”)???
@ a
Good point. What always amazes me is how quickly European kingdoms of the Dark Ages appeared struck coinage once their borders became firm.
It seems the Yanks are having problems with their new tankers too.
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5593186&c=AME&s=AIR
Why are they getting 179 tankers for $35 billion when we are getting 12/14 for about $20billion? What have I missed?