I was writing a long piece on the run up to the cancellation but I decided to delete it, Nimrod is gone and is not coming back. Of all the decisions in the SDSR the cancellation of Nimrod is the most insane but maybe insane decisions are needed. It is hard to reconcile the loss of such a versatile piece of equipment with the continuation of ceremonial, bands and display teams but maybe some sacred cows really are too sacred. Perhaps there are reasons for cancellation that are not in the public domain, was a sacrificial lamb, setting down a marker to industry or some unspecified technical issues that would have soaked up yet more cash?
Whatever, we need to move on.
So the question becomes ‘what next’
Taking a platform centric view, it was such a versatile aircraft with a range of capabilities that included anti submarine, ISTAR, electronic intelligence, anti surface, search and rescue, communications brokerage, land attack, maritime security patrol and many more. Its inherent versatility makes answering the ‘what next’ question quite difficult.
Below are 4 rather simplistic views of what it did.
Anti Submarine; the primary role was that of anti submarine warfare and many believe that this is an anachronism in the likely future hybrid wars amongst the people, but anyone who even vaguely takes note of current military affairs cannot have failed to notice the roaring trade in submarines across the global defence market. Modern submarines are very difficult to find and destroy and there is increasing use of improvised and mini submarines that should give naval planners reason for concern. Submarines can be a devastating weapon and what Nimrod delivered was anti submarine capability at range, unlike the about to be upgrade Merlin and existing Type 23 frigates. The capability of the Nimrod/Merlin/Type 23 (including the personnel of course) triad was without peer and one of those legs has now been taken away but we have to ask if the loss is terminal. One of the primary missions of Nimrod was to ensure the safe passage to its patrol areas of the Trident submarines and it is planned that this role will be carried out by Merlin and Type 23 which is not ideal because the anti submarine bubble around a naval task group will be limited by the range and endurance of the Merlin helicopter.
Anti Surface; the final weapons fit was not clear but it would have been capable of carrying more or less any of the RAF’s air to surface weapons between its wing hard points and cavernous weapon bay. In many respects it would have made an ideal semi strategic bomber, equipped with multiple Storm Shadow in the stand-off role and even with a large number of Paveway IV’s or Brimstones its range and endurance would have given the RAF a capability very few other nations possessed.
Maritime Patrol and Search and Rescue; providing long range search and rescue and coordinating the protection of offshore infrastructure would have been a major part of usage but in light of the move to a PFI or outsourced model for helicopter search and rescue, the complex relationship with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and the need to concentrate on core defence tasks we might question whether it is the MoD that should be providing this capability. The UK has treaty obligations for search and rescue but this does not have to be delivered as a military capability. Maritime patrol is also a task that could be argued has more to do with border control and law enforcement than a military task.
ISTAR and Others; equipped with an impressive ESM suite, various electro optical sensors and a comprehensive communications fit the MRA4 would be a versatile ISTAR and communications coordination platform, but with the rapid advances in long range high endurance unmanned systems and the Scavenger project likely to include some maritime element many of its capabilities are or will be duplicated elsewhere.
It was the synergy between these 4 broad capability areas that made the Nimrod such a versatile and useful aircraft but it may be that we can resource the requirement in other ways.
Options
The first and depressingly inevitable option is that we never come back from taking a capability holiday, lean on allies like France and Ireland for SAR cover and employ the Merlin and Type 23 in the ASW role, accepting the reduction capability and an increase in risk.
As Future Force 2020 takes some sort of shape over the next decade the main question is should the maritime patrol and anti submarine role be covered by a single aircraft, some combination of manned and unmanned systems or gapped completely.
A second important question is does the SAR/Patrol role need to be covered with a military capability.
We might also look at joint capabilities with NATO allies and in light of our recent bilateral agreements with France on greater military cooperation, however undesirable politically for many, may also be on the cards.
For the overland and expeditionary ISTAR role the Scavenger project may yet result in a suitable system. Using Nimrod to provide full motion video coverage during the early stages of operations in Afghanistan was a short term expedient and has now been replaced by a range of other systems. Accepting that the overland ISTAR and communications relay capability area has been assumed by others the remainder is maritime patrol, search and rescue and anti submarine.
At this point we come to a fork in the road, on one side is the future where the MoD retains responsibility for UK search and rescue and the other is where that requirement it goes off to the magical land of PFI. Given the current state of uncertainty about the helicopter search and rescue and rescue PFI the outlook is unclear. If it does go outside the control of the services then there are many off the shelf options that any winning bidder might use.
Making the assumption that SAR/Patrol remains a military task.
Current cover is provided by C130’s and maybe even an E3 Sentry but despite the undoubted qualities of these two aircraft and the MoD maintaining they are suitable, no one is being fooled and the limited life left in the C130 fleet as A400 comes into service means that whatever happens it is not a long term solution.
In the previous post on manned ISTAR I suggested a possible option would be to reuse the Sentinel airframes and convert them to provide long range high speed SAR. Using an off the shelf radar and EO system fit, removing the DAS and the ASTOR system would allow a decent capability to be generated. A Sentinel based solution would provide credible SAR and maritime patrol capability but there would be downsides, the aircraft is not really optimised for low level searching and beyond locating vessels in distress or providing radio relay capabilities the lack of storage space, an adequate payload bay and under wing pods makes the dropping of any meaningful rescue supplies remains a difficulty.
Although this might seem attractive the capabilities would be relatively limited in almost everything but its prodigious range and also in the previous post I thought converting them into strategic ‘eyes’ by fitting the same Goodrich DB-110 sensor as found on the RAPTOR pod would be a better use of the airframes.
If we want to aim high for the maritime patrol and anti submarine role then there are two obvious contenders, the Boeing P8A Poseidon and Airbus 319MPA. The P8A is just about to come into service and uses a modified 737 airframe; the Airbus product is still in the PowerPoint stage but would at least offer some UK industrial benefits and cockpit commonality with the A330 based FSTA. But the question remains, why invest in these when we have just dumped the MRA4 which is arguably a much better aircraft, and more or less bought and paid for?
If Future Force 2020 were to include a maritime patrol aircraft that did not have the word Nimrod in its title then the lowest risk would be the P8A, it maturing in the same time frame, but it would be very expensive although we would no doubt be able to piggy back on the development path. The low rate production order has only just been placed for 6 aircraft for $1.53billion, or snip at £170m each.
The French have just started an upgrade programme for their Atlantiques and the Avismar programme is looking to supplement these with a long range and fast business jet derivative to replace the existing Nord N262, the Falcon 200 fleet and Falcon 50 maritime surveillance aircraft. It should be noted that funding has yet to be secured but it cannot have escaped the notice of UK and French ministries of defence that there are obvious synergies. Dassault and Thales, who have jointly conducted a mission assessment, are proposing a Falcon 2000 business jet-based option for the mission. The primary mission would be monitoring sea lanes and combating illegal traffic, along with search-and-rescue and medical evacuation. While the system is not primarily intended to attack targets, the Falcon 2000s would be equipped with two weapons stations under each wing.
If the UK and France did pursue some sort of collaborative programme based on a small business jet it would still leave the anti submarine role unfulfilled.
Something more applicable to our modest pockets would be the C295 MPA or ATR72 ASW.
The Airbus Military C295 MPA is a derivative of the well established C295 twin turboprop transport in service with many forces worldwide. The C295 is a stretched version of the C235 which also has a maritime patrol version; notable users include the US Coastguard. For the MPA version changes made from the baseline transport design includes the installation of the fully integrated tactical system mission suite (FITS) configured with four onboard operator stations, sonobuoy dispenser equipment, magnetic anomaly detector boom, defensive systems, 6 under wing hard points and a FLIR sensor turret. Endurance is stated as
One of the great strengths of the C295 MPA is its versatility, the rear cargo door and palletised mission systems allow the same aircraft to be used for a number of roles. Standard 463L pallet compatibility means that in an expeditionary deployment it can carry its own spares or other stores, as an example. The FITS mission system is mature and extremely capable, including search radar, electro-optic / infrared sensors (EO/IR), electronic support measures (ESM) / an electronic intelligence system (ELINT), COMINT, a magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), an IFF interrogator, a SATCOM, a datalink and a Link-11. Endurance is reportedly 11 hours or 6 hours on station at 200nm range.
More or less in the same class as the C295 MPA is the ATR72 ASW which is a more combat oriented derivative of Alenia’s ATR72 maritime patrol aircraft, itself a stretched version of the AT42. The launch customer was Turkey and Italy has also started to purchase them in small numbers.
Endurance is comparable with the C295MPA, 7 hours at 200nm and is equipped with a rotary sonobuoy launcher, magnetic anomaly detector, defensive system, weapon hard points and a full range of sensors and mission equipment. Although they can be converted to carry cargo there is no rear cargo ramp like the C295 which makes them slightly less versatile but the reported cost of the 10 to Turkey was 260 million Euros.
Capital and operating costs of either of these would be significantly lower than the P8A or 319MPA but let’s not be kidding ourselves that they are in the same capability division.
Even if SAR/Patrol is hived off then the justification for a small force of ASW aircraft remains, if only to relieve pressure on the Type 23 and Merlin providing cover for the nuclear deterrent submarines as they enter and leave and a small modicum of long range support for an embarked task group. Going down the cheap and cheerful route allows some skills to be retained even if we accept the very real difference in capabilities between MRA4 and say an ATR72ASW.
Maybe this is a clutching at straws post but the madness of gapping maritime patrol and extended range ASW hasn’t quite sunk in yet.
## Other posts in this series ##
The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction
The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends
The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets
The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement
The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01
The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)
The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)
The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)
The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)
The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)
The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)
The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling
The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport
The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)
The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)
The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)
The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)
The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security
The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary
Something that has been overlooked by many is that the Nimrod was also air refuellable.
Both USN P-3 Orion and P-8 Poseidon cannot be fitted for AAR due to (CFE) treaty stipulations – they would otherwise fall under the strategic bomber and not MPA role.
Many contend that the long endurance (+8 hrs) of MPA aircraft in general must not be extended even further due to crew fatigue, but it is indeed that little extra that gave Nimrod a serious boost in range and thus capabilities (think scaled down Black Buck raids).
I can only hope that in due time the UK will follow the USN BAMS road; a manned MPA coupled with (joint service) HALE UAS like the Q-4 Global/Euro Hawk. This HALE may also be paired with the coming Rivet Joints.
Use C-130j’s for maritime SAR work, option more Merlin for ASW. How often do four Tridents come in and out of port? The threat of ASW warfare has been so diminished the last two decades, that nine Nimrods is just not worth the expense. The option to keep Nimrod, at expensive of what else? Less frigates? Cyprus bases? UAV and ISTAR are the future.
Hi all,
The commonality between Airbus aircraft, parts etc would be very useful. However as i suggested in another post if we accept that we might be working with scraps of the defence budget then buying the C-295mpa in my opinion is best, even better would be if we could afford enough money to buy a squadron or 2 of C-295 for tactical transport/intra-theater lift along side the A400m (which would ease some of the burden on the 22 A400m). 1 squadron of 12 planes would be enough to parachute an entire battalion. (not that we do that sort of thing any more, thank you budget cuts).
although the A319 is as you say a powerpoint aircraft, how long realistically would it take to become an actual asset, i only ask as; They have built, proven and flown the A319 (and are building, hence production lines running now) and they have tested and fitted the FITS in other aircraft. I accept there would be some lead time but with other nations also looking for MPA aircraft if this was ordered, it could open the door and possibily lower costs, seems a good system looking at the bumpf above, and answers above comment with the ability to AAR as well. would be nice not to be tied in with the tech transfer arsecakes that comes with purchasing US equipment.
I think the a319 would be the most sensible option for UK as we are going for a large a/c airbus fleet there is as TMM says sense in keeping all our large aircraft as airbus aircraft such as major airlines tend to do. These aircraft would come off existing production lines with delivery slots unavailable till sometime in 2013 (production is around 38 a/c per month at the min) so we have a little time to get things settled. I think we really need this capability back sooner rather than later.
Sorry chaps this is utter madness. The cost of developing and even building the MRA4 have been spent (as I understand it). It was the £200million operating costs each year that was the problem!!!!
One I cannot believe that any of these third rate alternatives will cost dramatically cheaper, especially when you factor in the purchase costs and the training (something else that was bought paid for and delivered for MRA4). One more thing the MRA4 was British, so that was A) British jobs B)means British tax us paid to the UK exchequer.
No matter what way you look at this, the decision is Wrong and makes no sense… AT ALL
TD said “Maybe this is a clutching at straws post but the madness of gapping maritime patrol and extended range ASW hasn’t quite sunk in yet.”
Surely Nimrod was only used for route surveillance up to the point the V-boat slipped off the continental shelf into the abyss?
x, I think it was used to sweep ahead and more importantly behind to make sure nothing was following
Perhaps the Royal Navy should float the idea of leasing say six Lockheed Vikings from US Navy stocks to provide some interim cover. They would have to be shore based, but would go some way towards plugging the capability gap, and would set the precedent for future MPA being controlled by the Fleet Air Arm; as the RAF clearly has no interest.
If the RAF isn’t interested in airborne ASW then why didnt the FAA put in a bid, whats that, ahh, the sound of silence
I cant see anything coming back this side of 2015 unless something really does hit the fan and we lease some p3′s of the US. After 2015 it depends if we see sense and abandon a coin lead defence posture if not I cant see it coming back in anything other than the less than adequate current work arounds.
TD “If the RAF isn’t interested in airborne ASW then why didnt the FAA put in a bid, whats that, ahh, the sound of silence” Probably because just like the heads of all the services they couldn’t run a bath.
@ TD
That is route surveillance. I was worried that you thought the Nimrod was charging about above 1million square of the oggin detecting everything from Captian Nemo to Stingray.
As for your comment about the FAA well large fixed wing MPA has been the RAF’s responsibility since 1st April 1918. That is why at the beginning of WW2 Coastal Command was equipped with odds and sods.
I wonder how many T23 you could run for £200million per year…
But as I said somewhere else Their Lordships aren’t going to admit their boomers are detectable. So they are just as bad as the Air Marhsalls with their fast jet fetish.
We all loose with this one.
x, we can’t even detect captain bloody birdseye now
@ Think Defence
Do fish fingers have an acoustic signature? Or are you a fish cake man?
those bloody sneaky fish cakes, and don’t get me started on breaded sodding scampi, little buggers
When did we suddenly decide we no longer need the awesome capabilities of the MRA4???
@ TD
http://i225.photobucket.com/albums/dd114/halcyonpoet/1203810101354.jpg
@ Phil D
As I have said it is a question of vested interests and political intrigues probably more than an assessment of security interests of the UK home islands. Admirals who think their submarines can’t be detected. Air marshals who want their Typhoons. And politicians who wouldn’t no the aft end of a frigate from a Chally 2 having to make decisions on “our” behalf. A complete fluster cuck.
Phil :- I think it probably came down to MRA4 losing out to vanity projects in the last minute interservice horse-trading that was going on.
But whatever the reason, this was a terrible mistake.
It’s not a “Nimrod/Merlin/Type 23″ triad – not a triad but a pentad, again you’re ignoring IUSS/SOSUS, perhaps the most important bit if you’re only looking at “defensive” ASW, and submarines, ditto “offensive” ASW.
Don’t get me wrong, I’d much rather have MRA4 than not – as long as it was actually flying, which it hadn’t since March. So it’s debatable whether we’re junking our MPA capability or merely £4bn-worth of useless scrap metal.
But lets play devil’s advocate a bit. Nimrod was probably the least important of the five members of the ASW pentad, at least for “defensive” ASW. It was great for bluewater offensive ASW, nothing like a plane once you’re on the attack against a sub – lots of torpedoes and no way the sub can fight back, unless he has SAMs. But realistically, how much of that will we be doing? Surely in the littoral a Merlin should be close enough to a base – and a Merlin’s dipping sonar will always be more powerful than a battery-powered one thrown out of an airliner.
The persistence is a real asset. The Yanks are going to compensate for the P-8′s crap endurance by giving it a UAV friend called the ACTUV to trail subs while the P-8 goes back to base to refuel (the Boeing 737 not being designed to cruise below 20,000 feet). It’s one of the more fun UAV projects, albeit only in the initial stages, worth a Google. Perhaps the biggest news in the announcement of the P-8 order is that they seem to have backtracked on the decision to delete the MAD on the US P-8′s as a range-increasing move.
As for using a 1950′s airliner as a bomber – what are we realistically talking about, half a dozen Harpoon? That’s less than a T23. 6 subsonic missiles are pretty pointless against anything with a half-decent point defence system; in other words, just about any naval escort of the last 20 years, certainly on the red team. So you’re talking about picking off the odd straggler merchant ship or surveillance ship that’s beyond range of Typhoon – and if it’s out of range of Typhoon, how much of a threat is it anyway?
As for using Nimrod for the next Black Buck – forget it. Aside from the fact that air defences are a bit more sophisticated these days, and the fact that we probably no longer have the tanking capacity to do another Black Buck – why one earth would we do it? Surely long-range surface strike is why we have submarines with Tomahawk?
It’s probably more of a loss for the ISR stuff, but as you say they could be civilianised if really needed.
@x I wonder how many T23 you could run for £200million per year…
13 T23 cost £313.8m “based on the expenditure incurred by the Ministry of Defence in 2009-10, include maintenance, safety certification, military upgrades, manpower, inventory, satellite communication, fuel costs and depreciation”, or £24m/ship. However I suspect that excludes the cost of their bases; I’ve read that only about a third of the £200m/year was the BAE maintenance contract, the rest was running costs for Kinloss.
Dunno how true that is but it makes you wonder that. Perhaps if Des Browne had had the cojones to close Kinloss when the order was reduced to 9 MRA4 then the budgets would have worked out – although it still doesn’t get rid of the nagging feeling that MRA4 still had fundamental problems as of October 2010.
Still – you can look it as 1 MRA4 cost as much as three T23 to buy, with running costs in the same ballpark. Would you cut all our Nimrods, or the majority of our frigates?
Perhaps our new friends in Brazil could supply a number of these ‘refreshed’ airframes for use as CATOBAR capable MPAs. It appears that the Brazilians plan to take ‘stored’ Grumman Trackers and uses them off their carrier. Perhaps the modular kit of a C292 would fit in an refreshed Tracker and could then be operated off our CVFs? Which considering there will only be 12 F35Cs embarked are going to be rather empty even in 2020+
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/clemencauclassaircra/clemencauclassaircra4.html
Okay, silly question I know. But if MRA4 still had serious problems in Oct 2010, why couldn’t the MOD just say so? What’s wrong in telling the bloody truth just once in a while? After all, it’s not like the British Government ever holds anybody to account for failure.
If I remember rightly one of the key deciders used through the SDSR was to look at the capabilities we had now, what could be desribed as essential and what could be desribed as nice to have. Agreed the definition of nice to have was used broadly but the MRA4 came under that catagory in the eyes of the Powers that be.
Could Her Majesty’s Coastguard take over responsibility for all SAR around the UK? They already have some responsibilies and it would clarify things and make it easier to budget.
What is really concerning me is the wolf in sheeps clothing that is the continuous review of defence that is on going. I thought this was initially a ray of hope after the SDSR where mistakes could have been recognised, but now it appears that it is going to be an annual review of what can be cut/delayed/reduced to save money without the high profile of a propoer review. This is probably why the treasury allowed the SDSR to limit cuts to 7.5% as they knew they would get more in the following years.
“As for using Nimrod for the next Black Buck – forget it. Aside from the fact that air defences are a bit more sophisticated these days, and the fact that we probably no longer have the tanking capacity to do another Black Buck – why one earth would we do it? Surely long-range surface strike is why we have submarines with Tomahawk?”
Yes, absolutely. Talking about using MRA4 as a bomber really is clutching at straws. You wouldn’t use it for anything within 800 nm of a friendly base, because that’s Tornado’s combat radius, and Tornado is a much better bomber (because it was designed as a bomber, not as an airliner). You wouldn’t use it for anything within 1400 nm of the sea, because that’s the range of a sub-launched Tomahawk. And you wouldn’t use it for any targets that had any kind of air defence system, because MRA4 isn’t designed to penetrate air defences and it wouldn’t have any SEAD support – if you could reach the target with SEAD Tornados, you’d just use Tornados for the strike itself.
So what does that actually leave? Is there really a critical need for the RAF to be able to attack undefended targets 1500 miles from the nearest coast? Are we planning to bomb Ouagadougou or something?
Just as with the aircraft-less aircraft carriers, we now have a hole in our defence strategy. There are 8 European NATO countries with a direct interest in the North Atlantic or the North Sea. Ideal situation for a joint project. And we have, presumably, a dozen or so avionic sets.
Something that has been overlooked by many is that the Nimrod was also air refuellable.
Both USN P-3 Orion and P-8 Poseidon cannot be fitted for AAR due to (CFE) treaty stipulations – they would otherwise fall under the strategic bomber and not MPA role.
Flight International disagrees.
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/04/26/340955/cutaway-p-8a-poseidon-a-boeing-with-boost-of-bravado.html
“Also hidden most of the time is an aerial refuelling port at the top of the fuselage just aft of the cockpit. Although not required for the mission profile, the navy decided to take advantage of the refuelling modifications that had been developed for the 737-based Wedgetail airborne early warning and control aircraft programme for the Australian defence forces.
Crews will largely learn to operate the aerial refuelling and other systems using simulators purchased from Boeing as part of a plan to achieve a three-to-one ratio of simulator-to-live flying for training and mission simulations, says Jim Reining, the navy’s P-8A integrated test team government flight test director.”
And here’s a photo showing (I think) the refuelling port.
As for the P-3:
http://airrefuelingarchive.wordpress.com/2009/05/10/p-3-orion-refueling/
http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/175048.asp
Rather than just bashing Nimrod again, I would say that C295 sounds like a great option. Flexible, relatively cheap, relatively proven – everything you need. If we once again need to start worrying about sweeping the North Atlantic for large hostile fleets of deep-diving nuclear-powered fast-attack submarines, then maybe something like P-8 will seem worth the money. At present, we don’t.
@ El Sid
Thanks matey I already knew before I asked. I was taking a gentle swipe at the RAF as is my want my wont. I wasn’t really advocating one platform over another.
And well said about the SSN, but we should remember there numbers are slowly shrinking too.
I will front up and say I do have concerns about how effective an MPA is an ASW platform. More on an intuitive level and subjective level. Basically my mind tells me a platform sitting in the water with a big sonar is better than a platform flying above it with little sonar(s.) Especially at the future points to more use of active sonar as submarine technology improves (supposedly.) Yes I know Merlin has a smaller sonar too, but it works in concert with its parent ship. And I think I am right in saying that Merlin’s ASW systems are at least as good Nimrod’s probably better.
Perhaps if Their Lordships had thought about it more the Rivers could have been fitted with a flight deck the same as HMS Clyde. And then when a Vanguard was going out or returning from patrol a River could be in place. A Merlin could be flown up from down south and make use of the River for extending its patrol to cover the Vanguard. Perhaps the duty T23 could have a trip up north to help out too? Its only once every 3 months or so. Just sayin’.
I’ve just found the costs of running Kinloss. In 2009-10, to look after 20-odd Nimrod, they had 1690 personnel costing just over £90m in direct operating costs for the base, excluding depreciation and maintenance contracts for the Nimrods themselves. On the next page they mention the equivalent costs for Lossiemouth, which aren’t that much greater despite running several squadrons of Tornados from there.
Surely it must have crossed Des Browne’s mind that if you’re going to cut the Nimrod fleet to just 9 aircraft, you can’t justify a separate base for them, at a cost of >£10m/year per airframe? Of course, the fact that he was also Scottish Secretary had nothing to do with it. It’s the kind of pork-barrelling that really makes me angry, a blatant waste of other people’s taxes. No wonder our finances our now so screwed.
A good one, El Sid. I will not mention the carrier (guaranteed work) contract; wrong thread for that one.
El Sid,
I think the MPA-as-bomber idea really comes into its own when you think about using them in COIN/LIC, not high-threat conflicts.
A 319MPA with AAR, a shirt-sleeve working environment, and 32 SDBs internally can provide a lot of CAS. The operators inside could use Gorgon Stare pods under wing potentially at a higher framerate because bandwith is less of a problem with a direct connection.
If we’re talking about modular or swing role transports what about this concept?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fairchild_XC-120_Packplane
I first came across it in this post,
http://www.angelfire.com/art/enchanter/att_gunship.html
the relevant part I will copy and paste:
“The Fairchild XC-120 was an experimental adaption of the C-119 transport aircraft using a detachable pod or “pack”.
This is a feature that should be considered for a C-130 replacement. A transporter could release a pod on a theatre airfield and take off again almost immediately. Use of pods would also increase range since the aircraft would be subject to less drag on the return flight.
Several models of pod are possible:-
* The basic pod would have a door/ramp at each end and an underside configured to produce body lift. Landed pods might later be used as pre-fab shelters.
* A tanker pod designed to carry fuel and giving the aircraft capability to act as an in-flight refueling aircraft. A variant of this could be used to carry water for fighting forest fires.
* A gunship pod -holding the weapons and various sensors needed for this role.
* A pod containing rotary launchers for Cruise missiles or free-fall bombs, coverting the transport into a Transport Bomber serving as a missile carrier or carpet bomber.
It is obviously possible to change an aircraft’s configuration just by changing the pod. The airframe without a pod fitted may serve as a bomber for low-intensity conflicts. In fact the entire pod could be replaced by a massive FAE bomb.
Most of the pods mentioned above would have the bottom configured to create aerodynamic lift. Another possibilty is to have the bottom of the pod shaped so that the aircraft becomes a seaplane/amphibian, useful for SAR and ASW missions. This might incorporate some of the features of the Blackburn B 20″.
The modules may or may not work but the concept of a “mothership/load carrier” and “underslung load” appears to be workable.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scaled_Composites_White_Knight
@B.Smitty. Trouble is, 32 bombs is about as many as a whole squadron of Tornados has been dropping in an entire tour of duty in Afghanistan, LIC really does mean LI! Most of the time they’re just firing cannon (which Nimrod can’t do) or doing low fly-pasts (errrm…..)
If you’re wanting a “heavy” for CAS, then in the event of the tooth fairy giving the RAF some money, you’d cut a hole in the side of the C-130′s we’re retiring, fit a 120mm mortar, some guns and maybe some Hellfires, and we have our own version of the Spooky. Would have much better roughfield performance if nothing else, and would certainly increase Terry’s underwear-laundry bill.
“x, we can’t even detect captain bloody birdseye now
”
Thanks, lol cheered me up some!
Looking at the options, both P8 and the A319 are both airliners… I mean, they were designed for hauling tourists, not what the nimrod did and had years to work out the kinks on an airframe operating as such (comet > nimrod and decades of operations). Looking at the options, I’d say the ATR-72 could fit in nicely; engines common with the A400 it seems, plus in truth what we only really need – bare bones stuff – is to protect our shores, sealanes and the boomers, not some wonder airframe that can do thousands of miles and take out shore installations… just something to monitor and take out a sub or ship threatening our resources/trade/subs.
But it is being hopeful, for now we have to accept we have a gap thats gonna put some strain on the Navy.
“Whatever, we need to move on” Amen!
@ El Sid
Comparing costs is interesting. So it seems that land based air isn’t cheap.
To keep the Vanguard boats at sea for a year costs £250m. But I don’t know whether that includes Nimrod air time plus sonobuoys to cover the V-boats coming and going.
When I say isn’t cheap I think I mean more expensive than I would have thought.
I still think scrapping the Nimrod MRA4 was madness.
How would it be a bomber?
The idea came out of the Falklands conflict. How to hit those Argentinian Super Etendard bases & their Exocets?
A Nimrod could fly the long over ocean sector, then launch a Storm Shadow cruise missile to fly the dangerous bit through defended airspace.
No Tornado has the range to do this.
Why not let a submarine launch a Tomahawk instead?
The submarine will need days/weeks/months to get into position.
Nimrod & RN submarines should work together ie. the Nimrod does the first strikes with Storm Shadow, until the submarine arrives with its Tomahawks.
If Nimrod is no more, then the RAF should look to the USAF regional bomber (son of 2018 bomber) to replace the short legged Tornado. The RAF was going to get 50 F-111 in the 1960s. If regional bomber costs are kept down, perhaps we could afford those numbers. A 10% stake for UK industry like the F-35 please. We need to learn to love making things again, or we will always be broke.
For ocean patrol, I think our short bodied C-130J are suitable for conversion to US Coastguard standard. I know ours are hard used, but other nations manage to refurbish old Hercules, so why is it beyond us?
Also Denmark has multi role Challenger business jets with a belly scan radar. They can be VIP transport or ocean patrol. A few Global 5000 based for the RAF perhaps?
El Sid,
According to this,
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/dangerroom/2010/11/31-October-2010-Airpower-Stats.pdf
The US CFACC reported 1,000 weapons were dropped in Oct 2010 over Afghanistan. Don’t know if this included British forces, but seems like business is picking up.
I said this on another post and imho still needs answering.
1. Did the MRA4 perform as required? If not then either Boeing OR BAE are in breach if contract and the Britsh government needs to seek redress through the courts!!!
2. The MoD agreed to a contract (which it amended at least 4 times) that wa so badly written that the contractors could take as long as they wanted, charge as much as they wanted and not deliver anything that could be used.
If either or both of the above is true then we need a public enquiry ASAP!!! As I for one am seriously miffed that £4.1+ million if tax payers money gas been pissed up the wall and us about to be scrapped and probably more wonder has be paid to BAE and others as compensation for what must be the fcukup to end all fcukups!!!!
@x (1.07pm)
but I thought it was worth bringing that T23 number into the discussion for comparison.
Yeah, I knew you knew,
On Nimrod versus Merlin – don’t underestimate Nimrod’s advantages, particularly for bluewater ASW. If you’ve got a faint contact, then 3x the speed of the Merlin is a real advantage in getting to it before you lose it again, and the sheer persistence of Nimrod is a big help again if you’ve got a fleeting contact, a Merlin will probably have to go home again before you regain the contact. Conversely if you’re up against a non-AIP SSK, then the odds are that the Nimrod will still be around when the sub comes up to snorkel. Nimrod has a bigger MAD too.
Don’t knock sonobuoys either – they’re part of the armoury of Merlin and Lynx as well as Nimrod, it’s just that Nimrod has a lot more of them. To get an idea of how they’re used, this is a nice piece written by an ex Orion guy : http://aw1tim.wordpress.com/2010/04/03/asw-on-station-with-the-orion-crew/
Then once you have got a contact, a Nimrod should be able to finish the job in one trip because it can have 9 shots without the sub being able to fight back (unless it has SAMs). That should be enough even for the double-hulled monsters like Oscar. A Lynx only has two Stingrays – given that Stingray isn’t a super-weapon, one of those might miss, one might hit and do damage, but then the Lynx has to go home to rearm. In the meantime, you might lose the contact, and have to start all over again… ACTUV could be interesting in this context, for maintaining the contact whilst the weapons platform goes home to rearm or replace the crew.
So if you’re looking to protect the North Atlantic sea lanes, Nimrod is good, but shepherding the boomers out as far as the edge of the continental shelf can probably be done by IUSS/SOSUS and helicopters.
I’d guess that the £250m/year for the boomers is direct costs attributable to Faslane and Aldermaston, but I don’t know for sure. Not the sort of thing they like to talk about….
Incidentally, here’s some details of the number and distance of Nimrod SAR missions, 1-2 a month and there have been 21 occasions in 5 years that a Nimrod has given assistance to a neighbouring country.
As for “land based air isn’t cheap” – I think the answer is that it could be, it just doesn’t work out that way in BAE/MoD/Des Browne land. If Nimrod was run by Ryanair….
Hmm – I’ve just looked up the numbers for Ryanair (p5). A permanent fleet of 232 stripped-out P-8 Poseidons (sorry, Boeing 737-800) plus an average of 50 leased aircraft – now that’s what I call ruthless commonality! I guess that’s more aircraft than the RAF FJ fleet? Their total costs for the 282 aircraft, including advertising fuel, maintenance, route charges and airport charges was €2,586m in 2009/10 – currently that’s £2,209m, or £7.8m/aircraft. If you just look at staff, fuel, maintenance and airport charges (rough proxy for base costs) it’s €1774m (£1515m) or £5.4m/aircraft. So they could run 9 aircraft for £50m – I know the comparison isn’t exact, but one can’t help thinking wistfully if we’d bought the P-8 and then just paid Ryanair to look after them. Obviously we’d get charged extra for each extra torpedo on board, or to turn on the radar, but still…..
I suspect that Ryanair work their planes rather harder than the Nimrod MR2 fleet’s 290 hours per year (24.2h/month) in 2007-8 (worth noting the Nimrod R1 was the hardest-working of our multi-engine fleet at 470 hours/year, in the run-up to the introduction of Sentinel). Hmm – assume MRA4 did the same, that would be 290 hours x 9 aircraft for £200m/year – I make that £76k/hour. That’s almost double the £42k/hour cost of a Merlin HM1, and people say that helicopters are expensive!
@B.Smitty – trust me, if you look at the RAF Ops updates, you’ll see that we’re doing nothing like that number. Unfortunately in the autumn the reports get a bit vaguer, but earlier in 2010 they give a good feel for what’s actually going on there – you may want to note in particular the summary of II Sqn’s tour – 7 cannon strafes, 5 Paveways and 4 Brimstone in about three months. It’s partly because the RAF are using Reapers more for dropping bombs from what I can tell, although they tend to be vaguer about the UAV force, and we’re not exactly talking 10x more than the Tornado, just a couple more.
@Phil Darley – this Jane’s article talks a bit about the MAA investigation : “Jane’s understands that the flying element of MRA.4 training has been ‘paused’ since March while MAA experts examine the aircraft under the new RTS procedure….An MoD spokesman told Jane’s that “work undertaken to validate the BAE Systems safety case on production-standard aircraft had identified potential safety issues. That issue is being rectified at the moment. The aircraft will not fly again until we are fully satisfied.”
@El Sid so tge MoD will be sueing bae for breech of contract then? So tge tax payer can expect a big chunck back in compensation then!!!
You may wish to look at Parliamentary questions from Angus Robertson MP on the issue. It has been admitted that Hercules has only flown one SAR mission in last three years. It is also not listed as an asset in international treaties. Finally electronics have been pulled out of MR4A, presumably for use on another airframe. Odds on its a lease p3 before purchase of p-8.
http://www.theyworkforyou.com/search/?pid=11189&s=section%3Awrans&pop=1
Surely the truth behind the cancellation lies in Conservative promises to buy more American equipment. Doubtless in 5 years time financial crisis over the Tories will buy the P8. What will be interesting to monitor is donations to the Tories from Boeing subsidiaries in the UK.
Welcome to Think Defence Ben
The mission system from MRA4 is from Boeing
Thanks TD,
RE “The mission system from MRA4 is from Boeing”
- I got that wrong on another thread lately, asserting LM (and synergies in putting them onto refurbed Hercs)
The manned P8 has now got an unmanned companion chosen by the USN.
I will send quite an impressive graphic about what 15 airframes, taking turns, can do for coverage globally. Hopefully TD can post it.
@ El Sid
Your next mission, should you choose to accept it, is to see how much stuff Fed Ex, UPS etc. move in their planes and compare that to Afghanistan air bridge for costs etc.
On the subject of modularity and ruthless commonality couldn’t the mission equipment for aerial ASW be put in shipping containers and loaded on an Atals 3 or 4 times a year?
No need then to buy P3 or refurbish C130J airframes.
This whould both maintain the capability and provide cover over the SSBN deployments.
In the event of the third battle of the Atlantic breaking out all bets would be off – but at least we would have an operational template to build from and not have broken the bank to do it.