I am going to start this post by looking at the history of the Watchkeeper project, the Army’s battlefield UAV system and try and explain why it is different to the RAF’s Predator/Reaper/Scavenger.
Before Watchkeeper
Despite getting a proper caning in the press, the Phoenix UAV did have a notable success in the early stages of the Iraq conflict. However, beyond its brief moment in the sun, it was an unmitigated disaster, hugely over priced and with reliability rates that were frankly, shocking. How it ever got into service is one of the enduring mysteries of defence acquisition. If anything, it told us exactly what we didn’t want. There is a picture (can’t find it at the moment) of a Phoenix UAV going nose first into the ground straight off its launch rail!
In fairness to the Army, the RAF didn’t seem interested in UAV’s and some might be forgiven for thinking that they were having a head in sand moment whilst humming the Battle of Britain March, aircraft without pilots, a bloody outrage!
It is all credit to the Army that they stuck with the concept through much pain and embarrassment. UAV’s have traditionally been used for artillery spotting, observing fall of shot and target assessment; hence the Royal Artillery’s vice like grip on the subject matter.
The first proper UAV in UK service (accepting the vintage Queen Bee’s and MQM57-Falconers) was the Canadair Midge 501 (a UK version of the CL89) which was used in the first Gulf War. The Midge was more or less a recoverable missile that flew a pre planned route and was fitted with an IR linescan camera and traditional optical camera. Launched from a truck mounted rail and recovered by a parachute the Midge was primarily used as a divisional resource to locate the enemy’s artillery so they could be destroyed in a proper big guns artillery duel.
After the Westland Supervisor programme cancellation the requirement for a replacement was created in the early 1980’s as a system to provide a real time, day/night interface, to the Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System (BATES) Phoenix was eventually bought into service in 1999, yes, and nearly 20 years after the requirement was outlined although to be scrupulously fair it entered ‘trials’ in the early nineties.
The system was supposedly named Phoenix because it rose from the ashes of the Medium Range Unmanned Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition System (MRUASTAS) programme. This was to be an unmanned rotary platform from Westland’s but proved to be impossible to bring to an adequate maturity.
Look at the MRUASTAS at this link, perhaps most upsetting is just how forward thinking we used to be.
In 1967 the Westland Helicopter future projects team developed the concept of an unmanned rotorcraft fitted with an electro‐optic sensor to provide the function of battlefield surveillance and target acquisition. The concept envisaged deliberate penetration of hostile air space with a small “semi‐ disposable” aircraft as an alternative to manned systems that were seen as increasingly vulnerable
Westland also submitted a proposal for Phoenix requirement but were unsuccessful.
The fixed wing GEC/BAe Phoenix had Its first operational debut was in Kosovo where 13 of the 27 deployed were lost and despite a spot of face saving by the MoD was widely considered to be a bit of a failure, despite catching the Serbs in the act of flying Mig 21’s that had survived the NATO air campaign out of the airport at Pristina, least said about that the better, we would not want the sky gods to be faced with evidence of a lack of success of the air campaign!
Phoenix was actually more forward looking than many people gave it credit for, bucking the trend for completely integrated air vehicle and sensor payload it consisted of the Air Vehicle Taxi (AVT) and Air Vehicle Pod (APD), with the pod containing the sensor and communications equipment. We might even give it credit for the fast jet targeting pod that was to follow; the thinking was the pod could be upgraded or different payloads developed without expensive integration work on the air vehicle. The payload included a daylight sensor and thermal imager (BAE Systems Thermal Imaging Common Module (TICM II)), both of which could be locked onto a ground location for continuous coverage whilst the taxi was moving. Completing its bag of tricks was a data link into the artillery system, BATES; that could adjust the fall of shot.
Operational use of Phoenix and others nations UAV’s in the Balkans demonstrated their sheer usefulness and utility beyond the artillery spotting mission that had generally characterised similar tactical systems. Much was also learned, the hard way, about operational management and control of UAV’s, especially in a complex air environment with multi nation components.
The UK tried to circumvent the problem of slow authorisation by proposing to use a forward air controller in a Phoenix ground control station to direct Harrier GR7 strikes but the USAF senior leadership in the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) refused to sanction the idea unless a satellite link could be installed to allow the CAOC to view the imagery and give the final authorisation of any strike. Needless to say, we ran out of war before the red tape could be untangled.
Operations in the Balkans also exposed slow and predictable UAV’s to enemy ground and air attack, the Serbs even had some success with flying a helicopter parallel to the airborne system and simply machine gunning them out of the sky, no need for MIG’s and AA missiles as used by the Russians in their spat with Georgia.
Perhaps the biggest lesson learned, apart from their vulnerability to even half competent air defence forces, from operational use of UAV’s in the Balkans was the difficulty of matching a strategic air campaign to what were in effect, tactical assets being used for an operation type for which they were not designed for.
The ‘ownership’ of these tactical UAV’s was never, apparently, challenged.
Have a read here for an analysis of UAV operations in Kosovo.
Despite its relatively poor showing in the Balkans Phoenix was credited by General Brimms (GOC 1(UK) Armoured Division), along with Challenger and Warrior, as being the top 3 war winning assets in the initial stages of the Iraq war, operation TELIC.
The Phoenix provided for the first time situational awareness commanders had not had access to before. We flew in front of the commandos before they went into attack and provided up to date, real time information to commanders on the ground, enabling them to make key decisions before they went into battle and during the battle itself
This despite 23 falling from the sky in the 2 month period.
Phoenix was last flown in 2006 in Iraq and formally left service in 2008.
In a written answer to a Parliamentary question it was confirmed in 2006 that the Phoenix programme had cost £345million, value for money at £1.75m each on a programme basis?
Perhaps the most charitable thing we can say about Phoenix is that when it worked, it was pretty good, it just didn’t work very often.
It was obvious a replacement was needed and as early as 1998 DERA was flying the XRAE1 test UAV, out of this work came the Sender (unit level UAV) and Spectator (formation level UAV) projects. BAe, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Racal were awarded 12 month study contracts. Both sets of requirements were changed and merged and so was Watchkeeper born.
Watchkeeper
In 2002 it was revealed that the following air vehicles were being considered; Hermes 450, Predator, Eagle, Firescout, Shadow 200, Hermes 180, Ranger and Spectre 3. The original Sender and Spectator split was retained.
Two consortia were down selected in 2003 for the Systems Integration Assurance Phase;
Northrop Grumman with General Dynamics, BAE Systems, Ultra Electronics, Detica and STASYS based around the Fire Scout UAV and the RUAG Ranger
Thales-UK with Aerosystems International, Elbit, and QinetiQ, offering the Israeli Hermes 180 and Hermes 450 UAVs
In July 2004 Thales were selected as preferred bidder and contract award was in 2005 with an in service date of 2007. It was also announced that the smaller vehicle would now no longer be part of the programme.
A number of MoD programmes like DABINETT and DII(F) have coincided with Watchkeeper and the UOR deployment of the Hermes 450 and Desert Hawk have considerably moved the programme on. We can complain that it has taken too long and that at nearly a billion pounds for 54 air vehicles is hideously expensive but we should look at what the programme actually consists of.
It is crucially important to understand that whilst the Hermes 450 and Watchkeeper have more or less the same air vehicle they are not the same, far from it.
The additions include;
- Substantial redesign of the existing air vehicle to provide greater payload, structural integrity and ease of maintenance
- Enhancement of EO/IR sensor resolution
- Addition of a SAR/GMTI radar sensor
- Addition of a Laser designator/rangefinder
- Redesign of the undercarriage to allow rough strip operations
- Addition of an Automatic Take-Off and Landing (ATOL) system
- Secure UK datalink and communications infrastructure
- De-icing system for improved survivability and operating envelope
- Integral expeditionary and mobile capability
- Organic training facility
- UK airworthiness qualification and Release to Service for UK training
- UK logistic infrastructure, manufacturing and repair facility
Watchkeeper sets the infrastructure framework for other systems, this is absolutely crucial. The twin sensor will allow one to cross cue the other without requiring a separate airborne system. The data link is encrypted, designed to avoid standing out in the EM spectrum and the engine has additional silencing.
The sensor fit comprises the Elbit/Thales COMPASS and Thales i-Master Ku-band (12.5 to 18 GHz) Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI)/Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) which can operate in the GMTI, spot and strip SAR modes. Having both these in the same air vehicle really does extend the functionality. It can be used to determine patterns of life, a reduction in road use might indicate presence of an IED, analyse moving targets, detect changes in the ground (footprints, tyre tracks) and cross cue the visual sensor for a closer look. There is a problem with this though because SAR works best at altitude and offset from the area of interest for a wide area view, the cross cuing currently in Afghanistan takes place between ASTOR/ASaC and Hermes 450 and takes advantage of the optimal operating conditions for these two different sensor types. As usual, trade-offs have to be considered.
The ground control station is fitted into a 20ft ISO container, moved by any DROPS/EPLS vehicle (happy days) and can control three air vehicles.
We sometimes complain about wanting an 80% system but Watchkeeper is a great example of the flip side of that argument. After several decades continuous experience it is finally looking like the technology and operating concepts will have matured and converged to finally deliver on the promise.
To put a cherry on the icing on the cake, Watchkeeper is looking like it will deliver more or less on time and cost, although digging deeper it is obvious that this isn’t quite the case. The 2010 NAO Major Projects Report shows an in service date of 2011. Initial estimates put a cost of £860 million, the main investment decision approved a cost of £907m and the estimated final cost will be £889m.
First flight was in April 2010 and it is expected to be deployed to Afghanistan sometime this year.
So all in the garden is rosy?
Unlike Phoenix the Hermes 450 derived Watchkeeper UAV will require a runway, even though it has been fitted with a more robust undercarriage and tested on non runway surfaces I don’t think it is likely to be deployed from any location other than a fairly stable air operations area. Its range and endurance is such that there is not really a pressing need for it to be operated from austere locations. The logistics, bandwidth, maintenance, airframe stress and other requirements mean that the preferred operating location will be exactly the same airfield that is operating other aircraft and UAV’s.
Robonic do have a launch rail system that has been tested with the Hermes 450 but Watchkeeper will not include one. Given pressure on runway space this might be a useful addition but this also fails to take into account the very fact that extreme endurance means that systems can simply be flown in from distance, of course you might need a few more airframes in the air but what you lose on the roundabout you gain on the swing. Even with tactical systems like Watchkeeper, with satellite control, they can be programmed to fly in on a route and control picked up closer to the area of operations by the ground control station.
In a nod to my container fetish, they can even be fitted into a 20ft ISO container!
The airframe has been loaded with extras so expansion potential is likely to be limited and although there remains an aspiration to fit it with SIGINT and weapon payloads the effect on performance may preclude this. With increased weight comes increased fuel burn and decreased endurance.
Ownership remains an issue, although the Royal Artillery has a tremendous amount of experience in the operational use of UAV’s the likely training to allow operation in non segregated airspace means yet another expensive pilot (or equivalent) training pipeline.
By keeping it as an Army system it has discouraged interoperability, there are no plans for maritime use for example. It is defined as Brigade or battlegroup asset and therefore will not be able to be retasked or stolen for theatre level priorities; this is understandable but hardly an efficient use of resources and is yet another stovepipe.
Arguably, the best part of Watchkeeper is not the air vehicle but the sensors, their back office integration and the ground component.
A number of Hermes 450 have been leased for use in Afghanistan where they now provide the bulk of full motion video for UK forces, these will be phased out as Watchkeeper comes into service this year.
Scavenger
After steadfastly refusing to see the benefits of UAV’s the RAF has joined the party late with the UOR purchase of a small number of General Atomics Reaper’s, operated by 39 Squadron. These have proven to be very useful and numbers have been recently increased, or at least ordered. Reaper is a high performance system with a similar type of sensor fit (EO/SAR) to Watchkeeper but encased in a larger airframe. It can fly for longer, faster and at a greater altitude. Its satellite communication system means that it is not reliant on in theatre communication resources so can be operated at distance. Finally, its party piece is a large weapon fit. This combination means the predator has value as both a strategic and tactical system. There is no reason it cannot carry out the battlefield missions of Watchkeeper equally as well a deep and persistent intelligence gathering or attacking targets in support of special-forces.
Because we are using the Reapers on US infrastructure this is a situation that cannot endure if we are to have any sovereign autonomy.
The MoD has been ‘looking’ at the requirement for a while now and working with industry on a number of projects like JEUP and various demonstrators. The Herti system had a useful deployment to Afghanistan in 2007 under the joint BAe/RAF Project Morrigan to demonstrate its autonomous flight control and image collection systems. When the RAF’s Future Offensive Air System (FOAS) was cancelled it was replaced with the strategic unmanned air vehicle (experiment) SUAV(E) programme in 2005, this is a more combat UCAV oriented programme with the Taranis being part of its output and a joint collaboration with the US on a UCAS system.
Scavenger is part of the wider DABINETT/SOLOMON programme and the requirement is described this;
Inaccessible loitering intelligence collection from difficult and distant locations. SCAVENGER will fill significant gaps in the UK’s strategic and theatre collection capabilities, using a mix of UAVs, standalone sensors and potentially Low Earth Orbit satellites.
UK has collection gaps which need to be filled if we are to gather all the intelligence we need.
It is thought that a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAV in the Reaper class will form a key component of Scavenger.
Scavenger is intended to provide sovereign capability but it has also been reported that we are considering the Reaper and its stealthy follow on, the Avenger, which has also been proposed as a maritime variant, the Sea Avenger. The Avenger will also have the same electro optical system as the F35, the much vaunted EOTS which dispenses with turrets and distributes the sensor throughout the airframe.
The BAe Mantis demonstrator recently completed a successful Spiral 1 flight test programme in Australia. Spiral 2 will likely integrate a range of Selex sensors and UK weapons. The Mantis air vehicle is relatively large, 22m wingspan, powered by a pair of Rolls Royce RB250B-17 engines (better for resilience) developing 450shp each which compares well with the 900shp single engine in the Reaper. Performance targets for a production version include a 24-36 hour duration, high operating altitude and a weapons payload of approximately 3,000kg or 12 Brimstone/6 Paveway IV on 6 wing hard points. Other payloads might include ECM, SIGINT, comms relay or even the RAPTOR pod.
With the recent Anglo/French defence cooperation agreement the Scavenger requirement is looking like it aligns perfectly with the similar French requirement, although the French may obtain a small number of Reapers as gap fillers. In a recent report from the French National Assembly the desire for increased funding for MALE UAS was laid out including a commitment to the technology and the classification of it as a strategic capability that should not be obtained from outside the EU.
The report acknowledges that because of funding issues the programme will have to be a collaborative one and suggests that the BAe Mantis might be the sensible choice with Thales and Dassault providing the payload and integration respectively, this is building on the greater collaboration on ISR announced in November 2009. Italy, Germany and Spain would likely be interested in joining any collaborative venture but only if EADS could be involved and therein lies the problem. EADS has a competing development called Talarion but this is at a much less advanced stage than Mantis and would no doubt be a riskier proposition i.e. more costly, however much snootily dismissive of Mantis EADS appear.
What started out as a possible joint venture could easily get wrapped up in European defence politics and likely morph into a multinational programme like the Typhoon or A400. No doubt it would be a fine system but it would be 10 years late, several billions over budget and not likely to be exportable because the Israelis and Americans had dominated the market.
It is interesting to note the rapid progress the MoD and BAe have made in unmanned systems development and contrast that with other European nations. The MoD and BAe have created a number of de risking programmes, getting on with the job quietly and competently. Mantis is the culmination of these to date and has cost very little in comparison, a limited set of deliverables, moderate aspirations and a low risk technology approach yielding significant results.
The MoD and BAe have valuable experience and a tangible lead over our European competitors in this area now.
We must not squander it and concentrate on fielding Mantis to provide the UK with a system that is independent of US infrastructure and easily exported, meeting the Scavenger requirement. There is a large future market for MALE UAS so let’s make sure the UK gets back into the weapons exporting business by not farting around for the next ten years deciding who is going to make the wings.
As a minimum, given our new found friendship with the French, a joint effort might be worth exploring but please please please, let’s not involve uncle Tom Cobbley and all. This would also exploit the replacement for the Skynet satellite PFI that is looking like it will also be managed on an Anglo French basis.
Scavenger envisions an in service date between 2015 and 2018.
Issues
There is far too much duplication which we can ill afford but plans are advanced, with Watchkeeper about to drag itself into service so it would be foolish to discard that. Service rivalry means that the Army wants to wrap its arms around Watchkeeper so that it won’t be used by anything other than an Army command and the Royal Artillery sees it is the key to its survival.
Scavenger seems to be dead set on creating a system that has more or less the same set of sensor capabilities as Watchkeeper but will be armed and able to operate much deeper but even given that, how likely is it that it will be looking at the same patches of ground?
Scavenger does not at the minute have a maritime version, given the potential for extending the ISTAR horizon and even having a future role in airborne early warning for a deployed task group.
We have Sentinel/Astor, Watchkeeper, Reaper and the Sea King ASaC’s all providing Synthetic Aperture Radar coverage for ground forces in Afghanistan. I suspect this was one of the reasons for withdrawing Sentinel, the fact that Watchkeeper, a future Scavenger and even the F35 will be able to provide similar service but I will come on to that in another post.
UAV operating costs are not the low cost panacea many think and despite being touted as low risk because of not risking aircrew, if one goes down we tend to launch ground patrols to recover it or some other form of intervention to deny it to enemy forces.
UAV loss rates continue to be a serious challenge and the presence of them signals to all that there is an operation ongoing.
The explosion of data has left analysis and dissemination systems flailing behind.
A Few Ideas
Project DABINETT/SOLOMON is often talked about as being the highest priority but this never seems to translate to reality or adequate funding, the higher profile projects always seem to attract more funding. This has to stop, if we cannot rapidly assess and disseminate useful information as opposed to masses of data then everything else is wasted. Watchkeeper has actually made great strides in this area and a strong case could be made for extended this to ensure that other systems can easily snap into the infrastructure, using common ground control stations and connectivity for example.
The first suggestion would simply be to match the talk about SOLOMON/DABINETT with action and build a fit for purpose ISTAR back office. The US is also doing some interesting work around the dissemination of their wide area ‘Gorgon Stare’ product which pushes the product out without hoarding and over analysis and this might also be a an exciting avenue to explore. If this means fewer F35’s and UCAV’s then so be it.
The second suggestion would be ensure that any MALE UAV that comes out of the Scavenger can fit seamlessly into the Watchkeeper infrastructure, no more service centric stovepipes please.
This brings us neatly on to why the majority of this post about the RAF has been discussing an Army system. With my overall suggestion of bringing all airborne assets except micro and tactical UAV’s into RAF control so would Watchkeeper. There is no practical reason why the RAF should and could not provide ISTAR for a sustained Brigade sized deployment or multiple interventions at a smaller scale. The earlier suggestion of expanding the self contained RAF expeditionary force would include the Watchkeeper aerial vehicle. Because it will more often than not operate from the same airhead as other RAF units putting all airborne assets into a single management structure simply reflects the reality of combined operations. As I mentioned earlier, the jewel in the Watchkeeper crown is not the air vehicle but the infrastructure and sensor integration.
The third suggestion is to absorb the Watchkeeper infrastructure into the RAF ISTAR/Expeditionary function to absolutely ensure maximisation of all airborne ISTAR investment, eliminate duplication and create a coherent capability.
Fourth, there exists a great deal of export potential for a twin engine, civil airspace certified, autonomous H/MALE UAV in the Mantis mould, but the window of opportunity will not be there forever. Israeli and US competition will dominate unless we can create a credible alternative in the next 4-6 years. The death knell for this timescale will be if we indulge in the usual European collaborative programme. A joint development with the French may be feasible and indeed advantageous but if history tells us anything it that two’s company, threes a crowd. Let’s keep things achievable and make sure we don’t get too ambitious, creating a product with the success of the Jaguar.
Fifth, the production Mantis should be capable of being deployed from CVF. Although the long range and endurance might actually make this less useful than one might think it is still an important and valuable capability. However, this should not be a core programme requirement and developed as a spiral, outside of the main development path. This means provision should be made in the basic design, strengthening etc, that will avoid the need for an expensive redesign but not fully developed or on the critical path for introduction to service. Fitted for but not with is a god way to describe this.
Sixth, let’s not fall too head over heels in love with UAV’s because the loss rates, operation in civilian airspace, all weather operation and cost arguments often favour manned platforms. I am going to look at manned platforms in the next post and although we might make the assumption that the long term future is unmanned, the short and medium term is characterised by a strong case for manned platforms.
Seventh, in the medium to long term, is the Hermes derived WK450 necessarily the best platform for the Watchkeeper tactical requirement? Given its limited growth potential, limited weapons capability and likely tethering to an existing theatre entry airhead in most operations these limitations might hamper its usefulness and duplicate capabilities. Would it be better to use a Mantis type vehicle for both the deep and tactical roles and why does the Army need its ‘own’ airborne ISTAR resources?
Eight, what is the correct number of Scavenger platforms, in terms of usefulness to joint operations I would suggest they are likely to be tasked more often than F35’s which means they should be available for sustained operations at strength.
Ninth, what about the ultra long range endurance and very high altitude systems, would a satellite or Global Hawk type platform be best suited, can we even afford or need such a capability?
## Other posts in this series ##
The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction
The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends
The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets
The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement
The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01
The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)
The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)
The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)
The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)
The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)
The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)
The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling
The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport
The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)
The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)
The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)
The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)
The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security
The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary
Great post TD, Liam Fox is meeting with his French counterpart on the 13th and ISTAR is one of the topics they will be discussing, hopefully a joint UK/French development of Scavenger will be on the cards.
with ref to long endurance/high altitude lets sit back and watch the US effort, seeing as a lot of it is being developed here in the UK (it’s an airship being built in bedford) I believe the american company have set up shop in the UK for the sensor fit.
i second Tubbys remarks. I think it is right to focus on the back room information distribution there ain’t much point in collecting info if it doesn’t get to the people who need it. Hopefully the Watchkeeper system will include lessons learned from recent operations.
Watchkeeper is 20Hr endurance system therefore for pure intelligence gathers there is far to much commonality with reaper or indeed mantis we do not need both air vehicles. In my view the army picked the wrong air vehicle. Appears to have a good ground system I would make this the UK standard and make sure mantis is integrate able with this network I would stop the use of the hermes vehicle and concentrate on mantis.
I agree we should develop mantis further and it becomes the UK standard brigade up level UAV system for afghan type operations. As you say time is short to field this capability I would lay done strict demands on the French you can develop sensors or airframe components but final assemble is in the UK airbus set-up but in reverse. I would not yet consider the use of any uav of a carrier for a number of reasons.
Indeed UAVs are only part of the answer they should suppliant additional manned assets NOT replace them. We have had UAVs crash into helicopters while airborne in afghan and it has been by shear luck no one has yet been killed. We should prob do with at least 4 24hrs constant orbits per deployed brigade so air vehicles would be procured accordingly. Troop numbers armoured vehicles and F35 number should be reduced to increase ISTAR funding greame lambs piece prior to sdsr was quite informative in this area.
These should be operated in a full joint unit between army and RAF like the Astor was/is so I agree with TD. Maybe even a joint command formed in the same way as the SF operate outside of normal service structure these are national assets.
I would go for micro sats for the ultra long range capability with a manned aircraft element in this area they are considerable more capable and deployable that UAVs and should incorporate MP.
This “Maybe even a joint command formed in the same way as the SF operate outside of normal service structure these are national assets” sounds good to me
good post admin.
I have no problem with RAF “taking over” the Watchkeeper, as I really can’t fathom why the Army chose a 20hr endurance UAV of that size, that requires a bloody runway ! Oh yes, of course, because when it chose it, the fast jet mafia were not interested……. !
Seriously, all that talk of stove pipes is possibly appropriate due to Watchkeepers size and complexity, however the Army absolutely should have its own UAV’s for Brigade / Battalion level operations – I think we discussed it last year during the pre-SDSR discussions about Recce regiments.
If your in a fire fight and the bad guys are dropping 152mm on your head, its a good thing to have immediate local control of your own assets, rather than passing a priority request up the “joint” chain of command to be put into the priority queue.
Otherwise, of course a joint intelligence information distribution system is a good idea; in fact we have them already, but in a rather limited form, and of course not able to disseminate the very large files, or the streaming of all that full motion video !
You can either say like the chinese that time is circular, or that the same s*it keeps happending because people never learn.
This UAV army /Airforce lark (on both sides of the pond) is almost entirely because, just like with the helicopter in the 50′s; the Airforce thought there was little in it, untill it started to work, and there was money an cudos in it, then naturaly the only people who could possible be trusted to run them must have wings on their uniforms, and in the UK wear light blue.
Sorry to be so cynicle, but really.
I have to agree with Jed
Memo to Royal Artillery – call Boeing and ask about the ScanEagle ! Mature (6th year of operational use) new D version has 20 hour plus endurance and digital datalink (with 100kms range) and its catapult launched and does not need a runway, so for Brigade level targeting of assigned AS90 batteries, or even MLRS, it should do just fine
Note to Jed, your spot on. This is a great article. I have even stolen a portion and linked back here…
http://www.suasnews.com/2011/01/3352/the-raf-and-uas/
Should it not be about who is operating the UAS, but how the data is being spread around?
We can’t be too far away from having more complete wide screen views of large areas that can be interrogated in multiple ways?
Is the Gorgon stare option not really trusted??
There are many sUAS rolling into service around the world, for hand held soldier operations.
Its probably worth buying a crate of each and sending them straight out into service to get real feedback.
But Jed hit my favourite, the ScanEagle and Integrator are well proven systems indeed.
Hi Gary and welcome to Think Defence, in an ideal world yes, it should be about the information rather than who operates them but this is a series of posts about how we can absolutely maximise utility and absolutely ruthlessly drive down costs. Even though the UK is better than most, we still have far too much duplication and it has to stop. As Jed points out, the Army putting its arms around Watchkeeper because it doesn’t want sub units waiting for product, that is fine but this approach is simply looking at a quick fix, not addressing the root cause of the issue.
I can see the need for organic company/platoon level tactical systems and we have Desert Hawk III in service, also, Watchkeeper was intended to have a smaller system, the Hermes 180, but this was deleted on cost grounds.
Scaneagle would be great because it would be useful as a Desert Hawk replacement and also able to operate from ships, the RN has been notably absent from the whole UAV business of late although it did trial Scan Eagle some time ago and plans for the Type 26 look as if they have made provision for a FireScout type system
Hi Jed @ 11:56,
RE ” in fact we have them already, but in a rather limited form, and of course not able to disseminate the very large files, or the streaming of all that full motion video !”
- I am not quite aware what we have
- Over the weekend I read a detailed review that tried to answer the question what on earth USMC gained by re-manufacturing old Cobras into Zulus; the answer was mainly two-fold:
1. There is an 80% component commonality between their UH and AH (counts for more than the Apache having more range and payload, and is only inferior on speed)
2. For this discussion thread the most important thing is that they have implemented a link so that a Zulu flying over the same area as a USMC Harrier, other fast jet,or (any??, or just USMC)drone can view streaming video captured by another platform
So commonality in components, links … still within a stove pipe, but a big one as the USMC is by far bigger than the UK forces combined
Hi TD,
RE “the RN has been notably absent from the whole UAV business of late although it did trial Scan Eagle some time ago and plans for the Type 26 look as if they have made provision for a FireScout type system”
- has there been anything concrete on the Scan Eagle side since March 2005 (in the trials bad weather forced both land -based launch and recovery, instead of the intended operating from the HMS Sutherland)?
- commonality in the flying platform over land and sea would be great, but the layers in the process, following after the acquisition platform? E.g. land-based recce is being re-equipped (FRES, at least the specs even if manufacturing might go slow to preserve cash)and will be critically dependent on these (and future)airborne platforms
ACC – I don’t want to go into details, due to opsec, but be assured, we are not so stone age that we don’t have intelligence dissemination systems on our military networks. The point being, that there were never designed to shuffle very large amounts of high res images, or streaming video to and from image analysts / int analysts / commanders in the field. So perhaps we should agree that the RAF ‘operates’ any air vehicle that needs a runway based infrastructure, and that the Army (Intelligence Corps) ‘owns’ the overall system, operationally controls its deployment and manages the “product” ? Either that or my whimsical fantasy “Joint Information Operations Command”
Just a thought, as I note TD has published my article on Sea Power and there are some comments reviving the Nimrod Insanity thread – perhaps the first use for twin engine, high flying, all weather (?) BAe Mantis should be maritime surveillance ? Obviously it can’t do ASW, but it can do surface search and could be used in SAR support.
The watchkeeper being on time and on target was a genuine shocker for me! Finally it seems a defence procurement is going well. Although when the time comes for the drawdown from Afghan, will it remain or follow the path of the Sentinel et al?
“We have Sentinel/Astor, Watchkeeper, Reaper and the Sea King ASaC’s all providing Synthetic Aperture Radar coverage for ground forces in Afghanistan. I suspect this was one of the reasons for withdrawing Sentinel”
Suddenly it seems the sentinel withdrawl makes a bit of sense when you put it that way; but I am just saddened at all that platform has achieved and value is to go… it’d be interesting on the costs and value we getting from the Shadow R1′s. Also, the ArmyAC Islander Defenders…a few new airframes have joined the others, but am I right in saying that are only for homeland security? And watching for terror alets? O.o Like Northolts examples?
I think the issue of which force should ‘own’ or ‘operate’it is at loggerheads; I think the Army should hang on to the smaller, light aircraft that watchkeeper is with closer co-op with the RAF if operating from the same airstrip and the RAF remain focused on the heavier, faster and weapons handeling of the larger systems we have/are getting like Predator and Reaper due to the bigger logistics and operating procedures etc. Perhaps an Army Co-op squadron? The AAC springs to mind too… the days of its use to soley the RArtillery is gone now, the UAV emcompasses almost everything the Army does; but wouldn’t shifting it to another service or unit out a spanner into the finely tuned operations and logistics machine?
Finally, you mention Naval use of UAV’s; I would like to see examples of that rather quiet area of naval aviation…internationally even. Like Jed said; I’d also fill a gap we created.
Good post TD ^^
I did not know Westland in the early 1960′s was thinking of something that NGrumman produced decades later!
Isn’t Sentinel/Astor to be phased out due to the SDSR by 2014? So not much duplication of capablities.
Does anyone have any details of the pilots (if that’s the right word). I would bet the RA Watchkeeper pilot is a gunner or lance corporal who’s only flying experience is on the play station. While the RAF Reaper pilot is just that have cost xx millions to train.
On another track I believe the RA got into the UAV market as targets for Rapier / Blowpipe and Machine gun air defence. I can remember happily shooting off 100s of rounds at this small model plane in the 80s.
Jimsw
As far as im aware in order to allow any UAV to operate in controlled airspace there must be a fully qualified pilot in the control area. This is one of the many problems with getting these aircraft cleared for use.
To replace the Sentinel capability at the minute would only be possible by use of a global hawk uav if an unmanned option was required.
Congratulations on your well researched article – have you thought about offering your services to the media (who in my opinion are the key to your agenda of “wish[ing] defence to go much higher up the UK national agenda”). For your content I would give you about 80%.
Here are some pointers that I think you have overlooked:
1. Proposed use of LEO satellites. In my opinion they are easy prey to current fielded ASAT capabilities, they are not stationary over the area of interest plus are harder to track, you need more satellite vehicles than GEO to give TOTAL coverage of the world and that altitude is becoming more cluttered – but they are cheap per unit cost, but you get what you pay for!
2. You speak of US infrastructure for the use of General Atomics RPAs (UAVs are so passe!!). Have a look at (http://www.l-3com.com/products-services/docoutput.aspx?id=1238) and you will see that commercial bandwidth is used for the L3 KuSDL in the Predator series – they use INTELSAT or PANAMSAT. However in the link it says it uses “bent pipe” transponders that are common on most commercial sats – so EUTELSAT or even future SKYNET with Ku could be used. Therefore, it is wholly reliant on US infrastructure.
3. Operational Sovereignty is mentioned in many places, but no mention is made of the “globalisation” of the western tech marketplace. The article mentions the UK sovereign datalink for Watchkeeper – did you know that the datalink is designed by CUBIC (which is a US company subject to ITAR) and then Ultra Electronics have a TAA to produce it? (see http://www.cubic.com/corp1/pdf/9916_data_links.pdf and http://www.ultra-cis.com/resourses/WK%20-%20press%20release%2021%20Jul%2010.pdf). Hardly sovereign is it? If the US withold the tech then we won’t get any spares just like the Iranians have experienced with their F-5 and F-14 aircraft.
4. BAES Mantis and EADS Talerion have different design philosophies. Mantis is “quick build something and fly it” – great PR but look at the length of take off roll in your clip and you can see without weapons it is underpowered (with weapons it would be as underpowered as your suggested Jaguar comparison!!). Furthermore, Mantis has not demonstrated any beyond line of sight capability or any sensor systems – ie. pretty immature. Talerion is a “paper aeroplane” – mock up aircraft and lots of CAD drawings. However, they are designing a system and have lots of experience with satellites thanks to EADS Astrium and they have proven the datalinks and control cabins in test flights with their Barracuda in Goose Bay. However, I do agree there is room for just ONE large MALE/HALE RPAS manufacturer in Europe.
5. The UK has bought 10 or so Reaper plus about a half a dozen Ground Control Stations (GCS). The Avenger is compatible with these GCS; so why junk them when Reaper is out of hours for replacement by Scavenger? Surely buying COTS and using already purchased GCS and infrastructure makes economic sense – maybe the clue is in the name scAVENGER?!!
6. Your revelation of 54 Watchkeepr for about £900M makes them about £16M each – you could buy a lot of King Air 350s for that money (about 2:1). A fleet of 54 King Airs with EO/IR turrets and other sensors is a very cheap alternative (half price!). £16M for a Watchkeeper is a LOT of money!!!
Anyway, keep provoking the debate as it’s good to kill off a few of the myths surrounding UAS/RPAS.
Regards
iSTAR
BTW – Watchkeeper is NOT on time or budget!
Technically it is £200M over budget and at least 1 year late – http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/vo050720/wmstext/50720m02.htm
Knowing bog all about UAV’s I don’t feel qualified to really comment on this so I will limit myself to one observation; Did the MANTIS designers set out to build an airframe to provide the biggest possible radar signature or was it just lucky coincidence?
Hi,
I also agree with “However, I do agree there is room for just ONE” European manufacturer of the heavier RPA types; Not following the Eurovision song contest or football definitions here, as they take Israel into Europe!
UK has 5 military types in use or on order, and the spreading out in the number of types (and user organisations within the military) is not dissimilar in comparable countries (according to UVS International, snapshot as per late last year):
Light UAS UAS Total
Finland 1 1 2
France 2 3 5
Germany 1 2 + 2* 5
Greece 1 1
Italy 1 3 4
Sweden 1 1
Switzerland 1 1
USA 18 14 32
One might say that experimentation has its role, but in Afghanistan alone, according to the same source, all these types have been operationally deployed:
Australia Scan Eagle
Canada Sperwer SkyLark
Heron ScanEagle
France Harfung DRAC
Skorpio Sperwer
KZO Germany Aladin
LUNA
Predator A Italy
Netherlands Aladin SkyLark
Sperwer
U.A.E. In-country-built UAS
Desert Hawk UK
Hermes 450
Herti
Predator B
USA Dragon Eye
Global Hawk
Pointer
Predator A & B
Raven Reaper
Shadow 20
I put my hope in EADS already being, at least to some degree, pan-European in its orientation and BAE & Dassault getting some firm guidance from their initial customers (ref: Franco-British defence co-operation agreement)
TD
An interesting article with a good overview of the growth and evolution of Army Tactical UAVs, which as you note dates back to the 1960’s – you can now see why the RA have UAVs and how through time and experience they continue to successfully employ the capability today on operations. Don’t knock Phoenix too much, it was a key capability to allow UK UAV evolution and some might say it was ahead of its time. The use of Phoenix in the Balkans and then in Iraq allowed the conceptual development of UAV use beyond target acquisition and more to deliver an ISTAR effect – hence we saw the generation of a sole Army UAV Regiment dedicated to the professional growth of this capability.
Army vs RAF – I am not so sure there is a real battle of owner ship that some might think. It is very clear that the Army require organic ISTAR, UAVs provide part of the overall tactical ISTAR mix to meet the ground commanders information requirements and allow him to fight intelligence led operations. If you don’t own it , you cannot guarantee an assured availability or be in the position to meet information requirements in a timely manner (cross service chains of command can defeat responsiveness and appropriate force allocation). Are we really in the position of growing the RAF after SDSR service cuts to take on Watchkeeper when the Army already has experienced and competent personnel, a regulated operating framework , training and structures all in place to field both a Tactical (H450 and Watchkeeper) and Mini (DH3) UAV capability? – I don’t think so.
A Layered Approach – Not one UAV will meet all the commanders information requirements at each level of command. A DH3 is an excellent system for the Coy or patrol base but will not provide the persistence and coverage for the component commander. A Reaper may support the Coy but will not be in sufficient numbers to support all the Coys, BGs, Div and component commanders due to limited platform numbers/task lines as a result of cost. Therefore, you need a layered approach that satisfy’s each level of commands information requirements with an appropriate cost effective capability– MALE at the component HQ/national tasks (Scavenger) – TUAV at Div/Bde/BG (Watchkeeper) – Mini (DH3)BG/Coy – Micro – Coy/Pl – Nano (Pl/Sects).
Watchkeeper – This is a system that has the ability to collect, process and disseminates the product to the commander using tactical data networks in a timely fashion – it is more than just an AV and of couse the cost of the system is more than 54 AVs! The capability that Watckeeper provides is actually cost effective if compared to other manned platforms. The beauty of Watchkeeper is that it is a truly tactical system, it can be packed in a truck and transported anywhere in the world and operate from either an existing airfield or a tactical rough strip without any requirement for fixed infrastructure or a huge logistic tail. This in turns creates increased mobility and responsiveness. Yes, it is a large tactical platform, but that provides persistence, range and coverage with multiple sensors and increased capability (cost effectiveness on one platform) – exactly what the land component commander wants! TD are wrong that Watchkeeper has limited growth potential, far from it, just ask Thales about there through life capability enhancement options. Also, this will be the first fielded AV that has an accredited safety case the same as a small manned passenger aircraft, this in turn allows the first steps to flying in non-segregated airspace over populated areas – look at the recent Airspace Change to allow Watchkeeper to fly outside of Salisbury Plain.
Pilots – It is all about training individuals to meet the requirements of the system and mandated regulatory requirements. H450 and Watchkeeper are very autonomous systems and do not require the same skill sets that a manned platform needs (including Reaper!). However, the operators still complete a long and demanding training course to be qualified and competent – ie fit for purpose (over 30,000 operational H450 flying hours in complex Afgan airspace proves that!). The argument that you need a fully trained manned aircraft pilot to fly outside of segregated airspace does not wash with UAVs, you are still lacking the ability to carry out visual flying and therefore react to other aircraft unexpected manoeuvre. In time and with technology advancement (eg. sense and avoid, UAV TCAS etc..) this will become easier and pilot training requirements are expected to adjust accordingly.
Hi Abderus, welcome to TD and thanks for your comments
Phoenix, I tried to show it in as much a positive light as I could but we also have to look at the value for money aspect. I know it allowed us to learn and I did make the point that it was more forward looking, in divorcing payload from air vehicle for example, than many give it credit for. It was a shocking money pit though.
Ownership, The RA or Army don’t get enough credit for sticking with UAV’s and have more experience over a longer period than almost anyone else but that does not mean its a situation that should continue. One of the threads that runs through my posts is the need to sweep aside convention if we can squeeze better value for money, reduce duplication and improve coherence across the lines of development. I don’t think the RAF would actually like WK either and I agree there is no appetite to do it but i like to mix things up and present the off radical idea just to get the comments going. The notion that unless you own it you cannot assure availability has to be challenged I am afraid, does the Army have its own CAS or SH elements for example, does the RN have its own comms satellite? We need to tackle the root causes of any availability or responsiveness issues, not resign ourselves and come up with a work around. WK is exactly that, a workaround for the lack of engagement by the RAF. DH3 and below as an organic asset is fair enough and that might sound contradictory but the operational issues are completely different so the benefits would not outweigh the disadvantages
Layered Approach, couldn’t agree more, but not sure I agree with distinctions. Do the old distinctions between theatre, div, bde,bg dividing lines still hold true in our SDSR new era?
Watchkeeper,I was at pains to point out that WK450 is actually a small part of the WK project but i am not sure if UAV’s still have the edge in terms of cost effectiveness over manned platforms, the jury still seems to be out on that but the US and UK investing in various manned platforms would indicate the argument isn’t in the UAV camp just yet. manned platforms is by next post on the subject by the way. I might be wrong about growth but I remain to be convinced that plans will match reality without serious performance penalty. Wasn’t the airspace change pretty limited though?
Pilots, isn’t H450 being operated by civvy contractors?
As we are dispensing with so many manned assets to be replaced by the scavenger uav I have one area of issue to raise. After the 7/7 incident in london a nimrod was deployed over the capital which uav would take its place post 2015 if such an incident happened again?
Which type of Nimrod would that be then?
Does it matter, aren’t they all the same!
May be a bit of interest to some,
http://twit.tv/floss148
New Hydrogen powered UAV.
http://www.gizmag.com/go/4224/
Whoops. Wrong link.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10617075
TD
“Does it matter, aren’t they all the same!”
Try Googling “Nimrod MR2″ and “Nimrod R1″ and see what you can learn…
Hi iSTAR
My subtle attempt at humour failed spectacularly then, of course I understand the difference between MR2 and R1 but was being flippant.
I’ve not seen it mentioned, but apparently the French have agreed to use Mantis as the basis of the joint MALE UAV http://www.ainonline.com/news/single-news-page/article/dassault-embraces-baeos-mantis-uav-29100/
On a related note, this is a nice interview about the early history of Predator, as the last one rolls off the line :
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/the-dewline/2011/03/a-history-of-predator-from-the.html
El Sid
Most interesting I didnt see the French accepting Mantis maybe they have changed. Is this a replacement for Reaper in UK service?
I also read today that the NATO ground surveillance system based on Global Hawk has now been reduced to just 6 Global Hawk airframes.
Thanks El Sid,
Very confusing, are they (the Gvmnts) really going to pour a bn into replacing the leased Predators with this Mantis-like thing (which is very much a like-for-like replacement)?
When Scavenger – slightly more survivable if, next time that is, more than the Taliban firepower on the OpFor side – is fully inter-operable with the avionics and ground systems of what we already have. Or is it – who can see through the marketing talk & glossies?
And that Dassault is the lead partner for the European (better?) version of Scavenger – but as you say, still just a concept.
- I was betting on that one hitting the dust bin; maybe this deal is compensation for the write-off? Gentle persuasion?
The Israeli element in this is somewhere there – Watchkeeper is touted as British, but it is just one version of the successful Israeli UAV.
Hmmm
Here is my idea; take the Heron-TP add to it sensors and electronic control land station from the local military industries in UK and you have excellent and cheap solution and in addition window of opportunity to specialize in UAV technology.
Belated comment I know, but some points. Gunners have been operating UAS since 1962, the reason for this was that both world wars demonstrated that air observation was the best way of locating hostile artillery, in WW1 it also demonstrated that air observation was the most effective way of directing attacks (by own artillery) on their locations. Unfortunately the direction loop wasn’t as effective in WW2 when the RAF had otehr priorities. By the 1950s it was clear that the RAF (or any other airforce) was unable to provide timely battlefield locations and other target intelligence, particularly since the battlefield was speeding up. Of course neither MQM 57 nor Midge were brilliant but the latter could deliver answers to questions in about 60 mins, and delivering photos to the local HQ was possible in a few hours if really needed (don’t ask how long it would have taken from a clutch airfield to somewhere east of the Weser!)
By the early 1980s, the UAS technology had moved on, and the advent of MLRS, extending the divisional area of influence to about 30km was one factor that led to Phoenix (the planned MLRS regts would include a locating battery with a Phoenix troop proviidng target data in the Depth Fire Direction Centre). The one snag some of us saw was that everybody would want access to realtime information and that the former priority of finding and dealing with enemy arty was likely to take a back seat (at least untill it got too painful – which would probably have been quite quickly!)
However, the increasing range of artillery means that increasing range realtime target acquisition is required, GMLRS gives a division (or brigade if that its subordination) area of influence out to 70+km, to apply this ‘influence’ means the division/brigade also needs organic (ie under command) target acquisition. UAS provides this.
Zero length launch/recovery is good to have, not least because it minimises transit flight time to the area of operation, which means fewer are required for the same level of available capability. However, it has a price (as Midge proved), quite a lot of work has to be done on the a/c before its ready to fly again. This has a substantial manpower cost, and its manpower that really damages your wholelife costs.
Getting back to Watchkeeper, the article misses a very important point, ground stations and liaison. It’s not just a GCS (which includes and Int Corps image analyst as well as the pilot, UAV comd and mission commander (who runs the local show), Int Corps have always been part of the UAS units), there are also several tactical parties and liaison parties that are deployed to wherever they are required to ensure proper integration into the land battle, basically these provide local imagery and ensure the local commander’s needs and intent get back to the mission commander in the GCS. All this is somewhat different to the way the RAF works, and is part of the reason for Watchkeeper being an army system.
The other issue is Command, forget meaningless waffle about ‘ownership’ which vests with the British taxpayer. ‘Command’ is what it it’s all about, tactical class UAS are a critical part of the land battle, and hence part of the toolset of the land commander, not something he has to ask politely for, he gives orders. No one wants a repeat of the support heli fudge.
The US and Germany have the Principle of War ‘Unity of Command’, ie the commander has command of all the tools he needs to achieve his mission. UK doesn’t quite subscribe to this simple principle, using ‘Unity of Effort’, but its useful to remember that Command is the bottom line.
Welcome to TD observer, thanks for the comments
Hi observer,
AS there are catapults that have been tested for WK size/ weight and fit to the back of a truck, I have always been wondering why more has not been done to improve immediate availability, from closer to the anticipated action, as in your
“Zero length launch/recovery is good to have, not least because it minimises transit flight time to the area of operation, which means fewer are required for the same level of available capability.”
- personally I would give recovery much lesser weigth than launching here – you mention the effort for the next mission (effort translating to turnaround time, and the required crew probably much more than would fit on a truck, not to mention everything else that is needed)