The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

In the previous two posts on ISTAR the general context and relationship between the collectors and ‘back office’ described. In the next few posts I am going to look at the airborne aspects of ISTAR, the collectors. With the new concept of Combat ISTAR some of these collectors might also be armed to attack targets of opportunity.

Signals intelligence is extremely complex and often at the cutting edge of science and technology. It seeks to provide intelligence from various emitters; cell phones, radio systems and radar for example. There are a number of variations, communications intelligence analyses the source and content of messages, pattern analysis seeks to obtain information from trends over a period of time and electronic intelligence analyses non communications traffic, radar for example.

SIGINT has value in all stages of an operation but is particularly valuable in counter insurgency operations and the mystique surrounding its capabilities can also have a distinct deterrent effect, although if targets resort to passing messages by combat carrier pigeon SIGINT may have a little less utility!

Nimrod R. Mk1/Airseeker

Providing theatre level SIGINT was the Nimrod R.1’s of 51 Squadron RAF, in service since 1974, although they have of course been continually updated since then.

There was already a project underway to look at options for its replacement before the Nimrod airworthiness issue. The project was called Helix and the 2010 NAO Major Project Report defines the requirement as;

Project Helix seeks to sustain the UK’s airborne electronic surveillance capability, currently provided by the Nimrod R1 aircraft and associated ground elements, against an evolving and increasingly complex target set up to 2025. It will provide a rapidly deployable capability to support operations where it will be able to collect, analyse, fuse and disseminate a coherent and readily interpretable electronic surveillance picture in support of national, joint and coalition operations. This information will support targeting and combat identification.

The project achieved initial gate approval in 2003 and a competitive assessment phase was resulted in L-3 becoming the preferred bidder in 2009, about the same time the first of the three R1’s was retired.

Parallel to this the decision was made to obtain three US RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft which is the USAF’s broad equivalent to the R1. The initial reaction was outrage, the R1 was reportedly much more versatile and capable, the Rivet Joint is focussed on communications intelligence for example, but the communications intelligence capability has been the most used and this is likely to continue.

The Rivet Joint uses the highest of high technology equipment and the UK will be the only operator other than the US, the degree of trust implicit in this deal is perhaps a sign of the much maligned special relationship. It has also been reported that some UK specific equipment, QinetiQ Tigershark for example, will be incorporated and that this will likely be rolled out across the USAF fleet.

It is not clear if the UK Rivet Joints will be equipped with an inflight refuelling probe and therefore able to receive fuel from UK tankers but the basic aircraft does have significant range and endurance. Expected to be in service in 2014, all three will be based at RAF Waddington, 4 sets of crews will begin work up training and joint operations this year.

Whilst many commentators have been frothing about the age of the airframes (they will effectively be zero lifed) the real jewel in the deal is the ongoing support arrangements. The three RAF aircraft will be maintained as a joint fleet and every 4 years until 2025 the aircraft will be returned to the US for a complete strip down, overhaul and technology refresh. Significantly, under a capability improvement programme, the RAF aircraft will benefit from the same technology upgrades as the US version.

It is a shame we could not use an airframe that is common with others in the RAF but this is the bargain of the decade, especially when one considers the spiral developments that will be delivered in due course. We are facing a capability gap for a few years but post 2014 the UK will have an excellent signals intelligence capability that is fully aligned with our principal ally.

Project HELIX rejected the Nimrod MRA4 airframe because of space and power issues and in an ideal world we would have transferred the existing R1 equipment/HELIX upgrades into a common airframe like the A330 but as a low cost way of achieving a great deal, the lack of commonality is a pill worth swallowing. Having said that, the airframe is the same as the E3 Sentry so there is some commonality and existing support arrangements.

3 will be delivered which if course isn’t enough but capacity issues may prevent it growing beyond that, the operators of 51sqn are extraordinarily skilled and experienced and the training pipeline cannot simply be increased overnight.

The cost of the deal is approximately £750 million and is now called Airseeker.

Hawker Beechcraft King Air

The UK already operates a number of King Airs both in training and front line roles, the RAF’s Shadow R1 and MFTS 350ER’s for rear crew training for example. The Army Air Corps also operate a small number of tactical SIGINT aircraft that are likely to be similarly fitted to the US RC-12 Guard Rail.

With my earlier suggestion of transitioning all aviation assets to the RAF, these would be transferred.

SIGINT and especially COMINT is gaining more significance at a tactical level and whilst the Rivet Joint will provide a serious level of capability we will have only three and would rightly be tasked for higher level missions. A lower level tactical capability is needed beyond the limited numbers we have.

With the troubled progress of the US joint Aerial Common Sensor programme the US Army (the operators of the Guard Rail) have initiated an upgrade programme called RC-12x. This will bring all their aircraft up to a common standard and although it is based on the smaller 200 series, for commonality, space and performance reasons we should ideally be using the 350ER.

A force of 6 aircraft would provide a valuable capability, able to operate in support of an enduring deployment or special forces and complimenting perfectly the Shadow R1’s (more of which later)

 

 

## Other posts in this series ##

The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction

The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends

The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets

The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement

The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid

The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01

The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)

The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)

The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)

The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)

The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)

The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling

The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport

The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)

The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)

The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)

The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)

The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security

The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary

 

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Think Defence hopes to start sensible conversations about UK defence issues, no agenda or no campaign but there might be one or two posts on containers, bridges and mexeflotes!

15 thoughts on “The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)

  1. ArmChairCivvy

    Hi TD,

    What’s a bn ($) between friends… No, more seriously, I think you are right about the good deal as the running costs (with deep maintenance and upgrades outsourced to be part of a much bigger fleet)is quoted to give a running cost of only third of what was extrapolated for the domestic alternative.

    However, for another alternative an American analyst estimated the per piece price for the upgraded Sentinel alternative (also with low running costs) at $200m. This would have covered the ELINT angle, too, and 80% of the SIGINT capability now coming. This is what another source http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Death-Spiral-for-HELIX-Britain-Wants-RC-135-Rivet-Joint-Planes-05102/ says about the detail: Sentinel…
    ” could have been modified to perform the SIGINT/ELINT role, and in fact Lockheed Martin had proposed this very combination for the USA’s canceled and recently restarted ACS SIGINT/ELINT aircraft program.

    The difference between the ASTOR ELINT and the RC-135V/W Rivet Joint comes down to development costs and known capabilities. A new version of the Sentinel R1 would require a full design and integration phase, starting from zero, with all of the attendant risks. Capabilities might be very high with the approach, and operating costs would be lower”

    Airseekers are positioned as a strategic asset and the current config Sentinels are more of a theatre-level asset. The latter going out leaves a huge step between the remaining theatre-level assets and Airseekers? While I am all for having the King Air’s under “one roof”, how does that tally with RA operating the Watchkeepers (in the same theatre, A-stan or other)?

  2. Think Defence

    ACC, if a Nimrod MRA4 derivative was rejected by Helix on space and power then I can’t see how a Global Express would have done the job. You need a large aircraft for antenna spacing, crew accommodation and equipment so although I would have much preferred something with greater commonality (Airbus perhaps) and independance this is a good deal for the long term

  3. ArmChairCivvy

    Hi TD, I accept these (“rejected by Helix on space and power”)for both Nimrod and Sentinel; and aperture has been mentioned, too, for Nimrod.

    Wasn’t it in the end on cost:Over the life costs weighed in more than the upfront price tags, writing off the good three and half bn and adding three quarters of a bn (now £) on top?

    Why is ELINT falling off “the radar screen” in importance? Are the actual strike platforms now so good at it that a specialised asset is less important (than for SIGINT)?

  4. Think Defence

    Welcome to Think Defence Arcadian.

    Yes, you are of course correct but if you look at earlier posts you will see the proposal to restrict JCA numbers as a means of paying for other priorities means they will be in relatively short supply

  5. Mike

    TD, I think its also been stated that the RAF RC-135′s will also benefit from using the same/similar engines to our E3 Sentry fleet, thus shortening the logistics tail…also there are usually USAF rivet joints based in Mildenhall.

  6. Mark

    I think the Rivet joint buy does indeed make sence the total fleet including uk aircraft will be 20 that means the uk will be contributing a significant proportion of the Fleet which should give significant input in future coalition operations as well as UK only capability.
    Numbers are an issue as airframes to covert are few. I would look to 2025 as a possible solution to this. There is a proposal to add a sigint capability to the P8 at the end of this decade. This could be tied into a possible P8 purchase to replace MP first followed by an addition buy of sigint variant latter and after that even a wedge tail variant to replace awac allowing all our strategic aircraft to be based on a cheap single airframe and in total commonality.

    As for Beech craft I would increase this force. I would replace the defenders and Islanders with this aircraft both in the shadow/guardrail variant and the USMC huron variant. Again commonality across the services and already in series as a training aircraft so cheap to operate and crew. The irony is we will be removing this aircraft after afghan and we have currently got an additional aircraft in final completion in the states.

  7. John Hartley

    I think the Rivet Joint electronics are superb, but no amount of spin will make me think it wise to stick it in a 45+ year old B707. Second hand B767-200ER are available. With a cargo door conversion, they would be easy to configure & upgrade. The cry of commonality with the US is doubtful, as the yanks would probably switch to B767s if we did.
    I fear that the B707 Rivet Joints will spend most of their time in a hangar. Another procurement disaster on its way.

  8. Tubby

    Can anyone tell me the difference between the MC-12 Liberty and the RC-12 Guardrail, as the US army seems to think the MC-12 is pretty nifty as they are ordering more of them.

  9. IXION

    JH

    There is nothing much wrong with the 707.

    As an accident of my work, I came to know the beast, and the men who still fly them, they were widely regarded as hugely over engineered.

    They remain the only commercial Large aircraft that can do victory roles and barrel roles without ripping the wings off.(Not I stress that either is a practical design consideration for a civil aircraft, nor necessarily safe, even in a 707).

    They are however thirsty, dirty, (environmentaly), and rather maintainence intensive. The one I had dealings with was hand flown, with no working flight instumentation, except for a yaught GPS bluetacked to the dashboard, accross the atlantic.

    The flight engineer had to fill up the oil on the port inside engine every time the aircraft Landed!

    I do not think that with properly rescourced maintainence availability should be an issue.

  10. Kentish Paul

    Hi Ixion,

    Quite agree as regards Rivet Joint air frame strength. With regard to thirst and dirt surely the RAF ones will have the CFM56 engine (as in Sentry and KC135R) and will have something a little more sophisticated than a bluetacked GPS.

    On a further note I believe the military 707 was in fact Boeing model 717. It was structurally different to the commercial model.

  11. Alex

    Richard Aldrich’s recent unofficial (and excellent) history of GCHQ has a lot of detail about the introduction of the Nimrod R1 and its associated systems. Notably, a major motivation was to have an extra field of sovereign capability-plus, and another was to cover what we thought was something the Americans didn’t do, or didn’t do enough of – ELINT/SIGINT tasked by the military in the field and funnelled forwards to them. The R1 was specifically designed for this and the support facilities at Wyton and in the Int Corps as well.

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