In all the debates about the RAF I find it most amusing that a lot of commentators want to strip the RAF of its assets and distribute amongst the other services like Robin Hood, dispersing the aviation riches amongst the poor of the Army and Royal Navy. There is an assumption that a) it can be done and b) it is a vaguely good thing to do
It could be done but I am less sure what benefits would accrue.
In all the discussions about taking helicopters, fighters and transport away from the RAF and giving them to the other services I have yet to see a decent enough argument to convince me that it would deliver any positive benefits or any sort of cost reductions.
In order to provide some sort of balance, how about going the other way?
Whilst the UK armed forces enjoyed plenty of resources (when?) there might have been an argument for each service having their own light infantry, logistics, policing, rotary/fixed wing aviation, intelligence and engineering. However, in these resource constrained times every instance of duplication should be challenged and whilst some are obviously still needed others might be less so.
Falling into the less so category, in my opinion, is aviation.
The reasons for the formation of the Fleet Air Arm and Army Air Corps are largely historical and wedded to an era when joint working arrangements or inter service collaboration was at a low point. Arguments like people don’t join the RAF to serve on ships are fair enough but only go so far and ultimately, the needs of the nation must be considered. What about the unique operating environment of ships or forward locations, again, are these really too significant to overcome, why RAF aircrew could not be trained in working aboard ships (damage control etc) or Army standard skill at arms is not clear. RAF aircrew routinely embark from naval vessels and work from the same locations as army aviation.
The bottom line is this; we need to drive out unnecessary duplication to reduce operating costs and if there are any sacred cows it is the Army and Royal Navy operating their own fixe and rotary wing aviation assets.
The Royal Navy will naturally view aviation as one element of their overall capability, likewise the Army and looking at the resources both services have given to aviation it is debatable if this would in any way improve if they absorbed the RAF. Conversely, if we concentrate pretty much all of the aviation roles and equipment into the single service that sees aviation as its reason to exist then one would think that it would be a better situation all round.
In a land of plenty each service would have their own everything and whilst the numerous joint forces have proven the basic concept they are a typical British fudge, avoiding making a tough decision.
The scarcity and cost of modern aircraft is such that they need a dedicated service that does nothing else to ensure they are suitably managed across the JOINT force, supported by a unified career structure.
This is not to say the RAF can just carry on normal jogging because they can’t. Attitudes have to change and the whole of the RAF have to work hard to shrug off the 5 star hotel, Monday to Friday and civilians in uniform perceptions that have built up.
It is also the role of the leadership at the MoD to ensure that resources are allocated to the most pressing needs, persuading the RAF that it needs to switch priority from fast jet to ISR and transport would not be easy but that is no reason not to do so.
Although it would not happen overnight this proposal is quite simply to move all aviation assets from the Army and Royal Navy into the RAF.
## Other posts in this series ##
The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction
The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends
The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets
The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement
The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01
The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)
The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)
The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)
The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)
The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)
The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)
The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling
The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport
The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)
The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)
The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)
The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)
The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security
The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary
TD
The Your idea has logic, but reality is the ‘shiney shiney’ crowd will soon win over any logic.
‘This is not to say the RAF can just carry on normal jogging because they can’t. Attitudes have to change and the whole of the RAF have to work hard to shrug off the 5 star hotel, Monday to Friday and civilians in uniform perceptions that have built up.
It is also the role of the leadership at the MoD to ensure that resources are allocated to the most pressing needs, persuading the RAF that it needs to switch priority from fast jet to ISR and transport would not be easy but that is no reason not to do so’.
Seems like a couple of good reasons why not just there.
Unlike my proposal, seeing 3 services reduced too two, this leaves us still with 3 services. 3 support structures etc.
How many vimtos have you had TD?
I am going to sit this one out.
TD
Your idea has the luxury of being tried before in the Thirties when the RAF were in charge of Naval Aviation which FAILED miserably, underfunding and neglect caused British Naval Aviation to wither on the vine whilst other countries flourished, this had dire consequences during WW2 due to the lack of modern naval aircraft. This CANNOT be allowed again, those morons in charge of the RAF cant even get there own service up to snuff never mind stuff for the army and navy.
Ha ha ha, ROFL, your New Years humour is so funny…..
Oh, that was not a joke ?
Dear TD may I suggest you put your pants on your head, insert a pencil into each nostril, and repeat after me “wubble” – then ask Baldric if he has any other cunning plans……
From what I gather through my reading and anecdotal evidence from soldiers I know most RAF bods have all the tactical awareness and fieldcraft of a Brownie troop.
Can you imagine the swap drafts adverts in the new merged Purple News if this happened?
“Swap T45 draft for anything 9 to 5 on dry land with 3 star accommodation (yes only 3 star but I am desperate.)”
There is a difference between army air, naval aviation and the RAF, even if they seem to fly the same aircraft and use the same weapons.
For example, an AAC Lynx crew is totally different from a RN Lynx crew in training, roles and mission orientation. They both fly the same type of helicopter, and you could even train an AAC crew to fly off ships, but the sensor and weapons kit are a lightyears difference from a TOW Lynx or Wildcat.
That same RN Lynx crew operates as part of an integrated team. The ASW (sub hunting) commander aboard a frigate can command the Lynx to stop-dip-listen with its sonobouy or sniff for signals just over the horizon, or attack a small boat during fog and nighttimes with Sea Skuas. This is teamwork requiring specialized training gained over time.
The AAC crew is used to go low and slow and take out armor within visual range, and support the infantry so it needs to be trained to communicate and navigate and distinguish Warriors IFVs from BMPs. Same thing is that you couldn’t ask an AAC crew the difference between a Leander and a Krivak FF.
The former RN Harriers also had an anti-ship role, which meant going up against a fast moving IADS with organic SAMs, guns and serious jamming.
That was a speciality not easily transferred to Fulda tank hunting RAF Harriers – and no disrespect intended.
One should look beyond the (common) platforms, and look at specific roles and missions. Some can be joint, and shared with sister services (and allies) but some are kept “in house” by their respective services for a valid reason, not “just” historical or sentimental reasons.
And a belated Happy Newyear to all!
“The scarcity and cost of modern aircraft is such that they need a dedicated service that does nothing else to ensure they are suitably managed across the JOINT force, supported by a unified career structure”
Would you explain this statement? I’m not RAF (no,honestly I’m not) but the above statement makes no sense to me. The only time a Service requires an independent command is when it has an independent role – which the RAF, in my opinion, does not.
How many joint schools and things are run either by the RAF or based at an RAF base?
And why do the RAF always seem to get the best kit? As I understand it back when both RAF and RA operated Rapier only the former got the night version?
Is is it me? I am just too anchor faced? But it seems a lot of what the RAF did or does outside the jets is there to justify the RAF or build up its corporate base? I am too biased?
@X, Not sure what your reference to joint schools is asking but equally, not sure why it would be relevant. I think you are too biased to be honest and although I am not suggesting the RAF are saints, they are not as bad as made out.
@Pete, I meant that because aircraft are so expensive to buy and run you need a dedicated service who does nothing but manage them, seems perfectly logical to me. The reality is, not one of the services has an independent role beyond some niche stuff. This suggestion is not above some grand arguments about air power versus naval or land power, it is about the most effective means of extracting every last drop of value from a diminishing defence budget
I have not seen any arguments beyond the emotional for binning the RAF but the counter, letting an air minded organisation handle all the air stuff is logical and has a number of benefits, but not surprisingly, has fallen on deaf ears.
“I have not seen any arguments beyond the emotional for binning the RAF”
Have you tried looking here; http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2010/12/the-future-of-the-raf-03-%e2%80%93-a-takeover-bid/#comment-10475
There’s several reasons for binning the RAF in the above link . . .
The RAF has NO independent role – not even a niche. All it’s roles involve supporting the other two services and, in the case of the Navy, they have proven totally untrustworthy; almost killing naval aviation between the wars and being economical with the truth about being able to protect the fleet at sea in the 70′s.
Kill the RAF and let the army and Navy purchase what they NEED rather than the RAF purchasing what it WANTS.
Arguing that only a dedicated service can maintain and fly aircraft effectively is, I think, wrong, and typifies the condescending attitude of almost every RAF pilot I’ve ever talked to…
Pete, I have a green background not that is relevant. I did chuckle when you mentioned about the Army and Royal Navy buying what they need instead of what they want. If only that were true, but, lets be honest, it isn’t is it. Does the navy have an independent role any more, a projectile fired by the …. and all that. If anything, the last several decades have been and wars with the RAF and RN serving as enablers. Lets give ships and planes to the Army
I thank you for your candour TD.
“From what I gather through my reading and anecdotal evidence from soldiers I know most RAF bods have all the tactical awareness and fieldcraft of a Brownie troop.”
Could it be that most RAF bods don’t need tactical awareness and fieldcraft. This is because most RAF bods are servicing aircraft and knowing how to stick leaves in your helmet is not very helpful when your head is stuck inside a Tornado.
How much time do the ground crew of the AAC spend being infantry? Is this a good use of their skills?
I might also say to the “anecdotal evidence from soldiers”, that they would say that wouldn’t they?
The old argument that every weapon from the Battleship to the Bayonet exist only to put some poor sod in the infantry on a certain piece of ground and ensure that he stays there has some truth – to a point. The Navy and Airforce exist to put the Army where it wants to be and make sure it doesn’t get torpedoed, shot out of the sky or bombed on it’s way there. However, the RAF does not and cannot protect the fleet at sea and would do a much better job of protecting the Army if it was part of the Army. Why shouldn’t the Army control the transport planes which exist soley to transport it’s assets? Why shouldn’t the Army have it’s own, organic air support which is under the command of it’s personnel?
You may have a point about us needing all air assets in one service but I don’t think so and, judging by the comments on this thread, few people who read Think Defence do either.
(cue massive support for the RAF in the next half dozen comment . . .)
Surely the cost and effort of such a major restructure, either merging the RAF or on the flip-side FAA and air core into the RAF would be counter productive. I can’t help but feel this would result in a monumental MOD cock-up, for something that might not even help.
Just out of interest, does anyone know of any other countries that operate a radically different army/navy/air force structure? And have they made any significant restructures to get there?
I forgot this point;
“letting an air minded organisation”
You used the phrase ‘air minded’ – Go to jail. Go directly to jail. Do not pass go. Do not collect two billion pounds. . .
Was wondering when you would notice
TD
You keep aserting that those of us who believe the RAF COULD be disbanded are emotional unrealistic etc.
Obviously ANY re arrangement of the force structure of the UK would require detailed anaylasis before proceeeding. And I venture a knowledge of the detail beyond myself, and most if not all of the posters on this site.
I (and others) have mearly suggested that.
The role of the RAF in the modern world is is essentialy mostly supporting the the others through transport etc and Air cover.
The only two non support roles are
1) Strategic Air opperations
2) Air defence UK
My views on strategic opperations are trenchent and oft expressed. (like the old beer advert) good but not THAT good.
Air defence Uk could be done by the navy. Not any better than RAF but probably as well and for the same money.
It could be looked at to see if the other roles could be done cheaper and more efficiently by the other two services, there is a prima facie case for so doing. As I said in my original post I am prepared to be proved wrong.
There are good business reasons why 3 organisations should become two.
All 3 organisations are parochial and more self centred than a Giroscope. My proposals would at least reduce that from 3 to two. And RAF attitude bashing aside, that follows modern business streamlining. It should come down to a number chrunching excercise.
Many AAC pilots did not originally join the AAC, and probably didn’t consider becomming pilots when they enlisted.
When I was working with the AAC many years ago, most of the pilots had come from either the RA or armoured units. After a couple of postings with the corps they would decide whether to rebadge and stay with the AAC or return to their parent units.
I doubt that many potential army pilots would consider the move if it meant switching to a completely different service, so filling pilot positions under TD’s proposal could become more difficult.
Similarly, many RN Lynx pilots are originally RM or other role RN. So lets get back to looting the RAF; you lot can keep the fighters, but I’m looking for a pair of comfy leather armchairs.
Hi, Michael. The AAC ground crew are infantry soldiers and need to be so because of their role in the forward rearming and refueling of army aircraft. They need these skills to defend themselves; while the need for these skills may not be so apparent when operating from well defended air bases, they need to retain those skills nonetheless.
Let’s be really radical.
1. Transfer Naval & Army aviation to the RAF
2. Transfer the RAF Regt & the RMC to the Army
3. Transfer the SLBM subs to the RAF (back to the Independent Bomber Force)
4. In about ten years time the RN will consist of a single carrier with RAF air squadrons.
Scrap the RN.
I have to say that some your point TD do make some sense if we can have a joined up procurement and systems. Also is all the squadrons make-up and engineering standards (not necessarily with the rafs being the standard) are common across each of the services it may could save more money that most things. I do still fill there is enough of a difference in the there flying services roles that we would lose more that we gain by merging them.
IXION
When you comment on strategic air operations you imply at least this only covers bombing operation strategic operations now cover significantly more than that but granted we appear to be giving most of those assets up. But I don’t for one minute believe it would have been any better if they were under the army. In fact post afghan and no appetite for coin operations and with the russian hordes no longer coming over the plain the role of the regular army outside of 16AAB and SF and enlarged TA is evaporating fast.
I think there is so much other deep routed waste in the system that we could save money (such as a single command stucture above a certain command level) there before going to disband any of the services as it has never been of a benefit in any other country that’s tried it
@x “As I understand it back when both RAF and RA operated Rapier only the former got the night version?”
If the RAF were working at night why would they need even 3 * hotel accommodation?
Perhaps the RAF scrambled eggs recognise that good accommodation helps retain expensively trained aircrew. It also placates families. “I didn’t get a wink off sleep last night” isn’t what custodians of £40 million aircraft should say.
Does anyone else remember the success of the RAF in policing Somaliland, Iraq and Transjordan? I hope this article will be of interest.
Finally, as a taxpayer, I don’t mind if the Army or RN takes over the RAF so long as they can first run their own organisations efficiently.
I agree with the sentiments of IXION, in that merging and consolidating companies in the business world will almost certainly give opportunities for cash savings without harming the delivery of services.
Also, many of the RAF’s tasks involve the direct support of the other services, and could be transferred directly to either the army or navy; and considering the RAF’s two non support roles as stated in IXION’s post, I don’t believe the size of the force necessary to provide them justifies an entirely seperate force structure.
TD, it’s not just a case of “let’s bash the RAF” – all the services need serious reform but the big question is how?
The service chiefs will lobby hard to get the best deal as they see it for their service – and who can blame them? – so any former high-ranking serviceman put in charge of reforming the Armed Forces as a whole would always be in danger of being accused of bias by the other two services. Any civillian – politician or businessman – would be accused of having no knowledge of what the Armed Forces need and find that he ahd suddenly found the cure for inter-service rivalry as Army, Navy and Airforce close ranks to fend him off. Add in the negative media coverage as the phrase “putting money before lives” would be splashed accross the Daily Mail and Telegraph front pages in no time flat.
The USMC proves that one service can operate on land, sea and air. Although I don’t put the USMC forward as a model for UK forces I do wonder if a unified UK armed forces would be more cost effective.
@ Brian.
I did enjoy that article – especially this bit;
“Trenchard, however, offered to do
the job using one squadron of de Havilland DH9s, in collaboration with the local
gendarmerie regiment, the Somaliland Camel Corps and a battalion of the King’s African
Rifles. His offer was accepted and the Squadron of 12 aircraft, to be known as ‘Z Force’
was shipped to the area.
In a matter of weeks, operating in conjunction with the Camel Corps, Z Force
successfully bombed and harried the Mullah’s forces, driving them from their traditional
stone forts. The entire campaign cost in the region of £100,000, and it was said
afterwards to be the ‘cheapest war in history’. The political effects for the RAF were
out of all proportion to the local impact in Somaliland. The RAF had demonstrated its
ability to undertake effective police actions in cooperation with small numbers of ground
troops at a relatively small financial cost.”
Which is a wonderful way to present the facts. What the RAF seems to have demonstrated there is that if the local ground forces (Army . . .) had it’s own, integrated air support then the RAF would be unnecessary . . .
Peter
I almost agree with your conclusion. What is actually shows is air power supporting a local indigenous ground force is the most effect way to run a coin operation. People don’t like being invaded and told what to do. You’d think we would learn from history.
I find it strange to see politicians outmaneuvering the military.
How do you divide & rule?
My understanding is that you get people to start on each other, so you start by getting them nitpicking & bickering amoungst themselves.
Can anyone please tell me why, our Governement, during nearly a decade of warfare has decided to continuously chip away at the defence budget?
About buisness practices:
I do not think that much of British buisness practices as it seems geared towards maximising profit on the one hand & doing everything possible to ensure that their customers, or end users (i.e. The Public), get nothing but grief & trouble for their money & time. I’m posting a letter as an example, i know it’s long but it’s well worth the read & i hope you’ll get the point i’m trying to make.
Streamlinning, may make sense to maximise money, or profit.
What does that generally do to the morale of an organisation?
In my own experience, it generally means that people start get pissed off & then start to leave & normally they are the very people you actually need to keep. People are very tribal, you take away their tribe & they get disillusioned & then they walk, taking their very valuable, good humoured, capable selves & skills somewhere else.
Streamlining, i have observed, only seems to decrease the headcount (costs), while seriously increasing the amount of stress that the people who remain, are put under.
What do you think the real world effect on our Military would actually be?
I am asking that question in all seriousness.
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Complaint Letter of the Year. The British do have a way with words…. A real-life customer complaint letter sent to NTL (to their complaints dept….)
Dear Cretins,
I have been an NTL customer since 9th July 2001, when I signed up for your 3-in-one deal for cable TV, cable modem, and telephone. During this three-month period I have encountered inadequacy of service which I had not previously considered possible, as well as ignorance and stupidity of monolithic proportions.
Please allow me to provide specific details, so that you can either pursue your professional perogative, and seek to
rectify these difficulties – or more likely (I suspect) so that you can have some entertaining reading material as you while away the working day smoking B&H and drinking vendor-coffee on the bog in your office:
My initial installation was cancelled without warning, resulting in my spending an entire Saturday sitting on my fat arse waiting for your technician to arrive. When he did not arrive, I spent a further 57 minutes listening to your infuriating hold music, and the even more annoying Scottish robot woman telling me to look at your helpful website….HOW?
I alleviated the boredom by playing with my t..ticles for a few minutes- an activity at which you are no-doubt both familiar and highly adept.
The rescheduled installation then took place some two weeks later, although the technician did forget to bring a number of vital tools – such as a drill-bit, and his cerebrum. Two weeks later, my cable modem had still not arrived. After 15 telephone calls over 4 weeks my modem arrived… six weeks after I had requested it, and begun to pay for it.
I estimate your internet server’s downtime is roughly 35%… hours between about 6pm -midnight, Mon-Fri, and most of the weekend. I am still waiting for my telephone connection.
I have made 9 calls on my mobile to your no-help line, and have been unhelpfully transferred to a variety of disinterested individuals, who are it seems also highly
skilled bollock jugglers.
I have been informed that a telephone line is available (and someone will call me back); that no telephone line is available (and someone will call me back); that I will be transferred to someone who knows whether or not a telephone line is available (and then been cut off); that I will be transferred to someone (and then been redirected to an
answer machine informing me that your office is closed); that I will be transferred to someone and then been redirected to the irritating Scottish robot woman…and several other variations on this theme.
Doubtless you are no longer reading this letter, as you have at least a thousand other dissatisfied customers to ignore, and also another one of those crucially important t..ticle-moments to attend to.
Frankly I don’t care, it’s far more satisfying as a customer to voice my frustration’s in print than to shout them at your unending hold music. Forgive me, therefore, if I continue.
I thought BT were s.it, that they had attained the holy piss-pot of godawful customer relations, that no-one, anywhere, ever, could be more disinterested, less helpful or more obstructive to delivering service to
their customers.
That’s why I chose NTL, and because, well, there isn’t
anyone else is there? How surprised I therefore was, when I discovered to my considerable dissatisfaction and disappointment what a useless shower of bastards you truly are.
You are sputum-filled pieces of distended rectum incompetents of the highest order.
British Telecom – w..nkers though they are – shine like brilliant beacons of success, in the filthy puss-filled mire of your seemingly limitless inadequacy.
Suffice to say that I have now given up on my futile and foolhardy quest to receive any kind of service from you. I suggest that you cease any potential future attempts to extort payment from me for the services which you have so pointedly and catastrophically failed to deliver – any such activity will be greeted initially with hilarity and
disbelief quickly be replaced by derision, and even perhaps bemused rage.
I enclose two small deposits, selected with great care from my
cats litter tray, as an expression of my utter and complete contempt for both you and your pointless company. I sincerely hope that they have not become desiccated during transit – they were satisfyingly moist at the
time of posting, and I would feel considerable disappointment if you did not experience both their rich aroma and delicate texture.
Consider them the very embodiment of my feelings towards NTL, and its worthless employees.
Have a nice day – may it be the last in you miserable short life, you irritatingly incompetent and infuriatingly unhelpful bunch of *****.
John
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That letter may not have been the best example out there. When people start talking about bringing UK buisness practices to military affairs, for some reason that always makes me shudder & then i remember that letter.
Honestly, i do not think it’s such a good idea to try to merge any of the service’s. Firstly i think i would rather have a serious CULL amoungst the top brass.
Why do we have so many in the upper echelons?
If anyone wants to give me an education, i’m all ears. I’m not trying to be sarcastic at all. I am asking.
TD, how about a post sometime in the future looking at the reasons why the Military is staffed in way that it is?
Not really what to do about it, more why we are where we are.
M(C)
My lettter to BT threatening to burn them at the stake as the adherants of satan was better…..
I can only recount the shear frustration of many of the smaller businesses who deal with not just the MOD (a sepperate point form the services I will admit), but also the armed forces. Who remain distinctly (according the reports I recieve) stubbornly 1950′s in their attitudes and practices.
If we’re swapping private rather than forces admin stories, one comment I received from one chap who provides minor services to an army Base (I will not name to avoid embarrasment); is that sometimes he feels like he’s walked into an episode of ‘Are you being served’
M (Ex Dis)
Point 2 has a lot of merrit.
As I have said I see no need to get rid of the RAF wholesale, although I do think it could be divested of certain of its current roles and tasks.
Marcase (as usual) makes a very sensible comment, and I would like to expand on it by taking a look at the USMC.
For the “single service” adherents the USMC is often held up as a the single service which does everything. In some ways this is correct, in others it is way, way off the mark.
The USMC is an expeditionary service, setup to be lightweight, strategically mobile and with a long history and heritage of small wars and COIN. Of course it also has very heavy elements, with lots of armour, artillery, and to the point of these articles, not just its own helicopters, but Harrier, F18 Hornet and even EA6B Prowlers. However there are many that question the need of the USMC’s fixed wing air component, asking why the USN squadron’s cannot be tasked with close air support of the Marine Corps – after all the USN / USMC is all part of one big happy family is it not ?
The link to Marcase’s post is that within the USMC they will tell you that the unique difference between the corps and the other branches of the US forces is that a Marine is a “rifle man first” whatever job he or she is doing. They will tell you that a specialist in the Army is a specialist first and a solder second, but for Marines this is always the other way round. This extends to all the pilots of the Marine air component. All USMC fast jet pilots are “Marines first” and must do the same basic training as “ground pounders” only later going to aviation training. Once they are a qualified pilot they will be expected to do non-aviation tours of duty, for example as a Forward Air Controller (Joint Terminal Attack Controller). I believe to be promoted they must do a tour as a Platoon commander etc.
This is the part of USMC aviation that is most similar to RN / RM helicopter crews and AAC crews, particularly the latter. The RAF pilot is a “pilot first, foremost and only” which is absolutely why you could not, should not roll up all aviation and put it in the RAF. As Marcase notes, a WO in the AAC flying an Apache may well have a lot of relevant experience as an infantryman or a tanker, in other words he is a “soldier first”. The Captain of a of RN ASW frigate may have been a Merlin pilot or observer at some point, he will have a critical understanding of the employment of his organic air assets.
In many respects a C17 or Tanker pilot may have more in common with a civvy airline pilot – (which is often why air force retention for such pilots is very difficult) – not that this is necessarily a bad thing, if it means efficient sortie generation from a secure operating location.
In conclusion, I am not for a total disbandment of the RAF, the USMC is in many ways a bad example of a single service that can do everything, but giving Army and and RN aviation to the RAF would just compound some problems, turning it into a disaster. Just because centralised aviation works for some countries with small forces and not a lot of assets (e.g. NL) there are a lot of other countries were it does not (USA, Germany, France).
Good points Jed but I tend to think that the Pilot first second and last is a better model when in charge of multi million pound and increasingly rare equipment. The problem with the USMC and AAC type career structure is that is creates rounded personnel, to progress they have to do non aviation jobs, in one fell swoop negating all that eye wateringly expensive training and requiring someone to start again. I want specialists to be really that, not generalists who used to do a spot of flying.
The RAF was founded to easen the financial burden of two services (Army through RFC and Navy through RNAS) competing for the same resources, driving aircraft and especially engine prices high. “Air-mindedness” was a paraphrase invented by so-called air-strategists like Douhet and Trenchard to back the new service with an ideological grounding.
Up to this point, the Navy had managed to invent carrier aviation, only to fall back in this (for an overseas empire) crucial area as soon as the RAF was instated. The lack of air staff lead to an ascendancy of battleship-officers in the Admiralty, largely forgetting the many learnings from WW1, where the RNAS was crucial not only in defeating the U-Boat-menace, but also the Zeppeling-menace, too.
In WW2, the RN struggled to create an air-mindedness of it’s own. This compromised the war effort at Kreta, in the Atlantic, in the Indian Ocean, leading to disasters or to unnecessary high loss rates. Meanwhile, the Coastal Command was a clear minor priority in the RAF. We should be thankful, that the real implications behind this have been remedied by the US war entry.
The army had no valid CAS-assets until the end of 1942, as well as the Armee de terre in France, leading directly to the collapse of the war effort in 1940. The “strategic approach” of the RAF to attack bridges has proven totally disappointing in combat.
So, FAA to the RAF? No! AAC to RAF? No!
In contrary, the Falkland campaign showed that the FAA is not only capable of air defence, but also of CAS. There where Harrier GR.Mk3 in theatre, but they would not have been necessary if there where a strategic reserver of Sea Harriers.
In fact, the RN was until late the only one of the three services providing all-aspect air defence, combining shipborne fighters and shipborne SAMs.
TD said “Good points Jed but I tend to think that the Pilot first second and last is a better model when in charge of multi million pound and increasingly rare equipment. The problem with the USMC and AAC type career structure is that is creates rounded personnel, to progress they have to do non aviation jobs, in one fell swoop negating all that eye wateringly expensive training and requiring someone to start again. I want specialists to be really that, not generalists who used to do a spot of flying.”
There are probably lots of bright infantry men who wouldn’t make good fighter pilots. But I doubt there are many fighter pilots who couldn’t cope with field training. 3 months or so learning to be soldier on top of a multimillion pound flight training program is nothing.
As for the USMC just being an expeditionary force fighting COIN war. Well the British Army with its BAOR legacy has done nothing but expeditionary warfare and COIN for the last decade. Apart from Warrior and a few AS90 batteries is the Army much heavier than the USMC? Not really.
Are your training and depot level maintenance activities already combined?
@x
Very well put. The British Army btw successfully fougth COIN-campaigns in Malaya and Borneo. Crucial where – according to officers in theatre – well equipped, skilled and airmobile infantry.
And I wonder, why nobody has ever mentioned the best CAS-aircraft in service, the AC-130.
@TD
” The problem with the USMC and AAC type career structure is that is creates rounded personnel, to progress they have to do non aviation jobs”
But in the USN, aviators are progressing to Admiral frequently. Regardless, what task they have fulfilled in their career.
The habit of the USMC to require their aircraft-operators to be trained infantrymen is to provide an esprit-de-corps, a target which is effectively achieved.
The UKs defence services having such problems is a cultural problem, as the Army and the Navy never overcame their victorian promotion practice, and the RAF largely duplicated them.
@Pete Arundel
“Why shouldn’t the Army have it’s own, organic air support which is under the command of it’s personnel?”
Because todays planes are supposed to be multirole and pegging them to one mission only would not be efficient?
BUT – and here i’m with you – if the RAF retires it’s anti-shipping or SEAD capabilities, it clearly shows no interest in multirole beyond dropping some bombs on a Talebans hat or carrying sexy cruise-missiles. The rest is deemed A2A-combat.
So: is the task of A2A-combat a sufficient reason for an independent service? Or is it a basic skill any pilot in the armed forces should have, especially if he is “in charge of multi million pound and increasingly rare equipment” ?
And it’s not, that the main task of an FAA-aviator till dropping the SHAR wasn’t air defence and force protection. Where is the special task the RAF is fulfilling? Only tankers and strategic transport?
Hi Mark @ 12:51,
RE ” some your point[s] TD do make some sense if we can have a joined up procurement and systems. ”
- wouldn’t this be using a sledge hammer to crack a nut; I, for one, believe the above to be possible through much more minor changes
For our next (non-RAF) thread an excellent point: “the role of the regular army outside of 16AAB and SF and enlarged TA is evaporating fast”, not forgetting the the RM that in numbers is roughly the same as 16AAB
- from within these two brigades a Battle Group can be easily sustained, as it essentially is a bn-size core force added to with specialist arms as per the requirements of the job at hand
Hi McZ @ 5:38,
Indeed “The lack of air staff lead to an ascendancy of battleship-officers in the Admiralty” – the Illustrious would not have been lost on the way back from Norway, had the ship’s commander not placed the aircrew under arrest (for court martial; no patrols were flown (and guns got within range)
@ McZ
I like to be cheeky and include Rhodesian LI fire force in with “our” success along with Malaya and Borneo. Though the other key to success in Malaya was the protected village. Of course to protect the green zone around the river, have a fire force, and another force for route surveillance take boots and bayonets something the UK doesn’t have. Or does it? I don’t know any more.
@ ACC
Of course the difference between 16ABB and 3 Cde is that the latter has (even now just) its own major manoeuvre assets. If money were no object I would put the Paras on the same footing as 3 Cde; a mini independent UK 82nd/101st airborne. But as we don’t have the money I would shove all of it under SF Group.
Hi Jed @ 5:15,
In this context the argument has always been: if they board off USN ships, why own aircraft
” not just its own helicopters, but Harrier, F18 Hornet and even EA6B Prowlers. However there are many that question the need of the USMC’s fixed wing air component, asking why the USN squadron’s cannot be tasked with close air support of the Marine Corps – after all the USN / USMC is all part of one big happy family is it not ?”
- with the uncertainty about the F-35B and the ageing of Harrier, the argument about forward basing fixed wing from ship to shore is going to suffer, and that is likely to tilt the balance in the pro’s and con’s of the independent air component
Hi McZ @7:44,
“successfully fougth COIN-campaigns in Malaya and Borneo. Crucial ” … were the heavy lift, banana-shaped, two-engined helos
- no, not Chinooks, but Belvederes (the only two military ones that have made it to production?)
“why nobody has ever mentioned the best CAS-aircraft in service, the AC-130″
- astronomical price?
- US looking to build a version “light” (Spartan; shelved) or unmanned (at a conceptual study phase)
Hi x @ 8:37,
Absolutely valid point about manoeuvre assets; I did not put it in as I understand that RM has lost/ will lose dedicated Commando (SK) helos?
RE” would put the Paras on the same footing as 3 Cde; a mini independent UK 82nd/101st airborne. But as we don’t have the money I would shove all of it under SF Group”
- it is already such a mini, as two bn are para and two are AA(=helo) only. The US (one and only) Air Assault Division has a strength of 27.000 (the largest used to be a USMC Div @ 20.000)exactly because everything is organic (the other mentioned division has been maintained in para role, jumping out of “somebody else’s” planes.
- RM also have, the 3 commandos put together, a 50% share of the total manpower in them.
ArmChairCivvy, don’t forget the Piasecki Shawnee etc, the Boeing Vertol(they bought Piasecki) Sea Knight, or the Yakovlev Yak-24 twin rotor helis that were produced in large numbers.
On a minor point ACC,
There were at least two other twin rotor helicopters that made it to production. The 50′s vintage piston engined Piasecki H21 and the Boeing Vertol CH46 Sea Knight which has been a mainstay of the UCMC for many years.
I should have put in more text to retain the link to Brian’s 2 intervention Bridages + SF + beefed up TA:
- under such a scenario there would be enough organic lift (even after A-stan wear and tear) for all of 16AAB (again)
Hi Brian & KP,
Thanks, I knew I would be corrected because I was taking the “blurb” straight from Boeing announcement for the new Chinook version.
- just a good example that the Belvedere was absolutely ahead of its time, proved under battle conditions… then came the East-of-Suez moment, we lost not only the Belvedere (and are buying Chinooks, with or without the necessary software), but carriers as well as the 4th commando from the RM OrBat (roulement battalion in place, maybe that is cost effective?)
A few years ago,I worked with an ex-RAFairframe fitter who worked on Belvederes in the Far East, RAF Seletar. Unreliable, hard to maintain, not a pilot’s aircraft, inconvenient to get in and out of and the fuselage actually curved in flight. Apart from that… it was so good it lasted 8 years. Compare with the Whirlwind and Wessex. The Westland Westminster might have been a better aircraft.
Hi Brian,
I always wondered how we lost this Piasecki guy (to further West); ref the Piasecki Shawnee etc, the Boeing Vertol(they bought Piasecki) Sea Knight, and the the current Boeing product
- so the early design (the Belvedere) was right, but had to be further engineered somewhere else?
The problem I see with the AC130 is that it is very vulnerable to AA systems – even simple manually aimed cannon would be a danger (at least during the day). It’s orbitting attack profile means that it cannot be used safely against frontline targets because it would have to orbit over the enemy positions that it wasn’t attacking leaving it very vulnerable to, well, pretty much everything from SA7′s up.
RE “The problem I see with the AC130 is that it is very vulnerable to AA system”
- it is a pure (hugely effective) COIN solution, but only any good when RPGs are the AA weapon of the other side