It must be said the Royal Navy has a robust mine countermeasures capability and contributes to counter IED efforts as well. However, things do not stand still and there is a project in the early stages called the Future Mine Countermeasures/Hydrographic/Patrol Vessel (FMHPV) that seeks to define a replacement for the existing Hunt and Sandown specialist vessels, some of the hydrographic vessels and the patrol vessels.
The project will look at delivered effect and not be platform centric, so instead of creating a specialist vessel to carry out the task it will look at a number of means of delivery, not necessarily a dedicated vessel.
Mines represent the most likely method that will be employed to deny access to critical choke points and littoral environments. They are very difficult to counter and relatively cheap, a classic asymmetric weapon.
The IED of the maritime environment
Despite their effectiveness and the probability of us encountering them, the whole MCM area has received only a relatively small investment in comparison to others. This must change and MCM forms one of the ‘Capability Plus’ areas of the Think Defence proposal.
The general theme of combining patrol, hydrography and MCM has been in circulation for some time, culminating in the C3 concept. Many people have proposed a well armed vessel that is more patrol and less survey/MCM with resultant designs using a mission bay and modular equipment to fulfil these latter requirements. Jed wrote a good post on using the Spanish BAM as a C3, here
The problem with this is that if it looks like a warship, the Treasury will question the value of the C2 and ask some uncomfortable questions hence the RN dropping the C3 title and proposing anything that doesn’t look too fighty!
I also think that using a small frigate/large OPV design also misses the opportunity to really add capacity, the number of MCM specialists and amount of mission equipment they would be able to carry would not provide much of an uplift over the traditional dedicated vessels.
There is also a great deal of expertise in mine countermeasures in other European naval forces, the legacy of two major conflicts means that even today, sea mines in European waters remain a very real threat to shipping and sailors.
Current plans seem to point to a single class of vessel about 100m in length and between 2,000 and 2,500 tonnes displacement. These will deliver on the MCM, survey and patrol requirements using a range of off board systems like USV’s, UAV’s and UUV’s. This concept recognises the synergies between survey and mines countermeasures and desirability of unmanned systems. The RN is not alone in moving in this general direction, many nations are travelling the same road; the US Navy, Royal Australian Navy and French Navy (Système de Lutte Anti-Mines – Futur (SLAM-F)) all have similar projects and with the recent Anglo French defence cooperation treaty it is likely that a joint project of some sorts will emerge. France is the lead in an eleven nation European Defence Agency project on Maritime Mine Countermeasures; perhaps a consensus could be reached to harness the undoubted collective expertise in this area within European nations.
The emergent specification for the afloat component would seem to fit neatly around the Spanish BAM design.
The survey mission is vitally important to submarine operations as well as general navigation and a nice sideline in selling Admiralty Charts!
The 13,500 tonne HMS Scott is built around a very large, multi beam sonar, for deep-ocean surveys and I wonder if this role is ready to be replaced with UUV’s just yet.
The project is therefore seeking to replace the Hunt, Sandown, Echo and River classes.
Contents
The Mine Threat and Mine Countermeasures/Survey Missions
When looking at the mine countermeasures capability it is important to start with mission requirements and threats.
Expeditionary Missions, mines are a basic sea denial weapon, their objective is not necessarily to sink ships but deny movement. Clearing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) and supporting amphibious operations are the most common expeditionary requirement. The objective may not always be the complete neutralisation of all mines but to provide assured access or an acceptable level of risk.
Accurate surveys will be required for most expeditionary operations, especially amphibious.
National Missions, when looking at this subject we should not forget the legacy of old sea mines and other unexploded ordnance. Any new capability must still be able to counter these old fashioned but no less deadly threats. In addition, harbour and port clearance are national missions.
Accurate ‘charting’ is essential to safe navigation and operations for both surface and sub surface equipment. This mission is carried out on a routine (the sea bed is constantly changing) and reactive basis.
Threats, the diversity of mine threats creates a significant challenge.
Environments include the surf zone, very shallow water, shallow water and deep water.
Types of device include surface, anti invasion, buried, partially buried, moored contact, bottom influence, moored influence, floating contact and rising influence. These can range in sophistication from very simple WWI vintage devices to the latest mobile intelligent devices that use a variety of initiation methods.
Emerging Trends
With the rapid advance in unmanned underwater vehicle technology the need for dedicated and specialist vessels is diminishing, it is a trend that is being seen across all spectrums of defence, separating the useful bits from the means of their transport.
Much of the research and technology is dual military and civilian use, the increasing search for and exploitation of underwater natural resources is driving the need for novel technologies such as synthetic aperture sonar which offers a number of benefits over traditional side scan sonar.
This crossover between survey and mine detection presents obvious opportunities and the synergy between the military survey and mine countermeasures capabilities have been recognised for some time. Mine jamming, co-operating autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) and laser bathymetry are also starting to mature.
Classification of mines, once detected, can be a time consuming process.
A significant problem is that of false target detection. The sea bed environment of any large port is likely to be cluttered with all manner of debris and this dramatically increases the false target rate. This problem was encountered in clearance operations around Um Qasr where only the super human efforts of UK, US and Australian teams managed to work through the problem.
Research on the automated classification of threats continues to improve false target discrimination rates and speed the process up significantly but this might be an insurmountable or extremely expensive problem to resolve.
A wily enemy would exploit this classification slowness to slow down amphibious operations for example, by liberally seeding the sea bed with dummies.
Once detected and classified the device has to be destroyed and this is still largely carried out by clearance divers. Although there are guided systems these are expendable or one shot and very expensive. Stocks would be rapidly depleted, especially against dummy devices, so there is a great deal of effort to find autonomous stand-off systems that can deal with multiple devices and reduce human intervention.
The traditional approach of picking an amphibious landing location, surveying and clearing boat lanes to shore is being replaced with Rapid Environment Assessment where the whole point is to land where mines aren’t and wherever possible, where enemy forces aren’t. Autonomous underwater vehicles, possibly launched from submarines or larger unmanned underwater vehicles; can covertly generate a rapid obstacle and underwater topography picture. Classification, nuetralisation or the mapping of safe lanes may take place, or another location might be selected. This is an environment where survey and MCM are obviously one and the same.
It is a sector of rapid technological change.
Configuring and Equipping the Force
The current fleet consists of the Sandown-class (single role mine hunting) with the variable-depth multi-mode 2093, and the Hunt-class (sweeping and mine hunting) fitted with the hull-mounted 2193. Supporting NATO operations, amphibious operations, securing Sea Lines of Communication, providing harbour defence and clearing legacy munitions the current fleet (even accepting recent minor small reductions) is highly effective.
Recent introductions include the Hydroid Remus 100, Remus 600 and Atlas Elektronic Seafox C unmanned systems. The Hydroid systems support detection and classification whist the Seafox C is a compact disposable one shot neutralisation UUV. Ultra Electronics delivered the Seafox system in partnership with Babcock for the Royal Navy. Seafox was instrumental in the clearance operations for Operation Telic around Umm Qasr. Another UOR was the Shallow Water Influence Minesweeping System (SWIMS) designed to operate in the small rivers and waterways in the south of Iraq. SWIMS consists of a towed magnetic and acoustic source, a tow/power delivery cable, a power conditioning and control subsystem, and an external or palletised power supply. Its small size and reduced weight require minimum handling equipment, and it is deployable from a helicopter or surface craft by two personnel. 12 QinetiQ modified remote controlled Combat Support Boats (CSB) were also used to tow Australian Defence Industries (ADI) Mini Dyad System (MDS) and Pipe Noise Makers (PNMs) ahead of the RN minehunters as part of the SWIMS payload. It is worth noting that the system demonstrator was available within 3 weeks of order placement, a truly remarkable feat.
The Remus 100 is remarkably low cost, less than a quarter of a million pounds each and is seen as a derisking stepping stone towards the future capability.
The last combined influence sweep system deployment was in 2005 (the link provides a great rundown of the history of RN mine countermeasures)
There is a good account of mine countermeasures and survey operations, including information on SWIMS and Seafox, in Iraq here, here and here.
The Hunt/Sandown fleet is not due out of service for some time so any replacement programme has some time yet but incremental improvements have been, and will continue to be made.
Looking forward though, systems and their means of transport should be separate
This leads to a requirement for deployable set of survey and mine countermeasures systems that can be hosted by any number of UK or other vessels.
Systems, it is difficult to say anything sensible about systems because the pace of change is amazing. The emerging research trends point to a removal of manpower from high threat locations, greater autonomy and high capacity data processing to support rapid environmental assessments to be made.
Diver detection, ship/installation inspection and harbour/installation protection would also be a sensible inclusion. It is an area that needs greater emphasis an attack against offshore installations and harbours would have a significant impact to the UK.
The data rates and total data size generated by unmanned vehicles and sonar systems can be significant, number crunching at high speed will provide many practical benefits and the system deployed could take advantage of modern containerised data centres, easily upgradable as technology improves. This large data storage and processing capability also enables extensive post mission analysis. Sorry, couldn’t resist a container based solution!
Airborne systems continue to show promise, rapid particularly detection and nuetralisation but selection of these might be dependent on unmanned helicopters like the FireScout.
The US Littoral Combat Ship modules have had rather a chequered history but the MCM module seems to be the diamond in the rough, although a number of its component parts are some way from maturity.
Given the rapid fielding of SWIMS and the availability of rapidly maturing off the shelf systems from a variety of manufacturers including Kongsberg, Atlas Elektronic, Hydroid, Saab and Kokums we should be careful about creating an overly complex and long lived project that will inevitably deliver less than expected for more than expected.
A series of gap filling projects, leveraging multinational NATO and EU projects, might be the most sensible way forward, taking advantage of differing rates of technology maturity across the different capability areas.
Lets take advantage of the commercial market/collaborative projects, lets not be too ambitious and lets not rely on too much advanced technology to replace expertise.
Vessels, although the systems might be deployable by air and use local ships or operated from shore locations having an afloat component is obviously a requirement.
Instead of creating a new class of specific to role vessels I propose to simply reuse the commercially derived Forward Presence Ship design in order to drive down costs by hull and equipment commonality. It is lightly armed and un warlike in appearance so is not going to be confused for a C2 by anyone.
Crucially, it is a design that is built around economic, high endurance operations. Instead of a fleet of smaller vessels that will need RFA logistics support they will be able to operate in singles or groups without extensive support. The large size and hull configuration means it can operate in high sea states or transit oceanic distances.
Their large accommodation and mission space also means they can carry a large number of mission modules, small craft, unmanned systems, accommodation containers, diver support equipment and even a helicopter or two. The mission bay is significantly larger than for any offshore patrol boat derived design and this space means that complex system integration is avoided and systems changed, replaced and upgraded over time.
Previous operations have seen the RFA Dilligence or HMS Scott or an Echo Class supporting the smaller Hunt and Sandown MCM vessels, acting as a mothership and providing command and control and logistic support. In some way, the FP Ship becomes its own mothership but instead of supporting lots of specialised manned vessels, it supports lots of specialist unmanned systems and their operating crew.
The Forward Presence Squadrons will cover the patrol function and an additional number of Forward Presence Ships, 6 of, can be obtained to cover the survey/MCM role. It would also be possible to surge additional systems and operators onto repositioned FP Ships should the need for an ‘all hands to the pump’ arise.
If a short response were required, the crews and equipment could be flown forward to the FPS location and operated from the FPS Ship. This could be reinforced by the main force if required at a later date. Early intervention may be necessary.
One would always be allocated to the NATO standing mine countermeasures task in European waters and the others could be forward deployed in singles or as a group, depending on training and maintenance schedules. The operational capability might also be deployed independently of the ships in some circumstances.
Although the C3 term is now no longer used it is as good a description as any for the Forward Presence Ship, combining patrol, security, MCM and survey roles.
######## OTHER POSTS IN THIS SERIES ##########
The Future of the Royal Navy 01 – (Context)
The Future of the Royal Navy 02 – (Tasks and General Approach)
The Future of the Royal Navy 03 – (Single Task Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 04 – (Forward Presence Squadrons)
The Future of the Royal Navy 05 – (Equipment – T26)
The Future of the Royal Navy 06 – (Capability Plus)
The Future of the Royal Navy 07 – (Equipping the Forward Presence Squadron)
The Future of the Royal Navy 08 – (Equipping the Littoral Operations Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 09 – (Equipping the Disaster Support Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 10 – (Mine Countermeasures and Survey)
Hi TD,
“The current fleet consists of the Sandown-class (single role mine hunting) with the variable-depth multi-mode 2093, and the Hunt-class (sweeping and mine hunting) fitted with the hull-mounted 2193…is highly effective.”
- it is – and not necessarily (quickly) deployable to the relevant theatre, so is this not a classic “case” for creating an active force (the more ocean going) and a reserve force (capable, but more relevant only if needed close to home, which, in its turn is not an imminent (but still a possible) threat? Fits the reserve(s) mobilisation time profile?
Looking into how best to go forward (and for once, not in too much hurry),
RE “Given the rapid fielding of SWIMS and the availability of rapidly maturing off the shelf systems from a variety of manufacturers including Kongsberg, Atlas Elektronic, Hydroid, Saab and Ko[c]kums”
- should we not trial combinations of these (and existing kit) to see 1. at what cost complete capability would come; 2. at what sort of numbers should/could the components ideally be combined (bang-for-the-buck, and that includes manpower); and critically, how much space & what kind of ship would that then require, without making the hull 100% single purpose?
The future of MCMV is robotics; there won’t be a need to have a man carrying hull attached to the side scanning sonar or ROV.
The hydrographic hulls are used as motherships as there aren’t many spare large hulls. Other hulls like Sir Galahad have be used too. It is nothing to do with the fact that MCMV and hydro’ look “under the sea.” Actually Scott’s lack of a flight deck would probably make her less than suitable.
X, I think the deep ocean stuff needs a massive transducer, hence the 13,500 tonne ship is built around it. Of course advances may replace this but not sure when.
Thats the point I am trying to make, the field is rapidly advancing and going off in all directions. Lets take advantage of this and not get too deep in multi billion pound projects that will be out of date by the time it is fielded.
Small incremental steps, using a modular approach and a large cheap seagoing pickup truck to carry it when needed
TD thanks I know why Scott is a big un’. And I am aware of the importance of hydography to submarine warfare that is why I don’t like the idea of it being farmed out.
Again I don’t see why this should be multi-million pound stuff. Of course I don’t run BAE.
Some more background reading for you fellows
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/mcm.pdf
http://www.demine.org/SCOT/Papers/Almquist.pdf
http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td2102/pollitt.pdf
http://www.docstoc.com/docs/15523567/Organic-Mine-Countermeasures-Future-Naval-Capabilities
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2008warfare/R4Hebert.pdf
http://www.hydroidinc.com/pdfs/Acoustic_Network_for_MCM.pdf
TD
I couldn’t agree more if ever a capability was asking for modularity it is this one. Just from a quick glance of the material you posted shows the enormous variety there is in the solutions to this threat. This will be an area of rapidly changing technology in much the same way as your home computer, what is state of the art today will need updating in 2-3 years time. But some things remain constant. This is where the NATO nations the Swedes, Australians need to come together and all agree common interfaces with industry. Such as everyone uses the same coding software, same units of measurement, everything has to fit into ISO 20 type containers, same plug and play sockets etc. This allows industry to start from a common base but use their money and inovate using rapid pro-typing to get new answers in the knowledge if they get a good solution there is a large market there not restricted to just one country. The other advantage is smaller companies can get involved as the system is not so complicated that it is the preserve of the large multinations.
Yes an ABCA for minewarfare.
As I’ve posted elsewhere, it’s no longer FMHPV, it’s now called MHPC. And that pretty well articulates the priorities – minesweeping is the biggy, with hydrography in second place, and patrol is what happens when the MCM AUV’s are removed for maintenance.
It’s also worth a mention of how the USN does this stuff, mostly with the MH-53E Sea Dragon – nice if you have the space for a Super Stallion and can afford the fuel bill.
It’s worth rereading some of the Venator stuff again, as that’s probably the best unrestricted guide to RN thinking on their requirements, plus some likely practical constraints.
http://media.bmt.org/bmt_media/resources/33/BMTVenator.pdf
The need to sweep ahead of battle groups has them requiring a cruise speed of 18kts @SS6 and top speed of 25kts, which in turn knocks out SWATH designs unless you really throw power at them (and the BAM only does 21kts). BMT think that standard ISO containers are too big and space-inefficient for this size of ship, they prefer the smaller sub-intermodal sizes which are still standard (already being used for eg Merlin support) and can still be stuffed in a ISO box for transport, but which are more manageable on board.
I would argue that if the MCM area of the RN has seen a lack of investment or underfunding, it is a very recent phenomenon as we had the biggest MCM fleet in Europe if not the world at the end of the Cold War. Of course this fleet has been slashed just like the rest, and the Hunt’s are now very old (I was part of the commissioning crew of one in 1987 !).
As for deployable versus reserve, the last active sea going element of the RNR with its own ships was in fact the River class minesweepers, built on a trawler type design they were for “armed, deep team sweep” (that is the sweep wire is “armed” with explosive cutters – it doesn’t mean other MCMV’s were un-armed… ).
Ref: “The problem with this is that if it looks like a warship, the Treasury will question the value of the C2 and ask some uncomfortable questions hence the RN dropping the C3 title and proposing anything that doesn’t look to fighty!”
And therein lies the whole problem of course – Treasury should supply budget to MoD, and RN decides what it needs to achieve the taskings required of it, regardless of what a ship class looks like to land lubbers !!!
Re: the Venator (design) pdf, I like the mission garage early on in the document, but when one gets to p.5 side view and fixed mission systems, it starts to look a bit anaemic.
This top view is of a ship that is a quarter of the design’s size
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ecuadorian_navy_ship_ESMERALDAS.jpg
…and should there not be any of the half dozen corvettes for LOG, would the incremental cost of these “box standard” systems be much? You can drop the ship-to-ship (Exocets in the picture, as they are so compact) and put in a Sea Sparrow, for instance (as it does both air and swarming boats at a distance that let’s you deal with several). You can drop the second 76 mm to emphasize helo deck (telescopic in the design) and the mission garage. But I have understood that we are not wanting a 3000t hull (many of them) just for MCM?
Someone must have a more recent inventory of modularised systems (this is 9 years old, shown in Wiki), but just to consider what sort of space in what locations should be reserved:
SSM 2 twin launchers for Boeing AGM-84 Harpoon missiles 10
SAM 6-cell Mk 48 Mod 3 launcher for RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles 20
Gun 1 Otobreda 76/62 Super Rapid gun 19
ASW Launchers for MU90 Impact torpedoes 4
VDS Thales Underwater Systems TSM 2640 Salmon variable-depth active/passive sonar 4
MCM Command and control equipment to operate MSF and MRD class drone minehunters and Double Eagle ROVs 5
Crane 1 hydraulic crane for launch/recovery of a RHIB or deployment of sea mines 22
Oceanography 2
Anti-pollution 3
Survey 1
Storage 14
SIGINT/ELINT 1
The numbers at the end of each line are not important (just an indicator how many of each the Danes had in use at a given point in time), but considering the highest priority missions, there will be hot competition for the space enabling launch over stern, and therefore other ways to get stuff in and out of sea should be part of the design?
- I have no competence in ship design [that must show], but food for thought anyway
there will be hot competition for the space enabling launch over stern, and therefore other ways to get stuff in and out of sea should be part of the design?
This is one of the reasons TD is interested in offshore support vessels – a lot of them have a “moon pool”, like a miniature version of the dock on a LPD, for launching and recovering divers, robots, etc.
Alternatively, perhaps some of the StanFlex slots on a covered mission deck could have a “gun port” over the side?
Given how specialised MCM is as a field, and how intensive it is in ships at the moment, it looks like a mistake to bet everything on robots that might not happen and not get enough keels. If the robots show up, all very good, they can operate from a Venator/global corvette/whatnot. If they don’t and we didn’t build more than three 5,000 tonne OSV-derived vessels, we’re completely fucked because there’s no way the terrorist group Cuts Jihad is going to accept laying down more ships once we’ve already had more ships and a bunch of R&D spending on robots that didn’t work.
Sorry but I think mixing MCM, patrol, and hyrdographic duties is a silly mish mash.
There are reasons why a Sandown is like it is and the are reasons why a River is like it is.
X, why don’t you write something up then, I will post it
A question regarding the current Hunt/Sandown classes. I know that each have their strengths in costal waters and variable depth environments, also the Sandown class does not cover the ‘sweep’ role. Is it possible to move kit from one class to the other, and basically just have 8 vessels of one class? Would this be enough to cover our needs?
The point I’m getting at is that it seems that there is no capability advantage to going to ‘hybrid’ vessels now or even in the next 10-20 years. It’s all about possible ‘cost’ savings which may or may not appear. If we focused on maintaining a smaller core of ships then we can invest when the technology is more mature and cheaper (say 2030+).
My understanding is that the current MCMV vessels are also used as Patrol vessels, which in my view they are not really suitable for (especially with no helicopter capability). By reducing the numbers of MCMVs we can divert the funds to increasing the numbers of C3s which in the short term should be focused on the Patrol role to ease the issues with the reduction in the escort fleet.
Just a quick one – traditionally minesweepers have had advantages from shallow draft, low magnetic / acoustic signatures, and other features. The sheer size of the projected Forward Presence ships that have been discussed seems to go against all these rules. Are we anticipating that AUVs and other technologies will mitigate against these shortcomings?
Thanks
DomS
whatever new name the C3 assumes, it ought to be in the region of 2,500 tonnes as i am led to understand this is the minimum for good sea-keeping in adverse sea conditions.
DomS asked: “The sheer size of the projected Forward Presence ships that have been discussed seems to go against all these rules. Are we anticipating that AUVs and other technologies will mitigate against these shortcomings?”
Yes that seems to be the general move around the world when you look at the current crop of R&D. As noted Hunt / Sandown were “conventional” 1980′s (erm,dare I say it “cold war”) designs based on UK / NATO requirements to keep our ports open, allow subs to sally forth and clear choke points. They were both very sophsiticated compared to previous 1950′s vintage wooden warships, and both very expensive pound for tonne (or pound per foot of length). While the Hunt’s could do physical sweep, and we did in the Gulf during the Iran / Iraq war, against moored contact mines, they were also able to sweep deeper waters with magnetic and acoustic influence sweeps. At the same time they were the first RN MCMV’s to introduce ROV’s with the PAP104 mine disposal ROV. The PAP was not a mine hunter itself though, it just dropped a “bomb” next to a mine, in order to detonate it. The Sandown took things a step further with no sweep gear and their innovative sonar.
Generally around the world the experts consider the next step as being to need a less specialist vessel by transferring the tasking to the remote operated vehicles, be they large-ish remote surface ships like the Danes use, or various size and shapes of sonar equipped remotely operated submersibles. The only Navy doing anything different at all is the USN with its predilection for airborne MCMV and weird stuff the rest of us can’t afford. Airborne includes the MH53 Dragon with its towed influence and acoustic sweeps, and the new heli-borne sensors for finding, and 30mm super-cavitating cannon for destroying, shallow water mines. Mind you, I also had the honour to meet some USN MCM Dolphins in Bahrain back in 88, I kid you not !
So the question to me boils down to this, are the remote surface and sub-surface platforms mature enough to operate from a big metal OSV type ship, or do we need to stretch out the life of the “tuperware navy” with it’s very expensive low signature platforms (as I don’t think we can afford another, new class of “old fashioned” low signature MCMV’s). Don’t forget in our expeditionary world, these OSV based MCMV’s would be deployed anywhere around the world, not clearing UK ports and coastal choke points. On that point, when we first deployed to the Gulf in 87, HMS Abdiel the MCM “support ship” was found to be so old and decrepit it was almost more of a case of us (the Hunt’s) supporting her ! This led to HMS Herald, a oceanographic / hydrographic survey ship being pushed into the role, and finally the RFA Diligence. Also, a Hunt being around 600 tonnes, can only stay at sea for so long and on the way to the gulf we got hit by a storm in the med that almost wrecked us – I have honestly never been quite so afraid of really sinking (!) so size does have some advantages
The current Hunt fleet ended its commitment to Fishery Protection with the introduction of the River class, so there is no longer an MCM element in the UK Patrol inventory. For the FP role they embarked additional RHIBS in the form of two SeaRiders, but retained their full sweeping and hunting capabilities. The exceptions to this were the three Hunts of the Northern Ireland squadron, which ditched their sweep gear and embarked two larger RHIBS plus two heavy duty cranes to launch and recover them. They were still able to minehunt, however. All three have been decommissioned and were never used after being withdrawn from Northern Ireland – two have been sold to Lithuania and one is now a training hulk. The only aspect of the Hunt which made it unsuitable for FP was its low top speed. Otherwise the class made a significant contribution to this tasking.
I think the move towards a multi role platform is one of the better moves by the RN and MOD, and TD makes a very clear point that MCM and surveying have a huge amount in common. By my count we have eight Hunt class, seven Sandown class, four River class and two Echo class, a total of 21 hulls. Let us assume we progress with the MHPC and follow one of TD’s recommendations which I think we all agree with, a commercially derived platform of around 90m in length and around 2000 tons armed with a minimum of two 30mm calibre gun systems. I am going to attempt to persuade you that 15 MHPC’s could replace the lot.
MCM. The current fleet of 15 hulls contributes 4 hulls in the Gulf, a standing commitment to UK port surveys including the approaches to the major naval bases, and a standing commitment of at least one MCM to the NATO Standing MCM force. The Gulf hulls consist of two Sandown and two Hunt class, giving a mixture of sweeping and hunting capabilities in deep and shallow water. Of the 15 proposed MHPC’s, this capability could be replaced by five ships; two in the Gulf, one on UK duty and one attached to NATO. A fifth could/should be in workup and training, or in maintenance. If the Gulf commitment continues, then two of the much larger and more capable MHPC’s could replace the four MCM’s, especially if the MHPC can conduct hunting and sweeping using remote vehicles.
More relevantly, the current RN MCM fleet leads the way in using remote vehicles (SeaFox and REMUS). Since we are already exploiting the unmanned capabilities relevant to MCM, there is no reason why the Hunts and Sandowns cannot continue until end-of-life as over-engineered launch platforms, with the sonar in reserve in case the ROV’s hit a capability gap which only a manned sonar could close (maybe operations in deep and rocky coastlines, areas prone to poor weather, etc).
The remaining hulls frequently spend significant periods of time in maintenance because the extreme magnetic and acoustic hygiene requirements of the design required some relatively temperamental systems. A commercially derived MHPC will have fewer maintenance issues, as many have posted on the greater availability of proven commercial designs and faulty systems could be swapped out.
Patrol duties. The baseline MHPC is a capable patrol ship – high endurance, good seakeeping, two organic RHIBS, a moderate level of self protection (we seem to be in agreement on a basic armament of two 30mm weapons) and the added bonus of a helicopter platform. At present three hulls are required for UK FP operations, of which one may well be in its maintenance cycle. So, if we take a further three hulls from the MHPC pool, you have a total of four vessels operating around the UK. The home MCM task can be easily rotated from one vessel to another, and such tasking does not endure year-round anyway. Finally take another hull for the standing Falklands commitment (currently filled by HMS CLYDE). Total to date – 10 hulls covering UK home and NATO duties/commitments.
Survey – the two Echo class are likely to be the last of the MCM/FP/H classes to decommission given their age and capabilities. However a quick scan of the sensors embarked show that none of these sensors require a dedicated hull mounting and could be easily deployed by articulated arm (for the Simrad multibeam sonar) or towed winch system (for the SeaSoar oceanic depth profiler). If the RHIB launch and recovery system could be made sufficiently capable, there is no reason why it could not host one or two of the workboats currently in use by ECHO and ENTERPRISE to continue the inshore surveying operations. Two more MHPC’s then, total so far, 12.
That leaves 3 hulls available for the various global commitments we have been commenting on, counter piracy, counter drugs, etc. The baseline weapons fit would have to be enhanced for these ships, but I see no reason why the baseline design could not include provision for a modular 76mm gun forwards (STANFLEX the best example seen to date) and be fitted for but not with a Phalanx or SeaRAM system elsewhere. Add in the two 30mm systems either side and you have a rather potent overseas patrol hull. (On the gun module forwards, the RIVER class has a forward compartment with horizontal deck hatch and HIAB crane, used for embarking stores but easily big enough for the STANFLEX 76mm module). There would be a need in the baseline design for a good surveillance radar, but this complements the patrol role. And opting for the in-service MSI Systems SeaHawk 30mm gun brings a pair of electro-optical surveillance devices as well, all part of the basic design.
Finally, the choice of a common hull means that if one goes down, another could be cycled into its place. If the Falklands hull suddenly gains the ability to conduct MCM with the simple addition of a few modules, then it’s a win. If the Gulf ships had a third hull in the Squadron which went off pirate hunting off Somalia, then again systems and ships could be rotated to deliver the mission if one goes down, or simply to enhance crew training opportunities. And final, final point – in the 21 ships of the current MCM/FP/H flotilla, only the MCM vessels do not operate a 3 watch manning cycle. The rest run such cycles and have 330/365 availability. What an improvement to the MCM force that sort of availability would be.
Hi Jed @ 2:41,
Good points there, I will just try to tag on some additional views:
RE “the USN with its predilection for airborne MCMV and weird stuff the rest of us can’t afford. Airborne includes the MH53 Dragon with its towed influence and acoustic sweeps, and the new heli-borne sensors for finding, and 30mm super-cavitating cannon for destroying, shallow water mines. Mind you, I also had the honour to meet some USN MCM Dolphins in Bahrain back in 88, I kid you not !
- FROM DID OF TODAY: new [USN} minehunter ship classes like the Ospreys are being retired by the US Navy and sold – in an era where the threat of mines is arguably rising. That makes AMCM [see below] a doubly-critical program.”
[ Even the USN not being able to afford the huge fuel bill for the huge MH-53s... so back to DID:]” The smaller MH-60S helicopter’s Airborne Mine Counter-Measures (AMCM) system adds an operator’s station to the helicopter cabin, additional internal fuel stores, and towing capability, accompanied by a suite of carried systems that can be mixed and matched. AMCM is actually 5 different air, surface and sub-surface mine countermeasures systems, all deployed and integrated together in the helicopter.”
Back to Jed “So the question to me boils down to this, are the remote surface and sub-surface platforms mature enough …., or do we need to stretch out the life of the “tuperware navy” with it’s very expensive low signature platforms (as I don’t think we can afford another, new class of “old fashioned” low signature MCMV’s)”
- this latter part is exactly what I said early on; if we have a paid-for & fit-for-purpose capability, let’s not do the US thing, ie,
- new minehunter ship classes like the Ospreys are being retired by the US Navy and sold –
- but put some in reserve, keep the ones that can actually (at least almost!) get to the theatre and slowly, start building the multi-role capability, working the old and new side by side and being double-sure that it works
Hi Somewhat Removed @ 4:01,
commercially derived platform of around 90m in length and around 2000 tons armed with a minimum of two 30mm calibre gun systems… 15 MHPC’s could replace the lot.
- great count of duties/ hulls
- if we talk about X Bows, the smallest that would fit is a ROV specialised vessel at 3k t; otherwise I would counter with
- Securitor ( a more real life Venator-MHPV-OPV).
- look for this under RINA Warship 2010 (authors “Venator” A C Kimber & J Booth); sorry, I first put it under the 08 thread
- weighs in at 108m & 3.5k t
Further: “The baseline MHPC is a capable patrol ship – high endurance, good sea keeping, two organic RHIBS, a moderate level of self protection (we seem to be in agreement on a basic armament of two 30mm weapons) and the added bonus of a helicopter platform.”
- a bit on the light side, but a base to give ALL of them CIWS without any further work/ modification
- and no expensive battle control system as standard fit, rather, a capable sensor suite
And “The baseline weapons fit would have to be enhanced for these ships, but I see no reason why the baseline design could not include provision for a modular 76mm gun forwards (STANFLEX the best example seen to date) and be fitted for but not with a Phalanx or SeaRAM system elsewhere”
- the USN RDS-2010 design has both Phalanx and SeaRAM; whereas the UK 108m design referred to could take a container with the 76mm and then slightly higher, towards the bridge another container (substitute SeaRAM for the the existing SeaSparrow module-rized)… And
-opting for the in-service MSI Systems SeaHawk 30mm gun brings a pair of electro-optical surveillance devices as well, all part of the basic design.
Alex
The budget for the MHPC project is seemingly around £1.4bill.
Serious money in anyone langauage.
A previous poster put up a link to an interview with the guy leading the whole programme and he said that the vessel under investigation was currently sized at 2.5K tons and 100m.
Step change from the Hunt / Sandown vessels we already have.
Ocean going capability looks to be on the agenda as is the need for a vialble patrol platform.
As always, loads of questions still outstanding:
Split of the budget:
1) Concept generation.
2) R+D – hull and payloads
3) Detailed design
4) Cost of an individual ship – only one hull size being built?
5) Numbers of hulls
6) Timing
2.5K tons looks a bit on the small side for me.
However the unit cost is the biggie and will tell if the MOD / RN have moved on from the T45 / CVF fiasco.
TD said “X, why don’t you write something up then, I will post it”
I hope you don’t think I was criticising you. This is one of my favourite places on the net and I humbled by the breadth of knowledge and displays of imagination shown by the regular crew. I know I can get angsty on occasion but I have mental health issues.
Um. All I was saying was that Sandown have grp hulls, Voith Schneider propellers, bow thrusters, non-ferrous fittings, etc. to reduce their signature to potential mines and allow for the ship to be positioned as accurately as possible. Even their small size (and hull form) results in less water pressure. If the sensors etc. can be placed on small manless platforms to much the better. But even this remote controlled hulls will be bulky and tying a “potential frigate” to move and control them would be a waste. There is a reason why the Sandowns were the most expensive warships per ton the RN has ever purchased.
I bet at some time all manner of RN vessels have done survey work. But I think today’s E-boats are optimum. Their size gives them good endurance and it is distant shores that need to be surveyed. (Though there are always surprising holes on charts even for European waters.) But just because they need to have bow thrusters etc, to give them accurate positioning it doesn’t mean you would want it tied into a MCM role. As said there are reasons for the GRP etc. and the small size. Could a basic design design be shared with a long range corvette? Perhaps the basic hull form but by the time had been modified for a hanger etc. and perhaps stretched we would be virtually at new design. I imagine that the new E-boats are built just as Scott is around their sonar equipment. So perhaps in a way they are position instruments.
As for OPVs well I can see the HMT funding a 3000 ton corvette or even RN asking for one. The Rivers are built around a hull to provide good endurance, good speed (for its purpose,) good seakeeping (have you seen how V shaped their hulls are? Eek!) and (increasingly important) good accommodation standards. Remember the Islands were tough, though not uncomfortable were hardly Cunard-esque, and lastly there were more of them. (But not that many more considering refits etc.) Even though I advocate bow thrusters for RN ships fitting one doesn’t mean whomever is driving the ship will have the same control as ship fitted with dynamic positioning.
Small ships work best when built with operation in mind.
with one operation or task in mind.
X, I wasn’t taking offence, far from it mate, it’s a genuine open invite, to everyone actually
I am not at all precious about the stuff I write, it’s often cack!
I want to finish the logistics post, do a summary and then post a couple of articles I have from other contributors on matters watery, alternative opinions etc.
Then on to other things I think, don’t want people thinking this is a pro naval site after all!
precision instruments
Why not “people thinking this is a pro naval site after all!”?
Participation rates at least double from the other topics, or is it that there is actually more to discuss as not much deep thought seems to have gone into matters naval in the super-rapid SDSR?
- or was it that on the civvy street the land and maritime thinkers were evenly divided (perhaps just on a religious basis, without being able to make a coherent connection to UK’s national strategy and how the Forces play/ should play within it?
aye aye shippers, (my attached to the army, navy mate would shout that to me every morning)!!!
thought you sea boffins would like a look at this, seems an idea for the future.
http://www.gizmag.com/spider-optics-rov-tether-system/17260/
Completely OT, but people might be interested in Flight’s free downloadable guide to the world’s airforces :
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2010/12/14/350794/tough-choices-world-air-forces-directory-2010.html
Interesting reading…
Hi I’m a new poster on here so here goes.
I’m liking the potential budget size and Somewhat Removed’s ideas. I’m more inclined to drop the C2 requirements. Instead build 8 C1 with sonar 2087 and then build a further 6 C1 without (fills in for C2) the ASW stuff and instead use the space for a bigger mission bay/GP frigate. Then any further funds can be diverted to a C3+ type vessel of around 3,500, which can patrol and have a suitably large aft mission bay area (al a venatar) for MCM etc. There’s a nice idea of what I’m thinking of in shipbucket under son/grandson of a River (See below). If we had around 20/21 of these vessels we could have a small permanent MCM squadrons and still be able to deploy small groups (2/3 of them) around the globe for anti-piracy, patrol/presence, etc. This would make up for the lack of C2 and allow the high-end escorts to protect the carrier and amphibious groups. I would for the mean time keep the hydrographic squadron with separate ships until industry can supply “swappable” systems suitable for a non-specialised hull.
http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Alternate Universe/GB OPV C3 Son of a River 1b AU.gif
http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Alternate Universe/GB OPV C3 Grandson of a River 1b AU.gif
http://www.shipbucket.com/images.php?dir=Alternate Universe/GB OPV C3 Son of a River 4 MCM AU.gif
P.S. I have cobbled together my own idea for a structure of the future navy if anybody interested in hearing it.
Hi mintcake, yes, when I have finished the series I am going to post some alternatives people have submitted, including yours
If we are allowed to make requests, can we have some articles on the future of the post-Afghanistan Army, as while I know nothing about the Army they look like they are in dire need of a fundamental review of their structure, mission and equipment post-Afghanistan.
Hi TD. Sorry about that, i didn’t mean to pressure. I wrote that after spending 5 hours revising for a pure chemistry exam (the joys of uni).
Anyway would anybody like to have a guess at what the cost difference would be to stretch the River class by 25m and fix the handling etc compared to using say the ULSTEIN P108 (its also an icebreaker circa 2800 tonnes) and uprating the speed, handling and kitting it out.
http://www.ulsteingroup.com/Kunder/ulstein/mm.nsf/inpdocument/244C75221361CB4BC12571A7003EAB23/$file/ULSTEIN%20P108.pdf
Hi,
If someone can answer TMM’s question, one further would be to marry the BMT Protector design (functionality rather than the hull) and this one: http://www.ulsteingroup.com/kunder/ulstein/cms66.nsf/pages/shipdesign.htm?open&qnfl=flash#shipdesign/s-series/ulsteins101/product/ulsteins10
The former 108m and 3.5k t and the latter 88m and 3.4k t.
Without having had any exposure to ship design I would hazard a guess that the hull form would compensate for slamming and pitch in rougher seas, despite the difference in length?
TMM @ 12.42
The ship you have found is probably not the best one in the Ulstein range, it has an icebreaker hull and its hull form is built to clear a channel of ice not go on missile polishing expeditions in the NA dreaming of a pre 89 world.
Looking at its dimension I would hazard a guess at a standard displacement of 7K tons with its designed cargo load onboard.
The ship will probable have a high block factor as in the hull takes up a lot of the cuboid that you can draw around a ship using its published dimensions.
Wl: 92m x 20m x 7.5m
Installed power = 18MW for 16 knots.
Length to breadth ratio of 4.6 is very low and the ice breaking bow is designed not for speed or efficiency but to not surprisingly break ice.
The Venator is basically a cheap frigate / OPV and its dimensions reflect this:
Wl: 90m x 15m x 4m = 2,680 tons.
L/B = 6
Cb = 0.5′ish (Block factor)
Talks about 25knots so I would expect an installed power of 20MW +.
Finally one comment related directly to here, the words by the guy incharge of the MHPV programme point almost directly to a Venator style of vessel.
I hope not as the Venator design is pretty poor compared to what is out there commercially. It is too small, too close in style to a thrifted frigate and does not offer enough space for growth. In addition the break in the strength deck just before the payload area is not the way to go.
Better to go for a wider / deeper hull and 4 med speed diesels with an IEP powertrain.
Also all this talk about a 90m hull so that the internal damage control and strength functions will be lower than thos allowed in any RN vessel over 92m would seem to be playing games with accepted standards and is a bit cheap considering people will be going to war in them.
Do you think I should send my idea for a £50mill frigate / 6K ton colonial sloop to them for discussion?
i always start my boat comments with a know nothing about this experience equals 24 hrs going around the isle of wight before kicking ass on brown beach (many startled bathers as half of 5AB drove past)! However there is a similar discussion going on at the arsse site at the moment one of the clever lot mentioned the formidible class used by the singapore navy seems to have some good points,115m 3.2k tonnes,27kts and 4200nm range
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formidable_class_frigate
Yes. I always think their bridge structure is well thought out
Thanks FBOT. Im an undergaduate chemist not naval architect so thanks for the info. I like your idea about a 6k colonial sloop, i just cant see HMT allowing the RN to get them. Maybe a 3,500 to 4,500 tonne colonial sloop.
I like ArmChairCivvy idea of the Ulstein S101. How about the havyard 858 or is that a bit to big?
Horribly off-topic I know but I’ve just seen that BATSUB Belize is being mothballed:
“The training area gives British troops some of the most testing exercises in the world with access to 5,000 square miles of primary jungle provided for free by the Belize government. In the last three years 9,000 troops, including special forces, have been to Belize. They additionally provide high level training for the Belize Defence Force.
Mothballing BATSUB will save the MoD £9 million, the cost of two Challenger 2 tanks, but is seen as a tiny saving compared to the £36 billion overspend by the MoD.”
Full article here:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8204320/Jungle-training-axed-as-Belize-base-shuts.html
Hopefully this is only a short term measure.
Dom
More on-topic:
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness/ChangesToRoyalNavysSurfaceFleetAnnounced.htm
@TD
“Jed wrote a good post on using the Spanish BAM as a C3, here
The problem with this is that if it looks like a warship, the Treasury will question the value of the C2 and ask some uncomfortable questions hence the RN dropping the C3 title and proposing anything that doesn’t look to fighty!”
This one made me thinking.
Let’s say, BAM would be chosen as C3. Let’s assume, you could also put the weaponry and sensor kit of a light frigate onto it (which should pose no problem, as the Israeli Sa’ar 5 corvette is showing).
Questions: why on earth would you opt to build a dedicated C2 at all if you have a platform which can be adapted? Which role would you want them to fill out, which can’t be done by a BAM-derivate? Land-attack? Wouldn’t be a “steel is cheap, air is free” (sorry, couldn’t resist) arsenal ship full of VLS-cells the better solution?
If an ASW-T26 comes in at £500m, a GP-variant will still be in the £360-440m range. For this money, you could get three or four BAM-derivates, fully adaptable if you take your module-concept serious. Even for an Absalon I would still get two BAMs. Which – btw – would be an equally capable trade protector, but you have two of them.
So, HMT is bloody right. The RN could build 30 BAM-C2s for 10 T26-C2s, treasury says “stay 10″, RN says “20 then”, deal.
@Jed
“And therein lies the whole problem of course – Treasury should supply budget to MoD, and RN decides what it needs to achieve the taskings required of it, regardless of what a ship class looks like to land lubbers !!!”
The RN seems not to be capable of adjusting to a given budget. The treasury is not guilty of the RN constantly botching up it’s procurement projects, not guilty of the RN having more top brass than ship bells, not guilty in the UKs armed forces gaining disastrous value for money.
She is guilty in making planning assessments over a large period hard, if not impossible. But then you have to shorten the planning circles. A 10 years timeframe for planning the Vanguard-replacement, I mean, come on. We are in the age of CAD + 3D design. Shouldn’t these tools make design easier?
I come to the impression, that these long planning times are part of the spiral to death. 12 Astutes planned, to be built in 10 years. Nothing to build over a 10 year period, so the trained personnel leaves the yard. More than enough time to think, thinking leads to top-of-the-notch, which costs money. Fewer Astutes ordered, 4 years late. Further personnel is set free. Building starts, not having enough qualified shipbuilders leads to quality problems, another 2 years lost. Astute run on a shoal by it’s skipper, another year. Next class, please.
McZ – your right, but that is not an RN operational issue, its a Treasury and MOD(N) issue. It is also a political issue. The only thing it has to do with the admiralty per se, is that we have had a generation of admirals who roll over to have their bellies tickled by the PM ! Of course that is a rant and not fair, as we don’t know what the Admirals have pointed out to Blair and everyone who has come after him in the privacy of No 10 – still it would have been nice to see one with the balls to publicly resign and start a media ruckus over such topics !!
McZ @ , I am wholly with you in
” But then you have to shorten the planning circles. A 10 years timeframe for planning the Vanguard-replacement, I mean, come on. We are in the age of CAD + 3D design. Shouldn’t these tools make design easier?”
- howvever, the example is unfortunate as, for once, we are using “industry standard” components, ie. the new launcher block from the US.
- as I understand it is not ready yet (bingo! The RN got an extra Astute due to the delay)
- the Russians have struggled for ten years with their new launch block (also with the missile, but the problem is probably interconnected), so at least in this case the R has been done and only the &D is left (= much less risk)
McZ
3D Design packages do make things easier however the product management systems that go with them these days tend to drive designers crazy. Also you have to remember that the introduction of 3d design packages has been used by companies to significantly reduce their engineering staff. We as a country have a severe lack of engineers of all disciplines and its only getting worse. This coupled with the large gap between orders and this creates the perfect storm you see unfolding across not only defence projects but civil ones as well. Slightly off topic I know but it has been a contributing factor to the some of the difficulties which projects were currently discussing
Mark it isn’t off topic at all.
Hi Mark,
RE “coupled with the large gap between orders and this creates the perfect storm you see unfolding across not only defence projects but civil ones as well”
- like Airbus (with coordination) across design teams for the 380 in several countries;
- they used different versions of the same CAD/CAM package
- ended up doing hundreds of kilometres of wiring by hand and writing off about 2 bn for delays, compensation and extra and/or re-work
ArmChairCivvy
I am pretty familiar with the Airbus design environment, it is one of the better ones ive experience but is very much handicapped by politics.
Looks like the FMHPV is tailored to the same requirements like the Australian Offshore Combatant. So I disagree, that this will be a cooperation between RN and MN.
http://www.navy.gov.au/w/images/Semaphore_2010_4.pdf
x says:
@ X post December 13, 2010 at 6:44 pm
“Um. All I was saying was that Sandown have grp hulls, Voith Schneider propellers, bow thrusters, non-ferrous fittings, etc. to reduce their signature to potential mines and allow for the ship to be positioned as accurately as possible. Even their small size (and hull form) results in less water pressure. If the sensors etc. can be placed on small manless platforms to much the better. But even this remote controlled hulls will be bulky and tying a “potential frigate” to move and control them would be a waste. There is a reason why the Sandowns were the most expensive warships per ton the RN has ever purchased.”
I understand your point on signatures. Its solid. However as i am reading “One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander” i have one question.
Where were the hunters/sweepers back in those days ?
In transit !
With their hull designed for low pressure signature their maximum speed is very much limited (12 – 13 knots). This is a drawback which back then forced the battlefield commander to send in a frigate to “clear” plausible mined waters.
Concerning your remark on price/weight ratio. It is true, low signatures do cost money, but one have to add a remarkt next to it. As they are build in GRP their weight is much lower (around a third?) than a comparable “steel” ship of same dimensions, already resulting in a high price/weight ratio.