Let’s have a recap
All the services are facing a difficult time; reducing budgets, escalating personnel and equipment costs, lack of grand strategy and a dysfunctional MoD/Senior Military Leadership are all conspiring to make the case for change ever more powerful.
The business as usual option is to retain our commitment to high end, boutique platforms with an exquisite specification. There is nothing wrong with this in an ideal world but bitter experience tells us that it always ends in tears but we simply fail to learn. The Treasury thinks the MoD is a basket case and is aching for an MoD that can deliver a reasonable capability at a reasonable cost, I suspect that a more cost effective MoD would actually be able to make a strong case for a budget increase but that’s another story. The unfortunate result of this approach is that it never works out according to plan, as we all know. The tough talking of Liam Fox and the formation of the Defence Reform Unit promises much but they have a combination of indifference, intransigence, commercial considerations, political forces and a vested interest in business as usual to face.
This series of posts, concentrating on the maritime element, proposes an alternative approach, recognising a changing world demands different approaches but that there will always be a requirement for traditional capabilities.
Essentially, this is about the recognition that the budget is going to have to be better aligned with what we are more likely to do and less aligned with what we are less likely to do, accepting the risk that we will be slightly less prepared for certain threats. This is a calculated risk but there are very few alternatives and hoping for the tooth fairy to deliver a big pot of cash, freshly minted at the end of the rainbow, is not a practical option.
On a wider scale, one of the main issues we face is because we try and maintain a full range of capabilities at a large scale; the inevitable result is a wafer thin veneer. Scratch the surface and we are exposed; Iraq and Afghanistan have done just that, exposing the fur coat and no knickers sham that we can do everything and anything and still be the best in the world.
If anything, we need a sharp intake of reality (hopefully Wikileaks might do this) and realise all is not well.
Action this day, as a certain cigar chomping prime minister would say.
To achieve any meaningful change we have to look again at the influence of industrial and political concerns on equipment strategies and retract the size of the full spectrum war fighting capabilities. It is important to retain these core capabilities at a high level of readiness, training and technological superiority to provide the option to deploy force in support of national interests at a smalls scale and provide a seed corn hedge against emergent strategic threats.
The result of this general reduction in size is it will free up budget for other things. These other things would be a select group of capabilities to which we would over invest and thus create a limited number of elements in which we truly excel at. I have called these ‘capability plus’ and they would allow us to do two things; better able to meet actual security challenges and deliver influence in coalition operations. For coalition operations, which are likely to be the norm not the exception, we simply have to recognise that influence comes from not being a liability.
So what does this mean for the Royal Navy, in these proposals I suggest a reduction in the size of the high end surface fleet of frigates and destroyers in return for investment in the capability plus areas highlighted in the previous post
The Forward Presence Squadrons contribute to one of those capability plus areas, maritime security.
In the previous post on presence squadrons I identified 6 locations and a range of security, rather than defence missions. The Presence Squadron will primarily assist with defence diplomacy and building regional security capabilities in conjunction with local and regional partners. The exception to this generalisation is the Falkland Islands based South Atlantic Squadron which will have a more defence and coastguard oriented set of tasks.
The term Squadron might be thought of as denoting the number of vessels but we should see them more as an organisational construct, a collection capabilities which might comprise any number of vessels, varied depending on requirements and situations.
The squadron will be augmented on a scheduled basis with other units, it might host the Single Task Group one month, a Littoral Operations Group another (more on the LOG in the next post) and a NATO vessel in between.
Having described in general terms the requirements and aspirations of the approach, this post concentrates on equipment and organisation issues but the inherent flexibility of all UK forces should not be sacrificed for organisational neatness, there is no reason why the forces that comprise a Forward Presence Squadron could not be grouped with the Littoral Operations Group or vice versa.
I will cover equipment options for the Littoral Operations Group and other capability plus areas in subsequent posts.
Contents
- Ashore Component
- Afloat Component – General Approach
- Payload Modules
- The Presence Ship – Basics
- The Presence Ship – Modifications 01 (Payload Architecture)
- The Presence Ship – Modifications 02 (Weapon and Sensor Fit)
- The Presence Ship – Modifications 03 (Mission Desk and Aviation)
- The Presence Ship – Modifications 03 (Accommodation and Equipment)
- The Presence Ship – Cost Estimates
Ashore Component
The ashore component will comprise command, logistics, ICT, planning, engineering, administration and intelligence staff and associated facilities. Ideally, these would be joint staffed with the most appropriate mix of RN, RNR, RFA, civilian agencies (MCA, SOCA etc) host nation staff and regional partners.
Existing UK governmental structures in the area should also be exploited, coordinating objectives and maximising resource use/cost reduction.
Maintenance should be carried out as much as possible at the host nation and the general principle should be low cost. To minimise the need for in transit vessels, maximise utilisation and minimise cost the ship and mission crews will rotate in and out from the UK.
Afloat Component – General Approach
In defining the equipment component the following diagram (which I have shamelessly nicked from BMT) defines a spectrum of cost, capability and my term, fightiness (remember, you heard it here first!) against which a naval vessel can be defined.
There are if course exceptions to the rule because a combat vessel can equally carry out a safety task and a security vessel can conduct limited combat operations in low threat environments or under the protection of others in a higher threat situation. The forward presence squadrons will generally operate in the intersection between security and safety, with occasional forays into the other segments, in other words, a bit of everything but concentrating somewhere in the lower middle!
The afloat component should comprise a single common class of commercially derived vessels, 1 per location with 2 covering the South Atlantic area and 2 in service spares for a total class of 8.
The first and arguably most important aspect in our design considerations is the avoidance of specification creep which is a result of widening the scope and concept of employment. These are not high end combat vessels. We must make a break from the assumption that single purpose vessels are a waste of money and everything we have must be able to take part in a high intensity fleet action because that will lead to exactly the opposite of what is needed. That said, even if we accept these limitations, with the correct payloads and employment they might provide useful augmentation for other force structures. The words, wouldn’t it be great if we could just fit xxx must be banished from the design process!
Some of these concepts are hardly new, even before the influence squadron, Streetfighter and the littoral combat ship there were a number of studies, in particular the 1992 US Regional Deterrence Ship. In parallel with these specific design studies was the concept of modular payloads plugging into a ship wide information and power backbone. Aircraft and aircraft borne systems have followed a similar path, the current crop of targeting pods and ground cued guided weapons have developed independently of the aircraft, this means the functionality is divorced from its means of transport.
The ever brilliant Information Dissemination published an interesting article on a Payload Centric Warfare Force that described the benefits of this approach but in a maritime domain. It is not only combat systems that are a payload, people are too. From this thought train emerges the concept of a payload frame or sea going pick-up truck, into which payload modules are fitted depending on mission. As long as there is a single unifying connectivity backbone into which they can be plugged, the payload modules can evolve separately. Upgrading is no more complex than swapping a module.
If they don’t mind me quoting from the article;
The force structure concept that is emerging as one most likely to make it into the QDR is the “boxes” force structure concept. The “boxes” concept emphasizes open architecture combat systems on warfighter centric platforms like CruDes and Subs, flexible payload space on everything else, and emphasizes a distributed, joint operations doctrine. Note again the emphasis of Payload Centric Warfare where “boxes” are filled with common combat systems and open space is utilized for flexibility.
The Danish STANFLEX and LCS Payload Modules show what is possible, even though neither have yet their achieved full potential it shows the state of the possible and demonstrates the direction of travel. Back to reality though, this is a post about the Royal Navy not the US Navy so we might set our sights a little lower and absolutely maximise investment by making the modules as common to all three services as possible.
This approach also opens up the possibility of breaking the monopoly of the major manufacturers, setting out a range of common standards for power, network connectivity, ergonomics, utility connectors and size, any number of manufacturers, including small enterprises, can compete and innovate. Systems design, development and manufacture can proceed at a completely different pace to each other and the ships they might be dropped into. Onshore training becomes simpler and by making a commitment to a tri service approach, further savings can be realised.
So in a break with convention I am going to discuss the payload modules first and then think about a ship to park them on.
Payload Modules
Anyone who has hung around Think Defence for any length of time will know I am a container fetishist. The concept of standard sized containers has been proven over many decades but apart from the logistics stuff, hasn’t really caught on in naval applications.
If we are going to achieve the benefits of modular payloads the absolute first thing we must do is define size and shape. It might seem obvious but the 20fot ISO container should be the standard unit of measure, with the Bicon and Tricon fitting into the mix as needed. Ease of handling in austere ports and transportation is facilitated by keeping to civilian standards for container size. For more background and further dribbling from Think Defence on containerisation click here, here, here, here, here and here(I know I know, it’s an obsession)
Once the size and shape has been defined we should proceed to connectivity and EMC requirements. Each container will have a standard connectivity panel that would be placed in a consistent location and might include power (various), network, water, waste, gases and compressed air.
The flexibility of the Presence Ships is therefore derived from its payload (including people)
Some payload modules will be more complex than others and might be characterised according to use but not all will likely be carried aboard the presence boats or even located at the forward locations.
Mission Support and Logistics; Basic personnel accommodation, tank containers, dry storage, refrigerated, laboratory, office, waste handling, ablutions, galley, mess rooms, washroom/laundry, battery charging, gyms, workshop, medical, diver support (inc decompression chambers), helicopter fuelling and ROV control are all available from a variety of manufactures including Asian Offshore, Diogenes,Ferguson Modular, VG Offshore Containers, Workfox, EPS and Strongbox Marine.
When supporting a disaster relief mission they might use a containerised water purification plant that can be operated aboard or more likely moved onshore.
Combat; moving into the military domain, a plethora of containerised systems either exist or could be manufactured for small arms stores, ROV and UAS/USV/UUSV control cabins, survey, EOD, ESM/SIGINT, command and control, briefing rooms and even data centres.
Containers can be armoured if deemed necessary.
For weapon systems, the modular containerised concept could also be considered; a containerised towed sonar array might provide some limited anti submarine capability when used in conjunction with an embarked helicopter. It would be an austere capability used only in limited circumstances but could be used to provide greater sensor coverage, screening or deterrence. In general, this type of module would not be used on this class of vessel but that is the power of a modular system, it could be, in absolute extremis.
Containerised weapons are not a new concept but looking forward there is no reason why CAMM, the Fireshadow Loitering Attack Munition and GMLRS could not be containerised. The Lightweight Mobile Artillery System – Rocket (LIMAWS(R)) could easily be resurrected and fitted within the confines of a 20foot ISO container.
These might be land based designs but would still be suitable for limited maritime use, remember, these ships will not normally need a heavy weapons fit but better to have and not use than need and not have!
The Presence Ship – Basics
I had a look at this basic idea a few months ago, here and this is simply an extension of this, so apologies for some of the text being essentially a copy and paste.
Another of my recurring themes is that there exists in the civilian market, technologies, concepts and ideas that should be fully exploited by the military, yet often are not.
The sturdy, simple, offshore Platform Supply Vessel (PSV) and it’s more powerful and complex Anchor Handling Tug Supply Vessel (AHTS) relative, form the basis for the proposed Presence Ship. In the harsh conditions of the North Sea and other similar areas the designs have been refined over decades; they are sturdy, versatile, capable and more than able to handle high sea states and bad weather. Above all else though, they are cheap to buy and even cheaper to operate, it is this that draws me to favour a PSV as the base design.
Competition amongst yards, sustained by a steady demand, evolving designs based on operational experience, common machinery and increasing automation have relentlessly driven costs down. This commercial imperative to reduce cost kept the pressure on in a way that simply does not happen with military designs.
There are many variations on the theme; the Platform Supply Vessel is the simplest, designed to carry bulk and liquid supplies like containers, pipes and drilling fluids, prices range from as little as £20million for a simple 75m design to £60million for the largest designs. Equipped with anchor handling cranes, greater engine power and powerful winches, the Anchor Handling Tug Supply Vessel can range from between £25million to as much as £200 million for the largest and most sophisticated designs. The Multi Purpose Service Vessel is the Swiss Army Knife of the offshore industry and these large designs incorporate extensive diver support equipment, ROV handling and heave compensated heavy lift cranes. In addition to the three basic types there are also a number of specialist types including dedicated rescue, seismic survey and even coastal patrol vessels. They key to their success is an evolutionary approach to change and adapting the basic design to specialist requirements as needed. They show an interesting approach to innovation, one might imagine there is an inbuilt conservatism but this is not the case; diesel electric power, combined propulsion/steering, the Ulstein X Bow and even LNG engines demonstrate that if innovation has a practical advantage, usually related to cost, it will be rapidly trialled and adopted
There are many manufacturing yards and design houses including Havyard, Rolls Royce, STX and Ulstein. The Ulstein X Bow is a very interesting innovation that is said to improve economy, sea keeping in high seas and increases volume in the forward sections.
Going against the small is beautiful mantra this proposal creates a class of vessels built around a roomy medium sized platform supply vessel with an open equipment architecture that decouples the means of transport from the payload modules described above.
With excellent sea keeping the basic design should have a very long range; typical figures for this type of design are between 10 and 20 thousand nautical miles. Many people state that naval construction is much sturdier and can only provide the kind of NBC protection and damage control that a naval vessel requires. This is not the case though, BMT have produced a number of papers that show how civilian build techniques can be adapted for military use and our previous post on the subject showed that for the kind of missions this vessel will be primarily required to complete it is perfectly acceptable to use the so called ‘commercial shipbuilding rules’
Using offshore vessels as the base for coastguard and naval vessels is not a new concept, Rolls Royce have sold a number of UT designs for coastguard use; the Norwegian NoCGV Harstad and Icelandic ICGV Þór (Thor) are good examples. The Icelandic vessel reportedly cost less than $40 million.
The Turkish submarine rescue tender project has attracted a number of interesting designs from Istanbul Shipyards and Meteksan, the latter based on an Ulstein X Bow design.
Some of the concept designs looks pretty much like what I envisage for the Forward Presence Ship, remove the submarine rescue submersible handling equipment and it’s not far off.
Propulsion, manoeuvre and power generation will be a direct lift from existing designs, nothing exotic. Sacrificing speed for low cost and endurance, a speed range of between 12 and 18 knots would be sufficient. Although these systems may seem unremarkable they have evolved over 40 years of operating in harsh conditions and are robust, built with resilience in mind and engineered to reduce running costs.
Approximate dimensions would be 100m length, 20m beam with a draught between 6m and 8m and a deadweight of between 4,000 and 5,000 tonnes. Of course, this is a large vessel but we should not equate size with cost. Large and simple vessels, without high speed propulsion systems and overly expensive weapons can be very cheap.
The ships in the South Atlantic will need to be ice rated and an argument could be made for all of them to be so for commonality reasons, but this would be dependent on cost.
To the basic PSV design a number of modifications should be made, the basic principle of minimum modification should be applied but we have to be sensible, the ship has to work.
The Presence Ship – Modifications 01 (Payload Architecture)
As much of the payload of the Presence Ship as possible should be modular, as described above. To support this approach, a common physical and services ‘connectivity keel’ should be fitted. This would need to have routing resilience and protected at key locations with lightweight composite armour, the UK has a lead in this area with NP Aerospace but I am not sure if it has been applied to maritime equipment.
Connection points will be located throughout the ship, internal and external as appropriate.
The Presence Ship – Modifications 02 (Weapon and Sensor Fit)
Each vessel would be equipped with medium calibre weapons, the MSI SIGMA A2 would be the obvious choice, a remote controlled system that mounts a 30mm ATK Bushmaster cannon and a 7 cell launcher for the Thales Lightweight Multirole Missile. It is a compact, relatively low cost mount, already in service (in its basic form) with the Royal Navy and appropriate in terms of firepower. In a previous post on littoral concepts I proposed a containerised SIGMA mount for use on a gunboat variant of the LCVP and it would be sensible to reuse the same.
There are other 30-40mm weapons to choose from, for commonality reasons perhaps the ATK M230LF which is a link feed version of the M230 used on the AH1 Apache helicopter, 40mm CTA weapon that is due to enter service with the Army in the FRES Scout or even the 27mm Rheinmetall cannon used on the Typhoon could be used (plenty available now with the reduction in Tornado fleet)
The problem with these weapon options is that whilst they offer a valuable anti surface capability their anti air ability is somewhat limited. The Bofors SAK57 may provide an ideal blend of capabilities, a good all rounder, but its adoption would very much depend on cost and the turret might provide integration challenges or legal issues in the Antarctic area. It would also drive the need for a more functional fire control system, increasing cost even more.
To provide a sensible mix of anti surface, anti air, anti missile and with minimal deck intrusion, the Oerlikon Seaguard might be a good fit. It does of course go against the Think Defence commonality drive but there exists a need in the land domain for an effective C-RAM and anti UAV system. UAV’s are proliferating and it will not be long before asymmetric opponents will start using these off the shelf system with a warhead payload as a weapon, operating in a swarm they would quickly exhaust missile stocks.
The system uses Oerlikon Millennium 35mm Naval Gun System and AHEAD air bursting ammunition to maximum effect. A good video can be found here
These would be located to the port and starboard of the bridge area, perhaps on a fabricated extended wing.
The whole approach to weapons fit should be open to discussion but I like the pair of Millennium guns port and starboard, complimented with pintle mount weapons and supplemented with container based system on a needs basis.
As soon as we start loading the design with full spec radar, fire control, communications, electro optical, ESM and other sensors the price will rapidly escalate but there are basic of the shelf systems that could be used. Although electronic systems are vitally important to any modern warship we must head for ‘middle of the road’ bearing in mind the goal of this vessel is to have a presence, if they are too expensive they won’t be able to because we will only be able to afford 2.
The Presence Ship – Modifications 03 (Mission Desk and Aviation)
Some of the emerging C3 concepts make room for a mission deck or flex deck, mission modules are container sized and the deck includes handling facilities. The only problem with these is their small size, it almost looks like they have taken a corvette design and hastily tacked on some space for 3 or 4 containers and a couple of RHIBS and called that job done.
We need more than this.
In a typical 100m offshore design the shelter deck is usually around 60m long and 20m wide. In this proposal a large open deck would still be very useful but would limit helicopter and UAV operations so the simple answer is to build a heavy duty mezzanine deck.
At approximately 40m length, the helicopter mezzanine deck could support large helicopters like Merlin or Chinook and a telescoping hangar fitted to provide shelter for a small/medium sized helicopter like a Wildcat or AW139. This type of telescoping hangar has seen widespread service with many military and civilian operators, available from a number of manufacturers including Indal Technologies and Aljo. If this proved too costly we could simply accept the compromise and go with a ‘bouncy castle’ inflatable shelter. If no air operations were needed this deck might be used for additional storage or as an operating/training area.
The single 60m main deck would still be retained but 40m would now be covered and protected from the elements by roller shutter doors. The open work deck area would therefore be approximately 20m long.
The full length of the cargo deck would have multiple ‘docking’ spots for payload containers; each spot having connections to the connectivity keel.
A gantry crane would support container handling in the sheltered area and a larger, heave compensated crane, on a travelling rail will be provided for the open work deck. This crane should be able to transfer equipment and containers from the helicopter deck or shore facility. In addition to the main and gantry cranes there would be a loading RORO ramp and possibly a stern ramp for easier loading and unloading of small ships. Some container space could be sacrificed for side loading davits, sized for a CB90 or Landing Craft.
Height of the sheltered deck should be at least 4.5m to accommodate large vehicles, small surface craft and HiCube containers. We might even consider making the sheltered area 2 containers high.
In a high density cargo only configuration the 60mx20m deck could accommodate about 50 20 foot ISO containers or TEU’s. Even allowing for the partition door, RORO ramp, small craft davits, deck crane, stern ramp and a 2 container width full length gangway space there is still capacity for a comfortable 20 TEU and that is discounting the option for double stacking. If helicopter operations were sacrificed yet more containers could be carried and experimenting with different container length and stowage configurations reveals incredible flexibility and capacity.
There are endless possibilities.
The Presence Ship – Modifications 03 (Accommodation and Equipment)
The basic crew should be around 30 although hotel services (food prep, cabin space, ablutions etc) should be scaled for 100 personnel. These may be specific mission crew or trainees but if accommodation modules are carried on the main deck this could be extended a great deal. Command spaces would also be fitted and a small hospital facility, again though, these could be extended with containerised modules.
Combat Support Boats, Offshore Raiding Craft, the LCAC(L)(R) and even an LCVP could be carried to support anti piracy/smuggling and special forces operations. The larger LCVP would have to be carried on the open rear deck but the ORC, CSB and even LCAC(L)(R) would fit in the covered deck area. Alternatively, if we opted for side loading davits a combination of LCVP and CB90 type small craft could be carried.
The boat fit would depend on mission requirements, much of the vessels utility and flexibility will be provided by its small craft.
A range of airborne, surface or sub surface unmanned system could also easily be operated from the open spaces and supported using containerised modules.
A tethered aerostat would extend the sensor horizon and enable the ship to influence a much greater area, again, quite easily operated from a container based module.
An offshore support vessel usually has large bulk fluid and dry powder storage tanks under the main deck. Some of these clearly will not be needed and could be replaced with dry stores or magazines but excess potable water, fuel and other liquid storage facilities increase flexibility and would also come in handy, so maybe worth retaining.
The base vessel is therefore, quite simply, a maritime pickup truck into which we place relevant payload modules
The Presence Ship – Cost Estimates
Practically, it is extremely difficult to come up with anything other than a bag of a fag packet estimate.
The real costs will be in carried payloads but given the normal cost for a typical mid range 90-100m PSV is about $50million, making the modifications detailed above, even including the sensor and weapon fit, is there any reason we could not get one of these for £75million each?
A total build of 8 should come in at about the price of 2 Type 26, the new cheap versions that is!
In line with other ships they could be progressively upgraded, one of the objectives of the Forward Presence Squadrons is to provide a test bed for new ideas. Upgrades might include sensor upgrades, ops rooms refresh or new handling equipment.
######## OTHER POSTS IN THIS SERIES ##########
The Future of the Royal Navy 01 – (Context)
The Future of the Royal Navy 02 – (Tasks and General Approach)
The Future of the Royal Navy 03 – (Single Task Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 04 – (Forward Presence Squadrons)
The Future of the Royal Navy 05 – (Equipment – T26)
The Future of the Royal Navy 06 – (Capability Plus)
The Future of the Royal Navy 07 – (Equipping the Forward Presence Squadron)
The Future of the Royal Navy 08 – (Equipping the Littoral Operations Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 09 – (Equipping the Disaster Support Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 10 – (Mine Countermeasures and Survey)
TD,
Thank you, a very insightful post on the future of the RN small ship community. Although I think containerising everything may be unnecessary, mainly because of the development costs for weapon systems, the overall concept is very sound and has a lot of merit.
I think we should be careful of buying too few of these versatile platforms, doing our best to keep them simple and inexpensive to maximise numbers. The design could also easily host a deep water survey system over the stern; is there any scope perhaps to evolve the stern to launch the small vessels proposed rather than craning them into the water – my experience with stern-launch systems makes me an ardent supporter for their simplicity and speed of deployment. It also puts forward another role for these ships, that of submarine rescue – although we do it with commercially chartered vessels the rescue system could easily be flown out to one of these ships also.
The containerisation of a missile system would be expensive to develop, and would such a vessel be able to cope without dedicated search and track radar systems, but has merit if we deploy such a vessel into a high threat environment. Ship the module out if tensions rise, or equip for deployment before leaving the UK.
I’m not sold on the idea of permanently based forward presence squadrons, but very much like the hardware proposed.
Something like this would be a better,
http://www.hydro-international.com/news/id3605-Polar_Supply_And_Research_Vessel.html
Anti-piracy patrols around the Horn of Africa have been very dependent on helicopter patrols.
I’ve jsut skimmed this, and I think you’ve got something there miladdo!
I was just looking at some of the links that TD provided in the article and I have to say I think I have found the perfect ship for the future, Rolls Royce Intra-Theatre Logistics Vessel, with a bit of a tweak on sensor fit, and a medium calibre gun it could do presence missions and provide useful role in the RFA:
http://www.rolls-royce.com/marine/products/ship_design/naval_support_vessels/flv/index.jsp
Excellent post. Mind you I am tempted to begin a campaign to outlaw the ‘word’ – “fightiness”.
I have two comments. Many small warships and auxiliaries at this scale would traditionally mount a 76mm or 57mm mounting in ‘A’ position almost as a default. Would not such a low cost mounting – perhaps an OTO Merala 76mm – add such a useful range of capabilities for such a small cost that would actually help make the concept work?
Similarly should the design not also be configured so that each unit is fitted with one of a range of switchable integrated masts that might come in a range of ‘flavours’. One would provide basic navigation and communication needs – rather like a UK based fish squadron River – and a fancier one would be closer to the mast fitted to the Dutch Hollands. A more ‘survey’ optimised mast could be used for the survey replacements. Each vessel could then be fitted with the mast that is needed for the task in hand and masts could be changed/improved over the lifetime of the hull. Of course the processing power for the data produced/transmitted would be held in mission payload modules.
Such a range of masts could also be fitted to RFAs and the Littorial Warfare C3s to replace the Hunts/SRMHs and there might end up being an order for 20+ masts of various flavours.
TD
I think you are right on the button, so don’t think I’m carping with two small technical niggles.
However
1) Most of the designs don’t to my untutoured eye seem to have nough room forward of the bridge for any kind of gun, (without getting into one of those angels on pinheads arguments about what type)
2) I think as a basic the type should have 360 degree CIWS.
Without getting silly, and as you point out the temptation to start saying ‘We’ll add this just in case’, I do think these ships are the most likley ships in the RN to be shot at by ‘Yahoos in speedboats’ they will be operating on thier own where the black flag flies. So 76 MM or whatever up front couple of simple wing 20mm and vulcan at the back, the latter two sharing ammo.
3) Perhaps a bit more space to be designed in for hanger for Helicopters. Helicopters do seem to be essential for this kind of work, not talking about lots of big ones. Just That ship should be able to so 1st and 2nd level repairs / maintenence on the ones it has. Two would be better, I do not think they have to be big ones AW139 seems a good bet. Particulalry as they wil spend a long time away from ‘home’ and will be expensive to get backwards and forwards if they need fixing.
I know that would push the price up a (a bit) but I think it would add the the endurance/survivability of the at sea ‘Squadron’ on station significantly.
I know I am almost certainly firing the starting gun, on the race to pile stuff onto theses ships. However I hope you will see I’m not engaging in anything else than suggesting a few modification to improve their fitness for the role you have envisaged.
Sorry that was 3 Nigggles!
TD
First up my pet hate, a £50mill frigate / 6K ton colonial sloop will not have telescoping hangar, it will have a 400m2 + multi purpose space next to the flightdeck. Headroom of 6.6m and enough kit to fettle a Merlin. As noted earlier this type of vessel will be much enhaced by the air element it can carry so if we go big for C3, we need to go to the max with its air potential.
That is under the bridge and aft of an accomodation block.
As you can probably guess I think you have done the hard work to get the idea on the agenda and provide the component set to make it both cheap and capable but I think that you played it too straight regarding what this type of vessel could be capable of.
The one thing is that this idea is not new.
The Absalon with its 90m long mission deck is an OSV type under a very heavy disguise.
The designer obviously put in a lot of time and effort to hide the ship’s parentage.
Consequently go a bit bigger.
The cost will be be quite small but the gain in utility will be large.
Consquently my ideal starting point with this family of vessels and this component set would be:
Wl: 125m x 25m x 5/6m = 6-7K tons standard.
I would go for 22knots+ capability – 600mile daily radius, better able to fitb ion with modern cargo ships.
Looking at 18MW installed power, diesel electric powertrain with 80% being available for propulsion.
The extra 4MW would cost in the region of £2mill so I think it would be worth it.
Higher speed = More pointy bow, not hugely different but more detail design.
Flight deck, 45m long goes right to the stern with a hidden crane underneath movable grills.
Wide rump with space for a TAS array, loading ramp and boat handling contraption.
The mission deck would be 80m+ long and 15m wide.
The width would match the width of the ship’s central spine where all the importnat bits would be located with an “A/Tor” bulkhead 5m wide on either side. This would be 8m deep to generate girder strength to back up the double bottom.
Also the war fighting kit of the ship should have more emphasis, plenty of space for big but cheap weapons. Space for two turrets up front and Vulcan Phalanx 100′ish up in the air located on the bridge roof.
Looking at ships which would make great examples of the genre:
Style = Normand Ranger
Size = Viking Poseidon
Scale = Normand Seven
All by Ulstein.
One thing to note in their spec sheets is the amount of kit that they come with. All three above are more than your basic OPV but a lot of their extra cost is down to kit that a stripper C3 vessel / HMS Clyde competitor would not need.
In the T26 thread I listed my thoughts on cots, upgrades and specs, the main thing was the £50mill figure and how the cost of any future naval vessel whould be split into 2:
1) Hull – Commercial systems, fully usable – £40mill.
2) Naval – Military sensors and systems – £10mill.
Both figures are tight but I think they are achievable.
Also in my T26 post I listed a number of upgrades that would be available to make the vessel much more military capable.
The big issue is that all the upgrades would cost less than £30mill and be ruthlessy appraised for VFM.
Interesting to see how this develops.
Finally check out the Italian “MSV” concept at EuroNaval 2010.
Fincatieri seems to be working in the same product space.
Overall concept of big, simple civvy based design for C3 – all for it. Still not convinced however about your overall strategic impetus for “presence squadrons”.
As per some comments above, add a 76mm Super Rapid up front (with a DAVIDE system it becomes your anti-missile system), take Mauser 27mm’ from retiring Tornado’s, and make at least a WildCat size hangar a permanent fixture.
However as per my previous article, to make operating them really cheap make them RFA’s ! As per the current model, ships flight, gunners, other specialists can be added to your core 30 crew as needed. If necessary, say you need to make 6 of them your deployable MCM assets, then those 6 could be “fully” RN.
Tubby – those RR logistics ships are actually the antithesis of what TD is proposing, they can do 40 Knots, but only for 3000nm, what is wanted is slower but with considerably greater endurance.
Hi FBOT @ 1:04,
“The Absalon with its 90m long mission deck is an OSV type under a very heavy disguise.”
- well said, Greenland is the Falklands for Denmark: mineral riches combined with disputed continental shelf definitions; showing the flag required (without going to war with either Canada or Russia)
As a small detail, it already carries TD’s recommended 35mm Millennium. The fact that it will soon be 10 years and no take- up by other navies must be down to resistance against adopting a new (= additional)caliber??
Just to jump in before we take this to the customising shop. Adding and developing purpose-built switchable integrated masts, state of the art anti-missile systems in dual-role guns and purpose built hangars will skyrocket the price – you will end up building the Type 23 replacement. The C3 concept, if I can use the term to cover this concept, is a replacement for the MCM, survey and FP hulls – it is not a ‘free frigate’ in disguise.
Basic mean basic. A 76mm gun is the top end of what I would consider realistic. But whilst I believe this would be the ideal example of what should be modularised, would the cost of developing such a mudular system (or possibly the extra costs of purchasing this from the Danes, should they be willing to export it) compare favourably or unfavourably with just buying enough systems to fit permanently on all hulls? Development costs have a nasty habit of spiralling out of control, and it might be better to bite the bullet and buy 8 systems.
A PDMS also bears merit, especially a modular one, but again cost must be very carefully considered. If it isn’t absoultely necessary it will not make it into the design.
AFOMG, not sure what you mean by a ‘survey mast’. Inshore surveying requires an accurate echosounder or multi-beam sonar suite, differential GPS, and a couple of survey workboats to chart coastlines, etc. There is nothing fancy or glamorous about survey work – you could do it with a yacht. The mast of this beast would require basic navigation radars, lights/flags/shapes/etc, mounting points for antennas and the remote possibility of mounting a camera/IR sensor system – again, rather unlikely. My opinion is that Integrated Masts are great for dedicated warships but a bit pointless for something this small. What other gear would we be swapping in or out?
Final point from me – anything we change from the basic commercial design will cost extra, so lets keep it to a minimum. If we can buy it commercially (and TD makes a great point about accommodation modules, RO plants, mobile workshops, etc) then lets do that and avoid the extra charges for painting it grey and making it ‘Jack-proof’.
With respect TD, I’m not sure I agree. For my money I don’t see a 5,000 ton ship topping out at 12 knots making much impression on pirates off Somalia or drug runners in the Caribbean.
I take your point that you may want to provide on-station disaster relief/transport/helicopter stationing and the like. But the navy wouldn’t be a navy if it can’t participate in the likely shooting operations in the place where you send it to.
I’d hope to see our forward presence have fast vessels (to cover the distances local operations will require), which will mean they will have to be small, forgoing helicopter hangers and UAV’s, etc, and be optimised with adequate albeit lightweight armament for policing operations. Because it is small and not trying to be all things to all people, it could be equally as inexpensive. Say two of these paired with the commercially based ‘mother ship’ you describe would make a more potent force but still with elements of the all round presence capability you are looking for.
Hi Richard, I think I said 12-18knots as an ideal blend of speed and economy. The ship isnt designed to chase down pirate skiffs or smugglers but influence an area. If we need things to go fast, that’s where the embarked helicopter, UAV’s and small craft stuffed with RM’s come in. By making it small enough to easily sustain 3 or 4 RHIBS/CB90 class boats then you can influence a much greater area. The concept of the design is that it is what it is carrying that makes the difference
SR @ 8.48
Have to ask, what is your background?
Are you serving or retired RN?
The C3 issue when it was current in the RN was replacement of the minor vessels in the fleet. I took that to be patrol, survey, guardship, MCM, fisheries protection …
TD has taken the discussion in this area further by speculation on what kind of RN we can have when we only have 19 escort hulls and could the C3 be expanded to provide the RN with a better balance and an enlarged presence.
The 19 hulls seem to be shaping up as:
AAW = 6 x T45 — Programme cost = £6.6bill / Marginal cost = £650mill per hull.
I fear the BAFO price of £500mill has gone for good.
As currently spec’ed this ship is an anaemic but expensive one trick pony.
Be on the look out for the programme to make the T45′s GP.
Dave the Rave talked about in the Commons so the cost of the programme will take another leap sometime soon.
ASW = T26 x 8 hulls, re-using the existing T2087 sonar.
The cost is £127mill and counting for a bit of concept generation and a few CGI’s.
Detailed design has yet to start and the per hull cost has reached £500mill before sanity intervened.
My take on the total programme cost will be £4bill + and this will be a pretty poor vessel.
GP = T26hull x 5. This vessel is only here to make up the numbers.
Hopefully it will be a VFM with second string AAW and ASW capabilities.
Total cost of the programme will be £2bill’ish by my Q+D analysis.
All the figures are in 2008/10 money.
Exports will tell us pretty quickly how good a vessel it is.
The main thing about this programme is that it will be a lot of money for not a lot of war fighting capability, capacity or credibility.
My thoughts are slightly different and that is where the C3 becomes involved.
AAW / S-S / Fleet flagship x 2 = Nelson and Rodney.
WL: 220m x 36m x 7/8m = 28K tons standard.
75MW installed, diesel electric for 28knots+.
Double ended T45 fit with big guns and missile silos / batteries.
X Bow to upset the yanks.
Hull = £250mill.
Naval fit = £500mill.
AAW = 6 x T45 as is.
VFM upgrade would be required.
ASW = 8 x Global Cruiser described below.
Wl: 170m x 28m x 5/6m = 12-13K tons standard.
Hull = £125mill
Naval fit = £125mill
ASW fit = in the main hand me downs from the T23.
T2087 and Merlin but new hull sonar.
That then leaves a budget for the C3 as £50mill frigate / Colonial Sloop.
£50mill = Basic naval role.
£100mill per hull including two “flexible boosters”.
That to me would be a T21 for the Teenies, that is a frigate substitute
On the basics of your other points, making everything modularised will save money, more work is done in the factory and the need for testing will be reduced due to the reduced amount of interfaces.
Consequently all the ideas you raise about “Chunking” systems will save money and most probably lots of it. All will mean more work in the factory that actually builds and understands the systems and less will be done on site in a shipyard or build hall.
Modules should all be ISO shipping container sized.
Stanflex and other military stuff can be re-used by wrapping them in ISO container sized dumb steelworks.
Plug and play will become the watchword in all this.
Entire ship loads of kit would be tested on-shore and then wheeled or craned aboard.
Modularisation does have issues, it is financially efficient but it can be wasteful both in space and weight. This to my mind has always been an issue with post war RN ship design in that they have been dimensionally thrifted to one inch of their usefulness and the main design driver has been trying to put a gallon into a pint pot.
Not any more.
Split the vessel into two separate parts:
1) Hull – Full civil navigation capacity.
2) Naval – Full military sensor and system fit out.
Looking for space, stick on another 10m of hull.
Effect on naval fit = a few lengths of upmarket armoured cable and nothing more.
£50mill frigate / Colonial Sloop:
Wl = 125m x 25m x 5/6m for 6-7K tons standards and 18MW installed for 22knots+
T26 alternative / Global Cruiser:
Wl = 170m x 28m x 5/6m for 12/13K tons standard and 45MW installed power for 29knots+.
Both have ranges of 12K – 18K miles + and supplies for 60 days at sea.
The financial questions that need asking are:
1) Cost per 1K tons steelwork cut, formed and assembled into a hull section?
The good folk at Govan will need to get down and dirty with this number very quickly.
2) Cost per 5MW installed power, diesel electric installed into a hull?
3) Cost of the military kit / mission load including shore testing ready for fit onto the vessel.
On your other points about rocketing cost, that is the MOD / RN mindset after years of dealing with BAE and their ilk. They have become like a financial Pavlov’s dog, writing cheques at the first sign of the contractor shouting scope creep, tech issues and unforeseen difficulties.
Hangar = Steel tent.
Gun = $2mill for an OM 76mm.
VLS = Cheap steel tube with gas generator.
Anything else is a salesman’s patter.
On your final point, the OSV / AHTS design proves that the customer is king, sort out the base financials, develop an atmosphere where VFM is understood by the customer and changes are not the issue they have become with the MOD / RN.
These ships are not a basic commercial design they are a large a varied commercial component set which can be mixed and matched to the customers content. The difference in attitude can be seen from the fact that the design houses and the builders fund their own new ideas.
Richard W @ 10.31
If you look below tha sloping sides and the fancy steelwork the Absalon is an OSV derived vessel, the 80m+ mission deck is the giveaway. All the rest is “styling” and by the figures quoted for this ship it comes pretty cheap.
Consequently it can do 23knots, it looks the part and when it comes to the job of sorting out Somali pirates it is the leader in the clubhouse.
TD’s designs are at the rugged / utility end of the market but the companent set has been used on quite a few different vessels. The Svalbard is my particular favourite style wise.
Finally when a U boat was under attack it made no difference to the crew that it was up against an Flower class corvette or a Modified Black Swann. One was a whaler and the other was a proper warship with turbines. Both did the same job.
MOD economics means that we will be left with one ship in 2037 along with a picture of a Trident missile and the RM band.
That ship will be a Type 98 which will be good for AAW, ASW and GP patrol work.
It will be also smothered in cotton wool and need a police escort to leave the harbour.
Any idea that gets the MOD / RN out of its current rut needs support.
FBOT,
My background should make no difference here – it’s a forum for open thinking. However, whilst I applaud your ambition it is simply not realistic. You are absolutely right; skyrocketing costs are indeed the likely result of the MOD / RN mindset after years of dealing with BAE and their ilk. Mind you when you say ilk, to whom are you referring? BAE is close to being the sole remaining major defence contractor in the UK, and any attempt to establish a mjor defence contract elsewhere will be stymied by ex-serving Officers (not just RN, thank you) on the boards telling the Government how they are throwing away British jobs. Buying from overseas is almost (I say again, almost) at the stage of being politically unacceptable. Do we really think BAE (and Babcocks, to include them as well) had nothing to do with persuading Brown to guarantee work in Rosyth for the next ten years? And that they never persuaded Blair and Brown that continuing to invest in MRA4, despite the truly staggering cost overruns, was good for defence and irrelevant for jobs?
You will not remove the mindset; you cannot clear Whitehall and Westminster of those who would prioritise other ambitions over our Armed Forces. We are a political pawn. So whilst it might be comforting to blog about building armoured missile cruisers and adapted merchant ships, I am trying to keep it realistic, and therefore focussed.
The SDSR stated that we required “14 mine counter-measures vessels, based on existing Hunt and Sandown class ships with a replacement programme which will also have the flexibility to be used for other roles such as hydrography or offshore patrol.” That to me is still the C3 concept – has anything changed?
TD has made an excellent pitch for the C3 concept and it fits very well with the paper advocating Payload Centric Warfighting. This is the direction we need to go in; it keeps the RN relevant, modern and capable, and sets the standard for many others to follow. We should always look to the best we can get for our money. But as always, we must buy only the basics, which means hulls not toys. Evolve the platforms in future as and when more money becomes available. Your numbers simply do not stack up in the real world. 250 million for a 12-13,000 tonne cruiser? Neither relevant nor realistic, even with second hand equipment. Sorry.
Come on guys!!! There is enough with me being miserable here without any extra help. Shake hands and move on.
I have tried to keep my musings at a thrifty level, by cutting 6 or 7 Type 26 from the notional future fleet I hope to create a bit of breathing space for the budget, funds for the invisible stuff like training and maintenance and to enable the UK to experiment with concepts like the Forward Presence Squadron, Littoral operation Group (next post) and others. In keeping them modest, we create the freedom to do.
If you go back to the beginning of this series (which I have to say has generated some bloody fantastic contributions from everyone) it was that we need to keep our feet on the ground and be realistic because a lack of realism has led us to where we are now.
It is so tempting to say, yeah, just add a 76mm or VLS or integrated mast but where do you stop?
I always thought as soon as you add a a ‘proper’ gun and missiles then by default it becomes your major surface escort in the eyes of the government. The max armament we should go for (fitted) is of a self defence nature, something to provide some degree of overmatch against a pirate (although as stated, thats the job of the carried craft) or to stop a sneak attack with say a ATGW or anti ship missile.
Remember, you can always upgrade or add modules.
Stick in a modular GMLRS container or even park a GMLRS on the deck, how about FireShadow or a tripod launched Hellfire. All either available or easily achievable and all of a sudden you have a fire support platform. Its imagination we need and the willingness to split, wherever possible, payload from transport
Some interesting ideas, TD, and I have a lot of sympathy for them. I like the idea of using a utility hull like the ones suggested (I’d not heard of the X-Bow before, it’s an intriguing concept and certainly seems to perform well in the company’s video).
I agree with you that the danger (especially in a big vessel with lots of carrying space) is to say: “oh, wouldn’t it be even better if we aded X/Y/Z capability” and before you know it, the price is mounting up towards that of a conventional warship.
So yes, the standard kit should be self-defence only, good enough to deal with small automatic-cannon armed gunboats. 35mm Millennium would probably be fine, with a beam-mounted pair giving 360 degree coverage it will act as an effective CIWS as well as boat-basher. You don’t need a gun in the bows as long as the ones fitted have good arcs of fire (the US OHP frigates had their gun in the middle of the ship, after all). The 35mm could be backed-up by small remote-control gun mounts distributed to give all-round overlapping coverage, at least four in 12.7mm calibre, or 20mm at a bit extra cost.
Any greater firepower (offensive or defensive) than 35mm should be provided by containerised missile systems.
Since the main recce/fighting force of these ships would be in their helos, backed up with fast assault boats, these need to be well provided for, with enclosed hangars. I’d rather see two small helos than one big one, to make certain that one is always available. Alternatively, one big one with a couple of UAVs might do the trick.
The value for money of ships like this would be immense compared with conventional warships, or even very fast commercial designs (which become vastly more expensive to build and run). I think that the RN should be looking closely at what you suggest, although I’m not sure if the decision makers have the mental fexibility required to see the advantages; they may prefer to keep battling on for as many high-end “proper” warships as they can get.
Excellent article thanks – good food for thought and seems to have sparked some interesting debate. To my mind the best thing is that the payload modules can be developed independently and plugged in later, providing capability upgrades without requiring a whole new vessel. The possibilities here are really fascinating, uav / usv control centres, sigint modules, decoy launchers (for a higher threat environment).
Finally the x-bow is essential, because it looks cool. Er, I mean for the improved fuel consumption benefits etc…
Hi TW @ 1:09,
I agree with all the CIWS (gun) arguments and further that “Since the main recce/fighting force of these ships would be in their helos, backed up with fast assault boats, these need to be well provided for, with enclosed hangars”
Next question is how to minimise their crewing, footprint (incl. hangar size) so that two are carried, and one always available?
The answer could lie in “what could the military/ navy do with a helicopter-like, autonomously-flown UAV with a range of 2,500 nautical miles and endurance of 16-24 hours, carrying a payload of 1,000-2,500 pounds, and doing it all more quietly than conventional helicopters?” This is from today’s Defence Industry Daily (about the Boeing Hummingbird), so we are basically talking about a rotor-drone
- not controlled from another continent, but from the ship itself
- that makes the best possible use of space available
- that can be armed, but has capacity for meaningful lifting of other types of loads as well
- and, unlike smaller similar concepts actually makes the area that can be patrolled huge, irrespective of what speed the ship itself can do, ie. speed vs endurance in the design.
ACC, I think that UAVs would be fine for patrolling and attack missions, but such a ship would probably need to be able to transport people rapidly from ship to shore, so at least one manned helo with some carrying capacity would be desirable.
TD, what an idea!
Would like to hear from more ex-rn or serving rn about the operational concept.
Two things i would like to ask about, starting with the X-Bow.
Near collisions at sea happen. If you have an extra section protruding beyond the part of the ship that you can see from the bridge, would that increase the chances of an actual collision due to misjudgement of the distance?
Next question is about Tubby’s link to the Fast Logistic Vessel. I see it’s designed for 40Knots & 3,000 NM range, i just wonder what happens if you run at 12Knots for awhile?
SR @ 12.13
On background the only issue is civvy or forces?
Just to get a bit of perspective on the response.
BAE Shipbuilding don’t employ 4-5K people, they have 4-5K human shields. Their goal is not better ships and greater productivity, it is playing the game to make sure the profits keep rolling no matter the cost to the capabilities of the RN.
They are running the MOD like a cash cow.
Reality is what can be built with today’s technology tomorrow. If we don’t go down the route of big is beautiful someone else will and the whole of the MOD / RN will scratch their heads and wonder why didn’t we think of that.
4 x 12″ on a 15K tons battleship was the norm for 25 years until someone went, I wonder …
We are in the same position today.
The Absalon, the Holland, the KCJ, the list is endless.
Things are starting to move from the WW2 derivatives and the oil canning 70′s.
You say a “Global Cruiser” is a non starter, why?
Six months ago you would have run the OSV based idea out of town, now …
The tech is there, the weapons are there, the concept is there.
Could the hull not be built for £125mill?
Could the weapons fit not be sourced for £125mill?
The ASW kit will come from the retiring T23 so its main role is sorted.
What numbers don’t stack up, any specifics?
Those two questions are there, I only ask you why not?
Will you only get involved if some else does it first?
The RN used to be a leader, it can and should be one again if it stopped trying to be the NA wing of USN ASW.
ACC @ 1.53
Big cheap hull means plenty space for a large hangar, 400m2+
You can work UAVs out of helo hangar.
You cannot work helos out of a UAV garage.
Needs to be sized to cope with 2 Merlins but the Wildcat will soon need a home so plenty of space for a litter.
Only point I would make on UAV’s is the level of the tech, new and shiny with lots to go wrong. The £50mill Frigate / 6K ton colonial sloop should be very much dealing with the here and now.
Low investment programme both in cash terms and also RN / MOD “brainpower”.
TW + TD
You need something big up front to keep the local yahoos wondering. Presence is everything, let the smaller stuff do the work but the big gun upfront is needed for back-up.
Speak softly and carry a big stick.
ACC – 1 x Lynx (Wildcat) or 2 x MQ8 / A160 as required for the mission. Manned helo can rescue people with a winch, helo(VTOL) UAV’s can’t do that yet. Even the rather smashing A160 Hummingbird cannot as yet carry a radar as good as SeaSpray 7000, plus optronics, plus a .50 cal BUT if the permanent hanger is big enough for a Lynx and some spare parts, then its big enough for a couple of UAV’s.
My only problem with all of this as it develops through the the articles and the various threads is TD’s comment: “by cutting 6 or 7 Type 26 from the notional future fleet I hope to create a bit of breathing space for the budget” so 19 minus 7 leaves us with 12 (6 x T45 and 6 x T23) and a bunch of “forward presence squadrons” that can do what exactly ? Fight piracy, drug smugglers and slave runners. So not enough “real warships” to fulfill the SDSR requirements for expeditionary warfare, to escort a single carrier and a reduced amphib group.
I know I will be accused of being “old school” of not thinking out of the box, of attempting to make the navy irrelevant in the modern world, blah blah blah, but my point is the Govt. should put the funding in to back up it’s rhetoric. If not then fine, but a ‘navy’ equipped with civvy offshore support ships armed with auto-cannon is not a navy, its a “coast guard” force able to deal with civilian issues on a law enforcement level. Last time I checked piracy is not a military threat to the UK according to the SDSR analysis.
I have no problem with building these ships as “big is beautiful” C3, or giving some to the RFA for constabulary duties, but not at the expense of chopping back the surface fleet any further. 19 is pathetic as it is for what HMG says it wants to be able to do, even less and we may as well subcontract our defence to France and the Neatherlands, but at least we will still have Challenger 2 and Typhoon to keep us safe !
FBOT:
“The RN used to be a leader, it can and should be one again if it stopped trying to be the NA wing of USN ASW.”
It is because the RN was a leader in ASW that it got the position you describe above. The SDSR says our abilities and capabilities should complement those of our allies. Well in that case seeing as the how the USN has over 50 AEGIS ships, but is retiring its major ASW component, the FFG7 Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates at an “alarming” rate, with only bizarre plans involving unfinished ASW modules on 3K tonne speedboats, what exactly is wrong with us perhaps taking up (again) the role of ASW experts in a NATO / Coalition fleet or task group ?
Just playing devil’s advocate you know, but perhaps that’s the best position the future RN will ever get – anti-sub and anti-mine boy for the Elmer’s………
I love these forward presence vessels, both in their mission and in their proposed form.
No problems.
Where I disagree utterly is any notion of reducing warfighting ships-of-the-line beneath the 19 planned.
There was a role for C2/C3, this takes its place IMO.
Jed @ 2.36
What is the plan at the moment?
6 x T45 made a bit GP / S-S?
8 x T26 with second hand ASW and a better point defense AAW fit?
5 x T27, GP version of T26 but without the ASW emphasis / top of the range kit.
Consequently a very poor roster for the 2020′s.
I would go all Japanese on the main escort fleet: 8+8.
2 new AAW hulls set up as fleet flagships – Nelson + Rodney.
8 new ASW hulls but with a thrifted area defence AAW included.
75/80% of the time in the water including training.
Double crewing if that is what is required.
Main fleet = 1 FF + 2 AAW + 2 ASW + 1 SSN
Amphib = 1 AAW + 2 ASW + 1 SSN
Nato = 1 AAW + 1 ASW.
Spare = 1 FF + 1 ASW
Consequently the resources left by not doing a GP version of the T26 would be put into the C3 concept.
That would get 12 hulls I think plus at least 18 “flexible boosters” to upgrade their performance, 4 to include T2087 sonar modules.
Add in extra hulls to replace the current OPV fleet, new fishery protection vessels, a new RMS for St Helena, 2 new RRS’s, a new Endurance, a couple of RFA’s for small scale stuff and 6 DfID charity boats for disaster relief and good works and you have a very capable, very visible fleet to get the flag waved around the globe.
Nice little business here, build 2 or 3 a year.
Half for internal consumption and half for export to keep the business honest.
Jed
All the focus on ASW just made us one club golfers in my detached Civvy opinion.
The next 50 years will not be like the last.
The RN has to be involved in all areas of sea power.
That is use the stuff effectively not try and re-invent the wheel with every system having a BAE badge on it.
We have go to be able to stand on our own.
I would not suggest we fight on our own but running around the world putting a coalition together with membership based on what you are good at rather than a in the mission is a recipe for disaster.
No use in keeping close to those who have a ball.
Too many issues will crop up. better we buy our own ball.
USN + ASW = Strange.
FBOT
Like I say, playing devils advocate, but:
1 Your right, next 50 years will be nothing like the last 50, because however dire our numbers or capabilities looked in the last 50, they are now a lot worse
2 RN has to be involved in all areas of sea power – well I agree, but HMG is not putting it’s money where it’s mouth is.
3 We already put together coalitions based on what different nations are good at, we have been doing it for years, so I don’t see the problem there, apart from UK having to downgrade it’s ego and admit we are not the worlds best at everything.
USN + ASW = role on the (naval operations) world stage (still, just…..)
Interesting article: Bryan McGrath over at Information Dissemination is pointing to an article in the Sunday Washington Post by Robert Kaplan calling for the US to take a naval centric strategy post Afghanistan:
http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/12/robert-kaplan-advocates-off-shore-shift.html
And original Washington Post article:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120306537.html
Short quote from Kaplan: “Armies win wars, but in an age when the theater of conflict is global, navies and air forces are more accurate registers of national might. (Any attack on Iran, for example, would be a sea and air campaign.)”
@Somewhat Removed, I agree that containerising everything might work out more expensive that just fitting everything but that only holds tru for the short term. As systems develop, they can be trialled ashore and just forklift upgraded. Its at this point that the cost benefits are realised so it will need some foresight at the MoD !
Perhaps there is scope to build more to replace the MCM and and some Survey ships, perhaps even some RFA’s as well but again, I am thinking modest and affordable
@Jed, I don’t think there is anything wrong being conservative at all, we need checks and balances against too much free thinking. I heard an interesting quote a few weeks ago about thinking outside the box. It basically said that maybe the box is the place to be because it has been built over centuries by generations of people who have had to face real world problems. Normally, I would agree but the problem is that the box is now so expensive we are forced to look elsewhere.
With reference to the SDSR and SDR before it, I keep making the point about likely operations at a medium scale and above being 1) discretionary and 2) in a coalition. All three services have to be able to deal with sovereign tasks at a small scale. Everything else is up for grabs and that includes Typhoon and Challenger. I don’t see anything in my proposal of a 12 ship FF/DD fleet that goes against that notion and whilst I 100% agree that the Government should fund more, it isn’t going to and this is what we all have to get used to, however much we don’t like the idea.
Consequently, we need to think alternatives, this is just one alternative
You say they ‘can do what exactly’ I agree, its not as much as a T26 but then at a quarter of the price it can ‘be there’
@IXION, I agree about a 360 degree CIWS for self defence, putting them out on a port and starboard blister might achieve that though
@FBOT, I agree with much of the sentiment but above all else they have to be affordable, which leads to compromises
@Jed (again), yes, why not make them RFA with mixed crewing, as per now. Would the RN accept that though!
@Michael, not the X Box is any more prone to collision than any other type, they seem to operate perfectly fine when in close proximity to offshore platforms etc. I suspect that fast logistics vessel would not be efficient at low speeds, its a racing snake and not something we actually need.
@JBT, as per my comments to Jed I guess. I agree it would be best if we had 19 or 20 first rate FF/DD but then that would mean business as usual or a significant uplift in budget, neither of which seem desirable or likely
Hi TD @ 4:15,
Following on from what I take to be nearing a concensus about CIWS being the most notable armament on board as in “@IXION, I agree about a 360 degree CIWS for self defence, putting them out on a port and starboard blister might achieve that though” but needing to be layered so that even an innocent looking boat pulling up close (as in USS Cole) can be dealt with, there is a follow-on issue:
I keep banging the drum about Holland class (matches mission, size and crew economies that we are, it seems, targeting). However, this has been achieved by such a high level of automation that even if “they” had remembered to put CIWS onboard (they did not), it couldn’t be manned anyway.
There is answer (installed widely on land, but at sea only in Norway’s navy):
“The Sea Protector is the navalized version of the Protector M151 weapon station intended to counter asymmetric threats in the coastal environment. The Sea Protector is suitable for patrol crafts or larger ships using multiple weapon stations. It is provided with a 12.7mm M2HB machine gun and a sensor package which includes CCD-TV daylight camera, uncooled thermal camera and laser rangefinder.”
- seldom needed, but vital; expensive (??) to buy but very cheap to operate
Hi TW @
A fully agree (and the space available can be used optimally through the mix) with ” I think that UAVs would be fine for patrolling and attack missions, BUT such a ship would probably need to be able to transport people rapidly from ship to shore, so at least one manned helo with some carrying capacity would be desirable” .
There is surely some requirement for the capability that follows “BUT” in the above, but how high is that relative priority? Do we then have to ditch the OPV terminology (Ship-boarding and inspection parties; a contingent sufficient in munbers to carry out several in parallel). I am sure that the littoral piece will force that revision on us anyway…? Ie. calling it something else than OPV.
But about going ashore it is interesting to note the doctrinal developments in/ for the USMC:
- moving away from division-sized frontal assaults, to
“– Persistent surveillance, enduring presence, ability to strike fleeting targets; Implies forces able to:
– Operate in small units for extended periods, often at extended ranges”
- so self-contained now even at company level, as opposed to division
How that brings us back to this discussion is that they believe in getting the force ashore by other means, but are evaluating using Hummingbird, after that, to keep them supplied
“I agree it would be best if we had 19 or 20 first rate FF/DD but then that would mean business as usual or a significant uplift in budget, neither of which seem desirable or likely”
My argument is that come 2015 we will be in a post-business-as-usual situation, and all of these fine ideas here (and i do think they are fine) will be happening beyond this horizon.
So there are really two possibilities:
1. Business as usual (land centric doctrine post afghan) = creative navy or 19 escorts as stated in SDSR.
2. Business not as usual (maritime centric doctrine post afghan) = 19 escorts and your X-bow C3 concept.
I’m fairly happy that the evidence weighs for the latter, so I am unwilling to accept the escort fleet dipping below the 19 deemed minimum for SDSR, and I’ll have a helping of X-bow C3′s post 2015 too, thank you very much!
TD
OK about the ciws on the wings, wot about the better permenant helicopter facilities? Poss space for two? Even if usally deployed with one.
I suppose it would all come down to the shekels
We need to put a cast iron ceiling on cost
I must admit to feeling like Scrooge and Mr Bumble here
I am finding it hard to reconcile the fact that many people are refering to the platforms to be used in these Forward Presence Squadrons as C3 derivatives. Surely this size of platform was for more auxilary roles such as MCM and survey work. I believed that the platform that should be discussed is the C2. Many are worried though that if we begin to build these “Cheap” Frigates then the Treasury will turn around and say “Why do you need more expensive platforms when these are doin gthe job just fine?”. In the current climate they may have a point but I myself would rather see the T-23s kept going until 2020-25 and a class of 8+ General purpose platforms built now that could be used as a basis for a more advanced version at a later date to replace the T-23.
I am also a fan of the Absalon design and at under £200M per platform they appear to rpovide alot of bang for the money. This would be a very low risk option for the UK with many systems being off the shelf or hand me downs such as the Mk8, phalanx although I would prefer to see 2x RAM fitted from the outset. With the addition of 2 -4 automatic cannon mounts this would be the basic fit for the UK version which together with aviation facilities to handle 2 Merlin or 4 Wildcat sized platforms and up to 4 RHIBs or the RMs new gunboats would provide an effective platforms for GP duties.
Turning to modules the first obvious one is for CAMM. Now would it be possible for the same module to be deployed on land mounted on a 4×4 or 6×6 as a Rapier replacement? Secondly would be a Towed Sonar and third a SSM. The Sonar plus Merlin would provide a very credible ASW plarform. The SSM is more difficult but time is on our side as new and improved systems are coming on line at the moment and so the RN has an opprotunity to stay a head of the game. However the Wildcat should turn out to be a very good ASuW platform so the need for a SSM module should be a lower priority. There a numerous possibilities for additional module such as Disaster relief and accomdation. What I would like to see in teh Daniush system improved over time to allow the next generation of RFAs be able to swap out modules in theatre.
Cost as always is going to be the driver but with the modular approach, incremental improvemants are far easier and cost effective. As I mentioned earlier there is a possibility the design could be modified to provide a replacement for the T-23, which in reality would mainly centre around the Electronis systems that would be fitted as part od the core design, with the other capability improvements being through more capable modules. By the time these platforms come on line new technologies such as underwater UAVs and UCAVs will be coming on line and these also lend themselves to the modular concept.
Yes the High End Absalon might not be the Super Battleship T-26 wished for by many but it will certainly get the job done and supported by twice as many C2 versions will provide the RN with a flexible fleet with much improved capacity. It will also future proof the fleet to a certain extent allow emerging technologies to be incorprotated much more simplye and allow UOR refits for unforseen situations.
TD
I do not think you are being unreasonably miserly.
Just wonder if folding hanger etc would be any more costly than built in hanger, which might be more weather resistant, I think FBOT suggested under the bridge, If you look at the Point class that would not seem to be a problem.
You could be right, moving things,bearing, salt water and sailors might combine to make them a maintenance nightmare so perhaps a fixed shelter would work out cheaper, it does cut your flight deck down though or if you choose to make it even longer, it cuts down your open work deck area at the rear.
Unless of course you make it bigger all round
Fascinating discussion, its all about trade offs and balancing priorities
The use of a telescopic hangar versus a traditional hangar has always been driven by space rather than cost.
What about this, a fixed hanger & landing space for a single helicopter, with any UAV’s loaded aboard via mission module?
That kind of keeps it all simple. We know where we are with a fixed hanger & with a crane, couldn’t you just lift the UAV onto the flight deck area?
I have to kinda agree with Lord Jim, i thought the C2 with space for CB90′s & RIB’s would be more suited for the presence squadron ships. Someone came up with the Bay class derivative idea & then there was the Absalon…..do you now think that is too much of a warship for this role?
Just like to say, i also sort of agree with IXION.
Rather see a 40mm CTA type gun though, 2 x 20mm Guns & as a must have to my mind, a CIWS, whatever flavour. I think if you fitted a 100mm/3″inch Gun, someone might be tempted to send it to do something that really requires a warship. We could meet in the middle & go with the 57mm but again i think it might give someone ideas that could get people into trouble.
I’m really impressed with all the idea’s here.
*sorry for not remembering who came up with it.
Absolute agreed jedibeeftrix 18-20 is the minimum number for high end escort. If further reductions are required they will all come from the army post 2015.
On the C3 vessel they do have the ability to transform the RN and be a very good export product if we do it right. But what do we want these ships to do? SDSR states Patrol, MCMV and Hydro graphic. I cannot see how these can separated from the littoral combat group as all the tasked outlined will happen in the littoral environment and the RN has not been involved in the littoral seriously for some time.
Threats include multiple fast attack craft, helicopters, mines, diesel subs, very shallow waters and floating debris. Sweden’s answer is the Visby corvette and it costs about £120mill. So hi tec can be done cheap.
I know FBOT is very keen on big boxy civy hull but IMAO this does not fit the mission profile. It would be like driving a humvee on the motorway great works well but very difficult in a village. Such is the blue water and littoral environments. So if you want big and boxy make them the next RFAs and have 1 support each of the Forward squadrons built along the lines of the Dutch JSS or Fort Class.
For me the following needs considering:
Water jets to reduced noise, reduced maintaince and less susceptible to FOD.
Armaments gun only due to difficulties with radar clutter so 57mm Gun, 2 x.50 miniguns and Phalanx
Mission Modules for MCMV, Hydro, UUV, and possibly sonar these would be interchangeable with the mission bay in the Type 26 allowing wider employment.
Shallow Draft to allow ease of manoeuvre in coastal waters. Would the Cornwall incident have happened had she been able to operate in shallower water.
Signature Reduction could be considered. It makes missile engagement difficult and would reduce engagement range.
Speed can be useful but needs to be balanced against the need to self deploy economically.
Wildcat helicopter Should be standard fit small nibble fast and packs a punch. Merlin should be retained for deep water work.
Trade-offs will need to be made to made to get to a price point around £100 mill but sweds have proven it can be done and the x-bow looks good for performance but on a clean sheet design of around 2000 tonnes and 40 crew. The hull is the cheap bit off the shelve sensors is what saves money. But to conduct MCMV in an amphib assault these vessels will be in harms way and should not be forgotten.
Mark and others.
I think there is a genuine argument for 2 classes of ships.
Both with the same armmament and as much of the same equipment as possible, but of 2 completely different sizes
One in effect river class size (and why knock it if it works). This is the true ‘litoral’ ship as you describe above.
However many of the ‘litoral’ areas we are taling about – coast of Africa/Falklands etc are in reality open Ocean.
To remain on station and operational in bad weather, and to have the endurance to get there, really does require 4000+ tons and 100+ M length.
I was starting to think along those lines though didnt want to suggest that given the idea of commonality. Having said that I would agree a 100m vessel is needed for ocean deployment capability part of the trade off i guess. The weight is less of issue as some of the hull could use composite material.
Signature Reduction could be considered. It makes missile engagement difficult and would reduce engagement range.
I do think, having just been looking at the STX website, that a lot of these designs have a huge, towering bridge-forecastle that doesn’t exactly merge into the background. Also, not quick. Of course, if you’re going to take along a lot of modularised missiles and a couple of helicopters and 5,000 tonnes of ship, you might say “come and have a go if you think you’re hard enough” to that.
I think the pick is between a 5,000 tonne PSV-derived ship, providing she gets enough modular kit to be more than a big target, and smaller, faster OPVs with module slots that allow them to bulk up if required, perhaps operating around an RFA for logistic support. (wasn’t that a 70s ASW concept?)
Also, if the cost is concentrated in the modules, that implies the only way to save is to save on the ship.
What’s the numbers cap for these again? 19 fleet escorts is now written on my heart, but…
Also, isn’t this: I always thought as soon as you add a a ‘proper’ gun and missiles then by default it becomes your major surface escort in the eyes of the government.
the slippery slope to “fitted for but not with” hell?
Mark said “Shallow Draft to allow ease of manoeuvre in coastal waters. Would the Cornwall incident have happened had she been able to operate in shallower water.”
Nelson said never set a ship against a fort. Sea room is important, even for NGS. Remember the pasting that Argentine corvette got in the Falklands courtesy of RM?
The Cornwall incident was due not to using proper boats in sufficient numbers. Imagine if “99″ had been close and got an RPG midships for her trouble. I don’t think the Mk8 would have been much use. And she would have been fighting back with small arms while presenting attackers with a lovely large target. The Iranians aren’t scared about shooting at Americans, I don’t think “we” bother them at all. Imagine the headlines too, “British frigate damaged in disputed waters.”
I think I am right in saying that the Iranian’s have more sailors (guard and “normal”) than the RN…….
Hi Mark @ 7:04,
I think the level of armament you have set is about right.
That makes the Swedish price point you brought in relevant, too. The 5 ships were due to get vertical launch SAMS late, but for budgetary reasons that was canned. So very good ships, for a very good price as long as there is no air threat somewhere far away.
Hi Ixion @ 7:49,
Your lower class would be about what Ireland/ Mauritius/ NZ have, and NZ bought in bulk, so they got 7 for $ 500m.
- too light an armament set, though
When we go to your higher size metrics $ 480m buys this (USCG): NSC 4 (=1 )will be 418-feet long, with a 54-foot beam, displacing 4,400 tons with a full load. It will have a top speed of 28 knots, a range of 12,000 nautical miles, an endurance of 60 days and a crew of approximately 110.
- I wonder what n:o 58, the last of the production run will cost?