The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction
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That is the question that seems to be on everyone’s lips whenever people talk about the RAF, its future as an independent force is always questioned when the time for budget cuts (sorry, defence reviews) comes around.
Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset, its flexibility.
Bernard Law Montgomery
So in one corner we have the opinion that air power can achieve effects independent of the other services, must not be spread across the other services who will have other priorities and that air mindedness is required to maximise its potential.
The other side of the argument says that air power is merely a tool to be used by the other services in support of its objectives, an essential, but nevertheless subordinate capability. The thinking goes that air power is an integral part of land and maritime operations and therefore should be under the financial and operational control of these services.
It is worth noting the atrophy of support helicopters (Chinook, Merlin, Puma) in favour of other capabilities whilst LAND hold the funding line for Joint Helicopter Command (JHC)
Air power is multi layered but as might be expected, the accusation that the RAF has favoured, at least until recently, fast jets above Support Helicopter, Air Transport and ISR. If one looks at the actual capabilities in service or on order it should be completely obvious that this is not actually the case, but sometimes the RAF seems to be its own worst enemy.
In the next few posts I am going to look at the future roles of the RAF, equipment and structure, covering a few of the following issues
- Does the RAF have the right equipment balance
- Expeditionary capabilities and force protection
- Joint Combat Aircraft, has the UK made the right decision
- Flying off the carriers
- Future threats and tasks
- Helicopters
- Air transport
- Airborne Counter Insurgency or deep strike
- ISR
- Air delivered complex weapons
- Unmanned systems
- Other things I think about as I go!
- Other things the TD readers want to discuss
I have had enough of Turkey so why not kick off the next series on Christmas day, it beats Corrie and Eastenders.
If anyone wants to contribute or suggest topics for discussion, usual rules apply.
## Other posts in this series ##
The Future of the RAF 01 – Introduction
The Future of the RAF 02 – Tasks and Trends
The Future of the RAF 03 – A Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 04 – Fast Jets
The Future of the RAF 05 – A Bargain Basement
The Future of the RAF 06 – A Reverse Takeover Bid
The Future of the RAF 07 – ISTAR #01
The Future of the RAF 08 – ISTAR #02 (DABINETT)
The Future of the RAF 09 – ISTAR #03 (SIGINT)
The Future of the RAF 10 – ISTAR #04 (Watchkeeper and Scavenger)
The Future of the RAF 11 – ISTAR #05 (Manned Airborne ISTAR)
The Future of the RAF 12 – ISTAR #06 (High Altitude Platforms)
The Future of the RAF 13 – ISTAR #07 (Maritime)
The Future of the RAF 14 – Strategic Transport and Refuelling
The Future of the RAF 15 – Tactical Transport
The Future of the RAF 16 – Vertical Lift #01 (Introduction)
The Future of the RAF 17 – Vertical Lift #02 (Basic Requirements)
The Future of the RAF 18 – Vertical Lift #03 (A Sensible Future)
The Future of the RAF 19 – Vertical Lift #04 (A Radical Future)
The Future of the RAF 20 – Building Regional Security
The Future of the RAF 21 – Summary
Category: Thoughts on the Future
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I fear we are stuck with the Crabs. It doesn’t matter how many arguments are made for precision guided artillery to replace CAS. Or cruise missiles to replace long range strategic bombing. Or how land power isn’t as inherently flexible as sea based power. Or how the RAF’s actions in WW2 were part of a greater whole. (Bomber Harris was bonkers, but where is Cunningham’s statue in London.) Or that the RAF’s post war record has been lamentable.
Kosovo was a textbook example of the popular belief that airpower could decide the situation on the ground – in that, it couldn’t.
After weeks of airstrikes, the “international community” had to eventually conduct an overt (UCK) and covert (SOF) – limited – ground campaign to reach an acceptable solution.
It’s hard to swallow that in the end, during war, both air force and navy are in support of the infantry, no matter if they are all independent services.
Having said that, I’m absolutely adamant that the services stay as seperate entities, albeit with thorough cross-service integration. Todays air (and naval) forces are highly specialized, not because they want to be, but because they need to be.
Finding the right capability balance is the key, which isn’t easy because that translates into funding. And funding requires influence, and influence means politics.
And that’s where it all gets FUBARed.
We need a land force and a sea force.
These chaps have the right idea………
http://www.marines.mil/Pages/Default.aspx
“air power is merely a tool to be used by the other services in support of its objectives, an essential, but nevertheless subordinate capability.”
I suppose i am in this category, although i too wish to see the RAF remain an independent service.
As an interesting exercise, i’d like to see how much interest, comment wise, the following sets of articles generate…………?
That said, I look forward to yet another challenging set of sacred cows being slaughtered.
We mustn’t be sentimental here. This is a life or death issue like, say, rugby going professional. We need to get rid of all those air marshals, get all those UK based RAF tech posts put out into the private sector, get some of those RAF air fields sold for building plots etc. etc.
We mustn’t be sentimental here. This isn’t a life or death issue like, say, rugby going professional. We need to get rid of all those air marshals, get all those UK based RAF tech posts put out into the private sector, get some of those RAF air fields sold for building plots etc. etc.
There is a fascinating website that shows the UK budgets going back to 1692. It is located here: http://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/uk_cofog_budget.html
Of course I am kidding, but it it interesting to wonder about the status of a nation that pays more on welfare payments than on national defense.
You can read this data as a timeline of changing values in the UK. Change your priorities to those of 1920 and you can have another fleet the size of the Jutland fleet
The argument over the RAF’s survival has been going on ever since it was created in 1918. After WW1, there were massive cut-backs in all three services, and the RAF (being very much the junior service) was threatened with dismemberment. To survive, it focused on activities which could not be done by the other services. In a small way, it demonstrated that suppressing (or more accurately punishing) the natives in places like Afghanistan could be done much more cheaply and safely by dropping bombs on them than by sending in troops.
But it was strategic bombing which they were really enthusiastic about – a potential war-winner, avoiding all that horrible trench stuff, and only the RAF could do it! No wonder they clung on to strategic bombing as an article of faith throughout WW2 and were very reluctant to get involved in “mud moving” in support of the army. The USAAF/USAF has demonstrated similar attitudes (they’ve tried to scrap the A-10 on at least two separate occasions).
Air forces love fighters because they are flexible, and can be diverted to whatever priorities are needed. Armies hate fighters (and love dedicated CAS planes) because they are flexible and can be diverted away from the army’s needs.
There are all sorts of issues to be debated here. Just to focus on the manned vs unmanned question:
- the place of UCAVs; at what rate, and for which tasks, will they replaced manned planes?
- which service(s) should be operating UCAVs for which tasks? The US is planning to have a separate recruitment stream for UCAV operators rather than reserving the role for pilots; is that the way to go?
I never could see a logical argument for the RAF.
I was prepared to accept there were good practical reasons (not appparant to me) for it’s existence, but it has become increasingly apparant that there are not.
1) Anything attacking the UK by Air must perforce come over the sea. If we follow the US and increasingly integrate sea based air defence into our terratorial air defence, logic say we shoudl hand the Typhoons and the job over to the Navy.
2) “Deep dstrike” has become almost an irrelevence, and can be done by sea and land launched Tomahawks way beyond the practical strike range of Tornado, and even longer by UAV.
3) The rest is just transport/ fire support, for the other two forces. In navel terms antishiping/submarine missions, in land terms Close air support.
4) Of course moving to that would not totaly remove all the Ponti’s; but it would shift many of them, and re focus the Air part of our armed forces towards actually doing a job.
(will never happen though I can hear the political screams with the Dambusters March backing music, playing out with never in the field of human conflict etc etc)
But can’t really see a downside to ditching RAF as an entity
As has already been stated the arguement that the RAF simply facilitates the operation of the other two services is an old one. But it can be taken a step further and transfer the Army to the Navy as without the latter the former cannot deploy to operational theatres.
Whilst the three services have aways looked after their own back yards, the bugetary pressures of the past 15 years had a divide and conquer policy by the Treasury have worsened this considerably but it is understandable. There is a strong case for more integration but mainly at the higher levels like conducting initial officer training at a single establishment doing away with two of the existing colleges and also reducing the number of Headquaters dramatically.
Concentrating on the RAF, like the other services it has to realise that in the current climate it cannot do everything effectively. So what should be its primary roles;
Air Defence
Tactical and Strategic Air Transportation (Fixed Wing)
Theater Level ISTAR
Close Air Support
In Flight Refueling
The first has been at the core of the RAFs reason for being since the 1930′s and will probably continue to be so, the threat is however now in the form unconventional attacks against the UK rather than masses of bomber heading south. For this do we need a state of the art platform? So what about Air Defence in theatre, covering UK ground forces. Well since WWII there have been few cases of the RAF being required to fire in anger in this role with the Navy havng more recent experience.
Moving to the second role and again this has been a long standing one for the RAF and one that has been expanded in recent years in capability if not capacity. With the demise of the middle weight Army programmes both here and in the US, the need to be able to fly in Army formation rapidly has diminished. There is still a need to move rapid initial entry forces quickly but the role of logistics has become paramount in recent years.
Next we have Theater level ISTAR with both manned and unmanned platforms. This was until the most recent SDSR a real growth area for the RAF and its future looked bright. Post SDSR the manned component is being cutailed at an alarming rate, whist any increase in unmanned is slow to say the least. ISTAR has become a corner stone for all operations and is one where national sovereignty should be maintained.
Close Air Support is vital for the UK’s ground forces if they are to be able to operate effectively. The ability of Fast Air to cover a large area quickly is a real force multiplier, especially with modern munitions. However to povide this service the platforms need bases from which to operate from. This is the main arguement used to support Carrier based avaiation and has many supporters. How ever without support assets like AAR adn AWACS naval avaitions ability to carry out this role is greatly reduced. These currently also require land bases and there is little interest is providing the RN’s new carriers with these assets the RN arguement begins to fall apart for all but the smallest operations
. Therefore is we decide that we are nearly always going to have to secure fixed land bases to conduct medium and large scale operations then the RAF has a role to play in CAS.
As mentioned above Inflight Refueling is an essential part of all air operations and will continue to be so. The RAQF is soon to recieve a fleet of Airbus A330 based Tanker/Transports that will greatly increase both its capability and capacity in both the AAR and transport areas. If the RAF is to operate Fast Jets and long ranged transports it must operate AAR platforms and this could increase with the introduction of advanced UCAV and UAV platform.
Next question is does it have the right platforms to carry out these roles covering capability and capacity. With the former it is worth investigating whether we have too much capability and is it cost effective for the missions required. This area is hotly debated between those who argue we are inlikely to face a high end opponent in the forseable future and those who believe the world is going to be saturated by double digit SAMs and sophisticated AD networks so we need the best equipment available. This is where Capacity comes in as with the high end arguement our assets are going to continue to shrink as the costs of state of the art equipment continue to outpace any increase in budget. To solve what has almost become an impass between these two arguement fresh ideas are required and a genuine evaluation of realistic threats the UK is likely to meet and what capabilities and what level of capacity are needed. the 2010 SDSR was a missed opportunity and hopefully 2015 will visit this area. However with funding tight and conflicting priorities their is little chance of real change until 2020 at the earliest with 20205 being the most likely.
Have you ever wondered – do the Navy & Army want the Air Force integrated into their services? The RAF tends to have rather different attitudes to “things” and might not integrate well into the other services. Moving them into the Navy & Army might change those services in ways their top brass might not like.
@ Lord Jim, fast jets are not necessarily the optimum choice for CAS. They are rarely hanging around overhead waiting for business and have to be called for – and can take some time to arrive. The pilots then have little time to examine the situation and sort out who the bad guys are.
In contrast, UCAVs can hang around all day monitoring a situation, with the operators keeping in close touch with the soldiers on the ground and warning them of what lies ahead. There is an increasing range of precision-guided munitions being developed for them, enabling even smaller ones to respond immediately with a precise strike where needed.
About the only CAS that UCAVs can’t do at the moment is to go in low for gun strafing. But with new planes like the F35 costing well over 50 million pounds each and the RAF having very few of them, do you really want to take them to within small-arms range to strafe?
Hi TW @ 1:24,
Good question, this one “which service(s) should be operating UCAVs for which tasks? ” For which tasks I guess are the key words, and then we come to the tricky issues of standardisation of types across services and dependence on bandwidth in their remote operation.
In 2004 the UK development effort was pushed very much into the direction of Afghanistan/ anti-terrorism which clearly is a subset only (and operated to this day with US kit mainly).
To differentiate between UAV and UCAVS, and then further between tasks, the least divisible is ISTAR. This is an area where there is no place for inter-service rivalry and organising it accordingly is a must. There is a manned component to it, so the hint might lie therein (while making sure that there is full “jointness” in spelling out the requirements.
Dependence on bandwidth is both the cost/ availability of it and the impact of countermeasures by the opposing side. For the former satellites are of course the key, while for the latter they may also be the weakest link. SDSR made some vague comments about upgrades needed/planned to Megabits per brigade level formation, but no specific mention was made about building in redundancy so as NOT TO make the satellite dependency an Achilles heel of what is, with all probability, going to be a very expensive and key set up going forward.
LJ @ 2:26 RE “Theater Level ISTAR”
- while I very much accept this, where do the “strategic” Rivets (at a cost of a bn for three) come in?
- similarly, where is the cut-off vs assets now under Royal Artillery
… difficult questions, I know, taking us back to jointness and therefore organisation(and funding), but just infusing them into the discussion (and looking forward to the in-depth threads).
JS, welcome to TD
I know we have a fairly dark blue crowd in, yet again, I am sailing into stormy waters!
I can see I aren’t the only person bored with Christmas as well
Aside from terrorism and submarine warfare almost any military threat against UK territory is likely to warrant an air power response of one sort or another. Whether the attacking force is airborne, seaborne or on land, an air response will be the first response. Neither of the other services are likely to be able to muster sufficient force as quickly nor get it to the right location as quickly. Moreover if the attack is airborne then saving for the attackers flying within sight of a T45 or the navy’s carrier happening to be in that location, then neither the navy nor the army will have any response to offer.
And with the ability to defend comes the ability to attack. The air force has the ability to attack places that will never be seen by or within reach of the army or the navy, or within the consciousness of generals or admirals.
Air power is fundamental, essential and irreducible. You would not abandon it before you had decided you did not need an expeditionary army to fight in far-off lands and the navy had no role beyond home waters.
The air force is not large in people terms – jets only need a pilot or a pilot and navigator, compared with hundreds of sailors on ships or thousands of infantry – and this reinforces the ‘junior’ service label, and suggests it could be ripe for being swallowed by a larger entity with some notion of economy; but size as a measure is immaterial when compared with its effect.
Okay, air power is used to support ground operations. But being the momentary recipient of air power is quite different from being in the business of delivering it.
Why then contemplate transferring air power to another entity that has no inherent aptitude for it?
Other aspects such as ISTAR and transport attach to the RAF largely on the basis that they involve aircraft. While these may be separable in theory you would think twice before setting up another branch to operate aircraft. If you did feel concerned about who was in control it would be more cost effective to designate the operation to whomsoever you felt appropriate but left maintenance and support of the aircraft with the RAF. However, in one area the status quo is not justified. Helicopters, as the RAF has, exist largely to transport the army and the army would be well capable of operating them themselves.
but where is Cunningham’s statue in London
Trafalgar Square, on the Gallery steps, facing Nelson. Do I win a prize? (Or did you mean AVM Conyingham?)
Good post Richard, can you all see which side of the argument I am on!!!
@ Alex
Yes you win tomorrow off. I know ABC has a bust in Trafalgar Sqr, but it is hardly as impressive as Harris’ statue.
Richard W said “The air force has the ability to attack places that will never be seen by or within reach of the army or the navy, or within the consciousness of generals or admirals.”
Um. I sincerely don’t understand that. The navy is a strategic service. And if anything has shown weakness in the Cranwell conveyor belt has been Stirrup’s tenure. If one service has been bereft of imagination during the post WW2 period it has been the RAF. Planes only need a pilot and a navigator? And it isn’t large in people terms? Transferring air power to a service with no aptitude for it? I think the FAA has displayed constantly that is has a fundamental understanding of air power. And if the Army had know understanding of air power why it would it be desperate to field AH to provide the air power it needs that seems to be sadly lacking from the RAF. Further the RAF’s Army Co-operation Squadrons are only there to serve the Army. In fact if you look up the definition of co-operation I struggle to see what the RAF get out of the deal. The US Army flies all its own heavy transport helicopters and I don’t see why the AAC can’t either.
It doesn’t matter what is said here. We are stuck with the RAF as much as we are stuck with 6xT45, 7xAstutes, etc. etc.
TD said “Good post Richard, can you all see which side of the argument I am on!!!”
I think you are confusing air power with the RAF. They are not synonymous,
RW
Any attack on UK terretory will come over the sea- look at a map (unles the Irish invade NI, Or Cpyrus as a go at our base ther, even a spanish attack on Gib would be sea based, are you proposing giving the Raf control of the RN?. If the RN flew the typhoons, it would have the rescouces to respond to any air threat.
You are confusing Air power, with how it is adminstered. Air power is still almost the dominant force, By land or Sea. But it is not ‘irreducable’ the moment you put togetehr a strike
package for an opperation you are reducing it it to the units required for a task.
The RAF has well over 100 people on the ground for every plane in the air. And is behind even a lot of air forces in that, i have heard other forces officer scrapping with each other over all sorts of stuff and with Raf officers, but Both RN and Army officers coinsistant complaint is that the RAf is stupidly overmanned.
The whole shift in civilain management has been to put the end user in charge of delivery.
The record of independant air power use as a weapon of itself since Ww2 has not been good. Vietnahm being one, Kosovo, another (who can forget that newspaper headline about the repeated bombing of the same ‘strategic’ targets
‘Rubble reduced to Rubble’
L pages comments about the smashingh up of Irag in G2 are quite pursuasive.
The ability to Strastegic attack, of both Tomahawks and UAV’s can go places a Tornado can only dream of.
There is a difference between having a few shiny aircraft and building a support infrastructure behind them
Exhibit A – FAA Sea Harrier
Exhibit B – Apache
Just as an aside before we kick in proper, I can see this is going to be a bumpy ride and that is great but lets not descend into Phoenix Think Tank territory with one sided arguments. If there is a good case for killing off the light blue then lets have at it but equally, let’s not indulge on flights of fantasy (see what I did there) or harp on about things from decades ago.
It always amuses me the amount of RN/RAF vitriol, especially given the reason for the formation of the RAF was to stop any damaging inter service rivalry. Don’t see the Royal Engineers getting up an outrage party (look at the history of the RFC!!!)
“The RAF has well over 100 people on the ground for every plane in the air”
What is the seaman/landsman ratio in the RN? And the teeth people/others ratio in the Army? I live near RNAS Culdrose – what is their aircraft/people ratio. Just asking.
Air power is indivisible. If you split it up into compartments, you merely pull it to pieces and destroy its greatest asset, its flexibility.
The Monty quote is more subtle than it sounds. Of course it’s compatible with a strategic bomber, airpower theory worldview, but it doesn’t require it. In fact you can read it as meaning that if you hived off the “big airforce” tasks and gave maritime and CAS to the other services, all that would happen would be that the elements would hare off after their own priorities and lose the ability to concentrate strategically and operationally. That might not require a single service (the US Air Force, Navy, and Marines manage to share an air tasking order) but it does require an integrated air command. Even if the strategy is to commit everything in support of land operations, that implies someone can give orders to all the RNAS and RFC air units and some organisation can draw up a common operational plan, lists of targets, deconfliction, etc.
If you have a common air command and a single ATO, you probably need common control of the ISTAR assets to draw that up. That conceded, why would you have duplicate logistics and admin…and you’ve created an air force.
I propose a different solution: reactivate the RAF Marine Branch, expand the RAF Regiment and mothball the other services. Seriously, the armed services and the defence chiefs in particular have to learn to work together again and not be so concerned about buggins turns, fair shares of expenditure and demarcation disputes. As a taxpayer, it appears that an awful lot of time, talent and resources are wasted on disputes that make ‘seventies unionism and devolution appear rational. Why can’t the joint chiefs of staff realise that the Defence of the Realm must be a seamless garment to be of any use and decide, after discussion, what are the priorities and equipment needs to fulfill it? It seems that one mob says you need a boat to do a job that its competitor says can be done better with an aeroplane. To keep the peace (shades of Dr Strangelove’s war room!) each union secures a chunk of funding for its members “because they’ve always done it like that”. Hence I would have confidence in the managerial ability of the top brass if the Army lobbied for more helicopters instead of tanks and other AFVs. Similarly, the RN should have made its carriers more RAF/AAC friendly. Perhaps an independent Office of Defence Responsibility (long the lines of the OBR checking Treasury forecasts etc) should be set up.
Is the RAF actually capable of defending UK air space?
Let say somebody launched one cruise missile against a UK target is the RAF capable of identifying, tracking, and killing it?
Obviously in times of tension there would be more aircraft on apron waiting for the off. But say it can hit one missile, when does the system break down? At 10 or 20 or 30? These might seem to be small numbers but if the UK was to loose all the cracking towers at the refineries the country would grind to a halt within weeks. The UK’s telephone system wouldn’t take many major nodes being put out of action before it collapsed. Humber, Forth bridges, Severn bridges, Therwall viaduct being destroyed would cost regional economies millions. The rail system hit in about dozen places would cease to function until repairs were made costing millions. Nuclear powers stations…….etc. etc. etc.
Hi,
While we are still warming up, I took Lord Jim’s taxonomy, rolled the time forward (with known equipment plans, twisted the order a bit), and got:
1. Playing from, rather than at, home
Air Defence
5 Sq Typhoon
2 Sq JSF (1 Counter-strike? 1 FAA Expeditionary?)+ 1 OCU+ spares
1 Sq (=5) Sentry
In-flight Refuelling*
*= more aircraft than needed, a service charge with the French to be agreed
Playing away:
Tactical and Strategic Air Transportation (Fixed Wing; why not also the helos for the tactical part)
Theater-level ISTAR
1 Sq (5) Sentinel
1 SQ (4) Shadow
+ UAVs
Close Air Support
UCAVs?
Apaches
That is not much, especially when you factor in that with the early retirement of the Hercules fleet, the transport numbers will be halved (how much will the greater capacity per unit make up for that?)
ACC, Sentinel is going as soon as we draw down from Afghanstan
Hi TD @ 5:54,
Yes, I knew that (and have lamented in previous posts). I take it there is a rational (!) explanation, like airframe fatigue
- I will stay away from the “going back decades” but the Valiant V-bombers where switched from bombing at the “safe” 50.000 ft altitude to doing a low-level approach (due to improved defences) and in that mode had a life of 25 (!) hours, so no practice allowed then – and scrapped after only 9 years of service
Also, what is the exact timing in the Tornado to JSF hand-over?
- I know that no-one has the answer, yet
- Will all of the latter be flying in the naval config (extra weight of the hook etc; now the costing looks much more for the naval version, but the two should get much closer to each other in unit costs when the numbers even out).
Thanks for giving an extra thread to “what will fly off the carriers”; of course the JSF role is not just that.
- but the “what” could have much more to it…
I just have a few questions.
What does the very high level of technology of todays fast jets mean for availability?
Why does the RAF have only 8 aircraft on QRA?
What aircraft will the RAF have to support the Army for either close air support or deeper strikes behind enemy lines in the future?
If the answer to that last question is, Well they will have the F-35C’s, what will happen (in terms of support for the Army), if we are involved in a war both at sea & land?
What assets will the RAF need in the future for surveillance & reconnaissance, beyond Afghanistan & Sentinel?
This may surprise a few here but i think that the RAF is too small to do what it’s asked to do.
After 2014/15, the Raf will be down to the Typhoon & will still be having fistfights with the Navy over the 40 F-35C’s.
How well will the Typhoon do in a high threat SAM enviroment in say 2017 if they really need to do deep strikes?
Some here have posted some very interesting stuff on the new Sukhoi Su-30MK Flanker.
How well will the RAF’s Typhoons do against something like that in 5 or 7 years time?
A while back TD talked a bit about decision cycles, was in relation to armoured logistic’s vehicles in Iraq & Afghanistan i think.
Someone else zero’d in on it right away. (i think it was Marcase)
Have the RAF’s decision cycles been got at in the same way?
What sort’s of SAM systems will the RAF operate in 5+ years time & what do they really need for base defence/security?
Will they still need to strip weapons & personnel from Royal Navy ships to cover their own lack of planning/capability?
Does the RAF have an actual plan of it’s own?
I recently looked at some stuff on the Israeli/US Arrow III project, i find it typical of the UK not to get involved.
“but the Valiant V-bombers where switched from bombing at the “safe” 50.000 ft altitude to doing a low-level approach (due to improved defences) and in that mode had a life of 25 (!) hours, so no practice allowed then – and scrapped after only 9 years of service”
I spent quite a lot of time during my six years on Vulcans at 500 ft or less. For Red Flag we flew at 100 ft. I can remember flying down the low level spur in Yorkshire, which followed the A66, and the lorry drivers were flashing their headlights at us!
Hi Michael (ex-DIS),
Exactly my point: a more versatile design. Keeping it this short to stay within “our brief”.
Hi Michael (Civ.),
RE “What aircraft will the RAF have to support the Army for either close air support or deeper strikes behind enemy lines in the future?”
Yes, I wanted to highlight that in the previous post:
- Apache “at the line” more or less, rather than further behind
- behind the line, either the CVF JSF (12?) or the their brethren, flown out on string of tankers (the other 12, as in a “squadron”)
RE: Michael (Civ.)
“This may surprise a few here but i think that the RAF is too small to do what it’s asked to do.”
I would say that the RAF, RN and even the Army are to small to do the jobs they should be doing, but I think that even a quick review by TD will be reveal that a lot of people think the RAF spends to much time and share of their budget on fast jets at the cost of transports and SH, on the off chance we will face a worst case scenario of an attack by Russia rather than concentrating on the day to day bread and butter roles.
You only have to look at the demise of the MRA4 (if it is really true it was only cancelled to save operating costs) which is the cornerstone of our ability to conduct long range maritime SAR to keep more Tornado’s to see the flaw in RAF’s thinking. However I am not sure giving their budget to RN or the Army would not just result in it being mismanaged in a different way – possibly the only way forward is to split the RAF into two new forces, one that only operates fast jets, and the other that operates all the other supporting elements.
PS Am I the only one who thinks that in the next financial year or so we will see the MoD announcing the purchase of P-3′s or some other second-hand MPA’s to fill the gap left by cancelling MRA4, due to pressure from the US and France to carry our own weight?
In the near future, Fast Air is still going to be a dominant force in low and medium level conflicts, ie those we are most likely to be involved in. As inportant though is to make sure that there are sufficient support assets available such as ISTAR,AAR etc to ensure the maximum effect. THere is an arguement that Fast Air is not neccessary for CAS and I partially agree with the Apache able to do a fantastic job and the on going developement of UCAVs showing great potential, but at present Fast Air is still able to get there quicker, is more flexible and can deliver a measured response if required.
On the Subject of AAR the A330 tankers will greatly increase the RAF capabilites with their inproved range and fuel capacity. Yes more would be better but we are on a budget.
I totally agree that the Army should be incharge of the SH force but must be reminded that they are to support all three services with these assets.
The RAF’s main objective up to 2020 should be to secure funding to ensure the Typhoon fleet is brought up to its full potential to allow the greatest possible pool of aircraft for future operations.
TD
I take it you do not mean this to be a discussion (or polemic) about keeping the RAF Ok I will leave that argument alone, Sacred cow lives on to fight another day.
OK I would like to ask some questions of all contributors before proceeding.
1) Any reason why RAF cannot hand all transport helicopters to Army? and let navy/ marines keep all theirs?
Any reason why RAF should be flying any UAV’s rather than Army / Navy, What do RAF bring to that table?
2) Likewise All intra theatre fixed wing Transport?
3) Why do we need a Raf reg, (in particular the parachute bit)
4) Does RaF need more than 4 Bases (If so which ones)
5) What capabilities do the Raf bring to the uk based terror threat?
6) What capabilities does RAF bring to foriegn terror threat to protect UK from direct attack.
7) Any reason why Raf keep raf reg
9) Could the Army/navy run Close air support?
10 How do we avoid the kind of reported stupid rivalry that cost us blackHawks?
I suspect it may be that the economics of running fleets of different fixed wing assets mean they are better run on a centralised basis IE status quo. But given existance of FAA and AAC should (in that case_ either be sustained as seperate organisation, even for rotary assets.
Ixion, I don’t mind at al exploring the issue of whether the RAF should be disbanded or not, there are NO sacred cows at TD. All I ask is that it is approached from a rational perspective
Your other question I will address as we glide through the series (see what I did there, again!!)
Hi LJ,
RE”The RAF’s main objective up to 2020 should be to secure funding to ensure the Typhoon fleet is brought up to its full potential to allow the greatest possible pool of aircraft for future operations.”
- absolutely right, I take it that you mean ground attack capabilities with all the trimmings (like RAPTOR and Litening III)?
- the numbers of JSF make this an absolute necessity (regardless of the latter’s in-service date)
- there is no proof (in public domain?) of the GA/CAS capabilities of Mantis/ Desert Hawk/ Taranis (yet) , as evidenced by the very recent raising of a second squadron with American (leased) kit
It has been stated here that Typhoon has never been to A-stan. Does anyone know if it is a joke that its composite body would buckle in the summer heat there? Someone ( I can’t remember where I read it) was lamenting the early demise of Jaguar: sturdy, and came with “plenty of” cannon.
Hi IXION,
Looks like I am out of my depth here. What is this: “3) Why do we need a Raf reg, (in particular the parachute bit)”?
- I didn’t know there was such a bit
- I tend to agree with you, particularly when the overstretch of the Herc fleet has kept the real paras from jumping (enough?) for a number of years now… I also heard that there is a problem of jumping from both sides of the ramp, ie. when the rapidity is reduced by 50% you get the guys dispersed on the ground in the good old Normandy style, ie. do they immediately make up a fighting unit? Well, they are not part of the RAF, but no paras without planes
- we have become like the Germans in WW2, who had specialised infantry under that nomenclature
More generally I am all for the specialised force protection RAF Regt bit with (new, 3G) Rapiers, (nicked)Phalanx for other types of “incoming”… come on, buy them a modern system, like Iron dome or even the Swiss one (not new any more, but comes with AHEAD, for good effect)
When it comes down to it the reason I believe the Typhoon hasn’t gone to Afghanistan is that we simply do not have enough of them at the right spec yet and with the delivery schedule being so slow it will be a while yet. If the Typhoon is developed to its reasonably full potential, the RAF will have a platform that will eneable it to meet 99% of all Fast Jet tasks it is required to carry out. This is especially so as I do not believe in the Double Digit SAM Bogy Man theory where everyone and his dog will be deploying them. Just how many nations that could be reasonably labled as potential adversaries now or in the future have anything more advanced than updated SA-2/3/6/8.
Rapier FSC operated by the RAF Regiment and Army is a good system and its successor CAMM shows great promise, but their range limits both to localised defence. Their are already Systems around such as Patriot, SAMP-T and others that cover all altitudes and offer much greater range yet are deployable. Fewer systems would cover a much greater area but the UK seems to show little interest is this catagory of weapons even if most of our allies disagree. Maybe the French will loan us a battery or two under our new defence co-operation pact.
If the RAF Regiment goes then Army battalions will have to take over the role. Given we are already short of deployable units we would have to increase the Army’s infantry strength and/or greatly increase the strength of deployable support units. In my view the RAF Regt falls under the same catagory as the Marines, “If it ain’t broke why try to fix it?”
I totally agree with the transfer of the SH force to Army control as I have already said. They like the Chinook and Merlin and would love something larger than the Wildcat for the light utility role but I am worried that there are those within the Army who cast envious looks towards the UA Army’s operating procedures and Equipment levels. Large fixed wing transport is totally different as is its responsibilities. In fact I cannot see the army wanting to control these assets. There could be an arguement for a small fleet os small fixed wing types that have multiple roles but that is a separate topic.
Moving off topic one thing I am noting in various threads is that although we lambast the three services for in fighting and defending their owempires, many on this board seem to be doing the same, defending their own favorite service to the detriment of the other two. This is unavoidable as with a limited budget for one service to gain others are going to lose and we must bear this in mind when discussing future developements, re-equipment and re-organisations. I would like people to say what would go when they propose such changes as we must look at the three services as a whole or things start to move into La La land.
Hi Michael (ex-DIS),
RE”For Red Flag we flew at 100 ft.”-
Less than that if there is any truth to the p. 157 mention of the Vulcans in the Empire of the Clouds, only came out this year
- you may have a second mention for “Skyshield” further down the same page (penetrating the DEW line with missions from Scotland and Bermuda)
- we had a new “DEW line” in the works (and to shelter behind), until the Obama Administration shifted the focus to the Pacific & at-sea ABM defences
- no one has costed that short-fall yet for our/European security (not fully read-up on the NATO Lisbon outcomes, but they did not budget for anything while there)
The only thing about the RAF that really makes me think is the ever smaller number of combat aircraft & air-crew.
Hate to say it but it kind of reminds me of the Imperial Japanese Navy at the start of the big war.
A smaller number of really good pilots & aircraft v America’s larger number of just good enough pilots & just getting started aircraft industry.
I really do think it’s too small with, maybe, the wrong type of technology mix.
Think F-20 Tigershark. Good enough to intercept Hijacked airliners & fast enough for precision close air support from 10,00 to 20,00 ft.
The drawbacks seems to be that it has one engine, would not be expensive & is not stealthy. Seems to me that it would have been perfect for Afghanistan & Iraq, where there was/is no significant air threat.
Is the real reason that we don’t buy something like that due to the fact that we like being on the receiving end of a “Strategic Shock” every few years & then quite like to have to scramble about to get the force’s necessary to try to support the Army?
Think about it, we are nearly a decade in, we still have a need & we have no cheap’ish, simple aircraft that can do the job. Why not?
From what i’ve seen, the British Army’s air-support seems to be the USAF, with lots of F15′s & ancient but damm good A-10′s preparing the battlefield. (i have seen a Youtube vid that is just scary, search for “A-10 Thunderbolt almost kills soldiers”)
This is one area where, i think, we should be doing it ourselves…….they are our people out there, we should (or the RAF or Navy should) be backing them up.
For the record, i am not anti-RAF……it just annoy’s me when they talk as though they can deal with anything, anywhere, that might happen on the earth…….when all who cares to look can see that, that, is absolute rubbish.
If anyone has watched the Vid from YouTube then you should know this too.
RIP Private Tony Rawson aka Nicey. He died in a firefight back in 2007
“Tony was the friendliest bloke you could ever meet, hence the nickname ‘Nicey’. If there was ever a problem, he was the first to offer his helping hand. If someone was feeling down he would go out of his way to help. He was a cracking soldier and an even better friend. He will be sorely missed by the whole of 11 Platoon and no doubt, the rest of the Battalion”
The reason i posted this (extra bit), is to try to concentrate minds, this isn’t just an abstract or easy subject for people to argue about.
Hi Michael (Civ.)
RE “A smaller number of really good pilots & aircraft v America’s larger number of just good enough pilots & just getting started aircraft industry.
I really do think it’s too small with, maybe, the wrong type of technology mix.”
Three thoughts
- the small, elite force was gone in 5 minutes (A Churchillian quote, he himself borrowed the quote and had to apologise)
- luckily, the larger numbers only exist on the other side of the world (e.g. Russia is currently flying about 350 front line designs)
- technology mix is an opportunity: not since Canberra-Hunter-Harrier has there been such an opportunity for an export success (once the designs have been proved in own use). There is even two! companies in the game, instead of the normal one-only. It just seems that all field requirements are fulfilled with proven US kit (I can read something good into the arrangements being “operating leases” only)
Hi ACC, you still up
The numbers thing, yes i think you’re correct but i still time & time again come back to the strategic shock thing.
What are we preparing for?
What are we not preparing for?
What does the next surprise look like?
I admit to being a fan of a simple, fast, cheap’ish jet for CAS & for the unexpected. The F-20 Tigershark (or something like it), does it for me everytime.
As someone else said, “Quantity has a quality all of it’s own”.
(i think X or IXION pointed that one out)
Five Squadrons of Typhoons & a few JSF’s just aren’t enough, not simply in terms of aircraft but the people too, to my mind anyway.
Sorry but you lost me with the 2 companies thing (i’m a bit tired), who are they & what are they trying to sell?
Hi ACC.
I think that having Apache & some F-35C’s isn’t enough for support for the Army/Infantry.
The Apache’s are fast but not fast enough & the F-35′s will be too few to be readily available.
What does that leave, Ucav’s or Typhoon’s to fill the gap’s?
The only other Ucav’s at present are technology demonstrators, aren’t they, apart from the Reaper’s & Predator’s?
If lot’s of Typhoons are fitted for & tasked with CAS/Deep Strike, doesn’t that leave us open at home?
Would that not be a perfect time to launch a totally deniable “terrorist operation”?
Is there an example of “cheap air force” ever winning?
RE: ArmChairCivvy @ 2.54
“Someone ( I can’t remember where I read it) was lamenting the early demise of Jaguar: sturdy, and came with “plenty of” cannon.”
I think that RAF and a lot of other air forces have a need for something small and cheap but still capable of being supersonic. If we could build a new Jaguar with France, and resist the urge to add all the whistle and bells, and maybe just add a slightly more modern cockpit, and an off the shelf AESA radar, and keep the unit cost down to around £35 million I reckon we would have a perfect platform for deploying as QRA in the Falklands and low and medium intensity conflicts. We could then ignore the facts – that we cannot afford to buy enough extra Typhoons or enough F-35′s to be able to deploy more than a squadron to support the Army for sustained operations, and that if we are not careful the RAF might not be able to even do that after future budget cut backs. Of course the problem (which is endemic in all the services) is they want the best on the off chance of peer conflict rather than something that is good enough at a price they can afford. Sure cheap and cheerful might get stomped on if we were invading Russia but they are more than enough to deal with the threats the country will face 99% of the time.
@ Alex
I did read once that somebody speculated that there would come a time when the West’s single fighter aeroplane would fly off to combat the Soviet’s single fighter aeroplane!
But your question hides a deeper one; has air power alone ever won anything?
@ Mike (Civi)
It is far from abstract for many who comment here. When you see an 18 year old go off to join the county regiment, who you have known since he was 11 or 12, knowing, or at least doubting, whether he will be properly looked after in theatre, have access to the appropriate equipment, receive timely massed fires when the unit he is in needs them, etc. etc. it stops being a game.
Hi Michael (Civ.),
RE “the 2 companies thing” around UAV/UCAV developments, I counted
- BAE slightly more than once as they are in head-on competition with themselves (through their 37.5% of MBDA)
- Thales less than once because they would seem to be more dependent on the US partner (rather than having an independent product line)
I’ll be most interested to find out in our forthcoming detail discussion about how permanent the partnerships formed for JUEP (Joint UAV Experimentation Programme) are turning out to be
- BAE + Northrop Grumman
- Thales + Boeing
Yes, good question, RE: how much are we still in the technology demonstration phase; e.g. about Taranis it is difficult to find any meaningful detail (I might not be looking in the right places?)