Proponents of a stronger Royal Navy consistently fail to make a coherent case for it, despite SDR98 and SDSR2010 making the point about scale, sovereignty in large scale operations, conflict prevention and the need for change. They complain about Afghanistan and so called worthless interventions but advocate a stronger Royal Navy so we can do just that, but with grey painted toys not green. The world has changed and very few in the naval community seem to want to recognise that, of course the light blue and green community have aspects of exactly the same attitude but this is a series of posts about the Royal Navy.
Instead of adapting, all we hear is complaining, talking about sea blindness, the Falklands and that golden of goldens, we are an island. Actions speak louder than words but what do we see, the same old paradigm of carriers, frigates and destroyers.
Perhaps I was setting myself up for a fall when I moaned about the lack of innovation because the concept of the single task group and the component parts is anything but, its actually an old fashioned concept. There are many interesting concepts in naval design; payload modularity, open source combat management systems, digital keels, the building block approach to construction, stealth, water jet propulsion and many different hull forms to name a small selection, but the name of the game for the single task group is cost control so risky new technology should be de-emphasised.
The current situation where we send frigates to do anti piracy, counter narcotics or standing patrol tasks is wasteful and we are squandering our most expensive asset, we also reduce multi vessel training opportunities because the ships spend most of their time on detached duty. If we want the Royal Navy to have a hard fighting edge we must not neglect individual and collective training.
This proposal would place the majority of surface escorts into a Single Task Group that provides the ability to prosecute a sovereign small scale focussed intervention or contribute to a coalition war fighting operation. It would be held at high readiness, conducting training or engaged on operations.
At the heart of this idea is the recognition that a large scale or hot war is less and less likely, globalisation and economic interdependence means the majority of conflicts will be regional, beyond UK waters and carried out with hybrid forces. Much like the Army has realised that the Russians are not coming through the Fulda Gap so must the Royal Navy recognise a similar situation. Conflict prevention, maritime security, countering asymmetric threats and supporting land based operations are the most likely outcome. I know it is a hackneyed straw man but how many times in the last 30-40 years have we actually used anti submarine, area air defence or anti surface weapons? I don’t want a long list because because of two things, it would not be a long list and that’s not quite the point, ask the same question of mines countermeasures, helicopters, RHIB’s, amphibious forces and you see a different picture.
Yes, we must always maintain an insurance policy against an emergent threat or the unknown but not if this insurance policy means we can’t do the mundane tasks that actually contribute to the hear and now.
It would be easy to argue for 12 Type 45’s, 18 Type 26 and 2 CVF with 36 F35C’s each but that would be preaching to the converted and would result in no RAF and an Army that consists of 2 Battalions and a ceremonial goat (however much that might please the ‘naval crowd’)
We must, however difficult, seek balance, relevance and realism. This leads my thinking at least, to a two tier force structure.
When most people talk about a two tier force they actually mean a 1 tier with extra’s, suggesting that same 30 plus FF/DD and then add another 20 or so armed to the teeth corvettes.
Again, however desirable, this is simply unrealistic
The Single Task Group is the output from this thought process.
It would provide the UK with a highly capable and rounded force that would be available at short notice for contributory coalition operations or sovereign small scale focussed interventions, AS PER THE SDSR.
It is still highly credible but the effect is achieved at a lower cost than with current plans. Some standing commitments would be stopped or resourced in a different manner as per the previous post.
The Task Group would have a number of capability slots that would be filled on a rotational basis.
- 1x Carrier
- 1x LPD
- 2x ASW/ASuW/Land Attack Frigate
- 2x AAW Destroyer
- 2x SSN
- Logistical support and associated minor capabilities
The maximum sized task group we would be able to deploy would be dependent on existing commitments, geographical dispersion, refit schedules and harmony requirements for enduring operations, but would approximate to;
- 1 swing role CVF plus aviation (various)
- 1 LPD plus aviation
- 1-2 LSD(A) plus aviation
- 2-4 Type 45 plus aviation
- 2-4 Type 26 plus aviation
- 2-4 Astute
- Various supporting elements as required (MCM, survey and logistics for example)
Whilst not operating at maximum stretch, the task group would be smaller; with some detached elements committed to FRE and other tasks. The remaining group would be engaged in training, the vital defence diplomacy and building security capacity roles that are so undervalued yet explicitly emphasised in the SDSR.
Yes, I understand the limitations of this configuration and the lack of a split between amphibious and carrier strike but there would be nothing preventing us using the group in one or the other, combining with other nations or splitting in a lower threat environment.
So now we come to the numbers and types game, here are my suggestions for the ultimate end state, achieved over a number of years, moving towards 2020 onwards.
Carrier; one CVF acting as a swing role asset, able to flex between LPH and strike roles, embarking a mix of F35 (Rafales/F18’s in a coalition operation), various helicopters and with accommodation for an embarked force. The second CVF should be retained in extended readiness and not sold so it can be activated to cover surge requirements at some notice or refit periods as required. Anchoring the group, CVF, even with a reduced F35 compliment will be credible and useful.
Maritime Fast Jet Aviation; I still think F35B offers the best combination of cost, flexibility, interoperability and utility but the decision is F35C. I also do not see the point of maintaining an FAA fast jet capability as this seems like unnecessary and costly duplication so I would disband the fast jet elements of the FAA and make the F35 the sole preserve of the RAF. The aircraft could then easily be used across a range of tasks in the most efficient manner possible. No more than 2 operational squadrons plus OCU/OEU. Longer term, make sure any resulting UCAV can be launched and recovered by CVF (please let’s not let this descend into a CVF argument again)
Anti Air Warfare; stay with plans for 6 Type 45 and mature the platform with extra silos, CEC, improved soft kill etc to enhance the AAW role. Fitting it with extra surface attack equipment ‘would be nice’ but we need them to be at the top of their game and not burdened with other expensive enhancements in a resource limited world. Some might think the anti air mission is less likely but given the proliferation of supersonic anti surface missiles and reductions in F35 we neglect this capability at our peril. Continue with development of FLAADS/CAMM and insist on integration with the Slyver silo for fitting to the Type 26′s.
Airborne Early Warning and Control; as the Sea King ASaC Mk7’s go out of service, simply transfer the equipment onto a palletised configuration and use the non HM2 upgraded Merlin’s. The longer term future is likely a data linked network of UAV’s but this is some way off.
Anti Submarine Warfare; another one of those cold war relic capabilities but again, low noise and effective submarines are proliferating and there is also a growing trend in ‘home brew’ semi submersible vessels that are likely to be encountered. The longer term future looks again like a data linked network of UUV/USV’s but the current king of the hill is the 2087 equipped Type 23. As these go out of service they are planned to be replaced by the Type 26. Simply put, I would cancel the Type 26 and evolve a Batch 2 Type 45 to fulfil this role. The Type 45 is large, has an Integrated Electric Propulsion system and plenty of growth potential. There are a number of compromises in using the Type 45 hull but in the context of this proposal, worth accepting for commonality and cost benefits. Jed has a post in the queue for this (even though we often disagree, great minds do sometimes think alike!) Total numbers should not exceed 6, equipped with the 6 Sonar 2087 sets from the Type 23’s. In light of this proposal the existing plans for 30 Merlin HM2’s look excessive so a quantity review might reduce these. Ruthless commonality, yet again, should be the driver for cost reduction and operational efficiency.
Anti Surface; Transfer the Harpoon launchers from the Type 23’s and fit to the Batch 2 Type 45’s. Continue development of the FASGW or Sea Skua replacement and the Lightweight Multirole Missile (LMM) for deployment on helicopters and surface craft to counter small, rapidly manoeuvring targets.
Land Attack; in addition to the Tomahawk equipped Astute submarines the Type 45 and Batch 2 Type 45’s would be fitted with the 4.5” guns transferred from the Type 23’s. These might be semi unique to the Royal Navy and without the commonality or guided munitions benefits of the more common 127mm or even modified 155mm systems, but they are adequate for now. Evaluate the cost benefits of commonality with the Army’s 155mm ammunition and compare it with an off the shelf purchase of the Oto Melara 127mm with Vulcano ammunition, for deployment in the medium term. A containerised GMLRS may also be a realistic option for precision land attack and more easily deployed on lower value vessels that can more easily be deployed into the littoral environment.
Helicopters; ideally, I would like to see Merlin and Wildcat replaced with a single type, NH90 or Blackhawk/Seahawk but recognise that however desirable from a commonality and capability perspective, is unlikely. Heavy lift would be provided by CH53K that can operate equally well in the land or maritime environment, replacing Chinook, again, however desirable, most unlikely, so, we are left with Wildcat and Merlin. Apart from a numbers review, no change to existing plans.
Amphibious; retain a single LPD and the three LSD(A)’s. Continue Investment in fast landing craft and if economically viable, improve aviation capabilities of the LSD(A) and LPD. Pretty much as per current plans, the LPD in extended readiness would provide refit cover and surge.
Other Capability Areas; Invest in a small number of off the shelf UAV’s, either the Scan Eagle or Camcopter, operate these as a standalone capability but also ensure they can, long term, integrate with the Watchkeeper/DABINETT/SOLOMON infrastructure.
Subsurface; Carry on with plans for a single class of 7 Astute SSN’s, they provide a hard core capability that is equally powerful and flexible.
Nuclear; in line with previous posts on the subject, the sixth and seventh Astute, with an additional 2, would be a stretched variant, equipped with a modular vertical launch silo that can be used for Tomahawk, special forces, USV’s or the Trident replacement missile.
The future RN core combat fleet would therefore consist of
- 1x CVF plus 1 in extended readiness
- 1x LPD plus 1 in extended readiness
- 6x Type 45 AAW Destroyer
- 6x Type 26 (Batch 2 T45) Frigate
- 6x SSN plus 4 dual role nuclear SSGN/SSBN
- Assorted RFA support and logistics
Depending on requirements, the Single Task Group would link up with the Forward Presence Squadrons for defence diplomacy and training, conduct training in home waters or be on operations.
Resilience would be afforded by the non tasked assets if we use the conservative and sustainable 3 to 1 availability ratio
These reductions provide the Royal Navy with three things; long term financial credibility with the Treasury, a higher readiness core and resources to fund other areas.
######## OTHER POSTS IN THIS SERIES ##########
The Future of the Royal Navy 01 – (Context)
The Future of the Royal Navy 02 – (Tasks and General Approach)
The Future of the Royal Navy 03 – (Single Task Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 04 – (Forward Presence Squadrons)
The Future of the Royal Navy 05 – (Equipment – T26)
The Future of the Royal Navy 06 – (Capability Plus)
The Future of the Royal Navy 07 – (Equipping the Forward Presence Squadron)
The Future of the Royal Navy 08 – (Equipping the Littoral Operations Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 09 – (Equipping the Disaster Support Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 10 – (Mine Countermeasures and Survey)
Just out of interest what – if any – are the downsides to ordering the batch 2 Type 45 a instead of type 26 frigates? From what I can see with my limited experience that seems an eminently sensible idea If the costs add up.
What do we get back for giving up 7 FF/DD? Is this going to be covered in the forces allocated to your overseas squadrons?
Will digest before replying but I do beleive that as you criticise Pheonix for being a blind advocate of maritime air you are in danger of being perceived as a blind opponent.
George- the problem with a type 45 in a pure ASW role is they are not very quiet. Yes they are electric propulsion but that electricity is generated by a gas turbine sitting very low in the Ship. When running quietly a T23 is propelled by 2 Diesel Generators mounted sound proofed and rafted at 1 deck level.
i’m not a boat man but surely a mix of three different types of aircraft would involve a lot of space for different spares ie engines etc.
APATS
What do we get for losing 7 FF?
1. Financial credibility and a link with financial reality
2. Freeing up funds for proper training for perishable skills like ASW
3. Freeing up funds for proper maintenance and logistics
4. Freeing up funds for other capabilities
TD
1. A 19 escort navy is not reality? Until the Government cuts tasking it is the minimum that is required. However if we are talking 12 plus extra assets for your overseas squadrons then it can be reasessed.
2. Funds for proper ASW training. ASW is perishable and in contact time with as submarine is valuable but having said that ASW is also incredibly procedural and can be done to a certain extent in a simulator. Inovative thinking has seen European Navys pay for FOST berths by providing a training SSK for a few years now. The real skill fade area is amphibous ops with the Cdo Brigade commited on a cyclic basis to Afghanistan and will become aviation ops with the demise of the Carrier.
3. Maintenace and logistics will become worse as we have fewer assets to complete tasking with not better. The issue is not paying for maintenance it is overworked over stretched elderly hulls.
4. My question exactly, what do we get back in other areas?
“Proponents of a stronger Royal Navy consistently fail to make a coherent case for it, despite SDR98 and SDSR2010 making the point about scale, sovereignty in large scale operations, conflict prevention and the need for change.”
I might argue the same by pointing out that while I argued the utility of a hi-lo army/peacekeeping force, you stated an intention to do the same and yet never got there. Likewise, you ridiculed the UK Defence Forum article on the utility of amphibious forces:
http://www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-analysis/how-much-might-be-done-with-a-hundred-thousand-such-as-these
However, once again you never got around to explaining ‘why’ it was ridiculous………
“This proposal would place the majority of surface escorts into a Single Task Group that provides the ability to prosecute a sovereign small scale focussed intervention or contribute to a coalition war fighting operation.”
It may be a difference in language but i don’t consider SSFI to be brigade level, and yet I see a continued commitment to brigade level operations and larger, as part of coalitions and general warfare, so I don’t see why rapid reaction forces should not operate at brigade level too. Frankly, the political utility in my eyes of rapid reaction forces at less than brigade strength is fairly minuscule, so I don’t support it. We will keep five multi-role brigades to sustain a ‘persistent’ effect, quite correctly, but 3 Cdo and 16 AAB could easily maintain a ‘permanent’ effect between them at brigade level.
“Much like the Army has realised that the Russians are not coming through the Fulda Gap so must the Royal Navy recognise a similar situation.”
No they have realised this, you only have to look at the reduction in the ASW frigate fleet, not to mention the loss of the through-deck ASW cruisers.
“It would be easy to argue for 12 Type 45’s, 18 Type 26 and 2 CVF with 36 F35C’s each but that would be preaching to the converted and would result in no RAF and an Army that consists of 2 Battalions and a ceremonial goat. We must, however difficult, seek balance, relevance and realism.”
That is hyperbole. You inflate what is necessary to preserve a useful RN, and you assign a cost to achieve this that is far too high.
“The Single Task Group is the output from this thought process. It is still highly credible but the effect is achieved at a lower cost than with current plans.”
The single taskgroup suffers from the problems I stated yesterday:
It is a one-shot party trick with no resilience and no depth to permit the surge of greater effect in time of general war.
Two task forces that alternate between high readiness and low readiness is the only sensible way to run an expeditionary capability.
There is always a task group ready which is essential for the rapid response that is deemed necessary for conflict prevention.
There is always a strategic reserve that prevents the loss of even a single hva from ensuring defeat, think carriers in the falklands.
There is always the necessary depth to surge force at a much greater capability by using sufficient preparation to deploy both taskgroups in support of general war.
My own thinking on the RN has been stated here:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/08/23/britain%E2%80%99s-future-strategic-direction-12-%E2%80%93-naval-deterrence-presence/
If I were to update it for today it would involve the following:
02x CVF
06x T45 (it is not too late to add a seventh to the production line)
09x T26 (seven with two EH101′s apiece could provide high-end ASW)
09x C2 (quite content for it to be a cheap Absalon style vessel)
09x C3 (2500 tonnes max, and able to deploy with the fleet – 18kt)
02x LPD
04x LSD
09x Astute
03x Trident replacement.
Personally speaking, I very much like Jim30′s forward basing idea, I also agree with Jed’s comments in the previous article, and I am fully onside with the concept of a low-end force to provide presence and training opportunities in support of the high-end force.
However, I do not agree with the single task-force, and I totally disagree with maintaining an occasional capability to intervene rapidly, and only then with a force too small to be of strategic utility.
TD
Why are you wedded to F35B?
It looking increasingly likely that it will not work.
The F35C unit cost has approached that of F22, and it is not entered service yet.
Yes, the aircraft that was going to cost less than an F16, costs 5 times more. The cost of 36 (yes I know it is difficult to work out a real price), stands at about 7 bilion, as apposed to about 2.5 for F18F.
How does that fit with cuts in funding?
Are there any more parts to this post comming?
Otherwise I like the ideas.
I am sure it must be difficult to write posts on the future of the RN when your not an advocate of maritime focused strategy !
You do seem to contradict yourself quite often though: “Much like the Army has realised that the Russians are not coming through the Fulda Gap so must the Royal Navy recognise a similar situation. Conflict prevention, maritime security, countering asymmetric threats and supporting land based operations are the most likely outcome.” I am not sure the army or the MOD or HM Govt has got any of that through its brains to be honest !
You ask why we need ASW and immediately state the proliferation of quiet and capable submarines !!
I know you don’t like playing fantasy fleets, but then that’s what your attempting to do here. As we have batted about in the other recent comment threads, there is no point in trying to build a fantasy fleet unless we have strategy decided first. What does HM Govt want a fleet (or armed forces in general) for ? Defence of the homeland, resource security, or the wielding of geo-political influence, either for our own ends or as part of broader coalitions ?
It appears its OK to retain tanks because they can be useful even in urban or COIN scenarios, but not OK to keep ships that can protect themselves from anti-ship missiles and submarines ? Meanwhile rogue nations and non-state actors will be armed by the Russians or Chinese, or their proxy’s to engage us and keep us busy, because globalization or not, their interests do not mesh with ours.
12 ‘real’ surface warships and 3 “forward presence squadrons” – not convinced, especially about the later !
APATS – don’t want to quibble but Euro-navies have been providing SSK’s to FOST for around 30 years at least, maybe 40 years, I have been “torpedoed” by them on many a “thursday war”
Jed,
They have but the prid quo pro ref training surface units is far more recent. In the last ten years FOST has done quite a bit of “income generation” including the MPV team from Faslane training Scandinavian countries and also Greeks in Greece.
But it seriously is so mad for the UK to have a balanced fleet based around:
1 Active CVF; Naval Strike Wing with 12 F35C regularly deployed on carrier, with two more RAF Squadrons available to increase the strike force for regular yearly (or once every two years) exercises and, of course, for military actions.
1 AEW Squadron with 4 Hawkeye leased from the US and jointly maintained together with the 3 french ones.
(Down from 3 squadrons of Sea King ASaC MK7)
1 “Junglies” squadron (down from 3 Sea King HC4 squadrons) equipped with 12 Merlins [4 HM1 are storaged, 8 not upgraded = 12, remove sonars and make them troop transports like it was earlier done with the Sea King]
Ideally, one Commando Squadron with 6 Apache [taken from those currently used to rotate through the fleet - 67 bought, 48 operative, 8 for training, 11 storaged] replacing the current fire support unit with the Lynx AH7.
1 Reserve CVF in High Readiness, to alternate with the Active one normally every six years, when there’s a major refit to the other unit.
1 Active LPD, with the other alternating into service.
1 LPH, to be replaced with a LHD in the 2022 or later, when HMS Ocean retires.
3 LSD(A), with the decommissioned one being “adopted” by the Aid Department. [They used a Bay to aid Haiti, and arguably there wasn't a better platform in the world to do it, save for a LHD. Besides, here in Italy the Navy gets funding for its amphibs in part by the Aid Department, because of their usefulness in the role. The UK should just do the same.]
6 Type 45. 4 of these can get the Harpoons and Stingray coming off the Type 22, plus ex-Type 42 CIWSs so they’ll finally look like “complete” ships.
CEC is a capability to get soon.
Tomahawk is not so urgently needed, and it can be put on Type 26 instead.
12 Type 26. Non-sense to hope in TWO classes of frigates for the future fleet.
Exploit economy of scale, build more hulls of the same class, fit only 8 with Type 2087 sonar (coming from the Type 23 as they bow out), fit all of them with Stingray, light guns and Harpoons coming from the Type 23s (HELL THE WHOLE WEAPON SYSTEM WILL PRETTY MUCH MIGRATE FROM ONE TO THE OTHER…) along with the Artisan radar.
CAMM does not need Sylver nor MK41 launchers, it is launched by its own simple canister. You COULD fit 4 CAMM canisters into a Sylver cell, BUT WHY THE HELL SHOULD YOU?
8 or 16 cells of MK41 launchers will instead find their way into the “General Purpose” Type 26 (AKA: the ones without sonar 2087, the “cheap ones”) to give an expanded Tomahawk capacity.
[Note: UK stock is of ONLY 65 Tomahawk missiles. Buy more should be a priority]
7 Astute
14 Minesweepers, later replaced by 8 (hopefully more, but 8 is more likely) C3 units, capable to do cover more roles. 1 more C3 will also replace HMS Clyde later on.
The C3 will also replace Echo and Enterprise, while HMS Scott will require a dedicate replacement, unless the Survey role leaves the MOD and goes to a Civvy ministry.
Mine-countermeasures role will be covered jointly by C3 and Type 26, since the Type 26 will be able to carry countermine drones and crew in the Mission Bay.
The drop in numbers is very high: 14 minesweepers + 3 Rivers + HMS Clyde + HMS Echo and HMS Enterprise gone and replaced by 8 + 1 C3.
However, the C3 will be a lot more useful thanks to its ocean-going patrol capability, which will allow the C3s to cover several standing tasks by themselves, so it won’t be so much of a loss.
7 Astutes
4 SSBN – Astute derivative, 8 enlarged Trident tubes developed in collaboration with the US, a number of these tubes available to carry:
-Special Forces
-All-Up Rounds Canisters with 7 Tomahawk each
-drones and other equipment.
This does not look that much ambitious to me. It is a balanced fleet, cut back noticeably from previous ambitions, but very, very capable.
I’ll tell you why i don’t like the navy to be scaled back, nor why i’m not hot on the “small boats deployed abroad in the gulf and so to cover standing tasks”.
In the gulf, a CB90 or even an OPV are good until someone fires at you. Even a minesweeper is sorta dead if things go AWOL.
Have you ever seen how much firepower even the small rocket and missile boats of Iran and such carry???
They’d sunk a Hunt and its meager 30 mm gun in 6 seconds, and it would be higly embarassing to say the very, very, very least.
Apart from painful, of course.
CB90s are good to hunt drug smugglers in the caribean.
Not much to help after a hurricane, but i guess it could be done.
How much would it cost, however, to have a deployed “boat squadron” based in the area…? I don’t know if it would be advantageous.
The point is that a frigate may be “wasted” covering such roles…
But if things go nasty and you have the frigate, you can tackle the problem.
If you have the CB90 or HMS Clyde, you can surrender.
And, if the navy started asking money for “Boats Squadrons” around the world, it wouldn’t be given money anymore for the serious ships.
Diplomatic weight: the Navy arguably “fights her war 365 days a year, even in peacetime”. It shows the presence, the flag, and the might of the nation.
It would be comfortable to tackle everything with a 30 mm gun on the bow, but… seriously.
Take it as childish, but please think about it.
If you were an allied of the UK such as Oman, would you feel nice seeing a nearly-disarmed OPV visiting you, knowing that it would last 2 minutes if a Pasdaran missile boat wanted to attack…?
I would feel a lot better seeing a frigate.
Again, you potential UK enemy.
If the RN showed itself to the world in the shape of CB90 and OPVs, you’d laugh. Sorry mates, it is brutal to say it so, but if you think about it, i’m pretty sure you’ll agree with me.
A C3, moderately armed, not a frigate but not an OPV either, is already another thing, more credible.
A frigate shows the flag and commitment and interest of a nation a lot more.
A carrier with planes on it and escorts scares the c**p out of everyone.
“Si vis pacem, para belli”.
Or to say it in the style of a past british minister opposed to disarmement before WWI, be strong, and there’ll be no threats against you. Show yourself weak, and you’ll have troubles soon.
Ultimately, there’s also the Great Question.
Why the hell everyone is arming up if there’s no real threat anymore…???
Even Brazil wants frigates, new fighter jets, new everything and a local weapons industry of high level too.
I’m not saying they fear Venezuela… Nor that they have no threats to deal with, either, on the other hand.
Bad as it may sound, the relevance and credibility of a country still depends LARGELY on its miliatary might, that’s why.
And the Navy is pretty much the element the enemy sees the most, and that in many cases sees first during a crisis.
Be it Korea, Falklands, Kosovo, Iraq, even Afghanistan, the ships are there first, or very early.
And usually they are the last out, too.
Either carrying Challenger IIs back from Iraq, or staying in the area guarding it.
I still feel uncomfortable with putting all fast jets in the RAF where they may never think about a maritime environment.
There is another way, put the FAA including F-35s under the Marines just as the US Marine Corp has fast jets used both on land and if necessary from carriers. This makes even more sense now because amphibious intervention is more likely than fleet on fleet actions.
Has anyone studied the question of what modular kit means for the maintenance cycle? Seems easier to swap over modules and maintain them in a production line mode in the UK, than bring the ship back from whereever. This is essentially what R-R does with airline engines (Power by the Hour) and it was a big success.
Apparently the biggest StanFlex is 15 tonnes and the dimensions are comparable to a 10 ton ISO container, so their travelling by commercial air charter, or by sea if no hurry, shouldn’t be too much of a problem.
That’s a fair point Chuck but is it efficient to have 2 air forces or is the cost of duplication worth the extra money?
TD
You must have Treasury blood in you.
The fleet would gladden the heart of any bean counter.
However if you are looking to the future you need to take onboard the direction of the political wind.
CVF (II) = Will be traded with the French.
We will get French equipment or use of French assets to the value of the PoW.
T45 = Will be made GP as their stripper spec AAW role is expanded to include S-S and a bit of ASW. Hopefully not with second hand stuff.
The cuts are finance driven to suit a lazy and unimaginative leadership. 14% cut in manpower has produced a larger reduction in hulls so the desk warriors will be safe.
The root cause of all the issues is that the MOD / RN cost base is too high. Sort that and a lot of things become possible.
Therefore before any change can be effected on the fleet their will have to be a root and branch reform of the MOD and the RN’s attitudes and capabilities.
Utilisation has to go up, 33% is nowhere near good enough. 50% should be the first target with more to come.
Value for money has to be addressed, the examples of profligacy and derivative, second rate design are just too many to mention. T45 was bad, the Astute terrible and the QEx2 look as if nothing has been learned beyond the fact that contractors are pushing against an open door when it comes to pushing through cost increases.
Case in point is the NPV route being taken to cost increasing automation in ships. if it doesn’t pay in threee years then it should be dumped. The contractors wil be back with cheaper alternatives soon enough, they are seeling kit not bodies. The use of 30/40 year lifespans for the vessels and pension costs running into the 22nd century is just a MOD / RN dealing with issues it doesn’t understand.
Big thing for me is make it big, make it simple, make it commercial. MOD economics has to stop, the T26 will be the next big test of the its capabilities.
On the point of the T26 re-uing the T45 hull, no issue ver sensible way of trying to increase design efficiency but the BAE gravy train might have other ideas.
£127mill / 4 years for concept generation is good money if you can get it.
On the subject of ASW and the T45 hull, the level of imagination regarding the subject beggars belief. The first point is that GT’s should be banned from RN ships, MS diesels are the way to go and the T45 MK2 should be the first ship to push this through.
One thing that does surprise me is the lack of desire to improve things. Rafted diesels up top fine, but what about a couple of large upmarket batteries for truly silent running? Regarding the future AAW situation we really are looking at a future made up with a lot of better yesterdays if point defence is deemed to be good enough.
Does no-one in the MOD / RN not understand the concept of Total Quality Management, we establish a standard and then take a hatchet to the costs to make it more affordable to a wider audience. The T45 provides the standards, all it needs is a clear focus to start taking the costs out.
Finally I think that this post only provides half the story, the RN needs to change its shape but also the shape of the ships needs to change as well. Billion dollar ships with a glass jaw are not what is needed. We need to start building in resilience into our designs, something that can take damage without it becoming a mission kill scenario.
If commercial standards, big boxy hulls and medium speed diesels are surely now the way of the future then armour needs to make a comeback. Oil canning tells the bad guys that we are vulnerable if they can get up close and personal.
So to use the T45 hull for the T26 woould be an advance on the usual RN re-invent the wheel and then give it a different name situation but the real advance would be a 12K ton “cruiser” with 3K tons of armour and a certain swagger that has been missing from our ship design since the QE (15) class or the Tribals (38).
All the building blocks are there, all that is missing is the imagination and the desire to lead.
Though I thank TD for publishing the site and allowing me to post crap, I must admit that TD at a fundamental level has no understanding of sea power.
(Apologies. One isn’t in a glowing mood today.)
The following has to be the option now. Given availability of three Trinidad & Tobago CC ‘River’ OPV why not lease three from BVT (on the same basis as the existing Rivers, but on a five year contract). Then forward deploy two to the British Virgin Islands and send the fourth Bay LPDA out in the hurricane season full of DIFID kit and embarking a pair of Lynxes. That would mean no more ‘Atlantic Patrol Task (North)’ for less money per year than a T23 and part of the year of an RFA costs to run. The T&TCC ‘Rivers’ would only need additional decent secure communications for this task.
Then send the third T&TCC ‘River’ to TF 151 or Op Alantea (with some additional passive defence aids) for a season to see if an OPV can hack it in the Arabian Sea. After all HSwMS Carlskrona seems to be working for the Swedes out there at present.
If that worked then place orders for a new class of River derivatives (with armament/C3I up to Holland Class standard + fitted for, but not with, Harpoon & CAMM to ensure they are ‘future proof’) to replace all non Single Task Group tasks. Around 1/3rd of these new ships should have a helicopter and hanger and if that was the only variation across the class there would still be sufficient commonality to keep costs down.
Ensure those new Super Rivers cost under £25m to operate per year (not including the Lynx embarked) and you can use them to replace the Fish Boats too by ending the existing river contract at the 2012 break clause.
End result
West Indies – 2 ‘Super Rivers’ forward deployed to BVI
Falklands – 2 ‘Super Rivers’ forward deployed to Mare Harbour
Arabian Sea – 2 ‘Super Rivers’ forward deployed to Bahrain
Home Waters – Fishery Protection – 3 ‘Super Rivers’ doing there thing. (Incidentally someone should think about offering Marine Scotland a deal to take over Scottish Fishery Protection Tasks at some point. They have no money!)
Training – 1 ‘Super River’ training crews to rotate to BVI/Mare Harbour/Bahrain
Depending on how excitable our Argentinian friends are one of the South Atlantic pair would always need to be of the Lynx embarked sub class and both might need to be actually fitted with CAMM and Harpoon, but that is I accept, rather dramatic.
Of course you would probably need more than 10 hulls to ensure a contract 3000+ days per year across the squadron, but that is the point of the BVT lease contract isn’t it. Since the contract cost of the 12 hulls needed to provide 3000+ days availability is going to be alot less than the cost of running three T23s the remaining T23s can be eaked out a little longer until the T26s actually turn up. Which considering how cheaply they were made in the first place is something not to forget.
A few thoughts
The lack of strategy with the SDSR is exactly because the MOD/Chiefs have not realised the Russians aren’t about to come through the Fulda Gap. UK armed forces are still far to land and personnel centric significantly so went compared to US or France.
I do agree that future tasks will most likely be “Conflict prevention, maritime security, countering asymmetric threats and supporting land based operations” All of which are most effectively done from the sea allowing ashore footprint to be kept to a minimum so avoiding large fixed bases which annoy the locals who think we’ve invaded rather than assisted and easy to predict road routes to and from. Sea Based forces also lets forces relax in climate controlled and safe areas.
The Idea of having a large striking (dare we call it the Home Fleet) fleet at home ready to deploy is perfect use of scarce resources. I would change its composition and its readiness posture more along the lines of what Jedibeeftrix posted e.g.
Fleet at Readiness
1 x CVF , 16-JSF, 6-Merlin Asw, 3-Merlin AEW, 6-Merlin HC4
1 x LPD, 1 x LSD + Amphib Battle group Assigned
2 x Type 45
2 x Type 26
1 x SSN
Identical Force at 6-8 month Low readiness not Extend readiness as 18 month notice is really too long and adversely effects the vessels materially. On top of that have 1 x type 45 and 1 x type 26 in the fleet ready escort roll. The 2 RM battle groups would be removed from the infantry plot and used solely for this purpose.
I still think 2 areas will require a frigate level deployment in the future South Atlantic and Far East we have ignored our obligations there for two long. 3 x Type 26 Assigned to both to allow a 1 ship deployment.
We can be much more inventive with our other tasking and do them at much lower cost. For other tasks purchase 18 C3 Class ships, VT global corvette design (1x57mm gun 2 x 0.5cal mini guns, Phalax, hanger and deck for a lynx, mission bay).
8 assigned UK/North Atlantic for MCMV/fisheries/Patrol, 4 Fwd Based Gulf/East Africa, 2 Fwd Based West indies, 2 Fwd Based Faulklands , 2 assigned Nato SMG1,
Purchase 4 x Dutch JSS ships for RFA replacing Fort Classes/Argos. Purchase 4 x Aegir 18 to replace rover/leaf class. Covert 1 Bay to replace the diligence as Fwd repair ship.
Look at getting 4 JHSV for army transport
1 JSS ship Supports the Main task group, 1 Supports the West indies during Hurricane Season and 1 Deployed East of Suez to support vessels there.
I don’t think this is a million miles from where we are headed anyway. Vary interesting/informative series of articles.
I, afraid i must disagree.
Your independant intervention force cant intervene independantly.
But in making it look like it can, you’ve robbed it of the ability to contribute to a coalition or be cheap.
Go big or go home.
If you’ve got a capability, you’ve got to HAVE it all the way.
If you want to land ground forces, its either a kill team or a mechanised brigade, if you want fixed wing air, you better be smacking down 150 f16′s.
Mark et al
Surely the C3 type vessel is one are whwre the RN could try and lead the field rather than do another round of “Me2″ ships spec’ed to deal with the inflated UK contractor / MOD value proposition?
All this talk of upmarket Rivers and Global corvettes is all to predictable where cheap has to mean small and limited?
As has been noted before if you want to do soft military diplomacy then your “wheels” matter and an old style fisheries protection vessel painted light grey just wont cut it.
Consequently back to the 6K ton colonial sloop / £50mill frigate, the first thing is that it has the scale and it will have style.
125m x 24m x 5m = 15MW for 22/24knots.
X bow for flash and sea keeping. Big accomodation block to look the part.
Base crew would be 50, mission crew 10-50 plus space for a company of RM’s and a 600m2 garage for their stuff.
Next up is a basic war fit – big hand gun, a couple of small guns, a Vulcan Phalanx, all second hand if necessary. The scale would allow a big flight deck and a hangar plus a couple of speed boats, VFM electronics and all the hand held kit a RM section can carry.
Then comes the hard part, that is the £20-30mill budget upgrade where the plan would be a T21 for the teenies. The main thing would be VFM kit all round looking to provide a useful vessel that can hold its own against the local yahoos and conduct an orderly retreat if it comes up against any big stuff.
What would £20-30mill get you in kit?
Finally for these sorts of deployments one vessel would not be enough – couple of colonial sloops, couple of DfID funded civil defence / charity boats and a couple of RFA’s (tanker/stores/Bay) and you have a lot of soft power keeping the locals impressed, the UK in the loop and the RN in the news.
FBT
Slightly of topic
I do agree if we are going the colonial sloop look ‘styling’ for want of a better word is quite important, they should look the part, as well as being big enough to have long 12,000 mile type ranges, be able to use commercial fuel, and to survive open ocean work. using commercial OTC would make them easier to fporward base and repair. EG MAN deisels have spares network and engineers world wide. WW2 Arethrusa class cruiser were specifically designed to the smallest length regarded as able to survive tropical storms.
Just a thought.
Many of the plac
Sorry pressed send before finished.
Many of the places we want to deploy to are a long way away, and effectivly open ocean. East/west coast of Africa in particular springes to mind, caribian can be rough as well.
Finished now.
Surely the problem is that any ‘Colonial Sloop’ is going to end up the size and cost of the proposed F125 Frigate for the Bundesmarine.
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/f125-frigate/
AFMG
Nope think more Bay class size:
Well dock, davits, 2-3 choppers (you can have lots of arguments about what, (I personaly think 2 EC635 +1 Merlin).
CB 90′s. etc. Armament should be to Absalon standard. I.e. Enough to deal with a sneak, one off attack by moderatly well armed enemy.
Should be do-able for 300 mill a pop top. Maybe less if we use phalanx and re-use 4.5 etc from type 42 Sea Wolf etc.
Ixion
Didn’t know the stuff about the Arethusa class.
I thought they were torpedo cruisers to lead destroyers and provide gun fire support to break up enemy formations.
From memory they were 150m x 16m x 5m’ish. Consequently if 150 becomes the magic number it would be quite easy to lengthen the design by a couple of frames.
Though in saying that the OSV / AHTS type seems to quite capable at the 90m x 20m x 6m size bracket.
I was looking at something a bit bigger so that it could put its sensors high up on a big mast and have enough space for a big hangar, 300m2 or thereabouts plus a garage below the flightdeck.
I would also include space for a TAS so that it can help out the missile polishers if required plus space for a VLS silo if the RN win the lottery.
Another job would be NGS using its big gun up front and if it made a difference another turret could be included if the length was increased by 10m.
135m / 440′ is starting to look quite substantial.
This is where the “Styling” comes in, it will cost nothing to make the ship look impressive. Good design costs nothing just a lot of imagination and a sympathetic customer. The main thing is the £50mill budget, 80%’ish for the basic vessel and commercial fit out plus 20% for a basic / rough and ready naval fit with the possibility of a £20-30mill upgrade to make it useful in fleet terms.
So do you have any idea how much stuff costs?
How much for an integrated mast?
How much for a middle of the road sonar?
Finally any thoughts on rotating crews to keep it in the water earning its keep? 33% utilisation is a joke.
FBOT
Rotating crews seems to be the way to go I think the Yanks have started doing it in the gulf.
50 perc utilisation becomes easier the simpler the general equipment is, and the more COTS componants and ISO container rafting is used.
AFMG
Where is the correlation between size and cost?
Cheap to the RN = Small and limited.
Cheap to me = Big and basic but capable.
No matter how good a T45 / T26 is, it can’t be in two places at once.
No matter the quality of the River class it has no flexibility or growth potential.
Against the F125 the colonial sloop / £50mill frigate saves money with its lower speed, medium speed diesels and its commercially derived hull. Its crew will only be 50 and it will earn its keep not keep a dockyard in work.
As noted with the F125 all navies are starting to get into this mode of working but they are starting from a position so far removed from commercial reality that they have a long way to go.
Next up because it is only a batting packer not an opening batsman it can have a thrifted / VFM naval fit where value for money is first, second and third on the agenda. These questions need to be asked, and keep being asked because the MOD / RN’s record is shambolic.
See automation — Contractors price = MOD’s NPV saving – £1.
The MOD / RN need to have a basic understanding of what something costs and what it is worth.
One further comment relates to the herd instinct of a lot of RN thought, it seems to be what others have done and nothing more. See all the chatter about the “Absalon” accepts what the Danes have done and nothing more. That to me is just a starting point, great idea but we could do more, there are substantial costs to be taken out of that design.
Next up for me is the issue of armour.
1000 tons on a colonial sloop would be a lot more use than ballast.
300′ belt, 18′ tall by 3″ would be useful to intimidate the yahoos. Plus some for the bridge and a central citadel. If it all becomes too expensive how about armouring the containers carrying the mission load / combat centre?
There is not a lack of ideas only a lack of impetus to do something different.
Hi Friend MrG @ 8:14,
Talking about fighting yesterday’s wars, since noon today I have been posting on the previous thread as I read all contributions simply by pressing the refresh button – much like what we are criticising here on the speccing of future capabilities.
“Given availability of three Trinidad & Tobago CC ‘River’ OPV why not lease three from BVT (on the same basis as the existing Rivers, but on a five year contract). Then forward deploy two to the British Virgin Islands and send the fourth Bay LPDA out in the hurricane season full of DIFID kit ”
- What a great idea; no one has yet contributed whether that availability can be better acieved by other means than taking them over at the shipyard by paying the $75-78m owing, though?
Aaaaargh – stop talking about a “Global Sloop” – historically sloops were tiny (200 tons), and sloop was original just a sail plan ! So I don’t think you really mean sloop !! Perhaps you mean “cruiser” as it was originally used in the sail navy of Nelson ??
Please please please think of a different term for your weird armoured merchant hull quasi-amphib innovative thingy
By the way, as the Absalon is already existing, uses commercial medium speed diesels, can carry two helicopters, 2 of the smaller versions of CB90 (without the complication of a well deck) and company of marines, how does reinventing it with a commercial x bowed (and armoured) hull not also count as a “me too” effort ?
Exactly what level of threat do you see this “thrifted / VFM” vessel being able to defend itself against ?
I am all for big = cheap, but I am just not sure exactly what you want this class of ship to do as its primary role, and what its secondary roles can be???
Better put my “inventory taking” onto this thread, too:
Hi TD,
Please note Area AD did not exist at the time of the Falklands, save for USN and Russian navies. Therefore, does the question about “how many times used” do any justice to the currently critical capability?
Carrier; one CVF acting as a swing role asset, able to flex between LPH and strike roles, embarking a mix of F35[ours], Rafales[ours? French?}, F18’s[surely not ours, but cross-decking]
-helicopters and with accommodation for an embarked force.YES
- The second CVF should be retained in extended readinessIF not sold { WHAT KIND OF BASIS IS THIS IF FOR PLANNING?]
Airborne Early Warning and Control; as the Sea King ASaC Mk7’s go out of service, simply transfer the equipment onto a palletised configuration and use the non HM2 upgraded Merlin’s.
- Why not use the specifically designed Merlin versions, including the stub wings for enhanced endurance?
The longer term future is likely a data linked network of UAV’s but this is some way off.
- not so; the main problem is recoverability
- they can (“as they are” now) contribute to altitude (not manned, therefore not needing to be pressurised)
- endurance: Launch as many as needed and then vector them towards detected or perceived threats (from the manned helo, themselves rotating on station, but a fewer number needed, ie one at a time)
Anti Submarine Warfare; proposal the existing plans for 30 Merlin HM2’s look excessive so a quantity review might reduce these. Ruthless commonality, yet again, should be the driver for cost reduction and operational efficiency.
+ Anti Surface; to counter small, rapidly manoeuvring targets.
=> We should look at the capabilities of the Wildcat (down-looking radar and the SK/ Merlin radar? These are good, but only the Lynx can execute the attack role on its own… not an expert, because not all of it is in public domain)
- total Merlin numbers (role assigned and not considering Lynx) leave the vertical insertation/ first wave capability of RN/RM behind the French. Therefore, we should consider the Merlin “footprint” to be a design standard for all helo-enabling ships. But when a troop-lift is to be considered, Chinook deck space calculation (and even CH-53 hangar height) should be factored in.
Hi all,
FBOT @10:08 really put it down nicely (not commenting on the rest of it):
“These questions need to be asked, and keep being asked because the MOD / RN’s record is shambolic.
See automation — Contractors price = MOD’s NPV saving – £1.
The MOD / RN need to have a basic understanding of what something costs and what it is worth.”
This is about separating the normal “cost of hull” from cost of capability. OPEX vs CAPEX. Unit cost vs Programme cost. Because of scale, DARPA is a good answer for the US; Anything like that would not be a good answer for us.
Hi Jed @1:15,
Without wanting to get into the discussion from which this quote comes from ” Absalon is already existing, uses commercial medium speed diesels, can carry two helicopters, 2 of the smaller versions of CB90 (without the complication of a well deck) and company of marines”,
- you forgot to mention that the best multi-purpose naval gun system is on-board
-not necessarily in sufficient numbers; Are there dead angles with 2, why not 3 then ?
Everything, from an incoming sea-skimming missile(s), helos (to 3.5 km stand-off range) conventional aircraft and swarming small boats can be stopped, without very much manpower at all. Then the company of marines can do the rest ( I did not know that the CB90 scales??).
Landings, and evacuations from threatened beaches can be covered with an amazing rate of fire, with sub-munitions that can handle infantry and up to Snatch -LR type of “improvised armour”.
What ever is “heavier” can be engaged by the on-board helos. So, short of hot wars, what is missing?
We have shifted over to armamments, but of course it goes back to numbers/ building costs/ manning levels.
ACC @ 0122 “Please note Area AD did not exist at the time of the Falklands, save for USN and Russian navies.”
Sure it did, it was called Sea Dart, GWS30 – might not have been as long ranged as US equivalent, but for RN it was “area air defence”.
TD: “I know it is a hackneyed straw man but how many times in the last 30-40 years have we actually used anti submarine, area air defence or anti surface weapons? I don’t want a long list because because of two things, it would not be a long list and that’s not quite the point,”
OK I see you have been precise and asked how many times the weapons were deployed / used – not the capability. Well air defence missiles were fired during FI and GW1, which makes a measly 2, but beats the number of times the army has taken on a neer peer in mobile armoured warfare (GW1). However, how many times was it nearly used ? How many times in the gulf during the 80′ or 90′s did a RN ship lock up a Iranian aircraft or surface ship ? Thousands would be my guess based on personal experience.
How many times did we drop light weight torpedo’s from helo’s or surface ships – other than the FI, possibly never. However we will never know what when deep below the surface between RN S class boats and their Soviet counterparts.
May I enquire from all the historically minded readers how many times the Army has been deployed to a theatre with no involvement at all of the RN / RFA / Merchant Navy since, lets say the Boer war ? Or for that matter how often has the RAF been involved in a conflict in which the RN did not play a part since is inception?
However all this naval gazing (get it ?) is pointless, the conversation should be about future threat scenarios, not the recent or even distant history.
Following on from my post on the previous related topic, the RN cannot afford the assets to maintain 2 Task Forces that are of an effective size. Present plans have the second CVF maintained in an almost mothballed state and their has be no definitive statement on what standard it will finally exist in.
I must state again that the platform the RN is in dire need of is a C2/GP frigate of between 3500 and 4000 tons, with the T-23 being kept in service until 2025 together with the exisiting MCM force. With effective cost management and the use of OTS equipment it should be possible to get between 8-12 vessels of this type, especially if the eventual T-26 buy is limited to 6 high end ASW platforms. Automation should allow these GP Frigates to have low manpower needs allowing them to embark additional personnel without a major impact on the amount of stores etc needed when compared to current vessels. High endurance should also be a high priority. I have stated many times I am not an advocate of retaining the Mk8, especially with the increasing capability and flexibility of newer medium calibre weapons and their reducing costs. For AD, if CAMM works as advertised and is cost effective then I see no reasin it cannot be fitted but the bench mark hear is the current version of the RAM system which should be more than adequate. IT should be able to carry and launch 2 RHIBs and either 2 of the new Armoured fire support RHIBs or an addition 2 conventions RHIBs. Aviation support would be in the form of 2 Wildcat or a single Merlin but both platforms will need additional capabilities to make them truely effective.
Taking a different track and kicking the UKs independant ship design capability into touch, Joining the Franco/Italian FREMM programme offers up a number of options. We would be able to purchase a number (6) of High end ASW versions and a number of austere GP Variants intially equipped with basic core capabilities similar to the GP frigate I mention earlier. These vessels would over time be able to have increased capabilities added if and when funding allows and a genuine need exists. There is no real reason these vessels could not be built in the UK but that would be a political decision with little account taken of costs.
The RN has got to get back into the numbers game and realise what many other navies have, in that to maintain fleet strength and the ability to cover all commitments a two tier approach is the most effective, more so when under financial restraint. Armchair admirals can play fantasy fleets until the cows come home but the RN needs to get as many slices out of its one chocolate cake that it can rather than only a few generous slices that are not enough to feed all the kids at the party.
Just on the topic of Absalon type ships. According to CASR the total cost (I assume capital cost of the Absalom class was 2.7B Kroner (that must be a 2005 price). So converting to pounds that is 1Dk = £0.12 that would be £324 million. That cost won’t include the two EH101s as they already existed nor will it include the Stanflex units transferred from other ships.
The only snag is that the UK does not have a shipyard as efficient as those of the AP Moller group so the two would cost rather more here – say £500 million.
Optimism bias anybody?
Hi Jed @ 2:27,
V good points about the use of capability as opposed to narrower definitions.
Re “Sure it did, it was called Sea Dart, GWS30 – might not have been as long ranged as US equivalent, but for RN it was “area air defence”.”
- I am guilty of using “private” terminology; Area AD to me consists of not only reach (range), but of enough depth at all altitude levels… a bomber always gets through needs to be updated to a sea-skimming missile always gets through when sufficient numbers are launched (someone made good point about the angle, to give the tracking/ fire control radar a hard time)
If that is the affordable definition (I think the right one for our discussion), then there are of course systems that are designed to handle also incoming ballistic missiles, BUT the step-change in costs is huge
Matters littoral: when the anti-ship missiles are actually land launched, it becomes much more difficult to deal with the “root cause” and take the launch platform out (first have to locate it, then typically deploy air power)
- someone mentioned Hezbollah taking out an Israeli ship 60-70 km from shore even though there was perfectly good fighter cover
Back to: what are the most likely threats within the time horizon when we will depend (mainly) on the classes already designed/ construction?
Brilliant and interesting post… Most of my thoughtsare along the lines of FBOT and Mark.
With regard to C3, my choice would be a larger vessel based on the RV Triton trimaran design. This has many advantages. Due to it’s size and particularly deck space could easily be fitted out for any range of tasks from fishery protection/anti-piracy through to Frigate able to perform ASW and AAW etc…
A fleet of say 15-20 backed up with some form of C2 mothership (a cross beteen Absalon and a Bay) and you have a tier 2 fleet that can be upscaled to perform as. Tier 1 if needed. Now that would put the RN back in it’s rightful place.
Hi Phil @ 9:21,
Re “my choice would be a larger vessel based on the RV Triton trimaran design”
I have seen nothing untoward reported from the use of Trials Instrumentation System (TIS), in place through the critical first six months of the R/V Triton’s trials program.
- TIS was designed, constructed and installed by the Carderock Division aboard R/V Triton to fulfill this requirement [ Joint US and UK funding!]
However, other sources talk about inherent instability and need for calm seas? I am not an expert, but the only other examples I can think of is one of the two designs for the US Littoral Combat ship and a fast missile attack boat, also littoral, used by China’s PLAN (photos available of it in the HK harbour).
- is this just a co-incidence?
Jed @ 1.11
Interwar RN – Sloop was the size of a destroyer.
It was defensive, the destroyer was offensive.
Colonial sloop was in use at that time, big boxy hull in a world of greyhounds.
Consequently the £50mill frigate is the colonial sloop of the 21st century.
The Absalon is a good starting point but it can be improved.
It looks to have a bit of OSV / AHTS parentage, the flex deck looks to be part of that that design heritage.
However it tries too hard to look like a coventional warship, it makes no progress on the armour front and it has no space for a TAS and the boat arrangement looks limited.
Consequently good start but it can be improved upon by going back to its roots, X bow and a big bridge / accomodation block to give the ship presence. If it works in the way that the Town class bridge / hangar worked in WW2 then so much the better as the bad guys will be aiming at steel and fresh air rather than something important.
The £50mill frigate is needed for the forward projection of soft power and presence. It allows the RN to be in more places at once flying the flag and keeping the UK in the loop. As I noted before a mixed squadron of 6 vessels will generate a lot more soft power and credibility than a single T23 on a jolly.
Regarding its abilities, the basic stripper spec would have a full commercial sensor suite with one upgrade to watch out for incoming threats out to 20/30km. That could be a stand alone naval system or a filter added to a commercial air search unit.
Armament would be shell based, refurbished to keep the costs down and would include a big gun of a T42 or an ex Army 155mm (there seem to be a lot of AS/90′s going spare), a Vulcan Phalanx, a couple of 30mm’s or similar and all the kit available to a RM section as carry on so A/T and hand held AAW.
The availability of a helicopter will be a big improvement, the new tarted up Lynx could be quite useful in this role. Finaly a full fire ship fit out with water cannons would be useful and take off a few of the hard edges
The next stage would be a £20-30mill upgrade package to make it the T21 for the teenies. As I am outsider in all things military including costs and detailed capabilities all this is a bit fuzzy but I would expect this amount of money to produce a useful improvement.
Stuff to look at would include the following:
Mid range combat control stuff.
Improved, but still basic sonar.
Two 155mm guns for NGS, which would be its war fighting role.
Slave 35/40 mm turret to extend the range of the Vulcan Phalanx.
S-S based on what is going cheap. Torpedoes available?
My thoughts on the main area for upgrade would be to the vessel’s AAW suite, Evolved SSM plus associated sensors would be the target though again cost is everything. If that comes out at too much money then it could be a case of doubling up on the Vulcan Phalanx or going Dutch.
Consequently the ship would be a serious war-fighter but it would pack the batting rather than open it. TAS tug or NGS when things get hot, flag waver or Kate Adie’s flagship for all other times.
If the local yahoos start to fancy their chances then a case of crack on because the ship will have some resilience, it will be able to fight back and it will have back up. That is one of the reasons for employing the flotilla concept as a surprise attack needs much more planning if there is more than one ship to fire back.
Finally not to sure of a Triton style hull, big jump in complexity, it offers reduced resilience in the main hull and the wide OSV style hull negates its big advantage deck area. Consequently still not fully cooked. However I do admit that the concept offers of positives if handled correctly.
However this should not be used as an excuse to do nothing now.
AFMG @ 8.30
Absalon project cost £330mill from the CASR article as you say but that included four elements:
1) Concept generation
2) Detailed design
3) FoC premium
4) Two ships
Consequently looking good value to me.
Regarding littoral stuff and land based S_S missiles, surely this is why the 155mm is needed.
Range — Upmarket 155 shells vs Readily available S-S missiles: Discuss.
Further task for the £50mill frigate: Handling ship for a tethered rotorcraft AEW system or balloon based system if that works out better.
Big hangar, big flight deck, lots of space for stuff.
Backing up my comments (Airforce-Technology, today’s issue):
”
The US Air Force is concerned that software development and production issues will delay its plan to begin using new F-35 fighter jets in April 2016.
The possible F-35 delivery delay has been revealed by the defence official in charge of the F-35 programme, vice admiral David Venlet, after a comprehensive review of the programme.
US Air Force general Norton Schwartz said the air force will consider upgrading its existing F-16 fighters through structural modifications and radar and avionics improvements if the F-35 delivery is delayed.
The general said the air force variant of the F-35 fighter jet has, however, performed better in testing and development than the Navy and Marine Corps’ versions.”
- I wonder why B is mentioned after C, very diplomatic way of putting it. The full version (to the Congress) gives that detail
Great article, and am broadly in agreement with the high / low mix. Forward Presence Squadrons in my view are exactly the way we should be going – it worked before the cold war.
Two significant points I disagree on however. Having a single Task Group is too much of a risk, and there is a danger that it will become “too important to lose”. Having two groups, one in reserve and the other active makes more sense and the cost, in my view, would not be that much greater. For this to work however, both QE and PoW must be completed with CATOBAR.
Scrapping the T26 for a second batch of T45, would also be a mistake, in my view, as the T45 was never designed with ASW in mind. As the T45 out of service date is mid 2035 anyway, why not revise the T26 design such that there will be a second batch of T26 to replace the T45? Perhaps ending up with 6 x AAW, 6 x ASW and 3 x GP; enough to support the two groups with some limited redundancy.
Also, in the longer term I would replace the LPDs with LHDs with sufficient defensive weaponary to allow them operate oustide of the protective escort sphere. This would give the flexibility to additionally perform small low end operations.
Also, I too like the Absalon, but do not feel that this would give the RN the right mix. Having LPD/LHD and LSDs means that the high end amphibious role is covered. Alternatively, in my view, they would be too expensive for the low end role and we would just end up with much reduced numbers.
I think we should really be looking at a vessels whose basic fit price is around £150 mil; though with the capability of operating a Merlin and being modular to allow for easy sensor / weapons upgrades if the requirements arises. A longer ranged Holland class for example.
I’m sorry Admin but respectfully i have to disagree with some of this.
Aviation ships/Amphibious ships.
Looking at this i do not think you have the right platforms using Albion & Bay class in the primary/secondary role of helibourne assault. They don’t really have the Aviation facilities, especialy for extensive maintainance, i.e. battle damage repair. I also think using your one & only CV class carrier for this role, instead of or even as well as the Albion/Bay classes, is probably asking too much.
I think you have to add an LPH (Ocean kind of ship) for these reasons.
To enable the repair, overhall etc of troop carrying & offensive rotory aviation (Apache).
To also provide an extra, large deck & facilities for AEW & ASW rotory aviation.
Here i’m just thinking in terms of the risk of a crash involving a fast jet (for instance), on a single Carrier could shut down the extra launching or recovery of defensive AEW/ASW rotory aviation for some time. The same goes for any extra assault aviation that may be needed as the operation progress’s.
Maybe i’m being too cautious but i’d rather have the assets to be able to deal reasonably with an expected event (a crash). I know crash’s are not that common really but they do happen and sometimes they are quite bad. Recovering a fast jet that has battle damage aboard a carrier is probably one of the scariest things you can try to do.
Escorts/Armaments.
I think you need some more Type 26 (if you want), to be able to give some cover and protection for your own peculiar logistics chain. I say peculiar, as the RN uses guns of a different calibre to everyone else, also missiles that are very different to everyone else, along with a lot of other things. Especialy for coalition type operations or even a for real war.
If your logistics train is the only thing the opposition can reasonably go after, then make no mistake, they would make every effort to go after it. They would have a good chance of success too.For them, sinking a couple of tanker or stores ships would be well worth it and the effect on our operations could be quite bad.
I really think that 6 Type 26 just isn’t enough, no matter what they are armed with or how good their sensors are. Really after looking at it some more, i think the navy needs at least 12 really good main ASW ships, also you will need some form of cheap’ish GP Frigate. If the navy were to go with the force structure that you suggest (for the escorts), then i really think they would just be heading for another very bad day.
I think the only realistic way for the navy to get the ships it needs is to contract someone other than BAe to build them. That £127 million contract is probably water tight, also i expect the contract to actually build the Type 26 is somehow tied into the whole CVF program too. I would allow go with the flow only so far & allow them to complete the design study, say “thanks very much, you blood suckers” and then get someone else to build it. Anyone else.
Consider how much money these ships are probably going to cost if BAe get to build them. £400 – £800 million each? Probably more. I have no faith whatsoever, at all, in their ability or the MoD’s ability when dealing with BAe, to actually complete a project on time and to an approximation of the original cost estimate. To continue throwing money at BAe will just get you fewer ships, with awfull armament.
I broadly agree with your thinking on Anti-Surface missiles, as there isn’t the money for a more modern one even if the navy were able to make a case for it.
Which brings me to the 4.5″ Gun, i know it’s damm accurate but i really think someone needs to tip-toe up behind the navy & hit them on the head. Hard! While they are unconscious, sell the 4.5″s & the Ammo for whatever you can get, to whomever wants it & do the right thing by buying & fitting 5″ Guns to every ship you can. As quickly as you can!
Really, how useful are we to coalition operations when we have to have our own logistic train for ammo, that can’t even resupply other navy’s ships unless the supply ships unload some 4.5″ ammo or stores & replace that with 5″ for friendly ships to use?
I find that a crazy situation, i really do. Just do the sensible thing & buy the Oto Melara 127mm with Vulcano ammunition. I know you’ve said that it should be looked at for the medium term but i think it would just lead to more procrastination.
I have read everything other people have said, some of it i like a lot.
Chuck Hill’s idea i really like & i think the cost duplication is worth it.
FBOT’s idea for a 12K ton cruiser is also a very interesting idea, the navy or gov. doesn’t seem to want to build ships that would give people serious pause for thought, why don’t they?
Using Admins format, i then come up with this.
The Task Group would have a number of capability slots that would be filled on a rotational basis.
1x Carrier
1x LPH *
1x LPD
2x AAW Destroyer
4x ASW/ASuW/Land Attack Frigate*
2x SSN
Logistical support and associated minor capabilities
The maximum sized task group we would be able to deploy would be dependent on existing commitments, geographical dispersion, refit schedules and harmony requirements for enduring operations, but would approximate to;
1 swing role CVF plus aviation (various)
1 LPH plus aviation *
1 LPD plus aviation
1-2 LSD(A) plus aviation
2-4 Type 45 plus aviation
4-8 Type 26 plus aviation*
2-4 Astute
Various supporting elements as required (MCM, survey and logistics for example)
I still think the navy will need a cheapish GP Frigate, but maybe something else could fill in for that? I don’t know.
* my additions for the reasons stated above.
Bugger, i’ve just seen that Repulse has kind of beat me to it.
Bashes head against the table…..
There are many different ways to have and many different ways to rationalize sea power, and usually when there is a crisis that requires it for leverage or a war, it occurs in a way that was not predicted.
The major problem that the UK is now undergoing is that it is on the edge of losing its ability to build, support, and man a meaningful Navy of any kind, mainly through a lack of consistent direction and policy. Who would be interested in investing themselves, individually or corporately, in a career in Naval related research and development, naval aviation, piloting specifically, or naval construction/naval related production in the current environment? BAE with the current Government agreement may end up having a single up to date shipyard with no workers and no orders. Bag it up and send on to India like Swann Hunter.
“Build few build fast build each better than the last” was Admiral Fisher’s motto and he had it right. A modest sized continually updated fleet consistently funded with adequate personnel retention and predictability would have been more cost efficient, whatever its configuration, than the gargantuan muck up we now see.
There is a need to commit to and keep to a predictable policy, with the Treasury not free to gut it every year on the heal of inevitable overcommitments and overuns, or the prediction will prove correct,navally the UK will be Belgium.
All of your concepts are better than what is actually happening. We are on our way to two empty carrier hulls,
a small and underequipped fleet of aging obsolescent escorts, and an undermanned, undertalented fleet that few want to be a member of.
Repulse, honest, i started this at 11 am this morning….!
Think i may have to try disrupting my sleep pattern, that way i’ll have the hours i need to peck away at my keyboard!!!
Wayne, have just read your post.
I hope to god your wrong, i really do but i have a sinking feeling that you are closer to reality than any of us, sadly.
ACC @ 1:12
If we get F35, who will operate it? Will it be joint force F35 (as in Harrier) or separate RN/RAF units. If the latter, the RAF would surely prefer the A(USAF)model (assuming it can be probe and drogue refuelled). If it is the former then all the aircraft will need to be C models (assuming the F35B is now a non starter). On a slight tangent, with the recent dealings with our French neighbours I get a 6th sense with regard to some sort of deal as regards Rafale/2nd CVF.
Its probably just me.
Regards KP
Hi Repulse @ 1:22,
I think you got it pretty close with” vessels whose basic fit price is around £150 mil; though with the capability of operating a Merlin and being modular to allow for easy sensor / weapons upgrades if the requirements arises. A longer ranged Holland class for example.”
These were euros 120m and of cheap, commercial steel, so there is armour where needed.
A contributor on another blog (GvG on IM) boils the spec down to a nicely short list [in brackets my additions]:
Looking at its intended missions, there are 4 things about the OPV’s that really stand out.
-The first is the lack of a CIWS [any, and the better ones tend to be through-deck, so upgrading difficult]
- the second is the Integrated Mast and all its capabilities [an overspec for the mission, stands for a quarter of the total price
- the third one is the lack of 'provisions for'[also other than CIWS, for less unforeseen needs]
- and the last is its lean manning. [In OPEX the manning costs down by two thirds from the predecessor]
How many we would need (eating into war-fighting ship budget) is another story