The main problem for the Royal Navy and armed forces at large is that the UK doesn’t actually have a grand strategy, so any subordinate strategies, i.e. a maritime strategy, have to cast around in the dark, second guessing the direction of travel but If there is an underlying strategy, it is this
‘We must do more with less, or possibly, less with less’
The financial situation for the next decade or so is the fundamental strategic driver for the nation as a whole. Everything else, to a greater or lesser degree, and this includes the military, is secondary.
We must all get used to this realism, yes I know that strategy should not be driven by money and I know there is waste and ridiculous spending across all departments but in the real world, our cloth must be cut accordingly and there is no point pretending we can do anything but. Sticking ones fingers in ones ears and muttering la la la la Falklands is not the basis for effective armed forces because it simply leads to regular exercises in ‘slash and burn’, sorry, Tough Decisions TM, without any real directional change or transformation, SDSR 2010 anyone?
As we all know, it is a fool’s game to look into the future with a degree of certainty but we can make educated guesses. These educated guesses allow us to shape a strategy and their resultant force/equipment structures. We are also subject to a number of treaty obligations and other standing commitments that we are bound to honour, unless the strategy dictates a change. This combination of educated guesswork and enduring obligations creates a list of ‘what do you want the Navy to do’. The to do list would normally be considered as a baseline but in a full review, those assumptions must be up for grabs, do we really need to do that?
Framing many of the things we require the Royal Navy to do are the standing tasks.
These standing tasks are;
- Fleet Ready Escort (UK waters)
- Atlantic Patrol (South)
- Atlantic Patrol (North)
- Mine clearance in the Northern Arabian Gulf
- Security Capacity Building in the Northern Arabian Gulf
- Offshore Patrol in the Falklands Islands
- Ice Patrol Vessel to the Antarctic
- Maritime Patrol support to Oman
- Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group 1 (North Europe)
- Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (South Europe and near East)
- Fisheries/EEZ protection
We recognise that a Frigate or Destroyer may not the best asset for certain tasks; the obvious ones are Mine Clearance in the North Arabian Gulf, Offshore Patrol in the Falkland Islands and Ice Patrol in the Antarctic. Atlantic Patrol (North) is increasingly being resourced with RFA vessels and others are regularly gapped.
The general approach recommended in this series of posts is to reduce the surface combatant numbers of the Royal Navy but expand certain key areas and take a different approach in others. This is in line with the Think Defence ‘Capability Plus’ model that suggests a reduced in size but still highly capable core, surrounded by a selected number of expanded capability plus areas that deliver increased security and influence in coalition operations.
These suggested maritime relevant capability plus areas are
- Building local/regional security capacity and defence diplomacy
- Disaster Relief and humanitarian support
- Mine countermeasures
- Maritime security and operations in the littoral
We must still be able to deliver underwater effects to protect the deterrent, provide sea denial, support special-forces operations, ISR and long range strike. A full range of anti air, anti surface, aviation and anti submarine capabilities should also be retained at a high capability level but in lower quantities.
Our future major strategic allies are the US, France, India and Brazil along with a select number of countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. It is to these that we should be focussing. Greater cooperation with France and Brazil has already been signalled with recent treaty declarations.
This series of posts consists of four central suggestions;
- Reduce the size of the ‘fighting fleet’ and form it into a single Task Group
- Ceasing or resourcing differently the majority of standing tasks
- Create a number of overseas Forward Presence Squadrons to perform a wide variety of less combat intensive missions and that can also cover most of the standing tasks
- Create or enhance additional capability in mines countermeasures, disaster relief and littoral security to supplement the Forward Presence Squadrons and Single Task Group
Single Task Group
The desired end state in this proposal is to have a single naval task group, maintained at high readiness or on task/training, consisting a single CVF and LPD, together with a range of supporting amphibious, SSN, AAW, ASW, MCM and logistics vessels.
Forward presence would be carried out with the Presence Squadrons and these would be backed up with the ‘big stick’ as represented by the Single Task Group. In some regards this is going back to the way the Royal Navy used to be configured.
This also has shades of the Future Surface Combatant (FSC) concept of C1, C2 along with C3 that seems to have withered on the vine, perhaps I was being harsh in my earlier criticism of the lack of innovative thinking in the RN, it’s not the thinking that is the problem, but the doing!
By making it smaller, keeping it together as much as possible and avoiding detached single ship taskings, the vital training that actually creates a credible fighting force can be carried out in depth. Equipment plays its role but there is no doubt that cohesion, skill and experience actually create an effective fighting force.
Accepting a smaller force size also frees up funding for other tasks, equipment and maintenance maintenance and contributes to the ability to meet harmony guidelines which have sound personnel retention, operational and financial benefits. Struggling to meet standing commitments that have little strategic or operational benefit reduces time available for perishable skills like ASW and combined sea/land operations and creates many other problems into the bargain. The deployments of the Single Task Group, apart from on operations, can be scheduled to ensure maximum benefit for ships and crew alike.
Forward Presence Squadrons
There would be 6 Forward Squadrons based in the following area.
- Caribbean and Northern Atlantic
- South Atlantic and Antarctic
- Mediterranean and Persian Gulf
- Far East
- West Africa
- East Africa
We must never forget that the main job of the Royal Navy is to fight but we should equally recognise that the world has changed and is changing even more. Maritime security, defence diplomacy, disaster relief and counter terrorism operations can equally contribute (if not more) to the security of the UK and our national interest. The role of all the armed forces is to protect the UK and advance our national interest and if this means helping Nigeria combat terrorism in the Niger Delta, guarding gas production facilities in the Qatar North Field, training with the Republic of Singapore’s Navy, interdicting drugs in the Caribbean or providing a disaster relief capability in East Africa then let’s get to it.
The Forward Presence Squadrons would provide a semi permanent UK naval presence in the 6 areas of strategic interest, be multi agency, link up with other UK assets and have a wide variety of non major war fighting tasks that make a significant contribution to conflict prevention, local security capacity building and protection of UK interests.
In high intensity operations they would provide limited additional capability for the Single Task Group
The geographic area is large but by making the commitments semi permanent and avoiding using ‘warships’ we can avoid stretching ourselves too thin. In the next post I will cover the roles and composition of each of the squadrons.
Capability Plus
In addition to the Single Task Group and Forward Presence Squadrons a number of specialist capabilities would be enhanced and new ones developed, particularly disaster/humanitarian relief, littoral and maritime security.
This may need modification to existing vessels or new equipment and force structures, again the concept will be developed in subsequent posts.
Standing Tasks
This approach would require a reappraisal of the standing tasks/commitments listed above.
Some will be retained as is, some merged with others and some covered not by single warship/RFA combination but by the Forward Presence Squadrons.
Using the list from above;
Fleet Ready Escort, this is an important standing task because it provides a single high readiness escort in UK home waters for deployment anywhere in the world and therefore should be retained as is.
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1), in order to provide a deployable NATO mine countermeasures capability the RN provides a small contingent. Most of the time, they are used to dispose of World War I and II sea mines that occasionally appear and need to be dealt with. Only a few years ago a Dutch fishing vessel was lost to an old mine. Mines remain an effective and asymmetric weapon; even a small number clandestinely laid would represent a significant problem for crowded intra European sea lanes and port facilities. With France coming into the NATO command structure proper and in line with greater resource sharing it may be possible to rotate with France, the newer NATO nations will also increasingly provide resources for this group. Retained as is but on a rotating basis.
Atlantic Patrol (South), the mid to South Atlantic is an area of strategic interest and covers not only the Falkland Islands but the East African coast as well. Both these areas as important and would be covered differently, by the West Africa and South Atlantic Forward Squadrons.
Atlantic Patrol (North), although not exclusively Caribbean based, of late, this standing task has primarily consisted of drugs interdiction and humanitarian relief in the Hurricane season. Despite a useful contribution being made by the RFA/RN, it is questionable if the security and drugs interdiction task is best met by a permanent frigate/destroyer presence. There are a number of British Overseas Territories in the area as well as Belize but the this be covered differently, by Caribbean Forward Squadron.
Mine Clearance in the Northern Arabian Gulf, in a previous post on energy security I highlighted the strategic importance of the Qatar oil fields and Straits of Hormuz to the UK. This task is currently resourced by a semi permanent flotilla of mines countermeasures vessels with crews rotating in and out of theatre as needed. This task can be merged with Security Capacity Building in the North Arabian Gulf and covered differently, by the Persian Gulf Forward Squadron.
Offshore Patrol in the Falkland Islands, complimenting APT(S) is the FI patrol ship, HMS Clyde is a slightly modified River Class offshore patrol vessel procured under a PFI. Although relatively low cost it has an important symbolic and practical role, clearly demonstrating commitment to the sovereignty of the islands and providing a range of EEZ protection capabilities that are less warlike in nature. If hydrocarbon exploitation does increase in the area then a case for a more suitable vessel could easily be made, providing a greater range of towing, fire fighting and pollution control capabilities. This would be covered differently, by the South Atlantic Forward Squadron.
Ice Patrol Vessel to the Antarctic, given the range of treaty restrictions this must remain essentially a ‘civilian like’ vessel. The SDSR reconfirmed the capability but did not detail how it would be provided, however, recent news seems to indicate a second hand Norwegian icebreaker will be used to replace the damaged HMS Endurance. In the longer term this would be covered differently, by the South Atlantic Forward Squadron.
Maritime Patrol Support to Oman, Oman is perhaps our strongest ally in the Middle East with many historic and military ties going back decades. Covered differently, by the Persian Gulf Forward Squadron
Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (South Europe and near East, SNMG2), this is the second NATO standing group the UK is committed to and notionally covers the Mediterranean but can be deployed anywhere. Normally, SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 come under the command of Allied Maritime Component Command (CC-Mar) Naples, which is one of the three Component Commands of Allied Joint Force Command Naples. However, for Operation Ocean Shield, SNMG2 has been put under the Operational Control of Component Command Maritime Headquarters Northwood. SNMG1 and SNMG2 normally rotate; SNMG1 is currently conducting Operation Ocean Shield, the anti piracy operation in the Indian Ocean and surrounding areas. Under the command of Commodore Christian Rune of the Royal Danish Navy the UK contribution is HMS Montrose. There are many questions that remain about piracy, its relative importance and the usefulness of traditional naval vessels in interdicting it maintaining a permanent commitment to SNMG2 can be questioned, again, the specific piracy interdiction/security task would be covered differently, by the East Africa Forward Squadron.
Fisheries Protection, this task also includes security of offshore energy installations in the North Sea and whilst one might argue about the efficacy of wind, tidal and wave power the fact remains that they are becoming more numerous and will therefore need protecting. We should have a serious debate about whether checking fisherman’s nets is a valid task for expensive Royal Navy crew but the they ship handling and command experience feeds directly into the large vessels, there are valid arguments on both sides. With the proposal to radically expand the forward presence squadrons there will be plenty of smaller command billets so this advantage of the FP fleet become less important. I think we should seriously investigate methods of transferring this mission to other agencies, open to debate
The next in this series looks at equipment strategies, quantities and concepts of operation but the goal is not to ask for more funding but to try and build this structure WITHOUT ANY EXTRA MONEY
######## OTHER POSTS IN THIS SERIES ##########
The Future of the Royal Navy 01 – (Context)
The Future of the Royal Navy 02 – (Tasks and General Approach)
The Future of the Royal Navy 03 – (Single Task Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 04 – (Forward Presence Squadrons)
The Future of the Royal Navy 05 – (Equipment – T26)
The Future of the Royal Navy 06 – (Capability Plus)
The Future of the Royal Navy 07 – (Equipping the Forward Presence Squadron)
The Future of the Royal Navy 08 – (Equipping the Littoral Operations Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 09 – (Equipping the Disaster Support Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 10 – (Mine Countermeasures and Survey)
Lets make a start by ditching these:
Mine clearance in the Northern Arabian Gulf
Security Capacity Building in the Northern Arabian Gulf
Maritime Patrol support to Oman
Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (South Europe and near East)
I’ve read this a few times & am still confused.
Are you saying that these tasks must be done?
Fleet Ready Escort (UK waters)
Atlantic Patrol (South)
Atlantic Patrol (North)
Mine clearance in the Northern Arabian Gulf
Security Capacity Building in the Northern Arabian Gulf
Offshore Patrol in the Falklands Islands
Ice Patrol Vessel to the Antarctic
Maritime Patrol support to Oman
Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group 1 (North Europe)
Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (South Europe and near East)
Fisheries/EEZ protection
If yes, are you saying to do that, that you are proposing to form 6 Forward Squadrons with various types of ships with various capabilities?
Also the Capability Plus stuff should also be done with other assets?
Also that 1 major set of heavy warfighting ships/subs will be on standby in the uk?
This is stuff/tasks that you think have to be done, correct?
Not things/tasks, that are open for debate about whether or not we do them?
As i said, i’m a bit confused….
Hi Michael,
I can only support this one “Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (South Europe and near East)”from your list. This is a typical example of how NATO structures become frozen over time. Since the setting up of this structure the Italian, French and Spanish navies have become hugely more capable. There is also a joint Amph. Group on the UK/ Dutch lines. The only rationale I can see is helping with rotation to the further east deployments. Gib is of course a unique asset but at the current threat levels the two fast interception boats there are just the right level of resourcing.
TD: You advocate focus, but the geographic spread you list is huge? Why should we be present in the Far East when we have hugely capable allies there. You mention a couple, add Australia for instance.
The point is that their presence does not stretch far enough (this way)and that is where RN can help so that strategic gaps do not emerge. Example: India has created a presence in the Cam Ranh bay, to counter China , especially the nuclear subs operating out of Hainan (India just launched their own!). At the same time, China also is eyeing a blue-water navy. Near their own shores the strategy is area denial, but they also depend on trade and have energy security concerns. East of the Malay Straits I have heard there are four blue water bases in the works. Where are they though (no attributable written source)? I have only read about an exclusion area (shoot-to-kill)of several kilometres around a river mouth in Tanzania; hardly necessary for off-loading mining equipment, which is the official explanation.
So I would advocate against over-stretch and more concentration on basing and presence in this area where Oman is the only local navy of any capacity (India and RSA being too far). There are of course options with Diego Garcia, Masirah Island, without necessarily adding new ones, but adjusting use.
Finally, on the fewer numbers/ better capabilities: I am not convinced about the survivability of the (single) task force if it sent to a littoral environment (with the current kit)?
Lo ACC.
Sorry but i’m still trying to figure out if TD means that these are the things that need doing & that the way he/they (TD), think we should be doing them is with 6 Forward Squadrons & a Ready Group of war-fighting ships/subs in the UK.
As well as the Capability Plus stuff with different assets.
ACC, what you’ve said has only confused me some more
It’s as though you’ve understood it while it’s gone right over my head.
If anyone can set me straight i’d be greatful!
OK OK, back to the drawing board!
Admin are you saying this:
That the current standing tasks are these:
Fleet Ready Escort (UK waters)
Atlantic Patrol (South)
Atlantic Patrol (North)
Mine clearance in the Northern Arabian Gulf
Security Capacity Building in the Northern Arabian Gulf
Offshore Patrol in the Falklands Islands
Ice Patrol Vessel to the Antarctic
Maritime Patrol support to Oman
Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group 1 (North Europe)
Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (South Europe and near East)
Fisheries/EEZ protection
That you want to throw that out and replace it with this:
There would be 6 Forward Squadrons based in the following area.
Caribbean and Northern Atlantic
South Atlantic and Antarctic
Mediterranean and Persian Gulf
Far East
West Africa
East Africa
Is that right?
With some fleet units on high readiness in UK waters and other fleet units being added to the various squadrons as needed?
Sorry !!
Didn’t see you reply, also i’ve been up for ages & am starting to get tired….which means complex idea’s are starting to hurt my head.
Mine was of course directed at the piece by the first Michael.
As it was the only post when I started writing I omitted my normal @[time stamp] reference from the beginning
OK, have re written parts
1. Majority of proper warships grouped into a single force with them rotating in and out dependant on the usual prep/task/recover profile
2. This task force would conduct training, exercises, defence diplomacy and operations mostly together, either in home or overseas waters
3. The task group would link up with the presence squadrons on a rolling basis
4. The presence squadrons are going to be lightweight so even though thin, they will not be over spread
5. Capability plus is new kit/structure or enhancing existing
As the saying goes, (armchair) generals are always fighting their last war. We can also say this about the current piracy/COIN “war” that is currently in vogue. Going small and cheap to deal with ‘mere’ pirate skiffs and ignoring the high-end systems just because China isn’t a threat and current pirates don’t field SSMs, IADS and submarines is a foolish view.
Small OPV/corvette types are certainly cheap and “properly scaled” to fight AK-toting pirates, but we can’t close our eyes for the trend of hostile swarm tactics as currently being practiced by Iran for example.
Iran is developing TTPs and fielding small boats as Action Groups to attack/harrass larger ships, and these tactics can be fairly easily copied by other groups as the requirements are fairly cheap and easy; small but fast boats, small arms (RPG and RPUs), some radios and dedicated crews.
MANPADS aren’t that hard to come by, and just one missile in each swarm group will be a considerable deterrent.
These “guerilla” boat swarms can be further protected by coastal (missile) artillery, either BM-21 MRLs or more advanced guided SSM. Something that has already been shown by Hezbollah.
These small boats may not warrant intervention of the main carrier squadron, leaving the smaller forward squadrons to deal with something they may not be suited for.
Hi TD:”4. The presence squadrons are going to be lightweight so even though thin, they will not be over spread”
Hi Marcase:”Small OPV/corvette types are certainly cheap and “properly scaled” to fight AK-toting pirates, but we can’t close our eyes for the trend of hostile swarm tactics as currently being practiced by Iran for example.”
I agree with Marcase, but it seems that there might be a misconception about how steep the step is from the toting to the swarming (ie. effective defence against them).I would not like to be on most of the below ships if having to face a swarming attack.
I quote from another source [text in brackets is mine]:
Khareef (Oman)-$262 million
[Hasn't this one often been mentioned as a model for our next step? Ocean going enough, and can do more than just patrol]
Knud Rasmussen (Denmark)-$50 million
Port of Spain (Trinidad and Tobago)-$76 million
[ Is this the new batch they didn't pay for, but only announced that intention when the ship was ready; Where are they now?]
River (Britain)-$31 million
[You guys know better than the source, so if this one is accurate, we can assume that the others are not too far off re: their price tag]
TD
Any ideas on how much it will cost to set up 6 forward bases? They will have to be self substaining as well. A couple of issues with your groupings from a purely practical view point.
1. Caribean and N Atlantic-Surely the N Atlantic is covered by UK bases so would leave this one at just Caribean. Only doing anti piracy/disaster relief.
2. South Atlantic and Antarctic makes sense nased in Mare Harbour.
3. Med and Persian Gulf-Sorry but there is a big cannal in the way and distances involved are huge. Med already well covered by NATO and our own base at Gib. Not required. Lets concentrate on Active Endeavour and consider moving a more capable asset to Gib.
4. Far East-Interesting as has been pointed out the Ozzies are very capable but the US are looking at building a Naval base in Australia. Singapore or Australia would have to be 2 or 3 FF/DD to make a difference.
5. What happens in West Africa that requires a maritime presence that could not be redeployed from Gib/Caribean?
6. East Africa, yes makes sense for anti piracy ops, secure basing could be an issue.
7. Instead of the Med/Gulf would base those assets in Bahrain just covering the Gulf, providing support to Oman and to security building in the NAG.
Hi APATS @ 11:00
In “has been pointed out the Ozzies are very capable but the US are looking at building a Naval base in Australia.” your “but” is out of place, I think.
In that half of the Pacific which is away from their own coast the Americans are systematically moving their assets at a further distance from China, simply because the area denial is currently judged too effective inside what is called the first ring of islands (seen from China) and the offensive weapons being tested, so soon effective almost to, or almost to, the outer ring of islands (of which Guam is part and receiving a superbase, to be populated by many such that are now stationed “too close” to China.
The Russians may have enlarged the diameter of their torpedoes to be effective against Nimitz & Co, but the Chinese are counting on sufficient numbers of carrier-killer ballistic missiles. (When Obama realised this, propping up defences on that side became the priority and the missile shield in/for Europe went on slow boil.)
So nothing to do with the lack of (naval) capability on Australia’s part. Add Singapore, Thailand, India…
We should only be looking to contribute this side of Diego Garcia, to avoid overstretch (and as pointed out, expensive basing).
ACC
I agree, I am not sure these advanced base squadrons pass the “so what” test.
A global presence is a fine ideal but I feel it is asking too much. The six squadrons would also create too high a proportion of limited use ships that would not justify their basing and running costs.
There needs to be some greater degree of prioritization. Primary concerns for a continuous presence should be patrols in home waters, the Falklands and the Antarctic – all relatively small commitments anyway; and it seems to me that the focus of our resources should be on the seas around Arabia and the horn of Africa – plenty of problems to get your teeth into before you start to worry about the rest of the world.
I don’t think we should try to maintain a continuous presence in the far east, west Africa or even the Carribean.
However; if we did go down the route of having something like a presence squadron, then rather than more river class or similar vessels might it be a better -though more expensive- to have additional frigates but with minimum weapons equip and crew? Either through using STANFLEX or similar or simply by accepting the dreaded “fitted-for-but-not-with”.
If beyond the number of escorts required for a cv/amphib group, you had lower equiped frigates then you’d have the hulls to do more but without the full cost; and though not immediately available for ww3, in the mid-term you would be better able to adjust the fleet capability as and when a more clear and defined naval threat presented itself.
Chaps, before knocking the idea, hang on until the next post which looks at force levels, manning, cost sharing, equipment and operational concepts. I would also say re read the first section of the post, business as usual i.e. Type 26 like for like with Type 23 is a fools errand.
Brian, you make an interesting point about limited use ships, but the problem is that we very rarely use our existing ships for the tasks they are configured for, this is wasteful of an expensive asset.
I think you all underestimate the value of presence, just because that presence isn’t always with a first rate warship doesn’t matter. Take the Far East for example, we have obligations under the Five Powers, so basing a squadron in Singapore would demonstrate some concrete commitment that would be reinforced by the task group on occasion for larger exercises.
Marcase, as for China, can you conceive any scenario where the UK goes toe to toe with China, I can’t.
We all need to be realistic about the limits of our capability, the Army is moving to a less war war stance so why not the RN, we can’t keep fighting the Falklands again.
The reality is that any operation that actually really needs frigates and destroyers will be in a coalition
Hi Brian @ 11:51,
You can count on my vote for ” the focus of our resources should be on the seas around Arabia and the horn of Africa – plenty of problems to get your teeth into before you start to worry about the rest of the world.
I don’t think we should try to maintain a continuous presence in the far east, west Africa or even the Carribean.”
If we do a zero-sum game, all of that and everything from the Med (minus the fast interception boats in Gib & Cyprus) beefing up the focal area, it still isn’t very much.
Under the £20 million thread it – the idea – was floated that the vessels with a dock (and huge loitering and storage capacity) could be rotated as mother ships. There are spares in two different classes; these proposed reallocations would pay for that additional £17m/ yr?
For the next 5 or 6 years this is what the surface fleet will look like. I think.
1 x LPH (Illustrious/Ocean) For Sea Control/ASW or Helicopter Assault.
1 x LPD Albion class (1 in extended reserve).
3 x LSD Bay class.
6 x T42/T45 AAW Destroyers.
13 x T23 ASW/GP Frigate.
3 x River class.
1 x Modified River class.
7 x Sandown class.
8 x Hunt class.
I have not inc. most of the RFA ships as if anything were to happen these ships would be re-tasked to support other operations. Also i haven’t inc. HMS Scott or the two Echo class ships as they are survey ships.
Thats just 43 ships total, some of which are going to be in re-fit/working up etc etc, or travelling to and from the UK to their bases after or for re-fit/working up. There just aren’t enough ships to provide a core for each Squadron that i can see.
The only way i can see the Gov. agreeing to increase the number of ships for your 6 Forward Squadrons is if you cut the numbers of Type 26 ships that are to be ordered, then spend the difference on a suitable ship. Which i really think will just give the MoD(N) another opportunity to display their skills in agreeing to crazy contract’s.
So what about this instead:
Caribbean, North Atlantic and UK
Western Mediterranean and West Africa
South Atlantic and Antarctic
East Africa, Persian Gulf and Far East
Would it work with 4 Forward Squadrons of differing sizes? Or are the distances too far in Arabian sea/Persian gulf/Indian Ocean area? One other thing, if something happened in one area, would that mean sending ships from other area’s squadrons as well as the main force of war fighting ships?
TD
I agree with your comment on presence. Having spoken to several army officers and DAs in remote areas of Africa and asia the value of the “cocktail party” as a means of influencing the locals should not be underestimated.
However you accuse some posters on here of being unrealistic then post this.
We all need to be realistic about the limits of our capability, the Army is moving to a less war war stance so why not the RN, we can’t keep fighting the Falklands again.
The reality is that any operation that actually really needs frigates and destroyers will be in a coalition
May i remind you we have a zero success rate in the last 40 years of forecasting the next strategic shock. Also as my good friends the Americans like to say. “hey the bad guys get a vote as well” We plan for the worst and hope for the best. Surely a Falklands style intervention should be the minimum yardstick we aspire to, especially given the fact that it could be sitting on N Sea vers 2.
TD
The roles you set out are over ambitious.
The forces are not there to provide any credible millitary presence.
A presence yes; but only one that could not face a shooting war in any of those areas. Without land based or organic airpower they are useless in most navel combat situations.
We are stuck with Quite Entertaining and her predecessor(s) in the LPH role, so we might as well use that as the core of an intervention fleet based in UK waters to deploy arround the world.
The fleet we have would be just about big enough for that.
Otherwise concentrate on keeping the bases and bring on the colonial sloop/ or big motherships (my favorite).
APATS
The defence of the falklands, if we keep some army and crucially airforce there, in sufficent number, it simply will not be invaded.
Only becomes a Naval Matter if it all goes completly T*ts up.
Going back at my posting at 8:05. Why would we be engaged in Mine clearance in the Northern Arabian Gulf? The Persian Gulf is full of very rich Arab states populated by people who were long distance sea-farers when we were in coracles. It is in their interest that the seas are kept clear of mines; offer advice and training – but don’t station warships there.
Fellas, as I keep saying, wait until the next post on structure and kit before saying it is unaffordable or over ambitious. One thing I have never done since I started this Blog is indulged in fantasy fleets of 12 T45,s 3 CVF, 24 T26 and a partridge in a pear tree. If anything, most of the time I tend to under size things based on pessimism about funds etc.
If we keep one the road marked, ‘if you have a large fleet of high end surface combatants everything else will be ok’ and ‘everything that floats has to be able to fight the Chinese’ then that road leads to still trying to do everything with a smaller number increasingly expensive bits of kit, the worse of both worlds.
Ixion, how would you define most naval encounters?
Look back at the last 30 years and tell me how many operations the RN has conducted in contested airspace. Most naval encounters have been the secondary roles.
Conflict prevention is an explicit direction in the SDSR and NSS and simply paying lip service to it isn’t actually doing it.
I know its a difficult concept for anyone who has a view that a strong and large navy is a good thing.
We simply have to change
APATS, I know what you are saying about the future being unpredictable and that is the fundamental challenge we face. I don’t have asteroid insurance on my house because of cost v probability, but I do have contents insurance because the same equation comes out differently. Its about preparing for one set of eventualities but hedging against the others. I don’t have asteroid insurance because I would rather spend the premium on beer, fags and hookers!
And isnt Trident our ultimate insurance policy>
TD
Trident is the ultimate insrance policy and guarantee of UK sovereignty and continued exsistence. E.G You can invade and wipe out the UK but you have to face the fact that we have the ability to destroy totally x number of your cities.
I do not think we area asking for asteroid insurance, merely direction about what the minimum level of opposed force application we are required to provide.
All Pats
I’ve got to say, i’m not worried about the South Atlantic at all. The Army are no fools and the RaF will have made the most careful preperation due to the threat to their standing as an independent force if they were to be taken by suprise.
The near hysterical reaction of former naval officers over the Falklands has just obscured the real reasons for our need for carrier-bourne aviation. I really don’t think they should have used the Falklands as an example in their anger at the withdrawl of the Ground Attack Harriers.
I do not remember such a fuss kicked up by them when the SHAR’s were got rid of. That was the time to really make a point and it wasn’t made, i really don’t recall those people yelling that we needed to replace them with better one’s, which, really, the navy needed more than they needed a newer Ground Attack version.
The reason i’m angry about the whole carrier thing, is that the Navy has had zero fighter cover (not inc. the RaF),for about 4 years now. You may be suprised at this but i do agree with you, cause we are 4 years into a nearly 15 year period where we can be subjected to that strategic shock and not be able to do a damm thing about it, if it does happen.
Also i have a horrible feeling that the economic problems are much worse than they are letting on. That problem seems to be driving everything and to me it looks like the Gov. are determined not to get involved in anything on our own at sea for at least the next 10 years, no matter what.
I don’t agree with them but i think that’s the real situation.
Sorry All Pats please ignore my post, i’m too damm slow at thinking about what i want to say.
Admin or anyone, isn’t our policy with Trident Fail Deadly?
Well I’m waiting for the next post. After all don’t the Dutch plan to operate a opv based forward presence squadron in the West Indies with single task group at home. Come to thing of it is that no how the French have been running things for years?
i cannot agree with the single task force concept.
it is a one-shot party trick with no resilience and no depth to permit the surge of greater effect in time of general war.
two task forces that alternate between high readiness and low readiness is the only sensible way to run an expeditionary capability.
there is always a task group ready which is essential for the rapid response that is deemed necessary for conflict prevention.
there is always the necessary depth to surge force at a much greater capability by using sufficent preparation to deploy both taskgroups in support of general war.
there is always a strategic reserve that prevents the loss of even a single hva from ensuring defeat, think carriers in the falklands.
Jedi, the single task force will comprise of multiple ‘vessel slots’ that will be filled in rotation so thee is inherent resilience because you always have the ability to surge those slots with non tasked ships to cover battle damage, create a larger force OR, create a separate force. It can scale up or down
Resilience is nice to have but costs a lot of money, back to the original point about wishing for more. We are beyond sensible anyway and have to salvage what we can. Sticking our heads in the sand and asking for more is fine, but not really very realistic.
A general war is an interesting subject as well, people who have a maritime slant tend to love the SDR98 because it spawned CVF and lots of escorts but it made a break with the past and explicitly recognised that there was much less likelihood of such a thing happening and anything medium scale and above would be in a coalition, a coalition to which we chose how to contribute. If we contribute two rowing boats and a bottle of Pussers then that is that.
If we are faced with an aggressive China that decides it is going to cut itself off from its overseas markets by going to war then that position isn’t going to hit us, Europe, India or the US overnight.
We need to be realistic and preparing for the unknown, there are limits
Everyone seems happy enough to see the RAF reduced to a small fast jet force or buy tucanos and the Army lose a Brigade or two plus half the armour but suggest a few less frigates and all you can hear is herumphing and special pleading
At the risk of repeating myself, bloody well wait for the next post
ps, when I mean everyone I mean those who don’t read TD by the way!!
A friend of Mr G, welcome to TD and yes you are right, it is exactly how the French have been operating for years. They do have a slightly different historical and geographic perspective so we can’t really compare the two from the past, but looking forward, as this series of posts does, it is reasonable to compare
i cannot agree with the single task force concept.
“Main fleet to Singapore”?
Michael (ex-DIS)
Sorry man, your right. Why exactly are we doing that?
Is it just cause we can, or just cause they don’t want to, as it’s the unglamorous side of naval warfare?
My two-pennies worth:
First, security ops in the NAG. These are due to cease in May 2011 when UK forces finally withdraw. So that commitment is already end-dated.
Second, the standing MCM force in the NAG. Those of you who have worked with the Arab nations will know that their approach to sustained maritime operations is questionable, and they are at the moment showing almost no interest in clearing further mines from the region. Our presence there is, I think, obvious – insurance for the oil supply and a surge presence if Iran decides to mine the Straits. You have a pre-positioned MCM force ready to go, to likely operate under a US or NATO air umbrella (either land based, carried based or both). Suggest this tasking is still relevant.
APT(N) – The counter drug operation is year round, so this would support the idea of a forward based OPV similar to CLYDE. However the hurricane season is predictable, so deploying an RFA when needed is also a sensible recourse. This removes the need for a permanently stationed FF/DD.
APT(S) – Agreed that the RAF and Army should continue to support our operations, but that a regular visit by a major unit (FF/DD) would continue to remind anyone with territorial ambitions of the seriousness of our commitment. CLYDE’s maritime presence is also valuable for EEZ integrity duties. Thus the FF/DD commitment becomes perhaps annual and could include joint exercises with Brazil.
Standing NATO MCM Force – let us not lose sight of the importance of working with our NATO allies and building relations as well as removing a persistent sea mine threat, maintaining operational readiness and potentially trialling new technologies and techniques. A permanent commitment might be relaxed but we should at least maintain regular annual participation. Remember that we are working with many of the newer NATO member states as well as training nascent MCM forces such as Estonia.
Perhaps we should be looking at developing further standing NATO groups to counter some of these threats instead of trying to ‘go it alone’. Drugs are a threat to all European countries, so why not investigate the formation of a standing NATO Counter Drug and Disaster Relief Group in the Caribbean. A standing NATO counter piracy group for Western Africa would also make sense and they could have a strong connection with the Caribbean group given that Western Africa is also a significant drug import point. These groups need not always require a British presence but a rotating commitment by the UK, and a leading hand in conducting such operations, would strengthen our international position and maintain our reputation for being rather good at this Navy malarkey.
Finally, UK EEZ protection – I am a strong advocate of forming a proper UK Coastguard tasked with fisheries protection, customs, border control and police duties to relieve the RN of this duty.
TD
Sorry had psychic button turned of when I read the post. Still think you have written a requirement that is too ambitious.
At the risk of exciting the Falklands war junkies, that was the last proper near parity war we got involved in without air cover we would have lost.
I sense; (and if I am wrong about this then I appologise in advance; a touch of “send a gun boat” diplomacy, I do not think a single, or even a couple of frigates will be a strong enough force to use in a shooting war. A touch of Renown,and POW to the Far East in ww2.
Back in the 1960s the late (great) Vice-Admiral Sir Louis Le Bailly proposed 4 task groups to operate in the Indian Ocean with reinforcements in Australia and forward basing in Diego Garcia. The orbat’ for each group was
1 x STOVL carrier, 1 x large amphib, 1 x AAW cruiser 8 x frigates (sloops)
The carrier, cruiser and amphib were to be nuclear ships. And the high number of frigates was more of a product of the time as helicopter ASW was still an exciting new idea.
The only thing I would like to see is T23 up north tracking the Ruskies.
I hear CO Astute has been relieved of his command……….
x
The sun goes up, the sun goes down, you park 1.2 billion defence asset on a sandbank, in public, making a b fool of yourself and HMRN You get fired.
It is even more worrying when you consider the USN look up to the RN’s ship driving skills………
TD said: “We simply have to change”
Yes, we have to admit there is no Soviet / Warsaw pact threat to the UK or western Europe, and that a ‘war’ of twice the duration of WWII, in a land locked central Asian country has done nothing to improve security to, or remove threats to the UK homeland: thus we can have a much smaller standing army.
Similarly there is no air defence threat to the UK, from Soviet Bears, cruise missiles or others. Hence the smaller RAF fast jet fleet.
So we need to change yes. If HM Govt wants to be a “player” on the world stage, the easiest way to do that is to have a strong, flexible Navy which leads coalition efforts from the front. We may need to invest in ballistic missile defence (currently best provided by ship launched missiles) and cyber needs investment.
So ref: “Everyone seems happy enough to see the RAF reduced to a small fast jet force … and the Army lose a Brigade or two plus half the armour but suggest a few less frigates and all you can hear is herumphing and special pleading” – yes absolutely! We can, believe it or not, do with out hundreds of Challenger2 and fast jets that need fixed bases and remain a major player on the world stage.
HERUMPH !
JED
Hear hear
For a few months earlier this year I believe no British government would get involved in another interventionist war. But now I am not so sure. I think this lot will sign us up for anything the Americans want; just as the last lot did.
If we were to play fantasy army I would only keep the Para’s, The Rifles, and the Guards. (Perhaps the Ghurkas) And I would spend some of the savings on a fleet of C17s/Antanov lifters. And dozen or so RFA manned Enforcers.
(I tend to see the Army in terms of infantry. A bit simplistic I know, but as you all know I am very “simple.”
)
Jed, I think I might have covered this before but I care little for being a player on anyone’s stage but what I do care about is the UK national interest and I disagree that a strong flexible navy is necessarily the best way to protect and advance that interest. Yes, it forms part of the mix but it should not be the be all and end all of UK defence.
If we can do without 50% of our panzers or fast jets, why should the Navy be exempt?
Sending Frigates to do the jobs that we are currently sending them to do isn’t flexible, its wasteful and batters them into an early date with the breakers yard and makes proper warfighting training difficult they are busy chasing cocaine speedboats or pirate skiffs
TD said: “Sending Frigates to do the jobs that we are currently sending them to do isn’t flexible, its wasteful and batters them into an early date with the breakers yard and makes proper warfighting training difficult they are busy chasing cocaine speedboats or pirate skiffs”
well I agree – hence my posting on the subject which yyou posted for me recently
Ref: “If we can do without 50% of our panzers or fast jets, why should the Navy be exempt?” – I explained that, because of the perceived threat, and because of the Governments desire (not mine) to be a “world class player”.
A I have said before, I don’t really care if HM Govt reduces to a coast guard consisting of second hand RNLI life boats with machine guns – as long as they are open and honest about it, give up their seat on the UNSC and unilaterally (nuclear) disarm.
Ref: “what I do care about is the UK national interest and I disagree that a strong flexible navy is necessarily the best way to protect and advance that interest”
Well that is where you and I will never agree, unless you can write a really good long article to convince me otherwise
HERUMPH, I say again, HERUMPH, break – time 00:44z authentication Foxtrot Oscar, Out.
TD, in your original post you said:
“I know that strategy should not be driven by money…”
I think we should be taking what accountants call a “zero-based budgeting approach” to developing and resourcing our strategy. As applied to armed forces, it would go something like this:
1. List strategic priorities in order of importance. Put dividing lines between those which are “essential” to national security, those which are “important” and those which would be “nice to address” if the budget permits.
2. For each priority, list different levels of capability, starting with “minimum acceptable” and working up.
3. Make the best assessment you can of the resources required to deliver each capability level for each priority.
4. Determine what what can be afforded in the light of a realistic budget. Obviously, the “minimum capability” for the “essential” priorities MUST be funded, regardless of budget issues – it’s the very bottom line. For the rest, political decisions (preferably cross-party so we don’t see incredibly expensive changes of mind after each election) would need to be taken over which priorities could afford to be addressed by which capability levels.
The important benefit of such an approach would be that it would drive home to the politicians, very specifically, what we can afford to do – or more to the point, what we CAN’T afford to do. This might restrain future governments from committing our armed forces to conflicts without bothering to provide the necessary resources.
Of course, there would be lots of issues around the zero-base budgeting analysis where the RN is concerned, especially the degree to which specific assets (i.e. warships) can effectively and efficiently cover different priorities. If we need a certain minimum number of anti-sub platforms to provide protection in a hot war, we may be forced for cost reasons to use those platforms for much lower-level policing work in peacetime, rather than providing cheap and efficient policing vehicles as well as anti-sub frigates.
One detailed point I would make is that using frigates or destroyers for policing has certain implications. Space would need to be provided for a Marine complement plus efficient means of handling their boats etc, and the defences against small boats would need to be enhanced by fitting several light cannon rather than just a couple. Perhaps most of all, training would have to be enhanced. I saw a TV programme about the new Daring ships a while back, and there was a highly embarrassing exercise purporting to show how the ship would deal with a potentially dangerous approaching small boat. The officers were still giving warnings over the loudspeakers when the boat had got within pistol range and was cruising alongside – and the weapon they were threatening to use was a rifle-calibre MG. That would have cheered up Al Qaeda no end…
Somewhat Removed
“Second, the standing MCM force in the NAG. Those of you who have worked with the Arab nations will know that their approach to sustained maritime operations is questionable, and they are at the moment showing almost no interest in clearing further mines from the region.’
Perhaps someone should point out to them that selling oil is a two way thing. If they can’t get it out they are rather stuck.
Do we still have a Ghurka bn in Brunei? Provided by us but funded by them. Why don’t we try that in the Persian Gulf. Not the NAG please!
Hi Tony @ 1:28,
“we should be taking what accountants call a “zero-based budgeting approach” to developing and resourcing our strategy.” McNamara introduced this in the sixties (before it then came to be used in private enterprise). Some of the capability graphics, to enable comparisons, would still be a step forward.
I was proposing our (MOD) accounting practices to be sharpened by capability, as opposed to unit costs or programme costs, which then would enable a zero-based exercise (everyone in it talking the same language). This was under the Parliamentary Questions thread, though.
Michael (ex-DIS): “Do we still have a Ghurka bn in Brunei? Provided by us but funded by them. Why don’t we try that in the Persian Gulf”
- Exactly my thoughts re: e.g. the MCM squadron. GW1 was fought much under this principle though. That is why KIO had to sell so many of the landmark buildings in Central London. In total, their assets went from $100bn to $40bn just for this reason, and the Saudis chipped in in a big way, too. The latter (not being under occupation) could also afford to joke that we get our “white mercanaries” do the work for us.
There is merit in what TD is suggesting but I agree with Jedibeeftrix’s concern that a bare single task force is too thin. There has to be at least the ability back up the active force with reserves which effectively amounts to having the resources for two task forces, albeit one is ‘reserve’ or dispersed among benign routine taskings. Yes a bit more cost but if the navy made a better job of matching the magnitude of assets to tasks, and weaned itself off its habit of paying more than anyone else for its kit, then it could be affordable.
The apparent absence of a strategy in the recent SDSR may owe much to the lack of an obvious adversary. Sure there are plenty of bad guys around but if your criteria is someone who actually threatens British territory then the list only comprises the Argentineans and terrorists. The military will only have a limited role in counter terrorism operations and the prospect of another Falklands is not high, so the immediate tasks for the military are simply those that the government chooses to give them. If the government is not minded to expeditionary warfare then the resources required are not so great. However, I do not believe we have changed our national character so we need more than your average Scandinavian state even if we can’t point to the strategy.
Richard W
Your second paragraph points up what I always think reading this blog. What is the threat? And maybe our national character has changed…….
TD
You seem to be having a hard shift keeping forward momentum going on this topic. However can I say that I agree with you, the RN / UK plc needs to be out there and we need to be relevant.
When the question of money and resources comes up then the T26 looms large. With a T45 in stripper spec costing £650mill+ it will not take BAE long to get the T26 cost up to £4-500m mill and that would not incluse the chunky design and development costs.
As an aside I missed the £20mill saving degate but the 4 year concept generation contract for the T26 at £127mill all in would have been a good place to start for me.
Consequently I agree with the idea of the RN getting out about, add in some DfID assets crewed by the RFA as well and you can get quite a lot of presence in the water for not a lot of cost.
T26 @ BAE / T45 value for money criteria = T26 at real world value for money criteria + £50mill frigate (6K ton colonial sloop) + £25mill upgrade package.
Base crew of 50 would not break the bank and a couple of exotic, sunny postings rather than the usual ASW “NA / WP / Kitchen sink” missile polishing expeditions would do wonders for recruitment and retention.
Finally to digress, interested in the comments about how to deal with proposed maratime guerilla tactics being worked up by the usual suspects.
A couple of 6′ guns at the sharp end of a large, resilient, cheap platform would seem to do the trick. Add in a couple of helicopters and RM section with all the kit they can carry and I think the bad guys would need a new playbook.
This is a fast moving thread and I am jumping in late. Firstly I think I agree with TD, there should be a core war-fighting element of the RN and then a lower end presence force doing all the jobs that a frigate are overkill for. Not sure I would go with the exact arrangements proposed but the idea looks sound IMO.
While I understand that in a hot war a large OPV is going to be less than useful, maybe the way around it is to make your OPV’s have a useful auxiliary role. Could you make a traditional OPV, enlarge it a bit, and tack on a towed sonar so that you could use them as auxiliary ASW platforms in case of a hot war where there low draft might make them useful than a T26 in shallow water? Or could you make them your primary littoral combat platform by adding two batteries of GMLRS and four of the 30 mm bushmaster cannons with 7 LMM tubes that TD is fond off, in addition to their standard equipment of one medium calibre gun, CAMM and a helicopter?
I agree with the sentiments, but think 6 squadrons is too many. Personally I’d look at building a squadron of River class (totally 3 ships) and deploy them in the West Indies where they can do disaster relief and presence patrols to support UK sovereign interests.
Park an escort in the Falklands, and also put 3 escorts plus an RFA in Singapore (i.e. our permanent base rights). Use Singapore to re-engage with the far east, and do Defence diplomacy properly, while using the River class in the Windies and West Africa for the littoral presence. Stick something more cost effective than a frigate in the Bad al Mendeb straits to do interdiction, and also look to recomission something like HMS Juffair (Bahrain) in the middle east as a permanent UK facility for 3 escorts.
Do all maintenance locally except deep refits, but invest in a a decent stores facility – then you have essentially 2 task lines permanently deployed overseas, leaving another 12 escorts to do the FI, FRE, TAPs etc. Ditch Windies as a DDG requirement, and rely on the OPV squadron there, with a view to doing the same in West Africa.
Lose the addiction to big ships, and do a ‘marine nationale’ by having some small overseas squadrons, backed up by a CVBG and ARG as needed.