If all you read was the output of the Phoenix Think Tank and similar maritime monocled blogs , letters to the Telegraph or the public output of the Royal Navy itself, one could be forgiven for thinking that the the Royal navy had little future, was forever under siege from from scheming Air marshals and Generals and that a glorious future, as long as the right people realised it, would consist of simply more frigates, destroyers and especially carriers.
Because the Royal Navy has only been used in their high end war fighting role infrequently in the last 30 odd years, there has been a continuous chipping away at capabilities and hull numbers. Without a clear role, a defined ‘enemy’ and in the face of ever increasing personnel and equipment costs, is it any wonder the Royal Navy is in such a parlous state.
In the last few decades, with almost constant conflict on land, the role of maritime forces has diminished and with that has come an increasing struggle for funds.
The other services are not without their gaffs but for some reason the sight of a billion pound submarine stranded on a sand bank, a matelot crying about those nasty Iranians calling him Mr Bean, a number of unflattering TV documentaries, engine trouble, navigation errors (various) or aircraft carriers without aircraft strikes a particular chord.
It is acutely embarrassing and one must feel sorry for the personnel in the Royal Navy, they of course deserve so much better.
As if that wasn’t enough, the recent maritime major equipment projects are an unhappy tale of cost and time over runs; the Bay Class, Astute, Type 45, CVF and many others have all had significant problems of one sort or another. Not all these problems are the sole preserve of those in dark blue but that doesn’t make any difference whatsoever to the outside observer.
One symptom or perhaps cause of this decline, is a lack of innovation.
The other services are also similarly afflicted, overly concerned with equipment programmes, cap badge rivalry and fighting over the remaining yet diminishing crumbs of the defence budget. There are however, flickers of forward thinking in all three services; the multi role brigade structure, innovation in Afghanistan across a number of capability areas (including by it must be said, the Royal Marines) and the Integrated Electric Propulsion of the Type 45, but even with this, they all still remain very conservative and resistant to change.
The Royal Navy might seem like a conservative organisation but look back into its past and it is obvious that it is anything but; more often than not at the vanguard of all aspects of maritime activity, pushing the boundaries, trying new approaches and generally leading from the front. But, whilst the US Navy is experimenting with super cavitating 30mm cannon rounds, laser mine detection and distributed sonar arrays mounted on unmanned surface vessels, the Royal Navy proudly presents a new engine on its ageing mines countermeasures fleet. Given the RN’s capability in this area and it’s early adoption of REMUS remote vehicles perhaps I am being rather harsh, its is a deliberate cheap shot, but even so, the difference in ambition is clear. The recent hostage rescue at sea carried out by the US Navy showed the utility and general force multiplication effect of maritime UAV’s but what is the Royal Navy doing in this area, there aren’t even plans for a Watchkeeper ground control station on any ships. The Danish STANFLEX modular system or US LCS Mission Modules is yet another innovation that has passed the Royal Navy by.
It is difficult to reconcile the current lack of creativity with the past; it is definitely not an institutional or national problem, as history shows.
Why do we seem to be getting increasingly conservative?
There is a lack of military experience within the career political classes; active service or national service is a distant memory for all but a handful of MP’s. That is not to say military experience is a pre requisite for leadership of the MoD, far from it, but there is a distinct lack of confidence in the political and civilian leadership to challenge military advice. Many of the more forward thinking innovations in the British armed forces have originated from civilians. Military advice will always be risk averse, taking the least career limiting path, why would turkeys vote for Christmas?
Some might say it is simply a mismatch between aspiration and depth of pocket, but this is lazy thinking, many organisations when faced with resource constraint come up with inventive ways to achieve their goals.
I did wonder if the SDSR cuts were deep enough to force a change, there was no strategy and even the most sympathetic would concede that it was simply a horse traded collection of salami slices, the final nature of which was only decided at the last minute, like some sordid back street market.
Would a serious cut of 20 or 30% have forced a step change in thinking or just more letters to the editor?
It’s difficult to predict but one thing is certain, the current situation is the worst of both worlds.
But it’s all about the money I hear you say…
Yes and no
The Treasury is almost 100% characterised as the bad guy, an unfeeling Mr Bumble to the Admiralty’s Oliver Twist, but again, this is lazy thinking.
The Treasury has an important and increasing role in defence matters yet all the services seem to do is present them with grandiose projects that fail to deliver on cost/capability/time, requiring yet more funding, no wonder it sees the MoD as a basket case requiring close supervision, spending like a sailor on shore leave. The UOR requirements for Afghanistan and Iraq are the obvious result of the more more more resulting in less less less approach to defence projects, when push came to shove and those expensive equipments needed to deliver value, they were found wanting and in need of yet more cash.
I think the Treasury would actually welcome some innovation or different ways of thinking, the only real piece of innovation that has been delivered by the Royal Navy in the last few years was in fact foisted on it by the Treasury, one might argue that the Points/River class PFI was not the best way of delivering capability but there is no doubt it was innovative when the alternative was nothing.
The Royal Navy does not have a small budget yet in equipment terms, delivers very poor value for money. Instead of being forced to cut back because of an obvious and entirely predictable shortage of funds, surely it is time for all three services to recognise that constantly spending 100% of its budget and having to crisis manage events when budgets change or costs rise is not feasible any more.
We must move beyond the Falklands, moaning about cuts in frigate numbers and the ‘we are an island’ arguments if the Royal Navy is to reverse its slow and depressingly inevitable decline.
To thrive, the Royal Navy must define a realistic role for itself that uses the National Security Strategy as a guide but isn’t afraid to look beyond it. Above all though, the resultant equipment, manning and strategic approach must be rooted in financial realism and not be afraid of rediscovering some inventive zeal and creative thinking.
In the next in this series I am going to look at tasks, a new approach, capabilities and a road map (or should that be Admiralty Chart)
At this stage I would simply say, this is just a collection of ideas, one alternative in an ocean of options!
######## OTHER POSTS IN THIS SERIES ##########
The Future of the Royal Navy 01 – (Context)
The Future of the Royal Navy 02 – (Tasks and General Approach)
The Future of the Royal Navy 03 – (Single Task Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 04 – (Forward Presence Squadrons)
The Future of the Royal Navy 05 – (Equipment – T26)
The Future of the Royal Navy 06 – (Capability Plus)
The Future of the Royal Navy 07 – (Equipping the Forward Presence Squadron)
The Future of the Royal Navy 08 – (Equipping the Littoral Operations Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 09 – (Equipping the Disaster Support Group)
The Future of the Royal Navy 10 – (Mine Countermeasures and Survey)
Steady on TD, are you agreeing with Lewis Paige?
“why would turkeys vote for Christmas?”
Because they just love Cranberry sauce?
Anyhow thanks for another thought provoking post on the Royal Navy i can’t wait to read whats next.
I am not sure its really innovation the royal navy needs. More likley a return to basics. We will always need a few high end hulls like T 45 and maybe T 26. The ability to field if only in an emergency a carrier task force. This we will have even after SDSR (once we get a carrier back). However we can only really justify 8 to 10 high end vessels for this. Even after SDSR the RN will have 19 high end hulls. We desperately need a small long range vessel with light armament built in great numbers i.e 30 plus for £100 million a piece. VT and BAE already build vessels like this for Foreign navies such as Oman and Brunei. Why not the RN. Having a T23 frigate chasing drug smugglers is already over kill. Now with no carriers to escorts and not enough T23′s we will likley be putting £1 billion T 45′s into this role. This is exactly the same mistake the US navy makes. The more money given to a service the greater the waste. In the past when we did have very dangerous high end threats we had large numbers of small cheap ships call them sloops, frigates or corvettes. Now with no high end threat suddenly every ships has to be a battle ship. Many of the RN’s decisions as well as the Army and RAF is far more about comparing trousers with the US than actuall facing our potential advisories.
It’s not rocket science
I’m afraid I cant disagree in strong enough terms.
The T45′s are effectivly 100% over budget, but at least 35% of that is simply because the project was cut off early.
The T45 program was £6bn for 12 hulls, or £500mn per hull.
Current unit cost is £650mn, so 6 more hulls would cost £3.9bn
Giving an average hull cost of £825mn, so 65% over budget.
Not Brilliant I admit, however, lets go further.
The Actual per Hull cost was supposed to be £500mn, and its now £650mn, which is 30% over budget, but considering this thing started its design in 1985, thats not exactly shocking, my house has gone up more than that since 2007!
The same of course, goes for innovation.
IT NEEDS MONEY.
You cant become world leaders in UAVs by trickling in £10mn a year for 10 years.
DARPA spends $3.2bn a year and employs about 140 people.
DSTL spends $500mn a year and employs over 3000 people.
Innovation is risk taking.
To Innovate, you need to know that you arent going to be unduely punished if it all goes to pot and you’ve wasted a billion pounds.
If the RN turned up at the Treasurey and said “we want £1bn a year for 5 years to design a nuclear Through Deck Cruiser with an Electronic Catapult and Self Piloting Air Superiority Fighters, Deep Range Interceptors and Penetrating Bombers” they’d be laughed at, and when the Treasurey realised they werent joking, the door would be slammed, and a frigate would be cut for the cheek.
As an aside, innovation almost always comes at least partialy from without.
What would Jacky Fisher really have managed without support from the monarchy, the papers and a small faction in the commons? He’d have been given a command somewhere irrelevent and ignored.
Would a modern day Fisher even be allowed to scrap half the fleet and start again?
Dom, project costings always include risk fractions, be that inflationary or currency but the fact is, Type 45 is hugely expensive for what it delivers. Now I know that is not entirely the RN’s fault but it sets the priorities and in clinging on to CVF for dear life, these are the consequences.
i don’t think innovation is totally dependant on cash because that assumes the only innovation is the technical kind. There is innovation in finance, manning, strategy, deployments and lots of other things that simply need imagination and the drive to push them through. I might also add, some of the greatest leaps forward in aeronautical design were made in the late 40′s in Germany, they were hugely resource constrained. I agree about external sources for innovation, some of the greatest have come about despite the professionals
Ixion, on the Lewis Page thing. I read his book ages ago and although the sentiment is right, its is child like in some of the assumptions. As for the personality, I won’t comment. However, he does occasionally ask the right questions but I have yet to see him come up with the right answer.
Hi Admin,
Good point ” that assumes the only innovation is the technical kind. There is innovation in finance, manning, strategy, deployments and lots of other things … ”
Sorry that I can’t quote an example with ships but US Army tactical studies after WW2 suggested “effects” ratio 1 Tiger: 5 Shermans: 10 T-34s.
- Clearly, Sherman was by far inferior in this trio. But the evaluation was for the whole context, including air support, tactics, level of training etc
- We don’t see any such studies for the recent past, presumably because after the Arab-Israel conflicts the engagements have been too one-sided (cfr. air power in Gulf War1)
TD
Is the T45 expensive?
As a project, yes, as a ship? Is £650mn a lot for a Type 45? For the purely AAW version, I’d say yes, but the cost to turn these things into “Cruisers” capable of engange submarines, surface ship and aircraft cant be that great.
Should someone have cancelled the T45 project before £2.75bn was spent to get to the point where we can can start building the first ship? Well, yeah, probably.
But can the Navy do that?
If the Navy did, would the end result be just no destroyers?
If I were in charge of procurement, I’d split it into four stages, research, design, prototype construction and ongoing construction.
Each one, easily cancellable, and controllable, without imperilling the entire project. The Treasurey is actualy trying to add a fifth stage to its already uncontrollable mess, ongoing costs.
The RN, to a point, sets priorities, but so does the Government, did the RN want a common NATO Frigate? Or a Common EU Frigate? Does the RN care about UK shipyards? Or were those decisions forced on it by the Government?
True, the RN is clinging onto CVF, but to be fair, thats on government instruction. The government says it wants independant power projection, even I, FanBoi in Chief of the Arsenal Ship, think you need some sort of fixed wing air.
The Government provides the Strategic Vision, it needs to match the funding. If it wont provide the funding, it needs to alter the strategic vision and cancel programs.
Thats a political imperitive, not a military one.
Congress is all to happy to ditch parts of its strategic vision when the costs become apparent, 76 army projects were cancelled in one 5 year period (more bang for the buck).
Officers who lie about the costs of programs find their carears ruined by the Armed Forces Committee, and rightly so.
Fair point that innovation isnt just technical, but much of it is outside the scope of the Navy.
Its simply not for the Navy to dictate to the Goverment whether or not we have a Caribean Guard Ship, they can advise, but the government decides. I think you would agree that my Strategy for the UKs commitment to NATO is innovative (Seizing Russias Northern Coastline and Sub Pens via amphib assault), but its beyond the Navy to demand.
The German state was resource constrained in the late 40′s, but were the armaments research teams? I may be wrong, but I find it highly unlikely that they were being cut to maintain cosmetics research.
The UK currently spends 0.03% of GDP on defence research, I bet Nazi Germany spent more.
The Retired Gentleman playing around in his country house did some phenominal things for science (and warfare), and its a model DARPA nicked (to a point) whereas we do exactly the opposite today.
The armed forces really should have seized the initiative and put out their own strategy papers, but its difficult when the government clearly has no idea what it wants.
i must admit i agree with martin you dont need a sledgehammer to crack a walnut why not use OPV’S ie for the west indies patrol ship their not crew intensive 50+ , ok they cant put to sea for much more than a month but when their on station ,like the falklands it seems to work ok there’s plenty out there RIVER CLASS ideally based on HMS CLYDE , HOLLAND CLASS , and probably the 3 built for trinidad if they go ahead with the cancellation .ok they might not be T45 but they can fly the flag look at HMS ECHO away now until 2011 using crew rotation , the crew would be reduced without the survey equipment , up gun it if you want but there has to be role for these vessels, i dont know the cost but why not go for another deal like they did with the RIVER CLASS .
ANOTHER THOUGHT , TAKE THE POLICE 95% OF THEIR WORK IS DONE BY DIESEL ASTRAS OR A TRANSIT YOU DONT NEED TO ANSWER EVERYDAY CALLS WITH A BMW ARV , SAME CAN APPLY TO THE NAVY KEEP THE 45′S FOR THE BIG STUFF , SEND OUT THE OPV’S FOR EVERYDAY STUFF
First time poster here, hopefully what I have posted is not a load of tripe.
While the RN seems resistant to the idea (they even called them Snatch Frigates), as a over opinionated civilian/arm chair admiral, I really think that the RN does need to bring back patrol frigates – 4000 tonnes, mounting a medium calibre gun, couple of 20 or 30 mm remote controlled cannon, Sea Wolf Mk II or CAMM and utility space for mission modules, and a hangar/flight deck they could be used for the less glamorous role.
If they really need offensive missiles and cannot afford Harpoon then I see no reason why we could not mount a couple of batteries of Sea Skua II, sure there short ranged, but the most likely threat is going to be Taliban suicide speed boat or an Iranian missile boat whose sensors and missiles are going to have trouble with even current soft kill systems, let alone the next generation systems being developed.
I suspect the problem is that RN fears it is either T26 or a patrol frigate, and they need the T26′s if the excrement does hit the fan.
Absolutely agree – we need a high end capability based around the new carriers / amphibious vessels escorted by a relatively small (in number) high end spec warships. The rest should really be about a large number of adaptable cheaper ships (with a reasonable standard of self defence); it seems obvious to everyone apart from the RN.
I’m as mad a hell about the loss of certain capabilities following the SDSR, but the RN needs to take some of the blame and make changes. The problem (as I see it) is not a lack of innovation it’s that the RN believes that to be relevant in the modern world everything has to be gold plated and at least to US standard. They have to realise that it’s not being relevant to the US that counts, it’s being relevant (and accessible) to the UK public that counts the most.
Could some of the everyday tasks you refer to be done by the reserve?
A lot of good points but in order for it to work the Politicians would need educated. they love to harp on about hull numbers rather than understanding capability. Many correctly fear that if the RN agreed to reduce the high end force to 6 upgraded T45(mk 41 silo with TLAM, 155MM gun CIWS and harpoon) and 6 T23 replacements (all with 2087, SWMLU or replacement, harppon, gun and possible TLAM) in order to get 15+ OPV type vessels what would actually happen is we would get 7 OPV vessels and still have 19 hulls.
Apologies for typo in name above.
Ah it deleted my post as I mispelt my name in original one and did not match my email address.
There is a reasonable worry that if the RN agrees to reduce to 12 warfighting escorts. 6 T45 upgraded with Mk41 VLS for TLAM 155mm gun, CIWS and harpoon and 6 T26 (2087, PDMS, Gun, 2 Helos, Harpoon) in return for getting 15 OPV type vessels they will end up with only 7 OPV veseels and the same number of hulls as Politicians only understand numbers and not capabilities.
@TD:
The RN simply *are* conservative about things they don’t consider core. Like Fixed wing Air in the 1940/50′s. They took from 1946 to 1957 to develop a swept-wing fleet interceptor, bought the model slated for the RAF (DH-110) and adopted it as the Sea Vixen in the same year that the F4 Phantom II first flew! Now, the Sea Vixen was a great airplane, but it was the lack of drive from the RN that made it arrive about 5 years too late!
One of the areas of innovation has to be with milestones and phases of *all* MoD contracts. There is too much “feature creep” and tinkering with requirements right up until the time comes to cut steel on a project. The projects that seems to go best are the ones where there is a clear stop point for re-specc’ing. Any further changes after that point have to go for the Mk2 variant! Unfortunately I see this all the time outside of the MoD, especially in IT, where managers think that because it’s “software” (and somehow is produced instantly) they can demand new features right up to the Alpha release.
And on an unrelated note, if the RN actually equipped their sghips with the planned equipment, or reused non-obsolescent equipment in nrew hulls, then they’d be a far more flexible and potent force!
TD – as you would expect, I disagree with every word
Of course money is not the total problem, but lack of clear strategic direction is also to blame. What does the Govt. via MOD want the Navy to be ?
A carrier strike force with just enough ASW / AAW roled surface units to screen them ?
An Amphibious task group, with same as above ?
Both of the above together ?
The worlds best anti-piracy force sailing around in 30 plus under armed OPV’s (i.e. the US Coast Guard) ?????
As ACC pointed out one can innovate in non-technical areas, and the RN has changed the way it man’s ships to try to eek ever more sea time out of them etc.
Using US Navy airborne MCM as an example is not a good idea. MCM was always a poor man’s job in the USN, much better to spend money on the massive cruisers and destroyers – real mans work don’t you know ! Then after Iran-Iraq and two gulf wars they realized the US marines are not getting ashore through minefields. They always had minesweeping versions of CH53 and this is a natural development of airborne MCM for them. Why should we copy it ? If we want it, why would we not buy it off the shelf once they have finished development and hang it on some Merlin’s ?
Also you say it’s not lack of money – of course it is to some extent. We can’t afford to upgrade the whole Merlin or Lynx fleets to the latest version, but somewhere in there we are going to find the money for MQ8′s ? What for ?
Also Ming your analogy is not a good one, because the RN are not supposed to be maritime police. Navy’s are for war fighting. If you want maritime law enforcement setup an appropriate structure, with an appropriate legislative / legal framework. See my previous post on using RFA model to extend the auxiliary flotilla to cover these roles.
Without a clear strategic direction, backed up by appropriate funding the RN continues to stumble around, without a clear vision of its purpose. If you don’t know what your supposed to be doing, how are you supposed to innovate ?
Finally of course, non of us know what specific innovations in MCM or ASW or sub ops are taking place, because if it was really innovative, it would likely be highly classified
Hi Jed,
You probably did not mean it like this, but this exactly what we have/ will have (and no more, as the rest goes into roundation errors):
“A carrier strike force with just enough ASW / AAW roled surface units to screen them ?
An Amphibious task – a small one! – group, with same as above ?”
Add the MCM & subs (not that the latter wouldn’t be both potent and multi-purpose).
Carriers ( by when and with what capability?) well discussed; the survivability of what is there in the intervening time, when (and if) having to operate in a littoral environment, has not been discussed much…
TD
The RN like the other services are a bit like BL in the 70′s, trying to do a bit of everything, failing due to a lack of development and living off past glories.
The RN has to take the lead.
It is part of the DNA of the UK.
Of the three services it is the only one that has been world class in the past for any length of time.
However today it is a shrivelled husk of its previous incarnations, 30K personnel and it will have the human capital of a mid market supermarket.
Consequently it needs a total re-jig.
More ships and less admirals.
It has to become relevant.
Find work to do.
It has to go back to basics.
For too many a RN career is lifestyle choice / access to cheap private education. Not as bad as the RAF but the drive for operational effectiveness has gone.
The RN needs to work out what it can do for a £1 and ask the government / society if that is good value and do we want to pay for it. Repeat until they say yes.
Cut the crap about automation
Cut the crap about pension costs, if it doesn’t pay in three years then chuck it.
Cut the crap about contractors reverse engineering their costs – their cost = your saving – £1.
The CVF cost shambles is every mistake rolled up into one programme.
What is a CVF supposed to do?
5 acres of flightdeck
1.5 acres of hangar space
Contraption to get the aircraft into the air.
Contraption to get the aircraft back down
Do 30 knots
5 container loads of electronics
30K tons of steel – Hull to suit.
100MW of power.
Room for 2000 people to live for 30 days.
10K tons of stores / fuel / odds and ends.
A bit of self defence.
In a world of 150K ton containerships for £100mill that is not worth anywhere near £3bill.
The people building the ships won’t see that money it will be used to featherbed the contractors and their service allies with a little bit for the shareholders.
The first thing to do is admit things are bad and accept revolutionary change is needed.
People don’t care about the navy anymore, that is wy things have gotten so bad.
The RN needs to become relevant to the general public.
Jed
The RN hasn’t fought a proper war in 65 years.
If we continue to gold plate everything we will be down to 10 hulls in 2040.
You can tart up a £50mill frigate / colonial sloop to do a lot of damage if required pretty quickly.
You cannot put a T45 in two places in the one time, period.
More of the same will always equal less of a navy.
The past 20 years have not been good for the RN it can’t go on like this anymore and remain credible.
FBOT
You post this sort of post on every thread and I agree that CVF cost an awful lot of money. My question to you is why can nobody build a cheap aircraft Carrier. The US is looking at £17BN pounds for 3 Gerald Fords, India is over £2 Billion on her project, Russsian figures are difficult to get but they are high, even the Chinese are over £3BN and they have very little in the way of Labour costs. Could it be that actually things like ensuring you can have an airtight citadel, automated weapon handling systems, a deck structure designed to accept the abuses of aircraft take off and landings, weapon systems, comms, radars and sensors etc are actually quite expensive and whilst I have sympathy with both your frustartions and your implied solution but nobody in the world seems able to do it. It may all be a bit more complicated than you realise.
Carrying on from 3:13 post: ” India is over £2 Billion on her project, Russsian figures are difficult to get but they are high, even the Chinese are over £3BN and they have very little in the way of Labour costs.”
- India: which one; the one being refitted in the Black Sea (I don’t think you have added up all the cumulative overruns) or the one being built in southern India? Re: the latter, the keel was cut so long ago that it is already starting to rust (delays with steel as well, but that was a minor factor) before the carrier even being launched
– as a side story, these two taking their time, it seems that the good old Hermes will have the same retirement age as us (65 years, but that is in service!)
- Russia: We won’t see the carrier back on active duty for a while, so maybe the counting of costs should be per hour of operational service (Cfr. the nuclear powered and at times propeller-less French carrier)
- China: They bought theirs from Ukraine (who never wanted a carrier) on the condition that it would not be refitted for active service. The way things are going in the Dalian shipyard may well conform with that condition. Regardless:
–navy pilots are practising take-off and landing on a land-base replica,and
– navy officers are learning carrier operations on the Brazilian carrier
Who said it would be easy? Someone (probably on this site, did say that relearning carrier operations after X years will not be easy, either)
– on this last note, there is a group of 12 navy aviators in a US carrier landing/take-off programme. Nothing new, there have always been individuals, but those have been using the slack that is available, whereas this time there is a confirmed quota/ slots (can’t remember the term for sure) for this group
DJ @ 9.41
Your T45 numbers are a bit ropey in my opinion.
You seem to have missed out the development cost if you assign a marginal cost of £500mill to each ship.
Currenty, last cost I could find had the T45 programme up at £6.6bill all in for 6 ships.
You say the original budget was £6bill for 12.
Looks like a big bit of reverse engineering going on.
Not build what we need, but what we have cash for no matter the contractors contractual obligations or its record of value for money achievements.
Consequently the T45 project looks like the Nimrod MR4A programme.
Same contractor, same client, same result.
If you take the programme to have 2 phases:
1) Design / deveoplement
2) Production
The design / development phase was in part a joint venture with two other partners so some savings to be had their.
If the money was to be spit £1.2bill D+D / £4.8bill production or £400mill per ship.
The current outcome seems to be £650mill per ship for a limited somewhat thrifted design is not the result I would have expected the RN / MOD to accept.
65% cost increase at least for a lesser vessel.
No wonder the Treasury is jumping up and down.
Consequently why is BAE not in the firing line for this?
If their is continual RN / MOD interference, why is this allowed and who benefits? Looks like a feedback loop to me.
Finally you mention the possibility of making the T45 GP vessels at low cost. Do you really think this would happen when the great black hole of “Systems Integration” awaits anyone who tries?
T45:
3K tons of steel – 500′ hull
50MW of power.
4 container loads of electronics.
Full suite of intelligent freworks.
1 VLS Silo
1 big gun
Consequently no big deal.
£650mill – you really are having a laugh.
The RN / MOD will only have changed when suff comes in on time and under budget.
Finally before the UK builder card gets played, please look at the numbers:
5K people / UK blue collar max workforce = £200mill pa.
They are not to blame, this is not the reason for the horrific cost and value for money of the T45 programme.
All PATS @ 3.13
The answer to your question is the “Majestics”.
And not the 60′s Scottish R+R combo who starred in the programme “Tutti Frutti”.
The 1942 light carrier programme.
Merchant navy design / scantlings with a well styled RN top hat added onto a commercial hull.
That is your answer.
The JCI is another part of the answer.
The fact that the carrieris treated as the fleet flagship is another part of the answer.
The one thing that CV construction tells me is that no matter the revolutionary fevour in any country sooner or later the military industrial complex takes over and well funded jobs for the boys becomes the name of the game.
Do a zero based estimate both on the costs and the capabilities of a CVF and the issue becomes simple. Pad it out with pen pushers, project managers, platform managers, account managers and other such bloodsucker types and the meetings multiply and the costs escalate.
Break the ship down into its basic systems and it all becomes clear. You talk about a deck, agle iron engineering. Dial in the static and dynamic loads, the catapults and the arrestor wires, the pick-up points from the base hull and away you go.
It is not difficult.
As for the Chinese I fear they are trying to do too much at once. All I know that there are people in the Chinese Treasury sticking pins into an effigy of Chester Nimitz and his PLAN groupies.
Add in the Soviet experience where CV’s / CN’s were being used by the Navy to re-dress the balance of power not with the USN but with the Red Army.
What happened with stealth and is it (an) important (innovation)?
VT was there (2001) at the same time when the Swedes launched their first stealthy ship (the whole Visby class is now in service)?
Sure, T45 looks stealthy as for the shape, but is it? And what is the relative gain
All PATS @ 3.13 II
The issue for me is that the problems of the RN all come back to the same basic issues:
Lack of Direction.
Lack of Innovation.
Lack of Imagination
Lack of Urgency.
Example:
Mild steel CVF prototype.
Next question is what will fly from it?
Aircraft = Buy a job lot of first gen F/A 18 as they are the best available off the shelf.
If that idea was put forward this blog would beinundated with all the reasons why it couldn’t be done!
Money wasted on short term assets.
Lack of suitable spanners.
No experience of the engine.
Need to “update” various systems.
Inability to shoot the last “Black Death” Super Deep Strike missile going into RAF service in 2019.
No second man capability in the FAA.
Manuals only written in US / Aus english.
NOx emmisions from 70′s tech engines.
And so the list would go on.
We have a military full of pen pushers who can tell you i 10 different languages why something can’t be done and very few who can tell you how to fix the issues cheaply and on time.
Finally my thoughts on the explosion of ideas from Germany in 46-51.
Lots of talented people working at the cutting edge because it was life and death and the current thining had failed.
Cue lots of thinking and doing and doing it quickly.
Transfer those ideas and that thirst for solutions into the post war world and they were sure to bloom.
Compare and contrast with the UK and the US where a winners mentality existed and things were not required to move just a quickly.
FBOT said “The RN hasn’t fought a proper war in 65 years.”
Two of my ex-cadet’s fathers were in the Type 22s that went south in ’82. They spent most of their time down there waiting for an Exocet to come through the side of the ship. I don’t think they would say they weren’t in a proper war. I won’t mention Suez or Aden or Indonesia. Or the submariners who chased their Soviet counterparts around the Arctic. Or indeed the submariners who man the Deterrent patrol.
If the RN’s post war record is poor what does that say for the RAF?
The RN’s main problem was the strategic shift thanks to our involvement in WW2. The British went from a country on the periphery of Europe to a major player the Army and the RAF became more important (whether it is true or not.) The RN’s ships pre-WW2 were crap (short legged, no powered turrets, inadequate AAA, poor engineering practices, open bridges, poor aircraft [wonder why?] ) In fact post-WW2 on the whole you could say slightly the balance in is tipped in favour of good ships (Leander, Castle, Island, Batch 2+3 T22, T81, T21 (yes!) frigate/destroyer conversions, Darings, Intrepid/Fearless, County (Sea Slug crap) etc. River (except no flight deck, Sandown, Hunts) over bad ships (T42, Batch 1 T22, Invincible) and indifferent (Ocean, Albion/Bulwark….) I would have preferred for the UK to have gone with the Dutch and Germans for Daring. And I think CVF was too ambitious.
Don’t feel like tossing this salad again today.
FBOT said: “The RN hasn’t fought a proper war in 65 years.
If we continue to gold plate everything we will be down to 10 hulls in 2040″
Well actually some would say the RN is the ONLY navy which has fought a proper war in the last 65 years ! Mostly they would be Falklands vets…..
Type 45 is not that gold plated, nor is it relatively expensive compared to a flight IIA Arliegh Burke – and of course if the Govt. had not dicked around with the order the unit price would be considerably lower, development costs having been amortized over a bigger buy. Of course I also accept that we could have had 12 x De Seven Provincien with euro-electronics and Yankee missiles and it would have done 85% of the job, cheaper.
Neither do we need to make the RN “relevant to the general public” – its not, it never can be “relevant” to 80% of the general public, who have never been out on a boat, never mind out to sea. The RN must be “relevant” to the MOD and the government in meeting strategic objectives set out for the UK armed forces. If that means engaging in high end maritime war fighting against near peer competitors, or whether than means being transformed into a MSO / Coast Guard force is purely at the discretion of our elected political masters. It has nothing to do with the RN itself per se.
Personally I would like to see the Admiralty “man up” as they say on this side of the pond, and kick some rocks over, cause some trouble etc but never gonna happen when your worried about your pension……
TD, I’m afraid I am with Jed and Dom here and disagree most strongly with the perception that the RN is resistant to or incapable of change.
The RN has evolved constantly through time to adapt to its ever shrinking budget. We have revamped our manpower twice, introducing significant pain (TOPMAST, need I say more to those in the know) to reduce our manning requirements and increase the flexibility of our personnel.
We have employed RFA’s in the counter-drug role. We have used BULWARK, an amphibious command platform, to conduct oil platform defence and territorial water security in the Northern Arabian Gulf. We have re-roled our aircraft carriers to and from the amphibious command role depending on availability – which takes a little more than shipping on a few green uniforms. You have failed to give the RN due credit for leading the world in mine countermeasures, and criticising the re-engine programme for the Hunt MCMV is a bit shallow – the hulls are plastic and can be used for decades yet, but they are far more seaworthy than the single-role Sandowns, have a larger working deck, have greater range and carry a heavier armament. The Type 23 was a cheap sonar tug conceived for the Cold War – it is still one of the most modern and relevant warships in service today and represents fantastic value for money. We introduced one of the most effective and capable digital navigation systems in the world and yet still meet the demanding standards of the international maritime community – ask a US Navy officer if he holds any civilian accreditation and he’ll laugh at you (I’ve done it). And we are still the only navy to champion Integrated Electric Propulsion for our ships. Don’t tell me the RN is not innovative.
The fact is we have an appalling public profile because our work is done out of sight, out of mind. We have an ignorant political class who have no concept of the RN’s role in worldwide affairs. Those who criticise our ability to intervene in hostage situations would do well to ask the Government why we did not and do not act – it is their call, not ours, and it would seem we prefer the (apparently) extraordinary approach of valuing life over a headline. We have a limited budget outside of our capital equipment programmes, which are overdue for many reasons not least the MOD’s complete inability to write a watertight contract or avoid interfering with an ongoing contract, and that limited budget has seen cutbacks in all the unglamorous areas that armchair commenters have no visibility of nor, I suspect, care about – travelling expenses, stationery, uniform allowances, meals, things that matter to the individual and allow us to do our job effectively. We are trapped in a vicious circle of ships working every harder, sailors working ever harder, growing disillusioned, leaving, creating manpower shortages, sailors working ever harder, and so on. Perhaps you might consider factoring in the people into your fantasy navy games of ‘off the shelf’ fleets and sky-darkening, ground trembling squadrons.
The comments of a select few former officers on the state of the RN are neither accurate nor welcome. But neither is the bizarre concept that the Royal Navy needs to dispose of its experience and warfighting capabilities to become a global policeman. Do you see the USN sending a couple of patrol boats to the area around South Korea? Imagine the international response when NATO decides to act and we send in a couple of converted container ships and an OPV. At least the French have the balls to keep their Armed Services at high readiness; modern, relevant and capable.
BTW, Tubby your comment “bring back patrol frigates – 4000 tonnes, mounting a medium calibre gun, couple of 20 or 30 mm remote controlled cannon, Sea Wolf Mk II or CAMM and utility space for mission modules, and a hangar/flight deck” – that’s exactly what a Type 23 frigate is. Nobody seems willing to accept that the Type 23′s were the best bang-for-buck ships we have ever bought – they were only ever designed for a 20 year lifespan and yet we will see them soldiering on into their 30′s.
All this shouting over the type 45 and carriers… I just wanna say lol to the pic the admin decided to use…it perfectly suits all 3 services.
I thought the saying was, when the SDAR came to public viewing, was that the RN emerged ‘better off’ thanks to it getting its carriers and no cuts to the Astutes (despite the affiction for bumping into rocks, are immense pieces of kit), but this blog has really turned that around; is the RN really in such a danger of becoming more of a paper tiger?
Somewhere people were mentioning the Russian carrier, indeed it has a reputation for being quite unlucky, but you MUST NOT immeidatly compare it to the other carriers out there… its an ‘heavy aircraft carrying cruiser’ – intended to defend submarines, surface ships, and aircraft carrying Missiles… with its Su-33′s that were completely wired for the interceptor/AD mission. That is now being turned around, with the Su-33′s going in for a very long overdue update that will give it improved A2G/AS weaponry…in the longer term the russian navy has also ordered the MiG29K, a much shorter legged but more multirole platform they can afford now thanks to the Indian Navy paying for most of the R&D costs.
But the the carrier itself was not designed and intended for use like the US Navy’s or even our carriers. So I would be careful pointing out comparisons with theirs… in the future there will be strike capability – and it does create a protective umbrella for offensive operations – but its not yet to be compared with french, british, american or even brasilian aircraft carriers (thats a point! Whats the status of brasils flatop?)
FYI, He (as the russians call machinery by the male term) has just completed carrier qualificiation training with new pilots and the russians plan for him to go through a major mid life update/upgrade in 2012, where the multi-rle MiG-29K may come in…
…then again lol just like us, the russians are prone to insusfficient funds and bondoogling it all!
Anyway, my participation to this… lol I am no navy minded, so I expect holes in what I said… but I am pretty sure its not so good to compare the russian boat to others… since it has a different mission compared to ours/planned boats for the time being…
and just a cool video, goes to show the power in those engines;
X
The Falklands was a campaign not a war.
Malta convoys June – Sept 42 as a reference.
It was nasty, brutish, deadly …
Going in position regarding, WW2, I think you do a bit of a dis-service to what we had, it was on the whole lmited but it was not crap. I would go as far as to suggets that the pre-war is an inversion of the post war.
Good big vessels produced in quantity while the situation at destroyers and below was a lot less satisfactory. Consequently the exact opposite of the post war situation.
As for the post war, the Good, The Bad, The Ugly the bit you miss out is how the overhang of wartime construction hampered the navy to fully develop a post war fleet. The carriers was a case of delay, delay, chop followed by a re-build trying desperately to produce a tomorrow based on better yesterdays.
I think you know the game is up when you mention the River class OPV’s as a highlight of post war builds. Consequently very poor mix haunted by a lack of urgency and a lack of imagination.
One thing on the Invincibles, better ships than to me than you was that an extra 10% length would have made them as carriers. The issue for me is that we parked the concept for 30 years before trying to take it forward.
Finally the GT focus was wrong.
when i read all the comments on this site with so many different views and ideas i can see why the mod takes 10 years to make a decision , it must be a bloody nightmare
SR @ 6.47
Very interesting comments but to me it was a cry for help rather than a reasoned analysis of where we are and where we need to go.
As always the use of straw man arguments suggests that you are not as certain of your position as you make out. Your Korean example does not stand up to historical scrutiny, we sent “commercials” out east for the wole duration of the Korean war. They seemed to do OK, better aircraft would have helped but what’s new about that.
RE: JED
Before I go into a long rambling post just to mention again I am an armchair admiral so I will not be offended if you poke holes in my theories.
I think the problem is that the task outlined in SDSR for the RN includes both high end warfare and low end presence duties. I would argue that there is no intention of turning the RN into a coast guard, but I would also argue if it is armed then it should be owned by the RN. The issue is how to best use the resources to meet both high end warfare and low end presence duties. While I appreciate that a patrol frigate is going to be pretty p*ss poor in high end warfare situation, not least due to being to small to survive a hit by a modern ASuM, I would also argue paying £300 – £400 million for a 6,000 tonne ASW frigate and then deploying it for most of its service life chasing drug smugglers in the Caribbean when a £100 million OPV or a £200 million patrol frigate seems a waste of money.
Assuming that my understanding is correct then based on the text on page 21 of the SDSR it looks like to me that the key tasks are:
1) CASD
2) Defence of the UK (which is mostly going to be protection of the EEZ, and maritime ISTAR)
3) Defence of the South Atlantic Territories (which is going to be ditto as above, plus the ability to surge war fighting capabilities against potential threats equipped with SSK’s, frigates, and possibly even an aircraft carrier)
4) The ability to keep ships on station around the world, most of which are going to be about providing a visible presence rather than war fighting.
5) The ability to contain potential rouge states (can we say Iran), which IMO is about maritime ISTAR and littoral combat, including littoral ASW.
6) The ability to deliver major force from either our surface fleet or SSN’s
7) Amphibious assault with our replacement for Ocean and by landing dock platforms and the Bay’s
8) A large enough RFA that we can do our do our presence work and surge for a short period either containment mission or delivery of major force.
The question is how many high end T26’s do we need to cover either the CVF’s or amphibious assault ships if we decide to deliver major force, or if we are tasked to assist in containing the Iranian Navy if the event the use their missile boats and mini-subs to close the Gulf or Oman, and how close this number is to the number of new frigates the RN will get. If lets say a reasonable figure is eight T26’s can we then the next question would be can we agree a suitable platform for presence duties that costs significantly less than T26? If so can we make the patrol frigate cheap enough that it would allow us to deploy 10 – 12 patrol frigates or would it make more sense to use any spare funds to purchase another five T26’s?
Looking at the task list the key duties that a patrol frigate might cover are presence duties and ISTAR roles. This suggests the key attributes might be the capacity to carry helicopters and UAV (preferably 2 of each), with enough defence’s to give it reasonable chance in a small scale conflict with a ship of similar size or smaller to survive, and have a reasonable chance of deterring air or submarine threats such as a MPA or an older noisy SSK (so maybe a combination of medium gun, a radar good enough to allow the medium gun to engage air targets, decent number of remote operated 20 / 30 mm guns, a better sonar than T45’s sonar, possibly light torpedoes or ASROC , and CAMM but leave out the Phalanx CIWS or Harpoon).
RE: Somewhat Removed
The T23 are great, but did they not start off as a cheap ASW platform and become more multi-role after the Falklands? To be honest I am imaging something like a modern Leander class (rather than bringing back the Amazon class).
With regard to the French, they seem to operate a two tier escort force, I thought the La Fayette’s were a replacement for the Floreal surveillance frigates, which looks like a patrol frigate to my uneducated eyes.
I forgot the Tons. Super, super, little ships. Deltics, steering by electrical-switch-thingy, etc. Super.
And the T23s are on my decent list too.
@ FBOT
War is war!!!
I did mention the main “failing” of the River, the lack of a flight deck. But they are lovely little ships. Fast enough. Good hull form (even has a bulbous bow.) Good accommodation. Well appointed bridge. I would have like to seen a monitor system and perhaps more thought given to pollution control. But no they are super. If you haven’t been aboard a River yet I urge you to get to Navy Days next year down in Guzz and have a visit. Well worth it. Super little ship. Heck even the welding is straight……
Hi Mike,
Quite a long mid-life facelift (crisis?) indeed:
“the russians plan for him to go through a major mid life update/upgrade in 2012, where the multi-rle MiG-29K may come in…”… a bit later
That is their only carrier. They can be without; we can …?
Multirole, yes, they (the planned aircraft) are. STOBAR, who operates? They do, and perhaps India in the future. No one else; why?
The video: Did you notice the trainer coming in, in-between the Sukhoi 33′s? How powerful is that? Flying without weapons (and fuel)?
FBOT said “wartime construction hampered the navy to fully develop a post war fleet.”
I think the war build carriers, Vanguard, and classes such as the Tigers (even though they were much delayed and buggered about) are a product more of the pre-war design thought processes. Perhaps I was a bit cheeky mentioning the destroyer/frigate conversions then? But the full conversions were imaginative and adequately armed for their role. You have to remember post WW2 British ship yards had full order books and those dollars were much needed. And also perhaps you should consider how confused post-Hiroshima “defence thinking” was. And how much a shock the later marks of U-boat were to Western navies after they had had chance to test them. So………
I have a love / hate thing for the Invincible class. I think the Giuseppe Garibaldi is better ship; “we” would have been better off in the Eastern Atlantic with a class of 6/4 GGs over 3 IC. Perhaps there is something to be said about conditions in the Med verses Atlantic? As for them being 10per cent bigger well if the Invincibles had been more like the Cavour (or one more directed towards air only and not dual use) yes then “we” would have been better off. At the water line (when I have been past them in a whaler etc.) Invincibles do seem short……..
Hey Arm Chair Civve ^^
I was pointing out how the carrier is pretty much air defence only, ours will be multi-role so using it as a comparison isn’t much of an argument, plus the age of the boat. They can most certainly cope without though, and its obvious thats their mindset in the lack of serious investment into it – and indeed most of their navy. With us its a whole different story. Just that I believe ours (and out allies) shouldn’t be comapred to theirs due to the different mission of the type.
The trainers used on the carrier, a varient of the Su-25, cannot use weapons, they’d be too heavy…so are only purely relegated to training.
The Indians have bought the 29K and soon will have IOC, but their future carrier which will use it is also a bit slow in coming… it seems everyone’s carrier drags its heels and money XD
ArmChairCivy said “Multirole, yes, they (the planned aircraft) are. STOBAR, who operates? They do, and perhaps India in the future. No one else; why?”
I have a book (well more a journal) on maritime air power published by Hull Uni. According to one paper that discusses carrier types says (apparently STOBAR) is an inefficient use of deck space. I shall go around to the other side of my office and dig it out……….
Hi Tubby,
Good man! Talking about the mission, rather than mission control:
“page 21 of the SDSR it looks like to me that the key tasks are:
1) CASD
2) Defence of the UK (which is mostly going to be protection of the EEZ, and maritime ISTAR)
3) Defence of the South Atlantic Territories (which is going to be ditto as above, plus the ability to surge war fighting capabilities against potential threats equipped with SSK’s, frigates, and possibly even an aircraft carrier)
4) The ability to keep ships on station around the world, most of which are going to be about providing a visible presence rather than war fighting.
5) The ability to contain potential rouge states (can we say Iran), which IMO is about maritime ISTAR and littoral combat, including littoral ASW.
6) The ability to deliver major force from either our surface fleet or SSN’s
7) Amphibious assault with our replacement for Ocean and by landing dock platforms and the Bay’s
8) A large enough RFA that we can do our do our presence work and surge for a short period either containment mission or delivery of major force.
The question is how many high end T26’s do we need to cover either the CVF’s or amphibious assault ships if we decide to deliver major force, or if we are tasked to assist in containing the Iranian Navy if the event the use their missile boats and mini-subs to close the Gulf or Oman, and how close this number is to the number of new frigates the RN will get. If lets say a reasonable figure is eight T26’s can we then the next question would be can we agree a suitable platform for presence duties that costs significantly less than T26?”
Just two comments:
- clear and present danger… has been ducked as a question in this discussion, but you put the cat on table (there could be other cats)
- …is about maritime ISTAR and littoral combat, including littoral ASW
Hmmm, I would like to see more discussion on this latter point
Hi Mike, @8:23
“Just that I believe ours (and out allies) shouldn’t be comapred to theirs due to the different mission of the type”
- I could not agree more with you.
I was just trying to point out how difficult it is to get into the game, by those who have not done it before (or have let it lapse!)
- size of ship; or top
- mission, what are they supposed to do (of course primary, so should be first, but is also budgetary, so let’s slot it in here)
- OK, those two settled: type of aircraft that actually could deliver
- take political (supplier) constraints and timelines
- take the generations (as for capabilities) and what is left
– “real” thing: US, France, Brazil (Skyhawks from the 60′s)
– STOBAR (currently only Russia, and during refit no-one)
– VSTOL… how many choices for Spain, Italy, India (STOBAR?), Thailand when they will need to move on (USMC, too, but they fly out of all kinds of bases)
OK, back to the mission?
- the USSR wanted a global blue sea navy; Russia is looking more closely to defending its borders (even though a lot of those miles are shores)
- we (discussed well); everyone else?
One of the biggest arms races going now is the ability to grab and defend mineral wealth off-shore (could be as far as the s. Atlantic, but for most a bit closer); Nations like India (and Australia) are setting up Marine Corps never deemed as needed before
ArmChairCivvie;
indeed, I too couldn’t agree more with that..add on to rafael wooing Brasil for an eventual Skyhawk replacement and it gets interesting, with more nations looking at potential carriers.
Though that is new news to me; the australia and indian marines thing…India is rapidly rearming as with most nations in the mid and far east.
Hi Mike,
“indian marines thing…India is rapidly rearming as with most nations in the mid and far east.”
India is getting so desperate with their (prolonged) carrier situation that they even looked at (USA offered?) buying one of those being decommissioned from the USN… This has left totally out of the news that they also are looking to buy some of the older amph. ships from the same source
This is all about the Andamans and oil,; they are hardly going to do a Normandy on the shores of Pakistan!
BTW: Western reference works site the ROK Marine Corps as the second largest in the word; PRC (I haven’t looked whether it is under navy or army) is far more numerous, no wonder USMC is pulling back to Guam so at least they will be in the position to pick their fight
With all of this brewing, leaving East-of-Suez to others might be an option again?
- ref: what is the mission??
PS On the Brazilian short list the only one that ticks the box for the naval variant is the Rafael
X @ 8.26
STOBAR – In-efficient use of deckspace.
Interesting though I would suggest that this would suggest the book is a child of the 80′s.
Two contrasting trends since then or even the 90′s.
Flight decks are getting bigger on all the second string, non CVN designs and the airwings are getting smaller.
Not sure the USN position but I think they are now at 50-60 rather than 80+ and the trend is lower still.
In all the pictures of the CVF that I have seen, with current aircraft buys it looks as if everything is topside and they are using the hangar for 9 aside football.
Anyone got news of the hangar = 4000m2 or 5000m2?
Finaly interesting comments on the T23 class, they certaimly seem to have grown up from their original task of dumb sonar tugs that needed outside assistance to do just about anything.
Good example of 911 engineering, development over design.
The question then is how doe you improve on the basic design?
Bigger, broader hull – They seem to be of the Glass Jaw School of frigate design.
I would go as far as putting 1K tons of armour on them to keep the bad guys shells out.
3″ belt – 300′ x 21′ / 2″ Citadel – 120′ x 42′ x 14′
Med speed diesel / electric propulsion. Couple of big batteries / capacitors for Italian style super silent prowling.
40MW = 28 knots +
I think the main improvement should come in the AAW situation, try and get a useful capability out to 30km.
Total fit would be off the shelf, everybody is doing AAW just now so the competition should drive down costs.
2 x VLS silos including S-S capability.
Couple of big guns to look fierce.
2 x CIWS for insurance
Any thoughts of a full blown Vulcan unit with a Denel 35mm x 2 unit as a slave?
Supersonic missile then you have 25+ secs of tracking and 10 seconds of gun time?
Big flight deck.
Big hangar, no trendy dog kennels, so last year.
Space for an athwartship catapult for UAV’s.
Space for a tethered UAV / AWACS lite contraption?
UAV recovery = Challenge.
ASW = Baseline would be as T23, better is it is not gold plated.
Boat handling contraption.
RO / RO capability for “stuff” to be loaded into the space below the flight deck..
Full containerisation of the ship’s warfare electronics.
Consequently at least 450 x 70 x 17 = 6-8K tons
Ideally 550 x 80 x 20 = 10K tons +
Crew = 100 + mission crew. Looking at 150 approx.
What is the going rate of 4K tons of floating, angled steelwork?
Cost = £200mill max?
Base ship = £100mill, naval systems extra? 2nd hand TAS?
Thank you FBOT!
The fact that I’ve deleted some of your comment rows in-between these three does not mean that I consider them irrelevant, but just to focus:
1. Supersonic missile then you have 25+ secs of tracking and 10 seconds of gun time?
=> ASac???
2. Space for an athwartship catapult for UAV’s.
3. UAV recovery = Challenge.
@ Fat Bloke on Tour
Well if you want to track a copy down it is,
Maritime Aviation, Light and Medium Carriers into the Twenty First Century, Edited by Hore and Hirschfield, Paper No 2 in the Maritime Security Studies Programme, University of Hull Press, 1999. (I know I should have wrote that reference out properly……..)
Anyway STOBAR…………
In the paper entitled British Naval Doctrine and the Future Equipment Programme on page 115 it states that,
STOBAR carriers are limited in their ability to conduct rapid flight operations because of the angled deck and long runway. STOVL carriers, .., use less space on the flight deck and are therefore more versatile.
(In the same paper there is a great paragraph about commercial building of large hulls.)
I think this YouTube vid illustrates the point…….
ArmChairCivy said “UAV recovery = Challenge.”
I would google Fairey Rotodyne………..
Here is a YouTube vid for it………
x,
I loved it (the video clip; first, because I remember snippets of it on TV… how sad am I; and second because of that train ref that the train companies NOW make in their favour).
I am with you (have a look at my post in More Rotary Innovation Nov 22 @9:05 pm). But here I was advocating a synergestic … if that is a word… use of UAVs for ASac, with existing helo assets
- so, unmanned (gives higher altitude and endurance)
- presumably launched from a ship
- definitely need to be recovered near that point (otherwise a throw-away capability, and they are not that cheap)
BTW, I borrowed those three points from FBOT, I thought he was a bit “fluffy” in his long list and I wanted to drill down to what could be new/ critical and make a difference (with limited budgets)
Leads me to BTW2: If all the orders “confirmed” by the SDSR actually sail through, there is a need to INNOVATE so that they can be usefully deployed against evolving and/or most likely threats