Parliamentary questions and answers from the MoD
Question
Lord Moonie (Labour)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is the approximate displacement of the new class of Type 26 ships.
Answer
Lord Astor of Hever (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Defence; Conservative)
When the Type 26 global combat ship assessment phase contract was announced in March 2010, it was expected that each ship would have a displacement of around 6,000 tonnes. Since then, the strategic defence and security review has adjusted the Type 26 capability requirement to match more recent assessments of the perceived future global maritime environment. Final decisions on capability and performance, which will drive the resultant ship size, are yet to be made.
Question
The Duke of Montrose (Conservative)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government how many British naval ships are currently involved in anti-pirate duties in the internationally recommended transit corridor and the Somali basin; and what success they have had in the past year.
Answer
Lord Moonie (Labour)
The UK is providing a sizeable contribution to the coalition military effort and has a leading role in countering pirate activity off the coast of Somalia. The Ministry of Defence has been at the forefront of the European Union mission-Operation Atalanta-since it was introduced in December 2008, providing the operation commander and Operation HQ at Northwood.
There are currently two Royal Naval ships involved in counterpiracy operations in the internationally recognised transit corridor and the Somali basin. HMS “Montrose” and RFA “Fort Victoria” are both currently tasked to NATO counterpiracy mission (Operation Ocean Shield).
Over the past year the Royal Navy has successfully disrupted a number of pirate action groups, continued to promote the best management practice to industry to increase resilience to attack as well as seeing eight pirates successfully prosecuted by the Kenyan authorities and passing over another six for prosecution. Coalition forces (including the Royal Navy) have disrupted 123 pirate attack groups so far in 2010.
Question
Lord Moonie (Labour)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what are the average annual running costs of a (a) River Class, (b) Type 22, (c) Type 23, (d) Type 42, and (e) Type 45 ship; and what is their forecast of the annual running costs of Type 26 ships.
Answer
Lord Astor of Hever (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Defence; Conservative)
In-service class operating costs are heavily influenced by each ship’s operational tasking and upkeep and maintenance regime during any particular 12 month period. The average running cost per class of River Class is £20 million, Type 22 is £130.9 million, Type 23 is £313.8 million, and Type 42 is £ 160.1 million. These figures, based on the expenditure incurred by the Ministry of Defence in 2009-10, include maintenance, safety certification, military upgrades, manpower, inventory, satellite communication, fuel costs and depreciation.
Average annual figures for the Type 45 ship are not currently available as the first of class, HMS “Daring”, entered service only on 31 July 2010.
The Type 26 global combat ship is in its assessment phase, which is considering the design of the vessel. As this will influence its running costs, it is too early to forecast the annual running cost of this class.
Question
Lord Moonie (Labour)
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what was the total procurement cost of the Bay class of amphibious support ships; when each ship came into service; what are the average annual running costs of a Bay class ship; and whether any financial penalties will be incurred as a result of the reduction of contractor support on the withdrawal from service of one of the class.
Answer
Lord Astor of Hever (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Defence; Conservative)
The total procurement cost of the Bay class of amphibious support ships was £660 million. The first ship to enter service was RFA “Mounts Bay” in July 2006, which was followed by RFA “Largs Bay” in November 2006, RFA “Cardigan Bay” in December 2006 and RFA “Lyme Bay” in November 2007.
The average annual running cost of a Bay class ship, based on the expenditure incurred by the department in 2009-10, is approximately £17 million.
As stated in the strategic defence and security review, one of the Bay class of ships will be decommissioned. There will be no financial penalties incurred as a result of the associated reduction in contractor support. This is because the provision of long-term maintenance for the ships of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary is based on partnering agreements with industry and no financial commitment is made until each maintenance period is placed on contract with the partners.
Question
Julian Lewis (New Forest East, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence
(1) how many of the 135 Tornados in the UK inventory have been modified for operations in Afghanistan; and what the estimated remaining in-service cost is for the Tornado fleet up to 2023;
(2) how many of the 79 GR9 Harriers in the UK inventory have been modified for operations in Afghanistan; and what the estimated remaining in-service cost is for the Harrier fleet up to 2023.
Penny Mordaunt (Portsmouth North, Conservative)
To ask the Secretary of State for Defence
(1) what estimate he made of the net financial saving consequent on removing the Tornado fleet from service and retaining the Harrier fleet (a) in the next four years, (b) during the anticipated life of the Tornado fleet and (c) during the anticipated life of a retained Harrier fleet; and if he will make a statement;
(2) what estimate he made of the financial saving consequent on removing the Tornado fleet from service (a) not taking account of and (b) taking into account the effects of that decision on other capabilities (i) in each of the next four years and (ii) during the anticipated life of the current fleet; and if he will make a statement.
Answer
Peter Luff (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology), Defence; Mid Worcestershire, Conservative)
In the interests of long-term financial affordability, the strategic defence and security review (SDSR) determined that we would transition to a two platform fast jet fleet consisting of the highly capable multi-role aircraft, Typhoon and joint strike fighter. In the transition period the difficult decision has been taken to remove Harrier from service in 2011.
The overriding factor in deciding between removing either the Tornado GR4 or Harrier was the ability to support operations in Afghanistan. The Harrier fleet would have been too small to support Afghanistan operations at current levels, notwithstanding Carrier Strike and other contingent operations. Conversely, the Tornado GR4 force-even at its reduced size-will be significantly larger than the current Harrier force and would allow continuous UK fast jet close air support to forces in Afghanistan and the ability to support concurrent operations. It also has a number of key capability advantages over the Harrier GR9 including:
- greater payload and range and integration of capabilities such as Storm Shadow;
- fully integrated dual mode Brimstone;
- the Raptor reconnaissance pod; and
- a cannon.
We will retain a reduced Tornado GR4 fleet that will drawdown gradually to ensure there is no effect on operations in Afghanistan as we transition to Typhoon and joint strike fighter, from which we will also regenerate our Carrier Strike capability. In line with these transitions, we currently plan to take the Tornado GR4 out of service in 2021. This updates the out of service date and associated costs in the reply given to the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead in another place by Lord Astor on 16 November 2010, Hansard,House of Lords, column WA178, which were based on pre-SDSR plans. The Prime Minister received full advice on the options regarding our fast jet fleet as part of the SDSR process.
The MOD made estimates of cost savings accrued from measures considered in the SDSR for the purpose of formulating policy. Some of these have been published to help inform the public debate. Release of further detail may prejudice the MOD’s negotiating position with its commercial suppliers. Furthermore, final savings figures will depend on detailed implementation, which will generally be subject to full consultation with all relevant parties, including the trade unions and the devolved Administrations, as well as the results of mandatory assessments on the impact that the measures will have on sustainability, equality and diversity and health and safety. The MOD is therefore not prepared to release more detailed savings or updated in-service cost figures at this time.
The MOD calculates the full cost of aircraft per flying hour. The current rates for our fast jets are shown in the table. These figures include forward and depth servicing, fuel costs, crew costs, training costs, cost of capital charge, depreciation and amortisation. The Typhoon cost per flying hour reflects the build up of the fleet with small numbers of aircraft currently in-service. This cost will comparatively reduce as the fleet builds and is expected to be similar to our other fast jet fleets when we reach a steady state position.
| Financial year 2010-11 | |
| Aircraft | Cost per hour (£) |
| Tornado GR4 | 35,000 |
| Typhoon | 70,000 |
| Harrier GR7/GR9 | 37,000 |
| Tornado F3 | 43,000 |
These costs will need to be reviewed once we have finalised the SDSR decisions and how they will be implemented.
The Tornado aircraft fleet, consisting of the GR4 ground attack and F3 air defence variants, is supported by two availability based maintenance contracts. The Availability Transformation: Tornado Aircraft Contract (ATTAC), for which BAE Systems is the prime contractor, provides Depth Support until 2016 and has a total value of £1.5 billion. The Turbo-Union RB199 engine which powers the Tornado aircraft is supported by the RB199 Operational Contract for Engine Transformation 2 (ROCET 2) awarded to Rolls-Royce until 2025. The contract has a total value of £690 million. There are no penalty clauses in either contract. However, both contracts include a number of conditions that allow for early termination. Any costs associated with the implementation of these conditions following the SDSR outcome are being negotiated with the contractor.
Under the Capability Upgrade Strategy (Pilot) programme approved in December 2007, 96 Tornado GR4 aircraft will receive capability upgrades between 2011 and 2014 at an estimated cost of around £300 million. This number of aircraft is sufficient to maintain the operational capability of the Tornado GR4 Forward Available Fleet until OSD. There are currently no plans for the aircraft to receive any further capability upgrades after 2014.
For the number of Tornado GR4 modified for Operations in Afghanistan, I refer the noble Lord to the reply given to the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead in another place by Lord Astor on 4 November 2010, Hansard,House of Lords, column WA427. To optimise the further 17 Tornado aircraft required for operations in Afghanistan will cost around £0.5 million. The 15 Harrier GR9 aircraft that have returned from Afghanistan would require refitting of equipment to be made ready for operations.
Ha – running cost of a Bay is less than a River – so decommission a River then you useless bunch of gits !
Some of those annualised costs are frightening. Frankly more has to be done about warship purshase and running costs. According to that we could have 10 Bay class opperating as patrol ships for the cost of 1 type 23.
Jed
It would be cheaper to cut type 22 and type 42.
Once again Anti Piracy is bigged up as good publicity.
Imagine if the answer to the question was
‘The RN is tied up in port awaiting threats worth it’s attention’.
‘Meantime the RFA is working it’s butt off, of the Horn of Africa’
I suspect it would not be long before people started asking why the RN was funded and RFA was not.
APATS – ta very much for the URL
Ixion – well its just statistics eh ? T22 and T42 ARE being binned anyway. T23 “average” is probably more as they are the fleet workhorse, across the 13 ships remaining they probably provide the vast majority of sea time, and they are also getting upgrades, which are mentioned in the context of these costs in the Parliamentary answer.
A Bay would not quite so cheap when you figure in the RN ships flight and RN / RM boarding parties etc, but the bottom line is they appear cheaper than Rivers, so instead of decommissioning one, why not just buy some CB90′s to run out of her well deck
Hi Jed @ 7:51,
“A Bay would not quite so cheap when you figure in the RN ships flight and RN / RM boarding parties etc… , so instead of decommissioning one, why not just buy some CB90′s to run out of her well deck”
Exactly my thoughts: the pirates use mother ships; beat them at their own game. Just that for the ranges around the “base” that are required. most suitable vessels are too high. Can’t quite cut the helo deck open and loose the use of that asset…
It’s the Spanish pirates off the Lizard I want shifting…….
Hello,
perhaps some here should go back and read the figures again.
The £20 Million figure relating to the Rivers was for the entire class of 4 ships,not for an individual ship.
That is £5 Million per ship,including capital costs.
The £17 Million figure for a Bay was for a single ship.
With the exception of the Bay class figure which is on a ship basis,if you take the figures given and divide by the number of ships you get numbers which are entirely consistent with other recent answers for the all-in costs of these warships,that is the cost including procurement.
GrandLogistics.
Hi GranLogistics @ 9:32
I have always wondered, relating to “consistent with other recent answers for the all-in costs of these warships,that is the cost including procurement”
- whether the cost of the original electronics/ armaments systems that get ripped off the ship in a major refit will still accrue a cost ( or are written off, and the new “vintage of capital” in that respect will start to be the basis, going forward
- the platform (hull etc,) obviously has a longer holding period (economic life it is called in most contexts)
GL, that’s not how I read it. Look at the question, which specifies per ship.
I agree that it looks ambiguous though
Perhaps we need another question to clarify things!
Hello ArmChairCivvy,
that is an interesting question.
I am not certain how the Ministry of defence accounts for such things.
Operating costs for various warships were given last year in this rather clearer reply:
“As you will also be aware, in-service Class operating costs are heavily influenced by an individual ship’s operational tasking and upkeep/maintenance regime during any particular 12 month period. Direct comparisons can, therefore, be misleading and should be avoided. For the same reasons it is pragmatic to only provide operating costs for each class of ship, rather than for an individual vessel.
The annual operating cost for the Type 22 Class of Frigates, which comprises four ships, is £129.8M. This is based on information primarily from Financial Year 07/08 the last year for which this information is available, and includes typical day-to-day costs such as fuel and manpower and general support costs covering maintenance, repair and equipment spares. Costs for equipment spares are also included, although these are based on Financial Year 08/09 information as this is the most recent information available. Costs for weapon system support are not included as they could only be provided at disproportionate cost.
The Type 23 Class of Frigates, comprising 13 vessels, has a combined annual operating cost of £340.3M, This figure is derived in the same way as that for the Type 22 Class cost.
The annual operating cost of the Type 42 Class of Destroyers, covering a total of eight vessels in the 07/08 period, is £250.8M. The costs have been derived in the same way as the Type 22 and 23 Frigates.
Turning to the Type 45 Destroyers, their actual running costs cannot be provided as the First of Class, HMS DARING, has not yet entered operational service with the Royal Navy. For the purpose of internal planning, however, estimates have been derived from cost modelling based on a class of six ships, which indicate a support cost of around £188 million per annum for the Class. This figure includes support for weapon systems (including the Sea Viper missile system) but excludes a number of other operational costs, such as berthing and fuel, which have yet to be determined.”
Link here:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090909/text/90909w0024.htm
GrandLogistics.
Hello ThinkDefence,
if those figures were on a per ship basis:
The 13 Type 23s would cost £4079.3 Million a year;
The 4 Type 22s would cost £523.6 Million a year;
The 5 Type 42s would cost £800.5 Million a year.
Giving a total of £5,403.5 Million a year for the destroyer and frigate fleet,not including the Type 45s.
This cannot possibly be correct.
According to the Ministry of Defence accounts for 2009/2010 the Royal Navy spent just £1,382 Million on it’s entire frigate and destroyer fleet including the construction and operation of Type 45s which are not included above.
See page 96 on this link:
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/F10E990E-C296-48B1-9838-B3006C1F8DCB/0/mod_ra0910.pdf
At £5 Million per ship per year,a River class costs half as much as a Tornado bomber.
It was interesting that Peter Luff finally gave a little more detail about the future fast jet fleet.
GrandLogistics.
Hi GL @ 10:13,
Thanks for those figures that included some “footnotes” as the accountants say.
I will ignore 42s as (without exact knowledge about it) I assume they spend a lot of time tied up to the pier or to each other. For the rest
22s @ 32.45m
23s @26.2m
45s @ 188m
With the footnotes, this immediately makes it clear that the accounting is based mainly (solely?) on OPEX and hull depreciation. Bizarre, as weapon & weapon control systems are the major factor (+ they are also driven by 2-3 swapping out’s partly or wholly, over the entire life). T45 goes into multiples of the others even though the talk is only about weapon system support, not even its CAPEX/ depreciation(?).
I acknowledge what the answer says ” Costs for weapon system support are not included as they could only be provided at disproportionate cost” – when the attempt is at the (flawed) “how much does this ship cost” level.
We (the Navy, too, as the guardian and operator) buy capabilities. Capabilities can be costed, starting from R&D phases (when not shared across many capabilities; these are split up fairly early on,if not terminated, so not a problem).
Capability that is not deployed is worth nothing. Therefore the total cost should allocated per point of deployment (sometimes these have to be corrected by capacity multiplier), and then added to the platform costs (I should say vice versa, considering the magnitudes).
Such an approach would drive standardization where ever it is possible at all (simply because of the division in calculating “unit” costs automatically lowers the costs when one system becomes used widely, instead of “a flavour for each day of the week”).
The pots of money (spent) are observable, the total for delivering capabilities (whose value as opposed to price can rapidly change) becomes better comparable – also across services who can sometimes deliver overlapping capabilities (in itself NOT a bad thing).
I must say sorry in advance, having gone into these mechanics, but there seems to be no shared standard or understanding. When I started visiting this site, a couple of regular contributors self-confessed being cost accountants. I am not (so I don’t need to), but I am sure that I will soon be put right. However, the 1992 Defence Review had appendices with some sort of capability combination tables (for field deployment). But, these were in physical units, quite rudimentary and lacking the money dimension that we need to minimize the SDSR’s damage from reductions. Realignment can of course increase capabilities, but that aside “more is always better”.
- Ooops! Now you know that I am an economist
Sorry, misread “per class, as in: estimates have been derived from cost modelling based on a class of six ships, which indicate a support cost of around £188 million per annum for the Class. This figure includes support”… ONLY for the weapon systems side of things
- so the really expensive things (that also make the difference) escape, and the comparisons don’t help much
Hello ArmChairCivvy,
I have been looking at these figures for many years and things often look as clear as mud even to someone with experience of accounting.
That comment about “weapon system support” costs is a good example.
That phrase could cover a multitude of things ranging from software upgrades to hardware replacement or even ammunition costs.
The “what?” and the “how much?” are often not clear.
When you have looked at these figures long enough you do get a feel for what is right and an appreciation that rough figures are usually all that is practical given the variables.
Take that £17 Million for the Bay class as an example.
If one of those ships is scrapped,laid up or sold at a substantial loss it’s cost per service year (and that of the class) will go up,even though the expenditure on it is going down,due to the depreciation.
As a rough rule of thumb it is best to think of Type 22s,42s and 45 as costing around £30 Million a year and Type 23s as costing £25 Million a year inclusive of capital costs.
The current aircraft carriers cost about £70 Million a year each.
A Tornado Bomber costs about £10 Million a year.
The new aircraft carriers will cost around £100 Million a year each.
An infantry battalion also costs about £100 Million a year.
Direct operating costs (fuel etc.)come to around £10 Million a year for a surface combatant.
What is very interesting is that the 9 strong Nimrod fleet was expected to cost about £200 Million a year to retain in service over the next 10 years,that obviously does not include sunk costs.
But it is as much as the all in cost of 40 River class vessels or 8 Type 23 frigates.
GrandLogistics.
Hi, as this thread is fading away in the bigger picture of this site (that would be a pity, as this thread is the big picture?), I would like to contribute a capability/ price index (has to be in common currency, sorry for that):
Astute SSN (UK)-$2,4bn
Barracuda SSN (France)-$1.35 bn
Le Terrible SSBN (France)-$3.8 bn
Ohio SSBN Replacement-$7 bn (est.)
Virginia SSN-$2.4 bn
… moving on from today’s capital ships
Cavour CVH (Italy)-$2 bn
- AUD has fluctuated so much that I cannot judge what to make of their horror of JC-class originally looking like, or quoted at AUD .5bn, but after the full spec to suit the mission (different from what Juan Carlos- class is doing for Spain)Canberra-class coming out @ 1.5 bn (AUD!)
Charles de Gaulle (France)-$3.7 bn
CVN-78 Gerald R Ford-$13.5 bn
Vikrant (India)-$).8 bn; this must be the refit only as ex-Hermes went into it after 50 years and came back fresh 52 years after original launch (B-52 life extensions are aiming at 80 years from initial date in service!)
Getting closer to the types of ships for which we are debating re:affordable numbers to fulfil the mission:
DDG 51 Arleigh Burke-$1.8 bn; Cannot find a figure for the improved Kongo- class (Japan, based on this design)
Daring Type 45 (UK)-$1 bn (could be a nice index base number, but wait!)
DDG 1000 Zumwalt-$6 bn (cancelled, obviously!)
Absalon (Denmark)-$.27 bn (the big favourite for a value benchmark!)
Bertholf USCG National Security Cutter-$.64 bn
FREMM (Franco/Italian)-$.75 bn
Littoral Combat Optimized Freedom-$.64 bn (gone up since?)
Valour MEKO A200 (RSA, other MEKOs can be found)-$.33 bn
Khareef (Oman)-$.26 bn
Visby (Sweden)-$.2 bn (the first operational true-stealth?)
Hamina (Finland)-$.1 bn… here is a nice base for an index (OK, it is not blue-water, but) as the punch packed on a very modern platform is as follows
General 1 × Bofors 57 mm/70 SAK Mk3
General 2 × 12.7 mm machine guns (NSV)
AA 8 × Umkhonto-IR SAM (Denel, vertical launch)
Anti-Ship 4 × RBS-15 Mk3 SSM (Saab)
Plus depth charges or mines (Sea Mine 2000)
Back to my point: Look at the platform (Hull, sea states, speed, range, survivability) and the mission systems separately (accepted)- and account for the cost of the two separately (to be debated?)