Reducing Challenger 2 I can understand, withdrawing the ageing Type 22 frigates I can understand, I can even understand (just) the logic of withdrawing the Harrier, but the decision on Nimrod MRA4 is reckless insanity with only marginal savings.
We sometimes get seduced by the ‘sunk cost’ argument where there is a reluctance to cancel something because the huge sums already invested. CVF is a good example, cancelling that might not save any money in the short term but the operating costs are significant so those sunk costs would be small in comparison with the long term savings.
From a financial perspective MRA4 satisfies the general rule of sunk costs but the running costs are relatively small, regardless of the capability loss so there isn’t even a strong financial case for cancellation.
Most of the costs have already been spent, as at July 2010 the total expenditure on MRA4 was £3.9billion.
The estimated total cost of the support solution up to the currently anticipated achievement of initial operating capability in October 2012 is £0.6 billion. In addition, the estimated cost of pay for RAF personnel undertaking the training until 2012 is £17.2 million
The Nimrod MRA4 is without a doubt the poster child of those famous toxic projects that the Labour government inherited from the previous one and is a perfect illustration of how good old fashioned bungling, political interference and industrial primacy over defence.
Two things have conspired to condemn the Nimrod MRA4
- The word Nimrod
- Political gain
Nimrod has a toxic brand identity; the wing issue, general bungling, £400million each and finally the safety issues. Despite BAe’s own staff and the types operators being absolutely crystal clear on how bad an idea it would be, the MoD and BAe decided to save £4.37 by upgrading old MR2’s to the new MRA4 standard. The ill fitting wing issue is well known and not worth repeating here but the fact remains that MRA4 is largely a new build aircraft, only parts of the fuselage and vertical stabiliser remains from the MR2 and those have been thoroughly inspected and re-lifed. For all intents and purposes, MRA4 is a new aircraft. The MR2 safety issues, accident and subsequent enquiry said more about the RAF and MoD than it did about the aircraft but there is no doubt even the MRA4 has been tarred with the same brush. A risk averse MoD and gutless government is simply scared of the name.
Secondly, there is maximum gain to be had by blaming the cancellation on the previous government’s incompetence in defence acquisition, what better example than a programme that would have delivered 9 aircraft at over £400million apiece?
But what are we losing?
Capabilities
Equipped with 4 RR BR710 Turbofans engines the MRA4, on one ‘tank of fuel’ fly for 6,000nm or 15 hours, can carry a huge quantity of weapons and other stores on 9 bomb bay/4 wing hardpoints, has an incredibly sophisticated mission system (the same as the US Boeing P8 Poseidon), long range Searchwater radar, an Electronic Support Measures system, Link 11/16, a wider range of sensors and more communications equipment than you can shake a stick at!
All this is held in an airframe that can operate equally well from 200ft to 36,000ft and has been proven to satisfy all requirements for several months, the first has already been delivered to the RAF.
In some ways, it might be argued that the MRA4 did not quite have some of the capabilities, especially for
Allies and Alternatives
One of the justifications for the cancellation of MRA4 is that we can rely on a combination of allies and alternatives to fill the gap.
Allies such as France and the USA do have long range maritime patrol aircraft but the French ones are just as old as the MR2 and nowhere near as capable as the MRA4.
The US is currently in the process of introducing the 737 derived P8 Poseidon but that is making the MRA4 look like a well run project. The MRA4 is derived from a civilian airliner (the Comet) it is a sturdy design with an old fashioned thick wing and inboard engines but the P8 Poseidon uses the Boeing 737-900 as its donor airframe. The 737, especially the wing and engine configuration, are wholly unsuited to the kind of low level manoeuvring required for the role and this has led to all manner of very expensive workarounds to compensate, especially for operating a medium, rather than low altitude.
The proposed A319 MPA remains nothing but a design study and would face exactly the same problems as the P8 but with a smaller payload.
For some of the less warlike roles of maritime patrol there are a number of off the shelf alternatives but they are a very poor substitute for MRA4 and would have only a fraction of the military usefulness.
Anti Submarine Warfare is a particular UK specialism and one which we neglect at our peril. New submarine designs are increasingly capable and being sold the world over, many think that anti submarine capabilities can be filed under ‘cold war relic’ but nothing could be further from the truth. The west has not faced a credible submarine threat for a long time but that is changing very fast and as we reduce numbers and consolidate capabilities onto ever more expensive but fewer surface platforms the loss of even one of these to a submarine would be catastrophic.
For alternatives, why bother when they would be more expensive and less capable.
For allies, the Maritime Patrol role, at least with a military role, is an area where our allies are rather poorly resourced and the MRA4 would have been much more sought after than almost anything else we have.
Missions
For the impact of loss of the MRA4 the best person to describe it is none other than Liam Fox MP, Secretary of State for Defence
Deletion of the Nimrod MR4 will limit our ability to deploy maritime forces rapidly into high-threat areas, increase the risk to the Deterrent, compromise maritime CT (counter terrorism), remove long range search and rescue, and delete one element of our Falklands reinforcement plan.
Remember that letter!
To pick on just a few of those areas
Long range search and rescue is a treaty obligation (International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979), one which we have been struggling to comply with since the MR2 was withdrawn (cobbling together a patchwork of capabilities) and will obviously continue to fail to meet with the MRA4 decision. Before withdrawal the MR2 carried out about between 1 and 2 search and rescue missions per month, the majority being beyond the range of a Sea King. Using a £400m military aircraft for long range search and rescue is perhaps a little overkill but using the Nimrod means the public purse does not have to fund a separate aircraft fleet just for the role. We might transfer this to the coastguard, perhaps rolling it into a revised SAR helicopter PFI deal but would this really be economical?
Nimrod also protects the Trident submarines as they enter and leave home waters, now this role can be carried out by Merlin helicopters and frigates but this means an increase in standing commitments from the RN at a time when frigates and helicopters are at a premium. The noise signature of helicopters is considerably more than the jet engines of the Nimrod and therefore much less detectable by modern submarine acoustic systems. Perhaps weakening the survivability of Trident will be used as another excuse to get rid of it by the Liberal Democrat’s.
Piracy was highlighted by the SDSR as being a particular threat, the MRA4 would allow the few surface assets we have in the area to be maximised and hugely improve our output.
Another huge capability loss will be the communications relay and ISR facilities offered by MRA4.
The real strength of Nimrod MRA4 is its versatility.
So, let’s keep the Red Arrows, increase the aid budget and shovel yet more cash into the EU but a capability as vitally important as MRA4 is tossed aside, just as it is coming into service. Perhaps the Red Arrows was a dig too far but its the sentiment, difficult decisions have been dodged across all three services.
Without sounding too hysterical, people will die because of this decision.
That’s not really very strategic is it?
UPDATE
In a recent Parliamentary written answer, Peter Luff MP (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State (Defence Equipment, Support and Technology) stated
But it is the aircraft’s future support costs that contributed to the decision not to bring it into service, despite its advanced state. Since the withdrawal of the Nimrod MR2 in March this year, the Ministry of Defence has sought to mitigate the gap in capability through the use of other military assets, including Type 23 Frigates, Merlin Anti Submarine Warfare helicopters and Hercules C-130 aircraft, and by relying, where appropriate, on assistance from allies and partners. Although it was originally assumed that such measures would only be required for a limited period of time, we are now developing a longer-term plan to mitigate the impact of cancellation on our continuing military tasks and capabilities. In view of the sensitive and classified nature of some of these military tasks, and the implications for the protection of our armed forces, including the nuclear deterrent, it is not possible for us to comment on these measures in detail.
As the defence establishment of the UK I think more emphasis should be placed on defence of the deterrent. It isn’t just the decommissioning of Nimrod, but the steady reduction of SSN numbers too. APT(N) should be just as the name suggests and not running around the Caribbean on useful but secondary tasks. (That decommissioned Bay with a hold full of civil engineering equipment and disaster relief supplies, and fitted with a hangar for a helicopters would be better surely?)
I know this fertile ground for an RAF conspiracy rant but I am tired of it.
One more thing. As I have already said here when OC RAF Kinloss was interviewed about Nimrod the second task out of his mouth was anti-maritime-terrorism……..
Yes indeed, agree with everything.
I can’t believe some elements of the RAF are happy with this. I am sure there is a “Fighter Mafia” that thinks getting all the Typhoon’s into service, then getting their hands on “the Navy’s” F35′s is more important, but this single aircraft when viewed as a “platform” offering a multitude of capabilities had the potential to be one of the most flexible aircraft available anywhere in the world.
If Afghanistan remains key at the moment what about its overland Non-Traditional ISTAR capabilities ? Ground Moving Target Indicator and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR – “mapping”) modes for SearchWater and built in electro-optical capabilities, provided improvement over the service provided by the old MRA2 before the fateful accident. Add to this the mentioned communications capabilities, long loiter times, ability to be used as airborne battle management, and hey I am sure it would not have cost much to integrate the Small Diameter Bomb, or even Viper Strike – how many of them could fit in that cavernous bomb bay !
If there was an ounce of sense in the MoD / RAF / Govt. the plan would be to maximise the return on investment in the program so far, get their hands on every Nimrod airframe available for the upgrade and build the original 21 or more, 28, 30 ? This would actually reduce unit price, and some could perhaps by sold abroad(?).
To be honest though, I don’t think the mods’ made to sonar bouys and torpedos (adding wings !) for use from medium altitude has actually added anything near the same level of costs to the P8 program, which I believe is both slightly ahead of schedule and under budget !
But in the end MRA4 could have done ASW, MPA, NT-ISTAR, airborne command post, Elint (sensors in bomb bay?), Close Air Support (as mentioned above) and even strategic bomber roles (long range Tomahawk or Storm Shadow delivery platform) – and probably a few more you can all think of, lets see yer Tranch 3 Typhoon compete with that then !
“So, let’s keep the Red Arrows, increase the aid budget and shovel yet more cash into the EU but a capability as vitally important as MRA4 is tossed aside, just as it is coming into service.”
Very much agreed, however, most of these happened outside of the Defence department, and if we are going to rail against the loss of MRA4 what would we have ditched instead?
To keep the discussion going why was the Commet airframe kept for so long?
No one wanted to buy the Comet 4 airliner any more, and the firm with the intellectual property, Hawker Siddeley, thought they could squeeze some money out of the government by turning it into a military product. Plus ca change.
As to keeping it past all sense and reason… it’s airframe was British. Tat, but British.
It seems to have caught Michael Portillo’s eye, when he wasn’t busy being a TV presenter, writer and bon viveur.
No good reasons.
That’s why I can’t find a definite reason, there is none.
I once heard that MPAs could find SSKs by sniffing the air for hyrdo-carbons……..
I think admin’s post and the two responses so far have said it all. I particularly like the way in which Jed’s comment “this single aircraft when viewed as a “platform” offering a multitude of capabilities had the potential to be one of the most flexible aircraft available anywhere in the world.” That really does encapsulate the all-round capabilities of the aircraft.
In what other plane would you get the ability to carry out the following roles: anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, reconnaisssance, gathering of electronic intelligence, general coastal and fishery patrol, search and rescue, airborne command post and even, as Jed suggests, a long-range bomber role, equipped with stand-off missiles. (I know that the last of these is one that was being considered very seriouly by the RAF. A few Hercules cannot achieve one tenth of those roles.
I wonder whether people think the following suggestion is fanciful. Is there any way in which the Government and BAE could get together and arrange some way in which the nearly completed aircraft could be kept for, say, four or five years, so that , when the economy improves, they could be purchased and enter service? Or is that just the idea of a ridiculous fantasist? I don’t even know what stage the building of the aircraft has reached!
I was shocked when the number of MRA4s was cut down to just 9. With just another handful, UK forces could station one or two here (Gibraltar) and control the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic approaches, or from the Azores. Mount Pleasant could also do with a flight, as that would make the Argentine Navy think twice about messing around in the South Atlantic. This is perhaps the worst decision of the SDSR. Does the RAF possess any naval strike capability? I once saw a reference to a Tornado ‘GR4b’ but not been able to verify this.
On page 28 of the SDSR it says in part, “We will depend on other maritime assets to contribute to the tasks previously planned for them”.
What assets are they thinking about?
I’m stuggling to see it myself.
Why would anyone, ever, take risk’s with the ships/boats that your ultimate security depends on?
I don’t mean to ask such rhetorical sounding questions, i really do not get it.
The more i think about the questions this document doesn’t answer, the more puzzled i’m getting.
Jedibeeftrix asked if we were to keep Nimrod, what would we ditch instead ?
OK – fair question, so, in no particular order, and without much amplifying discussion:
1. Continued involvement in Afghanistan
2. Remaining Gurkha battalions
3. Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters
4. Foreign aid budget (or at least large slice thereof)
5. Rivet Joint
6. E3D fleet
7. Tanker PFI
8. Tornado fleet (as in keep Harrier and Nimrod, retire Tornados faster – keeping some in the Stan)
9. Red Arrows – seeing as they were mentioned ! Replace with single Typhoon in nice Red / White / Blue colour scheme…..
10. All the RAF’s MQ9 Reapers
OK, there is 10 to get you going – feel free to mix and match as required
At least you kept the RAF Alsations!!
What do you have against the Ghurkas? We should be raising a couple more battalions.
My list;
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters would be a definite.
Every body above the rank of Air Commodore.
All the Foreign Aid Budget.
A good number of RAF Bases.
Type 26 design programme.
A400m involvement.
All those hidden bits of the MoD(N) like the RFCAs.
Reduction of URNU fleet to 2 vessels operating out of Portsmouth and 2 out of Liverpool.
X – I have absolutely nothing against the Gurkhas – we should have a full brigade of 4 battalions BUT if we are belt tightening, and reducing the army to save the Nimrod, then the could go….
Not sure reduction of URNU would save much of the budget….
TBH I hate URNUs nearly as much as I like Alsations!!
Joking apart the URNUs and the RAF University Units cost quite a bit.
And you didn’t leave much to go at did you young man?
Blue sky thinking but would it be possible for BAE to wet-lease the Nimrods (with ex-RAF crews) to a consortium of NATO/EU countries rather like the E-3 Sentry NATO consortium?
Fair point Jed, there are options, but which of those would you support losing?
I think RAF Alsation canine ninja squad gets a lot of bad press, surely they just need some underwater knife fighting skills and an NVQ in hacking and we’d be all set………?
But seriously, it does look as if RAF bases are going anyway, and are we keeping the rivet-joints anyway?
i’m not too hot on my ISTAR platforms.
although if i thought ditching the tornado’s would allow the preservation of the harriers and the MRA4′s i would be sorely tempted.
have to know how the savings mounted up on either end of the scale…………
Hello,
surely the Nimrod costs far more to operate than the aircraft carriers?
Does anyone have any recent official figures for Nimrod’s operating costs?
Some years ago I read a document which said the (then 22 strong) future Nimrod fleet would cost £20 Billion in support costs over a 24 year service life.
That would come to about £38 Million per year in operating costs for a single Nimrod Mark 4.
Not far off the often quoted £44 Million operating costs of an aircraft carrier.
The Royal air force budget doesn’t break things down by aircraft type and confusingly lists Nimrod both under “I.S.T.A.R.” and “Future Capability”.
In 2009/2010 the “I.S.T.A.R.” budget was about £1,600 Million (for thirty or so aircraft)and the “Future Capability” budget was about £800 Million.
I am guessing the former covers operating costs while the latter covers the cost of buying new aircraft.
GrandLogistics.
Hello Jedibeeftrix,
Rivet Joint raises an important question.
We would need such a sovereign capability if we were to continue conducting independent warighting operations.
But if we are reducing our combat units to the level where they cannot conduct independent operations then do we really need an independent electronic intelligence gathering capability?
GrandLogistics.
Sunk costs need to be ignored during deliberations for decisions. Period.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2008/03/sunk-costs-and-war-or-not-war.html
All else is incompetence.
think you said it all. Its TSR 2 all over agin. Eventually we will decide to buy the P8 then cancel that on grounds of cost. Would not be suprised if they start dusting of the Shakeltons soon.
GL
£38mn sounds about right.
A Fast Jet rolls in at about £20mn
I really do wonder about that £44mn a year and what it really includes, but a Carrier is useles without its airgroup, and they roll in, as above, at £20mn a year, at least.
I think the TD’s opening article relating to Nimrod is quite succinct and makes the reasons for retaining the aircraft and associated systems quite obvious and unarguable.
I don’t think we as ordinary people are used to amounts of money in million or billions. Is £44million a lot of money? If we do a bit of rounding up say £1million a week. I think some premier league football teams would be glad of such low costs.
We need to know the running costs of one of the large container ships.
I forgot this too. I asked about the airframe according to this BAE built whole new wings including those rather well engineered root engine nacels.
http://www.spyflight.co.uk/MR4A.htm
Martin, more likely we’ll end up buying ex-US Navy P-3B/C Orions. Might as well hang onto the C-130K props and engines, we may need them as spares! At least then we may have some commonality between us, most of Europe, Australia and New Zealand.
I notice that today on the Defence-Aerospace.com blog that BAE have offered Brazil a business package on building warships for them. One interesting item was no mention of T26 but it now seems to be called a ‘Global Combat Ship’, I suppose optimism is no bad thing.
Sven
Indeed ‘sunk’ costs are called exactly that for a very good reason. There is another economics / industrial term – “Return On Investment” or ROI. You have to decide the tipping point where a previous investment becomes a sunk cost, i.e. as you state in your post it becomes “throwing good money after bad”.
In the case of the Nimrod programme, it can be argued that an economic tipping point was ignored very early on allied to the engineering decisions made. But it WAS ignored and additional investment made. Now on the eve of being able to productionize and therefore actually gain a return on the investment, the program is cancelled for exactly the wrong reasons – “throwing good money after bad” ! Now there will indeed be no return on the investment at all, and that is what actually sinks the sunk costs.
The RAF has sacrificed everything that does not come with two engines and afterburners: all the ISTAR is being canned as is most of the theatre lift so they can keep their precious fast jets. It is insanity and further evidence that the RAF should be disbanded and split between the navy and army.
sealord, you assume that the decision was entirely made by the RAF, I suggest this might not actually be the case
This incident was monitored with a Falcon 50.
@x
What do you have against the URNU’s? You must be joking if you think reducing them would have even the slightest impact on the Defence budget – the annual budget for the URNU’s is £1.2 million; this is a steadily reducing figure and will continue to reduce further in coming years. This is nothing in the overall budget, yet what do you gain? 1. The presence of 14 Royal Navy ships around the country, flying the White Ensign in ports that cannot accept larger vessels and doing their part to keep sea blindness at bay, especially by participating in local and national events where the rest of the Fleet is too busy to contribute a frigate or other ship. 2. Fourteen direct lines into well over 30 of the country’s top Universities, keeping the significance of the Royal Navy (and through their RAF and Army counterparts, the rest of the Armed Forces) high in the national academic mindset. 3. A small, but useful number of students each year who have as good a chance of anyone of ending up in high profile jobs, whether in industry, business or government, with a good understanding of the significance of the Royal Navy. 4. A well informed and influential body of former members who continue to champion the cause of the RN in industry and in their local regions. 5. Fourteen independent commands through which we grow the next generation of frigate and destroyer captains.
Disagree all you like, but to say that you hate the URNU’s is both unnecessary and ignorant. They have a valuable role to play for comparative peanuts – we waste more than that on the headed paper for comprehensive spending reviews.
Does anyone know if an objective, independent report on the UK’s Defence commitments and therefore, requirements, has ever been done?
I do not mean a classified report.
Just something that lists what we really need, to cover the things that have to be covered.
URNUs? Go back and read what you wrote and then reconcile it against just what happened to the fleet.
And perhaps if you had put as much effort into fund raising to get inner city kids to sea as I have you would have problems with middle class kids having 14 vessels; while the leading maritime charity makes do with 2 vessels. Those kids go on to be the ones now running around Afghanistan and other places putting their lives on the line for Queen Country. While the middle class kids you set so much store do stay behind to have comfortable lives.
As for the armed forces high in the academic mind set? If I hadn’t spent last year doing security studies at uni’ I would think you were making a valid point. But as I was studying security at uni’ all I can do is shake my head and simply say that I don’t think you know what you are talking about.
I don’t apologise for making light of this serious topic. If ThinkDefence has a problem with me he can email me and I will stop commenting.
One thing I am not ignorant about is MoD spending, especially spending on cadets, reserves forces, etc.
One final thought. It is all very well talking about defence ministers, multi-national corporations, etc. etc. but there is waste and stupidity all the way through MoD and three armed services. They are no different than any other large government organisation for example the NHS.
Can anyone provide an estimated guess on how much ditching Marham and the associated aircraft would save in comparison to Nimrod?
my personal thoughts on foreign aid aren’t publishable but something I will say about foreign aid: Afghanistan is “military” foreign aid and should come straight out of the DfID wedge
the notion of cutting naval units and Nimrod is one that is lost on me, those are the first on my “keep” list (among items such as Shadow R.1, individual weapons etc.)
@x,
With respect, I know exactly what I am talking about. I regret that more is not done to enable young kids from any background to get to sea and experience the maritime environment. It’s obvious that you do undertake a lot of work in this area, for which I both commend and support you.
You’ve clearly had a negative experience of the URNU’s and I regret that also. What I can promise you is that the Units do more than just take ‘middle class kids’ to sea. We regularly engaged with Sea Cadets, CCF and other local youth organisations (I’m not going to list them all), not just those connected with the sea. We went out of our way to engage with these organisations, which at its best saw us spend a week in central London providing day excursions to exactly these groups – over a hundred visitors in five days. There’s a limit to what we can do – the Units consist of just six front line personnel plus volunteers and the students, and we run a 20m patrol boat in remote locations with minimal support – say what you like, but it’s true. And you can only get so many visitors onboard before the boat gets a little top heavy.
I don’t follow your rather vague comment about defence in education, but I an assure you that the impact we make at the highest levels of University counts – either that or two dozen or so key lecturers, bursars and Vice Chancellors of one top-two and one top-twenty University are lying and pandering to all three Services.
And I hold to you one more comment, which is particularly valid in light of current events. We must grow our Commanding Officers from an early age, and make damned sure that they are capable of commanding millions of pounds worth of taxpayers property, the more so as those resources grow ever fewer. Without these crucial training grounds, we will see more incidents like HMS ASTUTE, HMS NOTTINGHAM, HMS TRAFALGAR and others. Powerpoint is no substitute for experience, and it cannot be bought. The Services are nothing without our people.
Perhaps the view from out here in the provinces is slightly less rosey than in the promised land south of the Watford gap.
x, I haven’t banned anyone from commenting except spammers and don’t want to because I think you are all sooooper
All I ask is to keep things relevant and play the ball not the man. I tend to believe that the University air, army and naval stuff, whilst offering some benefit, isn’t worth it in a time of budgetary constraint.
I could equally say that about a lot of stuff across all 3 services, sacred cow culling, I don’t think so
Though I know that URNUs do some positive things and it is good to hear SR relating those positive things. But I also have my own experiences and thoughts on the topic.
I will take that break from commenting that I said would.
I shall take that break from commenting.
I hadn’t intended to get quite so vocal on the issue, and I also agree that in hard times we should look at everything, holding nothing sacred. However, I do believe that the URNU’s deliver value for money, and surely that is the key issue we are all concerned about.
On the topic in hand, I agree that Nimrod, despite it’s huge cost and embarassing gestation did represent a significant capability loss and one that it will be difficult to cover – the guarding of the SND, long ranged SAR cover and the sheer flexibility of the asset (there’s that Searchwater radar again). The whole SDSR smacks of poor thought, and I don’t have a lot of faith that the next review will have any more cash to start filling these capability gaps.
I think it is fairly obvious that it was made entirely by the RAF, hence their last minute battle to save the Tornado fleet over the Harrier. The RAF clearly made the decision that it had no interest in joint operations or learning any of the lessons of the last 10 years of war and instead wanted to focus on flying very fast.
The main article is right in every sense, but who knows this? The public doesn’t, neither do the ill informed members of parliament. It is no good preaching to the converted. Broadcast the folly by engaging the press and your MP to ask embarrasing questions. Even after the recent long range SAR incident a few days ago in the North Atlantic, nobody said how useful it would have been to have a Nimrod as on scene commander; an opportunity missed to educate the public on the value of this lost asset. Is there too much aparthy in this country ??
Rick – your right, but not just on scene commander, they used to be able to para-drop life rafts from the bomb bay !
Nevertheless, I never expected the government to be so short sighted to abandon MPA completely. Although there is little blue water ASW these days MPA embraces long range SAR, anti drug and gun smuggling, anti pracy, fishery protection as well as being an ISTAR asset declared to NATO and the UK also has an international treaty obligation since 1979 to provide long range SAR in the North Atlantic. In addition the project has been paid for and the contract cannot be cancelled until finished, otherwise the MoD will have to pick up the redundancy bill for British Aerospace employees who would lose their jobs. Some very strange decision have been made in this SDSR. A don’t think a potential enemy could have done better!
I think you will find the explanation is simple: BAE Systems cannot get the MRA4 systems to work properly and was faced with a huge loss to complete development and production (fixed price contract). The company has therefore persuaded their friends in the Conservative Party to cover its financial back by cancelling the aircraft, using SDSR as the smokescreen. The UK loses a key capability, 90 years of expertise in maritime reconnaissance and will inevitably have to (very expensively) reconstitute the MR force from scratch using Boeing P-8s. All it will take is a major RAF failure such as the inability to help a burning cruise liner or find a sunken submarine, and MPs will be demanding to know why we gave up this capability. Isn’t life great in Coalition Britain? I don’t think most readers appreciate the extent to which BAE, as the country’s largest manufacturer, has massive clout in Whitehall (including direct access to the Prime Minister, circumventing the MOD). If the company had been in favour of MRA4 entering service do you really think it would have been dumped?
I’m beginning to think that BAe Systems might need breaking up in the national interest . . .
I understood that the MRA4 has been working for about 18 months and the main and complex mission system is from Boeing anyway
Yes, MRA4 works after a fashion much of the time, but BAE was faced with the issue of being prime contractor (and thus taking the financial and political pressure, regardless of Boeing’s performance) over the life time of a mere 9 aircraft. The through-life support costs would have been horrendous and the expense of the inevitable upgrades for what amount to hand-built aircraft don’t bear thinking about. BAE will be very glad to be out of this game.
The real culprits in this are those senior officers and civil servants who could have stopped this farcical project in 2004 or even earlier when it became clear that the wing and systems integration problems could not be economically overcome. I flew on several Nimrod missions in the early 1980s and it was obvious even to the amateur observer that the various MR2s were all different (for example systems installed in different locations). So why did it come as such a surprise to BAE to ‘discover’ that the original force were all individual and, for example, the wing joints were different? Why did RAF engineering officers not point this out at the time to BAE and stop the programme in its tracks? Or did they? Did BAE recognise the problems but turn a blind eye because they knew that when the issues finally arose it would force the MOD to pay yet more money? Despite being a supposedly fixed price contract MOD did indeed end up paying more money to keep the doomed project alive. Why the MOD obsession with rebuilding tired old aircraft rather than producing new ones, which in the long run would have been cheaper and would have opened up export opportunities? Which senior RAF officers recommended carrying on with this farce rather than scrapping the MR2s, acquiring some old P-3s as a stop gap, and then moving on to P-8?
There are a lot if questions that could do with answers, but I suppose we will have to wait until 2040 to find out. The episode casts a very poor reflection upon the judgement both of MOD and the RAF, and underlines BAE’s magnificent ability to waste taxpayer’s money through lousy project management.
A very interesting article on http://www.key.aero. on the reasons for cancelling MRA4. In a written answer in the house of commons.
In para two it would appear that they have realised they have made an almighty cock up and are rethinking the whole strategy.
Then he goes on to say as it’s a ‘delicate matter’ nothing can be divulged at this time.
Whats the betting in the not so distant future ‘Poseidon’ will start to be mentioned.