In our months long romp through the SDSR the readers and authors at Think Defence have covered a lot of ground and as we enter the final build up phase, maybe we should go back to the beginning and re-examine aspects of strategy that should inform the outcome.
Before I wade in I would like to simply say thank you to all the readers of Think Defence and those that have also commented. The comments have been supremely well informed, very well mannered and have added massive value to the site. Of all the defence blogs out there I haven’t seen any that can manage regularly over 50 comments and in a few posts, over 100, bloody smashing!
One of the accusations levelled at this blog is the lack of posts about the strategic environment and a concentration on equipment issues. Whilst it is true that equipment and tactics should never drive strategy it is equally true that in the real world it does, who can say Typhoon, COIN or CVF have not been dictating the headlines?
The battle between the COIN and Maritime approach has been at the core of headlines and discussion about the SDSR, whether from august institutions like Chatham House and RUSI or less august environs like the blogosphere. If we dig even further it is obvious that the bitter and frankly shameful inter service politics, revolves not around strategy or even tactics, but equipment.
Probably the most illustrative aspect of this reality is CVF, the amount of letters to the editor, blog posts, comments, papers, conferences, interventions from ministers, energy and hopes expended on a mere piece of equipment tells me that there is no strategy, except the preservation of prestige and shiny new toys.
Once more we are letting equipment, industrial and political issues drive the strategic agenda, when will we ever learn?
Instead of seeing constant headlines about the dire impact of not proceeding with CVF it would have been nice if there was more discussion on the strategy that might ultimately derive the need for such a piece of equipment.
Don’t think I am picking on CVF because there are other equipments in the same frame but no doubt, CVF has taken on a mystic aura for detractors and supporters alike.
The SDSR will hopefully deliver a vision based on a foreign policy strategy but given the new Foreign Minister has been practically invisible except for fighting off scandal maybe it was too much to hope for. I hope for more, but expect the SDSR to be a series of vested interests being protected whilst the notion of a balanced capability is consigned to the round filing cabinet and salami slicing will occur left, right and centre.
Expect a fudge.
The nature and scale of the leaking and lobbying tells me three things
1. The service chiefs care more for their service than their country
2. There has been inadequate political control of the agenda
3. The Treasury has managed to divide and conquer, as ever
It is quite depressing really.
Back to strategy
One often hears talk about Great Britain’s place in the world, punching above our weight or maintenance of parity with others as if this is somehow actually means anything. It doesn’t and is simply a fig leaf for a complete lack of long term strategic thinking about single most important thing there is, the nations interest.
What is the nation’s interest?
In all matters to do with security and defence we must constantly ask, is this in the nation’s interest because if it isn’t, quite frankly we shouldn’t be doing it.
We must also be fully aware that without money and the will to execute, strategy is nothing more than daydreaming.
Therefore, any defence and security related strategy must have a simple straight line relationship to either a clearly defined national interest and/or the economic prosperity of the nation. Surrounding this straight line relationship between security and prosperity should also be a degree of crystal ball gazing, what the future may bring.
Are we really engaged in anything strategic in the absence of a credible vision of the national interest or is the SDSR going to be a short term exercise in budget cutting, specifically avoiding making any of those much vaunted tough choices and substituting genuine vision for babbling about cyber-warfare.
TBH I am past caring.
Tomorrow I want to respond to two comments directed at me, and then I am going to haul down my flag.
I just hope that in my life time I don’t have to live through a period like the late 1930s because of the actions of politicians (and lets be honest we the electorate) today.
You’ve made some very good points here admin.
X, what do you mean haul down your flag? Does that mean we won’t see you around anymore it’ll be sad to see you disappear. As for not living through a period like the great depression who knows but I suppose it depends how old you are I know I’m pretty much screwed as I’m probably the youngest person on here.
I’d suggest that with Liam Fox calling for a retention of generic capability accross land, sea & air it was very difficult to do anything other than salami slice!
Euan I was on about frantic re-armament to save civilization.
Ahhh! yeah sorry that makes sense the great depression was the early 30′s silly me:(.
At the base of many of my posts is the view in effect that much of this article is spot on. In particular about the essential stupidity of the current review and the forces reaction to it.
The Uk has simply got to cut it’s strategic coat according to it’s financial cloth. Whenever I hear anyone talking about Britain keeping it’s world role I despair and reach for my wallet.
CVF is unfortunatly the poster boy for this. because quite simply in an attempt to put together 2 CBGs that would last about 10 minutes against a US Carrier group, or good 2nd rate Airforce. That can at best Power project a weak Couple of squadrons, If the the F35 ever flies as a Combat aircraft. The admirals are proposing the destruction of the rest of the RN. I know you have said lets not get obsessed with kit, but in the case of the RN the CVF it is strategy / the next 20 years.
1.We should scrap the idea of us as any kind of A world power.
2.We should in effect start again looking at the entire UK force structure.
3. Any one who stands up and says “But the Bwifflesneesshire Rangers fought at Hastings; This was the RN port that Drake sailed from; The RAF saved the nation in 1940; should simply be taken out and shot.
None of those are arguments for doing anything now or in the future .
4. Decide what we can actualy afford to do well or at all.
5. If we cannot afford it then lets stop talking about it. It Is actually weakening us world wide, talking the talk but not walking the walk.
6. Millitary technology is not a strategy, I know Lewis P is not the most poular man on thsi site, but his arguments against using the defence buget as an industrial subsidy are spot on. (In my humble opinion).
7. Hanging on to Challangers/155mm tracked guns/MLRS (in its current form), worse still mothballing them; is daft. The UK will not in any reality be Putting such a force on the ground anywhere independantly in my lifetime.
All of this I know is slighlty off the point but like X im pretty p*ss*d off by all this.
’1.We should scrap the idea of us as any kind of A world power.’
1. We’ve about the 6th highest economy in the world
2. We spend about the 4th most on defence
3. With CVF we would be one of very few countries capable of sustaining a navy 9,000 miles on the other side of the planet
4. We are a member of the Nuke club
5. We have veto power on the UNSC
We are not a superpower, but we are a global power. Now what is the constant wish to belittle ourselves with some of our citizens? Are ‘influence’ & ‘Self interest’ dirty words?
Britain is not a land power, never has been. Which British interests have been served by keeping 10,000 troops in a desert for the past decade?
What have the Japanes and Germans (both big economies), suffered by
1.Spending far less than us on defence?
2.By not having nuclear weapons?
3.By not having a seat on the UNSC?
When we send our carrier, (in the singular as we will only have one available at a time) 9000 miles: -
4.What do we do when it get there?
5.How do we refuel/ rearm it in any intesive combat
6.How do we replace repair lost/ damaged fighters at that distance.
7. Against whom will it fly its plains
2 Carriers will be paper tigers cruising up and down the worlds oceans saying in a slightly whiny tones “Britain counts for something too you know”. Rather like HMS Hood they will look good.
What have we got by having 10,000 soldiers in afghan?
I’ve no idea complete waste of blood and treasure sending them there. So was Iraq.
To make my view clear, I am in support of a large capable RN and in fact in abolishing RAF and slimming down the Army.
If we could have 4 carriers and full escort groups to support them, with ambhib units, then they would be a good idea.
Two are worse than useless, like a two legged horse.
“I hope for more, but expect the SDSR to be a series of vested interests being protected whilst the notion of a balanced capability is consigned to the round filing cabinet and salami slicing will occur left, right and centre. Expect a fudge.”
I realise it is grossly hopeful, but a number of quotes from papers in the last few days leads me to believe that we might end up with a ‘vision’:
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard/article-23886028-david-cameron-rules-out-slash-and-burn-defence-cuts.do
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/defence/8052782/16bn-Future-Rapid-Effects-System-faces-axe-in-defence-cuts.html
The following:
“The Prime Minister is understood to have decided that there will be no reduction in the operational strength of the Army while the fighting in Afghanistan continues.”
“He has also agreed that both of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers will be built and that, instead of implementing widespread and large-scale cuts immediately, a “rolling review” of defence spending will take place over the next two years. Key decisions on the future strength of the Army will also be put off until 2015 — which Mr Cameron has set as the deadline for a British withdrawal from Afghanistan.”
“But The Sunday Telegraph has learnt Sir Bill Jeffrey, the MoD’s permanent secretary and its most senior civil servant, has thrown his support behind the Royal Navy’s £5.2 billion Carrier Strike programme. ”
“Officials have also warned that although the Army has escaped major cuts under in the present round, “they will feel their share of the pain” once Britain pulls out of Afghanistan in 2015.”
There is just hope that the most promising (IMO) of the four possible outcomes i listed here may come true:
http://jedibeeftrix.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/failing-to-fund-your-strategic-vision-%E2%80%93-oh-no-its-happened-again/
“1) Fox wins – Cameron won’t be happy but the Armed Forces survive as a useful force.
2) Cameron wins – Fox gets the sack but the Armed Forces survive as a useful force.
3) Osborne wins – A fudge is sought that will wreck ambitions of sovereign & strategic power projection. *
4) Osborne loses – Sufficient Treasury funding is found to bridge the Afghanistan mission but Fox gets his way.
The first two would be satisfactory, the third would be a tragedy, and the fourth would be ideal, but unless someone backs down we are headed towards the third. The great sorrow is the dishonesty of this squalid political bickering, because if the NSC didn’t want to pay for an “Adaptable” posture they should have just opted publicly for “Vigilant”.”
Of course, i stand fully ready to be proved grossly wrong come the next set of contradictory headlines……
I completely agree that the three services have wrongly been allowed to follow their own agendas without reference to what is in the national interest or even a coordinated defence posture. I don’t agree that Treasury has particularly sought to divide and rule. Rather, on being presented with spending proposals way above defence’s allocated funding and with not much by way of justification, Treasury has merely assumed the role of containing the exuberance by refusing to fund it. In a better place the MoD would sort out their own plan within their allocated budget and not give Treasury any reason to need to interfere. I hope that out of this watershed we can see a restructuring with all equipment procurement and indeed the standing order of battle, being governed by a single body over all three services; sort of the job you imagined the MoD should have done, but apparently doesn’t.
or looked at another way
The government has bottled the opportunity for genuine strategic change and opted for the status quo, deferring tough decisions, muddling through and staggering forward without any real connection between grand strategy, vision and execution
FRES has been on its arse for years so announcing it has been cut is like announcing the end of the cold war
Not sure why you couch it in terms of who wins, surely they should all be pulling in the same direction behind a coherent strategic vision, not letting petty party politics get in the way
A pox on all their houses I say
All the Treasury have done is say
You’re not having any more money
If Trident is so important you can pay for it.
The rest has been done by our three wounderful services fighting “like ferrets in a sack”.
Quite how the Army think there going to get to places like afghan, and get suplied when they get there, without a strong navy leaves me bemused, but there you go.
“Not sure why you couch it in terms of who wins, surely they should all be pulling in the same direction behind a coherent strategic vision, not letting petty party politics get in the way”
That pre-supposes that there is only one sensible outcome, and to quote you own words:
“The battle between the COIN and Maritime approach has been at the core of headlines and discussion about the SDSR, whether from august institutions like Chatham House and RUSI or less august environs like the blogosphere”
I have always believed the financial impact of any SDSR/FDR would be choice of maritime or land [if] we intend to retain any kind of strategic effect with what remains.
Once A-stan is over the Army (unless something really serious happens) because yesterday’s man for at least a decade as no PM would dare or even attempt to take the UK into another state-building/COIN conflict. We only need an army if we want to fiddle in other state’s affairs. One of the strategies mentioned on these very pages is that of defence co-operation between states and only funding those capabilities of which we are world class. Perhaps we need to scrap the army as well as the RAF? Just sayin’…….
To be honest all this talk of platforms is futile. We should be looking or campaigning to give those platforms we have the weapons they were fitted for but not with. I think a T45 with Phalanx and Harpoon is better than T26 (C1, C2, whatever) on a computer screen somewhere in the BAE empire’s design officers.
I know I am going to regret putting my head above the parapet, but can someone who is lammenting the perceived absence of the ‘strategic’ bit out of the SDSR perhaps describe what analysis they think should be happening and what different result that might lead to.
Richard W
Thats more like it. first SDR can only look and medium term, in my view no more that 20-30 years ahead at most.
That is the lifetime of most equipment, and the sort of time it might take any major new threat to emerge. It is also the sort of time scale it would take to build a new/ rebuild and old lost capability from scratch; e.g. conventional carriers, large scale airdrop, etc should such a threat requiring such a response emerge.
Beyond that we are guessing.
MY head stuck firmly outside the trench, here goes: -
Ask following questions: -
1) How much canwe/do we want to afford
2) Given that recource what do we actually want to do.
3) what are armed forces for
My first suggestion is that they should be to protect borders of state. Current and medium term is that could be done by a reasonable numerous well armed gendarmarie and a coast/air guard. With a few specialist anti terror/ bomb squad units.
My second is that they should be able to intevene abroad in the world to do hostage rescue, lebanon style “Get our people out of there”/ Seirra Leon missions. So marine / para style unit combined brigade strength with some amphib capacity, SOME aircover. So Juan Carlos type ships. With High end escorts, say 4 enough to have two ready at any time.
Third Worl police anti drug/ pracy style opperations “Keeping the british end up” Large Long range OPV, (see ealier posts about commercial based options) how about a well armed Bay class (sort of super Absalon). Can help out int he aboves tyle ops. We could have a couple of dozen for the cost of the Type 45′s
Third strategic Nuclear deterrent
Beyond that the worlds your Lobster How much do you want to pay for what? That is the strategic question. Do we as country want to have ambitions to be a “World Power” if so then you are into propwer carrier groups large scale well armed expiditionary forces. heavy arnmor so we can figth “side by side” with the US etc.
My own view is that time has come and gone the Americans know it the world knows it. We need to learn it.
Indeed the us might find that having us about the worlds oceans, doing all the above is more uselfull to them that an ally whose pretentions they have to keep supplying,(the borrowers).
Just some thoughts
The best place to tackle the drugs trade is to attack the fields of poppies and cocoa leaf. A job in the future for UAVs (cheap, low risk, high endurance.)
“I know I am going to regret putting my head above the parapet, but can someone who is lammenting the perceived absence of the ‘strategic’ bit out of the SDSR perhaps describe what analysis they think should be happening and what different result that might lead to.”
Consider all of Britain’s capabilities, including the links that allow sub-capabilities to reinforce larger capabilities, then attempt to surgically remove 20% of that capability whilst attempting to preserve capabilities that meet the following objectives:
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/fdr6.pdf
1. autonomous obligations (national defence)
2. contributory obligations (collective defence)
3. autonomous elective warfare (national interest)
4. contributory elective warfare (status & influence)
under a maritime doctrine the following characterisation might hold true:
autonomous elective warfare (medium scale)
contributory elective warfare (small scale)
under a continental doctrine the following characterisation might hold true:
autonomous elective warfare (small scale)
contributory elective warfare (large scale)
Having assessed the scale and manner of the ‘cost’ of your capability, you should then check whether your electorate can stomach that cost.