In an era of ‘shock and awe’ warfare where a deadly cocktail of sophisticated combat aircraft and smart munitions can deliver unprecedented destructive firepower, any debate about military small arms calibres may seem redundant. However, recent asymmetric campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan show that collateral damage seriously impedes efforts to win the hearts and minds of the local population, something that has proved essential to the achievement of wider military and political goals. This not only mitigates against the indiscriminate use of area weapons, but reasserts the importance of the humble infantry soldier equipped with small arms capable of neutralising enemy threats with surgical precision. The need to select the optimum mix of weapons and ammunition has understandably re-ignited interest in small arms calibres.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan also represent the first sustained combat use of the NATO 5.56 mm (SS109 / M855) round selected in 1979. Previously, this calibre had only seen service in Vietnam where most engagements took place at short ranges and seldom beyond 200 metres. This calibre was controversial choice at the time and despite a series of upgrades remains so today.
The thinking behind 5.56 mm ammunition is simple and compelling: the more rounds a soldier has, the greater his chance of hitting a target. With this in mind, the USA developed a round that would be smaller and lighter than the existing NATO 7.62 mm cartridge. The new calibre utilised a very small bullet (4 grams) fired at very high velocity (940 meters per second). To compensate for low mass, lethality was dependent on the cavitation effect of the bullet, i.e. the size of the hole created as it passes through a target. The original 5.56 mm round, the US M193, was designed to become unstable upon impact. This meant that it would tumble after hitting a target to create a much larger wound track and thus inflicting increased damage. It was a highly innovative concept which allowed soldiers to carry significantly more rounds for a given weight of ammunition.
When NATO adopted 5.56 mm, reservations about performance were overcome by redesigning the bullet to offer better penetration against armoured plate. This was achieved through greater stabilisation and the addition of a steel core. NATO testing showed that the new SS109/ M855 round could defeat a steel helmet at 500 metres.
It seems hard to believe, but NATO 5.56 mm ammunition did not receive a proper baptism of fire until 14 years after it was adopted. This happened during the US ‘Blackhawk down’ incident in Mogadishu in 1993. US soldiers reported that it had often taken multiple hits to incapacitate a single enemy combatant. British forces may have experienced the same problems during an equally brief but intense skirmish in Sierra Leone during 2000, but in both instances there simply wasn’t sufficient data to draw any conclusions.
However, since military operations began in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2002, a stream of negative feedback concerning 5.56 mm ammunition’s effectiveness has reached the public domain. Much criticism is due to the US Army’s adoption of the short-barrel M4A1 carbine, which has a 14.’5” barrel versus 20” of the standard M16A4 rifle; (a shorter barrel is likely to reduce the ballistic performance of any ammunition). Then, in 2007, operational reports from British troops serving in Afghanistan, supported by the UK MoD’s own analysis, suggested that 5.56 mm ammunition performance was also a problem for British soldiers. Then a secret German report, made public in 2009, showed that the Bundeswehr had experienced the same issues in Afghanistan. Problems with 5.56 mm ammunition fall into four categories:
1. Lack of effective range. More than 50% of infantry engagements in Afghanistan take place at ranges above 300 meters. When 5.56 mm ammunition was adopted, it was believed that 90% of combat engagements would take place under 300 meters. It frequently results in situations where ISAF troops cannot return fire when engaged by enemy snipers. 5.56 mm ammunition is meant to be effective at 500 metres, but combat feedback suggests that this is not the case.
2. Inconsistent lethality. There have been instances where enemy combatants have not been neutralised by 5.56 mm bullets, sometimes despite receiving multiple hits. This has happened at longer ranges, but also, surprisingly, at shorter ranges.
3. Poor barrier penetration. In certain situations, 5.56 mm ammunition has been defeated or deflected by barriers obscuring a target, including car windows, car doors, light masonry and woodwork. Even when a 5.56 mm succeeds in penetrating an intermediate barrier, its energy may be depleted so that lethality is compromised.
4. Inadequate suppressive effect. The UK MoD’s own analysis suggests that insurgent forces are not suppressed by 5.56 mm ammunition, whereas larger calibres have a more notable psychological effect.
Independent testing by US ballistic experts using gelatine blocks to simulate human tissue was conducted to examine lethality concerns. The results showed that NATO 5.56 mm ammunition does not yaw consistently. Sometimes, the bullet will travel straight through a target, like a hypodermic syringe, making an extended hole, but inflicting limited damage and failing to incapacitate. This is consistent with UK reports of malnourished Taliban insurgents running away despite being shot with several 5.56 mm rounds.
The UK MoD responded to criticism in late 2009 by publicly stating that it was entirely satisfied with the performance of Radway Green’s L2A2 version of the NATO standard SS109 5.56 x 45 mm round. Since that time, there have been a number of interesting developments which suggest that the above concerns are more than justified.
The US Army has now fielded an improved 5.56 mm round, the M855A1 EPR cartridge, while the US Marine Corps has developed its own improved ammunition, the Mk 318 SOST MOD 0 round. Both rounds provide American troops with better terminal effectiveness and barrier penetration at all combat ranges. With greater length and mass, they incorporate what is effectively an open tip bullet design enabling them to fragment upon impact. This allows energy to be transferred into the target more reliably, although their legality under the terms of the Hague Convention is questionable.
In August of this year, the UK MoD announced the intention to field its own improved 5.56 mm ammunition, the so-called “Dirty Harry” round, which also offers improved performance thanks to a longer, heavier bullet. Compared to US ammunition, the new UK round does not have an open tip. Although better than the existing L2A2 round and legal, the new round is likely to be less effective than its American counterparts because the bullet does not fragment.
While such improvements are likely to be welcomed by troops on the ground, there is an emerging consensus that 500 meters may be the maximum effective range for all 5.56 mm calibre weapons.
When 5.56 mm ammunition was adopted, future war scenarios envisaged mostly urban combat engagements and limited open country skirmishes, so a maximum range of 300 meters was seen as sufficient. The conflict in Afghanistan has challenged this belief. Vast open planes, high mountains overlooking wide valleys, plus bright sunshine and clear visibility enable small arms engagements to take place at much longer distances. Taliban insurgents already know this and have been using snipers equipped with full-calibre 7.62 mm x 54R ammunition very effectively to engage ISAF troops at ranges well above the capabilities of the latter’s 5.56 mm weapons, typically at 600 meters plus. This suggests the need for small arms that are effective at 1,000 metres.
US, UK and German forces have responded to this threat by readopting 7.62 mm weapons. The previous NATO standard calibre (the 7.62 mm x 51 M80 ball round) was never criticised for a lack of performance. On the contrary, it was only ever supplanted by 5.56 mm x 45 ammunition because the former calibre was felt to be too big, heavy and powerful.
The UK has now acquired a 7.62 mm AR-10 derivative from LMT, the L129A1, as a ‘Sharpshooter’ rifle. Equipped with the latest x6 optical combat gun sights, this weapon represents a significant step-up from the old FN FAL or L1A1 SLR rifle used prior to the adoption of the L85A1 SA80. However, with only 440 in service, they are in scarce supply. The US Army has also reissued a 7.62 mm rifle, the M14, which it used before adopting the M16. Other NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan have also readopted 7.62 mm as well as other large calibre weapons, including .338” sniper rifles and .50” machine guns. Such weapons give troops a significant long-range capability.
The resulting tool box of small arms is often described as a ‘golf bag’ approach to weapon selection. For short range and urban use, troops have 5.56 mm weapons. For long-range, open country engagements, they have 7.62 mm weapons.
Proponents of intermediate calibres believe that the dual calibre fleet of infantry small arms is a flawed approach. What happens when soldiers equipped with 5.56 mm weapons come under fire from an enemy at long-range? And vice-versa, what happens when soldiers with heavy 7.62 mm weapons are involved in close hand-to-hand fighting? Dual calibre solutions may result in situations where only half of a squad / section can bring their weapons to bear.
The procurement cost of multiple weapon types, the extra logistical burden, additional training requirements and increased weight of typical combat loads suggest that a reduction in ammunition types is desirable. British forces are not merely using 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm ammunition, but also 9 mm, 8.59 mm, 12.7 mm and 12-gauge shot gun shells.
The alternative view is that a single type of ammunition that lies somewhere between 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm could be a better option. A calibre of between 6.5 and 7 mm is seen as the ideal compromise. This point of view is often based on the previous UK development of 7 mm ammunition designed for the aborted EM2 rifle project in the early 1950s. UK MoD tests unequivocally showed that that 7 mm was effective at long ranges while weighing less than full-calibre alternatives and with lower recoil. Ballistic experts believe that a modern version of this calibre could even exceed the performance of 7.62mm ammunition at 1,000 meters while weighing 50% less.
The view of many soldiers, especially those with experience of larger calibre ammunition, tends to advocate a wholesale return to 7.62 mm ammunition. The truth is they want a round that is combat proven and which offers the best possible chance of rapidly incapacitating an enemy. The rule of thumb is: the larger the calibre, the more certain the terminal effectiveness. However, any bullet has to hit a target before it can be effective.
The rationale for the adoption of 5.56 mm ammunition was increased hit probability. Few would disagree with the statement that a hit with a small calibre round is always better than a miss with a larger calibre round. The problem with larger calibre rounds is that they have much greater recoil. This can cause shooter discomfort and limit shooting effectiveness. There’s no point in having a large round if you can’t hit the target with it. Perhaps the most important factor in favour of a small calibre is that troops can carry 200 rounds of 5.56 mm ammunition versus only 100 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition.
To be certain of rapidly incapacitating a target, any bullet (5.56 mm or 7.62 mm) needs to hit the central nervous system (CNS). That means it must strike the head or upper torso, which represents a small and narrow target area. This makes shot placement very important; something that most NATO armies’ training emphasises. With the adoption of optical combat gun sights, marksmanship standards have improved so that more experienced shooters can reliably hit the enemy in the desired spot. While soldiers using 7.62 mm weapons can also shoot more accurately than when they had iron sights, the ease with which soldiers can be trained to shoot accurately with low-recoil ammunition tends to favour 5.56 mm weapons over 7.62 mm weapons.
Perhaps the reason why many soldiers nevertheless prefer 7.62 mm ammunition is because of what it does if it fails to hit the CNS: it makes a much larger hole that is likely to cause rapid incapacitation if not death through catastrophic blood loss. In contrast, if 5.56 mm ammunition fails to hit the CNS, it may not create such a large hole or reliably incapacitate. In many combat situations, stress may prevent the kind of accurate shooting achieved so easily on the range back at barracks.
So does a small calibre give you a better chance of hitting a vital spot or does a larger calibre make up for it in case you don’t? The arguments that favour one calibre over the other are compelling. It is hard to choose which is the right one.
It could be said that neither calibre is ideal. 7.62 mm may be too large given its weight, recoil and energy. The bullet is effective well beyond 1,000 metres, with few soldiers possessing the shooting ability to hit targets at that distance. Conversely, 5.56 mm may be too small, because of range and lethality issues.
Quite possibly, the latest versions of 5.56 mm ammunition may fix performance concerns, but even if this calibre is now lethal at to 500 metres, NATO troops in Afghanistan still need a long-range capability to 1,000 metres. A round smaller than 7.62 mm (e.g. 7 mm) could be made lighter and with less recoil without compromising range or lethality requirements. Similarly, a round larger than 5.56 mm (e.g. 6.5 mm) could also have greater range and more consistent lethality without imposing a significant weight and recoil burden on troops using it.
Those who advocate the ‘golf bag’ approach to fielding multiple calibres argue that an intermediate round has all the disadvantages of both large and small calibre ammunition. The author’s view is that, whether a dual or single calibre solution is preferred, 5.56 mm may simply be too small to achieve consistent results against human targets.
What also makes the small arms debate increasingly relevant is that many UK units are firing more than a million rounds of ammunition per month. The wear and tear on the current fleet of weapons is intense. If the current tempo of operations continues, then the anticipated replacement date for SA80 of 2020 may need to be bought forward. Given long and drawn out procurement timetables, the MoD is already starting to think what should replace the SA80 family. This makes now a good time to reopen the calibre discussion.
Concerns about ammunition performance are unrelated to the previous criticism of SA80. The story surrounding its conception, development, deployment and failure is an object lesson in how not to procure a weapon system. However, after hundreds of millions of pounds of additional expenditure, the latest versions of SA80, the L85A2 and L85A3, are at least reliable and accurate. Unfortunately, the only accolade that can be attached to this weapon is that it is the world’s heaviest assault rifle. As good as it may now be, there are many newer, better-designed systems that totally outclass it.
One key future design requirement is the need to reduce infantry loads. This tends to favour the retention of small calibre weapons rather than adopting new larger calibre ones. The US Army is already looking at future developments. One particular new system that is attracting interest is the Lightweight Small Arms Technology (LSAT) program. This is centred around case-telescoped and caseless ammunition prototypes that offer between 40%-50% weight reduction versus existing 5.56 mm cartridges. The technology is calibre neutral so it would be easy to change to a larger calibre if required. The increased complexity of LSAT technology means that it needs a considerable amount of further testing before it becomes a proven battle-worthy technology. That said, it offers a unique opportunity to select the ideal calibre.
Other new developments include more powerful propellants and lightweight steel and aluminium cartridge cases. These could be lower cost, lower risk options compared to LSAT while saving the same amount of weight.
The most critical factor affecting future weapon and ammunition choices is not user requirements but the politics of change. It is unlikely that any NATO member would independently select a new calibre without endorsement from other allies, especially the USA. However, what the USA decides to do is likely to influence the rest of its allies. It should be noted that the USA unilaterally adopted 7.62 mm and 5.56 mm calibres, effectively forcing the rest of NATO to do the same.
In seeking to field new infantry small arms, the US DoD recently announced that, it would evaluate calibres other than 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm. These include 6.5 mm, 6.8 mm and 7 mm. Given that the USA previously developed two very good intermediate calibre prototypes, the .276 Peterson in the 1930s and the 6 mm SAWS rounds in the 1970s, it could be a case of third time lucky for the USA and NATO.
In summary, many NATO armies have bigger fish to fry than reviewing small arms choices. More helicopters and FRES Utility are certainly a greater priority at this time than any SA80 replacement. So, the most likely scenario is the retention of both 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm weapons. However, if China, Russia or Iran were to adopt an intermediate calibre, this might well be the catalyst for change that is needed to overcome an uneasy status quo.
The 5.56 received its “baptism of fire” during the Vietnam war, where the AR-15/M-16 was first fielded under combat conditions (alongside the 7.62mm M-14). The heavy semi-auto M-14 was deemed too heavy (as was the comparable FN FAL) for jungle ops and although the early M-16s suffered from various teething problems, the .223/5.56mm popularity grew mostly because of it’s light weight and short rifle/carbine chassis.
Anything out of range of the 5.56mm was to be dealt with by 7.62mm machine gunners and platoon marksmen or snipers. Or so the theory went anyway.
Having carried both the FN FAL 7.62mm in my younger years and C-7 (M-16) 5.56mm *and* being lucky enough to have fired both 6.5mm and 6.8mm SPC (on a range only for evalutaion), I have to say the latter is ideal.
Ballistics for the 6.8 SPC are roughly the same as a light version of the ubiquitous .308/7.62 yet you don’t need a heavy rifle chassis to absorb the recoil and stresses. Replacement uppers for M-16 style weapons are available off the shelf (via Barrett, Colt, H&K) so in theory it should be easy-peasy to re-chamber.
But of course, in defense, things are never easy.
Just FYI, Holland uses a heavy 5.56mm for their newly modified C-7/SRIM and .338 AW for platoon marksmen to deal with +300m ranges.
Marcasse,
The M193 5.56 mm round was used in the Vietnam. The NATO SS109 / M855 5.56 mm round was not fielded until the 1980s. It was the NATO 5.56 mm round that was not battle tested until the 1990s. I apologise for not making this clearer.
The 6.8 mm Remington SPC fixes all lethality issues with 5.56 mm. You’re right, it is like a lower-powered 7.62 mm round. The concern is that the 6.8 mm round has the same lack of range as 5.56 mm. Its maximum range is 300-500 metres depending on barrel length of the weapon used to fire it. Now that the USA has produced the improved M855A1 round, the 6.8 mm round is all but dead in terms of US military adoption.
The 6.5 mm Grendel is an excellent round. It is effective at 1,000 metres, but short range lethality is apparently not as good as the 6.8 mm. It needs further development. But it is definitely the basis of an improved NATO round.
I think that both the 6.5 Grendel and 6.8 SPC rounds are compromised by being designed to fit an AR-15 action / mag well and a better solution would be to either resurect the .280 british round and design a gun from the ground up or stick with the dual 5.56 / 7.62 NATO approach until new technologies such as cased telescopic mature. The problem with the latter idea is that the record of experimental cartridge programs has been one of dismal failure.
A new bullpup with ambidextrous ejection would be the best idea since it’s shorter than a conventional rifle and the balance is far less upset when you hang a grenade launcher under the barrel.
To my (uninformed) mind, Golf bag is the best approach.
It can still be a standardised golf bag, but golf bag it must remain.
Are two rounds enough?
Well as the author says, we dont have two rounds at the moment anyway.
We have 12.7mm at the high end,
7.62 at the mid high
5.56 at the mid low
4.4 at the low?
We already have belt fed machine guns at the lower mid level, and sniper rifles at the highest.
Just formalise what already exists
Pistol, PDW and Carbines can be chambered in low
Carbines, Standard Rifles and “Para” Machine guns can be chambered in 5.56
Standard Rifles, General Machine Guns and DMW can be chambered in 7.62
Heavy Machine Guns and Sniper Rifles can be chambered in 12.7
Make as many componants “common” as possible.
I relise its not very “Standard”, but your expoecting a single weapon to be effective at 1-1000m, thats like expecting a mortar to be effective from 100m to 100km at one calibre.
Theres no reson we cant re-engineer a 7.62 round to be a caseless telescoping round. (Is there?)
Obviously, if a full platoon tramps around the Afgfhan plains with PDW’s, they’re going to be in trouble, but I hope your average paras are more capable than that.
Monty – good point.
On the “Golf Bag” principle, that kind of already exists, if one counts all platoon and company (Coy) weapons.
Depending on Coy type of course, but a Coy usually has 60-81mm mortars, 40mm (automatic) grenade lauchers and (dis)mounted .50cal HMGs for longer ranged, suppressive fire.
And that’s not counting any AIFVs and MBTs that may be supporting.
Looking at this whole picture, the 5.56mm would be sufficient – even if short ranged and lacking ‘stopping power’. Here light weight trumps lethality.
Unfortunately, Afghanistan has turned into a light infantry “COIN” war, where small dispersed units lack the support of their organic Coy/Bn weapon support, and in general have to make due with their own 5.56 rifles and SAW/LMGs.
So I guess the question is this; is COIN going to be the norm, and do we need to “upgun” the infantryman because of that, or will combined arms return and is an improved 5.56mm cartridge sufficient?
Marcase
But COIN in a city is very different to COIN in the countryside.
Speaking with all the certanty and authority of one who’s millitary expernce consists of one druken paintballing session….I
I would question whether the Golf bag analogy works.
1) It must really complicate logistics
2) I doubt if a 7.62mm is actally useless at short range (maybe more cumbersome and less good = more likley given the other guy is as well trained likely to get you killed; but actually useless?)
3) whereas 5.56 is actually apparently ignored at long ranges by the Taliban.
4) The original 5.56 v 7.62 tests done by the US were pretty definitive about close range combat, but they were M14 v M16, how would a modern bullpup 7.62 (say KalTec)perform? it would not break the bank to find out by repeating those tests.
5) Golf bag asumes you have the luxury of time and space to select your weapons, combat I am told is a lot more chaotic and results in “fire everything you’ve got at the guy who is fireing at you”. Eg use of Milan as an anti bunker weapon in Falklands. (Apparantly causing horror in the treasury at the cost per weapon fired).
6)Golf bag assumes you can supply all these weapons in the field and resuply the ammo – at least part of the problem in Afghan.
7) Body armour will soon take big leap forward with non-newtonian fluids, and carbon nano tubes likely to be comming to a battlefield ner you in the next 5 years.
Even 7.62 will struggle with that.
Whereas A Williams arguments in favour of 6.5 Grendal seem very persuasive; I am very suspicious of wizzbang new gun technologies, since I was a kid Caseless/folded/rocket propelled new bullets were going to replace conventional rounds.
I was going to write a piece on this, except just about section, platoon, company level small arms, not the calibers per se.
Admin – you missed 1 point about the SS109 – it was not designed to kill out right. I was designed for the cold war, for full out war against the Warsaw pact. As such, and because it is well known that troops in trained armies fight “for each other”, the aim was a round that would wound, thus actually taking three men out of the immediate fight, as two guys provide immediate aid / evac to their buddy.
Marcase has a good point – if your going to engage in “wars of choice” in far flung places, are they going to be COIN affairs with restricted ROE for bigger weapons ?
This has a potential large impact, because generally, small arms are for “fighting through” in British Army vernacular, for taking on the enemy at close range. Medium to long range should be the tasking of machine guns and grenade launchers, up to the company mortar etc.
In this respect we have had issues of course. The LSW being magazine fed was found to be too accurate for traditional LMG suppressive roles, and yet the Minimi version we bought was the short barralled “para” version, which is definitely have ballistics issues with the SS109. Hence to the return to the ‘good old’ days of lugging around the 7.62mm GPMG in bipod mounted “light” role (which anyone who has ever carried one will know is a rather laughable label !).
For once the UOR approach is the right one – we have upped the caliber of specialist bolt action sniper rifles, and now procured 7.62mm semi-auto “designated marksman” rifle – although I would like to see these issued on a scale of 2 per platoon HQ section through-out the infantry.
Even better though, would be a nice big purchase of 7.62mm version of the Minimi, with the full length barrel. Let the “armoured” infantry carry 5.56mm Para LSW’s in the back of their Warriors, as they have plenty of “long range” back up in each vehicle.
As for whole sale small arms caliber change, I agree with Admin, we have better things to spend money on.
Jed, check the author of this post, it’s not me, which is why, lets face it, it is pretty good!!
This tweaks my commonality nose a bit. We don’t even have compatibility at a calibre level with link and ball being different I think, plus tracer. Does the new sharpshooter rifle actually use the same ammunition as the GPMG, not sure?
We have too many calibres, we are already massively overloading our infantry so for the argument comes down to weight reduction across a section and logistics commonality. Improving lethality would be a bonus
If they can solve the heat transfer and moisture absorption issues with caseless/plastic cased rounds then I think this is equally worth some limited research
JED
This is not the first forum or the first time I have read or heard the below.
“The view of many soldiers, especially those with experience of larger calibre ammunition, tends to advocate a wholesale return to 7.62 mm ammunition. The truth is they want a round that is combat proven and which offers the best possible chance of rapidly incapacitating an enemy”.
As an armchair warrior that sounds pretty persuasive to me.
“Medium to long range should be the tasking of machine guns and grenade launchers, up to the company mortar etc.”
This asumes these are available, it appears in Afghan they are sometimes not.
Given the argument that the guns are wearing out any way the cash will have to be spent on replacing them- (it won’t be a lot in real terms)why not adress the issue of calibre at the same time?
Whilst the L85 may be the heaviest standard issue rifle in the world, it also happens to be the most accurate. The two things are not unrelated and as the article points out, accuracy is necessary.
…Although saying that it does get a little tiring holding an L85 for long periods.
Anyway, as the article points out the USA will really decide what all of NATO will do here, so there really any point to the UK discussing this? Would we really go for a different calibre (unless we managed to get most of our European allies on board)?
Let me be lazy and just drop links to my earlier writings on the topic. The small arms calibre debate is as old and as tiring as “wheels vs. tracks” or “which is the best MBT?”.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2010/06/small-arms-calibre-discusson-tony.html
http://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2009/01/08/a-summary-of-infantry-rifle-caliber-discussions-and-relevant-wound-ballistics/
One of the good things about having an old blog is that sometimes you can simply lazily point at an old blog post (or four) instead of writing lengthy responses.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/07/infantry-combat-ranges.html
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/01/modern-small-arms-calibers.html
(blog didn’t allow for four links in one comment -.-)
The Russians and Chinese re-chambered to different calibers as well. The Russian 5.45×39 is well-known by now, the Chinese 5.8mm not so much.
(Shamelessly cut & pasted from StrategyPage);
“The QBZ-95 is unusual in several respects. It’s a Bullpup design, meaning the 30 round magazine is behind the trigger and overall length is 30 inches (compared to 34.2 inches for the AK-47 and 38.8 inches for the M-16).
But even more unusual is the cartridge, it’s a 5.8mm round developed in China. The Chinese experimented a lot during the 1980s, with new cartridges of different calibers (from 5.5mm to 6mm) and settled on the 5.8mm round in 1989.
The QBZ-95 weighs 8.3 pounds loaded. There is a light machine-gun version that uses a longer barrel and a drum magazine. This weapon weighs 11 pounds loaded, but is awkward to use because of the heavy ammo drum sitting behind the trigger. There is also a “carbine” version with a shorter barrel.
The QBZ-95 is also a complicated piece of machinery, with, as some users have reported, “too many parts” (especially compared to the AK-47.) The 30 round magazine, sitting behind the trigger, makes it awkward to fire from the prone position.
The new 5.8mm cartridge does not appear to be much more effective than the short 7.62mm used in the AK-47, or the 5.56 round used in the M-16.”
DominicJ – Indeed it is.
During the Balkans, (counter-)sniper teams still required a good heavy round – even though they weren’t allowed to use (counter) sniper fire.
And during the Iraqi MOUTs the US fielded hundreds of 7.62mm M-14 EBRs to supplement the M-16 on ops both inside and outside of cities.
It’s perhaps noteworthy that the US Army favors the M-4 carbine, while the US Marines prefer the full-length, long barrel M-16A4.
Which is an interesting difference.
Not sure if it was clear
When I say “Golf Bag” I mean a company base should have a selection of weapons, and the platoon about to patrol should pick a selection of appropriate weapons.
A few points about comments made:
Jed,
This old chestnut, about 5.56 mm being designed to wound rather than kill is very interesting. As you can imagine, I did my homework as carefully as I could before putting finger to keyboard. I can find no mention in any NATO or MoD reference that wounding to the enemy instead of killing him to tie up additional manpower required to evacuate him from the battlefield was ever part of the official strategy, policy or rationale for adopting a small calibre. Indeed, when 5.56 mm was first mooted as a NATO calibre, the suggestion was that it was as lethal as 7.62 mm due to its propensity to tumble / yaw. So, the wounding theory is probably no more than an urban myth that 5.56 mm apologists fall back on!
Ixion,
Excellent point about new body armour technology. This is likely to be a major factor driving choice of next generation calibres and weapons. A 7.62 mm round manufactured with same components as a NATO 5.56 mm cartridge, i.e. a bullet with a steel core, should have no problems penetrating any level of armour that affords general mobility to the wearer! This is therefore another factor that favours a larger calibre versus a small one.
Sven Ortmann,
Yes, this subject is well-worn. But since we need to save money and to save weight on the battlefield, reviewing the calibres we use now and are likely to use in future scenarios could provide a useful means of reducing combat loads while increasing effectiveness of troops on the ground. Given that everything is up for grabs in the SDR, I felt that this topic merited revisiting.
A few other minor points
7.62 mm ammunition is very effective at short ranges – if it hits the target. However, it is very difficult to control 7.62 mm weapons in the shoulder when firing automatic bursts. This is why the old SLR (L1A1 FN FAL) did not have an automatic capability in British service and why this calibre is less good for urban CQB. Issues with 5.56 mm short range lethality explain why the UK recently acquired combat shotguns.
The 7.62 mm rounds fired by the GPMG is the same as that fired by L129A1 Sharpshooter rifle: M80 NATO ball ammunition.
There is a current UK solicitation for a lightweight 7.62 mm machine gun. The US M60E4 and Belgain 7.62 mm Minimi are both in contention. Heckler & Koch has just released a brand new lightweight 7.62 MM GPMG, the HK121.
Finally, the Chinese 5.8 mm round has performance issues as does their bullpup assault rifle. They have recently developed a new AK-clone that fires 5.8 mm instead. The bullpup design may be discontinued. As an ex-UK infantry officer with experience of all the weapons discussed, I am not a fan of bullpups. The ergonomics are far less intuitive and certainly with the L85A2, the weight is too far back. I find I can shoot just as accurately with an HK416 with a 16″ barrel as i can with an SA80 with a 20″ barrel.
We have to ask ourselves what will give the greatest improvement in mission effectiveness for a given change in a soldier’s carried weight, cost and logistics.
Staying with a lighter round produces a lighter load for a given number of rounds, which improves the mobility of overloaded troops. Or it allows you to spend kgs on better body armor or improved optics, radios or other gear.
Can your average infantryman even be trained to consistently hit a target with partial cover under combat conditions with a rifle at 3-500m, regardless of caliber?
B Smitty
The three PDW’s to one support fires per section route is a pretty reasonable setup in a lot of situations.
I believe Jed was a big proponant of it.
A 40mm Grenade Launcher / HMG / Sniper Rifle beats a gaggle of AK at 800m and a gaggle of P90′s beats a gaggle of AK at 20m
Nobody going to comment on bullet design then? Um. FMJ vs hollow point. I just can’t see any mention of the USMC’s new SOST round in the article. Sorry if its there. A larger calibre isn’t always the answer to lethality.
Further it is hard enough to make considered shots at range, never mind when the “targets” are firing back. The thinking that brought about the adoption of 5.56mm is that infantry fire is about suppression to fix the enemy in position so that something larger can “stonk” (lovely word that) them.
Personally I think 6.8SPC is the way to go. Spotting who is shooting at you beyond 300mtrs is hard enough. The majority don’t need a round that can reach past that.
Without perusing the previous comments. I believe it has been proven that the Remington 6.8 SPR, which itself was developed from the British round designed for the EM2, has the required range and lethality. I also believe that this round has also been further developed to a higher standard at about 6.75.
The only reason that I can think of for not adopting this round is that the Yanks are looking at some form of the old HK research into rounds that are encased in propellant (in the HK case they were looking at a square profile propellant charge …. I think!). Anyway this, to me, appears to be the reason for some delay. No doubt when they have decided the rest of us will follow as the article suggests!!
In short I have to agree with the (my) perceived thrust of the article.
I am in favour of a new – or the resurection of an old – intermediate round rather than the ‘golf bag’ approach if only on the grounds of cost! A decent 7mm round firing a well-designed bullet can replace 7.62 and 5.56 as the basic round for the entire infantry squad ie assault rifle and LMG (for which you want a good high capacity drum mag. No LMG should be belt fed).
As for the US forcing whatever they want on NATO, I’m not so sure. Both the UK and France will be looking for a new AR soon. If they were to adopt something unilaterally I would bet three or even four english pounds that most of europe would follow suit. The US has ignored the NATO standard in the past. Let them do so again if they choose.
“Can your average infantryman even be trained to consistently hit a target with partial cover under combat conditions with a rifle at 3-500m, regardless of caliber?”
Yes. It’s been done in the past (see BEF, 1914) but it would require VAST expenditure in ammunition and time to achieve. The modern way is to introduce technology to achieve an increase in hit probability without a corresponding increase in training time (see US ACR program and the H&K G11)
And just for fun;
DominicJ said, “The three PDW’s to one support fires per section route is a pretty reasonable setup in a lot of situations.”
Insert the obligatory references to Mr. Owen’s papers on the topic.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Owen,_UK_Platoon_Weapons.pdf
http://www.asianmilitaryreview.com/upload/200712031747321.pdf
Pete said “Yes. It’s been done in the past (see BEF, 1914) but it would require VAST expenditure in ammunition and time to achieve. The modern way is to introduce technology to achieve an increase in hit probability without a corresponding increase in training time (see US ACR program and the H&K G11)”
The H&K G11 was a true Star Wars rifle. I thought its clever rotating feed mechanism was an amazing piece of engineering.
Thinking allowed I think there would be trouble with using the BEF, well WW1, as a comparison is the use of bolt action weapons vs semi/full automatic…..Um. I going to cogitate on that a bit longer because I can’t articulate what I am thinking.
Another thought, question; what does the average Taliban fighter carry as his long arm?
that never worries me x
Well it should, if as you say “More than 50% of infantry engagements in Afghanistan take place at ranges above 300 meters.” We want what they got…….
ha ha, comments crossing in the night
I was referring to your comment about not wanting to write anything because your couldn’t articulate!!
Would it be feasible to scale down to small arms calibres the howitzer concept of variable propellant charge ammunition? The propellant (using H&K G11/ Dynamit Nobel technology) would be kept separate from the bullets in a clip together two-part magazine and a measured number of propellant blocks would be inserted into the chamber according to the distance or type of target selected.
X, I don’t think we necessarily want what they have.
If engagements are primarily ambushes, where the enemy has the terrain and numeric advantage, they can more effectively employ sniper rifles, MGs and RPGs.
We need to figure out how to counter this, not emulate it, IMHO.
I admit admin to actually being a bit naughty; I was trying to draw you out on the 300m plus figure.
This is surely connected with the Taliban technique of using a HMG to shoot and scoot? This can only be countered with more HMG at platoon level, which isn’t a realistic proposition. As I said the further away the attacker the less likely you to pick them out; once the dust has settled the Taliban would have gone to ground.
Also I know full well what the Taliban carry more often than not. The odd old Enfield 303 (if the ammunition is loaded correctly) and the occasional HK G1 are hardly grounds for a wholesale re-equipping. These two are the only common occurring infantry weapons that the Taliban carry. The AK47 and AK74 carried by the majority suffer similar “problems” to the 5.56mm.
B Smitty said “X, I don’t think we necessarily want what they have.”
See below.
I said “These two are the only common occurring infantry weapons that the Taliban carry.”
I meant to say “These two are the only common occurring infantry weapons that the Taliban carry that can out range the 5.56mm”
I am always a bit suspicious about wonder technology.
Some of the proponents/manufacturers claims are doubtless exagerated, however some combinations of
1)Carbon nano tubes: – (Fibres could have 20 times tensile strength of best available Kevlar)
2)Non newtonian fluids: – Custard that sets to incompresable solid when subject to shock)
3)Kolsterised foils: – (Steel 4 times harder than best available steel armour)
4)Carbon Nano powders: -(Combined with fibres already being tested vastly improves shock absorbtion of soft armour).
Are really going to happen.
When they do even 7,62 AP will struggle against much lighter and more flexible body armour than we are using at the moment.
This is not just about hitting people with aimed shots at 600 metres. Its about killing him stone dead at 300, and as a complete flip side of the coin doing the same to thin taliban who are also it appears shrugging off 5.56.
Can ask some questions of the more experienced on this sight.
As far as hitting people at 6-800 mtres.
With modern simulators etc would it really be that expensive?
If each soldier in the unit could do this, would they not have to lug as many 40mm/GPM /sniper rifles etc and the other favoured long range weapons.
IXION said, “…doing the same to thin taliban who are also it appears shrugging off 5.56.”
Beware anecdote evidence.
The Talaiban are using anything they can get their hands on, including a number of very old but still entirely serviceable Lee-Enfield SMLEs. That said, they have two weapons of choice:
- 7.62 mm x 54R Dragunov Sniper Rifle – a very accurate assault rifle
- 7.62 mm x %$R PKM machine gun – a lightweight belt fed machine gun
These weapons are effective at 1,000+ and should not be confused with the 7.62 mm x 39 AK47 which uses a shorter version of the 7.62 x 54R but is only effective to 300 metres.
Monty,
“Heckler & Koch has just released a brand new lightweight 7.62 MM GPMG, the HK121.”
With reference to the above point, which you made in a much earlier post. I hope I have got the right weapon. Apparently the new design creates a 1.8 kg weight reduction thanks to its shortened barrel, external flutes and titanium receiver. The managing director of Heckler and Koch is quoted as saying: “This is a significant weight reduction and the cost penalty is minimal.” Apparently the UK MOD is seriously considering it.
I’ve purposely waited until pretty late on in this debate before dropping in with my two pence worth. Not to steal ideas or to take sides, but mainly to weigh up the pro’s and cons. Obviously the argument isn’t going to be settled over night, so I thought I’d drop in a bombshell and see what the general consensus was.
Why can’t we have both? Hear me out.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daewoo_K11
The South Koreans, bless their cotton socks, have designed a multi-calibre modular weapon in the Daewoo K11. Inasmuch that it is a 5.56 mm assault rifle in the general sense of the term, albeit with an over-barrel 20 mm grenade launcher with an integrated ballistics computer in the sight.
Given that the system clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of having two weapons that are fully integrated, as opposed to merely bolted together like the M16/M203 combination, then it should be possible to have a system that has a Daewoo K11 with a 7.62 mm rifle in place of the 20 mm grenade launcher.
The LAW 80 had a lightweight integrated spotting rifle fitted to it, why can’t we do it (metaphorical question of course) with a 5.56 mm assault rifle?
As an aside, the K11 could be an answer to our 300 m+ problems in Afghanistan. If our troops are having trouble hitting the target, then perhaps we should be looking at the targeting systems and not just the round.
BSMITTY
US Armies own tests showing than thin 3rd world types (as contained in the main post), suffer a lot less serious injury (No yawing), than fat westerners!
Tests conducted after the “Blackhawk down” incident brought about by the first complaints from the troops. Complaints that continue to be published regardles of new bullet types being issued.
Maybe not exactly bible scripture, but not exactly anecdote either.
Monty said “7.62 mm x 54R Dragunov Sniper Rifle – a very accurate assault rifle
- 7.62 mm x %$R PKM machine gun – a lightweight belt fed machine gun”
But these are support weapons. What I am on about is what does the “average” Taliban carries. This is like me inferring that every British soldier carries a L1A1 (he would have to a be a big chap) or a L115A3.
Monty said “7.62 mm x 54R Dragunov Sniper Rifle – a very accurate assault rifle
- 7.62 mm x %$R PKM machine gun – a lightweight belt fed machine gun”
But these are support weapons. What I am on about is what does the “average” Taliban carry. This is like me inferring that every British soldier carries a L1A1 (he would have to be a big chap) or a L115A3.
X
i realise that the Dragunov and PKM are support weapons but they are widely used, very simply because they are so effective at longer ranges. Obviously AK47 and AK74 variants are used widely too. TO be honest, I don’t think we know precise details of the enemy ORBAT.
Mike W,
The HK121 seems to be very good. I suspect that it was developed precisely to meet UK and US needs for a lightweight 7.62 mm machine gun. I’ll know more about this next week, but information released so far seems to suggest that it is a larger version of the H&K MG4, which itself ‘borrows’ a lot of ideas from the FN Minimi and improves on them.
Monty – as far as I am aware the Dragunov is certainly not accurate to 1000m+ – it was the Soviet version of what the Yanks now call a “designated Marksmans rifle” – probably 1 shot 1 kill at 600m, and accurate harassing fire out to 800m perhaps.
Ixion – ref: “As far as hitting people at 6-800 mtres.
With modern simulators etc would it really be that expensive?”
Its not that simple. At up to 30m with a Browning Hi-Power I rival a wild west gun slinger, at anything over 100m with either the old SLR or the SA80 with iron sights, I am completely pants
Especially if the Annual Personal Weapons test was done straight after Combat Fitness test …. ! So, back to simulators; my unit was a ten minute drive from an RAF base that had a SAT – Small Arms Trainer. This consists of a large back projected screen, and 4 x SA80, with lasers in the barrels and an action that is operated by compressed air. This means that once you have”fired” 30 shots, the bolt stays open and you have to change magazine. It is a truly superb way of practising, and we were lucky to get frequent access (just about every friday night). Using did improve my shooting.
HOWEVER, if you want average infantry type to kill bad guys out past 200m, never mind 500 to 600, then give him a small light weapon and let him hump belts of 7.62 for his machine gunner and / or extra 40mm medium velocity grenades for one of his squad carrying a Milkor MK32 6 round grenade launcher (or maybe a lighter MetalStorm 3 round one).
Unless we are going to get a sudden “paradigm shifting” advance in small arms technology, talk of exotic or intermediate calibers is in my opinion a waste of time.
AA12 with Frag-12 for everyone… !!
Jed said ” my unit was a ten minute drive from an RAF base that had a SAT – Small Arms Trainer. ”
I take yours was a small unit and the RAF base was a major installation……..
X – ref: “I take yours was a small unit and the RAF base was a major installation”
NO !
My small specalist TA unit was based on a large army base, which is actually home to a Corps. It has on site pistol ranges, and a small exercise area where blanks could be fired.
The RAF base (not an air field) had lost a number of units, was a home for a hodge podge of lodging units, and yet their tiny RAF Regiment contingent had the SAT,
“go figure” as they say on this side of the Atlantic….
There’s also the forthcoming, lighter, M240L version of the MAG 58.
IXION, I’d like to see these definitive studies.
Here’s another article by Mr. Owen,
“True but Irrelevant: Small Arms Performance in Afghanistan”
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/owen_RDS_feb2010.pdf
BSMITTY
V busy now (small matter of earning a living) until friday but will check out and post a link)
The point is not to turn an average infantryman into a marksman but to simplify logistics. This is where the Intermediate cartridge makes sense.
The L85/86 will need to be replaced at some point in the not to distant future so that would be the time to consider a new cartridge, wouldn’t it?
The golf bag approach is fine. It represents a perfectly sensible compromise. But if a fireteam/section had to carry only one type of round?